the conflicts in yemen and u.s. national security

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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

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SSI Monograph

THE CONFLICTS IN YEMENAND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

W. Andrew Terrill

January 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the De-partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publica-

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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I would like to thank Dr. Steven Metz, Mary J. Pelusi, andSarah E. Womer for useful and insightful comments on thismonograph and on earlier drafts. All mistakes in this work offact, omission, interpretation, and speculation are, nevertheless,entirely my own.

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ISBN 1-58487-474-0


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FOREWORD

The political situation within Yemen has catapultedto the top tier of U.S. national security concerns overthe last several years as it has become more directlylinked to both the problem of international terrorismand the need for future stability in the Arabian Pen-insula. On the terrorism front, the December 25, 2009,attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in

Detroit, Michigan, by an individual trained by Yemeniterrorists was a particularly clear warning to the Unit-ed States about the dangers of neglecting this geopo-litically important country. Yet, this near catastrophealso underscored the need for a careful considerationof U.S. policies regarding Yemen. This requirementmay be especially clear when one considers the chain

of events that might have been set off had there beena successful terrorist strike in Detroit in which hun-dreds of Americans were killed. Apart from the hu-man cost of such a tragedy, the U.S. leadership wouldhave been under enormous pressure to respond in away consistent with the level of public outrage associ-ated with the event. Public pressure might well haveexisted for military intervention in Yemen with U.S.

ground combat troops. Such an intervention is some-thing that the present work insists would infuriate vir-tually the entire Yemeni population, regardless of theobjective merits of the U.S. case for the offensive use ofU.S. ground combat forces.

In approaching this analysis, Dr. W. AndrewTerrill quotes then Central Command Commander

General David Petraeus in an April 2009 statement thatthe al-Qaeda threat across the Middle East is weaken-ing except in Yemen. In Yemen, the threat still seems


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to be growing well over a year following this prescientobservation. Additionally, while the terrorism threat

alone requires an intensive U.S. interest in Yemen, itis not the only reason why an understanding of cur-rent Yemeni issues is important for the U.S. nationalinterest. An intermittent insurgency by Zaydi rebelsin northern Yemen and an expanding secessionistmovement in southern Yemen are also serious prob-lems which may have important implications for thewider Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, while theseproblems are straightforward, their solutions are not.Dr. Terrill also points out how deeply distrustful mostYemenis are of any foreign military presence on theirsoil and how quickly clerical leadership in Yemen willcharacterize any U.S. bases in Yemen as colonialism,which the population is required to resist by their re-ligion. The U.S. challenge is therefore to help Yemen

destroy al-Qaeda without deploying large numbersof U.S. troops in that country, while encouraging apeaceful and lasting resolution of the governmentsproblems with the northern Zaydi tribesmen and theSouthern Movement, which calls for an indepen-dent state in the south. All important U.S. policies onYemen will have to be coordinated with Saudi Arabia,which is Yemens largest aid donor and plays a majorrole in Yemens politics.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to of-fer this monograph as a contribution to the nationalsecurity debate on this important subject as our na-tion continues to grapple with a variety of problemsassociated with the future of the Middle East andthe ongoing struggle against al-Qaeda. This analysis

should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leadersand intelligence professionals as they seek to addressthe complicated interplay of factors related to regional

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security issues, ghting terrorism, and the support oflocal allies. This work may also benet those seeking a

greater understanding of long-range issues of MiddleEastern and global security. It is hoped that this workwill be of benet to ofcers of all services, as well asother U.S. Government ofcials involved in militaryand security assistance planning.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic StudiesInstitute (SSI) in October 2001, and is SSIs MiddleEast specialist. Prior to his appointment, he served asa Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the Inter-national Assessments Division of the Lawrence Liver-more National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr.Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S.

Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is aformer faculty member at Old Dominion University inNorfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a varietyof other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S.Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign AreaOfcer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in nu-merous academic journals on topics including nuclear

proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERTSTORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons, and bal-listic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commandooperations. He is also the author of Global SecurityWatch-Jordan(Praeger, 2010). Since 1994, at U.S. StateDepartment invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated inthe Middle Eastern Track 2 talks, which are part of theMiddle East Peace Process. He has also served as a

member of the military and security working group ofthe Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group since its estab-lishment in 2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from Califor-nia State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from theUniversity of California, Riverside, both in PoliticalScience, and a Ph.D. in International Relations fromClaremont Graduate University, Claremont, Califor-

nia.


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SUMMARY

Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is ex-periencing huge political and economic problemsthat can have a direct impact on U.S. interests in theregion. It has a rapidly expanding population with aresource base that is limited and already leaves muchof the current population in poverty. The governmentobtains around a third of its budget revenue from

sales of its limited and declining oil stocks, whichmost economists state will be exhausted by 2017. Ye-men has critical water shortages aggravated by theuse of extensive amounts of water and agriculturalland for production of the shrub qat, which is chewedfor stimulant and other effects but has no nutritionalvalue. All of these problems are especially difcult to

address because the central government has only lim-ited capacity to extend its inuence into tribal areasbeyond the capital and major cities. Adding to thesedifculties, Yemen is also facing a variety of interrelat-ed national security problems that have strained thelimited resources of the government, military, and se-curity forces. In Saada province in Yemens northernmountainous region, there has been an intermittent

rebellion by Houthi tribesmen who accuse the gov-ernment of discrimination and other actions againsttheir Zaydi Shiite religious sect. In southern Yemen,a powerful independence movement has developedwhich is mostly nonviolent but is also deeply angryand increasingly confrontational.

A key country that must be considered in for-

mulating Yemen policy is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh isYemens chief aid donor and often considers itself tohave a special relationship with Yemen that affords


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it an elevated and privileged role in providing exter-nal guidance to Sanaa. Some observers suggest that

Saudi Arabia views this role as so important that chal-lenging Saudi interests in Yemen is sometimes viewedas equally offensive as interfering in Saudi domesticpolitics. Riyadh has become especially sensitive aboutYemen issues in recent years and even intervenedmilitarily on the side of the Yemeni government in themost recent phase of the Houthi war in Saada prov-ince. The Saudis are also deeply involved with Yemenin the struggle against al-Qaeda due in part to a 2009merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of this orga-nization. The merger occurred following the decisionof Saudi al-Qaeda members to ee to Yemen to rebuildtheir battered organization. Saudi Arabias special re-lationship with Yemen can both help and hinder U.S.objectives for that country.

Additionally, Yemens government has waged astruggle against al-Qaeda with vacillating levels of in-tensity since at least 2001 when its leadership chose tocooperate with the United States on counterterrorismconcerns in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,strikes. More recently, Yemen has emerged as one ofthe most important theaters for the struggle against al-Qaeda, as many members of this organization attemptto regroup and reorganize themselves in Yemen aftersuffering crippling setbacks in Saudi Arabia, Paki-stan, and Afghanistan. The loss of Yemen to al-Qaedawould be particularly damaging to Western interestsdue to its strategic location and a population which isexpected to exceed half of that of the entire ArabianPeninsula within the next 20 years. Moreover, al-Qa-

eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), headquarteredin Yemen, appears to be strengthening and showingsigns of transitioning from a terrorist group with lim-ited capabilities to an emerging insurgent movement.

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Yemen is also an especially distrustful and warynation in its relationship with Western nations, and

particularly the United States. Most Yemenis areercely protective of their countrys independencefrom outside inuence, especially from countries thatthey believe do not always have the best interestsof the Arab World in mind. While Yemens govern-ment is coming to understand the dangers it facesfrom al-Qaeda, the struggle against this organizationis not always popular among the Yemeni public, andany large-scale U.S. military presence in the countrycould easily ignite these passions and destabilize theregime. Under such circumstances, it is important tohelp Yemen, but to do so in ways that are not viewedas intrusive or dominating by a population that doesnot always identify with U.S. concerns about interna-tional terrorism. In recent years, U.S. policymakers

have managed to maintain this balance, but the com-plexities of Yemeni domestic politics will continue torequire subtlety and nimbleness in U.S.-Yemeni secu-rity relations.


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THE CONFLICTS IN YEMENAND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

As President, I have made it a priority to strengthenour partnership with the Yemeni governmenttrain-ing and equipping their security forces, sharing intel-ligence, and working with them to strike al-Qaedaterrorists.

President Barack Obama,January 20101

Yemen stands out from its neighbors on the ArabianPeninsula. The inability of the Yemeni government tosecure and exercise control over all of its territory of-fers terrorist and insurgent groups in the region, par-ticularly al-Qaeda, a safe haven from which to plan,organize, and support terrorist operations.

General David Petraeus,April 20092

As soon as the [United States] comes down into ourland and comes to colonize us, jihad is obligatory ac-cording to our religion.

Sheikh Abdul Majeed Zindani,leading Yemeni cleric, January 20103

INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently deeply concernedwith the need to contain and defeat al-Qaeda forces inYemen. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to formu-late a meaningful strategy to meet this objective with-

out carefully considering a variety of other importantfactors which have come to dominate Yemeni politics.These factors include a crippled and declining econo-


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my, as well as recurring problems with national unity.Currently, Yemen faces simmering unrest in the north

that sometimes leads to revolt among Houthi tribes-men and a strong but mostly nonviolent secessionistmovement in the south. Under these conditions, U.S.policy must be informed by a deep understanding ofboth Yemens domestic politics and current Yemenigovernment capacity to enforce its laws and maintaininternal security. U.S. policy formulations must alsobe based on a solid understanding of the constraintsthat inuence Yemens leadership, especially the nu-ances of Yemens relations with its most inuentialneighbor, Saudi Arabia, and the views of the Yemenipublic on both al-Qaeda and U.S. objectives in the re-gion.

The tasks associated with developing and imple-menting effective policy for Yemen are challenging.

Yemen is remote from the United States and has tradi-tionally generated little interest in Washington. Untilrecently, it has seldom been linked to important U.S.national interests. Moreover, Yemeni values and atti-tudes have been formed within a very different typeof society than those of the West. The potential for dis-trust, misunderstanding, and miscommunication istherefore strong, although the importance of the U.S-Yemeni relationship has seldom been greater, due toa variety of factors including the rise of al-Qaeda inthat country. Fortunately, while Yemeni society andpolitics are complex, they are also comprehensible.Moreover, well-informed U.S. planning efforts to helpYemen and ensure stability in the Arabian Peninsulaare clearly possible.

This work hopes to provide an overview of manyof the most important issues that must be consideredwhen addressing Yemen policy, as well as suggesting


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possible approaches to obtaining important U.S. andYemeni goals in the region. It is hoped that the reader

will nd this work useful in understanding and un-tangling many of the complexities of the Yemeni polit-ical, economic, and international situations that touchupon key U.S. and Western interests.

THE YEMENI POLITICAL SYSTEM IN CRISIS

Yemen is a large and strategically important coun-try in the southern Arabian Peninsula bordering Sau-di Arabia, Oman, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Adenwithin the Arabian Sea. It is also the poorest countryin the Arab World, with a population that has beenunrelentingly resistant to signicant central govern-ment involvement in local affairs (except to provideresources). The territory outside of the capital of

Sanaa is difcult for a national authority to controldue to restive, well-armed, and powerful tribes spreadacross a diverse geography, including vast desert ar-eas and extremely rugged mountains. These tribeshave at various points in their history resisted the au-thority of the Ottoman Turks, British military forces inthe south, and various Yemeni governments that theyjudged as being too heavy-handed in their relationswith tribal leaders. Historically, Yemeni tribes havealso been willing to show conditional loyalty to na-tional government authorities that avoid taxing themand that provide them with gifts of money, weapons,and other forms of support. A frequent and sly com-ment on the political culture is that loyalty is rented inYemen rather than bought.

Yemen is currently the only nonmonarchy on theArabian Peninsula, as well as one of that regionsmost heavily populated countries.4 Its population of


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23,500,000 is almost comparable with that of SaudiArabia, and the birth rates of both countries suggest

that Yemen is rapidly becoming the most populouscountry in the Gulf. The Yemeni population is cur-rently growing by around 3.45 percent per year, andis expected to reach 38 million in the next 15 years.5Yemens poverty, political geography, republicanform of government, and large and rapidly expandingpopulation distinguish it from the other states of theArabian Peninsula, including the wealthy, sparsely-populated monarchies. Yemeni society is composedof two major Islamic sects which are variants on thetraditional Sunni and Shiite forms of Islam foundelsewhere. Yemens current president, Ali AbdullahSaleh, is a member of Yemens Shiite Muslim sect,known as Zaydis. The monarchy that his republicanpredecessors overthrew in 1962 was also governed by

a Zaydi imam and his circle. Around a third of Ye-mens population is composed of Zaydis, the dominantgroup in the northern part of the country. Yemensform of Sunni Islam is known as Shafeism. Shafeismand Zaydism share many similarities in doctrine andrituals, and the gap between the sects has narrowedin the last few decades due to state efforts to stresscooperation between sects. Zaydi beliefs and ritualsare usually considered to have much less in commonwith the Twelver Shiism practiced in Iran and Iraqthan with Yemeni Shafeism.

Yemens years as a republic began with a Sep-tember 1962 military coup dtatin what was then theseparate country of North Yemen (the Yemen ArabRepublic [YAR]).6This coups leadership overthrew a

traditional imamate that had ruled the area either in-dependently or under formal Ottoman sovereignty forover 1,000 years.7The new leadership consisted of left-


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ist military ofcers who were heavily inuenced by theArab nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric of Egyp-

tian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. 8

Correspond-ingly, the 1962 change in government (often called arevolution) was strongly supported by the Egyptiangovernment, which viewed the imams ouster in ideo-logical terms, whereby a pro-Egyptian modernizingmilitary elite would replace a reactionary monarchi-cal leader.9The imams ouster also led to a long andbloody civil war between the new government (sup-ported by a large Egyptian expeditionary force) andtribal rebels seeking the restoration of the imamate.10At the height of their involvement in Yemen, Egyptianforces included at least 60,000 troops which made useof chemical warfare to combat tribal-based oppositionto the new government.11Conversely, royalist ghtersreceived substantial military and nancial aid from

Saudi Arabia and made exceptionally good use of thedifcult terrain of the northern Yemeni mountains.This conict lasted almost 8 years and concluded onlyin 1970, although Egyptian forces had withdrawn sev-eral years earlier, following Cairos massive June 1967defeat by Israel.12 The North Yemen Civil War waswidely described as Nassers Vietnam.13

Somewhat surprisingly, North Yemens repub-lican government survived in ofce following thewithdrawal of Egyptian troops from that country. Thegovernments ability to retain formal authority andat least some power was partially made possible bydivisions and inghting among the tribes that had op-posed it. North Yemens republic also survived dueto strong governmental efforts to establish acceptable

relations with enough of these tribes to avoid a nalconfrontation against them. The Yemeni governmentfurther moved decisively to improve its relations with


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Riyadh and thereby halt outside funding for the re-bellion. Republican compromise with the tribes and

Saudi Arabia thus prevented the development of apowerful Yemeni government and assured that theSanaa leadership curbed their ideas about extendingtheir authority and modernizing the country.14 Else-where in the Arabian Peninsula, South Yemen becameindependent in 1967 after 128 years as an amalgamof protectorates of the United Kingdom.15This newlyindependent country then established itself as thePeoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), theArab Worlds rst Marxist government, and quicklymoved to establish close relations with the Soviet bloc.Later, South Yemen gave up its separate existence andmerged with the more populous North Yemen in 1990.This was done primarily from a well-founded fear ofeconomic bankruptcy and political isolation following

the loss of aid due to the then impending collapse ofthe Soviet Union. Political and ideological differencesbetween northern and southern Yemenis were ex-pected to be addressed and resolved through a systemof political democracy including multiparty elections.With this future environment in mind, a number ofsouthern Yemeni leaders entered the union in the ex-pectation that they would play an important role inthe new government and that the Yemeni electoratewould quickly come to view them as the true mod-ernizers. Such expectations were dashed when theywere increasingly overshadowed and then marginal-ized by former North Yemeni President Ali AbdullahSaleh, who had retained his position as president andthe head of state in the newly united Yemen. Salehs

political party, the General Peoples Congress (GPC),dramatically outperformed the Yemeni Socialist Party(YSP) in the April 1993 Parliamentary elections, help-


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ing him to consolidate power and marginalize south-ern rivals.16For reasons to be examined later, this was

to be the last election where the YSP was an importantcompetitor.17

Despite the views of many southern Yemenisabout the self-evident superiority of socialism, Presi-dent Salehs political skills at marginalizing his south-ern competitors should not have come as a surpriseto anyone. Saleh had taken power in North Yemenin July 1978, more than a decade prior to the merger,replacing caretaker president Abdul Karim al-Arashi,who served for only 3 weeks before turning his po-sition over to Saleh. Although Arashi served for anexceptionally brief period, he at least walked awaywith his life. The two Yemeni presidents serving inthe years immediately prior to Arashis pathetic termwere both assassinated as a result of the turbulent

Arabian Peninsula politics of that era. Arashis imme-diate predecessor, President Ahmad al-Ghashmi (inofce 1977-78) was murdered by an envoy from SouthYemen in what appears to have been part of a powerstruggle in the PDRY. The preceding president, Ibra-him al-Hamdi (in ofce 1974-77), was assassinated byan individual who is widely believed to have been aSaudi agent. The Riyadh leaders at that time fearedthat the North Yemeni president was seeking a rap-prochement with the PDRY that could have become aserious national security threat to them.18Saleh him-self became president at age 35 and was not widely ex-pected to survive for long in the top job. Nevertheless,he deed these low expectations and has remained inpower ever since that time through brilliant political

skills and personal toughness. Later, as previouslynoted, Saleh became president of a united Yemen in1990 when North and South Yemen merged. He has


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remained in that position ever since, outmaneuveringall domestic opponents and using the military to crush

a 1994 attempt by southern leaders to secede from aunited Yemen in a 10-week civil war.

Salehs longevity in power and craftiness as presi-dent has nevertheless not made governing Yemen eas-ier over time, or allowed him to consolidate power asthe leader of a powerful and well-organized autocraticregime. It is consequently impossible to consider himto be a strong president such as Egyptian leader HosniMubarak, let alone a despot like former Iraqi dictator,Saddam Hussein. Rather, President Saleh compareshis efforts to balance the often competing concernsof Yemens tribes, religious groups, political factions,and interested outside powers to dancing on theheads of snakes, a continuous struggle to make ex-actly the right moves to avoid serious confrontations

with powerful political groups, families, and tribes.19

Others sometimes suggest his tactics are more like

a divide and rule strategy, expertly exploiting andsometimes widening the ssures in Yemeni society.In this struggle, the presidents chief tool of gover-nance is a network of patronage relationships andsubsidies provided to friendly individuals, families,and tribes in exchange for support.20The governmentsometimes uses police and military repression to en-force its policies, but this approach is usually a lastresort which cannot always be applied efciently andeffectively within strongly tribalized regions. Yemenconsequently runs on a system of tribal subsidies andbribes, with tribal leaders consistently showing an in-terest in money that supersedes concerns about reli-

gion, ideology, or politics.21 In essence, tribal leadersbase their support for the government on how much itis willing to provide to them.


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Additionally, throughout Salehs time in ofce, Ye-men has often been described as a family regime,

in which the presidents relatives and members of hisSahhan tribe have steadily been placed in a numberof key national security positions in order to protectthe regime. This approach is a partial hedge againstthe system of rented loyalty and shifting alliances thatcharacterize Yemeni political culture. Unsurprisingly,in this environment, the presidents oldest son, Colo-nel Ahmed Ali Saleh, is expected to become a seriouscontender for the ofce of president upon his fathersdeath or retirement. Currently, Colonel Saleh is thecommander of Yemens Republican Guard and theYemeni Armys elite Special Forces units. In additionto placing his son in this key position, President Salehappointed his half-brother as the commander of theYemeni Air Force, while the presidents nephews com-

mand the Central Security Organization (CSO) andthe Presidential Guards.22Another leading regime g-ure is Brigadier General Ali Mushin al-Ahmar, who issometimes identied as the second most powerful in-dividual within the government. He is often describedas a kinsman of President Saleh, although the exactnature of their family ties is unclear.23 Mushin hasplayed a signicant role in many key regime policies,including the recruitment of Yemenis to ght in theanti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.24He has also playeda major role in leading the military struggle againstHouthi rebels in the northern part of the country.25

Within the labyrinth of regime and family politics,succession is an increasingly important issue. Presi-dent Saleh is currently in his late 60s (born on March

21, 1942), and was most recently reelected to his postin a September 2006 election for an additional 7-yearterm in ofce.26It is not known if he will seek another


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term in ofce in 2013 at the age of 71. To do so mayrequire an amendment to the Yemeni Constitution or

perhaps a friendly legal interpretation of the eligibil-ity requirements regarding a sitting presidents abil-ity to seek a third term in ofce.27 Some solution ofthis sort should be obtainable if Saleh decides to seekreelection. Nevertheless, at some point, the currentpresident will not be able to continue to serve in ofce.At that juncture, whoever ultimately follows Salehwill face Yemens exceptionally serious economicand security problems, with fewer carefully nurtureddomestic alliances and less political experience thanSaleh currently possesses. The new leadership willalso have to consolidate power within the system ofpolitical, tribal, and personal relationships that Salehhas constructed throughout his years in power. Thepresidents son, Ahmed Saleh, is something of an un-

known as a political leader, and his skills at managingand manipulating Yemeni power centers are untested.Perhaps shrewdly, the younger Saleh has maintaineda low public prole in Yemeni politics despite thepossibility that he may have a solid claim to be thepresidential heir apparent. Ahmed probably madethis choice in the knowledge that bloodless coupsby sons against their aging fathers are not unknownin the contemporary Arab World.28 While there isno evidence that President Saleh is concerned aboutAhmeds activities, it may be useful for any carefulson to seek no more than reected glory under suchsensitive conditions.

In addition to being a highly tribalized nation, Ye-men has the most well-armed society in the Middle

East. Virtually all Yemeni men have ries, and onesstanding within rural Yemeni tribal communities isoften enhanced by the possession of high quality re-


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arms and other personal weapons such as hand gre-nades. Yemeni tribes have often been able to obtain

crew-served weapons, including machine guns andmortars. Reacting to this excess, Yemens governmenthas attempted to institute some curbs on weaponspossession and publicly carrying small arms overthe past few years. These efforts have been of lim-ited scope and effectiveness. Openly carrying assaultries and similar weapons in cities was prohibitedin 2007, and some rearms markets (apparently op-erating without government permission) were alsoclosed in that year.29These measures had no practicalimpact on the availability of weapons throughout thecountry. Moreover, the most heavily armed segmentof Yemens population lives in rural areas, and thesepeople often view possession of small arms as essen-tial for their security. Correspondingly, any extensive

efforts to regulate weapons more aggressively couldmeet a serious backlash and would remain unenforce-able in the areas of the country that the governmentdoes not control.

Even more alarming than the issue of unregulatedsmall arms is the state of the Yemeni economy. Ye-mens economic system is currently under severestrain and may be in danger of collapsing if ongoingtrends are not reversed. In addition to worldwideproblems created by the global economic recession,Yemen is faced with diminishing oil resources, an ex-ploding population, an escalating strain on water re-sources, and other serious economic problems.Sanaa,in particular, is widely expected to be hit by especiallysevere water shortages in the next decade.30 Unem-

ployment is also at a shocking 35 percent, according toa 2010 interview with Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mo-hammed Megwar.31Sadly, under these circumstances,


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the Yemeni middle class has been steadily shrinkingover the last decade, and this destabilizing trend is ex-

pected to continue without signicant new sources ofincome. Hunger and malnutrition are already seriousproblems, with the potential to become signicantlyworse. According to the United Nations (UN) WorldFood Program, around 7.2 million Yemenis sufferfrom chronic hunger, and the possibility of famine ex-ists.32

Additionally, Yemen would clearly face an evenmore severe employment crisis without its bloatedpublic sector employment, although many of thesejobs are unproductive and contribute little or nothingto economic development.33Adding to these problems,Yemen already has an extremely young population,with almost 44 percent of its population under age 14,and current population growth trends will dramati-

cally increase the Yemeni youth bulge with no clearcorresponding ability to provide jobs for these youngpeople.34Large groups of unemployed youth may alsobecome a major force for instability.

Yemen reached peak oil production in 2004, and itsoutput has been decreasing since that time. Currently,the Yemeni economy produces less than 300,000 bar-rels of oil per day of which around half is exported.35The revenues obtained through these exports usu-ally contribute around three-quarters of the fundingfor the national budget.36 Unfortunately, Yemen hasresponded to falling oil revenues by increasing theexploitation of its two major oil elds of Masilah andSafar in an attempt to compensate for their decliningoutput and maintain a steady source of government

funds.37This approach has some short-term nancialadvantages, but more ominously suggests the pos-sibility of an almost total production crash around2017.38


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Other sources of hard currency are equally prob-lematic. The Yemenis have only recently begun efforts

to export liqueed natural gas, and it remains un-certain how successful this effort will be.39The once-promising tourism sector has been partially under-mined by occasional incidents where terrorists havekilled or kidnapped tourists for a variety of reasons,including disapproval of the policies of the touristshome country.40 The past tribal practice of kidnap-ping foreigners and treating them well while usingthem as a bargaining chip to gain concessions fromthe government still occurs, but there are now morebrutal kidnappings that sometime result in the prison-ers deaths, as well as the direct tourist assassinationswhere there is no intent to kidnap, only to kill.41

The expanding Yemeni population and possiblecollapse in export income have implications for re-

source distribution, including that of water and food,but such systemic issues are not the only dimensionsof these problems. Looming water shortages are alsoa result of misplaced agricultural priorities, includingthe excessive cultivation of the shrub, qat(catha edulis),which requires large amounts of water and good agri-cultural land but has no nutritional value. Qathas beencultivated in Yemen for at least 600 years as a chewedstimulant, which produces a feeling of euphoria afterseveral hours followed by a state of mental depres-sion.42It is often described by both Yemenis and non-Yemenis as a mild narcotic, although this classicationseems to be one of convenience rather than medicalfact. According to the Yemeni Deputy Prime Ministerfor Economic Affairs, Though it is not a drug as many

believe, it has many harmful effects, especially whenit takes up a major proportion of the familys spend-ing at the expense of food and schooling.43While the


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tragedy of wasting water and land resources on qat isapparent to many government planners, no Yemeni

government has ever been able to impose serious con-straints on its cultivation and use, which is deeply en-trenched in Yemeni society. Around three-quarters ofall Yemeni men use qat regularly and usually spend asignicant percentage of their income to do so. Whileit has not always been socially acceptable for womento chew qat, this outlook is changing and the numberof women users is now expanding.44Unsurprisingly,qat is one of the most lucrative cash crops for Yemenifarmers.

An additional Yemeni problem with both politicaland economic dimensions is corruption, which is sopervasive that some analysts have labeled the Yemenipolitical system a kleptocracy, in which most ofcialsuse their positions to enrich themselves, their families,

and key associates.45

The system of corruption beginswith hundreds of thousands of lower-ranking andbadly paid government employees and soldiers whoseek small bribes in the performance of their duties, tothe much more important tribal leaders, governmentofcials, businessmen, and military ofcers who areable to conduct corrupt activities on a much largerscale.46 The low pay of ordinary soldiers and juniorgovernment ofcials tends to bias the system towardcorrupt practices, which many people nd necessarysimply to survive. More senior ofcials naturally havegreater opportunities for corruption, which they of-ten exploit to the maximum extent possible. Thesecircumstances are reected on most recent Corrup-tion Perceptions Index of the international watchdog

organization Transparency International, which givesYemen an abysmal ranking of 154 out of 180 countries(with 1 being the best rating for controlling corrup-tion).47 Moreover, Yemeni ratings have been getting


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progressively worse over the last few years, and are apotential indicator of cripplingly dysfunctional levels

of corruption throughout the political and economicsystems. It should be noted, however, that some, andperhaps many, Yemeni public ofcials chose to limittheir corrupt activities and others may not be corruptat all.48Even this degree of restraint may disappear ifthe Yemeni economy continues to decline as is widelyexpected.

As Yemens middle class continues to shrink andnationwide poverty deepens, it is unclear how toler-ant Yemeni society will remain of continuing corruptpractices, the most signicant of which benet onlya limited number of political elites. The public mayhave already become cynical about reform due to thehalf-hearted, duplicitous, and ineffective measuresto control corruption in the past. In the late 1990s, for

example, the government announced efforts to moveforward on issues such as reducing bribery, improvingthe efciency of government bureaucrats, and elimi-nating unnecessary jobs. Unfortunately, the campaignsoon emerged as a disguised purge that allowed thepresident to oust senior ofcials whose loyalty to himmay have been in doubt, while increasing the securityof his senior aides and closest associates.49

YEMENS SECURITY CONCERNS WITH THEHOUTHI REBELLION AND THE SOUTHERNSECESSIONISTS

Yemeni leaders, including the president, publiclymaintain that ghting al-Qaeda forces in Yemen is

their countrys rst priority for national security.50Such assurances are almost certainly misstatementsdesigned to placate the United States, Saudi Arabia,


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and other interested countries and particularly to re-assure those countries that provide aid to Yemen.51

Behind such declarations, the Sanaa government, andespecially the population, have conventionally seenthe actions of al-Qaeda as primarily a set of Westernand Saudi problems.52This perception has now fadedsignicantly among many senior government ofcialsin recent years due to an escalation of the ghtingbetween al-Qaeda and the security forces. Unfortu-nately, much of the population remains unconvincedthat al-Qaeda is a serious threat since the organiza-tion does not usually target nongovernmental Yemenicivilians. Of course, civilians have suffered collateraldeaths in al-Qaeda operations against security targets,and civilian deaths are sometimes collateral to infra-structure attacks.53Many Yemeni civilians also believethat the growth of al-Qaedas strength throughout the

region is a natural response to legitimate Arab angerover U.S. policies in the Middle East, particularly re-garding Israel, the Palestinians, and Iraq. In a furthercomplication, Yemeni news media commentatorshave frequently expressed their belief that the UnitedStates is insufciently concerned about civilian collat-eral damage in its struggle against al-Qaeda through-out the Islamic World.54

The Yemeni government also faces other securityconcerns which its leaders may view as more threat-ening than al-Qaeda. These two concerns are an inter-mittent rebellion by northern Zaydi tribesmen, knownas Houthis, and the separate and growing secession-ist movement in the southern part of the country inwhat was formerly the PDRY. The Houthi rebellion is

currently experiencing a shaky cease-re, which thegovernment publicly refers to as a permanent end tothe conict. This interpretation seems doubtful forreasons which will be discussed below. Either of these


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conicts has the potential to sap the already steeplydiminished energies of the Yemeni government and

security forces, thereby rendering them less effectivein ghting terrorism and supporting policies of inter-nal economic development. The continuation of bothconicts would be especially difcult for Sanaa.

The Houthi Rebellion.

The Houthi rebellion has its origins with nonvio-lent anti-government demonstrations that broke outin Saada province in northern Yemen in January 2003under the leadership of Hussein al-Houthi, a promi-nent northern political leader, who was also one ofthe rst members of the Yemeni parliament. At thattime, the Houthi establishment and its supporters hadbecome increasingly alienated from the Yemeni gov-

ernment over what they characterized as economicdiscrimination against their home province of Saadain the north, as well as the governments excessivetolerance of Saudi-inspired anti-Shiite agitation innorthern Yemen. These activities included the white-hot rhetoric of Saudi-trained anti-Shiite clerics whowere sponsored and heavily funded by the Riyadhgovernment.55 Many assertive Sala clerics maintainthat the Zaydis and all other Shiites are heretics andapostates from true Islam.

In the aftermath of the January 2003 demonstra-tions, President Saleh unsuccessfully attempted tonegotiate some sort of reconciliation with Hussein al-Houthi. Meanwhile anti-government demonstrationscontinued and even spread to the Grand Mosque in

Sanaa. The conict also intensied in the north withincreasingly angry demonstrations there. While theHouthis had serious grievances related to their re-


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gion, they challenged Saleh on a more direct and fun-damental level by accusing the Yemeni government

of placing itself in the service of the United Statesand Israel at the expense of Arab and Yemeni inter-ests. Saleh viewed such charges as close to treasonousand was especially concerned because they came at atime of widespread Yemeni anger over the U.S.-led2003 invasion of Iraq and the continuing unpopularityof Yemeni cooperation with the United States in thewar on terror. The rebels also continued to maintainthat their region had been victimized by ongoing gov-ernmental discrimination and received limited publicresources when compared to other parts of Yemen.Under these circumstances, Saleh lost his patiencewith negotiations and unsuccessfully moved to haveHouthi arrested. This failed move led to the outbreakof war.

The rst round of sustained ghting in Saada tookplace from June 18 until September 10, 2004. After themove against Houthi, he and his political organiza-tion, the Believing Youth (Shabab al-Moumineen)moved to expel government troops and bureaucratsfrom Saada. The government responded to Houthiacts of rebellion by increasing its military presencein the northern area, with ghting continuing in thenorth until Hussein al-Houthis death in September2004. The conict has repeatedly reignited and con-tinued sporadically since that time, with the rebelsled by al-Houthis brothers, including Abdul Malikal-Houthi. Qatar helped to negotiate a cease-re in2007 and a more comprehensive peace deal in 2008,but these agreements eventually broke down, and a

new government military campaign was initiated inSaada province on August11, 2009, under the menac-ing name, Operation Scorched Earth.


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The conict with the Houthis then assumed a newdimension, with direct Saudi Arabian military inter-

vention in the northern Yemeni ghting in November2009 when some of the rebels crossed into Saudi terri-tory, killing at least two border guards and apparentlytaking control of two or more Saudi border villages.56These audacious actions provoked a strong Saudi re-sponse based on the Riyadh leaderships anger overthe aggressive violation of its sovereignty and the spe-cial concerns they harbor about hostile forces based inYemen.

Yemen has a 700-mile border with Saudi Arabia,porous in many places, that can be used by crimi-nals, smugglers, terrorists, and insurgents. The easyavailability of arms in Yemen is a further complica-tion, with most of the illegal weapons and explosivessmuggled into Saudi Arabia coming from Yemen. The

Saudis watched the Saada conict anxiously, becom-ing especially concerned when Houthi forces crossedinto Saudi territory. Houthi spokesmen stated thatthey had crossed into Saudi Arabia because Riyadhhad allowed the Yemeni military to use Saudi territoryto wage war against them.57In response, Riyadh tookdecisive action, with Saudi military strikes againstHouthi rebels rapidly unfolding as the largest com-bat operation that they had undertaken since the 1991Gulf War. Saudi tactics in this conict involved theheavy use of artillery and airpower bombardment fol-lowed by the deployment of infantry in mopping upoperations.58The strategy behind this form of warfarewas to employ repower to destroy large elements ofthe Houthi forces so that Saudi infantry could more

easily defeat the residual military forces.Such tactics were only partially successful. The

Saudi army reported that at least 133 of its soldiers


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were killed in action, with an undisclosed number ofothers wounded or captured in the ghting.59The Sau-

dis discontinued their military involvement in the warin February 2010 when the Houthis withdrew fromSaudi territory, a cease-re involving both the Yemeniand Saudi governments was established, and all Saudiprisoners were returned.60

The Houthis agreed to the six point truce with theSanaa leadership in February 2010, although it is un-clear how long such a truce can be maintained. TheYemeni government did not address major Houthigrievances over discrimination and lack of develop-ment aid, and it is uncertain whether it will seek to doso at a later time. Despite these unresolved problems,President Saleh has attempted to project optimismon this issue, maintaining that we can say the war isover; not stopped or in a truce.61Nevertheless, few

informed observers view this result as likely withoutan intensive and ongoing governmental campaign toconsolidate peaceful relations. Such concerns seem tohave been underscored in July 2010 when 4 days ofserious ghting again broke out between Houthis andeither regular army troops or auxiliary governmenttribesmen who had been ghting beside the Yemeniarmy.62At least 40 people were killed in this ghting,according to sources on both sides.63The conict wasthen nally brought under control by tribal mediators.

Despite the problems noted above, there have alsobeen serious efforts to maintain the truce. The Qatarigovernment, in particular, chose to recommit itself tothe struggle for peace in northern Yemen, falling backupon its familiar role as mediator. In late August 2010,

the Qataris sponsored a meeting in Doha in which thetwo sides agreed to an explanatory appendix associ-ated with the earlier agreement.64The signing of this


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document by representatives of both the Yemeni gov-ernment and the Houthi leadership was dutifully wit-

nessed by Qatars Prime Minister and Foreign Minis-ter. The main goal of the Houthis in these negotiationswas to obtain the release of around 1,000 prisonerswho had been taken in the ghting in the north. Thegovernment agreed to meet this Houthi demand, andin return the Houthis agreed to surrender capturedgovernment weapons to Qatari mediators.65

The Yemeni government disputes Houthi claimsthat their recurring rebellions have been a response tocontinuous discrimination against the northern regionand that they never sought to overthrow the Yemenirepublic. Rather, Sanaa charges that the Houthis initi-ated the conict in order to return Yemen to the dayswhen it was ruled by a Zaydi imam, and that theywould select such an imam from the senior leadership

of the Houthi family. Additionally, while PresidentSaleh is a Zaydi and therefore a member of the sameIslamic sect as the Houthis, his lineage is not distin-guished, and someone with his family backgroundwould not be eligible to become a Yemeni imam evenif a non-Houthi was chosen.66

Saleh would never wish to achieve such status,however, since he is particularly contemptuous of thetraditional stratied structure of Zaydi society asso-ciated with the imamate. Conversely, throughout theconict, rebellious Houthis have often maintained thatPresident Saleh has betrayed his co-religionists and itis therefore their right to defend themselves againstthe excesses of his regime. The right to rebel againstan unjust leader is deeply ingrained in Zaydi doctrine,

history, and tradition.67Moreover, the Houthis gainedsome moral high ground in the conict since theirattacks have been directed at Yemeni military andgovernmental targets, although this approach is not


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surprising as the ghting occurred on Houthi hometerrain.

Houthi leaders have made considerable use of anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli rhetoric during previous roundsof ghting and have particularly enjoyed excoriatingPresident Saleh for his ties with Washington, whichthey refer to as an alliance. While these criticisms mayembarrass the Saleh regime with the Yemeni public,they also make it signicantly easier for his govern-ment to characterize the Houthis as radicals and ter-rorists before an international audience. Such chargescome in an interesting context. There is no evidencelinking the Houthis to al-Qaeda, and they are knownto be bitterly hostile to that organization and all Salajihadists. The Yemeni government has therefore notwasted its effort or credibility by attempting to linkthe Houthis with al-Qaeda terrorists.

They have, however, frequently accused Iran ofbacking the Houthi rebels with funding, training, andmaterial aid. Yemen further claims that such supportis provided either directly by Iran or through Ara-bic speaking surrogates such as the radical Lebanesegroup Hezbollah.68The Iranian leadership reinforcesthis perception with rhetorical support for the Houthisin a policy of religious solidarity. It is difcult to imag-ine that they could remain silent on an issue so im-portant to the Shiite community.69 Yemens chargesinvolving Iranian materiel support and training havenot been proven and may be at least partially basedon the fact that the rebels are Shiite, although they areFiver Shiites rather than the Twelver Shiites foundin Iran. Yemeni government ofcials have sometime

charged that the Houthi leadership seeks to moveits followers away from the principles and practicesof moderate Shiite Islam to a more militant form of


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Twelver Shiism modeled after the Iranian approachto religion.70The Yemeni government has also accused

Libya of supporting the Houthi rebels, but providedno credible evidence to support these accusations.71

The nature of the Saada conict may have createddifculties for the prospect of permanent Houthi rec-onciliation with the government. The Yemeni armydoes not have a well-developed doctrine for counter-insurgency, and Houthi civilian casualties have oftenbeen reported to be heavy. The Houthis claim to havesuffered over 25,000 deaths at the hands of the Yemenimilitary since 2003, although other estimates are sig-nicantly lower.72Critics of the Saleh government havegone so far as to state that civilians are deliberatelytargeted by government forces and pro-governmentauxiliary units.73Such charges are plausible. The prob-lem of waging conventional war in mountainous ter-

rain had previously led the Saleh government to hirethousands of mercenary tribesmen from elsewherein Yemen to help the army conduct military opera-tions in the north. It is doubtful that these irregularsght with a great deal of regard for the laws of armedconict or make a careful effort to distinguish guer-rilla ghters from their noncombatant sympathizers.Under these circumstances, the conict has displacedaround 250,000 people, with around 100,000 of theserefugees having ed since late 2009 due to an espe-cially intense outbreak of ghting at that time.

The Yemeni government came under considerableinternational, and especially American, pressure toreach a negotiated solution to the Houthi war in theaftermath of the December 2009 terrorist bombing at-

tempt against a Detroit, Michigan-bound U.S. civilianaircraft by an individual trained by anti-governmentextremists in Yemen (which will be discussed later).


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Many U.S. and allied leaders would prefer to see theYemeni government concentrate its efforts on defeat-

ing al-Qaeda rather than ghting the Houthis, andthe failed attack on a U.S. aircraft served to intensifythese priorities. The Yemenis have responded to thispressure by stressing that they are already makingstrong progress against al-Qaeda and have achievedpeace with the Houthis. The shaky nature of the cur-rent truce nevertheless suggests that cooperative rela-tions will have to be strengthened and consolidated asquickly as possible in order to avoid collapse.

The Southern Movement.

The Yemeni government is also deeply concernedabout a serious secessionist movement in the southernpart of the country, which reemerged as a signicant

political force in 2007. Although almost all of the im-portant leaders of the Southern Movement emphati-cally stress nonviolent political confrontation, thegovernment views them as a grave and potentiallyexpanding threat against Yemeni national unity, fear-ing they may ultimately shift to routine use of violenttactics. Moreover, the disagreement between the twosides to this conict could hardly be more fundamen-tal. The unication of the two Yemens is an especiallysensitive issue to the Sanaa leadership and is suf-ciently weighty to be viewed as the presidents mostsignicant achievement in over 30 years of rule. Ona more pragmatic level, the Saleh government wouldbe loathe to surrender vital oil producing areas of theHadhramout area of the south before the resources

there have been fully extracted. Perhaps most signi-cantly, a breakaway southern regime could establishitself as an enemy of the current government once


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it achieved independence. In this regard, the PDRYwas often at odds with its northern neighbor dur-

ing its separate existence, and there were two borderwars between the Yemens when they were separatecountries, one in 1972 and the other in 1979.75An ad-ditional concern is that the south itself has serious s-sures and that a break with northern Yemen may notresult in a unied southern state. Different portions ofthe southern region may seek independence or quasi-independence, following any break with Sanaa. Thispossibility is particularly serious with the importantHadhramout province, whose people sometime viewthemselves as quite distinct from other Yemenis.76

The current confrontation between the northern-dominated government and southern secessionistsappears to date back to differing expectations abouthow a unied Yemen would be governed following

the 1990 merger. The unication of the two countrieswas undertaken without a great deal of preparationor transitional moves, despite the vastly differenttypes of governments and political cultures withinthe two Yemens. The leaders of South Yemen agreedto unify at a time when their countrys circumstanceswere particularly troubling, and they believed thatthey possessed few acceptable options. The PDRY hadbeen an expensive client of the Soviet Union, whichby 1990 was in unmistakable decline and unwillingto further subsidize Marxist regimes in the develop-ing world. Likewise, during its long involvement withleftist radicalism, the PDRY had managed to get itselfplaced on the U.S. State Departments list of countriessupporting terrorism.77Consequently, the prospect of

a rapprochement with the United States or the conser-vative Arab states seemed nonexistent without somedramatic change in the way southern Yemen was per-


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ceived internationally. Unfortunately for beleagueredsouthern leaders, the new and signicant oil depos-

its were discovered only after the two Yemens hadagreed to unify. These discoveries would probablyhave caused southerners to entertain second thoughtsabout the value of the entire enterprise if they hadbeen identied earlier.

Perhaps because of their dire circumstances, thesouthern leadership was also inclined to believe theSaleh regimes assurances that they would have animportant role in determining the future of a unitedYemen and that the political system would reect amodern political outlook. Most doctrinaire Yemeni so-cialists felt that faster movement towards secularismand a planned economy was more or less inevitable ifYemen was to advance in the political and economicrealms, which they assumed was an underlying goal

of both northern and southern Yemenis. They also as-sumed that their political leadership was especiallywell-prepared to lead the way to such changes. Thenorthern Yemenis, by contrast, tended to view theirrole as something akin to that of West Germany ab-sorbing East Germany, a neighboring state that no lon-ger possessed much justication for an independentexistence after its system of government had failed.78The northern leadership further believed that theyshould have a larger role in deciding their nations fu-ture since the population of the YAR was signicantlylarger than that of the PDRY. Saleh successfully usedthe latter argument as the decisive reason for him toretain the presidency after the two countries unied,while the PDRY leader became vice president.

Yemens unication was accompanied by bothsides acceptance of a variety of democratic institu-tions and the development of a multiparty political


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system that was expected to create opportunities forall Yemenis to work through their political and eco-

nomic differences. Throughout the process, PresidentSaleh nevertheless maintained a disproportionate lev-el of control over the countrys nances, while signi-cant steps to unify the separate militaries were nevertaken due to the distrust of both sides. The Yemenipresident used his political power and skills to ensurethat he and the GPC were able to marginalize the in-uence of many of the most important southern lead-ers, while cultivating pliable gurehead allies fromthe south. This approach helped bolster the appear-ance of power-sharing, while actually undermining it.This task became much easier after the GPC won theparliamentary elections in a landslide in April 1993,with the former governing party of South Yemen(Yemeni Socialist PartyYSA) emerging as a distant

third behind the GPC and the Islamic party, Islah.79

As their political setbacks multiplied, many southernleaders came to regret their decision to support themerger. This situation reached a crisis in 1994 as theformer leaders of the PDRY attempted to dissolve theunion and reestablish a separate southern state afterthey came to the conclusion that southern interestsand their own vision for a united Yemen were be-ing largely ignored. A 10-week civil war followed, inwhich around 7,000 Yemenis died and the southernsecessionists were decisively defeated.80Most of theirleadership that was able to do so ed into exile to es-cape charges of treason and probable execution.

Secessionism reemerged as a visible and expand-ing political force during summer 2007, being touched

off by the anger of forcibly retired ofcers from thePDRYs army and air force. These ofcers and theirsupporters became involved in political demonstra-


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tions against the extremely low level of support formermembers of the southern military received in military

pensions after quietly seeking redress for a number ofyears. Predictably, as the forced retirees of a defeatedmilitary, they had virtually no inuence with whichto press the government to move forward on theirgrievances. Moreover, the governments dismissivetreatment of the ex-ofcers was widely viewed in thesouth as yet another symbol of a vindictive northernoccupation in the aftermath of the 1994 civil war. Theimpasse also served as a spark unleashing southernanger after a range of other perceived affronts. Mostsoutherners continued to believe that their region suf-fered widespread neglect while southern leaders wereaccorded only a cosmetic and stage-managed role inpolicymaking.

Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that

the secessionist movement continued to grow afterbeing ignited by the retired ofcers demonstrations.81In December 2007, the full scope of the movement be-came clear as the result of a massive funeral proces-sion for four southern men killed by security forcesunder suspicious circumstances. Estimates suggestthat hundreds of thousands of mourners attended,thereby demonstrating their solidarity with the south-ern cause.82Enthusiasm for the cause of independencealso surged in the aftermath of this event. By 2009,large numbers of protesters were attending recurringrallies, where a number of participants waved theag of the former Marxist republic.83Moreover, thereare now at least seven activist organizations seekingsouthern independence.84 The Southern Movement

has also held rallies at particularly sensitive times,such as directly after Yemeni presidential appeals forincreased aid from abroad.85The reasoning here is that


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these rallies may complicate aid requests and perhapsmore importantly cause the government to moder-

ate repressive actions while it is appealing for foreignsupport, at least to the extent of limiting the use ofdeadly force against demonstrators. The governmenthas responded to increased agitation by raising thevisibility of military and security forces on the streetsduring times of tension and by maintaining rigorousefforts to prevent demonstrations that have been orga-nized without permits.86

Activists struggling for southern independencealso face the possibility of arrest on such charges asinciting violence and undermining national unity.Sentences for such actions can be quite hefty, as indi-cated in a March 2010 decision by a special securitycourt to sentence a leading activist of the southernindependence struggle to 5 years in prison on these

charges.87

One month later, four activists convicted onsimilar charges were given 10-year sentences.88Manyof the prisoners who have received these sentenceshave so far been deant. Two of them have stated thatthey consider the verdict to be a medal which theywould wear proudly.89 At least one of the prisonershas refused to appeal his verdict. There have also beenharsh government measures employed to prevent orbreak up demonstrations, including the use of tear gasand ring live ammunition at or near protestors. Therules of engagement for these encounters are not clearto outsiders, but there have been a number of dem-onstrations where protestors have been wounded,and a few have been killed in various incidents. Aswith certain other countries (such as royalist Iran in

1978-79), protestor deaths do not always quell unrest,and in Yemen they sometimes spark new and largerdemonstrations in response to the deaths of peaceful


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activists.90 The government consistently defends theactions of the security forces and opposes efforts to

initiate independent investigations regarding the useof force.91

Brutality against demonstrators is inherently dan-gerous since Yemeni civilians have easy access to re-arms, and any use of deadly force against demonstra-tors can potentially turn into a bloodbath.92The vastmajority of the Southern Movement has neverthelessremained strongly committed to nonviolence despitethe serious and recurring problems at demonstrations.This restraint is especially impressive given the widevariety of loosely coordinated organizations underthe umbrella of the Southern Movement, but there arealso smaller groups seeking southern independencethrough the use of violence, and there have been a fewinstances of rioting as well.93On some occasions, in-

dividual Yemeni soldiers away from their comradeshave been killed in the south, and the Yemeni newsmedia sometimes describe these events as assassina-tions by secessionists. More recently, government carconvoys have been ambushed including two separatemotorcades, each carrying a different deputy primeminister. These incidents also led to suspicions towardsouthern secessionists.94That interpretation is never-theless unproven and probably wrong since al-Qaedahas a strong presence in the south and is deeply desir-ous of striking at governmental targets. Under theseconditions, the mainstream Southern Movementsreputation for nonviolence remains relatively untar-nished, at least for the time being.

Despite its regional popularity, the Southern

Movement appears to have a number of importantweaknesses that limit its ability to challenge the stateor even control its supporters. As noted above, the


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movement is highly diverse. There also appears to beno organizational structures capable of serious coor-

dination among the different groups seeking southernindependence. Moreover, most of the organizationswithin the Southern Movement receive only limitedfunding and outside assistance from Yemenis workingabroad. In particular, Yemeni expatriate sympathizersworking in the Gulf are usually blocked from contrib-uting by nancial regulations in their host countries.Moreover, support from foreign countries appearsnonexistent.95 While accepting funds from foreigncountries is almost always a bad idea, the absence ofalternative income has led to a clearly impoverishedpolitical movement. Additionally, some leaders of theSouthern Movement are reported to be concerned thatthe governments cease-re with the Houthis will al-low them to move more decisively in repressing the

struggle for southern independence.One of the most prominent Southern Movement

leaders to emerge in recent years has been Sheikh Tariqal-Fadhli. Fadhli is an important former ally of Presi-dent Saleh who participated in the anti-Soviet war inAfghanistan during the 1980s and did not associatehimself with the Southern Movement until 2009. Heis sometimes described as a former bin Laden associ-ate, and even as an old friend.96Fadhli denies thesecharacterizations, maintaining that while he did meetOsama bin Laden in Afghanistan, they were neverclose. He also insists that he fought against the Sovietsbeside local Afghan guerrilla commanders, and not asa bin Laden condant or subordinate. Fadhli has de-nounced bin Ladens international terrorist activities,

and also stated that Yemen needs a positive relation-ship with the West.97To underscore this point, he hadhimself videotaped raising an American ag at his


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family compound in southern Yemen and placed thescene on the Internet.98Such antics are difcult to take

seriously, and even if Fadhli has given up on jihadistradicalism, he remains an inherently more violence-prone gure than other southern leaders.

While Fadhlis unsavory past may be troubling formany of the Southern Movements leaders, he is nottheir most serious public relations headache. The mostserious problem developed in May 2009, when Nasseral-Wahayshi, the leader of al-Qaedas branch in Ye-menal-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)proclaimed his organizations support for southernindependence.99In the same statement, the al-Qaedaleader sternly warned southerners that Marxism wasa failed ideology, and that it could not provide anyuseful guidelines for achieving their goals. Only jihadcould lead them to victory.100Wahayshi's support for

the south was correspondingly conditional and can beinterpreted as a demand for southern acceptance ofal-Qaeda leadership for their struggle.

Such demands are disconcerting and repellent tomost of the southern leadership at this time, and noneof the mainstream groups within the Southern Move-ment have shown any interest in working with al-Qa-eda or adopting its tactics. Instead, they are alarmedabout the potential for the government to capitalizeon al-Qaeda statements of solidarity to convince theinternational community that a serious link exists.101Such perceptions could be used by the government tojustify increased repression in the south with muchless fear of an international backlash. Some activ-ists claim that the government is already arresting

southern independence supporters on trumped upcharges of working with al-Qaeda.102Southern Move-ment leaders may also fear that hotheads in their own


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organization might eventually be attracted to al-Qae-da if they remain unable to show results for their non-

violent efforts.President Saleh has stated that his government is

willing to engage in dialogue with pro-unity elements[in the south] who have legitimate demands. But wedont have dialogue with separatist elements.103Thisoffer is underscored by the governments continuedreference to the entire Southern Movement as com-posed of terrorists or agents of foreign powers.104While the president cannot reasonably deny the exis-tence of large anti-government demonstrations in thesouth, he often claims that the problems bedevilingsoutherners are more economic than political, and thatthese problems exist in the north as well. Additionally,any ofcial discussion of casualties at southern ralliesinevitably minimizes violence against the demonstra-

tors and instead emphasizes police and security forcescasualties.105

YEMENI REGIONAL POLITICS AND THERELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia is Yemens most important and inu-ential neighbor, and Yemens future is deeply tied tothat of this regional power. The relationship betweenthe two countries is currently strong, although therehave been serious tensions between them that havesometimes damaged their bilateral relations. Majorevents in Yemen almost always have important reper-cussions in Saudi Arabia, and the Riyadh leadershipis deeply aware of this dynamic on issues as diverse

as terrorism, the future of Iraq, and even democraticor semi-democratic elections in Yemen. The Saudissometimes view such elections by neighboring states


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as a bad example for their own citizens. In this re-gard, many Saudis seem to view Yemen as a special

sphere of inuence where Riyadhs concerns trumpthose of any other outside power. Saudi Arabia hasprovided subsidies directly to various Yemeni tribesfor a number of years without bothering to go throughthe Sanaa government, thus effectively establishingitself as a separate sovereign capable of providing orwithdrawing patronage.106Riyadh also supports vari-ous religious institutions that favor its version of Is-lamic orthodoxy. Yemens desperate need for foreignaid has prevented Sanaa from challenging this sort ofmeddling. In this regard, Saudi foreign aid has alsobeen provided directly to the government of Yemenand is often more extensive than that provided by anyother country. It dwarfs the amounts provided by theUnited States.107

The current close but somewhat uneasy relationsbetween a formal republic and an absolute monarchyhave taken a considerable period to forge. After theofcial end of the North Yemen Civil War in 1970,Sanaa maintained an acceptable relationship withSaudi Arabia until 1990 when Yemens leadershipsupported Saddam Hussein in the crisis leading upto the 1991 Gulf War. Although Yemen halfheartedlycondemned Iraqis invasion of Kuwait, it also opposedthe anticipated U.S.-led invasion to liberate that coun-try. At that time, Yemen was a nonpermanent memberof the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), andits diplomatic actions assumed an importance andlevel of visibility that was exceptional for the Sanaagovernment. As the only Arab country then serving

on the UNSC, Yemen resisted calls for the use of forceagainst Iraq, called for an undened Arab solutionto the conict, and condemned Saudi Arabia for in-


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viting foreign troops into the kingdom.108 Most, ifnot virtually all, of Yemens government leaders and

members of the public were solidly opposed to a UNresolution calling for all necessary means to oustSaddam from Kuwait. Many Yemeni ofcers admiredSaddam Hussein, and those who had undergone mili-tary training in Iraq were often especially opposed tothe potential invasion.109 President Saleh found suchsentiment extremely difcult to ignore, and attemptedto avoid offending domestic public opinion by tiltingtoward Iraq. Moreover, on a geostrategic level, theSaleh government worried that a defeated Iraq wouldleave Saudi Arabia disproportionately powerful onthe Arabian Peninsula, and that such a developmentcould allow the Saudis to dominate Yemen on its keydomestic and foreign policies. The Yemeni presidentapparently believed that he could maintain a good

deal more autonomy by maneuvering between thetwo major Gulf Arab powers rather than by attempt-ing to convince one dominant regional state of theneed to help him address Yemens problems.

Riyadh viewed Yemens pro-Saddam policies asa betrayal even prior to the UNSC vote authorizingthe use of force against Iraq. Many Saudis believedthat they had been extremely generous with Yemen,and that Sanaas support of their enemies at a timeof crisis required punishment. On September 19, 1990,Riyadh acted on this anger, revoking the special statusof Yemenis allowed to work within Saudi Arabia.110This change led to the expulsion of hundreds of thou-sands of Yemenis from the kingdom, forcing theirreturn to Yemen. Various other Gulf monarchies fol-

lowed the Saudi example, with many expelling theirYemeni workers to please Riyadh and because theywere also angry that Yemen appeared to be siding


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with an expansionist Iraq. The Yemeni governmentthen made matters worse for itself internationally by

voting with Cuba against UNSC Resolution 678, whichauthorized the U.S.-led coalition to use all necessarymeans to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.111This UNSC resolution passed despite Yemeni oppo-sition, and Saddams value as a regional ally evapo-rated after Iraqs massive defeat in early 1991. By 1991over 800,000 Yemenis had returned home after losingtheir jobs abroad.112This setback deeply crippled thealways troubled Yemeni economy. Remittances sentby workers to their families in Yemen had previouslybrought at least one billion dollars per year into thecountry throughout much of the 1980s, but now driedup.113 In Yemen, food prices quadrupled, and unem-ployment reached around 35 percent, thus ensuringthat virtually every Yemeni household was hurt by

the disaster.114

The leadership of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the

other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states re-mained hostile towards Yemen in the years immedi-ately following Operation DESERT STORM. Whenasked about President Saleh in 1994, the Kuwaiti For-eign Minister bluntly stated, He is another SaddamHussein.115This was an overstatement, of course, butone that clearly reected the sense of betrayal some ofthe Gulf Arabs felt. Although Saudi support may havebeen mostly rhetorical, they took the surprising step ofsiding with the southern Yemeni secessionists in the1994 civil war despite the Marxist orientation of manyof their leaders. Publicly, the Saudis and their Araballies supported a UN call for a Yemeni ceasere and

a mediated end to the conict, policies which couldbe expected to head off an impending northern mili-tary victory.116Riyadh may have also surreptitiously


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provided more tangible forms of support includingweapons and funding, but little evidence exists of such

actions. According to a leading scholar of the region, anumber of the Gulf monarchies, including Saudi Ara-bia, allocated funds for weapons and other materialsupport for the southern secessionists, but failed toprovide this support to the rebels before their resis-tance collapsed.117The primary Saudi motivation forproviding even limited support for the south seemsto have been a desire to continue punishing PresidentSaleh for his 1990-91 actions and perhaps to supportthe division and hence weakening of a potential re-gional adversary. The Saudis may also have reactedangrily to Saddam Husseins strong rhetorical sup-port for Salehs efforts to maintain the Yemeni unionby force.118Riyadhs policies had little, if any, impactof the outcome of the war since it apparently failed to

provide weapons.Salehs continuing ability to remain in power fol-

lowing the 1991 war eventually caused the Gulf Arabmonarchies to moderate their position of unrelentinghostility toward Sanaa. One key reason for this changewas that the Saudis, and especially the Kuwaitis, bythe mid-1990s were willing to engage in limited out-reach to Arab states that had tilted towards Iraq dur-ing the 1990-91 crisis and war.119 This approach wasimplemented in the hope of permanently realigningthem away from Baathist Iraq. By this time, the Gulfleaders understood that Saddam Hussein remainedentrenched as Iraqs dictator despite his 1991 defeat,and that he was therefore unlikely to be overthrownby Iraqi moderates seeking better relations with other

regional states. Thus, the leaders of the Gulf Arabmonarchies sought to ensure that Iraq was isolatedfrom potential sources of political support in any fu-


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ture conict. That concern meant that relations withYemen had to be placed on a more normal footing. Aid

links were slowly expanded and efforts were made tomove forward on bilateral problems.

A number of Yemeni workers were able to returnto Saudi Arabia in the second half of the 1990s, and by2000 some estimates reached as high as 500,000.120Thisnumber included Yemenis who made special arrange-ments with Saudi authorities to return, as well as somewho were exempted from deportation or had other-wise evaded the requirement to leave Saudi Arabia.This number does not seem to have expanded dramat-ically since that time as most Yemenis remained con-ned to unskilled jobs, especially in the constructionsector, and minor shopkeeping under the sponsorshipof a Saudi citizen. As Saudi Arabias labor needs haveevolved and a more sophisticated workforce has be-

come important, poorly-educated Yemenis have hadless to offer.121Their most important asset for futurework is that they are willing to do hard manual laborthat is of no interest to Saudis, although fewer of thesejobs are available than in the past. In recent years, theSaudi leadership may also have become concernedabout the dangers of increasing numbers of Yemenisin the kingdom for security reasons.122The limitationson Yemeni workers allowed to enter Saudi Arabia re-main a source of disagreement between the two coun-tries.

A key turning point in improved Saudi-Yemenirelations was seen at the 10-year anniversary celebra-tion of Yemeni unity in May 2000. Saudi Crown Prince(now King) Abdullah attended the event, and thereby

became the rst Saudi leader to be present at such afunction.123This action also signaled Riyadhs accep-tance of the unication of the two countries which it


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had previously opposed. Another fairly solid indica-tion of the improvement in Saudi-Yemeni relations

took place shortly afterwards on June 12, 2000, whenthe leaders of the two countries signed a bilateral trea-ty in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on international land andsea borders, expanding upon the Taif Treaty of 1934.124The Jeddah Treaty was announced on the rst full dayof an ofcial visit by President Saleh to Saudi Arabia.As such, it indicated a signicant improvement in Sau-di-Yemeni relations, and it also dramatically reducedthe danger of future confrontations along the border.As late as 1997, border skirmishes had occurred be-tween the two states with Saudi and Yemeni soldersengaging in armed conict. In December 1997 severalsoldiers died in such a confrontation.125

Relations between the two states have continuedto improve at a steady pace since the signing of the

Jeddah Treaty in 2000. The Saudis have been one ofYemens most generous aid donors since at least 2006when they pledged $1 billion dollars in aid, and SaudiArabia, as noted, is currently Yemens largest regionalsupplier of aid.126 Additionally, Saudi Arabias GCCpartners also provide smaller, but still signicant,levels of aid to Yemen. In March 2010, this trend wasespecially clear at a Friends of Yemen conference inDubai where the GCC states pledged to provide theYemenis with at least $3.7 billion in aid.127Even in thisenvironment, however, tensions can persist, and someYemenis suspect that the Saudi leadership would liketo maintain a status quo whereby Yemen is weak,impoverished, and dependent upon Saudi largess.128Such weakness would allow the Saudis to dominate

Yemeni politics on issues of importance to the Saudis.While there may be some truth to this argument, Ye-men is hardly in a good situation to refuse supportfrom any friendly country, even if Riyadh, with its


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own agenda, can be somewhat overbearing and intru-sive at times.

Along with the provision of foreign aid, the Saudileadership maintains an especially watchful eye onYemeni efforts to deal with various national secu-rity problems that could expand to include their owncountry. The example of the Houthi rebellion is espe-cially notable, since Saudi Arabia became embroiledin large-scale combat operations in Yemen against theHouthis on the side of the Sanaa government in 2009.One author suggests that President Saleh manipulatedSaudi fears of Shiite empowerment to gain Riyadhssupport for his own conict with the Houthis, whichmay not have required such an overwhelming Saudiresponse to protect its interests.129

There may be some truth to this charge, but Ri-yadh does not have to be pushed particularly strongly

to become concerned over Shiite political assertive-ness. Saudi fears entail not only their deep disap-proval of Shiite religious doctrine but also involve therecently intensied Saudi rivalry with Iran.130 Iransincreased political role in the Gulf since 2003 is oftenviewed throughout the region as a reection of Teh-rans power-based ascendancy.131In some of its worstnightmares, Riyadh worries about Iran and a Shiite-dominated Iraq collaborating again in future conictinvolving political subversion and proxy struggles.Yemeni government accusations, if perceived as cred-ible, that the Houthis seek to restore a Shiite imamatewith strong ties to Iran would consequently be of theutmost concern to the Saudi leadership. Suc

the conflicts in yemen and u.s. national security

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