the conflict in the moluccas:

Peace and Conflict Studies III

Spring Semester 2013

Supervisor: Kristian Steiner

Faculty of Culture and Society

Department of Global Political Studies

The Conflict in the Moluccas: Local Youths’ Perceptions Contrasted to Previous Research

Martin Björkhagen

Words: 16 434

Abstract

The violent conflict in the Moluccas (1999-2002) has occasionally been portrayed in terms of

animosities between Christians and Muslims. This study problematizes that statement by

analysing several conflict drivers seen through two perspectives.

The first purpose of this study was to contrast previous research regarding conflict factors in

the Moluccas to the perceptions of the local youths’. There is a research gap regarding the

youths’ experiences of the conflict, which this study aims to bridge. A second purpose was to

analyse discrepancy between the academic literature and the youths’ bottom-up perspective.

The final purpose was to apply the theory of collective guilt to explain and analyse the

youths’ memories and perceptions regarding the conflict factors in the Moluccas.

The qualitative case study approach was adopted since it could include both in-depth

interviews and an assessed literature review. Six in-depth interviews were conducted in

Indonesia which explored the youth’s perceptions. The critically assessed literature review

was used to obtain data from secondary sources regarding the same conflict factors, as was

explored by the interviews.

The first part of the analysis exposed a discrepancy between the two perspectives regarding

some of the conflict factors. The collective guilt analysis found that the youths only seem to

experience a rather limited feeling of collective guilt. This is because all strategies to reduce

collective guilt were represented in the youths’ perceptions. The most used strategy was to

blame a few ‘black sheep’, or in this context a few provocateurs for the harm inflicted by the

in-group, towards the out-group.

Keywords: Moluccan youths, conflict in the Moluccas, collective guilt, in-depth interview,

qualitative case study

Sammanfattning

Den våldsamma konflikten på Moluckerna (1999-2002) porträtteras ibland i termer av

motsättningar mellan kristna och muslimer. Denna studie problematiserar den bilden genom

att analysera flera konfliktfaktorer som belyses ur två perspektiv.

Det första syftet med denna studie var att jämföra tidigare forskning gällande

konfliktfaktorer i Moluckerna med lokala ungdomars perception. Det finns en forskningslucka

rörande ungdomarnas upplevelser av konflikten, vilket denna studie syftar till att överbrygga.

Ett andra syfte var att analysera diskrepansen mellan den akademiska litteraturen och

ungdomarnas underifrånperspektiv.

Det avslutande syftet var att applicera teorin om kollektiv skuldkänsla för att förklara och

analysera ungdomarnas minnen och uppfattningar om konfliktfaktorerna i Moluckerna. En

kvalitativ fallstudieansats har valts eftersom den kan inkludera både djupintervjuer och en

litteraturgenomgång. Sex djupintervjuer genomfördes i Indonesien som utforskade

ungdomarnas uppfattningar. Den källkritiskt granskade litteraturgenomgången användes för

att erhålla data från sekundärkällor angående samma konfliktfaktorer, som undersöktes I

samband med intervjuerna.

Den första delen av analysen visade att det finns en diskrepans mellan de två perspektiven

när det gäller några av konfliktfaktorerna. Analysen av kollektiv skuldkänsla visade att

ungdomarna bara upplevde en begränsad känsla av kollektiv skuld. Detta berodde på att alla

strategier som minskar den kollektiva skuldkänslan var representerade i ungdomarnas

uppfattningar. Den mest använda strategin var att beskylla några "svarta får", eller i detta

fall, några provokatörer för skadan den egna gruppen orsakat den motsatta gruppen.

Nyckelord: Ungdomar från Moluckerna, konflikten i Moluckerna, kollektiv skuldkänsla,

djupintervju, kvalitativ fallstudie,

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I want to thank my family for always being there and supporting me.

I also would like to thank several other people for helping me with this study, both in Sweden,

the U.S.A. and in Indonesia. I initiated the material gathering for this study when I

participated in the exchange program between Malmö University and Gadjah Mada

University, Yogyakarta. Therefore, I want to send my gratitude to these institutions for giving

me this great opportunity of studying in a different environment. Further, I want to thank

CSPS Research Centre in Yogyakarta for welcoming me as an intern and letting me to start

with this project under their supervision. Especially Dr. Muhammad Najib Azca and Dr. Eric

Hiariej at CSPS. Both have extensive research experience regarding the Moluccas and have

provided me with much appreciated guidance when I started my study. I am also very grateful

to Mira Andiani for the translation support she provided, including both during the interviews

and transcription work. I also want to express my gratitude to my friend Dr. Jesse Rhines in Los

Angeles for proofreading and for his kind encouragement. Yet, my deepest gratitude goes out to

the brave youths from the Moluccas who volunteered to participate in this study. Without their

contribution this study would never have been made possible.

Martin Björkhagen

August 2013, Malmö, Sweden

List of Abbreviations

ALA – American Library Association

BAPPENAS – Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (The National Development

Planning Agency of Indonesia)

BKO – Bawah Kendali Operasi (Extra Non-regional Forces)

BRIMOB – Brigade Mobil (Military Police Mobile Brigades)

CPRU – Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (Jakarta)

CSPS – Center for Security and Peace Studies

DDII – Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Outreach Council)

FKM – Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Maluku Sovereignty Front)

HD Centre – The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

HRW – Human Rights Watch

ICG – International Crisis Group

ICMI – Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals

IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons

IDR – Indonesian Rupiah

ISAI – Institut Studi Arus Infomasi

IMS – International Media Support (Copenhagen)

LBH – Jakarta Legal Aid Institute

MMC – Maluku Media Centre

MPC – Maluku Protestant Church

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OPM – Organisasi Papua Merdeka (The Free Papua Movement)

PRRI – Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the

Indonesian Republic)

RMS – Republik Maluku Selatan (the Republic of South Maluku)

TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Military)

UGM – Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF – United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

VOC – Vereenigte Oost-Indische Compagnie (the Dutch East-Indies Company)

YLBHI – Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................1

1.1 Contextualization of the Research Problem...............................................................................2

1.2 Purpose Statement and Research Questions.............................................................................3

1.3 Delimitations..............................................................................................................................4

1.4 Outline........................................................................................................................................5

2. Conflict Overview..............................................................................................................................6

2.1 Demographic Profile...................................................................................................................7

2.2 Overview of the Conflict in the Moluccas (1999- 2002).............................................................7

2.3 The Post-Conflict Scenario..........................................................................................................9

3. Methodology...................................................................................................................................10

3.1 A Qualitative Case Study...........................................................................................................10

3.2 In-depth Interviews...................................................................................................................11

3.2.1 Selecting Interviewees……………………………………………………………………………………………….11

3.2.2 Conducting In-depth Interviews…………………………………………………………………………………12

3.2.3 Ethical Aspects, Interpretation and My Role………………………………………………………………12

3.3 Assessment of Secondary Sources............................................................................................14

4. Theoretical Framework....................................................................................................................16

4.1 Collective Guilt...........................................................................................................................16

5. Analysis: Previous Research versus the Youths´ Perceptions...........................................................20

5.1 Religion as Identity and as a Conflict Factor..............................................................................20

5.1.1 Review and Analysis of Previous Research.....................................................................20

5.1.2 The Youths´ Perceptions.................................................................................................21

5.2 Different Loyalties Towards the Indonesian Nation..................................................................22


5.2.2 The Youths´Perceptions..................................................................................................23

5.3 Autocracy, Islamisation and Transmigration..............................................................................24

5.3.1 Review and Analysis of Previous Research......................................................................24

5.3.2 The Youths´Perceptions...................................................................................................25

5.4 The Peace Agreement and Role of the Goverment....................................................................25


5.4.2 The Youths´Perceptions...................................................................................................27

5.5 The Role of the Elites and Provocateurs.....................................................................................27



5.6 The Media..................................................................................................................................31



5.7 The Security Forces....................................................................................................................33



5.8 Inter-communal Relations and Pela-gandung...........................................................................36


5.8.2 The Youths´Perceptions.................................................................................................37

5.9 Discrepancies between the Youths´ Perceptions and Previous Research.................................39

6. Collective Guilt Analysis...................................................................................................................42

6.1 Collective Guilt..........................................................................................................................42

6.1.1 Self-categorisation with the Harm-doing Group............................................................42

6.1.2 Recognition of Responsibility……………………..……………...................................................43

6.1.3 Perceptions on the Harm Done to be Illegitimate .......................................................44

6.1.4 Perceived Difficulty and Costs Correction…...................................................................45

6.2 Strategies Reducing Collective Guilt...........................................................................................45

7. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................47

References…………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………….49

Appendix I………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………54

Appendix II……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..56

1. Introduction

In the recent decade Indonesia has made progress in areas such as democratisation and

economic development. Yet, Indonesia struggles with poverty, widespread corruption,

environmental degradation, natural disasters and civil conflicts within some of its 33

provinces (SIDA, 2013). This qualitative study explores the perceptions of local Moluccan

youths’ regarding the violent conflict in the Moluccas, including its post-conflict phase. I

contrast previous research regarding the conflict factors, with a bottom-up perspective gained

by interviews with local youth. I then analyse and explain the results of the comparison by

applying the concept of collective guilt, and subsequently discuss conclusions gained

through the literature review, and the analysis of collective guilt. In this introductory chapter I

will put the research problem into context, explain the study’s purpose, and present my

research questions and delimitations. In the end of this chapter I will give a more extensive

outline of the study.

1

Indonesia

Source: Wikimedia Commons (Map of Indonesia).

1.1 Contextualization of the Research Problem

The conflict in the Moluccas is often simplified and portrayed in terms of animosities between

Christians and Muslims (HD Centre 2011: 16). However, the reality is far more complex. This

study is contrasting previous research with the perceptions of local youths’1 and analyses their

memories with the theory of collective guilt. To reach an understanding, I stress the

importance of addressing both the historical and systemic roots, as well as more present

escalation factors, thus the youths’ memories can be explored through different angles.

Beneath the calm surface of stability and economic growth of General Suharto and the New

Order regime (1967-1998) was often widespread state violence to be found. The New Order

roften repressed violent manifestations of tensions without dealing with the underlying

causes of concern to the local population. After 1967, tensions within the archipelago often

laid latent or simmered until the fall of the regime (Brown et al. 2005: 5-6). The fall of

Suharto and its aftermath were bloody. In May 1998 the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta

became a place of unrest, along with many other places within the archipelago. This violence2

was surprising to many Indonesians; partly because it involved shocking cruelty, but more

1 The label ’youth’ is socially constructed and historically variable (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 3). The youths in this

study were all under eighteen at the time of the conflict, but at the time of this study in the age between 17-26.

2 Schultze (2003) describes characteristics of the conflict as: “frenzied slaughter, savage mutilations, forced

conversions and the wanton destruction of property”.

2

importantly—it involved citizens versus citizens. According to Bertrand (2004: 133), the case

of the Moluccas demonstrates the first time in Indonesia where Christians and Muslims were

pitted against each other in such sectarian warfare. In the separatist conflicts it was easier to

identify conflict drivers, but these new communal conflicts have a very different and more

complex character (Van Klinken 2007: xviii). Across six provinces in Indonesia that

experienced large-scale extended violence, at least 15,967 people were killed between the

years 1998 and 2002 (Barron et al. 2012: 1). The conflict within the Moluccas was one of the

most devastating (HD Centre 2011: 16). When the conflict erupted in January 1999, the

Moluccas were still one province (Maluku province), but in October 1999 the government

decided to split the province into North Maluku province, and Maluku province.3 They lie in

eastern Indonesia, between Sulawesi and Papua. About 90 percent of the

provinces are maritime and consist of over 1,000 islands. The capital of North Maluku is

Sofifi, while Ambon is the capital of Maluku Province (Brown et al. 2005: 8-9). A peace

accord4 was signed in February 2002 marking the official end of the conflict. The current

situation could be described as being in a post-conflict phase. Nonetheless, tensions remain

high within many communities and occasional deadly violence and looting still occurs (Azca

et al. 2012: 14). The fall of Suharto and the subsequent transition from autocracy to

democracy is just one of many underlying factors which have influenced the conflict

dynamics.

1.2 Purpose Statement and Research Questions

This study has three purposes. The first purpose is to contrast previous research concerning

conflict factors in the Moluccas, to the memories and experiences of the Moluccan youths’.

There is a research gap regarding the local youths’ memories of the conflict, which this study

aims to help bridge. Because the youths are university students by now, they have potential to

hold important positions within the society in the future. Furthermore, their perceptions of the

conflict and its factors can provide some insights regarding the future of a sustainable peace in

the region. These aspects are strongly related to Peace and Conflict Studies. The inclusion of

youths is often neglected when conflicting parties make peace agreements, as is the case in

3 I use the term ’the Moluccas’ to include both provinces.

4 The Malino II Agreement.

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the Moluccas. In my view, youths are an important part of the population to include in any

attempt to build peace in a society. It has also become a United Nations policy to promote

such inclusions (McEvoy-Levy 2006: 3).

The second purpose is to analyse similarities and differences between the academic literature

and the youth’s bottom-up perspective. The last purpose is to apply the theory of collective

guilt to explain and analyse the youths’ memories and perceptions.

To operationalise these above stated purposes in the analysis, I use the following research

questions;

What does previous academic research tell about the conflict factors in the Moluccas?

What are the Moluccan youths’ perceptions and experiences regarding the conflict

factors mentioned in previous research?

Is there a discrepancy between these two perspectives?

How can the theory of collective guilt help explain the memories and perceptions of

the local youths’ regarding the conflict factors in the Moluccas?

1.3 Delimitations

Several delimitations have been made to improve the quality and feasibility of this study.

As mentioned above, several conflicts erupted in Indonesia in the aftermath of the Suharto

era. A comparative analysis of those would be interesting, but would be too extensive to fit

the frames of this study. Therefore, all light is shed on the conflict in the Moluccas, as a case

study. Another delimitation is the focus on the youths’ experiences and perceptions, which

means that the primary sources are limited to six in-depth interviews conducted in Indonesia.

A final delimitation is the choice to use the theory of collective guilt to analyse the youths’

memories and perception of conflict factors, in relation to the secondary sources.

4

1.4 Outline

This study consists of seven chapters. The opening chapter starts by contextualizing and

problematizing the research problem. Subsequently follows a presentation of the aims of the

study and a presentation of the research questions. Then follows the delimitations I have made

for the study. Chapter two presents an overview of the conflict and post-conflict scenarios. It

also includes a map of the Moluccas and a demographic profile of the two provinces.

The third chapter begin with motivating the chosen methodological approach. Then the

method of in-depth interviews is presented, as well as an assessment of secondary sources.

Chapter four is designated to the theoretical framework and the theory of collective guilt is

presented, which will be used in the analysis chapter.

In the fifth chapter the review and analysis is undertaken. Previous research is contrasted to the

perspective of the local youths’ regarding conflict factors. Subsequently follow an analysis of

the similarities and differences found between the two perspectives.

Chapter six explores if the theory of collective guilt can help explain the discrepancy

between the youths’ perceptions and previous research. In chapter seven the conclusions of

the study is presented and discussed. The chapter ends with a discussion of possible avenues for

future research relating to the research topic.

5

2. Conflict Overview

This overview initially displays a map of the Moluccas, where the main islands are portrayed.

Subsequently follow a description of the demographic profile, where the two separate

provinces are outlined. Then an overview of the conflict, the peace agreement and post-

conflict phase is presented.

The Moluccas

Source: Wikimedia Commons (Map of the Moluccas).

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2.1 Demographic Profile

According to the census in 2000, North Maluku province had a population of approximately

670,000, with about 85 percent Muslims and 14 percent Protestants. In Maluku Province

however, the demographics are evenly split (49.1 Muslims and 50.2 percent Christians),

which is fairly unique in Indonesia. Included in these numbers are the migrant populations

which are 9.1 percent in North Maluku, and 6.6 percent in Maluku. The majority of the

immigrants are Muslims from Java and Sulawesi.

2.2 Overview of the Conflict in the Moluccas (1999-2002)

The conflict is sometimes referred to as a communal war. With nearly 5,000 lives claimed,

and the displacement of nearly a third of the population of Maluku and North Maluku, I can

understand and agree with that label. The violence in Maluku broke out on the last day of

Ramadan, 19 January 1999. It was ignited by a dispute between an Ambonese Christian bus

driver and an immigrant Bugis Muslim passenger.5 The initial violence that followed lasted

for about two months, in and around Ambon, and resulted in the death of more than a

thousand people (Brown et al. 2005: 15; Barron et al. 2012: 10).

In this stage, the targets of violence were predominantly Muslim migrants6 from Sulawesi

Province (Bugis, Buton and Makassar). In July the same year, violence erupted again and also

spread to other parts of Maluku and lasted until January 2000. The capital city of Ambon was

now divided along religious lines. Later in May 2000, the conflict dynamics changed for two

reasons: security forces reinforced both Muslims and Christians, but mainly the Muslim side.

Further, the Muslim side was reinforced by Jihadists, predominantly from Java, joined the

newly-formed Laskar Jihad militia7 (Mulyadi 2003: 80). This shifted the power-balance in the

conflict to the Muslims favour. In June 2000 the government issued a civilian emergency

status and thousands of army and BRIMOB were sent to the islands. Additionally the police

5 The initial violence was mainly between Muslim and Christian youth in the area called Batumerah, in Ambon

City. For further chronological details see ICG (2000), Klinken (2001, 2007), Azca (2003) and Crouch (2010).

6 This migrant group had achieved a relatively dominant power in Maluku’s informal labour market, which had

generated resentment by some in the local community (HD Centre 2011: 17).

7 Founded by the neo-Salafy fundamentalist Ja’far Umar Thalib in direct response to the conflict in Maluku. It is

the militia wing of Thalib´s Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah Wa- al-Jama’ah, FKWAJ. Thalib preached a conspiracy theory where the United States, Israel and Christians in general are seen as the masterminds of the conflict in the Moluccas. Further readings on Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus see: Mulyadi (2003) and Schulze (2002).

7

and security forces were given increased powers, i.e., curfew (Brown et al. 2005: 16). Several

sources give testimony which indicates strong partiality and co-ordination problems within

many security forces (Bertrand 2004: 127). Yet, after the heavy reinforcement, violence

started to decline in the Moluccas. Since that time Maluku Province as a whole did not return

to major conflict, but Ambon and some other areas did experience occasional outbreaks of

communal violence, and tensions remained high even long after the Malino II agreement

which was signed February 11th, 2002 (HD Centre 2011: 21).

Still up until today tensions are evident in parts of the Moluccas. In North Maluku the

conflict erupted later, but in just eleven months 3,257 people got killed. The initial fighting

here, had a more ethnic character compared to Maluku Province (Barron et al. 2012: 11).

Fighting began in August 1999 with clashed between indigenous Kao and migrant Makian.

This initial violence was a result of several months of tensions related to the creating of the

new sub-district of Malifut,8 on Halmahera island. According to Wilson (2005: 89);

Kao Muslims and Christians maintained ethnic solidarity in the face of what was ultimately ethnic antagonism,

Kao Muslims and Christians joining in retaliatory attacks against Muslim Makian […] the Kao response in late

October was largely free of religious symbolism.

However, Wilson’s explanation only covers the initial clashes in Kao-Malifut, where politics

and struggles over resources did play a role. Yet, outside Kao-Malifut, other conflict drivers

were at work. In October 1999 the fighting spread to other parts of North Maluku and took on

a more religious undertone. It was influenced by the violence in the Maluku Province in

general, and by the arrival of Muslim Makian IDPs in particular. Moreover, propaganda and conspiracy

theories gained ground, in the absence of coverage by the media. The area’s remote location, lack of

infrastructure, and also a degree of conflict fatigue in the press can explain that (Van Klinken 2001: 5).

A widespread view was that Jakarta elites were behind the violence,9 but this theory has been less and less

convincing over time.10 Violence continued up until June 2000. At that time several factors combined which

helped put an end to the most deadly violence in North Maluku Province e.g., imposition of civil

emergency, extra troops, conflict fatigue, and a stalemate between the two sides. North Maluku has

remained relatively peaceful since, compared to Maluku province (Barron et al. 2012: 11).

8 Important factors here were issues of territory, natural resources and ethnic solidarity Wilson (2005: 89). 9 It was based on theories regarding the military being unreformed and still financed by Suharto and his Golkar

Party. This theory suggests that the military had incentives to destabilize the newly democratic government by

the means of communal war, and then reinstate military rule.

10 For further readings on the unlikely nature of the Jakarta elite theory see Van Klinken (2001: 8).

8

2.3 The Post-Conflict Scenario

In Maluku, episodes of large-scale violence have been numerous, even after the peace

agreement. In contrast, North Maluku experienced far less outbursts of violence.

After the Malino II agreement, there was a widespread feeling within some communities that

the agreement lacked credibility. This became especially evident when the Muslim

negotiation leader’s house got burned down, after the signing of the agreement (HD Centre

2011: 26). In the subsequent months after Malino II, violence still occurred periodically

(Bertrand 2004: 133) with the majority concentrated to Ambon city e.g., the bomb thrown into

a crowd in Jan Paays street in the Christian area, which killed seven people and injuring 56

(Barron 2012: 18).

In 2004, another serious outbreak of violence happened when more than 40 people died

following riots in Ambon. This happened after Alex Manuputty, a well-known Christian

leader of the FKM, had the RMS flag raised at his home (Brown et al. 2005:17).

FKM was seen as a cover for a revived RMS, which was a very sensitive issue in Maluku.

Even outside of Ambon, communal conflicts have escalated into violence. A ICG (2012: 5)

report concludes;

[…] without more attention to the systemic roots of violence in Ambon – segregation, poor

policing and lack of transparency in investigations, to name three – the eruption on 11

September [2012] can easily happen again.

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3. Methodology

In this chapter I will motivate my methodological approach, explain the use of in-depth

interviews, reflect on my role, explain the use of an interpreter, discuss ethical aspects of the

study and finally follows a part which includes an assessment of the secondary sources. In this

study I have chosen to use a qualitative design with a case study approach, and in-depth

interviews as a method to explore the bottom-up perspective of the respondents’ perceptions.

3.1 A Qualitative Case Study With this methodological approach I am able to take advantage of the receptiveness to

interdisciplinary strategies within my field of study (Wallensteen: 2011: 17; Denscombe

2000: 43). Since much of the research concerning the conflict in the Moluccas have been

quantitative, it will be interesting to contrast some of the previous research with a qualitative

case study approach. Moreover, I argue that this is an intrinsic case study (Creswell 2013: 98)

since it involves a unique case. In my view, all conflicts are complex and include distinctive

factors depending on the specific history and other contextual differences. The case study

approach has many advantages i.e., different forms of qualitative data collection can be done

and the researcher can identify themes or issues to study within the case (Creswell 2013: 98)

e.g., the analysis of conflict factors in the Moluccas. To make use of the above stated

advantages of the approach, I have chosen to include different types of data collection

approaches in the study; both in-depth interviews and a critically assessed literature review.

An ethnographic approach could also have been an interesting design for this study.

However, since extended observations on the spot in the Moluccas have not been an option

for this study, I argue that the case study approach is a more feasible choice.

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3.2 In-depth Interviews

This method promotes the importance of individual views which add insights into processes

that cannot be fully understood through statistically documented facts and trends. I adopted

this method because it is a well-suited method if one wants to explore the perspectives of the

respondents, in relation to the same research problem. Therefore, it is important to cover the

same themes in all the interviews, hence common themes can be analysed subsequently.

Yet, it is essential to follow up on related themes that are brought up by each respondent.

Further, using open-ended questions permits the interviewee to choose how extensive each

answer will be (Brounéus 2011: 130). These aspects make each interview unique, even though

the same interview guide is used. It is the respondent’s views and thoughts that are central to

the analysis (Esaiasson et al. 2007: 258).

3.2.1 Selecting Interviewees

Six in-depth interviews were conducted in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, as well as one interview by

e-mail. The in-depth interviews were conducted with students from both the Christian and the

Muslim community, sharing the common denominator of growing up in the Moluccas during

the violent conflict. Moreover, both male and female students are included with the purpose to

gain insights from a gender perspective.

Furthermore, since they are university students now, they have the potential to hold

important positions within the society in the future i.e., their experiences and outlook on the

future is of interest to my study, even though the main aim is to explore their views on the

conflict factors. Their ages were between 17 and 26 years old at the time of the interviews,

which I see as a preferable age sample also in an ethical perspective, compared to

interviewing younger children for example. To find respondents for the interviews I put up

information posters on several university campuses in Yogyakarta, where I had summarised

my study, informing possible participants about anonymity and providing my contact details.

After I had found a few respondents in this manner, I could perform snowball sampling to

find additional respondents as well. In this selection process, I was always guided by the

principle of ‘credibility’: what sources will provide best reliability and validity of the results?

This principle further stresses the importance of the interviewees to be experienced and

knowledgeable in the area of research (Brounéus 2011: 134). However, since my interviewees

were ‘respondents’, not ‘informants’, it is their subjective experiences, thoughts and

memories which are of interest. Therefore, I made sure that they had the right experience i.e.,

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had grown up and lived in the conflict environment, but they do not need to be ‘experts’ in

regard of the conflict factors because they will not be used as sources in that sense (Esaiasson

2007: 258).

3.2.2 Conducting In-depth Interviews

I conducted the interviews during the fall semester 2012, when I was doing my internship at

CSPS. I conducted two interviews at the respective university campuses of those respondents,

since they suggested that and felt comfortable in that environment. The remaining interviews

were conducted in a café/restaurant in Yogyakarta called Soma Yoga. I chose that café

because I know from experience that it is low-key in the afternoons, and keeps traffic noise

away because of the surrounding rice fields. It turned out to be a good milieu overall. The

minor disadvantage of the location turned out to be the infrequent, but high-pitched, sound of

grasshoppers. However, that was only a small distraction during the transcription process.

I always took time to talk to the interviewees before we started the interview. I recorded all

interviews and I always asked about permission to do so from each interviewee. If they

wanted, they could look at the interview questions, or ask any question about the study. I had

one respondent who felt more comfortable doing the interview in Indonesian, which was fine.

I had stated in the information that this was an option and that I would have a translator

available, which I always had. Although I used the same interview guide, the interviews lasted

from 32 minutes up to 83 minutes. This shows that each interview follows its own path,

exploring follow-up questions on related themes (Brounéus 2011: 134). When conducting the

interviews I paid special attention to use ‘reflective listening’. That includes empathic ability,

listening-skills, and to make ethical judgements regarding when to stop asking about a certain

issue (Brounéus 2011: 137).

3.2.3 Ethical Aspects, Interpretation and My Role

This study involves many aspects which might be of sensitive nature: the respondents are

interviewed about their experiences and thoughts concerning an often violent conflict.

Therefore, I have made several considerations in honour of the golden ethical rule; do no

harm (Brounéus 2011: 141). First, I always made it clear to the participants that their

participation was completely voluntary, and that they could cancel their participation at any

time. That is also part of fulfilling informed consent (Kvale 1997: 107). This was explained

both in English and Indonesian, so I could be assured that informed consent had not been

misunderstood. Second, I had my interview guide and themes approved by my supervisor at

12

CSPS, Dr. Najib Azca, who have done extensive research in the Moluccas. Third, I made sure

that the respondents had understood the basics of the research project before each interview

and asked their approval of recording the interviews.

Furthermore, some small-talk before the actual interview is beneficial because people tend

to feel more relaxed. Creating a comfortable atmosphere where the respondent feels safe and

comfortable is important both in the way of conducting a fruitful interview, as well as

conducting ethical research (Brounéus 2011: 136). Anonymity for the respondents is another

vital aspect to protect the respondents who volunteer to talk about sensitive subjects.

Therefore, I insisted on keeping all interviews with the Moluccan youths confidential. This

includes fabricated names in the transcriptions as well.

My own identity traits i.e., gender, age, nationality, class, skin colour and how I dress may

influence the information being shared by the respondents in this study (Höglund 2011:

124). My background and identity also influence my own perceptions, as well as being an

outsider in the eyes of the respondents. Therefore, I stress the importance of being aware of

these aspects, and especially transparent about them in the study. However, being viewed as

an outsider can be positive in some instances. Kristine Höglund (2011: 124) argues,

[…] the outsider may benefit from locals’ perceptions of a ‘stranger-value’. The outsider researcher is in many

cases seen as a sympathetic and interested person and is for this reason well-received […] sharing information

with outsiders can be easier because they will not remain in the area or in the country.

In my view, I feel that I benefited from being an outsider in some ways; I felt I was being

perceived as an interested outsider which the respondents felt they could easily talk to.

Moreover, the fact that the conflict is currently in a relatively calm post-conflict phase, made

it less sensitive for the respondents to reflect about the situation. Yet, one of the female

Muslim interviewees only wanted to answer the questions by email, which may be linked to

my identity as being, compared to her, foreign, white, slightly older and probably assumed of

being a non-Muslim etcetera.

During all interviews I was working together with a translator, which involves both

potential benefits and challenges. The perceived identity of the translator has the potential to

influence the respondents in a similar way as my identity (described above). My translator

was female, Muslim, 23 years old and was born on Sumatra. Therefore, she may also have

been considered an outsider, compared to the interviewees from the Moluccas. Additionally,

she did not wear any religious symbols during her work, so the respondents did not know her

13

religious affiliation. She had no active role in the study, apart from translating and

transcribing the Indonesian part. However, I paid great attention to explain the aim of the

study, the interview questions, protection of the interviewees’ anonymity, and the importance

of being an empathetic listener. Since I know my translator well, there is good rapport and

understanding between us. Moreover, my own intermediate knowledge of Indonesian further

helped me to understand much of the context, even when the respondent spoke Indonesian.

There are also benefits from working with a translator: translations make the pace slower

which give time to pay closer attention to the interviewee. When communicating, people use

other signs than just words i.e., how we sit and look also tell some information, between the

lines (Brounéus 2011: 136). Even though I always had the translator present, all interviews

but one was conducted in English, since the interviewees’ had a good level of English and

were comfortable speaking it. Yet, during almost all interviews, the translator could provide

help with translation of certain words and expressions.

3.3 Assessment of Secondary Sources

The secondary sources, which is the academic literature included in this study, do need to be

assessed however. The previous research has been used with multiple aims. First, it was used

to locate the research gap which motivates the study in the first place. Second, it was used to

build an understanding of the historical context and conflict factors in the Moluccas, which is

needed to be well prepared for in-depth interviewing. Finally, the previous research has been

reviewed in order to contrast that research to the memory and experiences gained from the

respondents. When evaluating secondary sources I have paid attention to the following factors

(Dulić 2011: 38; ALA 1994: 1);

What type of source is it (book, report, journal etc.)?

Who is the intended audience?

Who authored the document (i.e., his/her academic background)?

Is the author a third party or part of the conflict in any way?

When was the source produced?

Is the source original or a copy, and/or translated?

14

Does the source contain a bibliography?

Has the material been peer-reviewed or edited?

Further, this process was gradually made easier since one builds an understanding and is able

to compare different sources that are independent from one another. This process made me

exclude any sources relating to news agencies from the conflict area, which is known to be

controlled by the conflicting parties, and/or unprofessional and biased in their reports of the

violent conflict. I found it especially useful to study the references of the

books/articles/reports to evaluate their own sources, where many became familiar to me

subsequently. Furthermore, most of the journal articles, books and reports included in this

study have been peer reviewed which adds to the credibility of the secondary sources.

15

4. Theoretical Framework

This study is not theory-driven. Instead, the theory of collective guilt has been adopted using

progressive focusing. The reading through the data and continuous interpretation of the

material is important in qualitative data analysis since it enables the researcher to gradually

refine the focus inductively (Chambliss & Schutt 2006: 195).

I find it motivated to include this theory since it relates well to the stated purposes of

the study (noted above). This theoretical framework is a useful tool for analysing similarities

and differences by operationalizing the theory of collective guilt. Moreover, the insights

gained from the literature review regarding the conflict factors will also be used to explain

discrepancy between previous research and the perspective of the respondents’.

4.1 Collective Guilt

Our memory has long been known to not only conserve the past, but to adjust itself to current

needs in certain situations. Susanne Langer (1953: 263) writes that: ‘Memory is the great

organizer of consciousness’. This is a process that is done to make history conform to

memory according to David Lowenthal (1975: 27). Reminders of history in the context of

belonging to a certain group may influence our present-day emotional experience.

For example, both collective pride can be evoked, as well as collective guilt, depending on

the aspect of history. A desire to correct the wrongs committed by the in-group may follow

when associated to a feeling of collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje 2004: 3). An

interesting aspect of collective guilt is that personal involvement is not necessary, which is

one of the reasons I have integrated this theory in the study. Many of the interviewees were

16

not personally involved in the violence during the conflict in the Moluccas. However, the

important aspect is instead the association with the ‘in-group’. Nyla Branscombe and Bertjan

Doosje (2004: 3) explain that;

[…] people’s reactions to intergroup events are not usually based on having had a direct role in those events;

rather such reactions will be dependent on the social identity that is contextually salient when people are

reminded of their in-group’s past actions.

Therefore, a person does not need to be ‘guilty’ of anything else other than the psychological

thought of associating oneself with a group that has wronged another group; it is a self-

conscious emotion. That is an important difference compared with being ‘guilty’ in a legal

sense. An interesting insight, in my view, about collective guilt is that it can be a rare

phenomenon. This is because there are several strategies that are group-serving, with the aim

of legitimising in-group’s actions. Michael Wohl et al. (2006: 4) writes;

Once an instance of intergroup harm has been made salient, group members have a variety of means available

for defending against this threat to their in-group’s identity […] Accepting responsibility for in-group harm

doing, either in the past or in the present, entails the incorporation of negative elements into the group’s

collective identity, and this is opposed to group members’ desire to maintain a positive group image.

There are three general techniques stating that judgements of responsibility can be deflected

and collective guilt can be reduced (Wohl et al. 2006: 13);

(1) Put focus on the victimised out-group’s experiences instead of the victimising in-group’s

harmful behaviour;

(2) Put the blame on the out-group for the harm they experienced;

(3) Placing blame for in-group harm on a few ‘black sheep’ who do not represent the

‘usual’ in-group member, to minimise the flaw to the in-group as a whole.

Further, the literature about collective guilt says that in ethno-political conflicts for example,

collective guilt may occur without close relations between the offender and the victimised

group, in contrast to an interpersonal level, where the feeling of guilt is more likely in close

17

relationships (Wohl et al. 2006: 4). In the violent conflict in the Moluccas, both past and

present perceived experiences of injustices between the two communal groups are among the

conflict drivers. According to the literature concerning collective guilt, on-going group-based

inequalities, or ethnic discrimination, may also cause collective guilt (Wohl et al. 2006: 27).

It could similarly be the experience of profiting from existing injustices in the society, even

though that person did not have any role in creating those inequalities (Branscombe & Doosje

2004: 6). To feel collective guilt might be unpleasant, but it has the potential to lead to

something good (Wohl et al. 2006: 3);

When responsibility for harm is accepted, the guilty individual may be motivated to take action to alleviate the

wrongdoing or unfair treatment. In response to feeling guilt, individuals may apologise and seek forgiveness,

and they may attempt reparations to the extent that the self is perceived as morally responsible.

In that sense the acceptance for collective guilt may have positive impacts on intergroup

relations, and peace and reconciliation in the long run. There are four main psychological

factors that are essential for evoking collective guilt. The degree of collective guilt

experienced is influenced by the extent the following factors are true (Wohl et al. 2006: 9);

(1) If the person categorises herself or himself as a member of the harm-doing group;

(2) Self-categorised group members recognise their group to be responsible for the action

considered to be harmful for another social group;

(3) Members of the group perceive the harm done to be immoral or illegitimate;

(4) The extent to which collective guilt will be felt depends on the perceived difficulty and

costs to the in-group of correcting the erroneous action committed.

Furthermore, if members of the group that have done harm to the other group adopt a more

inclusive categorisation where the members of the victimised group are seen as fellow

members, the experience of collective guilt may be more likely (Wohl et al. 2006: 11). This

will be interesting to analyse further in the context of the conflict in the Moluccas, which

divided the Moluccan inhabitants into religious in-groups. If this process of re-categorisation

should be made possible, it usually requires a common standard of justice to be used to the

now included ‘in-group’ members (Wenzel 2001: 315).

In an active conflict, in-group members often view collective guilt as a sign of weakness

18

and even as a way of causing harm on the in-group. The post-conflict stage in the Moluccas

thus provides a better case to study, compared with a more intense conflict. There are several

obstacles that potentially hinder the experience of collective guilt (mentioned above). These

strategies of trying to ‘escape’ collective guilt are of interest to my future analysis too, when I

seek to explore my interviewees’ perspective of conflict factors. Besides, the potential

positive impacts on reconciliation processes are also of great interest when applying this

conceptual lens in a conflict milieu. Powell et al. (2005: 510) argues that;

We showed that when collective guilt is expressed, there is also a reduction in prejudicial attitudes towards the

harmed out-group. When collective guilt is coupled with a public apology, forgiveness by the out-group for the

in-group’s harmful actions is more likely, making intergroup reconciliation a stronger possibility.

19

5. Analysis: Previous Research versus the

Youths’ Perceptions

This analysis consists of two parts. Initially I review and analyse what previous research tells

in regard of the conflict factors, and contrast that picture with the perceptions and memories

of the local youths’. Then follows an analysis of similarities and differences between these

two perspectives.

5.1 Religion as Identity and as a Conflict Factor

The conflict in the Moluccas is often described in terms of antagonism between Muslims and

Christians. The reality is far more complex, but it cannot be ignored that the conflict was

almost entirely dividing the parties along religious lines (Brown et al. 2005: 10).

5.1.1 Review and Analysis of Previous Research

The division of the local population of the Moluccas is far from a new phenomenon. To

understand this division, one needs to explore how Islam and Christianity have influenced the

societies. Arab trading colonies had been set up in the China Sea as early as the seventh

century (Wolf 1997: 234). Around 1460 the ruler of the island Ternate, in today’s North

Maluku province, converted to Islam (Taylor 2003: 66). ). When the European colonial

powers arrived they entered a domain of hegemonic Islam (Wolf 1997: 234). It was the

20

trade in cloves, nutmeg and mace, which at the time, was only to be found within the

Moluccas11 (Van Gils 1994: 117). The Portuguese seized control of the important trading

islands in the early 1500s and remained the dominant power until they were expelled by the

increasingly powerful Dutch,12 nearly a century later (Van Gils 1994: 117). The Portuguese

introduced Catholicism to the Spice Islands, and the Dutch Protestantism. The English also

tried to cut in on the famed spice trade, e.g. by trying to seize the Banda islands in the 1619,

but failed at that attempt13 (Wolf 1997: 240). The most important aspect is the fact that as

early as 1650, complex horizontal conflicts were already apparent, splitting the local

population alongside commercial, factional and religious lines (Bertrand 2004: 115). By the

end of the 17th Century, the Dutch colonial power was dominating the region, with Ambon as

their main centre of operations. The Dutch colonial administration created an evident social

stratification along religious lines by treating the two communities differently, e.g. local

Ambonese who had converted to Christianity could get good education etcetera. This was

denied to Muslims, and also people who followed native animist religions. Hence, the newly-

converted Christians started to control the bureaucracy, as well as civil services (Brown et al.

2005: 10).

5.1.2 The Youths’ Perceptions

All respondents in the study confirm that an affiliation to either Islam or Christianity is part of

their identity. Yet, somewhat surprising, none of the respondents talk straightforwardly about

any major remaining negative affects resulting from the Dutch colonial rule.

However, religion seems very important to some of the youths, like 21 year-old Riri: “I am

Catholic […] it is the strongest link to my self-identity”. Another respondent, Pat who is 24

and from the Southeast Moluccas, who also says he is Catholic, describes his own family’s

integration with the other community before the conflict: “For example my sister married with

a Muslim and we were all family like that. Before, Confucian, Muslim and Christian people

lived together”. Furthermore, all respondents said that they had friends from the other

religious community, and still do today. Yet, they also express that the schools were usually

segregated depending on religion, as were many neighbourhoods even before the conflict

erupted. The respondents confirm the literature as describing the segregation as worsening

11 The reason these spices was so valued was because they were extremely rare and was needed as preservatives

for meat and fish, as well valued exotic flavours of Eastern cooking.

12 Much because the power of the VOC, who gained a complete monopoly of the entirety of Dutch trade.

13 It was not until 1796 when the English finally could break the Dutch monopoly of the spice trade, by obtaining

seeds which they could grow on English colonies (Van Gils 1994: 118).

21

when the conflict erupted. Dani, a 26 year old Catholic, expressed the changes in his

neighbourhood and view of the other religion as follows;

In my neighbourhood [in Ambon] lived many ‘immigrants’ from Southeast Moluccas, Buton, Bugis, Manado

and Java. I had so many friends from different ethnic groups and another religion […] I saw many of them for

the last time when my father told them that they had to leave the neighbourhood because he [a Christian militia

commander] could not protect them anymore. When the conflict began I did not know so much, but some

people were yelling things about religion, […] when I was a teenager [when the conflict erupted] I started to

think that I had to protect my religion, the identity.

When the respondents were asked about what role religion had as a conflict factor, they all

gave answers pointing in the same direction; downplaying the role of religion as a factor

causing the violence. Yet, like Dani’s quote reveals, most soon got divided from their friends

with a different religion and caught up in the common rhetoric which depicted the other

religious community as an enemy.

Gino, 23, who is a Muslim from North Maluku province said: “When the conflict erupted in

1999, I was a child at that time, all Muslims in my district, Sanana, saw the other religion as

an enemy”. The youngest respondent Gary, 17, and a Protestant from Ambon, gave the

following answer when asked if the conflict changed his relationship and view towards the

other religious community;

I did not change my way of thinking about the other religion because my family has always taught me to look

and treat all people the same. Even if we are different, we are all humans but with different beliefs maybe. If

people have different beliefs, so what?

5.2 Different Loyalties Towards the Indonesian Nation

When Indonesia fought the Netherlands in the war of independence14 (1945-1949), many

Christian Ambonese choose to side with their former colonial rulers, and even supported

campaigns to pacify the republicans in other parts of the archipelago. This part will review

and analyse if this question of loyalty still remain as a conflict factor.

14 Also known as the Indonesian National Revolution.

22


According to the literature, different loyalties to Indonesia was a sign of the very beneficial

treatment Indonesian Christians had received under the Dutch. It also reflected a fear of

domination of Muslim Javanese also in the Moluccas. Under the Dutch colonial system, the

Moluccas were part of the East Indonesian state. When it became clear that the Dutch were

losing the war, Dr. Soumokil, the East Indonesian Minister of Justice, declared the

independent RMS, in April 1950 (Brown et al. 2005: 11).

This declaration of independence was not accepted by the new Republic of Indonesia and

was eventually defeated with military force. Yet, the RMS is still a symbol and factor of

political and religious division in Ambon. The integration of Maluku into the state was also

met with long resistance and Malukan leaders kept in contact with other rebellious

movements in the archipelago, i.e., PRRI in Sumatra and Permesta movement in Sulawesi,

which opposed Sukarno´s regime until 1961.

Therefore, Sukarno sought to encourage Maluku to integration by allocation of resources

intended for different development projects. Further, not all Christians in RMS had supported

the Dutch and those who had instead supported the Republic of Indonesia, were awarded by

Sukarno, typically by different roles in the central government (Brown et al. 2005: 11).


None of the respondents expressed any loyalty or support for the Moluccas to be independent

from the Indonesian nation. Most had little to say about this topic, but some identified the

RMS movement to still be a source contributing to the continuing violence in the region. Gino

argues;

[…] the riots in Ambon are sometimes identified with the movement of RMS. There are a couple of RMS

leaders who want the independence of Maluku, this is screwing up the situation […] every year they always

make terror like bombing or putting their flag up when they claim the independent RMS […] they are like

OPM in Papua who wants independence, and a lot of their leaders now stay in the Netherlands.

23

5.3 Autocracy, Islamisation and Transmigration

This part will review and analyse General Suharto’s rule and his Islamisation policy in the Moluccas,

as well as transmigration effects.


When Suharto came into power the Moluccas lost many of the few privileges it had received

under Sukarno. Changes were also made politically as Suharto appointed governorships to

external military officials. Furthermore, any actors within the civil society who bothered the

regime were arrested and often accused of being an RMS sympathizer (Brown et al. 2005:

12). Moreover, the heavy-trafficked shipping routes to the Moluccas were redirected away

and the intra-island trade of the eastern part of the archipelago was re-arranged. In the

northern part of the province, the centralisation of power in Jakarta made the impact of the

rivalry between the sultanates of Tidore and Ternate weaker (Brown et al. 2005: 12).

The acceleration of religion as identity has its roots in the New Order’s purge against the

Indonesian communist party (PKI). Indonesians without a stated religion were automatically

suspected as being communists. Hence, every Indonesian citizen was required to carry identity

cards stating their religion. And not any religion of choice, but only the government approved

religions: Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Therefore,

thousands of people, communists as well as other people who were atheists, converted to any

of these religions, in fear of being punished for being an atheist (alleged communist)

(Bertrand 2004: 74). In Maluku province, where the population was almost split evenly

between the two communities, these policies became a source of growing tensions. Further,

the once privileged Christian community in Indonesia in general, and in Maluku in particular,

became increasingly marginalised compared to before. This was an effect of the late

Islamisation of Suharto’s New Order. One of the most significant changes during Suharto’s

Islamisation was the creation of ICMI, which signalled the departure from the regime’s

previous policy of denying political platforms to Muslims. According to Bertrand (2004:

114), the conflict in Maluku “was a consequence of New Order policies that disrupted the

balance of power between the two communities”. Further, patrimonial networks also

reinforced group identities, as influential and profitable positions within the civil service

became a source of competition between the religious communities. Therefore, even before

1999, religious identities in Maluku were highly politicised and the groups were poised for

conflict (Bertrand 2004: 114). The official transmigration policy under Suharto, which

24

encouraged people to move from overpopulated islands (i.e. Java), to less populated ones, had

impacts for the Moluccas. Together with spontaneous migration, it changed the fragile ethnic

and religious balances. The majority of the migrants and transmigrants were Muslims from

Java, but also Muslims from Sulawesi. It was not just a demographic change, but also a social

and economic aspect: the transmigration policies entitled them to communal land which had

traditionally been owned by local communities. In some places infrastructure projects

intended for the transmigrants displaced or negatively affected the local communities (Brown

et al. 2005: 12).


The respondents did not state the long autocratic rule under Suharto as a conflict factor.

Similar for all the youths’ answers were likewise that they do not describe any tensions

towards the migrant communities before the conflict erupted, unlike the literature. The same

trend is mostly accurate for what the literature describes as Islamisation in the region.

However, both Pat, and Mimmi a 23 year old Muslim from Ambon, argued that inequalities

between the religious communities did have some influence. Mimmi said;

At first in the conflict yes [effect of inequalities]. Maybe it [the conflict] was about why some people got

important positions in the government, […] but I think it is equal between Muslims and Non-muslims now.

When I asked Pat about if Suharto’s Islamisation policies had affected, as a conflict factor, he

replied: “Yes, I think it did, even if I think it was not a big problem”. Dani had a different

view compared to the other respondents regarding Suharto’s Islamisation: “Rather it should

be called Javanisation because so many Javanese people come to take jobs in Ambon. In the

Suharto era just one Governor was from the Moluccas”.

5.4 The Peace Agreement and Role of the Government

This part includes a review and analysis of the Malino II agreement and further analyses the

Indonesian government’s role according to the different perspectives.


The national government had long failed in its reconciliation attempts and was even accused

of neglecting the conflict by many. A more resolute attempt was initiated under the backing of

25

the Coordinating Minister for People´s Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, to repeat the successful Malino

peace talks.15 On Kalla´s initiative the Governor of Maluku got to select one representative

from each side in the conflict, and then that representative selected a larger group of

representatives from each community (HD Centre 2011: 20). After three days of negotiations

in Malino, the Malino II peace agreement was signed on February 11th, 2002.16 The

agreement looks ambitious on paper and contains eleven specific points, i.e. end all disputes,

disarm militias, establish an independent investigation team, call for voluntary refugees to

return and to rehabilitate mental health, as well as social, economic and public infrastructure

(ReliefWebsite 2002). Graham Brown et al. (2005) writes:

Stakeholders consulted as part of BAPPENAS/UNDP process, confirm that the Malino II agreement retains

broad legitimacy in the province and it is still seen as important in bringing an end to the violence by providing

a ‘platform for future peace action’. However, as later violent events testify the agreement did not manage to

achieve sustained absence of violence.

The weaknesses of the agreement lie not in its content, but rather in how the process went

about. Firstly, the process was top-down oriented since the government had already made a

ready draft of the agreement. Secondly, more time for the representatives of the different

communities to engage in this important agreement would have been beneficial in a long-term

perspective. Further, religious leaders were not part of the process. This aspect gave the

agreement less credibility with many within the religious communities (HD Centre 2011: 26).

In Maluku, episodes of large-scale violence have been numerous, even after the peace

agreement. In contrast, North Maluku did experience far less outbursts of violence. After the

Malino II agreement, there was a widespread feeling within some communities that the

agreement lacked credibility. This became especially evident when the Muslim negotiation

leader´s house got burned down, after the signing of the agreement (ibid.).

In the subsequent months after Malino II, violence still occurred periodically (Bertrand

2004: 133) with the majority concentrated to Ambon city e.g., the bomb thrown into a crowd

in Jan Paays street in the Christian area, which killed seven people and injuring 56 (Barron

2012: 18). In 2004, another serious outbreak of violence happened when more than 40 people

died following riots in Ambon. This happened after Alex Manuputty, a well-known Christian

leader of the FKM, had the RMS flag raised at his home (Brown et al. 2005:17). FKM was

15 The Malino I peace agreement had helped bringing an end to the conflict in Central Sulawesi; see Brown et al.

(2005: 51).

16 To review the agreement in detail see (the Relief Website).

26

seen as a cover for a revived RMS, which was a very sensitive issue in Maluku, and still is.

Even outside of Ambon, communal conflicts have escalated into violence.


The views of the legitimacy of the Malino II peace agreement differ between the respondents,

and some state that they do not know so much about it i.e., Gary. Both Gino and Dani were in

favour of the initiative. Gino argues: “[the agreement] was a breakthrough in solving this

problem”. However, they both shared the view, which is shared by all respondents, that it took

too long for the government to act. Dani said:

I still remember in December in year 2000, President Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] said that the Ambonese

should take care of their situation themselves […] it was kind of like ‘wow’, the President of our state is just

letting us like that…

Riri and Mimmi both claim that the [Moluccan] people did more to support peace, compared

with the government. Mimmi said: “When the conflict started they [the Indonesian

government] was so slow […] for me the conflict in Ambon did not go back to normal

because of the government, but because of the people themselves”. Overall the respondents

confirm the picture of a peace agreement which was quite in-effective, as described in most

literature as well.

5.5 The Role of the Elites and Provocateurs

Here follows a review and analysis of the different aspects relating to both national and local

elites. Provocateurs were often blamed for being behind much of the conflict and this aspect

will also be covered here.


The violence in the Moluccas has many connections with local elite’s struggles for resources

and important positions and should be viewed in a context of decentralisation and

democratisation, which created great political uncertainty across the nation (Brown et al.

2005: 30-31). Most large incidents of violence need to be organized and the coordination and

mobilisation was usually done by elite leaders. So, who is included into this elite? Previous

27

research mentions regional politicians, traditional, and religious leaders, as well as

commanders of criminal gangs and militias. These elites often exist in many levels e.g.

village, district, or province (Barron et al. 2012: 26). One factor that contributed to why elites

used violent methods is that there was a lack of accurate information. Both sides therefore

continued with violence to show that they were strong, or because they under- estimated the

other side. Another reason is that episodic violence is sometimes used to increase the size of

the resources being sent for peace-building and peacekeeping operations,17 in the post-conflict

period. This is relevant to the conflict in the Moluccas, since episodes of violence continued

to erupt many years after the Malino II peace agreement was signed in 2002. Literature

regarding war economies has revealed that even when there are various other reasons behind

extended violence than materialistic, logics of predation often sees an increase in significance

over time. For example it can create opportunities for criminal rent-making activities i.e.

‘protection service’, trade in drugs, minerals, and monopolisation of different economic

sectors. In this conflict, local elites have had incentives to use violence since it has paid off in

the past, and also because the risk of engaging in violence is still low. This was evident after

the peace agreement too; potential trouble-makers have many times been rewarded with

important jobs and resources, with the intent of more or less bribing them to become peaceful.

Violence has even been used by elites to deter corruption investigations of funds received by

the elite, which evidently has worked since some investigations suddenly have been called

off, and few big shots have been convicted (Barron et al. 2012: 122). While elite motivations

are an important part behind the violence in the Moluccas, it is needed to state that the

motivation on a grass-root level also is an important piece of the puzzle. Without tensions and

some acceptance of violence as means for solving conflict, the incentives for elites to use

violence would decrease (Barron et al. 2012: 30). In the Moluccas and many other provinces

of Indonesia, the elites often use ‘premans’18 which may include gang members, ex-

combatants, thugs or other ‘violence specialist’, to pursue political goals19 (Wilson 2010:

200). The process of fast decentralization, that saw important means of power and control get

transferred to the district level, further increased the incentives for elites and religious groups

17 More than 630 million USD was spent on international programs to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate former

combatants in the year of 2007(Barron et al. 2012: 28).

18 Meaning gangster or thug.

19 ‘…these groups [preman] are often involved in racketeering and violent entrepreneurship, both as a service to

supply a ready market for forms of intimidation and in the form of a coercive relationship imposed on their imidiate communities’ (Wilson 2010: 200).

28

to gain access to key bureaucratic and political jobs.20 This eventually led to the use of

violence as politicians sometimes used militia or thugs to pursue their goals (Barron et al.

2012: 41).

Elites emphasised religious difference and the (potential) threat of other confessional groups to mobilise

masses in violent actions, often for self-serving purposes (ibid.).

When some of these underlying motivations became more evident as the violent conflict

continued, peace efforts started to include means of pleasing the needs of the elites, which

often were divided along religious lines. Both bureaucrats with significant power and local

politicians are included into this group, as well as leaders of militia groups. Many of these

persons were present in more than one of these categories (Barron et al. 2012: 41-42). The

democratisation process that was on-going in all of Indonesia also meant that important

positions now had to be obtained through rallying popular support. In the past this has many

times been achieved by currying favour with the national elite in the capital city Jakarta. Thus,

the motivations to mobilize along religious and ethnic lines increased (Brown et al. 2005: 30).

The national elite include members of the army and also economic and political elites linked

to the Suharto family. It is clear that the national elite lost much of its former power and

access to resources from the decentralisation process. Therefore, it has been widely suspected,

but never overwhelmingly proved, that some within the national elite tried to provoke violent

conflict in the Moluccas, and other provinces too. By doing so, they would try to reassert the

need for a strong central leadership and resources to the military (Brown et al. 2005: 31). A

(HRW: March 1999) report mention three categories of theories with relation to immediate

causes, which ignited the communal war:

Provocations by people within the Christian community aiming to revive local

domination through bolstering support for the RMS and attacking Muslim migrants;

Provocation by local military officers through mobilisation of RMS support but with

the intent of benefitting from the anticipated Muslim backlash;

20 The law 22/1999 on Regional Government and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Regions and the

Central Government led to a significant transfer of authority, as well as resources, to districts (Barron et al. (2012: 41). Regional government spending went up 15 percent between 2000 to 2002 (ibid.).

29

The conflict was triggered by elements within the military and the national elites to

destabilise the process of democratisation and let the military to resume power, as

during the Suharto era.

In North Maluku province, some of the violence follows a similar pattern; much of the initial

violence took place between followers of two top rival political candidates, which clashed in

the provincial capital of Ternate (Brown et al. 2005: 31). In this area, much of the fighting

was also centred on the creation of a new sub-district, which eventually led to fighting and

evacuation of the Makian community.


When asked the question what reasons were behind the conflict, the most common answer

from the youths was provocateurs. However, when asked who the provocateurs were the

answers varied. Most were uncertain who was really pulling the strings behind the

provocations. Mimmi expressed her view regarding the provocateurs as follows: “It is like a

ghost to me. You always hear about provocateurs, but until now I am not sure […] like what

organisations or who is behind this provocations”. None of the respondents linked a specific

name to be held responsible for the provocations. Unlike the literature, none mentioned the

possibility of local leaders ( i.e. religious, traditional or political) to be behind the

provocations. However, some respondents mentioned political links, but rather unspecified.

Pat argued;

There are so many reasons that could be discussed, but provocations… You know? There are so many people

that we call provocateurs. In my view it was provocateurs and politics that started the conflict. You know how

politics is in Indonesia… […] sometimes they [the national government] cause big problems like the

government corruption and like that.

Gino was the only respondent to make the connections to the fall of Suharto and the New

Order regime and the transition from autocracy to democracy;

The conflict started in 1999, and before that was a very terrible situation in Indonesia. You know the ruin of

the New Order and I think after that, some of the ‘secret people’ take advantage of the situation to screw up the

country.

30

This looks like being a reference relating to the third theory mentioned in the HRW report

(above), which stated that elements within the military and national elite triggered the conflict

to destabilise the democratisation process and let the military resume power, as during the era

under General Suharto.

When asked about what role the provocateurs played in the conflict, some respondents

emphasised the spread of disinformation. Riri reasoned; “They managed to spread gossip all

the time, which often was not true. It was about religion all the time”. Some respondents also

mentioned possible connections to the military. Gary spoke about the military: “ […] If

people in the public were armed, there must be someone who gave it to them…”

5.6 The Media

This part will focus on the role of the media throughout the conflict and post-conflict

scenario. Especially the local media has been accused of taking sides in the conflict and this

factor is therefore important to review and analyse deeper.


The media21 in Indonesia had newly become ‘free’ after more than 30 years under

authoritarian restrictions22 (ISAI & IMS 2004: 5). Yet, the coverage of the conflict by the

media was more often used as a tool to instigate violence. Especially in Ambon, Maluku

where the media fast got divided along religious lines to promote disinformation and

disseminate rumours (HD Centre 2011: 24). In the beginning of the violence media

infrastructure, as well as journalists themselves were targets by both sides. The consequence

of this was that almost all media actors seized to cover anything during the months of intense

fighting, which opened the door for rumours and propaganda as the prime sources of

information, at the local level (ISAI & IMS 2004: 5).

In a survey with 350 Moluccans, over 40 percent said that their main source of conflict

information was “Gossip or Friends” (Brown et al. 2005: 34).

The national media also had some coverage of the conflict, but it usually lacked depth and

permanence. The national media faced multiple difficulties the first years after the fall of

Suharto, due to much unrest in several parts of the archipelago at the same time. At the same

21 Including newspapers, radio and the internet.

22 Since August 30, 1999 under the new Indonesian Press Law.

31

time the newly freed media lacked sufficient educated journalists which strongly affected the

professionalism of the media both at national and local levels (ISAI & IMS 2004: 6). When

the local media was operating, it often played a decisive role in the conflict dynamics, because

of the publishing of biased stories which inflamed feelings in both communities (Brown et al.

2005: 33). ‘Envelope journalism’ which means that journalists accept money for writing

certain stories, was another obstacle to professional reporting (ISAI & IMS 2004: 5). One

reason behind the fast sectarian division of the local media was the fact that many media

outlets were controlled by one of the religious groups through ownership, even prior to the

violent conflict. Many groups published rumours and propaganda on the internet and some

actors even founded their own mediums i.e. Radio Suara Penjuangan Muslim Maluku, a radio

station by Laskar Jihad (Brown et al. 2005: 33). The Indonesian government was also guilty

of spreading disinformation e.g., a government report23 in 2001 stated that 1,382 mosques

versus 18 churches had been burned between June and October 2000. The report was later

withdrawn when Governor Latuconsina stated the actual numbers; 87 mosques and 127

churches (Brown et al. 2005: 34). There is at least one example of a media initiative with aim

of building peace, and that is the Baku Bau peace movement. They held workshops for

journalists about peace journalism and later helped to create the MMC. This is a media centre

which comprises both communities, where they can verify and exchange information, which

had been almost non-existent prior to that (HD Centre 2011: 25). Yet, up until today there are

reports of continuous disinformation being disseminated in the Moluccas. In many cases

disinformation is picked up by radical sites outside the region e.g. www.voa-islam.com, who

preach that all Christians are RMS supporters. Voa-islam is closely linked to DDII which is a

national organisation that funds deeply conservative clerics to mosques around the country

(ICG 2012: 3).


The respondents did not mention the internet as a source of misinformation, as the literature

did. Furthermore, none of the youths talked about Laskar Jihad’s own radio station. However,

there were few questions with such similar answers amongst the respondents, as the one

regarding the role of the media as a factor in the conflict. All, except Mimmi, argued that the

local media took sides during the conflict and that this factor had a negative impact for the

people. Pat said: “I think the media was sometimes in the middle, and sometimes not.

23 A report issued by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs, July 2011.

32

Sometimes the media make a bigger problem, make it worse”. Riri further exemplified some

of the disinformation, that she argued came from the local media;

The local media were often taking sides depending on from what group that media belonged to. Muslim local

media were always blaming the chaos on the RMS, and the Christian media were always said that the conflict

happened because the military took sides on the Muslim side.

Dani also argued that the media were taking sides and he gave some examples;

For Christians you could see for example Siwalima, Dara-Pos and Suara Maluku. On the Muslim side you

found Ambon Ekspres, Suara Maluku and more. So many took sides in the conflict because the journalists

were scared too. Often they only interviewed people from the one side.

Gino, who is Muslim, still considered the local media to be siding in favour of the Muslim

community: “[…] In the local media the Islamic influence was very strong […] we can

recognise from the language, the headlines”.

Mimmi was one of the few respondents who expressed most concern about the coverage in

the national media, compared to the local media coverage.

5.7 The Security Forces

This part focus on the roles of the security forces, which include both the police force and

military units. Elements within the security forces were mentioned as provocateurs (above)

and their roles is important to analyse further.


Biased sections within both the military and police forces was a key escalator of conflict in

the Moluccas. Initially, the security forces were accused of inaction and incompetence when

facing low level violence (Brown et al. 2005: 33). Further along the conflict, many security

33

forces were reported to have joined the fighting, based on their own religious affiliation24 and

also sold weapons on the black market (Brown et al. 2005: 33; Bertrand 2004: 129). Regional

chief of police, Firman Ghani, admitted that about ten percent of his forces were ‘missing’ in

the year 2000 (Crouch 2010: 256). Even in-fighting between police and military took place25

(HD Centre 2011: 21-22). The strong partisanship of both police and military also led to the

increasing of local militia; when the credibility of many security forces went to the bottom

among the Moluccan people, some subsequently formed militias as a means of protecting

themselves (Brown et al. 2005: 33).

This phenomenon escalated when it spread to Java and the creation of the Laskar Jihad. This

fundamentalist Islamic militia perceived the communal violence as a holy war. A group of

sympathetic officers within TNI provided military training and supplied the militia with

modern weapons, before thousands joined the fighting in mid-2000 (ICG 2002: 1). This had a

major impact on the conflict dynamics, putting the Christian militias on the defensive and

forcing thousands of Christians to flee. After that, civil emergency was imposed in both

provinces. At the same time the army launched a new strategy involving a Joint Battalion.

This unit included elite forces from three services and proved quite effective since fighting

started to decline. However, there were several allegations of brutality from members of the

unit26 (ICG 2002: 1). Extortion is another problem associated with security forces; people

were forced to pay the police or military if they wanted their protection (HD Centre 2011: 22).

Furthermore, many sources tell of both police and military personnel playing active parts in

initiating episodes of post-conflict violence i.e., the Letwaru incident, RMS riots in 2004 and

the September 2011 riots (Barron et al. 2012: 105-115). To a large extent, the motives behind

this involvement seem to be financial, especially with security personnel from outside the

region. These forces, known as BKO troops, have become increasingly active in the informal

economy.27 This is a means of gaining extra income both at a personal level, as well as

upwards in the hierarchy (Barron et al. 2012: 107). Thus, these units wish to remain in the

Moluccas and keep the financial benefits they have created. Therefore, individuals within the

security forces are still part of, and tolerating, violence to occur to motivate their presence and

extra funding (Barron et al. 2012: 105-107).

24 Security personnel who had removed their uniforms, or deserted, were known as pasukan siluman (phantom

forces) during the conflict, and post-conflict periods of violence (Crouch 2010: 256).

25 In July 2000, fighting between military (Batallion 509) and Brimob left at least one police dead (HD Centre

2011: 22).

26 Yon Gab (Batalyon Gabungan) was established in June 2000 and later replaced in November 2001 by army

special forces (Kopassus).

27 Including i.e. illegal mining, drugs, running cinemas, student housing, gambling, car rental etcetera (Barron et

al. 2012: 107).

34


The roles and involvement of the security forces in the conflict is a complex issue and turned

out to be a topic which generated quite different answers from the respondents. Gino was the

only respondent who mainly told of a good experience in relation to the security forces: “As

far as I know the military played a role of protecting the minority”. Yet, when speaking about

the police he mentioned that they sometimes did not have enough resources to stop the

violence: “[…] people came and brought people, weapons, swords and the police just could

not do anything”.

Dani was the only respondent who said he had been active in the fighting during the

conflict. He had bought weapons together with his father, who was a Christian militia

commander during the conflict. Dani revealed;

[…] at the first times they handed it out for free, but afterwards they sold it to us. It was like 5,000 IDR for one

bullet. You could get M-16´s or AK-47´s too for around 3 million IDR […] At my 15th birthday (one year into

the conflict) my father gave me a M16 as a birthday present, with a grenade launcher, and a Beretta (pistol)

that I used to carry when I went to school.

Dani’s experiences confirm the picture of a security apparatus being corrupt, biased and

active in the conflict in a negative way, as well as the fact that many youths participated

actively in the conflict. Some respondents have been more sheltered from the direct conflict it

seems. Mimmi claims she had heard much about the security forces taking sides, but never

seen it herself. She also argue that the police and military could not handle the large-scale

violence erupting “Many say the military came late to make the situation ok, but the military

say it is not their job to handle that, it should be the police. And the police say they do not

have enough people […]”. Pat argued that the conflict could have been stopped if it was not

for the fact that the security forces were taking sides. Gary, who is the son of a local police,

has a different perception regarding the police: “[…] most of the police did not take sides

between groups. They were more likely to save people who did not want to be in the conflict,

like us”. In contrast, Riri, claimed that she and her family had been victims of an attack from

people within the military;

In my experience, the military was helping the Muslim side in the conflict more. When I was 11 years old,

35

people from the military burned our house down […] and shot my father, so that is partly why I can say they

were on the Muslim side. […] Every time I saw the military [after that] I always ran, just seeing them was

traumatic.

Many respondents have different stories to tell regarding the actions, and in-action, of the

security forces. Put together they do confirm many factors mentioned in previous research i.e.,

in-action, bias, corruption, poor capacity and sometimes provoking escalation of the violence.

Moreover, the consequences of these factors are made evident through some of the

respondents’ personal, often tragic, experiences. Yet, as is also suggested in the literature: the

picture is not entirely black and white. In some areas the external Joint Battalion, did manage

to put an end to some of the violence. However, that happened after one year of communal

war. That delayed reaction from the government and the military, is an aspect that was

expressed by the majority of the respondents as well. Moreover, the respondents did not

mention the entering of the Laskar Jihad militia. Yet, it seems, as Dani did mention, that the

delayed response from the security forces, as well as biased involvement, resulted in the

forming of militias as a way of protecting the community. The security forces further

escalated the conflict by selling weapons to the militias in their own communities, an aspect

confirmed by Dani, and often mentioned in previous research.

5.8 Inter-communal Relations and Pela-gandung

This final factor includes a review and analysis of the traditional system of Pela-gandung, as

well as how the inter-communal relations between the communities are perceived.


According to the literature, one of the important factors which hindered peace between the

fighting communities was the desire for revenge (Brown et al. 2005: 34). People may

experience revenge both at the communal level or personal level. This is also true for the

actions related to the desire for revenge. Conflicts can easily escalate if revenge moves from

the personal level to the communal, thus it is of great importance to deal with in relation to

social cohesion. The aspect of revenge being transferred could be seen in the conflict i.e. the

36

large demonstrations in Jakarta in January 2000, which led to the creation of Laskar Jihad

with the intention to revenge their Muslim brethren in the Moluccas (Brown et al. 2005: 36).

In many cases though, the personal desire have been more evident throughout the Moluccas.

Many interviews conducted have described the majority seeking revenge against the

murderers of family members, and not directed against the other community. Even though the

conflict divided most parts of the Moluccas along religious lines, there are more positive

examples as well at the grassroots level. In Wayame village they established a group

including 10 local Christians and 10 local Muslims who managed to keep the peace between

the religious communities. They maintained critical to un-verified rumours and managed to

convince villagers that the conflict was not about religion.

The ‘Baku Bae’ Peace Movement was another example of an initiative which helped forge a

common identity between both communities. This movement was built by civil society actors

in Ambon e.g. NGO activists, YLBHI, LBH Jakarta, lawyers, journalists, scholars, and also

local representatives i.e. village and religious leaders. It was also this movement that helped to

establish the MMC (HD Centre 2011: 24). Pela-gandung is the name of a traditional system in

the Moluccas, which can be seen as an oath of allegiance, usually between Islamic and

Christian villages (Brown et al. 2005: 20). The system promotes mutual help between the

villages. Dieter Bartels (1977: 325) argued that Pela-gandung formed the basis of an

Ambonese identity which had the important ability to transcend religion. However, these

traditional structures became less influential under Suharto’s rule, which have led some

scholars to doubt the importance of Pela-gandung for today’s communal relations (Brown et

al. 2005: 21).


Many respondents have different experiences regarding the inter-communal relations. Dani

for example, who participated actively in the fighting, have witnessed situations which might

have led to feelings of revenge:

I had three or four of my good friends from junior high school […] we joined in the conflict and in the second

year they died in the conflict, […] I remember I brought my Beretta pistol. They just brought what we call

‘rakitan weapons’ [home made weapons]. […] After I saw my two best friends die in the conflict, it made me

very upset and angry towards Muslim people.

37

Looking back at that violent period, about ten years ago, Dani can reflect and expresses

dislike of the way religion was manipulated during the violence:

[…] I think religion should be about me and my god. Other people should not have the right to decide what

kind of religion you should fight for. During the conflict religion was about identity.

Mimmi explained her view on how the inter-communal relations changed over time, and

especially when she started at Pattimura University, which is one of the few schools in the

Moluccas which is not segregated depending on the students religion;

When the conflict came we felt chocked. Why was religion becoming a problem for us? […] The conflict

made a kind of trauma for us. So when we met someone new we used to ask what religion they had, and if they

had a different religion I was scared. But when I went to collage later and met so many other people I realised

it is not a problem for me. […] We are the same; Moluccans.

Another aspect which unites all respondents is the view that the Pela-gandung system played

a significant role in the reconciliation process. The literature rather downplays that role on the

contrary. Mimmi explained how Pela-gandung could work;

There are some programs for everyone, kind of like cultural events that people do together between different

villages to improve relations. It reminds us that we are brothers and sisters. […] the concept of Pela-gandung

includes unity in diversity for Moluccans.

Gino describes the motive of revenge and argued that Pela-gandung played an important role,

but not initially;

I think it was a strong tool but for the post-conflict time only. During the conflict no one mentioned Pela-

gandung, because many people hated one another and just wanted to fight and kill. It is all because they saw

their family get killed, and they wanted revenge, that is what happened.

Riri, like most respondents, emphasise the view that the local people were the most important

aspect in reconciliation: “[…] the peace in Ambon was made by the people who thought again

about their local wisdom culture like Pela-gandung”. Furthermore, she is the only one

mentioning positive NGO involvement;

38

There are some good programmes now in Ambon by both Save the Children and UNICEF, that are bringing

youths together from the two communities.

5.9 Discrepancies between the Youths’ Perceptions and Previous

Research

Conflict factors highlighted in previous research have many times been confirmed also in a

bottom-up perspective. Yet, there are also significant discrepancies to be found. The literature

argued that horizontal conflicts started during colonialism, which divided the local population

along religious lines, (Bertrand 2004: 115) e.g., providing education and jobs mainly to the

Christian communities (Brown et al. 2005: 10). Such inequalities are claimed by many

scholars as being important conflict drivers. Yet, the majority of the youths did not agree on

that. Many viewed the Moluccas to be quite equal in that aspect, both before and today.

However, all respondents agreed that religion was a part of their identity and described how

the conflict enforced religious segregation.

The next factor, the loyalty towards the nation of Indonesia, also revealed a great

discrepancy between the literature and the youths’ perceptions. Not even Dani, who had taken

active part in the fighting in the Christian youth militia, expressed any support for the RMS,

or FKM, movements. Instead, many respondents mentioned RMS in relation to

disinformation in the media. The only respondent to mention the RMS as a conflict driver was

Gino, who grew up in North Maluku province. RMS has mostly been reported to be active in

Ambon, in Maluku province. Further discrepancies compared to previous research were that

neither transmigration nor the autocratic legacy was emphasised as important conflict

drivers by the youths. Though, an interesting aspect in my view, was Dani’s opinion that the

Islamisation under Suharto, was rather a Javanisation. The next factor brought up the Malino

II agreement. Here, the youths and the literature pretty much agreed that it took way too long

for the government to come up with a peace initiative. Further, both perspectives also stress

that the agreement was ineffective after its implementation. The exceptions being Gino and

Dani who withheld that the agreement had been a positive influence, even if it took too long

implement. In general, the major discrepancy between the two perspectives is that the

39

respondents share the view of the Moluccan people as more important for reconciliation,

compared to any government initiative.

The question regarding the role of elites and provocateurs is interesting in many ways.

Provocateurs were the most frequent answer given by the youths, when asked about what the

reasons were behind the conflict. Yet, much uncertainty remains among the respondents up

until today concerning who the provocateurs really are. Such reasoning is highly

understandable, in my view, given the fact that it remains a shady phenomenon, hard to prove,

according to the literature as well. Gino was the only respondent to give an answer which

indicated specific involvement of national elites.

Pat was the only respondent to stress the factor of corruption to be involved, but he also

pointed to the national level. None of the respondents suggested the possible involvement of

corrupt local elites. Gary’s answer did point out military corruption to be part of the problem,

which also is evident by the experiences of Dani, who had bought weapons from corrupt

military personnel. This shows how many conflict factors are interrelated, i.e., the corrupt

security forces, provocateurs and elites. Yet, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents

even mention corrupt local elites, e.g., the politicians fighting in the gubernatorial elections.

Several sources in the previous research also present solid examples of links to involvement

of local elites, which is evident when potential troublemakers have been given important

positions, corruption investigations aimed at local top bureaucrats and politicians have been

called off. The media was another factor in the conflict.

The respondents all held the media accountable for disseminating biased news throughout

the conflict. Mimmi was the only respondent to argue that the national media was more biased

than the local media. The literature also mentioned the internet as a source of misinformation

wich affected the Moluccas. The respondents, however, did not mention that aspect at all, as

well as Laskar Jihads’s radio station.

The role of the security forces were complex and a multifaceted issue in the literature, which

is reflected by the answers by the respondents. The common theme among them was negative

experiences though. Their stories often included very personal tragic events related to the

involvement of security forces. Many examples given by the interviewees is to be found in the

literature as well, i.e. bias, poor capacity, corruption, in-action as well as a source of further

provocations. The significant discrepancy between the perspectives is that the respondents did

not mention that elements within the security forces were helping Laskar Jihad (training,

arming and allowing them to enter the Moluccas), which involvement changed the balance

during the violence. The last factors analysed were inter-communal relations and the Pela-

40

gandung system. Here, a notable discrepancy was the respondents’ view on the importance of

the Pela-gandung system. Previous research had stressed that revenge, often on a personal

level, was a big obstacle for a sustainable peace. This aspect was confirmed by two of the

respondents; Gino and Dani.

41

6. Collective Guilt Analysis

The second analytical chapter focuses on applying the theory of collective guilt. The analysis

will explore if the theory of collective guilt can help explain the discrepancy between

previous research and the perception of the youths’ regarding the conflict factors.

6.1 Collective Guilt

This part will analyse the youths’ perceptions in relation to the four psychological factors that

are needed to evoke collective guilt. The experience of collective guilt is related to the extent

of which the four factors are accurate. The experience of collective guilt can be a rare

phenomenon because people sometimes use strategies which aim to reduce the feeling and

legitimise the actions of the own group (Wohl et al. 2006: 4). These strategies will also be

analysed in relation to the youths’ perceptions.

6.1.1 Self-categorisation with the Harm-doing Group

One can argue that all respondents can be said to self-categorise with a harm-doing group,

Christian or Muslim. According to the literature, both these community groups have taken

turns in being harm-doers and victims. None of the youths claimed to belong outside of their

community religious group. All admitted that religion was part of their identity, some more

than others e.g., Riri who argued that it was the strongest aspect of her self-identity.

Even though it is only one respondent who claims he was active in the actual violence, all

respondents claim to be part of the one of the harm-doing groups. Yet, personal involvement

is not necessary. The most important is the aspect of association with the group.The self-

categorisation with the harm-doing group is more uncertain though, if one focus on the

42

respondents’ perceptions regarding who, or what groups, were to blame for the conflict. The

most common answer was provocateurs, but the youths answers were in general vague

regarding who the provocateurs were. Yet, that aspect will be covered more in the subsequent

analysis regarding strategies to avoid collective guilt. To conclude, I stress that the

respondents are all ‘guilty’ of the self-conscious feeling of associating oneself with the harm-

doing group.

6.1.2 Recognition of Responsibility

This factor is considering if the self-categorised group members also recognise their group to

be responsible for the action considered harmful for the other community, or social group.

This factor has no clear-cut answer regarding the respondents’ perceptions. None of the

respondents, except Dani, explicitly mentioned that their group should be held responsible for

harm towards the other group. Yet, reading between the lines, many respondents do stress the

fact that the conflict did involve harm for both sides, but few respondents want to be explicit

about it during the interviews.

Dani however, who had been active in the fighting, did make some reflections regarding

responsibility of harm: “Muslim people are very kind to my mom because she helped them

[working in a refugee camp], it is different if you mention my father’s name… [he was a

militia leader] because my father was very dangerous for them”. He further reflects on his

involvement in the fighting;

I enjoyed the situation, not when your friends die, but when we got the enemy. Maybe it was like three or four

enemies coming and we could show them and shoot at them when they were coming. That was exciting. […]

In Ambon I always felt I needed to protect my Christian identity, killing Muslim people, burn the mosque and

their houses. It was like that. But now when I got older, it is bad memories.

Dani clearly admits being personally involved in fighting which resulted in considerable harm

for the other group. Many other respondents do not mention any specific harmful actions

committed by their group.

Yet, many tell of the general feeling of hatred and revenge towards the other group, which

kept the conflict alive. Gino grew up in Sanana in a village where the majority were Muslims

like him, but including a Christian minority which got more affected during the conflict.

When the conflict erupted the Christians had to flee that area or risk being killed. Gino

expressed this scenario rather diplomatic;

43

The fact was that after the conflict had started the rest of the Christians, almost all of them moved. They went

away. There were just a couple of them that stayed…

He also recognised some responsibility on behalf of his community. I asked if he considered revenge

to be a motive for a lot of the violence. He replied;

Sure. Particularly in Islam… you know the concept of Jihad? Because if you participate in Jihad the feedback

is heaven, paradise. That is an Islamic perspective and lots of young men in my district participated in Jihad.

[…] During the conflict no one mentioned Pela-gandung because many people hated each other and they just

wanted to fight and kill.

Both Gino and Dani are explicit about the involvement of their groups (from opposing sides) in

the violent conflict, which is well-known to have inflicted great harm for both sides.

6.1.3 Perceptions of the Harm Done to be Illegitimate

The question of the perceived legitimacy is another aspect, which will be analysed here.

Closely related to this aspect is the question if the harm is considered immoral or not (Wohl et

al. 2006: 9). The answers to these questions are not obvious. There are tendencies from a few

respondents which could be interpreted as some harm done in the conflict was illegitimate,

e.g. Dani who reminisces considering his own involvement in the fighting: “[…] now when I

got older, it is bad memories”.

Reflections like that can be perceived as if Dani consider the harm inflected as something he

is not proud over and thus illegitimate. If he had considered such actions as legitimate, one

should anticipate that his perception should rather be related to feelings of pride or honour, for

defending his religion. Instead, when talking about religion in a conflict context, Dani argued:

“[…] I think that religion should be about me and my god. It is not about other people. Other

people do not have the right to decide what kind of religion you should be fighting for”.

Although Dani has mentioned that the fighting could be exciting when he was a teenager, he

has also indicated that he felt pressure from both his father and the Christian community to

defend his religion and identity. He said: “[…] If I did not help they would call me like a pity

or something in the neighbourhood. As the oldest child of the family, you have to help your

father”. However, Dani’s reflections only represent his perception. The majority of the

respondents are rather using different strategies to legitimise the harm, or use other strategies

to avoid collective guilt.

44

6.1.4 Perceived Difficulty and Costs of Correction

I conclude this factor to be problematic to analyse because it would first require that the harm-

doing group admitted their actions towards another group to be illegitimate (see above).

Dani’s personal perception alone, which relates to his own involvement, is not enough to

categorise the whole group. In my view, the majority of the respondents rather applied

different strategies aimed at reducing responsibility, to maintain a positive group image.

Therefore, after having applied the four psychological factors relating to collective guilt, I

conclude that the general perception of the respondents’ does not fulfil all the requirements

which cause the feeling of collective guilt. However, since the first, and partly the second

factor were accurate, I argue that some feelings of collective guilt are not unlikely. Yet, the

feelings have been reduced and that aspect will be analysed next.

6.2 Strategies Reducing Collective Guilt

In this part I analyse the three main strategies used to reduce the phenomenon of collective

guilt experienced by the local youths’. The first strategy is to put focus on the victimised out-

group’s experiences instead of the victimising in-group’s harmful behaviour. This strategy is

applied by several of the respondents. Gino for example, when talking about the violence,

preferred to explain the harm that the in-group were responsible for, by saying that people were

fighting because they had seen their family get killed etcetera.

Therefore, he argued that his in-group was motivated by feelings of revenge because that

was part of Jihad; the obligation to defend Islam, which is a strong concept in Islam, in his

view. This argument also relates to the next strategy which is to put blame on the out-group

for the harm they experienced. I argue that Gino, and other respondents too, usually explained

violence during the conflict by initially blaming the out-group for attacking first. By framing

the violence in that way, harmful actions against the out-group is normalised because it often

portrayed as an understandable reaction in the spirit of revenge or the obligation of Jihad.

The third strategy used to avoid collective guilt is to place blame on a few ‘black sheep’.

This person, persons or group should yet be categorised as a member of the in-group, but is

often portrayed as unusual or deviant, compared to the in-group. I argue that this strategy was

the most frequent used by the respondents to escape the feeling of collective guilt. As

45

mentioned before, provocateurs, was the most common answer to the question of who was

behind the conflict. Some respondents, for example Gino and Pat, argued that the

provocateurs probably were part of the national elite, which then does not categorise as

belonging to the in-group in the Moluccas. However, the majority of the respondents did

argue that both local Muslim and Christian security personnel were sometimes siding with

their community during the violence, selling weapons etcetera.

Riri, Pat, Dani and Gary all argued that they believed people within the military to be

provocateurs. Riri also stressed that local media on both sides was to be considered

provocateurs because they were taking sides and spreading false provocative information.

To conclude I stress that all strategies to reduce collective guilt has been represented among

the perceptions of the youths’. The most apparent strategy was to blame a few ‘black sheep’,

or in this context a few provocateurs. Yet, given the fact that all respondents did self-

categorise with a harm-doing group, and some even recognised their group to be responsible

for harming the other group, I argue that it is likely that collective guilt is experienced to

varying degrees. In general though, that feeling has been limited due to the use of different

strategies which reduced the experience of collective guilt amongst the Moluccan youths.

46

7. Conclusion

This study has contrasted the perceptions and experiences of the Moluccan youths’28 to

previous research regarding the conflict factors. Both similarities and differences exist

between the two perspectives. The first part of the analysis exposed a discrepancy between the

two perspectives regarding some of the conflict factors, which were highlighted and analysed

in chapter five. This final chapter will only address the main findings though. Furthermore, I

will discuss lingering possibilities relating to the research topic.

Previous research stressed the importance of lingering horizontal inequalities between

Muslims and Christians, as one of the conflict drivers. Very few of the respondents

emphasised that factor as significant.

The conflict in the Moluccas has sometimes been portrayed (e.g., occasionally in the

Indonesian media) as being caused by religion. Both the academic literature and the Moluccan

youths disagree on that simplification, which is evident in the analysis. Nonetheless, all

youths acknowledged religion as an important part of their self-identity and the literature also

conclude that it did not take long before the Moluccan society got (more) divided along

religious lines. A scenario also confirmed by the bottom-up perspective. Further discrepancies

included that neither transmigration nor the legacy of autocratic rule were emphasised as

important conflict drivers by the youths, contrasted to previous research.

Yet, Dani argued that the Islamisation under Suharto rather should be called a Javanisation.

This reflection is very interesting in my opinion. It promotes the view which emphasises a

unified Moluccan identity among the once so divided community. Dani had also expressed

remorse, when thinking back at his own involvement in the violent conflict, that religion was

manipulated and provoked for the wrong reasons. Many respondents argued in a similar way

and emphasised the importance of traditional systems like Pela-gandung, to help in the

reconciliation process.

28 I am only referring to the Moluccan youths who participated in this study. Thus, the result should, and cannot

be, generalised statistically.

47

Now, ten years after the peace agreement, many respondents argued that they had good

relations with the other community, and that the University of Pattimura in Ambon was a

milieu which inspired religious integration. That was the place that Mimmi described as

opening her eyes towards the fact that they were all Moluccans and that religion was not the

reason for the conflict. Another important aspect which separated the two perspectives was

the perceived role of elites and provocateurs. There is no simple answer that can explain the

differences and similarities between the two perspectives. I argue that some insights from

previous research (e.g., the roles of the media) are a part of the puzzle, because the youths

have been growing up in an environment influenced by disinformation. Yet, to understand and

analyse the perceptions of the local youths’ the main tool was the theory of collective guilt.

The analysis found that all strategies to reduce collective guilt were represented among the

perceptions of the youths’. The most obvious strategy was to blame a few ‘black sheep’, or in

this context a few provocateurs. However, since all respondents did self-categorise with a

harm-doing group, and some even accepted their group to be responsible for harming the

other group, I stress that it is likely that collective guilt is experienced to varying degrees. In

general though, that feeling has been limited because multiple strategies, which reduced the

experience of collective guilt amongst the Moluccan youths’, were in use.

This study has also led to the conclusion that further research is needed to explore this

matter more comprehensively e.g., by including a greater number of interviewees. The use of

a quantitative approach could also be an interesting option, if one aims to achieve

generalizability, as opposed to the aim of this study. It could also be very interesting to apply

a similar research design in another conflict context. For example, to analyse if collective

guilt is experienced among Indonesian military personnel in Papua province, in relation to the

conflict with OPM.

48

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Internet Sources

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Accessed on 30 July 2013

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ambon-violence


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regioner/Asien/Indonesien/Utvecklingen-i-Indonesien/

Accessed on 22 April, 2013.

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malino-malino-ii-signed-end-conflict-and-create-peace

Accessed on 3 May, 2013.

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Interviews

Interview 1. ‘Pat’, October 10th 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Interview 2. ‘Gino’, October 12th 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Interview 3. ‘Mimmi’, October 16th 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Interview 4. ‘Gary’. November 5th 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Interview 5. ‘Riri’. November 29th 2012 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Interview 6. ‘Dani’. December 5th 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

All interview recordings and transcripts are in the author’s possession.

53

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/ambon/

http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/what-caused-the-ambon-violence

http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/what-caused-the-ambon-violence

Appendix I

Interview Questions

1. How old are you?

2. Where were you born?

3. How long did you live there?

4. What religion do you have?

5. How were the relations between the Muslims and Christians before the conflict, in your

opinion?

6. What role do you think religion played in the conflict in the Moluccas?

7. Did you have any friends from another religion or different ethnic group before the

conflict?

8. Did you go to a school with mixed religions?

9. What role do you think the so called ’provocateurs’ had in the conflict?

10. What role did the military have in the conflict, in your view?

11. What role did the police have in the conflict, in your view?

12. What role do you think the media played in the conflict?

13. How did your daily-life change when the conflict erupted?

14. Did you have friends from the other religious community during the conflict?

15. When the conflict erupted in 1999 Indonesia was still struggling with the Asian economic

crisis. How do you think that effected the environment for conflict in the Moluccas?

54

16. During colonialism Christians were in general treated better than Muslims: they could get

work in the administration etcetera. But in the end of the Suharto era it changed, and Muslims

were given more influence. Some describe this as a process of Islamization in the late

Suharto-era. In your view, what influence did these policies have regarding the conflict, (if

any)?

17. How did the Indonesian government handle the conflict, in your opinion?

18. There is a traditional peace method used in the Moluccas called Pela-gandung. Do you

think that system still was influencial when the conflict started? If yes, how did it influence

the conflict?

19. Did the conflict change your view of the other religious community?

20. What is your opinion about the Malino II peace agreement?

21. Even after the peace agreement there have still been violence from time to time in the

Moluccas. What do you think is the reason behind this extended violence?

22. How are the relations now between Muslims and Christians in the Moluccas, in your

view?

23. What does Bhinneka Tunggal Ika [Indonesian national slogan meaning: ’Unity in

Diversity’] means to you?

24. Do you think that Indonesia is becoming more tolerant towards minorities, or more

intolerant?

55

Appendix II

Secondary Sources in the Analysis

Printed Sources

Barron, P., Azca, M N., & Susdinarjanti, T. 2012. After the Communal War: Understanding

and Addressing Post-Conflict Violence in Eastern Indonesia. Yogyakarta. CSPS, UGM.

Bartels, D. 1977. ‘Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, Religious

Syncretism and Ethnic Identity Among Ambonese Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas’,

PhD Thesis, Cornell University.

Bertrand, J. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge. Cambridge

University Press.

Brown, G., Wilson, C., Hadi, S., 2005. Overcoming Violent Conflict: Peace and Development

Analysis in Maluku and North Maluku. Jakarta, Indonesia Printers.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2011. Conflict Management in Indonesia – An Analysis of

the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso. Geneva. HD Centre.

Crouch, H. 2010. Political Reform in Indonesia After Suharto. Singapore. ISEAS.

International Crisis Group. 2002. The Search for Peace in Maluku. Asia Report no. 31.

Jakarta/Brussels.

International Crisis Group. 2012. Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon. Asia Briefing no. 133.

13 February 2012. Jakarta/Brussels. ICG.

ISAI and IMS. 2004. The Role of Media in Supporting Peace-Building and Reconciliation

Efforts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. Jakarta. UNDP-CPRU.

Taylor, J G., 2003. Indonesia: Peoples and Histories. New Haven. Yale University Press.

Van Gils, C., Cox, P A. 1994. ‘Ethnobotany of Nutmeg in the Spice Islands’ in Journal of

Ethnopharmacology. Vol 42, No 2, pp. 117-124.

56

Wilson, I. 2010. ‘The Rise and Fall of Political Gangsters in Indonesian Democracy’ in

Aspinall, E & Mietzner, M (eds.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections,

Institutions and Society, pp. 199-218. Singapore. ISEAS.

Wohl, M J A., Branscombe, N R., & Klar, Y. 2006. ‘Collective guilt: Emotional reactions

when one’s group has done wrong or been wronged’, in European Review of Social

Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-37. Routledge.

Wolf, E R., 1997. Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley. University of California

Press.

Internet Sources

Human Rights Watch, March 1999

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/ambon/


Relief Website, 14 February 2002

http://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-moluccas-agreement-malino-malino-ii-signed-

end-conflict-and-create-peace Accessed on 3 May, 2013.

57

the conflict in the moluccas:

Documents