the concept of death: a religio-philosophical analysis
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The Concept of Death: A Religio-philosophical AnalysisMohammad Rasekh a & S.M.R. Ayati ba Faculty of Law , Shahid Beheshti University , Tehran, Iran;b Faculty of Philosophy and Theology , Islamic AzadUniversity,ctTehran , IranPublished online: 18 Jul 2007.
To cite this article: Mohammad Rasekh & S.M.R. Ayati (2007) The Concept of Death: A Religio-philosophical Analysis, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:3, 377-389
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The Concept of Death:A Religio-philosophical Analysis
MOHAMMAD RASEKH� & S. M. R. AYATI��
�Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran; � �Faculty of Philosophy and Theology, Islamic
Azad University, Tehran, Iran
ABSTRACT In an age in which vast progress has been made in organ transplant technology, it isimperative to determine the point at which a human being is considered dead, for transplantationcannot occur until after death. Traditional religious views imply that a human being is dead uponthe departure of the soul from the body. Taking the biological death of the body as a conclusivesign of the soul’s departure is not an option. Biological death refers to decomposition, and thiscannot equate to the death of the person as such, for this would make the concept and practice oftransplantation absurd, for transplantable parts of a biologically dead—i.e. decomposing—bodycould not be used. On the other hand, if parts of the human body are themselves still biologicallyalive, could it not be said that taking such parts would amount to murder?
Two conclusions follow from this predicament. First, death as a ‘normative’ concept stands insharp distinction from a purely biological concept. Second, a normative concept of death isentangled with a normative concept of personhood. That is to say, from the moment that a humanbeing is not considered a person as such, parts of the body could be removed for transplantationor, indeed, for any other justified medical purpose. In this regard, various theories of the personare put forward. Which of these theories is compatible with a workable concept of death? In thispaper two principal theories of the person will be discussed and it will be argued that a brain-based theory of death is conducive to a normative concept of death, thus allowing for organtransplantation.
Why ‘The Concept of Death’?
The subject of this article arises from a paradox. On the basis of the normative religious
equation of death with the departure of the soul, the question to be asked is: Is there an
accurate, objective way to pinpoint the departure of the soul, thus confirming death, so
as to allow for the timely use of transplantable parts of the body? On the other hand, if,
indeed, full biological death is the only sure measure of the death of a human being,
does this not vitiate the possibility of organ transplantation, as either full biological
death renders organs unusable or else, if the body is not fully dead, their removal
Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,
Vol. 18, No. 3, 377–389, July 2007
Correspondence Address: Mohammad Rasekh, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Evin, Tehran 19839,
Iran; Email: [email protected]
0959-6410 Print/1469-9311 Online/07/030377–13 # 2007 CSIC and CMCUDOI: 10.1080/09596410701396121
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amounts to murder (should death be necessarily entailed)? The paradox may be a theor-
etical one, but the practical application that provokes it is not. It requires to be addressed.
Let us explain in reverse order. The application is the practice of transplantation. Fol-
lowing advances in biotechnological knowledge and methods during the last three decades
or so, it has become possible to remove certain organs of a person’s body—e.g. heart,
liver, cornea or kidney—in order to transplant or engraft them into another person. This
phenomenon has given rise to various quite complicated legal and ethical problems. For
instance, as a legal conundrum, could body organs be considered as property and,
hence, eligible for commercial transactions? Is the removal of organs from human
bodies an instance of a crime of injury or murder (especially if the removal amounts to,
or causes, death)? From an ethical point of view, is it not against human dignity to
allow the sale of body organs? Does this not reduce human beings to material objects,
quantifiable in terms of money?
More importantly, transplantation also raises philosophical issues. One of them is a
paradox. On the one hand, for an organ to be transplantable it should be biologically
alive. That is, the organ should not have deteriorated. In order for an organ to be engrafted
or transplanted, the procedure needs to take place within a short period of time (cf.
Menikoff, 2001, p. 462). On the other hand, separating a live organ from the body
should not amount to causing an injury to or the death of a human person. So, there
appears to be a paradox: ‘transplantation is possible when organs are alive, while no
harmful act of any kind to a live person is permissible’. The apparent contradiction
contained in this statement stems from an important underlying assumption. The claim
contained in the first part of the proposition, that engraftation is possible only when the
organ is alive, is a matter of fact; the claim included in the second part, that no harm to
a live person is permissible, is not. The second claim is an ‘ought-statement’ that embodies
a normative position. According to this position, every human person ought to be con-
sidered as possessing inherent value and, consequently, ought to be protected from any
kind of physical or psychological harm: ‘human beings ought to be taken as inherently
valuable entities’.1 The paradox therefore obtains as a result of the conflict between two
different claims: on the one hand, separating a part of a live human person is illicit
while, on the other, transplantation should take place some time before the complete
biological death of the body part.
It appears that the only way to do away with the paradox is to concede that, for the
purpose of transplantation, the death of a human person happens sometime before the bio-
logical demise of the whole body. To be more precise, a concept of death that is compa-
tible with the phenomenon of transplantation cannot be a ‘whole body’ (biological)
concept that implies the requirement of a complete lack of biological life in all parts of
(the whole) human body.2 A basic theoretical point ensues from this argument: death is
a ‘normative’ concept in the sense that it is not a description of a biological event,
namely, the demise of the whole body of a human person. On the contrary, death is a situ-
ation that is ‘considered as’ the end of the life of a human person. In other words, in that
situation or at that point a human person ‘ought to be considered as dead’ even though the
whole body is not biologically dead. Death, according to this view, is a prescriptive
concept that embodies a value judgement concerning the life of the human being. Why
and how is this so?
The answer seems simple. If death cannot be taken as equivalent to biological demise, it
is not an independently existing fact, free from any choice made by us. This being so, there
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is an element of choice regarding the definition of the death of a human person. Notwith-
standing the substance or nature of the choice, this element reveals that it is human choice
that determines when and how death occurs. In other words, death, from this perspective,
is not of itself a factual event; rather, it is an emblem chosen for a fact (or series of facts)
that, when it occurs, we are bound or required to take as death. This is exactly the meaning
of a normative concept; it is prescriptive rather than descriptive. On this basis, the discus-
sion turns on the nature of the choice that is being made for defining the death of a human
person. The reason is that the decision to take any event, other than the complete biological
death of the whole body, as the determining point of death will be an arbitrary choice.
Thus, any claim about the sign or basis of death, such as heart arrest, cessation of breath-
ing, higher-functioning brain death, whole brain death, or a combination of any or all of
these, should be backed up by supporting arguments. One could rightly question the pro-
posed criterion (or criteria) for the basis or sign of a human person’s death; hence, the
concept of death as a normative concept is in need of justification.
It is also worth noting that the very assumption underlying the second part of the
paradox is the main source of the normative nature of the concept of death. That part
reads, ‘no harmful act of any kind to a live person is permissible’, and the assumption
behind this claim is that ‘human beings ought to be taken as inherently valuable entities’.
It is clear that excising or removing part of the body of a live person is wrong, since the
person ought to be respected and, hence, protected from any harm. Accordingly, in order
to define the concept of death, we need to concentrate on the constitutive element(s) of the
human person. To do this, we shall look first into the sacred text of Islam, the Holy Qur’an,
to see whether or not it provides us with a clear concept of death.3
The Qur’anic View
The word ‘death’ and its derivatives are mentioned in 143 verses found in 53 chapters of
the Qur’an. They may be divided into three categories. First, some of the verses do not
relate to the event of human death at all, but rather deal with and discuss the death of
other creatures. For example, Q 2:164, which refers to ‘the water which God sends
down from the skies and the life which He gives therewith to an earth that is dead’, is
obviously about the ‘death’ of the earth, implying that a barren piece of land is indeed
dead and is revitalized by rain sent by God. It is worth noting that, as the verse speaks
about reviving earth after its death, it appears that the life of land is related to its capacity
to produce crops or fruit. This is suggested in a few other verses. Q 36:33 (‘A sign for them
is the earth that is dead: We do give it life, and produce grain therefrom, of which ye do
eat’) indicates that giving life to the earth means growing grain from it for human beings to
eat. This process is actualized by wind that arouses clouds: ‘It is God who sends forth the
winds, so that they raise up the clouds, and we drive them to a land that is dead, and revive
the earth therewith after its death: even so [will be] the Resurrection’ (Q 35:9). So it is that
the land will be vibrant with life in consequence of being showered with water (Q 41:39).
In other words, according to these verses, God sends rain to an unfruitful land and makes it
move and become alive, that is, bear fruit.4
Second, some verses refer to the death of human beings, but only in a metaphorical way.
They do not discuss the actual demise of the human body. Rather, it is the soul or spirit that
is addressed in this second category of verses concerning death. They are in fact about
spiritual resurrection brought about by God; that is, being revived by being blessed to
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find the right path. Thus, part of Q 6:122 reads, ‘Can he who was dead, to whom We gave
life, and a light whereby he can walk amongst men, be like him who is in the depths of
darkness, from which he can never come out?’ The verse clearly uses ‘light’ as a metaphor
for ‘guidance’ and ‘faith’. The contrast stated in the verse makes the metaphor even
clearer. One who does not have faith is indeed in the midst of darkness and can by no
means escape from it; the more one endeavours, the less one succeeds in finding the
way. In another verse (Q 3:169), God commands, ‘Think not of those who are slain in
God’s way as dead;’ ‘Nay,’ the verse continues, ‘they live, finding their sustenance in
the presence of their Lord.’ Here it is indicated that, notwithstanding physical loss and
worldly death, those who are killed for the sake of God are really alive.5
Third, certain other verses deal with human death in the strict sense of the term. For
instance, the pious are enjoined, in Q 2:180, to write an equitable will for the benefit of
their parents and relatives before death approaches. And Q 2:133 speaks of the death of
one of the God’s messengers: ‘Were you witnesses when Death appeared before Jacob?
Behold, he said to his sons: “What will ye worship after me?” They said: “We shall
worship thy God and the God of thy fathers, of Abraham, Ismacıl, and Isaac, the One
God: to Him we submit”’ (our translation) (cf. Q 4:78; 19:33; 23:99). Five major
qur’anic principles may be gleaned from this third category of verses that deal in one
way or another with the subject of death.
The first principle, based on Q 67:2, is that it is God who creates death: ‘HeWho created
death and life, that He may try which of you is best in deed: and He is the Exalted in Might,
Oft-Forgiving.’ Another text puts this differently: no death can occur without permission
from God, for ‘nor can a soul die except by God’s leave’ (Q 3:145).6 The fact that death is
created by God suggests, indeed, that death, like life, relates to existence rather than to its
absence. By dying one is not ruined; rather, one is transported to another world, another
kind of life. This is why it is said that death is created by God, the sole creator of every
kind of existence, and created in the same sense as life is created.7 In fact, the Qur’an
on many occasions explicitly introduces God as the sole creator of death.8
The second principle is that there is a time for death and this time is determined by God.
In this regard, Q 3:145 states, ‘Nor can a soul die except by God’s leave, the term being
fixed as by writing’ (emphasis added). Tayyeb asserts, in interpreting this verse, that even
the number of breaths each person breathes is predetermined by God (1378, vol. 3, p. 380).
Q 34:14 indicates the same: ‘When We decreed his death, nothing showed them his death’
(emphasis added). At one point the principle is asserted generally and emphatically for all
individuals and societies: ‘We have decreed death to be your common lot, and We are not
to be frustrated’ (Q 56:60).
The third principle relates to the nature of dying. It is understood from the Qur’an that
death happens as a process: ‘It is God that takes the souls [anfus, (sing. nafs)] at death; and
those that die not [He takes] during their sleep. Those on whom He has passed the decree
of death, He keeps back [from returning to life], but the rest He sends [to their bodies] for a
term [ajal ] appointed. Verily in this are signs for those who reflect’ (Q 39:42) (emphasis
added).
According to the fourth principle, the process of death is brought about by the Angel of
Death, who acts on behalf of God.9 Q 32:11 reads, ‘The Angel of Death, put in charge of
you, will take your souls: then shall ye be brought back to your Lord.’ Elsewhere the
Qur’an states, among other things, that ‘when death approaches one of you, Our angels
take his soul, and they never fail in their duty’ (Q 6:61).
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The fifth principle addresses one, if not the most, important issue in the discussion of
death—that is, what is it that dies? It is already implied in the verses mentioned thus
far that it is the nafs to which death comes, and also in Q 3:185: ‘Every nafs shall have
a taste of death: and only on the Day of Judgment shall you be paid your full recompense.’
Death is also related to nafs in Q 3:168: ‘avert death from your own selves, if ye speak the
truth’.10 Now, nafs, most usually translated as ‘soul’, may be translated also as either ‘self’
or ‘ego’. Thus, death happens to the human self, which is to say that a human being that
loses its self is certainly dead. This being so, two questions come to mind. First, how can
we determine that the ‘self’ (nafs) has been taken back (to God) from a human being? Is
there a concrete and fixed criterion by which to identify the point or time at which the
departure of the self happens? Second, what exactly does nafs mean? What is it in
human beings that could be called their ‘self’? With regard to the first question, there
seems to be nothing in the sacred text to give us a clear picture or a concrete criterion
to determine the point at which one’s ‘self’ is taken back. As for the second question con-
cerning the nature of ‘self’, the situation is no better. However, verses that deal with the
birth and death of human beings suggest another concept that might be of help in answer-
ing the second question. The story of the creation of the human being, according to Q
15:29, culminates in God’s breathing His spirit (ruh˙) into the first human creature:
‘When I have fashioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down in obeisance
unto him.’
Having examined the other verses in which the terms nafs (self/soul) and ruh˙(spirit/
soul) are used, exegetes of the Qur’an have put forward two significant points. On the
one hand, either they believe nafs and ruh˙are one and the same thing, or they consider
nafs to be an emanation, or extension, of ruh˙. Those who think self and soul are two differ-
ent things believe that the former is taken back when one falls asleep, and the latter is taken
back when the time of death arrives (cf. Zoheili, 1418, Vol. 24, p. 23; Meibodi, 1363, Vol.
8, p. 421). In any event, it is clear that the two are of one nature and some exegetes expli-
citly claim that at the time of death it is the soul that is taken back from the human being
(cf. Sadeqi Tehrani, 1365, Vol. 23, p. 283; Makarem Shirazi, 1374, vol. 19, p. 478). On the
other hand, it is asserted that human beings are human beings because of nafs. It is nafs that
makes a creature human. More importantly, cAllama Tabataba’ı, for instance, believes that
what we attribute to human beings in terms of rationality and free will originates from nafs
and ruh˙(Tabtaba’ı, 1417, Vol. 20, p. 139). Moreover, Tabataba’ı, in his interpretation of
Q 15:29, remarks that ‘when soul is coupled with body, the human is alive and when it
departs he dies’ (ibid., p. 72).
By contrast, the Qur’an nowhere refers to the nafs or ruh˙of any creature other than the
human being. No reference is made to the departure of the soul or self of any other crea-
ture. Nowhere in the Qur’an is it stated that God has breathed his ‘spirit’ into any creature
except into the human being. Therefore, it could be said that, according to qur’anic teach-
ing, (1) death happens to the nafs (soul), (2) nafs and spirit (ruh˙) are either identical or of
the same nature, (3) nafs/ruh˙is what makes an entity a human,11 and (4) nafs/ruh
˙is the
basis of human rationality and free will, which distinguish a human person from other
entities.
Three possibilities arguably follow. First, as rationality and free will are embodiments
of consciousness or mind, nafs/ruh˙is to be viewed as the same as consciousness/mind.
Secondly, the basis of ‘personhood’ is mind, and human beings who have mind are to
be treated as inherently valuable. Thirdly, death can be taken as the irreversible loss of
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nafs or ruh˙, that is, ‘mind’: but if death is an irreversible loss of mind, what is ‘mind’? Let
us then turn to a discussion of mind.
Irreversible Loss of Mind
It is argued that, on the basis of qur’anic teachings, the characteristic feature of the human
being, as distinct from other kinds and species, is mind.12 This feature is regarded as the
same as consciousness, will, soul, and the like. In addition, when human beings lose, in an
irreversible way, their mind, it could be said that they are no longer alive as human
persons. In other words, it is mind that constitutes the entity of the human person, who
should not be harmed in any way. Therefore, as a human person is identified or individ-
uated in contrast to members of other species by mind, a question then remains: ‘What
is mind?’ Various answers have been put forward and they may be classified into two
main groups, non-reductionist and reductionist.
Non-reductionist Accounts of Mind
Non-reductionism, or dualism, of mind claims that the mind is different from the body
in nature. Both are basic and fundamental and cannot be reduced to each other. Rene
Descartes, for example, pointed out that ‘I’ is in the strict sense only a thing that
thinks—a mind; and the mind, furthermore, is separate from the body.13 Dualism has
been suggested in two different senses. Some believe in the duality of the substances con-
stituting mind and body (substance dualism)14 while others are inclined to believe in two
distinct and basic effects of one and the same substance (property dualism) (see Kim,
1996; Churchland, 1994). Let us turn to an explanation and appraisal of the two
viewpoints.
Substance Dualism
According to this viewpoint, put forward vigorously by Descartes, every human is a com-
posite being made up of two distinct substances, one constitutive of mind and the other
forming the body (see Searle, 1992, p. 13; Carruthers, 1986, p. 39). Descartes’s argument
for this is as follows:
1. I can doubt my body.
2. I cannot doubt my mind.
3. Therefore, my mind is separate and distinct from my body.15
The first premise relies on Descartes’s arguments in the First Meditation, and the second
premise derives from the nature of ‘I’ (Cogito ergo Sum: I think therefore I am), for which
Descartes has argued in the Second Meditation. It might be observed that underlying these
premises there exist two principles. One is that whatever is imagined can be possible
(embedded in the first premise), and the other is that whatever is possible can be actual
(embedded in the second premise). It is evident, however, that there are some entities
that are conceivable—for example, Pegasus or the Phoenix—but which are not possible
(see Baillie, 1993, esp. pp. 82–88). In addition, notwithstanding the logical possibility
of some events, for instance travelling from England to Japan in five minutes, it does
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not logically follow that the event is actual. Therefore, the two moves, from conceivability
to possibility and from possibility to actuality, are not logically warranted, and even if we
accept the premises, we cannot yet reach the given conclusion (see Carruthers, 1986, pp.
91–97 for similar points). On the other hand, the two premises are epistemic statements,
whereas the conclusion is a categorical ontological claim. That is, Descartes starts with
subjective uncertainty about his body, then moves to subjective clarity about his mind,
and finally moves to the objective reality of mind and body. So conceived, the conclusion
does not follow from the premises. In addition to the logical problems, the following criti-
cisms may be raised against a substance-dualistic view of mind.
First, how do the two substances interact, that is, how do a person’s mind and body
influence one another? (see Ryle, 1990, pp. 14ff.; Carruthers, 1986, pp. 61–62; and
Crane, 2001). How is it possible for non-physical mind and physical body to have
causal effects upon one another? It should be noted that causal laws hold between parts
of the same world (the same substance) in the sense that causes and effects are bound
to be of the same nature: only a physical event can cause another physical event. In
other words, the physical domain is causally closed. Thus, either one must accept the
view that mental and physical events are of the same nature (so that one can assume a
causal relationship between the two) and so abandon substance dualism or, in order to
sustain the dualist standpoint, one must deny a causal relation between the two substances.
In the latter case, mind becomes an epiphenomenon (causally inert). That is, while mental
events exist, they have themselves no causal powers, and produce no effect on the physical
world (Blackburn, 1994, pp. 122–123; Churchland, 1994, pp. 10–11; and Kim, 1996, pp.
51–52). After all, if mental events by nature have no mass, shape and position in space (in
a word, are sealed off from the physical world), how is it possible for them to have any
causal influence on the body at all? (Churchland, 1994, pp. 8–9, 18–20; McGinn,
1982, pp. 24–25; Carruthers, 1986, pp. 63–65).
Second, how does a dualist explain an action? Since, according to substance dualism,
there are two kinds of matter (mental and physical), there must be two different expla-
nations for a single action, namely, mental and physical descriptions. For, if there are onto-
logically two independent parts in the single person, there must be two epistemically
independent explanations of them. Yet, assume, for the sake of argument, that two inde-
pendent causal explanations of an act (one physical and one mental) could be given, again
the problem arises of the relationship between the two kinds of cause: how do the physical
and mental causes interact?What kind of relationship exists between the two? On the other
hand, there are some actions for which it is not the case that there are two different and
independent explanations—for example, the act of writing a letter. Moreover, for any
single event there cannot be more than one cause. This is called the principle of explana-
tory exclusion, according to which two distinct explanations of the same event can both be
correct only if at least one of the two is incomplete or one is dependent on the other (Kim,
1997; Crane, 2001). Put differently, by giving two independent and sufficient causes for
one and the same action, we are, in fact, over-determining it (Kim, 1997, pp. 265–266;
Carruthers, 1986, p. 64). All these points are indeed what Ockham’s principle implies:
‘Do not multiply entities beyond what is strictly necessary to explain the phenomena.’16
Third, where should we locate the mind?17 Obviously, since the substance dualist
claims that the mind is non-physical (non-spatial), he cannot locate it anywhere in the
body, which is physical (spatial), whereas any attempt to identify the Cartesian mind
would ultimately and paradoxically fall on the body.18 Given the above arguments
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against the substance dualism position, some are moved to resort to certain less extreme
forms of dualism, namely, property dualism.
Property Dualism
This version of dualism insists not on the existence of two different basic matters but on
the parallel existence of two different and distinct properties of the same substance. The
basic idea is that while there is no substance beyond the physical brain, the brain has
certain particular properties that are non-physical; hence, there are two basic properties,
neither being reducible to the other (see Churchland, 1994, pp. 10–13; cf. Searle,
1992). Consequently, such properties as thinking that ‘P’ [thinking a propositional
statement—Ed.] and having a visual ‘sensation’ of a colour, both of which are character-
istic of conscious intelligence, cannot be reduced to or explained by the concepts of the
familiar physical sciences (cf. Jackson, 1986; Nagel, 1974; 1986). There is a need, there-
fore, to develop a new science of mental phenomena with its own nomological structure.
The condition of ‘irreducibility’ means that this is a dualistic position. Why is it claimed
that mental events and phenomena cannot be reduced to physical matter? For instance,
Davidson’s argument for the anomaly of mental events is, in fact, an attempt to show
that mental properties cannot be explained in terms of physical or psycho-physical laws
(Davidson, 1992, passim, esp. pt 2, n. 11; see also Hamlyn, 1984, pp. 180ff.). He
asserts that the characteristic feature of mind is that it is rational.19 That is, mental
states are representational (intentional) and the attribution of intentionality (representa-
tionality) to those states is regulated by certain principles of rationality and charity.20
Whereas physical events are not susceptible to these principles, the two groups of
events belong to two different domains, between which there cannot be nomological
relations. Therefore, there is no psycho-physical law, which implies the anomaly of
mind (see also Mele, 1997, p. 5). But if (according to Davidson’s argument) mental
events cannot have a law-like relation with physical ones, it appears that mind has
become an epiphenomenon, that is, causally inactive. This problem is the same as that
involved with substance dualism. To circumvent it, Davidson resorts to the notion of
supervenience.
What does the idea of supervenience imply? Supervenience is a kind of dependency
relation. One set of properties is supervenient on a second set when they are so related
that there cannot be a difference in the first without there being a difference in the
second (Honderich, 1995, p. 860; Blackburn, 1994, p. 368). Applying this notion to the
field of mind, two different versions of the dependency of mental events on brain
events may be given. According to the ‘strong’ version of supervenience, the relation
between the two sets of events is a necessary and causal one, whereas the weak version
does not require such a necessary and law-like relation. For Davidson, physical laws
are physical descriptions of brain states while psychological laws are mental descriptions
of brain states. The two descriptions are basic, neither being reducible to the other while
the latter supervenes on the former. This implies that ‘there cannot be two events alike in
all physical respects but differing in some mental respect’, or ‘that an object cannot alter in
some mental respect without altering in some physical respect’ (Davidson, 1992, p. 141;
see also McGinn, 1982, p. 29; and Searle, 1992, pp. 124–126).
The problem is that if Davidson takes seriously the notion of supervenience (in the
strong sense) he is faced with a dilemma.21 This is because strong supervenience
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cannot sit well with the anomaly of mind, since, according to a strong reading of super-
venience, there cannot be two exactly identical persons if their mental states are different,
whereas, according to the anomalous picture of mind, this is possible owing to the denial
of psycho-physical laws. In other words, to admit the strong supervenience notion is to
accept that there is a law-like relationship between the physical and the mental (see
Kim, 1996, p. 49), which is exactly what Davidson’s theory intends to deny. Interestingly,
John Searle, while explaining the supervenience of mental phenomena on the brain, claims
that the supervening relation is causal, in the sense that mental phenomena are caused by
the brain (Searle, 1992, p. 125). By contrast, if the property dualist wishes to give up the
strong sense of supervenience in order to keep the anomaly thesis, he must accept the
mental as an epiphenomenon. In this case, the resort to supervenience makes property
dualism inherit the problem of epiphenomenalism, rather than solving it (Churchland,
1994, pp. 10–12). It is worth noting that the property dualist would also encounter a
problem if they were asked to identify a mental event. If they used in their identification
a spatio-temporal criterion, which locates the mental event somewhere in the brain (see
Jackson, 1996, p. 387), they have already presupposed a physicalist account of mental
events, and the anomalism part of property dualism cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, if a non-spatio-temporal account is put forward, then this would, again, make
mind a mysterious entity, creating all the problems raised against substance dualism
(see also Crane, 2001, ch. 2, sections 17–18).
Reductionist Theory of Mind
In contrast to non-reductionist theory, there is a reductionist account of mind. This may be
called the ‘identity theory’ of the mind-brain (see Gregory, 1987, p. 204; cf. Carruthers,
1986, ch. 5). There are, of course, different versions of such a monist theory of mind
which cannot be dealt with in this article.22 According to the identity theory, mental
events are, in fact, physical events, in the sense that the ways of thinking represented
by our terms for conscious states, and the ways of thinking represented by some of our
terms for brain states are indeed different ways of thinking of the very same (physical)
states and events (McGinn, 1982, pp. 17–18; Dennett, 1986, pp. xiv–xv). So, for
example, pain does not mean ‘such-and-such a stimulation of the neural fibres’, but the
two terms refer to the very same thing. This is because we believe some mental events
are causally necessary for the occurrence of some physical ones (Kim, 1996, pp.
47–49). For instance, had I not been conscious of a pain (a mental state or event) in my
back, I would not have visited my doctor (a physical event). The former was the cause
of the latter and, on the basis of the criticisms levelled against the dualistic accounts, it
seems that we cannot resort to such notions as substance or property dualism. Hence, a
physical–physical explication seems to be sufficient for description of the causal nexus
behind the given physical event.23 Let us then refer to some of the encouraging (construc-
tive) grounds for an identity theory of mind. The first ground relates to an adherence to
Ockham’s razor (that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity) (Smart, 1959).
Accordingly, when we give an account of mind, the principle requires us not to make
the nature too complicated, that is, a single-constituent theory of mind would be preferable
to a double-constituent one. This is a restatement of the principle of simplicity. On this
basis, there is a reason for us to give an identity, rather than a correlative, thesis of
mental and physical events, for the former satisfies the simplicity principle, while the
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latter makes mental events something over and above brain states, and ultimately renders
the mental redundant.
The second ground refers back to the success of the field of neurophysiology in explain-
ing mental states. Many attempts have been made to reveal the neural dependence
of mental phenomena such as reasoning, emotion and consciousness. For instance,
Churchland points out that alcohol, narcotics, or senile degeneration of nerve tissue will
impair, cripple, or even destroy one’s capacity for rational thought; psychiatry knows of
hundreds of emotion-controlling chemicals (lithium, chlorpromazine, amphetamine,
cocaine, etc.) that do their work when vectored into the brain; and the vulnerability of
consciousness to anaesthetics, caffeine, and something as simple as a sharp blow to the
head shows the very close dependence of consciousness on neural activity in the brain
(Churchland, 1994, pp. 20, 28). It should, however, be noted that this ground for the iden-
tity theory, according to its proponents, needs to be read in the light of the simplicity
principle (the first ground) so as to exclude property dualism. That is, an argument
based on the two grounds mentioned may be constructed as follows:
1. Mental states are causally connected to physical states.
2. In a completed neurophysiological discipline, there will be no need to appeal to any-
thing other than physical connection and causality.
3. Therefore, mental states are identical with physical states. (See Carruthers, 1986, pp.
133–134; Churchland, 1994, p. 11)
The moral of the argument is that in neurophysiology the attempt is made to find intimate
relations between types of mental facts and types of physical facts: viz. a mapping of
mental onto material. Therefore, it seems that not only does the identity theory character-
ize mind—unlike the substance dualist—in a positive way, but it also appears able to
tackle many of the problems encountered by non-reductionist theories. However, these
motivations and advantages do not imply that identity theories of mind have succeeded
in explicating every aspect and feature of mind.24 Specific correlations between mental
states and brain states, Kim maintains, are matters of empirical research and discovery,
and we may assume that many of the details about these correlations are still largely
unknown (Kim, 1996, p. 49). It could nevertheless be said that the identity outlook
does not leave the mind mysterious and inexplicable, and it has the advantage of being
able to be pursued by research programmes for future investigations. However, the
debate, which has so far been at a metaphysical level, transfers from this point on to a
scientific one, and philosophy and other related fields will undoubtedly be at the mercy
of scientific facts in this regard.
All in all, since property dualism is often defended by a strong sense of supervenience—
as is the case with Davidson—(or ‘causal supervenience’, in the words of Searle [1992])
and considers brain as the seat of mind, it may be said that both property dualism and the
identity theory can be taken as the basis for the identification of mind. Accordingly, ‘brain’
as the seat, so to speak, of mind is ultimately the criterion for identifying an entity as a
human person.25 Therefore, no matter which theory of mind one sides with, at the end
of the day it is brain that is to be conceived of as either the seat of mind (the lack of
which would mean the lack of mind, that is, a state in which mind can no longer stick
to the body), or as identical with mind (the lack of which would simply mean the lack
of mind and personhood).
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Conclusions
Our conclusions follow from the above explanations and arguments. First, once it is
demonstrated beyond doubt that a being embraces a human brain, that entity may be
said to be an instance of a human being who has a moral status and, accordingly,
should not be harmed in any way. Conversely, if that entity irreversibly ceases to have
a functioning brain, it has ceased to have mind and should no longer be considered a
human person; it ought to be taken as dead. In other words, the death of a human
person (loss of personhood) is the complete and irreversible loss of the chief characteristic
that makes a human a valuable entity qua a human person. This characteristic is clearly
consciousness or mind, which is the bearer of personhood and is located in the brain, or
is the brain itself. Accordingly, once the mind/brain is lost in such a way that it could
not be said that consciousness, and so ‘personhood’, could be restored under any foresee-
able conditions, the entity or individual concerned is normatively regarded as dead. Under
such conditions, for example, organs could be removed and transplanted into another
human person.
Our second conclusion is that the very criterion of brain death is itself a normative
choice that makes the concept of death a normative (or constructive) one. The reason is
that entities that possess a human brain are human persons and as such ought to be con-
sidered of inherent value and treated with utmost respect. However, we conclude,
thirdly, that for moralists and lawyers to identify brain death requires them to be at the
mercy of medical scientists, for it is the latter who hold the expertise to determine
whether or not a person’s brain has ceased to function and so is irreversibly dead. Never-
theless, our fourth conclusion is that once the irreversible brain death of a human being is
announced, it is then justifiable to engraft that person’s organs into another person. At this
time, such organs are still biologically alive and thus the concept and act of transplantation
of live organs is both feasible and acceptable. Fifthly and finally, the line of argument and
the theory that we have put forward in this article could be of use in tackling certain other
problems, for example those encountered when dealing with other death-related issues
such as some forms of euthanasia, infants born with no developed brain as such, and
the like.
Notes
1. This claim is, in turn, in need of justification, which, of course, could not be addressed here. In this
regard, see Dworkin, 1990; Harris, 1992; Rasekh, 1385; 1998.
2. For different criteria for death, see Cranford (2004) and Menikoff (2001, pp. 443–444).
3. A methodological point is in order. The path taken in this article, in introducing and dealing with the
concept of death, lays bare a particular method of discussion and argument. The methodology of discus-
sion is a pathological one that moves from a problem towards an abstract theory. Although the departure
point is a specific problem, the theory constructed in response to this problem is of a general nature. It is
therefore claimed that it is able to deal not only with the problem in hand, but also with other problems of
the same kind.
4. The following verses deal with the same concept and so could be included in the same category:
Q 2:259—raising a question about the possibility of reviving a town after its death; Q 7:57 and
Q 45:5—explaining the process of sending wind, gathering clouds, driving them towards dead lands,
and finally causing the earth to produce all kinds of fruits; Q 16:65, Q 29:63, Q 30:19, 24, 50, and
Q 57:17—God giving life to lands after they have died.
5. Certain other verses that could be listed under the second category are as follows: Q 2:28: ‘How can ye
reject the faith in God—seeing that ye were without life, and He gave you life?’ Q 2:154: ‘And say not of
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those who are slain in the way of God: “They are dead.”’ Q 22:66: ‘It is HeWho gave you life, will cause
you to die;’ Q 27:80 and Q 30:52: ‘Truly thou [the messenger] canst not cause the dead to listen;’ and
Q 35:22: ‘Nor are alike those that are living and those that are dead.’
6. For different meanings of ‘permission’, see Razi (1420, Vol. 3, p. 379).
7. See Tusi, n.d., Vol. 3, p. 9; Ghoreyshi, 1377, Vol. 11, p. 252; Makarem Shirazi, 1421, Vol. 18, p. 473;
Sadeqi Tehrani, 1365, Vol. 23, p. 96; and Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 6, p. 75.
8. See, for instance, Q 10:56: ‘It is he who giveth life and who taketh it;’ Q 26:80–81: ‘It is He . . . who will
cause me to die;’ Q 30:40: ‘It is GodWho . . .will cause you to die;’ Q 40:68: ‘It is He who gives life and
death;’ Q 50:43: ‘It is We who give life and death; to Us is the final goal;’ Q 53:44: ‘It is He who granteth
death and life.’
9. See Sadeqi Tehrani, 1365, Vol. 23, p. 283; Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 6, p. 75.
10. The view that death happens to self is also explicitly mentioned in Q 21:35; Q 29:57; Q 31:34.
11. Mulla Sadra explicitly states that the departure of soul takes away all human characteristics (1366,
Vol. 6, p. 78).
12. See, for instance, ibid.
13. See Descartes, 1994, Meditation 6, p. 54; cf. Hart, 1988; and Ryle, 1990.
14. It is worth noting that almost all exegetes of the Qur’an believe that human beings consist of two sub-
stances, that is, body and soul. See Tabataba’ı, 1417, Vol. 20, passim; Tayyeb, 1378, Vol. 8, p. 29;
Sadeqi Tehrani, 1365, Vol. 23, p. 283; Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 6, p. 74; and Makarem Shirazi, 1374,
Vol. 19, p. 478.
15. See Descartes, 1994, Meditations 1–3; cf. Hart, 1988; and Ryle, 1990, pp. 13–17.
16. William Ockham (1285–1347) was a medieval philosopher. See Honderich, 1995, p. 633; cf. Blackburn,
1994, p. 268. The principle is also called ‘Ockham’s razor’.
17. Descartes located it in the pineal gland (Descartes, 1994, p. 59; cf. Kim, 1996, pp. 50–51).
18. Strawson, for instance, argues that the only place to locate consciousness is in the body (1969, ch. 3).
19. In addition, Nagel (1974, esp. pp. 435–436) emphasizes the conscious and subjective character of mind,
which cannot be captured by reductive analyses. See also Searle, 1992, pp. 116–124.
20. Rationality in the sense of finding the best relevant evidence (i.e. justification), and charity in terms of
being coherent and consistent. See Davidson, 1992, pp. 139, 145–146. For more details about the reason
for the distinctness of the mental, see the second part of this article; and McGinn (1982, p. 21).
21. For the varieties of supervenience see Seager (1991, ch. 4). It should be noted that the weak sense of
supervenience would leave the problem of epiphenomenalism unresolved.
22. For a presentation of these, see, for instance, Kim, 1996, chs 2–5; McGinn, 1982, ch. 2; and Seager,
1991, chs 2–3.
23. Carruthers, 1986, chs 2, 5. See also Jones et al. (1992, p. 4 and pt 3), in which all the essential attributes of
humankind are explained as functions of the brain; and Gertler (1986, esp. pp. 1061–1062), who states
that ‘it is neocortical activity that endows human beings with higher intellectual functions’.
24. See, for instance, Churchland (1994, pp. 29–34), Nagel (1986, ch. 1), and McGinn (1982, ch. 2) for a list
of the problems that these theories have yet to tackle.
25. See Baillie (1993, pp. 114–115) for the convergence of the physical and psychological theories on the
significance of the brain; and Wiggins (1980, p. 187) for his emphasis that psychology supervenes on
human neurophysiology.
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