the common sense philosophy of g. e. moore · prejaoe the primary purpose of this thesis is to...
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Loyola University ChicagoLoyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1970
The Common Sense Philosophy of G. E. MooreMark A. PhillipsLoyola University Chicago
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Recommended CitationPhillips, Mark A., "The Common Sense Philosophy of G. E. Moore" (1970). Master's Theses. Paper 2480.http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2480
THE COMMON SENSE PHII1080J?Iff
OF
G. E. MOORE
by
Mark A. J?hillips
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillmem:1-'0f·
the Requirements for the Degree'' of. ' Master of Philosophy · · . ·"
June
.( r· \, ., !
1970
PREJAOE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to clarify the
notion ot common sense in the philosophy of G. E. Moore. As
such, it will serve as no more than a propaedeutic tor evaluating
whether a common sense philosophy is viable. The scope of dis
cussion is admittedly JD.70pic: there is no presentation of earlier
common sense philosophies, nor criticisms of such philosophies.
~e only excuse tor this omission is that it is impossible thor
~ughly to discuss even the twentieth-century material in a short
work. For this reason, this paper can serve as little more than
a "preliminary propaedeutic."
To Pr. Maziarz I extend a sincere thank you for allowing
philosophy to be enjoyable and dull.
11 •
Jhapter
I.
II.
OOl'TEn'S
IHRODUO!IOlf • • • • • • • •
A. Jrom Scotland to Amerioa B. Continental Assistance c. American Realism
l. New Realism 2. Critical Realism
D. English Realism
• • • • • • • • • • •
MOORE Olf COMMON SENSE. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ' A. Moore's Defense of Common Sense: An Exposition
l. "A Defence of Common Sense" (1925) 2. "Proof ot an Eltternal World" (1939)
Page
• .l
•• 7
B. Moore's Notion ot Common Sense: An Interpretation 1. Criteria tor Comm.on Sense Statements 2. Criteria of !ruth
III. COMON SENSE ilD ORDINARY LA.NGUAGE: Alf EVALUATION. • 24
A. Moore's References to Ordinary Language 1. Reflection on Usage: Meaning 2. Appeal to Usage: Truth
B. !he Reductive Thesis l. Example: E1cternal Objects 2. Moore's Response 3. Comments
IV. COMMON SENSE AND ANALYSIS. • • • • • • • • ••••• 45
A. What Is Analysis? 1. Kinds of Meaning 2. !he "Analysandum" 3. Kinds of Analysis
B. Common Sense and Philosophy
SIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 60
iii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, idealism was
the philosophy of the day. 1 '?o a great extent, it was G. E. -Moore who brought about the downfall of idealism, and gave early
twentieth-century thought its thrust towards realism. Yet it is
important to notice that the philosophical community was ripe tor
this transition. 'l'he following remarks are designed to indicate
some of the philosophers who contributed to this climate.
A. From Scotland to America
One or the origins of twentieth-century realism la;y in
the Scottish common sense philosophy of 'l'homas Reid (1710-1?96)
In addition to the abbreviations used in the bibliographJ the following abbreviations are used in the footnotes. Works by Moore:
di • !he Commonplace Book of G. E. Moore, 1919-1953 ""'Befence"• irx-Detence of! Ooiim'Oii' lJinse"-Lectures • Lectures on Philoso:ebz, ed. by c. Lew.y PE • :P.i'!ncl:eia~hlca '15roottt • "Proof of! an Eiternal 'World" "Reply,. • "A Reply to f\y' Critics" SMPP • Some Main Problems ot Philoso:phY
Other-Works: - -EM • The !Pistemolo~ of G. E. Moore, by E. D. Klemke 1[Q! • g. !• Moore: A ritical-Exposltion, by A. R. White
l"'?he main tendency of nineteenth-century thought was towards the conclusion that both 'things' and tacts about things are dependent for their existence and their nature upon the operations ot a mind." John Passmore, A Hundred Years of PhilosopbY (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p7 1?4. --
1
2
and Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856). 2 This naive form of real-
ism was, like Kant's critical philosophy, a reaction to the scep
ticism of Hume. While Scottish common sense philosophy had some
effect upon English philosophers, including Moore,3 it had even
more of an impact in America, where it was introduced by John
Witherspoon (1723-1794) and James Mccosh (1811-1894). 4 However,
its impact in America was tempered by German idealism, which was
imported sho~tly afterwards. And the realism that was kept alive
--by philosophers like Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1837-1903) and
Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914)--was subjected to yet another
current of thought: continental philosophy.
B. Continental Assistance
Two continental philosophers were instrumental in the
~ise of realism in America and England.
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) called attention to the inten-
tional character of knowledge: the distinctive characteristic of
mental phenomena is that they point towards an object. But this
lfirst step towards realism was brought up short by the question
2cf. E. Hershey Sneath's introduction to The Philosoph.y of Reid (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1892), pp.-rr-61 ands. A. ~ave, The Scottish Philosophy a.! Comr~on Sense (Oxford: Clarenion PreS"S';" 1960).
3cr. M:CE, pp. 191-9. Rev. Denis Cleary, I.e. argues !that there is--a-"°lack of historical sense" in Moore's philosophy, and Cambridge philoso:phy in general. "An Essay on G.E. Moore," Downs. Rev., 81 (1963) 9 214-6, 223-5.
4Herbert W. Schneider, A Histori of American Philosophl• 2d ed. (New York: Columbia Univ7 ~ross, 1°9b3), pp. 216-20.
3
of how objects are related to mental acts. Prior to 1900, Bren
tano held that the object of ~nowledge is identical with the con
tent which one has before his mind. But this position gave rise
to the problem of fictional things: a centaur may be a content of r.
a mental act, but it is not an independent object./ It was Mei-
nong who found a solution to this problem.
Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920) accepted the intentional
character of knowledge, but deemed it inc~edible to consider a
physical object as being identical with, or a constituent or, a
mental act. To resolve this problem, he adopted Twardowski's
distinction of (i) the mental act, (ii) its content, and (iii)
its objects. This enabled him to say that fictional things are
the objects of thought, but not the content of thought (since the
content exists). 6 It was Meinong's contribution to the problem
of the intentional or referential character of knowing fictional
things which was first adopted by American realists.
C. American Realism
When Josiah Royce (1855-1916) stated his opposition to
~ealism, his former pupils, R. B. Perry (1876-1957) and w. P.
Montague (1873-1953), were quick to provide a defense. The es
sence of Royce's attack on realism was this: if the objects of
5Passmore, .QJ2.• cit., pp. 1?8-80. See also: Roderick M. Chisholm (ed), Realism and the-Background of Phenomenology (New York: Free Press, 1960)-;J?°p:--4-6. ~
6Passmore, .2£• £!.!., pp. 180-1, 556 n. 10; Chisholm, .2£• cit., pp. 6-12 • ..........
4
knowledge are completely independent of our knowing them, then
there is no relation possible, not even the knowing relation.
The essence of the reply to Royce was that relatedness and inde
pendence are compatible characteristics of knowledge and its ob-
. t 7 JeC • Somewhat later, it was argued that they are compatible
because, as James and Russell had shown, relations are external.
From this it follows, presuming that knowledge is a relation, that the known is not constituted by its relation to the knower, or the knower by its relation to the known, or either knower or known by the fact that it is a constituent in the knowledge relation.8
The exchange between Royce and his pupils brought out the
central issue in American realism: the relation between the ob-
ject and that through which the object is known. There was gen
eral agreement ~ knowledge of independent objects is possible.
The intentionality of perception and knowledge is prima facie
evidence for this. Then too, our knowledge is both reliable and
seemingly not a consequence of our purpose, which suggests that
it is an effect of independent objects. Thirdly, both our exper
ience and our language "presuppose" the independence of the ob
jects of knowledge, and it seemed difficult, if not impossible,
to regard these as nonsense.9 However, it was difficult to
?Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, 1900; R. B. Perry, "Professor RoyceTSRefutatIO!i "OrRealism and Pluralism," Monist, 12 (1902), pp. 446-58;; w. P. Montaguet "Professor Royce's He.futation of Realism," Philos. ~·, 2 (1902;, pp. 43-55·
8Passmore, .212• .£!..:!!., p. 261.
9Thomas English Hill, Contemporar~ Theories of Knowledge (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1961), pp. l 0-21.
5
explain this common sense relation: !!2.! are knowledge and its ob
jects related? It was in answering this question that two
"schools" developed in America: the new realists and the critical
1 . t 10 rea is s.
1. New Realism was characterized by monism: there is no -----distinction between the object and that through which it is
known. Knowledge is a direct apprehension of its object. Thus,
in an attempt to describe experience without reference to con-
sciousness, Perry spoke of ideas as "things in a certain rela-
tion." However, this lack of distinction between a subjective
and objective knowing made it very difficult for the new realists
to adequately account for error without compromising the indepen
dence of the object. And realists such as w. P. Montague (1873-
1953) who did make this distinction found it difficult to avoid a
representative or dualistic account of knowledge. 11
2. Critical Realism was characterized by dualism: there
~s a distinction between the object and that through which it is
Known. That is, the critical realists assert "that there are
three distinct ingredients in perception--the perceiving act,
'3omething given ••• and the object perceived. 1112
With idealist against new realists, critical realists have properly claimed that (1) knowledge involves at one state or another an active experiencing that cannot
lOibid., p. 119 9 Passmore,~·£.!.!., p. 260, Chisholm, ~· .£?..!!., pp. 22-34.
11~., pp. 122-4; Passmore, 2.E• £!_!.,pp. 263-4. 12Pa.ssmore, op. cit., p. 283.
6
be assimilated to objects. With new realists against idealists, critical realists have rightly claimed that r2J knowledge involves objects that are independent of being known. And with both against representative realists, critical realists have recognized that [3] knowledge is apprehension not merely of one's own cognitive experiences but of the objects themselves intended in such experiences.13
The problem in this case was to explain ~ knowledge can be both
mediated and direct. How are independent objects (and not merely
sense data) known? To avoid a sceptical solution, the critical
realists held that what is given is a datum which points beyond
itself to an object. But there was considerable controversy over
the nature of what is given. George Santayana (1863-1952), ~or
example, held that the given is a set of universals or essences.
R. w. Sellars (1880-19 ), on the other hand, believed that the
given is a set of particulars which reveal the structure of the
object.
D. English Realism
The realism which sprang up in England arose from various
sources. For example, the realism developed by John Cook Wilson
(1874-1915) grew out of his interest in logic. Others--like Sam
uel Alexander (1859-1938), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947),
Bertrand Russell (1872-19?0) and C. D. Broad (188?-19 )--were
Primarily concerned with the problems of science. Finally, there
were those like T. P. Nunn (1870-1944) and G. E. Moore (18?3-
1958), whose realism was bound up with the notion of common sense.
l3Hill, .2.12• .£.!.i•• P• 155.
CHAPTER II
MOORE ON COMMON SENSE
George Edward Moore (1873-1958) began his schooling at
Dulwich College in London. When he was eighteen, he went to Tri
~i ty College, Cambridge to pursue his interest in classical stu
dies. Moore had almost completed his second year of studies (in
1894) before he decided to study philosophy. 1 Moore's philoso
phical curiosity was piqued by the things philosophers like J. E.
M. McTaggart had said about the world, for their philosophical
assertions seemed to contradict common sense. 2 F. H. Bradley was
unequivocal on this subject; he "argued that everything common
sense believes is mere appearance."3 Under this kind of influ
ence, Moore's confidence in common sense waned. His first publi
cation showed that he had made an about-face. 4
1 G. E. Moore, "An Autobiography," ~. p. 13. 2Ibid., p. 14. Broad once asked, "In what place is th~
mirror-imageof a pin?" Russell thought that the answer is: "In ~our head." Moore observed: "Whether you are interested in the question whether Russell is right as to this or not is • • • a good test of whether you will be interested in philosophy or not." "The Justification of Analysis," Analysis, 1 (1934), p. 29.
3Bertrand RusBell, "Autobiography," The Philoso~bx of ~ertrand Russell, ed. by Paul A. Schilpp (Lonaon: dambridge-Univ • .Press, l946J, P• 36.
4 "In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?" Mind, n.s., 6 (1897), pp. 235-40.
7
He argued that time does not exist, and he did so using Bradley's methods and premises, in particular the dogmas of internal relations and concrete universals and the principle that identifies reali·t;y with the absence of contTadiction. When his conclusions, like the one that time does not exist, proved to outrage common sense, Moore was prepared to say that common sense is simply wrong, and he did so more than once.'
8
After graduation in 1896, Moore began working on a paper
in order to compete for a fellowship at Trinity. 6 It was during
[this period that 1'1oore severed his philosophical ties to idealism.
He describes the period from 1897-8 as "the beginning of a break
away from belief in Bradley's philosophy, of which, up till about
rthen, both Russell and I had, following McTaggart, been enthusi
astic admirers."? What is significant in this break is that com
mon sense became more than a mere starting point in Moore's phil-
psophy. It became the foundation of his philosophy.
This chapter will indicate how Moore def ended the truth
pf common sense, and then attempt to discover some identifying
~haracteristics of common sense.
A. Moore's Defense 2f. Common Sense: Ag Ex:position
This section contains merely a summary of two passages in
which Moore presents a defense of common sense.
5John O. Nelson, "George Edward Moore, 11 The Enc~clo~edia ~ Philosouh~, ed. by Paul Edwards, Vol. 5 (New-yQrk:acm llun, L96?), p. ~7 .
6Moore submitted his paper in 1898 and won a six-year nPrize" Fellowship. His paper was published the following year under the title: "The Nature of Judgment."
7Moore, .2.E.• £!.i., P• 22.
9
1. "A Defence .2f Common Sense" (1925). This article be
~ins with (1) a list of common sense truisms which Moore knows,
~ith certainty, to be true.
There exists at present a living human body, which is ~ body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes ••• Among the things which have, in this sense, formed part of its environment (i.e., have been either in contact with it, or at some distance from it, however great) there have, at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of other living human bodies, each of which has, like it, (a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist from some time after birth ••• Finally (to come to a different class of propositions), I am a human being, and I have, at different times since my body was born, had many different experiences, of each of many different kinds: e.g., I hav8 often perceived both my own body and other things • • •
Next, Moore adds (2) a single truism: many human beings have fre
quently known "a proposition correspondin5 to each of the propo
sitions in (l)."9 Finally, he enumerates (3) some implications
of his list of truisms: (i) material things are real; (ii) space
li.s real; (iii) time is real; and (iv) at least one self is real.le
If, for example, "I have often had dreams, and have had many dif
ferent feelings at different times," it follows that time is real
Moore's thesis is that (2) and (3) are true. He begins
his defense by noting:
There are some philosophers, who, while denying that (in the senses in question) either material things or Space
8 "Defence " PP p 33 ' _, . . 9Ibid., P• 34. -lOibid., pp. 38-39. -
10
are real, have been willing to admit that Selves and Time are real, in the sense required. Other philosophers, on the other hand, have used the expression 'Time is not real,' to express ••• something which is inconpatible with the truth of any of the propositions in (1).11
rJbile such expressions as "Material things are not real" may be
~biguous, their ordinary usage is certainly incompatible with
(2). As such, they are certa:Lnly false. Moore offers four argu
ments to substantiate his claim. First of all, a denial of (2)
or any of the implications stated in (3) is incompatible with the
~ery existence of any philosopher. The philosopher's own spa
tial, temporal existence prohibits him from denying the reality
of space, time and selves. That is, philosophers are human
beings; and this is to say that they have had experiences corres
oonding to Moore's list of truisms. Secondly, "no philosopher
bas ever been able to hold such views consistently. 1112 He would,
ifor example, allude to a "we" who do not know such and such.
All philosophers have belonged to the class of human beings which exists only if (2) be true: that is to say, to the
~~~~= ~~r~'!!:~~n~~!:g~ow~~c~a~~ ~~=q~~~;~~i~~~ l~0~~)~I3 Thirdly, some philosophers contend that the list of truisms pro
posed by Moore are not "wholly true, because every such proposi
tion entails both of two incompatible propositions. 1114 Moore
11Ibid., P• 39. -12Ibid., p. 40. -l3Ibid., p. 41. -14Ibid. This objection and Moore's reply are too laconic
to be clear:--For Moore's possible meaning, cf. bis Lectures, pp. 20 rr.
11
replies, "All of the propositions in (1) are true; no true propo
sition entails both of two incompatible propositons; therefore.
none of the propositions in (1) entails both of two incompatible
propositions. 111 5 Finally, the truth of the propositions in (3)
is clear from the fact that all of the propositions in (1) are
true. This is, Moore claims, his best argument. 16
Other philosophers have objected to Moore's insistence
that he is certain. The objection is that no one knows for cer
tain propositions about the existence of material things or
selves. Moore replies that this objection is self-contradictory.
When be says "No human being has ever known of the existence of other human beings," he is saying: "There have been many other human beings beside myself, and none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings. 111?
2. "Proof of an External World" (1939). In this arti
cle, Moore attempts to offer a conclusive proof of the existence
of "things outside of us."
(a) With an eye on Kant's discussion of this problem,
Moore spends a good deal of time clarifying the notion of "things
outside of us." His analysis results in identifying "things out
side of us" with "things to be met with in space." (Thus he ex
cludes things which are external to our mind and Eresented in
~pace, but which are not ~ in space--such as after-images,
16Ibid., p. 42. -l?Ibid., PP• 42-3.
12
double images, bodily pains and dreams~)18 He concludes this
part by saying:
I want now to emphasize that I am so using 'things to be met with in space' that, in the case of each of these kinds of 'things,• from the proposition that there are 'things' of that kind it follows that there are things to be met with in space: e.g., rrom the proposition that there are plants or that plants exist it follows that there are things to be met with in space.19
(b) Moore then proceeds to show that anything which is to
be met with in space must be external to my mind. Consider the
differences between what is external to my mind and what is i!!, my
mind. One difference is that what is external to my mind (e.g.,
my body) is to be met with in space, whereas what is in my mind
(e.g., bodily pain) is not to be met with in space. But there is
a second, and more important difference.
Whereas there is a contradiction in supposing a pain which I feel or an after-image which I see to exist at a time when I am having no experience, there is no contradiction in supposing mx body to exist at a time when I am having no experience.20
1811Proof," PP, pp. 131-6. Regarding this section, Levi observes: anoore's pUrpose in this analysis is not merely to show that 'things presented in space' fall outside the conception of 'things external to our minds,• but also to underline the doctrine of a realistic epistemology that 'there is no contradiction in supposing that there have been and are to be met with in space things which never have been, are not now, and never will be perceived.'" Philoso)hy and the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1959 , p:---45~
19Ibid., p. 137. The reason this follows is that there could not Dea plant which was not to be met with in space. (p.13 s:
20Ibid., p. 143. Cf. also: CB, p. 106. Klemke states Moore's po1nrvery clearly. "For any object X: a) X is in my mind, if from a proposition that X exists at time tl, there logically follows a proposition that I was having an experience at tl. b) X is external to my mind, if from a proposition that X exists at tl, there does not logically follow a proposition that
13
fhus, what is to be met with in space does not imply that I am
experiencing it, which is to say, it is external to my mind.
Combining his first and second analyses, Moore offers
nis proof.
There are ever so many kinds of 'things', such that, in the case of each of these kinds, from the proposition that there is at least one thing of that kind there follows the proposition [l] that there is at least one thing to be met with in space ••• [and, 2] that there is at least one thing external to our minds: e.g., from 'There is at least one star' there follows not only 'There is at least one thing to be met with in space" but also 'There is at least one external thing•.21
rehus Moore contends that by holding up his two hands• he has pro
iven the existence of external things. He considers this a proof
I was having an experience at tl. 11 "G. E. Moore's Proof of an External World, 11 !Im• p. 279.
21Ibid., pp. 143-4. Moore's "Proof" is also summarized oy Klemke.---rii the second part of his article, Klemke proposes the following explicit formulation of Moore's argument.
"Let us adopt the following as abbreviations to be used in the full proo~:
E\tl: external world OU: outside of us
E: external EM: external to our minds EE: empirically external rm: to be met with in space H: hand
HE,t: has an experience, at time t fhen Moore's 12!:Q£f .of an external world is:
i) o~ • -me • Msx = Ef'bC 2~ ~$ x) (x • x~ tl) + (3y) (HEy, tl)J ~EMx 3 3x) (Hx, tl fr(3y) (HE, tl) 4 x) (Hx, tl ~ (3 x) EMx 5~ E\.lz .. (3x) (3y) r(EMx. EMy). (y" :x:)J 6 (Ha • Hb) • (a ,Eb) ? ••• (3 x) (3 y) E(Hx • Hy) • ( y 1' x) J 8) .•. (3x) (3y) (EMx: • EfV) • (y 1' x)J 9) (3 z ) EW'z "
"G. E. Moore Proof of Ext l 1-1 ld " SPM 28') an erna wOr 9 ___ , p. ~.
14
Decause it fulfills the necessary conditions tor having a proot;
(1) the conclusion is ditterent .from the premiss, {2) the premiss
is certain, and (3) the conclusion follows trom the premiss. To
one who objects that he has not proved the premiss, Moore replies
~hat he did not intend to do so, nor is it possible to do so.
"How am I to prove now that 'Here's one hand, and here's ano
ther'? I do not believe I can do it."22 But this situation does
not alter the tact that "I can know things, which I cannot
prove."23
B. Moore's Notion .2! Common Sense: Al! Intez:pretation
In order to appreciate Moore's philosophical starting
point, and his reasons tor regarding it as foundational. it is
~eeessary to answer two preliminary questions: (1) when is a
statement to be considered a statement of common sense? and (2)
~hen is a statement or common sense true?
The main problem in attempting to answer these questions
is that Moore did not explicitly deal with them. So the only way
or finding an answer is to carefully observe Moore's use or com
mon sense, and then state what is implicit in his use. !'ltl.s has
been done by Alan R. White. 24 White contends that there i~ deri
~itely one, and possibly two criteria by which to determine whe-
22Ibid., P• 149 • ............... 23Ibid., P• 150. 24White, "Moore's Appeal to Common Sense," Ph.ilos., 33
{1958), 221-39; M:OE, PP• 9·20.
15
ther a statement is actually a statement of common sense: univer-
sal acceptance and, possibly, compulsive acceptance. White also
contends that there are several additional criteria by which to
determine whether a statement of common sense is true: inconsis-
tency, a particular type of inconsistency, and self-evidence.
He leaves unanswered the question as to which of these criteria
is necessary or sufficient to determine the truth of a common
sense belief.
In this section, I will present White's analysis, and
then attempt to show why it needs to be reformulated. My purpose
will be to determine what are the criteria of common sense and
its truth.
1. Criteria for Common Sense Statements. According to --- --~-- ~---
White, the first characteristic of all common sense statements is
that of universal acceptance. 25 This means that only statements
which are "commonly or generally or universally or constantly
~ssumed to be true" can be considered statements of common
aense. 26 For example, it is generally accepted as true that the
~arth had existed for many years before we were born. 27 The sec
pnd criterion suggested by White is that of compulsive accep
tance. 28 For example• we cannot help believing in the existence
25M:CE, p. 11. Klemke agrees with White on this and the rollowing criterion, ll1• P• 21.
26M:CE, p. 11. -27 1•Defence" PP p. 33. _, 28M:OE, p. 12.
16
of external objects. 29
It is not clear whether or not this second criterion is
necessary in order to have a common sense statement.30 It is
tempting to treat the two criteria as being interdependent, since
compulsive acceptance implies a universal acceptance. That is,
one is apt to think that a given common sense belief is univer
sally accepted as true because we cannot help believing it. But
is this how Moore uses these criteria? According to Moore, to
say that a given belief is universally accepted actually means
"commonly or generally" accepted.3l So strict universality is
not a criterion o~ common sense beliefs. And this implies that
~t least some common sense beliefs might not be compulsively ac
~epted. Now the fact that some common sense beliefs have changed
~rom one era to another,32 and that there is often only general
~cceptance of these beliefs might be taken as evidence that some
~ommon sense beliefs are not compulsively accepted. Yet the fact
~hat some beliefs have changed does not prove that they were not
~ompulsively accepted as true.
It would seem, then, to be a fair description of Moore's
usage to say that the one necessary criterion of common sense
statements is that they are "commonly accepted as true"; and the
Reality
29Moore, "Hume's Philosophy," .£:§, PP• 157, 163-4.
30M:CE, p. 11. Cf • .!!':!t P• 21.
31cr. "Defence", ~. p. 44. See also: of Objects of Perception, 11 E§, pp. 31, 32 Cf. SMPP, pp. 3, ?, 8-9, 13. -
"The Nature and 42-3.
17
su.f ficient criterion is thR.t the;y be "compulsively accepted as
true."
Does Moore use any other criteria not; mentioned by 1.Jh.i te?
One possibility would be that all common sense bel5.efs are ex
pressf'!d in ordinary Janguage.33 However, this does not seem to
be a distinct or additional criterion, for the notion "commonly
accepted" seems to imply the notion "expressed in ordinary lan-
er· fl 0 ua.ge. A sAcond possible criterion would be psychological cer-
ltainty, for "we believe that we do really know" common sense be-. -
~iefs.34 But again, this seems to be contained in the notion
"commonly accepted as~·"
2. Criteria .2! Truth. Although we believe that we know -la given common sense belief, we make a distinct~.on "between
rthinga which are now absolutely known; things which were formerly
believed, but believed wrongly; and things which we do not yet
Know."35 While common acceptance and compulsive acceptance are
reasons for considering a given common sense belief to be true,
~either criterion is sufficient to determine its truth. What
~ther criteria does Moore use to determine whether a given common
~ense belief is true? White suggests that there are several cri
teria.
true says
33E.g., "Defence," PP, pp. 35-6. This assertion seems of Moore's practice, tnough it may not be true of what he about his practice, ibid., p. 37. -34 SMPP, p. 12.
35 Ibid., p. 1.3. Cf. "Defence," PP, pp. 44-5. - -
18
(a) The first criterion White suggests in inconsistency
upon-denial: a given common sense belief is true when it is, some
now, inconsistent to deny it.36 There are five or six variations
of this criterion. One type of inconsistency is that of presup
posing the very common sense belief which one is attempting to
disprove. For example,
Any philosopher who asserts positively that other men, equally with himself, are incapable of knowing any external facts, is, in that very assertion, contradicting himself, since he implies that he does kno~ a great many facts about the knowledge of ot~men.5?
Another type of inconsistency is that of basing an argument
(which denies a common sense statement) on premisses that are
less certainly true than the common sense statement to be dis
proved. Consider the following case.
Russell's view that I do not know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I am right, on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don't know these things immediately; (2) That I don't follow logicall~ from any thing or things that I do know immediately; (3) That, if (1) and (2) are true, my belief in or knowledge of~hem must be 'based on an analogical or inductive argument'; and (4) That what is so
36EM, p. 22. White refers simply to "inconsistency." The fact tnat common sense is "opposed to the paradoxical" seems to be an expression of the criterion of inconsistency. Cf. S.A. Grave, "Common Sense," The Encyclopedia of Philosophl' Vol. 2, ed. by Paul Edwards (Ne'W'"York: Macmillan-;-196?), p. 56.
3?ttoore, "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 158. Cf. also: "Defence," PP, pp. 42-3 (quoted on p. 11 aoove); "The Nature and Reality Of Objects of Perception," PS, pp. 31-2; SMPP, p. 202.
White's second type of inconsistency is "where an alleged disproof of a common sense belief does not presuppose its truth but the truth of the ~ of belief, namely a common sense belief, which is being denied."(H:CE, pp. 12-3) This type of inconsistency seems so similar t'O"tlie one just presented that its differ~ntiation is unnecessary.
19
based cannot be certain knowledge ••• Is it, in fact, as certain that all these four assumptions are true, as that I .£2. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious? I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I i!Q. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four.38
A third example is the inconsistency of denying the implications
of common sense beliefs• i.e., of things we know to be true.
E.g., the proposition that my body has existed for many years past, and has, at every moment during that time been either in contact with or not far from the earth, is a proposition which implies both the reality of mater~ things ••• and also the reality .2f Space.3lJ°""
Fourthly, it is inconsistent to deny a common sense belief and
thereby contradict other beliefs which we hold to be true. This
seems to be part of the naturalistic fallacy: it is inconsistent
to maintain an identity between 'good' and something else (~),
and also maintain that it makes sense to ask, "Is x good?u Fin--ally, it is inconsistent, even self-contradictory, to maintain
that we know certain things "to be features in the Common Sense
view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that ~ know
this, is to say that they are true. 1140 This is the special kind
38Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism," PP, P•' 226. See also: "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 160; "Certainty,"~. p. 24?; "Some Judgments of Perception," ~. p. 228.
39"Defence," E_~, pp. 38-9. ,Cf.~. p. 12. 40Ibid., p. 44. Moore also says of some truisms that "if
they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether we know this or not), it follows that they are true." (p. 45, italicized). Malcolm interprets Moore as saying that the proposition "There is a Common Sense view of the world" entails such things as "Time is real" and "Space is real." Therefore, if there is a common sense view of the world, then the entailea propositions are true. "Critical Notice of G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition,"~. 69 (1960), pp. 93-4.
20
of inconsistency referred to by White. But as White himself
notes, this is probably only a particular variation of the first
type of inconsistency mentioned above; and so it can be ommitted
as a distinct criterion of truth. 41 To summarize: a common sense
belief is true when its denial is inconsistent with accepting
(i) its truth, (ii) a less certain truth, (iii) other things one
holds to be true; or when (iv) one denies the implications of
pommon sense beliefs.
Two comments are in order. First, we need to distinguish
a logical inconsistency from what might be called existential
inconsistency. Thus, Moore maintained that it is inconsistent to
deny a common sense belief because this involves the logical in
consistency of self-contradiction, or of denying the conclusion
of a valid syllogism; or because the denial involves the existen
tial inconsistency of accepting what is less certain, or of ac
cepting what is incompatible with other beliefs we hold to be
true. Secondly, both types of inconsistency seem to be related
to the criterion of compulsive acceptance. Speaking about Hume,
for example• Moore says:
He points out, with regard to all such excessively sceptical opinions that we cannot continue to believe them for long together--that, at least, we cannot, for long toge- 42 ther, avoid believing things flatly inconsistent with them.
It would seem, then, that the compulsive character of many common
41M:CE, p. 14. White believes that this argument is similar to an--apj)eal to the paradigm case. (pp. 36-?).
42Moore, "Hume's Philosophy,".!:§, p. 15?. Emphasis mine.
21
sense beliefs is merely the consequence of the inconsistency
wbich results when these beliefs are denied. If this is so, then
inconsistency-upon··denial would be a clearer formulation of the
criterion wbich is sufficient for having a common sense state
ment. However, when considering the truth of a common sense be
lief, the criterion of inconsistency is not sufficient. Like
the first two criteria, inconsistency-upon-denial may be a reason
for holding a belief to be true, but it does not prove it to be
true.43 Nor is there any evidence in Moore's writings to indi
cate that inconsistency-upon-denial is a necessary condition for
the truth of a common sense statement.
(b) We are left, then, with only one criterion of the
truth of common sense beliefs: self-evidence. The kind of thing
Moore has in mind when he speaks of something as self-evident is
our belief that there are "enormous numbers of material objects;
~nd there are also a very great number of mental acts or acts of
Consciousness."44 Similarly, it is self-evident that personal
~ffection is intrinsically good. 45 Now while Moore maintains
~hat self-evidence is the sole criterion of the truth of a common
•ense belief, he does not believe that it constitutes a Eroof of
rthat belief. "If, therefore, anybody asserts ••• that it is
~vident to him that one and the same action ~ be both right and
43White agrees that four types of inconsistency
448Mnn 4 ~' P• • 45~, p. 188.
this is true for at least the first enumerated above (M:CE, p. 14). -
22
ong, I do not see how it can be proved that he is wrong. 1146 In
other words, self-evident ~ruths cannot be proved; they can only
e shown to be true. There are no criteria for self-evidence.47
or example, there is no evidence that can prove what kinds of
-hings ought to exist for their own sakes. 48 Thus, for Moore,
elf-evidence is the sufficient criterion of the truth of common
beliefs.
However, Moore did speak aboui, proving some common sense
He tried to prove, for example, that there is an exter
al world. 49 But there is no real incompatibility between his
otions of proof and self-evidence. If someone denies a common
belief, if he does not see its self-evidence, then all
could do was attempt to show that it ie somehow inconsis
ent to deny the common sense belief. He recognized that all his
"proofs" rested upon an unprovable or self-evident premiss. His
"proofs'' were an attempt to make one see the self-evident charac
er of a belief .50 They were not aimed at establishing the truth
46Ethics, p. 86. Cf. also "The Refutation of Idealism," here Moore says: if an idealist asserts that "esse is percipi" s self-evident, then Moore can only say that "ttdoes not appear o me to be so." (!:§, p. 11).
47~, pp. 75, 145, 160; Ethics, p. 86; ~. p. 191.
48~, pp. viii, x. 49"Proof," ~. p. 149; ~. p. 120; "Reply," ~. PP•
50"The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception," PS, 55-6; "Hume's Philosophy," PS, pp. 148-50, 159-60; "PfOOf,'
P, pp. 148-50; "Defence," PP, pp. Yi, 44; SMPPf pp. 191, 237; ics 1 p. 86. But cf. alsO: Murphy, "MoorerB' Defence of Common
.....,.e"""'n"""s'"'"e- "
23
of common sense beliefs, but at rejecting the denial of tbese be
liefs. Moore made no clain to logical certainty; he was only
relatively certain. This is ·;;o say, ffoore was psychologically
51 certain simply because he found no good reason not to be.
5l"Certainty," ~' p .. 237, 244. For a brief statet1ent of ~oore's common sense argument, see V. C. Chappell's example in "Malcolm on Moore,"~. 70 ~1961), 420-3.
CHAPTER III
COMMON SENSE AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE: AN EVALUATION
After first reading Moore's works, it is tempting to sim
ply ask: are his arguments valid? The difficulty is that; one can·
not answer this question without knowing the "status" of Moore's
arguments. The debate over this issue centers around the rela
tionship between common sense and philosophy. The relati.onship
is obviously one or conflict. Philosophers have denied both the
l truth of common sense beliefs, and our knowledge of them. But
are these real conflicts?
Some philosophers consider the conflict between eommon
sense and philosophy only an apparent one because the conflict is
taken to be merely linguistic. Thia is the view we will consider
in this chapter. 1n effect, then, we will be asking whether an
~ppeal to common sense is equivalent to an appeal to ordinary
language. And if there is merely one appeal, is this appeal such
that it can be interpreted as being either an appeal to common
sense or as an appeal to ordinary language; or, ia an appeal to
Pommon sense really a disguised appeal to ordinary language?
1Moora also mentioned that some philosophers add -to com~on dense belie.f's--they say, for exampltl, "Therd is a <fO'd. n How~ver, these additions were not particularly disturbing to Moore, aince common sense holds no view regarding ·~hese addi tons 11 and so ~)~ not being contradicted. (SllPP, pp. 2, 16-8; cf. also :pp. 301-
24
25 And if there are two distinct appeals, is one more "basic" than
the other?
Since the linguistic interpretation revolves around a
discussion of ordinary language, we will begin by describing how
Moore utilized ordinary language.
A. Moore's References to Ordinary L.angµSY)e
Moore ref erred to ordinary language for two general rea
sons: to clarify what he and others meant, and to ascertain whe
ther what was meant is true or not.
1. Reflection on Usage: Meani:qs. Often, Moore's refer
ences to ordinary language were merely reflections upon ordinary
usage, in order to call attention to how we actually use certain
expressions. His purpose was simply to be clear about the menni
of an expression. Yet his reflections upon ordinary usage were
~ore than practical measures taken in order to be understood. 2
His efforts at achieving clarity were aimed at avoiding the
source of philosophical difficulties, which is attempting "to
answer questions without first discovering precisely what ques
tions it is which you desire to answer.,.3
In attempting to clarify philosophical statements, Moore
used a special technique, called the translation into the con
crete. This is the technique of spelling out in ordina17 language
2ar. !:1!.Q!, p. 32; EM, 233 .. - pp. 40-1; and Broyl~s, .2J2.• ~., p.
3pE _, p. vii.
26
the implications of a philosophical concept or proposition.4
How Moore utilized this will be illustrated in the following sec-
ti on.
Despite Moore's emphasis on clarity, it is worth keeping
the following observation in mind.
Moore generally chooses to employ language in a straightforward way • • • This is largely based on a consideration of clarity ••• But it is characteristic ot Moore to treat the ordinary meaning of expressions as unproblematic. He holds that there obviously is an ordinary use (or several), that we all know perfectly well what it is (or they are;, and that it would be foolish not to follow it (or them). No great issues are seen to hinge upon the ordinary use of language. Moore's faith in ordinary language might almost be described as precritical. It foreshadows none of the coming "wars•t over the status, the character, the legitimacy of the appeal to ordinary language.5
Th.is serves to remind us that Moore did not give an extended
treatment of the questions raised in this chapter.
2. Appeal to Usage: Truth. At times, Moore not only re
flected upon ordinary language, but actually appealed to it. In
these situations, he was not only interested in the meaning of an
~ssertion, but more especially in its truth. His appeals to or
dinary language served two purposes. The first was a construc
tive appeal to what people commonly say, as indicative of what
~hey believe. In this way, ordinary language is something like a
guide to what is commonly, and perhaps compulsively, accepted--a
4sMPP, PP• 29-30, 135; "The Conception of Reality," E!h P• 209. I
P• 36. ~royles, .21?.• ill.•, P• 234. Of., e.g., "Defence t" ?Et
27
guide to common sense beliefs. 6 For example:
We constantly speak as if there were cases in which a given thing was true on one occasion and false on another; and I think it cannot be denied that, when we so speak, we are often expressing in a perfectly proper and legitimate manner something which is undoubtedly true.?
Appeals to ordinary language not only reveal common sense
beliefs; they also reveal weaknesses in some philosophical posi
tions, and thus serve a destructive purpose. Once Moore had
clarified a particular philosophical assertion by translating it
into the concrete, he was often able to show that it was self
contradictory. 8 And if someone were to object that Moore's tran
slation was not what the assertion really meant, tr1en Moore had
at least shown that the statement was not really paradoxical,
and therefore was not really as important as it seemed before
hand. 9 And finally, Moore's technique enabled him to show that
a given philosophical assertion actually does conflict with com
~on sense, in which case it was vulnerable to Moore's appeal to
common sense.
6cr. M:CE, p. 32; !!'.'.!• pp. 42-3. Broyles overlooks this type of appear:--
7 "William James' 'Pragmatism,'" PS, p. 133. Cf. also "The Refutation of Idealism," PS, PP• 19~0; "Some Judgments of Perception," PS, p. 226; SMPP,pp. ?, 311; "The Subject Matter of Psychology," l5roc. Arist.~., 10 (1909), p. 41; "Is Ex:istence a Predicate?" f.~, pp. 118-9; "Symposium: Indirect Knowledge," Arist. Soc., Suppl • .!21.• 9 (1929), pp. 27-9.
,gPE, p. 99; "Four Forms of Scepticism," "Defence,,,-PP, pp. 42-3, quoted on p. 11 above.
9"Defence," PP, p. 39; SMPP, p. 204. - -
PP, pp. 208-10; -
28
Consider, for example, how Moore dealt with Hume's Eeep
ticism. Moore granted that: ".!!.Hume's principles are true, no
body can ever E1.9!. of the existence of any material objects."lO
Moore then translates this assertion into a concrete one, and
proceeds to refute it.
If Hume's principles are true, then, I have admitted, I do not know now that this pencil--the material object-exis:tS'. If ,~erefore, I am to prove that I ,9:.2 know that this pencil exists, I must prove, somehow, that Hume's principles, one or both of them, are not true. In what sort of way, by what sort of argument-;-'Can I prove this?
It seems to me that, in fact, there really is no stronger and better argument than the following. I do know that this pencil exists; but I could not know thrs, if Hume's principles were true; therefotI' Hume's principles, one or both of them, are false.
This example serves to illustrate that Moore's ultimate
appeal was to common sense, not to ordinary language. However,
it also illustrates the peculiar situation in which Moore seems
to be caught when he appeals to common sense. His reply seems to
be obviously true. Yet he cannot convince his opponent, for his
argument begs the question.
One solution to this predicament is to reinterpret just
what is the question under discussion. For !! there is only a
linguistic disagreement, then Moore does not beg the question. -L.Je will now consider this interpretation o:f the conflict between
common sense and philosl°1phy.
lOSMPP, p. 119. -11sMPP p. 119-20. _,
29
B. The RP.ductive· Thesis
According to the reductive thesis, the disagreement be
tween common sense and philosophy is not .factual; it is linguis
.:E:.£• When Moore thought he was refuting a factual absurdity, he
was simply pointing out a logical absurdity. Thus, Moore's so-
called appeals to common sense a~e really disguised appeals to
o~dinary language. Here is a brief .formulation of the reductive
thesis by Norman Malcolm.
~~an a philosopher maintains that we do not know material object propositions to be true (Hume) or that we do not see material things (Prichard), he must be holding that the notions of knowing a material object proposition to be t;rue and of seeing a material thing are really selfcontradictory. He certainly cannot be maintaining-rfiat It is a matter of experience that people do not kn.ow or see such things. He must be trying to state what he thinks is an a priori truth. He must be claiming, perhaps without fully realising it, that ordinary sentences like ''I know that that thing sticking up in the garden is a shovel," "I see your glasses under the bed,n are selfcontradictory. To understand that this claim is mistaken it is su.fficient to realize that those sentences do have a correct use in ordinary discourse, which they cculd not have if they were self-contradictory. The important function of I1oore • s rebuttal was simply to remind us of this fact • • • He was not begging the question against Hume or Prichard because his very point was that it is really not open to question that such sentences have a correct use. On my view then, Moore's so-called defence of common sense, in so far as it is an interesting and tenable philosophical position, has nothim:; to d.o either w:l. th common sense, properly speaking, nor common belief, but is merely the assertion, in regard to various sentencGs, that those sentences have a correct use in ordinury language.12
We will now consider a lengthier statement of the reduc
tive thesis by Alice Ambrose, followed by Moore's response, and
12Norman Malcolm "Critical Notice o:f. G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition." l1ind, 69 (1960), p. 97.
30
some comments.
1. Example: External Objects. Moore was quite certain
that there is an external world. And after analyzing what this
meant, he thought it was quite easy to prove his point. However,
according to the reductive thesis: (a) Moore's proof of an exter
nal world ~ not establish the truth of an empirical proposi
tion; (b) Moore's technique could not establish the truth of an
empirical proposition of this sort; and (c) once the problem is
clearly formulated, it is evident that Moore was defending ordi
nary language, and not common sense. These are the main points
made by Alice Ambrose in her critique of Moore. 13
(a) Ambrose begins by observing:
Prof. Moore considers the proposition, "There are external objects," to be an empirical one. It follows from a proposition which is established by empirical evidence, viz., the evidence of the senses. One has merely to show two hands and one has established that there are external objects.14
As Moore himself recognized, the sceptic would not be satisfied
with this proof.
If the existence of external objects is in question, then calling attention to a visual experience-no ai?ferent in important respects from many past experiences which the sceptic has precluded from constituting proof will not convince him.15
That is, what the sceptic requires is a proof of the premiss,
"Here is a hand." This is why Moore's argument does not convince -l.5Alice Ambrose, ''Moore's Proof of an External World,"
~. pp. 397-41?. 14Ibid., p. 398. -l5Ibid., p. 405.
i 'I
31
the sceptic of the empirical proposition "There are external
objects."
(b) Moreover, Moore cannot prove this proposition. To
"point out" something is to distinguish it from other things.
But one cannot point out anything which is .!12.! an external object.
Therefore, it is impossible to prove that "There are external
objects" by pointing out an external object. Nor is the proposi
tion "Th.ere is an external object" entailed by a proposition such
as "There is a dime." That is, the proposition regarding exter-
nal objects cannot be established even indirectly.
not
that
that
Holding "A dime is an external object" expresses a necessary proposition does not entail holding that anything which is a dime satisfies all the criteria tor applying the phrase "external object." For this phrase is not used to apply to any kind of thing. One will therefore not have established the existence of any tging of the kind "external objectn in producing a dime.l
Aside from this, there is a second reason why Moore can-
prove his point. For there is a catch in the sceptic's claim
no one can know that external objects exist. The catch is
"no possible amount of further evidence would alter the
sceptic's claim about the limitations of our kn owl edge. ,,l? This
shows that the sceptic's claim is unfalsiriable, and hence, is
not an empirical proposition at all.
lated.
(c) This indicates that the problem needs to be reformu-
16Ibid., p. 408.
l?Ibid., p. 399. -I!
32
When the sceptic says no one can know that external objects exist, he cannot describe what prevents him from knowing, what obstacle stands in his way. Nor can he describe what kind of thing he would need to know in order for evidence for the existence of external objects to ~e complete. He cannot because he wants to say that there a~e no describable circumstances in which anyone c"O'UI'U be said to kriow that external objects exist. This comes to saying that "no one knows external objects exist" cannot be falsified, that is, that it i~ not an empirical assertion about our ability to know.l -
Thus, "the scep'l:iic is arguing for the logical impossibility of
knowledge and not for any empirical fact."19 Yet this seems un
reasonable, for it implies that such statements as "I know there
is a dollar in my purse" are logically impossible. The sceptic's
argument is not about empirical matters, and is in such marked
opposition to the way we ordinarily speak that he must actually
be "making a disguised proposal. 1120 That is, he is proposing
that such statements as "No one knows the existence of hands"
should be accepted as necessarily true. Thus, what appeared to
18Ibid., p. 402. -l9Ibid. -20Lazerowitz offers two additional arguments for this in
terpretation. Moore summarized these, and replied as follows. "He [Lazerowitz1 says that i.f they did mean anything more by them than this, we should have to suppose that they held sincerely views which they knew to be .false; and that this is impossible ••• To this, I should reply that he is right in saying that we should nave to suppose that they held sincerely views which they knew to be .false; but that there is no reason whatever to suppose that this is impossible--nor does he even try to give any. And he points out (b) that philosophers in these cases, 'counter facts with arguments;' that they cannot, by (a), both know the .facts and regard their arguments as correct arguments against them; that there.fore they plainly want us to look at the arguments rather than the facts; and, therefore, their arguments are merely meant to back a verbal recommendation. The last 'taerefore' seem~~to me to be a simply enormous non-sequitur!" CReply," ~. n. 61::J).
33
be a real conflict about factual matters is actually a conflict
over how we should speak.
Now if the sceptic is not really questioning an em~irical
proposition when he says "No one knows the existence of external
things," then what was Moore really doing when he replied to the
sceptic?
Moore's statement that '"There iJs a hand• entails 'There is an external object'" calls attention to criteria for applying "external object words" • • • [He] calls attention to criteria for the use of such words as "hand," "dime,u and the like, and in doing this shows that in English it makes sense to say "I know there is a dime in the box." That is, Moore's argument (although it does not establish the truth of an empirical proposition about the existence of a kind of thing, external objects) has as a consequence that it is lo5icallt possible to know there are coins in a box. We recall hat ~he sceptic argued as if it were logically impossible.21
Thus, Moore was actually resistin~ a lin~uistic recommendation
and "insisting on retaining conventions already established in 22
the language about the usage of the words 'know' and 'believe'."
Moore was simply pointing to ordinary usage to show "that the
sceptic's linguistic recommendation is objectionable. 1123
2. Moore's Response. In his reply, Moore tries to cor
rect four errors in Ambrose's critique.
(a) First of all, Moore believed that one can prove that
external objects exist. To say that such a proof is impossible
because one cannot "point to" anything which is not an external
21Ibid., pp. 409-10. 22Ibid., p. 415. -23Ibid., p. 411.
~18RAHY /
object is not a valid argument, unless "point to" means only
"point with the finger at."
34
One can point out to a person an object which is not an external object ••• You can say to him: "Look a~ bright light for a little while; then close your eyes; the round blue patch you will then see is not an external object." ••• And it seems to me that the contrast with objects Qf this sort enters into the meaning of "external object. 11 24
(b) Next, Moore beli~ved that "There are external objects"
is an empirical proposition. Ambrose aret1es that this is not an
empirical proposition because "no possible amount of further evi-
dence would alter the sceptic's claim." Moore replied:
This argument is a good reason for saying that his reason for denying external objects is not an empirical one • • • But he is, of course, wrong in thinking that "There are external objects" is self-contradictory, and, if so, "There are externalobjects'' may really be an empirical statement. It seems to me that !;r statement, that there ~· certainly is empirical. WhY should it not be the cas~ that from 11Ts false non-empirical statement that "There are external objects" is self-contradictory, the philosopher invalidly infers the empirical statement "There are no external objects?" This seems to me to be what has actually happened.25
(c) From these two replies, it would seem the.t Moore was
attempting to defend a common sense position. Ambrose objects:
since our language is used in such a way that "I know that there
is a dollar in my pursen describes what could be the case, the
sceptic is B2.i asserting the non-empirical proposition that such
2411Reply," ~' P• 671. 25 11Reply," PG.EM, pp. 671-2. Cf. also: CB, pp. 11?, 202.
In commenting on Moore's reply, Ambrose seems t'O"misinterpret what Moore saiG.. ("Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy," Ess~s ~ Analysis, pp. 208-9).
35
assertions are self-contradictory; therefore, he is making a lin
guistic recommendation. Moore replied: "though he knows that
such language is often used, yet he is not aware that it ever -describes what could be the case. 1126
(d) Finally, Moore expressed his dissatisfaction with the
reductive thesis as an interpretation of his arguments. "I could
not have supposed that the fact that I had a hand proved anything
as to how the expression 'external objects' ought to be used. 1127
If he was merely making a recommendation that we should not use
certain expressions in a way which deviates from ordinary usage-
"If this is all I was doing, I was certainly making a huge mis
take, for I certainly did not think it was all. And I do not
think so now. 1128 An appeal to ordinary language was not satis
factory for Moore's purpose.
A man may be using a sentence perfectly correctly, even when what he means by it is false, either because he is lying or because he is making a mistake; and, similarly, a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what he means by it is true, even when he is not using it correctly, as, for instance, when he uses the wrong word for what he means, by a slip or because he has made a mistake as to what the correct usage is. Thus making a sentence correctly--in the sense explained--and using it in such a way that what you mean by it is true, are two things which are completely logically indepencrent' of one another: either may occur without the other.29
260Reply," PGEM, p. 673. Cf. V. C. Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore,"~' 70 (1~, 419-20.
27uReply " PGEM '-· p. 674. 28Ibid., p. 675. Cf. also: CB, pp. 196-7. - -29Ibid., p. 548. Cf. also: PE, pp. 6, 12. -
36
Moore's reply gives a fairly clear indication of his reac
tion to the reductive thesis. It would seem that Moore considers
the conflict between common sense and philosophy a real one, and
not simply a verbal conflict. In other words, (1) an appeal to
common sense is (or could be) adequate to refute a philosophical
assertion, whereas an appeal to ordinary language is not adequate;
therefore (ii) an appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an
appeal to ordinary language, which is to say, an appeal to common
sense is not a disguised, linguistic recommendation.30
3. Comments. This section contains some remarks on
three topics: an alternative to the reductive thesis, Moore's
reply to Ambrose, and the reductive thesis.
(a) Some commentators have held that what Moore did could
interpreted as defending either common sense or ordinary lan
Ambrose, for example, says: "Either interpretation is
lausibly supported by placing different constructions on the
Moore made use of, namely, analysis."3l This is sur
for Ambrose devotes so much attention to the ordinary
interpretation, without in any way indicating how a com-
on sense interpretation could make sense. James Broyles also
that "the appeals are in essence the same."32 However,
Cf. EM, PP• 31-9. -31Alice Ambrose, "Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy,"
sa s in Anal sis, p. 205. Later, Ambrose adds: "It seems to me a oore s re u ations • • • are much more convincing when tak
n as ar~ents whose im~ort is iinguistic than when taken as deending a factual truth. (p. 213;. For examples of this in np
eration, cf. Lazerowitz. "Moore and Philosophical Analysis," SPM, p. 229,3~31. . -
Bro les o • c
\
3?
he only indicates how "these are not independent techniques"-
which is an entirely different issue. Since no substantial argu
ment has been offered in behalf of the identity of these appeals,
we can rest with the summary statement of Moore's position: an
appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an appeal to ordinary
language.
{b) Now we can turn to Moore's reply to Ambrose. It
seems that three of his arguments are adequate for refuting Am
brose' a position; or, at least they are adequate .!! he is correct
in maintaining that "There are external objects" is an empirical
proposition. Moore believed that this proposition could be under~
stood as either an empirical or non-empirical assertion.33 It
can be treated as an empirical proposition insofar as it is sup
ported by evidence of our senses. For example, a sceptic might
argue that since some sensory experiences are s~milar in impor
tant respects to dream-images, it follows that all sensory exper
iences one is now having may be mere dream-images.34 Moore would
reply that such a premiss implies that the sceptic knows that
dreams have occurred. And so the sceptic is inconsistent. The
sceptic might grant that we cannot always be wrong; he can still
maintain that we are unable to identify those cases in which we
are correct, in which we do know. In reply, Moore resorts to - -33cf. "Reply," PGEM, p. 6?3. -34 "Certainty, 11 Ef, p. 248. This is one kind of argument
for scepticism.
38
self-evidence.
If he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is ~ only dreaming that dreams have occurred? Can he possibly know therefore that dreams have occurred? I do not think that he can.35 -
Elsewhere, Moore points out that the issue is an empirical one
because there is evidence which can falsify his claim to know, --:-
for example, that he is seeing a table. "That I am seeing one,"
he says, "needs no proof to me. If someone were to come & fail
to see one, that would be a reason for me to doubt. 1136
For Moore, then, the real conflict between common sense
and philosophy (at least in this case) has to do with the P.Vi
dence for each. The lack of proof for self-evident statements
may be unsatisfactory as far e.s the sceptic is concerned. But
for Moore, such unprovable truths are necessary for all reason
ing. Even the sceptic claims to know things by means of ar w .. rner:~
But all arguments are based on reasons which support it; all rea
soning (mediate inference) depends upon judgments (immediate in
ference). Therefore, if we know anything by means of arguments,
there must be something which is self-evident--otherwise there
would be an infinite regress in our reasoning.3?
However, it is important to realize that Moore knew his
arguments begged the question, insofar as the question is non-em
pirical. He says, for example: "Now I cannot see my way to deny
above.
35°certainty, 11
36~, p. 11?.
3?sMPP, P• 121;
PP, p. 249. -"Proof," .ff, pp. 146, 149-50. See p. 22
39
~hat it is logically possible that all the sensory experiences I
~having now should be mere dream-images. 0 38 The surprising re
sult is that Moore appears to agree with the sceptic, at least
insofar as they are talking about a non-empirical proposition.39
The following seems applicable to Moore, as well as Reid.
Sir James Mackintosh remarks that he observed to Dr. Brown in 1812 that Reid and Hume 'differed more in words than in opinion.• Brown answered: 'Yes, Reid bawled out, We must believe an outward world; but added in a whisper, We can give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out, We can give no reason for such a notion; and whispers- I own we cannot get rid o~ it.'40
Why, then, did Moore seem so perturbed by scepticism? Simply be
~ause he believed that there are times when it is absurd to be
lieve that what is logically possible (viz., an error) is actu
ally the case.41 He was anxious to point out that because it is
logically possible for ~ to be something else does not in itself
imply that I do not know ~· The logical possibility that I may
oe dreaming is no evidence that I!! dreaming.42 Moore's exampl~
nowever, is not adequate. For a sceptic would likely grant that
. 38 "Certainty," PP, p. 250. Th.is is a second kind of argument for scepticism: I'Ogical possibility.
39Notice how Moore, like Hume, defines 'know for certain' so that to say "I know for certain that .E." implies ".E"• ("Certainty," EE, p. 238.)
40James Mackintosh• Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosounv. 2d ed. (Edinburg, 1A3?), p. 346. Quoted by S. iA. Grave, Tne Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 109.
4111certainty," PP, p. 231. -42cr. Philip P. Wiener, "Philoso:phical, Scientific, and
Ordinary Language," J. Philos., 45 (1948) 9 260-?. ! i
40
one can be directly aware of his states of mind, and so can know
these things. The problem that the sceptic emphasizes is that we
are not directll aware of material objects. In a way, the scep
tic is simply a disenchanted direct or new realist. But Moore
does not adhere to direct realism either, which implies that he
believed that indirect knowledge (or, a representative theory of
perception) does not prohibit one from knowing empirical facts.
(c) We can turn now from Moore's view to that of the lin
guist. Perhaps it would be helpful to state the reductive thesis
in more linguistic terminology, such as the following.
rsome philosophers claimJ that certain ordinary ways ot talking had always to issue in false statements, no mat-ter how the facts of the particular ease might vary • • • that a considerable body of ordina{l langu.ase is incor-rect Aamf¥age, in the sense that i can never be used in !he norma c!roumstances of its use to make true assertions.43
Thus, the reductive thesis, when stated linguistically, is simply
a reminder that ordinary language cannot be incorrect language.
However, several problems arise with this interpretation
o! philosophical assertions. First of all, the linguistic inter
pretation goes beyond pointing out that various philosophical
statements are non-empirical. Notice, for example, how Ambrose
continues this kind of interpretation.
It is hard to suppose the sceptic is arguing that such rnon-empiricalJ propositions are necessarily true when It is plain that as language is ordinarily used they are not.44
4 'Richard G. Benson, "Ordinary Language, Common Sease, and the 1'1.me-Lag Argument," ~ (196?), p. 28. Emphasis added.
P• 402. 44.Ambrose, "Moore's Proof of an External World," PGEM,
I i I
I
41
Consider the statement • • • "The sceptic argues as i.f 'no one knows that hands exist' exuresses a necessary ~ro~osition." Thi3 is to argue as if "knowing hands exist had no application • • • The sceptic knows that "knowing hands exist" has use, and that "no one knows there are hands in the world" is used to express something which can be either true or falde. He is holding that they should not be so used, only he does not say so expli-citly.45 -
The mistake that Ambrose makes is to ignore the .fact that "know-
ing hands exist" does not have an ordinary use, when 'knowing'
has the implication of "necessarily true." In other words, the
sceptic is per.fectly correct in claiming that "knowing hands
exist" can have no application in ordinary language, because in -ordinary language, 'knowing' does !!21 imply "necessarily true."
The philosopher, in other words, would distinguish 'correct use' in the sense of 'use in accordance with the rules o.f ordinary language' from 'correct use' in the sense of 'use to make true statements', and would claim that a sentence could have a correct use in the first of these two senses without having a correct use in the second. Moore indicates that he thinks the philosopher is justified both in distinguishing these two senses and in claiming what he does about their relationship. Malcolm, on the other hand, [like other linguists] denies that this distinction can be made, or at any rate denies that a sentence can be correct in the first sense without being correct in the second.46
Therefore, it does ~ .follow that the sceptic is necessarily
$ayi:ug how we should speak or use the word 'know•--though he
might wish to do this. As Moore was regarded as mistakenly
~hinking that a sceptic was speaking about matters of fact, so
~he linguist mistakenly thinks that the sceptic is speaking in
45Ibia., pp. 403-4. 46v. c. Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore,"~. ?O (1961),
p. 419.
42
ordinary language, or has to. The linguist overlooks that ordi
nary language is used in vario~s contexts, in various spheres or
levels of discourse.
The linguist is bound to reply: ordinary language cannot
be incorrect language. But this is no valid objection against
the sceptic's position. As I stated it above, I gave the impres
sion that the philosopher is not speaking in ordinary language.
This is only partly true. Por the sceptic could very easily use
ordinary language to state his position. He might say: "In ordi
~ary language, we say that we 'know• external objects or empiri
cal facts. But we also say, in ordinary language, that it is im
possible to prove that a particular case of knowing is necessari
ly true. (The very accusation that Moore had begged the question
is evidence of this). Therefore, in ordinary language we use
'know• without regard tor logical possibility." It is important
to notice that this argument is also directed against Moore's
position. For Moore•s argument is stated in ordinary language:
we know empirical statements in the ordinary sense ot 'know.•
However, if--as the sceptic claims--the ordinary sense ot 'know'
does not include the notion of certainty; then Moore's argument
is completely ineffective against scepticism.47 A second difficulty with the linguistic interpretation is
that the appeal to ordinary language seems to be based on the
47ct. A. c. Ewing, "Knowledge of Physical Objects," in Non-Limruistic Philosoptq (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), P• o-'•
JI
i'
43
principle of verification,48 according to which all cognitively
11eanine;ful proposi~.:;ions are either a'l'lalytic or empirical, and
those ilhich Fl.re empirical have cognitive meaning only if they ad-
mit of some evidence for or against thelli. But the assumption of
this analytic-synthetic dichotomy is at least debatable. 49 And
it is important to keep this in mind, for it is by means of this
rigid classification that metaphysical assertions are ruled out
as possib1y having CO{jnitive meaning. Because of this dichotomy,
we have been restric+.ed ~o considering the conflict between com-
t mon sense and philosophy as either empirical or linguistic. The
possibility of a third alternative, or a real, metaphysical con
flict has been ruled out.50
The issue might be put this way: "Is the significance of
the language of common sense exhausted when it has been used with
reference to what can fall unde::::- the sense and (the speaker's)
introspection, or does it go beyond this to what these cannot
48Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the appeal to ordinary language is based on "methodological verificationism, 11 or "methodological nominaliam,rr which does not commit one to the truth of the principle of verification. On a cifficul ty with this position, cf. Ewing,~·£!!., p. 68.
49As Moore said, to maintain that metaphysical statements have no meaning requires identifying these statements by the kind of meaning they have, which iR the meaning of asserting something unverifiable. (Cited by Alice Ambrose, Essa.ys in Anal;zsis, p. 207). On the pJ'inciplo of verification• cf. Carl G. Hempel, "Problemc and Changes in tbe Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," Rev. Intern. J>hilos.·, (1950), pp. 41-63.
50Lazerowitz contends that even if there are synthetic a priori judgments, this type of knowledge does not help solve the problem. ("Moore and Philosophical Analysis, 11 S?M, p. 243). -
,,
44
reach?''5l Or we might ask: do common sense beliefs contain a
trans-crapirical content?
51 Grave. -212• .£!!., p. 101.
I
Ir
CHAP.rER IV
COMMON SEISE AND ANALYSIS
So tar, we have considered a tew aspects of Moore's no
common sense, and the relation between common sense and
!he notion or common sense remains problema
ic, and the relation between comm.on sense and ordinary language
as not even been adequately stated, much less resolved. !':bus,
t has been impossible to proceed to the more important question:
as Moore successful in his attempts to defend common sense?
erhaps by considering this issue more directly, it will be easi
r to clarity Moore's notion ot common sense--which is the main
onoern or this paper.
When the question of the validity or Moore's arguments is
a common reply is that they are valid on the level or
sense, but irrelevant on the philosophical level. As
emke says:
In one sense, we understand what it is for tables and chairs to exist, and, in that sense, we know that there are such objects • • • However, in another sense, and in a different context, might one not plausibly hold that it is sometimes appropriate to question various commonsense assertions, since we know, among other things, that common sense is often wrong (Moore admits the latter)? • • • I might suggest, tor example, that I am now sensing a red datum which is wholly presented to me is absolutely certain. But I might wonder whether, in this same sense, it is absolutely certain that there is a red book on that table over there. Might I not tind that the 'GOOi is
orange, or that the object is a box and not a book, or that there is, in tact. no object over there at all?l
In etfect, Klemke accuses Moore of overlooking that, on the phil
osophical level, one is attempting an analysis ot common sense
statements,2 which gives rise to technical terms. In other words
Moore is accused of ignoring the fact that words like 'know• and
'exist' are used in a special sense on the philosophical level.
Therefore, his arguments miss their metaphysical and epistemolog
ical targets.3
Thus, we have not yet finished considering the relevance
of ordinary language. Now we take it up again in a somewhat dif
ferent context, that of analysis. Roughly speaking, whereas the
last chapter centered around the truth of common sense proposi
tions, the present chapter picks up this problem in terms of !!,!!
nin&:e.
Moore's position is this.
It is ;eossible to understand (common sense1 statements about L.•uoh things asJ observed material ol>jects and other selves, in their ordinary or popular meaning, and to know their truth tor certain, without knowing what their correct analysis is.4
lnemke, EM, P• 19c ct., PP• 20.t 26-30. See also Malcolm "Defending Oommon-Wense•, .§E!11 PP• 203-·1, 215-81 and Barnes, ~e PhilosoDhical Predicament, P• 42.
2~., p. 30. See also l"'furpb.y, "Moore's 'Defence ot Com• mon Sense , ~. PP• 303, 308•9.
3Moore denied this charge and maintained that he was (at least operatively) aware of this distinction. ("Reply", PG.EM, PP• 668-70• Ot., e.g. 1 "Ob~ecta of Perception", PS, P• 6~; "Proof", PP, pp. 141-2 J. --
4MurpbJr, .2.R• oit. 1 p. 310. See Moore's "Defence", PP, PP• 36-7. Is thispaicr-or the reason why Moore spoke of common sense "beliefs", and not "knowledge"?
47
Now there is no real conflict between 11oore•s position
d that of the epistemologist, as long as the latter does not
extend the technical meaning of 'know•, tor example, so as to in
lude its ordinary or common sense meaning. However, when a
echnieal, philosophical term is used so as to include its comm.on
ense meaning, and when this results in a conflict between a
hilosophieal assertion and common sense--then Moore's defense of
ommon sense is at least relevant, it not conclusive.5 As .A';rer
aid: "the philosopher has no right to despise the beliefs ot com
on sense • • • What he is entitled to despise is (onlyJ the un
etlecting analysis ot those beliets."6
The crux ot the issue seems to be the meaning of •to
ow•. For Moore, to know something does not imply knowing its
alysis. For other philosophers, it does.? However, there are
till others who agree with Moore's position, but rejeot his
tatement ot the issue. It is this latter disagreement that we
11 consider in what follows.
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that Moore's notion
t analysis implies that while common sense is the starting point
t philosophy, it ia not the limit ot philosophy. For "the first
d most important problem ot philosophy is: ~o give a general
5Mu.rphy, tor one, believes that in this situation, H:>ore•s guments are conclusive. <Jlla• ,g!!., PP• 312-3).
6.A. J. Ayer, La.nsuase, ~uth !as! Logic. 2d ed. London, P• 51.
?Barnes, ll• .2!!•• P• 32.
I .
48
iescription ot the whole Universe."8
For Moore. as tor others, understanding Oommon-sense statements and knowing them to be true is not enough. A common-sense philosopher is not one who remains at the level ot Common Sense. His quest is tor knowledge which penetrates .further into the nature of things than unaided Oommon Sense is able to.9
A. What Js Analysis?
When Moore said that he knew a particular common sense
statement to be true and yet did not know its analysis, he was
distinguishing two difterent types of meaning that an expression
may have: its ordinary meaning• and a technical kind of meaning.
Analysis is a Aomewhat technical term tor a specific kind of
meaning. In an effort to clarity this notion, we will first dis
rtingulsh analysis from other kinds 0:£ meaning, and then consider
what it is that is analysed, and finally, how it is analysed.
l. Xinds of Meaning. .An expression or statement may
~ave several different types ot meaning.lo First ot all, the
meaning of an expression may be its sense !!.!, ordina..:::r t!BS'!8-6e•
A vivid example is found in Moore's lectures.
Who is there who does not know what is meant by saying that some men are alive and others dead, ~utticiently
8 SHPP, P• 2. -9Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore and Philosophical .Analysis",
SPM, P• 232. 1010.emke notes that Moore also used 4meaning' in the
sense 0£ (i) 'im.portance•-as in, "!bat was a meaningless gesture" -and in the sense of (ii) emotive meaning. ht these two uses have little meaning tor philosophy. (Jr:!1 PP• 53-4).
49
well to be able to say with certainty in ever so many cases that some men are alive and others are dead? But yet, if you try to de?!ne the meaning ot ilie word 'lite• quite generally--to give an account of the difference between lite and death, which will apply to all cases in which we sa:y that one thing is alive and another dead, you will certainly find it extraordinarily difficult. The very same person who may know quite well that one particular man is alive and another dead, may yet be quite unable to say exactly what properties there are which are common to a living man and to all other living things--a living plant, a living cell; a living bacillus, and which at the same time do not belong to a dead man or to anything not living. Vi!I, in the same way, it seems to me we do usually understand quite well the meaning ot these much more fundamental expressions 'real', •exists•, 'is'• 'is a tact•, 'is true• ••• even though we do not know their meaning, in the sense or being able to define c1.e., give an analysis otJ thea.11
econdly, the meaning of an expression may be its use. "Often,
e are not only able to lunder•tand an expression • • • but we are
so able to use the expression intelligently or in accord with
ommon usage."12 And when someone consistently uses an expres•
ion correctly, we could say that he knows the meaning of that
Thirdly, the meaning ot an expression :might be its
erbal definition. Tb.us, one could speak of the meaning ot
'horse• as being "a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equusn.13
ourthly, the meaning of an expression could be its referent,
the object or concept to which an expre&sion refers.14 For
llHoore• SMPPt PP• 205-6.
12nelilke, ~· P• .56· ~s distinction between "sense in ordinary language• and •use" is made by Klemke. It is very doubt ul, however, whether Moore made this distinction. (Of. "Neces
sity", Mind, PP• 289-90; !I· P• 6; ~. PP• 205-6, 216-?; "Deenoe", a>, PP• 19?-8; "Reply", PGJIJ;P. 548) Whether or not his distI'nction is made does no~ seem important here.
l3Moore, E!t P• B. 14While Moore reco at times I
I I
50
example, the meaning of 'good' is the object or idea which the
word stands ror.15
2. The "Anal:sandum". 7or all four ot the kinds ot
meanings mentioned, what is to be analyzed (the anal:sandum) is
an expression or statement. This is not the case in analysis.
Rather, what is to be analyzed is a concept or object. As Moore
said in his "Reply":
I never intended to use the word ['analysis'J in such a way that the analisandum would be a verbal hi\ression. When I have ta!ite of analysing anytFllng, "w I have talked or analysing has always been an idea or concept or proposition, and not a verbal expression.16 -
Unfortunately, Moore did noi always speak so unequivocally and
clearly. !hue he did, at times, speak ot analyzing words or expres
sions .17 But this seems to have been simply a misleading way ot
be equivalent to •use•, he usually spoke ot meaning in terms ot naming. It is possible that the distinction between the two was unclear to him. (See his "Repl7", where (p • .583) he equates ·the "dirterent senses in which the word 'good' is used" and the "different characteristics or which it is a name"). Soaetiaes Moore thought that what was named or referred to was an obieot, while at other times the referent was taken to be a concep • ~or a dis~ussion or Moore's naming theory ot meaning• see Ohite, M:OE, PP• 39-50, and Kl9mke, !!:!1 PP• 57-62.
l5n, P• 6.
16"Reply"•yfQEM, P• 66. Nelson believes that there is an earlier and later ew in Moore's writings on analysis. Nelson also notes: "Although he CMooreJ was unclear about what the relation is between concepts, the entities objectively making up the universe, and verbal expressions, he appears to have thought that concepts are not only distinct trom and(at least from their side) independent ot their verbal expressions but also distinct from the entities objectively making up the universe." ("George Edward Moore", ~e Encp,lf&edia ot Philosophy'. Vol. 5. Ed. by Paul Fil.wards. lew for : cm111an and Fiee Press, 19671 p. 375).
l?see White's discussion ot the analzsandum (M:OE, pp. 50-3) tor numerous references. ---
51
describing what he was about. 18 Despite the various terms Moore
employed, there is an essential coherence in his descriptions ot
analysis.
Since • • • when he J:MooreJ talks of a proposition or concept he is talking in a misleading way about the meaniag ot expressions ot various kinds, it follows that to propose a proposition or concept tor the role of analzsandua is to say that it is the meanings of expressions 'that we 'tiave to analyse. Further, we saw that on his naming theory there is no important difference between talking ot an analysis of the entity ABC and an analysis ot the meaning of the expression 'ABC'• We JBa7 conclude, therefore, that these other genuine candidates for the role of ana~eandum, namely, entities and conoepts--expressions o y sl!p into the ring when the judge is not looking--are all one and the same candidate, namely, the meaning of an expression, in disguise.l9
!his brings out the main relation between analysis and
ordinary understanding or use, namely, analysis presupposes an
runderstanding of the ordinary meaning of an expression or con
cept: analysis is about the ordinary meaning of a ooncept. 20
"Philosophy only analyses words of which we already know the mea-
lning, in the sense that we can use the word right, although we
could not perhaps saz what it means."21 As this was expressad
18Klemke's contused discussi~n of Moore's ase of analysis overlooks Moore's remark: "There is, of course, a sense in ~hieh verbal expressions o~n b& •analysad.'" But this is a nontechnical sense of analysis. "Reply", PGEM, p. 661.
l9Wb.ite, MzCE, PP• 52-3. Moore•s position could also be put this way: the analfsandum. is commoa sense, tor the common sense view is not a oo~eotlon ot 2ro2ositions. (.Q!, p. 280).
20sMPP, pp. 267-9. Ct. n. 14 above. 21Moore, "!he Justification of Analysis", Anal;sis, 1
(1934), P• 28. See also: SMPP, PP• 2l6 1219,279e3otJ; u our Forms ot Scepticism", .fl1 pp. l~ "Detence", ,!l, p. 37.
52
later by others: there is a distinction between knowing how to
use an expression or concept, and knowing the conditions under
which the expression can be used correctly--and the latter de
pends upon the former.
So far, then, we have observed two things which help
cla1•ity why Moore believed that "knowing X" does not imply "know
ing the analysis of X": (i) "knowing the analysis ot X" is
"knowing the t&chnical mean.i;ig of X"; and (ii) this is "knowing
the technical meaning ot an idea of concept or proposition or
meaning".
Bow we can consider l1.2!! the meaning in question is ana
lyzed, and the criteria ot an analysis.
3. Kinds of Analyses. According to White's interpreta
tion or Moore, there are three ways in which the analysis of the
ordinary meaning of a concept may be carried out. The analysis
may be by division, by analytic distinction, or bj inspection. 22
22nemke suggests that the various kinds of analysis can be classified as follows. (EM, P• 68)
"l. Retutational anirysis: (a) Showing contradictions; (b) Translation into the concrete;
2. Distinctional analysis; 3. Deoompositional analysis:
(a) Definitional; (b) Divisional;
4. Reductional analysis." However. this classification seems to be very misleading.
For example, "refutational analysis" is not a description of analysis in its technical sense. What Klemke refers to as refutational analysis is actually an appeal to ordinary language. Ref· utational analysis is not so much a kind ot analysis as it is the purpose or result of distinctional analysis. llemke himself seems to have doubts about the appropriateness of hie acoount. (Cf. PP• 62 and 72). Moreover, Moore warned agliinet just this
53
(a) Analysis by Divis~. 23 One way or analyzing the
eaning or a concept is by dividing a complex concept into its
omponent parts. .An example of analysis by division is given in
"!he Refutation or Idealism", where Moore analyzes the notion of
sensation into two elements: c?nsciousness and the object of
ons~iousness. 24 Similarly, a beli~t oan be analyzed into two
act of belief and the object or beliet.25
!'his type or 8.!lalysis is not particularly problematic.
t it is worth noting a few characteristics of an analysis by
ivision. First of all, there is no doubt that the analzsandUJll
is a concept or entity. Tb.is is not clearly the case in other
I I
analyses. Secon1ly, the analysandum is not synonymous Ii
analysans. as seems to be the case in the next kind ot
considered. Furthermore, this type of analysis is only
pplicable in dealing with complex concepts. Yellow and good,
or example, "are notions ot that simple kind, ~ut of which deti
analysesJ are composed and with which the power ot
sort of contusion. (Ot. "Reply", PGEM,pp. 661, 664-5). See also • 36 above, and n. 27 below. ----
230n this type of analysis, ct. lJhite, M:OE, PP• ?3-4, 201-8. White makes this 1nteresti!!S observation. "Moat philosohers who took this division view rot analysisJ searched tor some timate set of elements trom whicn the other parts and wholes
re to be built. Moore also hints that analysis must, it pushed far enough, get down to the simplest elements ••• But he did explicitly deny, somewhat in contrast to others, that the whole s nothing more than the sum ot its constituents.'' (p. 73).
24PS, P• l?. -25Moore, SM.PP, p. 303. Ot. also PEt P• 189 tor an analy-sis of "esthetic appreciation". --
54
urtber defining Cor, divisionJ eeases."26 Finally, this type ot
nalysis re~ults in new information.
(b) Analysis bz Analytic Distinction.27 A second type ot
alysis is referred to by White as "analytic distinction". !he
aradigm of this kind of analys\s is: "The concept 'being a bro-
identical w!:th the concept 'being a male sibling•.u28
is example pr~vidas the chief characteristics of an anRlytic
istinction: (i) it is applicable to both simple and complex
deas; (ii) the anal?$andum and the analysans are synonymous; 29
iii) the analz~ans does not seem to be informative, rather it
imply clarifies the analysandum; and therefore (iv) the "°alz
the analysans seem to be verbal expressions. !he
three characteristics give rise to a problem: the paradox of
26PEt P• 8. -2.?or. White, M:OE, pp. 74-83. 'White also talks about
oore•s use of "disorlmlnative distinction", wh~.ch is very simi-ar (if not identical) to lOemk:e's discussion ot "distinctional alysis". (Ot. n. 20 above). Unlike Klemke, however, White
oes not considgr discriminative distinction a type ot analysis. Despite what he Sli..YS, I think that Moore did not wish to identi- I
y discriminative distinction with, or make it a part ot, analy- [; is and that he only appears to do so because of th9 ambiguity : I t the word 'distinction••" (MzOE, P• 78). White follows this 1
1
tatement with tour reasons (p:-'78), and reitera·tes one ot them a i 1
ittle later (p. 81). , , 28"Reply", PGEM, P• 664. White carelessly cites this as
example or analysis by division. (M:OE, PP• 73-4) As Morris zerowitz says: this is not "the moder-l'or all analysis done in
hilosophy." ("Moore and Philosophical Analysisn, SPM, p. 228). -29"In essence the Cnatural!stioJ tallacy is simply that t identifying or equating any two notions which in tact are dis-
1
inet, or of supposing two words to be synonymous which are not." 11
!1:.Q!, p. 124). 1
1
I 1
111:1
55 alysis.30
!he paradox of analysis can be stated in this way. Every
alysis is a statement which not only expresses an identity be
ween the analzsandum and the analzsans, but which is also intor
ative.31 However, (1) it an analysis is a statement of identity
30Although this problem can be found in the writings ot egel and Frege, recent discussion was initiated by c. H. Langord' s formulation ot it in "!he Notion of Analysis in Moore's ilosopby", PGEM:, P• 323. Untortunately, Langford formulated
he problem in ~erms of "verbal expressions"• which is misleadng. It is not surprising, then, that Moore rejected both views f analysis which Langford presented in his essay.
31In his "Reply", Moore gave the following conditions tor correct analysis:
(1) "both analzsandum and anal1sans must be concepts or propositionsTI.e., meaningsJ, au, mere verbal exp sions." (p. ~)
(2) "both anal\!andum and analysans • • • must in some sense, be tie same concept." (p. 666)
(3) "the eXJ>ression used tor the analzsandum must be a difteriii\ expression from tha' used for the analzsans." (p. 666)
(4) 1ihe eiiression used tor the analzsans must 9xplicit!z men on concepts which are not explicitly mentioned by the expression used tor the an.alzsandum." (p. 666)
(5) "the method of combination should be explicitly mentione<I by theexpress!on used tor the analzsans." (p. 663)
(6) "nobody can know that the analzsandum applies to an object without knowing that the ana!zsans applies to it." (p. 663)
(?) "nobody can verit7 that the analzsandum applies without verifying that the analzsans applies." (p. 663)
(8) "any expression which expresses the analzsandum must be S1'?lonymous with any expression wh!cS expresses the analzeana ... (p. 663)
the ordering given here follows Klemke's. White reters o six conditions, because he combines (1) and (2) into a single on<friion; and he omits (8) because this is equivalent to condiions (2) and (3).
' 1111 , I'
!
I
i
I
tautology, and unintormative--and therefore is not
n analysis; and (11) it an analysis is not a statement of iden
ity-1 then it is not an analysis. Thie paradox is significant
ecause it raises doubt as to the justification of Moore's dis
inction between knowing a common sense statement to be true and
owing the correct analysis of that statement.
!he central problem in the paradox of analysis lies in
list of criteria for a correct analysis. To be specific,
ore maintains that analysis has to do with concepts, and not
erbal expressions. However, given the criteria of being synony-
intormative, the two terms ot an analysis cannot be a
they must be verbal expressions. This criticism is
ased on nominalism or veritioationism. Given this stance, phil
sophy is merely a "conversion analysis".
In philosophy an c.nalysis is used to make a linguistic alteration, it is used to ~ustity a manoeuvre with terminology. It is a linguistic conversion which in every instance creates the semantic il~usion that a theory about phenomena is being stated.3
en we turn to the third type ot analysis, we find that this
can be restated in terms ot Moore's notion ot meaning.
(c) Analzsis by Inspection. Moore's basic view ot what
s involved in an analysis is that of observing what it is that
think, or have before our minds. Rather than being
distinct method ot analysis, inspection is rather "the way to
32Lazerowitz, .22• cit., P• 245. Ot. also Richard Rorty's troduction to !he Li;sriitrc furn. Ed. by R. Rorty. Chicago:
niv. ot Ohioago-,ress~7. pp. 2?tt.
5?
test a proposed analysis".33 As was just mentioned, the central
)roblem is Moore's contention that analysis deals with concepts
or meanings. Lazerowitz puts it this way.
~e picture of themselves that philosophical analysts create is that of people who examine the meanings ot terms, or the concepts denoted by them, more care~lly and with greater skill and penetration than is done by others. And furthermore, they make it look as it they are examining objects of a special, perhaps raritied 1 kind. !hey make it look as it they are examining ob~ects which accompany terms and are given with them by psychological contiguity ••• the written word "elephant," for example, is present to sight; its meaning, the concept elephant, is present to the mind. And a philosopher who practices analysis with the last of the above objectives in mind gives every appearance of believing that by carefully scrutinizing the concept ele~hant he will learn zoological facts about actual elep ants.34
intite expresses the same point by saying:
The picture, taken over trom his concept theory of meanin~, which Moore has of a person bent on ana1j'ilng a
ion is that of him concentrating on, peering intently at, something behind and naked of words, which he holds before the mind's eye.35
[n other words, Moore's "language suggests that something more
than linguistic fact is thrown into clear light, that hidden
raets about things are revealed."36 Lazerowitz offers this al
ternative.
!he picture ot the penetrating gazer into concepts changes it we replace the expression "meaning ot a term," ••• b7 the expression •11teral use of a term." ••• It removes
33M:CE, p. 6?; ct. also P• 112.
34Lazerowitz, .!m• Si!•• P• 238.
35M:OE, p. 61. Emphasis added.
36Laserowitz, .2:2• s!!•t P• 240.
the false notion that the meanings of words contain hidden tacts about things which analysis can bring to light.3?
!'he preceding discussion has indicated that Moore's dis
inction between knowing something and knowing its analysis rests
naming theory ot meaning. And because ot this, Moore con
ot philosophy as not only clarifying, but also discover
ng things about the universe. Others have accepted Moore's dis
inction, but base it on a use theory ot meaning. And because ot ........... of philosophy as merely clarifying our lan
age. Perhaps the only possibility lett tor Moore is analysis
division. Jor this method ot analysis allows him to retain
s theory of meaning. to discover things about the universe,
d avoid the main objection of ordinary language philosophers,
paradox of analysis.
B. Oommon Sense and Philosopl!J::
fb.e basic issue to which we have addressed ourselves can
e expressed as follows: what, precisely, is the relationship
etween common sense and philosophy? The notion ot common sense
emains unclear so long as this question is unanswered. In
hapter 3t we considered whether or not the conflict which char
cterizes this relationship is simply an apparent, linguistic
ontlict. It would seem that there can be a real conflict only
t the philosophical statements which contradict common sense
ave an empirical content.
3? Ibid., p. 239 • ..............
I
I
59
In the present chapter, the problem has been shifted from
realm of truth to that of meaning. With the distinction be
ween "knowing X" and "knowing the analysis of X", Moore main
ained that what is problematic is not the truth of common sense
eliets, but their analysis or meaning. Philosophical statements
e simply attempts to explicate and go beyond the ordin&r7 mean
common sense beliefs, In this context, it seems that the
a real conflict between common sense and philosophy qnlz
t common sense beliefs have a meta sical content. this is
he crucial issue. The matter might be stated in several ways.
e can ask whether or not common sense has a philosophical con
ent, i.e., whether common sense is philosophically neutral, or
hilosophically committed. For example, doee the comm.on sense
eliet in material objects imply that a philosophical analysis
of this belief must result in a substantive or realist analysis-
a Moore thought? Or, we might inquire whether or not the ordi
ry language in which common sense is expressed commits one to
particular philosophical position.
It is evident, then, that we have not arrived at a pre
cise statement of Moore's notion of common sense, nor of the re
lation between comm.on sense and philosophy. Ye have, however,
stated the problem in a number of different ways, as Moore him
self might have done. We, like Moore, have, in effect, remained
adrift on the sea of analysis.
I. I
ii i
' '
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following abbreviations are used:
PGEM • -w-. m • ID5M • -
G. E. Moore: Essays .!!! Retrospect ed. by Lazerowiz and Ambrose The Philosophy 2f Q• E. Moore ed. by Paul A. Schilpp ~losophicai Papers oy G. E. Moore Philosophical Studies by G. E. Moore Stuiltes !!! the P.Eiilosophl 2f. Q• !• Moore ed. by E. D. Kie e
Cf. indicates other works which are directly related to a given entry. For example, the "Cf. 11 after Malcolm's article "Defending Common Sense" refers to Black's discussion of Malcolm's article.
e. indicates that an entry is directly concerned with another article. For example, the nRe." a£ter Black's article "On Speaking with the Vulgar" indicates this is a discussion of Malcolm's article.
v. indicates where additional information--especially regarding a reprint--can be located.
l.
2.
4.
I. \./OR.KS BY MOORE AND TRANSLATIONS {In order of Composition)
In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Ex:ist? (By B. Bosanquet, S. H. Hodgson, G. E. Moore). (Read before the Arist. Soc.). Mind, n.s., 6 (Apr., 1897), 228-40; Moore's contrib., 2~0.
Review of Leon Brunschvicg, La Modalitedu Jugement (Paris, 1897). ~. n.s., 6 (Oct:", 189/), 5'54-9.
Freedom. (Read before the Arist. Soc., Nov. 15, 1897). Mind, n.s., 7 (Apr., 1898), 179-204. -
Review of J. G. Fichte, The Science of the Science of Knowle'Q'jife' (Tr. by A: tne Hon. Dr.-W. T. Harris. London, Ethics, 9 (Oct., 1898), 92-7.
60
Ethics, as Based on !. Kroeger, ed. by 1897). Int. J. - -
11
111
11'
6.
61
The Nature ot Judgment. (Read before the Arist. Soc.). Mind, n.s., 8 {Apr., 1899), 1?6-93. Ot. 135.
Review of Bertrand Russell, An Essa~ on the ~oundations ot Geomet5:' (Cambridge, 189?). Hin , n.s., 8 (1Uly, 1899), 397::40 •
8. Review ot F. Bon, Ueber das Bollen und das Gute (Leipzig, 1898), Mind, n.s., B (JUiy, 1899), 420:2.
9. Review ot James Ward, Naturalism and ~osticism (Gifford Lectures). Cambridge Rev., XXI:520 (Nov. 2, 1899) 1 57.
1900
10. Review ot J. Gurnhill, !he Morals ot Suicide. Cambridge Rev., XXI:538 (May 24, 190l'5), 3lR). Unsigned. -
11. Answer to Letter on Review. (See: 10) Cambridge Rev., XXI: 539 (May 31, 1900), 352. Signed: "Your Reiiewer."
12. Necessity. Mind, n.s., 9 (July, 1900), 289-304.
Identity. (Read Feb. 25, 1901). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., l (1901), 103-2?.
14. !he Value of Religion. (A lecture delivered for the London School of ethics and social philosophy). lat• J. Ethics, 12 (Oct., 1901), 81-98.
15. Mr. Mcfaggart's "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology." (Read May 51 1902). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 2 (1902), l??-214.
16. Articles in fictionafY of Philoso:ePz1 ed. by J. Mark Baldwin, MaomI !an an Oo., 190:!. Vol. I. Oause and Effect, Change Vol. II. Nativism, Quality, Real, Reason, Relation, Rela
tivity of Xnowledge, Substance, Spirit, Teleology, f'.ruth.
Princi~ia Ethica. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1903. Repr., 192 , 1929, 1954, 1959. er. 196, 242, 272, 323. Reviews: Bosanquet, B. Mind, n.s., 13 (Apr., 1904), 254-61. Deledalle, G. r.-"'Philos., 15 (1960), 555.
I f
?a.
62
Freed, L. Philos. ~uart., 6 (1956), 315-26. Mackenzie, J. s. Int. J. Ethics, 14 (Apr., 1904), 377-82, McGilvary, E. B. I5hiios. Rev., 13 (I1ayt 1904), 351-8. Russell, B. Indep. Rev., 2 (Mar., 1904J, 328-33.
Principia Ethica. Tr. di G. Vattimo. Pref. di Nicola Abbag·~ nano. Milano: V. Bompiani, 1964. Reviews: Cardoletti, P. Scuola Cattol., 93 (1965), v1-3. A.G. De Romine, 1965, 259-60. :
17b. Princii!a Ethica. Tr. por A. Garcfa Diaz. Meiico: Centro de tudios Filos., 1959·
l?c. Zasady 'Etyki. Tr. by C. Znamierowski. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo M. &eta, 1919.
18. Experience and Empiricism. (Read Feb. 2, 1903). Proc. Arist Soc., n.s., 3 (1903), 80-95. -
19.
20.
Mr. McTaggar.t's Ethics. (On McTaggart's Studies in He~elian Cosmology). Int. J. Ethics, 13 (Apr., 1963) 1 '541-? •
The Refutation of Idealism. 1:1!!ill.t n.s., 12 (Oct., 1903), 433-53. Repr.: PS, v. 50. Review:-Perry, R. B. J. Philos., l (Feb., 1904), 76-7.
20a. Kannenron no rombaku. Tr. by Kazunori Kunishima. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 19;0.
~l. Review of Franz Brentano, The Ori~in of th~ Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Tr. by Cecil ague. Vestminster, 1902). Int. J. Ethics, l~ (Oct., 1903), 115-23.
Review of David Irons, A Stud~ in thA Psychology of Ethi~s (Edinburgh and London, !9o '· Int. J: Ethics, 14 (Oct., 1903), 123-8.
~3. Kant's IdAalism. (Read May 2, 1904). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 4 (1904), 12?-40.
124. Jahresbericht \iber "Philosophy in the United Kin6dom for 1902." Arch. systematische Philos., 10 (1904), 242-64.
Review of Hans Cornelius, Einleitung in die Philosoill!ie (Leipzig, 1903). ~. n.s., 14 (Apr., 1965), 2 -53.
I I I
I t
I
6.
8.
o.
1.
2.
63 Review of W. R. Boyce Gibson, A Philosf£hical Introduction
to Ethic~ (London, 1904). Int. J. hies, 15 (Apr •• 1905), 370-9.
The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception. (Read Dec. 18, 1905). Proc. Arist. Soc.• n.s.·., 6 (1905), 68-12?. Repr.: PS, v. $6. -
Review of George Santayana, The Life of Reason, or The Phase of Human Progress (Five vols. LOndon, 19C5-l906). Int. J. Ethics, 17 (J'aii., 190?), 248-53.
Mr. Joachim's "Nature of Truth."~' n.s., 16 (Apr., 1907) 229-35. Cf. 192.
Professor James' "Pragmatism." (Read Jan. 6, 1908). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 8 (1908), 33-??· Repr.: E§, v. ~
Review of Gustav Starring, Ethische Grundfra,en (Leipzig, 1906). Int. J. Ethics, 19 (Oct., 1908), C58-18.
Review of Hugo Munsterberg, Philoso~hie der Werte, Grundzu~e tiner WeltaJschauun~(Leipzig, 1 08). Int. J. Ethics, 9 July, 1909 , 495-5 •
3. Hume's Philosophy. The New Quarterly, Nov., 1909. Repr.: f§, v. 50.
4. The Subject-Matter of Psychology. (Read Dec. 6, 1909). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 10 (1909), 36-62. Cf. 1?9.
1910
Review of August Messer, Em~.findun~ und Denken (Leipzig, 1908). !:!!B.£, n.s., 19 (,u!y, !_lo), 395=409.
Review of Dimitri Michaltschew, Philosophische Studien: Beitrage zur Kritik des Modernen Psycholo~ismus (Leipz:tp;, t9o9). Mind, n.s., 26 (Jan., 1911), 113- •
Eth~cs. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: H. Holt, 1912. (Reset Edition, London~ Oxford, 194?). Reviews: Cooke, H. P. Mind, n.s., 22 (Oct., 1913)~ 552-6. Pitkin, ~. B. ~Philos., 10 (Apr~, 1913J, 222-3. P.s. Espiritu, 15 (1966), 89-90. waterlow, S. Int. J. Ethics, 23 (Apr., 1913), 340-5.
?a. Etica. Tr. de Manuel Cardenal Iracheta. Barcelona: Labor, S. A., 1929, 1962. '
l'I
I
64
38. Symposium: The Status of Sense-Data. (By G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 14 (1914), 355-406. Moore's contrib., 355-80. Repr.: PS, v. 50. Cf. 259.
39. Suggestions for the Council of Trinity College. Cambridge Magazine, 5:7 (1915), 143.
40. Symposium: The Implications of Recognition. (By Beatrice Edgell, F. C. Bartlett, G. E. Moore, and H. Wildon Carr). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 16 (1916), 179-233; Moore's con tri'6., 201-23.
41. Symposium: Are the Materials of Sense Affections of the Mind? (By G. E. Moore, W. E. Johnson, G. Dawes Hicks, J. A. Smith, and James Ward). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 17 (191?), 418-58; Moore's contrlb., 418-29.
42. The Conception of Reality. (Read Dec. 17, 191?). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 18 (1917), 101-20. Repr.: E§, v. 50.
43. Some Judgments of Perception. · (Pres. Address. Read Nov. 4, 1918). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 19 (1918), 1-29. Repr.: ~. v. 50.
44. Symposium: Is There "Knowledge by Acquaintance?" (By G. Dawes Hicks, G. E. Moore, Beatrice Edgell, and C. D. Broad). Arist. Soc.~ Suppl. Vol. 2 (1919), 159-220; Moore's contrib., 17 -93.
45. External and Internal Relations. (Read Dee. 15, 1919). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 20 (1919); 40-62. Rev. and repr.: PS, v. ;o.
46.
48.
1920
Symposium: Is the "Concrete Universaltt the True Type of Uni versality? (By J. w. Scott, G. E. Moore, H. Wildon Carr, and G. Dawes Hicks). Proc. Arist. Soc., n.s., 20 (1920), 125-56; Moore's contrib., 132=46.
Symposium: The Character of Cognitive Acts. (B~ John Laird, G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and G. Dawes Hicks). ~· Arist. Soc., n.s., 21 (1921), 123-60; Moore's contrib., 132-40.
Principles of Logic. (Review of w. E. Johnson, Logic, Part I. Cambridge, 1921). The Times Literari Suppl., London, (Aug. 11, 192~, 508 b-c. Unsigned. Cf. 95.
. I
I i I
I I t
50.
51.
52.
~.
65
An Analysis of Mind •. (Review of B. Russell, rue Analtois of ~· London, 1921). a't!e Times LiteraQ': UJ?p!., ndon, \oept. 29, 1921), 622 ~. Unsigned.
Philosophical Studies. London: X. Paul, !Tench, !rrubner &r. eo.; Bew Tork: Bircourt, Brace & Oo., 1922. Contains:
I. file Refutation of Idealism (1903) 1 1-30. II. !he Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception
III. IV. v. VI.
VII. VIII.
(1905), 31-96. 'William James' "Pragmatism", (1908), 9?-146. Hume's Philosopb.3' (1909), 14?-6?. !he Status of Sense-Data (1914) 1 168-96. !he Conception of Reality (19l?J, 19?-219. Some Judgments of Perception (1918), 220-52. !he Conception of Intrinsic Value (First publ.), 253-?S.
IX. External and Internal Relations (1919), Revised, 276-309.
X. The Nature of Moral Philosopb.3' (First publ.), 310-39.
Reviews: Jordan, E. Pb.ilos. Rev., 33 (Jan., 1924) 1 88-98. Laird, J. M!iid, n.s., 32 (Jan., 1923) 1 86-92. -
Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular? (By G. E. Moore, G. P. Stout, and G. Dawes Hicks). A£ist. Soc. Su~l. Vol. 3 (1923) 1 95-128; lfoore•s cOiiir!b., 9S:I1 • lepr.: l,?1 v. ?3.
A Defence of Common Sense. jontemJ?Oraf!' British PhilosoRh.!• Second Series, ed. by J. • HU!rhea , ton4oni Ilien I Unwin; Bew York: Macmillan, 1925, 193-223. Repr.: U• v. ?3.
Death of Dr. Mcfaggart. ~. n.s.,34 (Apr., 1925), 269-71.
s,.mposium: !he :Nature of Sensible Appearances. (By G. Dawes Hicks, H. H. Price, G. E. Moore, and L. s. stebbing). Arist. Soc. SuJ?Rl• Vol. 6 (1926J, 142-2051 Moore's conir1'6., 179:;a9.
Review ot A. :N. Whitehead, Religion in the Maki~ (Bew York, 1926), !he Nation and Atlienaeum, 1146. 12, 19 , 664.
Symposium: "Pacts and Propositions." (By.,. P. Ramsey and G. E. Moore). A£&st. Soc. 8URPl. Vol. ? (192?), 153-206; Moore's contrib., !71-2~. Repr.: .fe, v. ?3.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
64.
65.
66.
6?.
66
Symposium: Indirect Knowledge. (By G. E. Moore and H. W. B. Joseph). Arist. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 9 (1929), 19-66; Moore' contrib., 19-56.
1930
Preface, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, by F. P. Ramsey. F.d. by R. B. Braithwaite. ton ~on:~. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1931, 1950, vii-viii.
Is Goodness a Quality? (By G. E. Moore, H. W. B. Joseph, and A. E. Ta;ylor). Ari st. Soc. Supftl. Vol. 11 (1932), 116-68; Moore's contr!b., 116-31. epr.: ~' v. ?3.
Symposium: Imaginary Objects. (By G. Ryle, R. B. Braithwaite and G. E. Moore). Arist. Soc • .a, SU:E,Pl. Vol. 12 (1933~ 1 18-?0; Moore's contrib., 55-76. Repr.: ~. v.73.
The Justification of Analysis. (Notes of the fourth lectur given by Moore in a course on The Elements of Philosophy. Notes taken by Margaret Masterman and corrected by Prof. Moore). Analysis, 1 (1934), 28-30.
Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate? (By w. KnP.ale and G. E. Noore). Arist. Soc.a Suvl• Vol. 15 (1936), 154-88; Moore's contrib., 175=8 • epr.: PP, v. 73.
Proof of an External World. (Read Nov. 22, 1939). British Academy, Proc., 25 (1939), 273-300. Repr.: ~. v. 7~.
1940
An Autobiography. The Philosoph~ of G. E. Moore. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. EVanston an Chicago: Northwestern Univ., 1942, 3-39.
A Reply to My Critics. The Philoso~h~ of G. E. Moore. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. 'E'Vanston anhlcago: Northwestern Univ., 1942, 535-677•
Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." The Philosop~ of Bertrand Russell. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. EVans on anu Chicago: Northwestern Univ., 1944, 175-225. Repr.: EE• v. ?3.
1950 Addendum to My "Reply." The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2d
ed. Ed. by Paul A. Scfiiipp. New Turk: TUdor Pub!. Co., 1952, 677-8?. Re: 82.
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67
68. Letter to c. J. Ducasse. (:Dated Jeb. 8, 1943). Philos. thenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 323-6. Repr.: PGIA, 2! ed., 952, 681 4-E. • o~. 133. -
?O.
?l.
Some Main Problems of Philosophz. (Lectures given in 1910-1911). tGn!on: George Xlien & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953. Reviews: Ambrose, A. J. P.b.ilos.) 51 (K&Jr, 1954) 1 328-31. ~on) Clerf: Rev., 3~ \1954), ?52-3. Barnes, v. ~ t. Philos., 31 (1956), 362-6. Bouws~a, o. K. See: 105. OhishQlm, R. M. Philos. phenom. Res., 15 (June, 1955),
5?1-2. Collins, J. Thought, 29 (1954), 28?-8. Cunningham, G. w. lthics, 64 (1953-1954), 331. DeMullewie, M~ !heoi. Pliilos., l? (1955), 554. Gardiner, P. ~ecfiator (OCt., 1953)t 434, McCarthy, E. ~l!os. Stud., 5 (1955J, 152-3. Ruja, B. Personaiist, 35 (1954), 304-5. · !he Times L!ter!!l Suipl., London (Jan. 22, 1954), 61. Vo11heim, I. liWSta esman and Nation, 46 (Nov., 1953),
646.
Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. Mind, 63 (1954), 1-151 289-3161 64 (1955) 1 1-2?. Repr.: ]!, v. ?3.
1'wo Correetions. (Concerning "'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. III." See: 70). Mj.nd, 64 (1955) 1 264. Repr.: PP, v. 73. -
?2• Visual Sense-Data. British Philosophy in the Mid-Centef.:• .Ed. by c • .A. Mace. LOndon2 ~orgellien I Unwln Lt ., 195?, 205-11; 2d ed., 1966, 203-11.
?3.
PUBLISHED POSTHUMOUSLY
Philosophical ~era. (Introduction by c. D. Broad). London: George A !en & Unwin Ltd.; Bew York: Macmillan Oo., 1959. Contains:
I. Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular? (1923), l?-31.
II. III.
IV. v.
VI. VII.
VIII.
A Defence of Common Sense. (1925) 1 35-59. Jlacts and Propositions. (1927), 60-88. Is Goodness a Quality? (1932), 89-101. Imag:tnary Objects. (1933), 102-14. Is Existence a Pr~dicate? (1936), 115-26. Proof of an External World. (1939), 12?-50. Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." (1944), 151-95.
74.
?5.
68
IX. Four Forms of Scepticism. (Jirst publ.), 196-226.
X. Certainty. (First publ.), 22?•51. XI. Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. (1954-5),
252-324.
Reviews: Two Corrections. (1955), 324.
Ambrose, A. Philos. Rev., ?O (1961), 408-11. Chappell, V. 0. Ethics, ?O (1959-1960), 183. Lofthouse, w. P~ tonaon Quart. and Holborn Rev., (Jan.,
1961), 12.· Raschini, M. A. Giornale di Meta., 21 (1966), 682-4. Root, H. E. J. theoi. Stu!., 13 (1962), 23?-40. Shalom, A. ii. P61Ios., ~·(1959), 553. Teichmann, J. Mind, 70 (1961) 1 280. oee Times Literan:: Suppl., London, (Oct. ,o, 1959), 629. erkiie!ster, V. • Personalist 1 41 (1960), 520-1.
White, A. R. Philos., 35 (19'>0J, 358-9· Wollheim, R. Apeotator (Jul7, 1959), 146.
Commonplace Book i312-19~. F.d. by Casimir Lewy. London: George Il!en I nw!n d.; New York: !l'h.e PJ'a.cmillan Co., 1962; New York: Humanities Press, 196?. Reviews: Ayer, A. J. Twentieth Cent., 1?2 (1963), 120. Granese, A. ltv. JIIos., 55 (1964), 343-?. Lazerowitz, ~. 39 (1964), 165-?3. MacICinnon, D. M. J. £heol. Stud., 14 (1963) 1 555-6. JQ-le. See: 239. Shalom, A. Et. Philos., 19 (1964), 113.
Lectures on Philosol?,• F.d. by Casimir Lewy. London: CJeorge Allen I Unw n Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press, 1966. . Contains: · Par·t I: Selections from course lectures, 1928-29.
I. What is meant by "nature"?, 3-ll. II. Are material things real?, 12-19.
III. "Real" and "imaginary-", 2<>-43. IV. Do we know that material things are real?, 44-52.
T. Sense-data and sense-qualities, 53-?. VI. Sense-data, events and change, 58-66.
VII. Perceptual continuity, 6?-76. VIII. Identity and places, ??-86.
IX. !he representative theory of perception, 8?-103. Part II: Selections from course lectures, 1925-26.
I. Classes and incomple·te symbols, l0?-28. II. Necessity, 129-31.
III. Propositions and truth, 132-49.
t t
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l
76.
?8.
79.
80.
81.
82.
69 i
Part III: Selections trom eourse lectures, 1933-34 I. What is analysis?, 153-64.
I:C. The justification of analysis, 16~;-71. III. Questions of speculative philosophy, 1?2-9.
IV. Other philosophical questions, 180-90. ·· v. Philosophical methods, 191-6.
Reviews: . Louch, A. R. J. Hist. Philos., 6 (1968) t· 18~-~. Roelants, H. f!em'· t!Ios., 29 (l96?J, l8Q..I.~. Warnock, G. J. _, ?? (!~Jt 431-6. \
II. WORKS ABOUT MOORE
ABBAGNANO, NICOLA. G. E. Moore ei Princi.ia sentazione della traduzione ital ana e oa, in corso di pubbl. presso l'ed Bompian -Os'. t 54 (1963) t 44-64. ! ' i! \
I \, I \ '
ADDIS, LADD and LE\r/IS, DOUGLAS. Moore and, kle;1
ho ',;Oi,.tcil, °fists. Iowa City, Univ. or Iowa; fhe Hague:Mii't?nu~ ' I jlio!'t • 1965. . - <
' ~
AMBROSE, ALICE. Moore's Proof of an External._ World. ~ (v. 280)• 394-417. Repr.: Essaya in Ana.lzsis. LoncronT
'George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1 1966; 2!4:3~; bf.' 206.
• !hree Aspects of Moore's Philosophy. (Read at a --.-e-e'""t""'lng in memory of G. E. Hooret Columbia Univ., Jan.
15, 1959). J. Pb.ilos., 57 (l960J 1 816-24. Repr.: s in Analzs~r· tondon: George Allen & Unwin, 1966, 2 ......... -. R:IR (v. 9).
AYD, A. J. G. E. Moore on Propositions and Facts. H:D, (v. 219) •. Repr.: MetaRbJ'sios and Common Sense. Ban Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & do., 19?0, 180:202.
----·· Symposium: Does Philosophy Analyse Common Sense? (v. 139); .Ayer•s contrib.: 162-?6.
----· the Terminology ot Sense-Data. • 289-'12, Repr.: Philosophical Essa.ya. Marti.n's Press, 1964, ~1'54. Re:o$.
Mind, 54 (1945), lew York: st. or. 6? •
BANERJEE, HIRANMOY. For the Best Statement of the Use or -the Term •Proof" in G. E. Moore•s Supposed Proof of the External World, or For the Best Re-Statement ot the Supposed Proof. Rev. Meta., 16 (1962), 133-7• Ct. 30?.
84. BAlfERJI, KA.LI KRISHl'fA. G. E. Moore. Philos •.. Sl!!£t. ,A., 33 (1960-1961), 93-102.
86~
88.
90.
91.
92.
94.
95.
70
BARNES, WINSTON H. The Philoso~hical Predicament. London: Adam & Charles Blae~, 1950,9-160. (Chapters 2-5).
BARONE, FRANCESCO. George :Ed.ward Moore. Les Grands Courants de la pensee Mondiale Contemporaine.. ouvrage pu'6lie sous la direction de M~ F. Sciacca. III8 Partie: Portraits. Vol. II. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1'9b4°, 1117::41.
BAUMRIN, BERNARD H. Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy? ~· Philos. Quart., 5 (1968), 79-89.
BAUSOLA, ADRIANO. La Filosofia Morale di G. E. Moore. !!.!.!• Filos. neoscol., 56 (1964), 376-408.
BENTLEY, A.F. Logicians Underlying Postulations. Sci., 13 (1946), 3-19. -
Philos.
BERGMANN, GUSTAV. Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore. Ingu11' V (1962), 116-42. Repr.: Logic and Reality. Madison: niv. of Wisconsin Press, 1964, I$t!-70. Repr.: SPM, (v. 208), 81-94. -
BLACK, MAX. How can Anal~sis Be Inf'ormative? Philos. phenomenal. Ras •• 6 (1946), 628-31. Re: 213 •
• On Speaking with the Vulgar. Philos. Rev., 58 ---c1-9--4-9), 616-21. Repr.: .fil!!, (v. 208), 226-S. Re: 231.
____ .....,._. Review of Th~ Philosop~ of G. E. Moore. (v. 286). J. Philos., 40 {1943), 682-95 •
• The "Paradox of Analysis.'• Mind, 53 (1944), 263---.7-.-.... Re: 214. Cf. 123, 213, .314. -
• The "Paradox of Analysis" Again: A Reply. ~' --54-(-1945), 272-3. Re: 314. Cf. 311.
96. BLACKSTONE, RICHARD M. An EXamination of the Philosophical Methods of G. E. Moore. Unpubl. Disser., Brown Univ., 1968.
97. BLANSHARD, BRAND. Linguistic Philosophy - Some Earlier Forms. Reason and Analysis. Londf)n: George Allen & Unwin, 196~, 308-38. Re: 5~. 234.
98. BLEGVAD, MOGENB. Mill, Moore, ar:d the Naturalistic Fallacy. Philosophical Essa\1Dedicatea to Gunnar Aspelin. Lund: c. ~. K: Gleerup, 63.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
71
BOUWSMA, O.K. Moore's Theory of Sense-Data. PGEM, (v. 280), 201-21. Repr.~ Philosophical Essazs. ""ll'iicoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965; 1-20.
----· Reflections on Moore's Recent Book rsome Main Pro;lems of Philosophil. Philos. Rev., 64 (1955), 248-63. Repr.: Philosophical Essa;Ys• London: Univ. of Nebraska .P:i:'ess, 1965, I29=48; M:ER, (v. 219).
BRAITHWAITE, R.B. Geor~e Edward Moore, 1873-1958. Proc. Brit. Acad., 47 (1961), 293-309. Repr.: George Ed.Ward Moore, 1SZ3-195§. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963; H:'.ER, (v. 219}. -
• Verbal Ambigi1ity and Philosophical Analysis. --(~R-e_a_d-Mar. 19, 1928). Proc. Arist. Soc., 28 (1928), 135-
54.
BROAD, C.D. Certain Features in Moore'3 Ethical Doctrines. ~. (v. 280), 43-6?.
• G. E. Moore. The Manchester Guardian (Oct. 25, ---1-9-53--J-. Repr. with corrections and additions: ~' (v. 73)
11-2.
• G. E. Moore's Latest Published Views of Ethics. --Mi~n-a-,-70 (1961), 435-57. Repr.: M:ER, (v. 219).
----· Is "Goodness" a Nam'9 of Simple, Non-natural Quality. Proc. Arist. Soc. (1934). Repr.:with some additions and moairications as part two (57-67) of: Certain Features ••• (v. 103).
----· Phi.losop:hy and "Common Sense." ~. (v. 219).
108. • Symposium: Is There "Knowledg3 by Acquaintance''~ (v. 44); Rroad's contrib., 206-20.
109. BROYLES, JAMES E. Language and Common Sense. Amer. Philos. Quart., 6 (1969), 233-9 •
110. .
BRUNIUS, TEDDY. G. E. Moore's Anallsis of Beautz. Uppsola, Sweden: Almquist & \Jiksells, 965.
111. J3UBSER, EBERHARD. Ethisch'3 Etud. Philos. Rundsch., 16 (1969), 77-92.
112. • Moore und der Common Sense. Arch. fur Philos., 8 (I'J.58), 145-55.
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113. CAI1PANAI,E, DOMENICO. Filoso.fia ed Etica Scientifica nel Pensiero di~. E. Moore. Bari: Adr1at1ca ~itr., 1962.
llil.
115.
llf>.
11?.
llR.
CAMP.BELL, C.A. Common-Sense Propositions and Philosophical Paradoxes. Proc. Arist. Soc., 45 (1944)~ 1-25. Re: 234.
CARGILE, JAMES. On Believing You Believe. Analysis, 27 (1967), 177-83.
CARNEY, JAMES D. Malcolm and Moore's Rebuttals. (1962), 353-63. Re: 230.
• Was Moore Talking Nonsense in 1918? __ p_h_e_n_o-menol. Res., 22 (1962), 521-?.
Mind, 71 -Philos.
CARTER, ROBF.RT R. The Importance of Intrinsic Value. Ph.ilos. phenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 567-??.
119. CHAPPELL, V.C. Malcolm on Moore. ~i 70 (1961), 417-25. Re: ?30,234.
120. CHARLESWORTH, MPJCWELL. George F.dward Moore: Common Sense
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
and Analysis. Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. Pitts~ burg~ Duquesne Univ. Press, 1959 ·, 11-IJ'.6.
CHAT'!'ERJI 1 G.C. G. E. Moore as I Knew Him~ Fhilos. Quart. !,.., 33 \1960-1961), 71-8.
CHISHOLM. R.M. Philosophers and Ordinary Language. Philos. ~·• 60 (1951), 317-28. Re: 234. Cf. 236.
CHURCH, ALONZO. On the .Pe.radox of Analysis. J. symbol. Logic, 11 (1946), 132-3. Re: 94.
CLEARY, DENIS. An Essay on G. E. Moore. Downs~Rev., 81 (1963), 212-25.
COATES, ADRIAN. Professor Moore and the Philosophy of Common Sense. A 8cettical Ex:fil'lin~tion of Contemporary British Philosophy. · on<Ion: Brentano 1s, 1929, 23L1--56.
126. COBITZ, J.L. The Appeal to Ordinary Language • .AI'.alysis, 11 (1950), 9-Jl. Re: 234.
127.
128.
GO~~~~l~~~5; 4~2:~9~1 and Non-Natural Qualities. Philos.,
COPLESTON, FRBDERICK, S.Jo G. E. Muore and .li.nalysis. A distoJ.'Y o.f l.)hiloPophy. Vol. VIII. Wes'tminister, Md.! Newman Press, 1966, 402-24.
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129. DALY, C.B. G. E. Moore and Non-naturalism in Ethics.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137·
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
Philos. Stud., 12 (1963), 25-65.
DEVAUX, PHILIPPE. George Edward Moore. Rev. int. Philos., 12 (1958), 414-5.
• George Filward Moore (18?3-1958). Rev. philos. _Fi'_an_c_e Etrang., 83 (1958), 556-8.
DICKOFF, JAMES W. Analytic Ethics: From Moore to Good as an External Mode. Unpubl. Disser., Yale Univ., 1962.
DUCASSE, C.J. Letters to G. E. Moore. (Dated Jan. 25 and Mar. 4, 1943). Philoa. phenomenal. Res., 28 (1968), 320-3, 326-31. Repr.: PGEM, (v. 280), 687-7d, 68?h-n. Re: 65, 75.
• Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism." PGEM, --cv-.-2-80), 225-51. -
DUFUMIER, HENRY. Les Th,ories Logico-Metaphysiques de MM. B. Russell et G. E. Moore. Rev. de Meta. et de Mor., l? (1909), 620-53. Re: 6.
DUMMETT, MICHAEL. A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time. Philos. Rev., 69 (1960), 49?-504.
DUNCAN-JONES, AUSTIN E. G. E. Moore: Some Impressions. Analysis, 19 (1958-1959), 25-6.
• Intrinsic Value: Some Comments on the Work of -G-.-E-.-Moore. Philos., 33 (1958), 240-?3. Repr.: !ll!!l•
(v. 219).
and AYER, A.J. Symposium.: Does Philosoph~ Analyze __ C_o_mm __ o_n Sense? Arist. Soc., Suppl. Vol. 16 (193?), 139-
?6. Duncan-Jones* contrib., 139-61.
EDEL, ABRAHAM. The Logical Structure of G. E. Moore's Ethical Theory. ~, ( v. 280), 13?-?6.
EDGELL, BEATRICE. Sym:posium.: Is There "Knowledge by Acquaintance''? (v. 44); Filgell' s contrib., 194-205.
EPSTEIN, FANNY. On the Definition of Moral Goodness. Iyyµn, 19 (1968), 153-69.
143. EWING, A.C. G. E. Moore. ~' ?l (1962), 251.
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145.
146 ..
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152,.
153.
154.
74
---i__.._.,,._. Knowledge of Physical Objects. Mind, 52 (1943), 97-121. Repr.: Non-Lingnistic Philosop&:--Iondon: George Allen & Unwin, !968, 67-91. Re: 63.
• ---- Moore and Metaphysics • M: ER, (v. 219). -,. Pseua.o-Solutions. Proc. Arist. Soc., 57 (1956),
--;-1---5-2-. Repr.: Non-Lin~istic Philosophy. tondon: George Allen & Unwin, 1968, I72i=92. Re: 234:
FIELD, G.C. The Place of Definition in Ethics. Studies in PhilosoEhy. Bristol, Eng.: Univ. of Bristol, 1935. ~epr.: Readings in Ethical Theory. Ed. by Sellars & Hospers. New York: Appleton-Century-nrofts, 1952, 92-102.
FINDLAY, J.N. Some Ne~lected Issues in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore. M:ER, {219). -
FOGEJ4IN, ROBERT J. Variations on a Four-Part Theme. Evidence and Meaning. New York: Humanities Press, 196?-;-ll'i-38. Re: 1'i.
FRANKENA, WILLIAM K. The Naturalistic Fallacy. Mind, 48 (1939), 464-77. Repr.: Readin~s in Ethical Theory. Ed. by Sellars & Hospers. New Yor : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, 103-14. Repr.: SPM, (v. 208), 30-43. -
----· Obligation ruid Value in Roore. PGEM, (v. 280), 93-110.
the Ethics of G. E.
-FRANKS, GABRIEL, o.s.B.
Some Ethical Theories. George Edward Moore's Criticism of
Thomist, 31 (1967), 259-81.
--------· Virginia Wolff and the Philosophy of G. E. Moore Personalist, 50 (1969), 222-40.
• Was G. E. Moore Mlstaken Ahout Brentano? ---ia•c_h_o_i_as., 43 (1969), 252-68.
New -155. GARGANI, ALDO GIORGIO. Lineu_aggio e Societa in G. E.
Moore e Nell 'ultimo Wittgenstein. G. crit. Filos. ital., 44 (1965), 98-J.18.
156. GARNETT, A. CAMPBELL •. Moore's Theory of Moral Freedom and Responsibility. ~' (v. 280), 179-99·
157. GAUTHIER, DAVID P. Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. Ph.ilos. Ouart., 4 (196?), 315-20.
Amer. -158. GLASSEN, PETER. Moore and the Indefinability of Good.
Philos., 55 (1958), 430-5. J. -
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GLUCK, SAMUEJ., E. Richard Price, G. E. Moore, and the Analysis of Moral Obligation. Philos. Quart. A., 31 (1958-1959), 163-?2.
160. GOLDSTICK, D. On Moore's Paradox. Mind, ?6 (1967), 275-?. -161" GRAM, M.R. The Paradox of Analysis. .§!!1, (v. 208), 258-7
162.
163.
165.-
GRANESE, ALBERTO. Origini e Sviluppi della Filosofia Ana-11 tic a. Caglia.ri: S. E. I. , 1964.
GRAVE, S.A. Common Sense. The .Encyclopedia of J?hilosoahy. Vol. 2. F.cl .• by Paul F.dwards. New York'.: MacmillRn an Fre~ Press, 1967, 155-60.
GREENWOOD, ROBERT. G. E. Moore's Theory of Perception. Unpubl. Disser., Univ. of Miami, 1968.
\ rnEI CT, GORDON. Moore and Analysis. M: ER, ( v. 219) .. -166. GRINDEL, CARL W. Ethics Without a Subject: The Good in G ..
E .. Moore. Thomistlca Morum Princiiia. (Communicationes V Congress Tbomistiei Internationa is. Romae, 13-17 Septembris 1960). Romae: Officium libri catholici, 1960, 73-85.
167. GUPl'A, R.K. Ethical Theories. Kant-Btudien, 60 (1969), 22-39.
168.
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, ~
GUTIERREZ, A. La etica de G. E. Moore. Excerpta ex disser tatione ad lauream in Faculate Philosophic~. Pontificae Universitatis GregoriAnae. Madrid: Punta Europa, 1963.
HAEZRAHI 1 P. Some Arguments Against G. E. Moore's View of the Function of 'Goon' in Ethics. Mind, 57 (1948), 322-40.
170. HALL, E.W. Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill: Critique of G. E. Moore's Analysis. Ethics, 60 (1946), 1-18.
171.
172 ..
173 ..
----· Review of Schilpp' s The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Philos~ Rav., 53 (1944), 62-S.
HANCOCK, ROGER. The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare. J. Phj.los. , 57 (1960), 326-34. Re:pr. : .§.m, ( v. 208), 44-52.
HARE, PE~ER and KOEHL, RICHARD. Moore and DucaAse on the Sense Data Issue. Philos. phenomenol. Res., 28 (1967-1968), 313-20.
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174.
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180.
76
BARTMAN, ROBERT S. The Analytic, the Synthetic and the Good: Kant and the Paradoxes of G. E. Moore. Xant-Studi• .!!!.• 45 (1953-1954), 67-82; 46 (1954), 3-18.
HATCH, L. It's and Can's in Moore, JJowell-Smith and Austin. Unpubl. Dissert., Boston Univ., 1969.
HEA'l'H, P. L. '!he Appeal to Ordinary Language. Philos. guart., 2 (1952), 1-12.
BEJfSOBElf~DABLQUIST, ABJJ-KARI. Remarks to Austin's Criticism of Moore's Analysis ot "Can". Theoria, 29 (1963) 1 304-11.
BIOKS, G. DAWF.S. Are the Characteristics ot Particular !b.ings Universal or Particular? (v. 51); Hicks' oontrib .• , 123-8.
• Mr. G. E. Moore on "'!he Subject Matter ot Psy_c_h_o_i_o_gy". Proo. Arist. Soc., 10 (1910) 1 232-88. Re: 34.
• Symposium: Are the Materials ot Sense Attections _o_?....,t•h-e Hind? (v. 41); Hicks' contrib., 434-45.
181. BILL, THOMAS E. English Realism. ~o .... on~tir'le"'m...-o....,r.....,.~iftn.....---.....,.. Xnowledge. New York: Ronald Press, •
182.
183•
184.
185.
186.
HOCHBERG, HERBERT. Moore and Russell on Particulars, Relations, and Identity. (Presented to Seminars at Queen's College. Edinburgh, ~he Univ. ot St. Andrews, the Univ. ot Sussex, and G8teborg Univ., 1965-1966). SPM,(• •. 208), 155-94. -
• Moore's Ontology and Non-Natural Properties. --1-.-v-.--Meta., 15 (1962), 365-95. Repr.: Ess sin Ontolo
Ed. by E. B. Allaire et al. Iowa City: v. o owa Press, 1963 1 121-47; !!1.11 (v. 208), 95-127. Ct. 256.
• Some Reflections on Mr. Nelson's Correction. -L-l'M-,-{v. 208), 141-54. Re: 256.
HOLMES, AR!HUR J. Moore•s Appeal to Common Sense. J. Philos., 58 (1961), 197-207.
HOPE, V. '!he Picture !heory ot Meaning in the !ractatus as a Development ot Moore•s and Russell's !b.eories of Judgment. Philos., 44 (1969) 1 140-8.
HUBER, OARLO. Die A.nalytische Philosophie in England und Ihre Wandlungen. !heol. Philos., 42 (1967), 208-35·
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188. HUBIEN, HUBERT. Philosophie Analytique et Linguistique Moderne. Dialectica, 22 (1968), 96-119~
189~ HUND, WILLIAM. B. The Distinction Between Ought-To-Be and Ought-To-Do. New Scholas, 41 (1967)~ 345-55·
190 ..
191:.
192.
193.
194.
J.95·
HURWITZ, GERALD. A Defense of Kant's Ethics and Metaphysics A~ainst Moore•s Early Critieis~. Unpubl. Disser., Johns Hopkins Univ., 1968.
JAGER, RONALD. Moore on Beauty and Goodness. J. Value Ing., l (196'7-1968), 258-67.
JOACHIM, HAROLD H. A Reply to Mr. Moore. Mind, 16 (190?), L!-10-5. Re: 29.
• La Natura della VeritA. A cura di Vittorio Ma---t_h_i_e_u-, trad. dI Franca Caligarip. (Con discussioni di
F. H. Bradley, R. F. A. Hoernle, G. E. Mooret A. K. Rogers, B. Russell, G. F. Stout, A. R. Wadia;. Milano: Fabbri, 1967.
JOHNSON, W.E. Symposium: Are the Materials of S~nse Affections of the Mind? (v. 4l)J Johnson's contrib., 430-4.
--....~-· The Time Literary Su;p;plement, London, Aug. 18, 1921, 5330. Re: 48.
196. JONES, E.E.C. Mr. Moore on Hedonism. Int. J. Ethics, 16 (1906), 429-64. Re: l?.
197.
198.
199.
200.
JONES, J.R. Dr. Moore's Revised Directions ro~ Picking Out Visual Sense-Data. Philos. Quart., 1 (1951), 433-8.
JOSEPH, H.W.B. Is Goodness a Quality? (v. 59); Joseph's contrib., 132-45.
-------· Symposium: Indirect Knowledge. (v. 57); Jos• eph 1s-con-trib., 51-66.
~e Journal of .Philosolhy, 57 (Dec. 22, 1960), 805-24. Contains: 79, 249, 3 3.
201. KATTSOFF, L.O. Lazerowitz's Verbalism • .Philos. Stud., 9 (1958), 17-20. Re: 218.
202.
203.
KAUL, B.N. Moore and the Indefinability of Good. Quart. A., 31 (1958-1959), 211-6.
KENNICK, W.E. Moore on Existence and Predication. (v. 219).
Philos.
M:ER, -
••• , 204.
206.
207.
208~
78
:ro:.r:tlC'!;R, GEORGE C. G. E. Moore. The Revolution in Ethical Theor~. New York: Oxford Univ. '.t>ress, !9~6, 5=39.
KLEMKE, 3Lr1ER D.. An Examination o:f the Epistemology of G. E. Moore. :l)isser., Northwestern Uni'r•, 1960.. Rev. and publ.: The EJ;>istemo1051 of G. E. Moore. Evanston: Northwestern Univ., Press, 969.
• G. E. Moore•s Proof of an External World. -.,...( v-.-·-2:-.t-08) , 276-87. Re: 63, 78.
SPM, -• Mr. Warnock on Moore's Conception ot Philosophy.
-Pli---r-1-0-s~ Stud., 13 (1962), 81-4. Re: 304 •
• (ed.) Studies in the Philoso of G. E. Moore. ~I~n-t_r_o_a.: Did G •• oore ·e ute ea ism. - • -
cago~ Quadrangle Books, 1969. Contains: 90, 92,150,161,172,182,183,184,206,2161 231,252 1 256,297,313. Review: .Evans, J. J. Rev. Meta., 23 (1970), 558.
209. KNE.ALE, WII,LT.AM and MARTHA. Propositions and Til!l.e. M:ER, (v. 219).
'lOo KNOX, JOHN. The ProblemA or Perception. Personalist, 50 (1969), 254-6? • ..
11. KORNER, s. Some Types of Philosophical Thinking. British Philosothy in the ~dd-Centur....z. Ed. by c. A. Mace: tonaon: XI en & Unwin, 1957, 115-31.
12. LAMB, ROGER E. Two Epistemological Dogmatists: Reid and Moore. Unpubl. Disser., Univ. of Rochester, 19,:)6.
13. LANGB'ORD, C.H. Critique of Max Black, The "Paradox of Analysis''. J. SYD;\bol. Logic, 9 (1944) t 104-5. Re: 94. Cf• 91.
14. • The Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy. PGEM, (v. 280), 319-42. Cf. 312.
15.
16.
17.,
LAZEROwITZ, MORRIS. Moore and Linguistic Philosophy. M:ER, (v. 219) •
• Moore and Philosophical Anal~sis. Philos., 33 --\-r-9-:;A--), 193-220. Repr.: .§!!!, (v~ 208J, 227-57.
• Moore'E Commonplace Book. .Philos., 39 (1964), -111""!6"""$,...--7-3. R~pr.: M:ER, (~r. 219~iloao a:nd Illusion.
London: George Al"!'e'Ii & Unwin 19 - •
79
218. PG.EM, (v. 280), 371-93. - c:r. ---:---· 201. Moore's Paradox.
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