the chosen war

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Introduction

The above quote, by Yaakov Guterman, son of a Warsaw Ghetto fighter and f ather of

one of the first soldiers killed in action during the 1982 Lebanon War, displays a major current

in contemporary societal thought in Israel that the people had been misled, the military

dishonored, and the government made subservient to the war-hawk tendencies of three

personalities: Chief of Staff Raf ael Eitan, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and none other than

Prime Minister Menachem Begin.1 It is not an unreasonable line of thought, as the time that has

passed since the invasion has not been kind to those three men. It was, as Begin himself would

admit after the invasion, a war of choice.2

Why make that choice? Why launch a war that from

the start had so little chances of true success? Time has given the answers, and it lies within the

minds and personalities of the three individuals at the top of the government and defense

sectors. The answers will be shown by taking each of the main actors and then showing how

everything ties together in the end. Menachem Begin did not just give the order to invade

Lebanon though. In the end, it was his obsession with equating the plight of the Maronites to

the Jews during the Holocaust, to equating Araf at with Hitler, to his unbalanced mental state,

and to total belief in a military answer to the Palestinian problem that led him to push for an all

out war that Israel neither needed nor wanted.

1Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon. London: Zed Press, 1982. Page 68.

2Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon. London: Zed Press, 1982. Page 139

Cynically and shamelessly you declared the Peace for

Galilee operation when not one shot had been fired

across the northern border for a year my colossal

sorrow will pursue you in your sleeping and waking

hours, and it will become the mark of Cain on your



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Part One: Desperate Times

It was the war that split the Israeli people and stole the innocence of the nation. A war

that nearly led to a mutiny within the Israeli Defense Forces and seemingly stole the moral high

ground on which Israel depended for much of its support. The 1982 Lebanon War, and more

specifically the decision by the Israeli government of Menachem Begin to go to war against the

PLO in Lebanon, has produced ramifications and significant consequences that reverberate to

this day. The Intif adas, the birth of Hezbollah, the rise of post-Shah Iran as a regional power,

and even the terrorist attacks of September 11th

can be traced back to the 1982 Lebanon War,

and in that way back to the decision on June 6th

, 1982 by Begin to invade Lebanon. Begin, in a

sort of triumvirate with Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Raf ael Eitan, pushed a

war, by deceit and other ways, through the Cabinet, taking advantage of vague wording by

American officials in their warnings about launching a war to do exactly that. The common

denominator in all theories and explanations of the First Lebanon War is the Prime Minister

himself . Some try to pin everything on Sharon and Eitan, but, as will be seen, Begin is not a man

whose capabilities should be underestimated. Look to Begin, and the timing and reasoning

behind the Lebanon War f all into place.

Part Two: Where to (Menachem) Begin?

The buck stops here, was the f amous motto of American President Harry

Truman; it represented the belief that ultimately, responsibility for any actions taken by the

government f alls on the leader of that government. In the case of the 1982 Lebanon War, that

responsibility lies with Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel from 1977-1984, representing



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the right-wing Likud Party. Seeing as the younger years often have an effect on the decisions

made in the later years, it would not be imprudent to give a quick run-through of his life, and

while there give a brief run through of Israeli-Lebanese relations. Born in Brest-Litovsk in

Poland on August 16th

, 1913, he was as devout in his belief in the politics of Jewish nationalism

a la Vladimir Jabotinsky as he was pious as a Jew.3 Only he and his sister Rachel out of their

immediate f amily of four survived World War Two and the Holocaust, a time which was to, like

most Jews, have an incredible effect on his later life. Even before then he was the victim of anti-

Semitism and poverty, causing him to harbor resentment not only of anti-Semites but those

who were better-off . Leading the Irgun during the fight for Israeli independence, he headed the

opposition Herut Party until 1973, when he formed an alliance with a number of right-wing

parties and formed Likud.4 By 1977 he was Prime Minister of Israel.

Part Three: Two of a Kind: Lebanon and Israel to 1970

Now obviously Israels involvement in Lebanon stretches back well before Begins

election. In f act, connections between Zionists and Lebanese Maronite community leaders

stretched back almost half a century. Early contacts were amicable enough to convince many in

both parties that the two western-looking minorities, similarly beset by Muslims resisting their

claims, should forge a minority alliance to coordinate resources in confronting their common

Muslim enemy.5

However, as well as things went in the early days, attempts to forge a

3Silver, Eric. Begin: A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984. Page 1

4Silver, Eric. Begin: A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984.

5Eisenberg, Laurie. "History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel's 1982 Invasion of Lebanon." Israel Affairs, 2009: 372-396.

Page 373



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legitimate alliance foundered time after time, because it became clearer by the day that the

Maronites f avored coexistence with their Muslim neighbors over any alliance with Jews, a

lesson that went unheeded even after the 1982 invasion. Relations during the 1948 war and

immediately after still remained somewhat good, to the effect that it kept Israeli strategic

thinkers convinced that a natural affinity existed between Maronites and Jews.

David Ben-Gurion was never one for paying much attention to Lebanon, but as Laurie

Eisenberg notes, during his short retirement in the early 1950s, it seemed very much at the

forefront of his mind. As she notes, Ben-Gurion thought the time was ripe for a Christian state

in Lebanon, and that no expense should be spared in making it happen.6

The then Prime

Minister, Moshe Sharett, shot the idea down with vigor, noting with amazing similarity to the

situation thirty years later that the Christians were weak and unprepared, and if Israel were to

push and goad we would become entangled in an adventure which would only bring disgrace

upon us.7

Sharett vetoed any more attempts by Ben-Gurion and Dayan to try and change

Lebanon, and Israeli interest in Lebanon waned, except for a brief resurrection during the civil

strife there in 1958, which led to the introduction of United States Marines. To put it plainly,

Israel had better things to do; Egypt and Syria were f ar more important to government decision

makers, and after the Suez Crisis of 1956 Israel was trying to use the lull in violence to build its

economy and infrastructure. All was quiet on the Lebanese front, and as long as the status quo


Page 379.


Page 380.



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was maintained, few Israelis saw any reason to keep their attention pointed northward, let

alone try and forge a major alliance with the Maronites.

Part Four: Israel and the Lebanese Civil War

Things started to change after 1970. The events of Black September in Jordan had

forced Yasser Araf at and his PLO to flee the country, and they eventually settled on Lebanon.

The Cairo Agreement of 1969, negotiated by Egypts Nasser in his twilight years, had ended a

period of fighting between the Lebanese Army and the PLO, and guaranteed the PLO the

freedom to conduct operations from Lebanese soil into Israel.8

PLO attacks usually had negative

consequences for the country from whence the raid came, and Lebanon was no exception.

Araf at used the growing power of the PLO in Lebanon to carve out a veritable state-within-a-

state stretching from Beirut south to the Israeli border, the f amously named Fatahland. The

PLO and the Palestinian problem in Lebanon in general were major f actors in the outbreak of

civil war in Lebanon.

Obviously, such events would greatly interest Israel. Israel remained a quiet actor in the

early stages of the civil war, but it could not stay quiet for long. Soon enough feelers came from

the Maronite camp, deeply in-trouble in the f ace of a concerted offensive by the PLO and a

Leftist-Muslim alliance known as the National Movement. In meetings as early as March 1976,

representatives from the Gemayel f amily-led Phalangist Party and former President of Lebanon

Camille Chamouns National Liberal Party were meeting with Israeli intelligence and military

officials, lecturing about the old ties between Israelis and Maronites and doing just about

8 Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon 1970-1985. London: Cornell University Press, 1985. Page 41.



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everything but prostrating themselves in order to try to secure Israeli aid.9 Neither Israeli

representatives nor the Prime Minister himself, Yitzhak Rabin, were too impressed with the

Maronite forces, but nonetheless Rabin was willing to help the Maronites help themselves by

sending over $150 million worth of military aid to the Maronites.10

Any Maronite hopes for

more were dashed though, as Israel had no intentions of more direct intervention in the civil

war. This did not stop the Rabin government from propping up the forces of renegade Lebanese

Army officer Saad Haddad and his Free Lebanon Forces in order to try to keep the PLO away

from the Israeli border while not stepping over it themselves.11

Syrian intervention, at the

request of Maronite elders no less, produced a ceasefire, and for a time at least it seemed as if

Israel would have to do little more in Lebanon.

Times change though, and in came Menachem Begin and the Likud Party into power

after a stunning victory in the 1977 elections. No longer in what seemed to be in perpetual

opposition, Begin surprised and disappointed the Maronite leaders by sticking to Rabins policy

of helping the Maronites help themselves. 1977 brought the beginning of negotiations with

Anwar Sadats Egypt, and Begin was not going to let anything, let alone a now low intensity

conflict in Lebanon, sabotage the peace talks. What didnt change in this time was the PLO; it

continued to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanon, and after the Coastal Massacre in

early 1978 killed scores of civilians in a brazen attack on a bus and the coastal highway in Israel,

Begin was forced to adopt an interventionist stance against Lebanon and launch a major

9 Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Pages 11-20.

10Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Page 18.


Page. Page 383.



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operation, dubbed Operation Litani.12 Seemingly over before it got started, the IDF cleared

out a section of Lebanon south of the Litani River of PLO forces before being obliged to adhere

to a ceasefire; the U.N. passed a resolution creating the United Nations Interim Force in

Lebanon, or UNIFIL, to create a buffer zone between Israel and the PLO.

During that time peace with Egypt was achieved, and Begin increasingly became

preoccupied (or obsessed) with the Maronite struggle and the PLO presence in Lebanon. Firstly,

the Maronites: following the Litani operation, Begin slowly but surely increased the amount of

aid to the Maronites, in particular to Bashir Gemayels Phalangists. A few f actors in Begins

mind came to play at this time. Begin was, as Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari write, genuinely

moved by Chamouns and Bashirs unabashed patriotism and declarations of the appreciation

of Israel as the only party that cared about the Lebanese Christian minority.13 Not just savoring

the idea of being able to influence a neighboring (and Arab no less) state, Begin took on the role

of being responsible for the Maronites and making their plight not just a moral duty but a

matter of national self-interest. Begin was a subscriber to that old school described earlier, of

an alliance of minorities to counter the Muslim and Arab forces.14

Begin made it his position that he would not let the Maronite community be destroyed,

speaking in terms of preventing genocide, and though he did not take any drastic action in

f avor of the Maronites, so as to not jeopardize the new peace with Egypt, he talked of the

Maronites as a sort of persecuted minority. The Prime Minister was being dragged towards war

by the sweet talking of Bashir Gemayel, who tapped into the Begins nature as sympathetic

12Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Yaari.. Israels Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Page 24.

13Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Yaari.. Israels Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Page 24.




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towards those he perceived as being maligned and hostile to those who do the persecuting. It

comes back to one thing, one event, the defining moment of the Prime Ministers life: the

Holocaust.

Part Five: The Holocaust Factor

As a survivor, the Holocaust was constantly on Begins mind. Therefore, things were

certainly getting serious when he talked of the plight of the Maronites in terms of the

Holocaust. When Bashir Gemayel infiltrated Phalangist fighters into the city of Zahle near the

Syrian occupied part of Lebanon, attacked Syrian forces, and the Syrians responded by putting

the city under siege, Begin spoke of saving the beset Christians of Lebanon from a

Holocaust.15

Supporting the Maronites appealed to Begin both ideologically and also

temperamentally. Israel would be asserting its long built up might against the latest enemy

that sought to destroy it, and most of all, the Jews would be taking their f ate into their own

hands. Begin wanted it to be known that, as Amos Oz put it, unlike the Christian world, which

had stood aside while the Jews were being slaughtered, the Jews had not stood aside, but had

gone to the rescue of their Christian brethren in Lebanon.16

He never bothered to mention

that it was a disaster that the Maronite powers-that-be mostly brought down upon themselves.

Begin wasnt just the Prime Minister of Israel; in his acceptance of responsibility for the

Maronites in Lebanon, he became a sort of last Crusader, saving the poor, helpless Maronites

(especially Bashir, who had thoroughly charmed Begin in the past) from the Islamic menace.

15 Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Yaari.. Israels Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Page 34.

16 Oz, Amos. The Slopes of Lebanon. 1987: Vintage, London. Page 15.



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This was only one side of the Holocaust though; Begin had his substitute for Jews, now

he only needed his Hitler, and he never wavered in his belief that it was Yasser Araf at. Araf at

was the new Hitler, seeking to destroy the Jewish people and other minorities. Araf at and the

PLO were the successors to Hitler and the Nazi hordes, and he had no qualms about using

imagery drawn from that earlier, darker era in referencing his Palestinian enemies. Indeed, as

Amos Oz said in his masterpiece The Slopes of Lebanon, if we are to judge by his speeches

during the war, Menachem Begin went into Lebanon to fight a worldwide war against the

enemies of Israel, from Amalek to Chmielnicki to Hitler: an awesome retribution for all that the

Jews had suffered. Once and for all.17

It seems that Begin had a strange urge to resurrect Hitler, just so he could kill him over

and over again to avenge the horrors of the Holocaust and especially the murder of his f amily.

As Zeev Schiff records, during a visit to the United States in late 1981, Begin was heard telling a

high-ranking IDF officer I [Begin] want Araf at in his bunker!18

The Lebanon War was not just

about saving the Maronites, but defeating the latest force dedicated to eradicating Jews before

they got into any sort of real power. It is interesting to note that someone had the same

opinion of Begin as Begin did of Araf at: David Ben-Gurion. Begin, said Ben-Gurion around May

1963, is a thoroughly Hitlerite type, ready to destroy all ArabsI have no doubt that Begin

hates Hitler but this hatred does not prove that he is different from himwhen for the first time

I heard Begin on the radio, I heard the voice and the screeching of Hitler.19 It is too easy

though, and in all seriousness too immature, to throw around Hitlers name like that. This


18 Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Yaari.. Israels Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984. Page 39.

19 Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon. London: Zed Press, 1982. Page 126.



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connects to a major force in Begins life, that is, his devout practice and nationalistic pride in his

Jewish f aith.

Part Six: Faith in Something Bigger

Next to the Holocaust, the next f actor that had a major effect on how Begin

thought and acted was his f aith. Part of Begins philosophy was a result of his mystical belief s,

from the school of Kabbala. Michael Jansen notes that Begin took from these belief s that the

Jewish god, Jewish law, and the Jewish people form a trinity: an attack on the people is

therefore an attack on God, for which no punishment is too severe. But Jewish attacks on non-

Jews are simply acts of God, something that happens, sometimes necessarily so.20

He was constantly couching the war in terms of religion. The 1982 Lebanon War was

simply another war of the Jews, in a line stretching back to wars against the Assyrians and the

Romans. He and the Israeli leadership sought from the beginning to give the war religious

sanctification. On June 8th the Chief Rabbinate decreed that the invasion was a divinely

inspired war, milhemet mitzvah, meriting divine sanction.21 Lebanon was a holy war for the

likes of Begin, a Jewish Jihad , which Begin and the religious higher-ups ordained as a moral war

of the highest order. It being amitzvah, it was an obligatory war at that, and one cannot start a

mitzvah without finishing it, in this case marching to Beirut and destroying the PLO. How

interesting a line of thought! All of this, considering how much Israelis scorn and condemn

religious wars when proclaimed by others. Obviously this framing of the war had little appeal to

the average Israeli.





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So what was going on in Menachem Begins mind during the run-up to the Lebanon

War? Was he blinded by his f aith? Obsessed with the connection to the Holocaust? One thing

seems certain, and that is that the Prime Minister was obviously mentally unstable.

Part Seven: War on the Mind

It is not unknown that Menachem Begin had some sort of mental problem. Growing to

manhood in a time filled with either Tsarist pogroms or Nazi persecution, he had lost most of

his f amily to the Holocaust. He was taunted as a youth for being a Jew, a poor one at that, and

throughout his life he carried a grudge against those who he believed did him wrong.22

Begin

was constantly on the losing end of things; the Irgun was for the most part sidelined in war to

create Israel, and his Herut party looked as if it would never hold any sort of political power. He

was patronized and looked down upon by others who saw him as little better than an eccentric

Jabotinsky wannabe. Throughout his life he showed distinct signs of bi-polar disorder and manic

depression.23 Begin was capable of hitting near suicidal lows, and just as capable of

impenetrable highs when he became able to accomplish anything he set his mind to. The Prime

Minister had a well-known tendency to extreme hysteria tinged with messianic madness.24

It

is part of the enigma of Begin and part of what makes him such a f ascinating figure.

This has a great bearing on the decision to go to war in Lebanon in June of 1982. As Eric

Silver puts it in his biography of Begin, the slow decline of body and spirit that culminated in

Menachem Begins resignation in September, 1983, started almost two years earlier on the

22 Silver, Eric. Begin: A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984. Pages 1-9.

23 Silver, Eric. Begin: A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984. Page 241.




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evening of 26 November 1981.25 Silver goes on to describe an incident in which Begin fell and

severely injured his hip, an incident that shook his self-confidence and reminded him he was

growing old. He entered a bout of manic depression, yet he rebounded and it was in this time

that he declared the de f acto annexation of the Golan Heights. He was still nursing the injury

almost a year later when discussions about intervening in Lebanon came to a climax.

Part Eight: The Choice of War

It would be all too easy to dismiss Begin in 1982 as a man on the way out, a mere

puppet in the triumvirate of Begin, Sharon, and Eitan. As was said before, he was constantly

being patronized and even more often underestimated. In the time since the Lebanon War,

Begin has been popularly painted as weak and fragile, led along by the war hawks Sharon and

Eitan. His son Benny especially has sprung to his defense whenever the late Prime Minister is

accused of wrongdoings in the lead-up to the war. He was misled, his defenders say with

conviction. Yet, again, he is being underestimated. As much as he was in a precarious mental

state at the time, he was still capable of the old Begin overdrive.

I do not understand, said Amos Oz, the tendency of many mainstream Labor party

people these days to assign the responsibility for this war to Ariel Sharon and Raf ael Eitan, and

to depict Begin as being led, without a mind of his own, by these two. On the contrary: Sharon

is a clumsy but obedient instrument.

26

Oz illustrates the situation perfectly. First the focus on

the man most vilified during the Lebanon War: Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. If most talking

heads are to be believed, he put the war together and sold it lock, stock and barrel. This is





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to the problem of the PLO; both wholeheartedly believed in and supported the Maronites,

especially Bashir Gemayel; both wanted to use the war to weaken the Palestinians and pave the

way for a total annexation of the occupied territories; both wanted the Syrians out of

Lebanon.29

In these belief s they were joined by Chief of Staff Raf ael Eitan. Humorously enough, as

much as he was a believer in the same points as Sharon, he could not be more different of a

person. His military credentials were impeccable, his integrity unquestionable. In f act, as

Michael Jansen relates, he had actually accused Sharon of exceeding his orders and sending

young men to their deaths during the Suez War in 1956.30

Eitan had been an excellent Chief of

Staff since 1978, building a large, expensive, and well trained war machine, and simply put, he

wanted to use it as part of the military answer to the PLO. He was convinced he was still

fighting an extension of the War of Independence, and he believed he had the tool to end it.

Begin had two tools to use in his quest for war. The armed forces under Begin, Sharon

and Eitan had been geared for an attack on Lebanon for many a month and all they needed was

a pretext. Together they mounted an information offensive against the Cabinet and the

Opposition Labor Party. Exploiting the military inexperience of Begins second cabinet, they had

little problem conforming them, and even the more experience Labor leaders (led by ex-Chief

of Staff Rabin) were pushed aside.31

They did not know what they were getting though. The

idea of a re-run of Operation Litani was not unpopular, and extending the lines of the advance a


30 Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon. London: Zed Press, 1982. Page 127

31 Schiff, Zeev, and Ehud Yaari.. Israels Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984.



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little f arther even less so. Nobody knew they were being misled into supporting a war that from

the beginning was to include entering Beirut and fighting the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley.

This was information that Begin was not only privy to, but had promoted for two years.

The notion that he was a dog on a leash held by Sharon and Eitan is misguided. As Begin himself

would say, I know about all the moves before they are executed, sometimes afterwards.32

During the actual war he would spring to the defense of Sharon, saying such praiseful verses as

fortunate is the country in which Ariel Sharon is Prime Minister.33 The Lebanon War was

Begins baby, and he had nursed it until the time came when he was able to let it walk.

Nothing happened in this war, he declared, that was not planned.34

Israel, and Begin, knew

what it wanted from the start, and he was willing to run roughshod over the Cabinet and

Knesset in order to get it. Sharon and Eitan were his loyal subordinates to whom he entrusted

the actual waging of the war. Not much misleading was really necessary for the Cabinet

though. One Begin supporter described the Cabinet as "Snow White and the seven dwarf s. They

all owe their political lives to Begin. On the issues that count, the Cabinet reflects his views

completely.35

What about the f acts? The PLO, the enemy of Israel, held sway over a large swathe of

Lebanese territory from whence it launched attacks on Israel and Israeli citizens. It had

weapons stockpiled, it had a sanctuary from which to train and prepare for war. Syria held

another block of territory, a possible second front in any future war against Israel. The




35 Smith, William E. "A Defiant No to Reagan." Ti me Magazine, September 20, 1982



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Maronites, the allies of Israel, were in trouble. There is no doubt that an enlarged version of

Operation Litani may have been in order, which is why in the early days the war had so much

support in the Israeli public. This is not what they got though; they got Peace for Galilee, an

operation whose intended results were none other than the destruction of the Palestinians as a

fighting force, the expulsion of the Syrians from Lebanon, and the creation of a new political

order in Lebanon so Bashir Gemayel could be made President and make peace with Israel.36

Part Nine: Conclusions

In the end, the Israelis accomplished none of those objectives. The PLO, for the most

part, was forced to pack up and leave, but enough remained whereby they would continue to

be major actors for the rest of the Lebanese Civil War. The Syrians, f ar from leaving, would still

be there twenty-three years later, when they were forced to leave by overwhelming

international pressure. As for Gemayel, he was made president, only to have his head blown off

by a bomb laid by Syrian agents. His brother Amin had neither the will nor the way to make a

peace acceptable to Israel and palatable to the Lebanese. 28 years later, Lebanon is just as

much at war with Israel as it was in 1982. Sharetts prophecy had come true; Israel had waded

into the Lebanese quagmire, and found itself stuck, in disgrace. The war hadnt happened under

Rabin in the 1970s because he had known that f ar-reaching objectives were just not feasible.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin wanted that war though, not just for the reasons given

to the public, but because of his obsession with the link between the Lebanese Civil War and

the PLO to the Holocaust, because of the mental instability which inhibited his rationality, and




K h o u r y | 18

because of his firmly held belief that the fight of two indigenous peoples for one land could be

solved solely by military means. In the end the main casualty would be Begin himself . Though

the death of his wife would be the last straw, his complete collapse can be mostly attributed to

the high costs of the war. This was the choice he made though. Maybe the Cabinet Ministers

were misled, but he certainly wasnt. Begin had planned, waited, and taken the chance to

launch the war when it was given. It was the result of his own line of thinking, his own

ambition, and it would exact from him a most terrible retribution. In the end though, he

believed he had in his hands the makings of a nice, neat war, one that would be over quickly

and be a rousing success for Israel. By June 3rd, 1982, when Shlomo Argov was shot by

Palestinians of the Abu Nidal Organization (an organization at war with the PLO), by the next

day when Begin got his war passed through the cabinet, by June 6th

when the first boots hit the

ground in Lebanon, the story of the Lebanon War had already been written. The end would not

be kind to Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel.



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Works Cited

Central Intelligence Agency. "Summary of CIA Monthly Meeting." Declassified Documents Reference

System. September 29, 1981. http://galenet.galegroup.com (accessed November 27, 2010).

Eisenberg, Laurie. "History Revamped or Revisited? The Maronite Factor in Israel'."

Eisenberg, Laurie. "History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel's 1982 Invasion of

Lebanon." Israel Affairs, 2009: 372-396.

Inbar, Efraim. "Great Power Mediation: The USA and the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement."

Journal of Peace Research, 1991: 71-84.

Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon. London: Zed Press, 1982.

Laffin, John. The War of Desperation. London: Osprey Publishing, 1985.

Oz, Amos. The Slopes of Lebanon. 1987: Vintage, London.

Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon 1970-1985. London: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Schiff, Ze'ev, and Ehud Ya'ari. Israel's Lebanon War. London: Unwin, 1984.

Silver, Eric. Begin: A Biography. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984.

Smith, William E. "A Defiant No to Reagan." Ti me Magazine, September 20, 1982: 1-11.