the case for kalabagh dam
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The Case for Kalabagh Dam
Illustration by Minhaj Ahmed Rafi
Why the reservoir is in Pakistan’s interest.
The late governor of the Punjab had advocated passionately for construction
of the Kalabagh dam, an Indus River project in Mianwali, Punjab, that could
have contained some of the devastation wrought by the 2010 floods,
Pakistan’s worst. In 1960, the World Bank recommended it be built, but
Kalabagh became a victim of ill-informed, nationalist fears. This exclusive
piece has been distilled from his paper, 100 Reasons Why Kalabagh Should
Be Constructed Immediately. If Kalabagh is not built, argues the author,
Pakistan’s economic future and the prospects for its stability will dim even
further.
Pakistan’s population is expected to reach 335 million by 2050. By then, our
requirement of wheat—the most important staple in our diet—will double
from the present-day 22 million tons we need. In another 40 years, such
volumes of wheat may either not be available or may be prohibitively
expensive. And this will feed into the cycle of poverty, deprivation, angst,
and violence. To prevent such a situation from arising, Pakistan has no
choice but to produce the food volumes its growing population requires. This
is manageable. It will require better seeds, better fertilizer, better
agricultural practices, and, most importantly, better water availability.
We are a water-stressed country. By 2025, our water storage capacity per
capita is projected to dip to 700 cubic meters from the current 1,038 cubic
meters. When this happens, Pakistan will rank as a water-scarce country.
(The U.S. and Australia have over 5,000 cubic meters of storage capacity
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per capita, China 2,200 cubic meters.) Pakistan has very little capacity to
store rain and glacial waters, which account for 75 percent of our total water
availability, and is losing whatever capacity remains as dams continue to silt
up. In another five to seven years, at the current rate of dam siltation, we
will not have enough water for our crops and will suffer major food
shortages. This then is all the time we have, five to seven years, to secure
our future.
Most of Pakistan—specifically southern Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan—has
underneath its surface saline water unfit for agrarian purposes. The majority
of Pakistan’s usable water supplies are generated from June through
September, when the rivers provide some 500,000 cubic feet per second (or
cusecs) of water. The rest of the year, river supplies drop drastically, by 88
percent to about 60,000 cusecs. This is absolutely insufficient for our needs.
Before the canal system was introduced in the 19th century, this was all arid
land. The people were generally livestock herders, and nomadic, moving
from waterhole to waterhole. The system of canals the British left us
changed this. It stores rain and glacial waters, and regulates and channels
them to 50 million acres of cultivated land across the country throughout the
year.
The average annual flows in our river systems in the last years have totaled
around 135 million acre-feet. The present dams and canal system stores and
conveys 103 million acre-feet of water to lands in all provinces. However,
the same recording systems show 38 million acre-feet of water simply
flowing to sea each year, lost for agriculture and food production. Storing
this water in new dams is critical for Pakistan. Some quarters contend that
there is no spare water in our river systems, and so there is no need for new
dams. However, last year’s super floods have shown the bankruptcy of this
argument. The floods generated 50 million acre-feet of water which ravaged
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towns and villages as it cut a devastating path to sea. If Pakistan had the
capacity to store this floodwater, it would have sufficed our needs for seven
years.
At the current rate of dam siltation, water is going to start running out in
January, hastening a decline in crop yield. The wheat crop, for example,
requires watering thrice after planting—in December, February and March.
In February 2009, there was no water in the dams and wheat targets fell
short. If the surfeit of seasonal water is not stored, it will run off into the
sea, leaving agricultural lands thirsting during winter and early summer.
Wheat production is likely to drop by at least 30 percent within seven years
if the water storage issue remains unresolved. To regulate supplies evenly
across the year, summer flows need to be dammed and distributed
efficiently and equitably via the canal system. To avert inflation, starvation,
poverty and consequent instability, we must construct Kalabagh dam
without wasting any more time.
Kalabagh will also produce cheaper electricity and improve our overall power
mix, which will work to the advantage both of the domestic consumer and
industry. The availability of affordable power will result in Pakistani goods
becoming more competitive in international markets. Industries and
commercial enterprises which are either closed or struggling shall start to
prosper, generating employment. Sixty percent of our population resides in
rural areas and is involved in agriculture or agriculture-related activity. The
textile industry, one of our major exporters and a growth driver, depends on
raw materials from agriculture. Without sustained water supplies to cotton
farmers, this industry will collapse. With dams making water available
throughout the year, the rural population will enjoy irrigated agriculture all
year round and become well off instead of being seen as a liability to the
government.
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The future does not look bright. The water table, which has already dropped
by 30 feet in sweet-water zones, will drop even further and a complete
collapse of the sweet-water aquifer could occur. In saline-water zones, since
canal water will not be available in the desired volumes in the absence of
new dams, and tube wells cannot be installed, rain-supported agriculture will
have to be practiced. Water is the most important issue for us. Since water
projects have a long gestation period, urgent decisions are required to be
made. We have only five to seven years to construct replacement reservoirs
and expand storage capacity through new dams, like the ready-to-go
Kalabagh, before Pakistan starts seeing unbearable wheat shortages.
Let’s not forget that it was only because of Tarbela and Mangla dams being
constructed that agriculture prospered and created some food security for
Pakistan. The World Bank-midwifed Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between
Pakistan and India gave three rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi), which provided
water to southern Punjab, to India. In lieu, Pakistan was provided two
dams—Tarbela on the Indus River in Haripur, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and
Mangla on the Jhelum River in Mirpur in Pakistan-administered Kashmir—and
a system of link canals to convey water from these dams to Punjab’s
southern plains.
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Bert Kaufmann
Eventually all dams die. Tarbela and Mangla had a combined live storage
capacity of 15.02 million acre-feet of water, and have been silting up at the
rate of 1 percent per year. Tarbela took six years to complete and started
out with a storage capacity of 9.68 million acre-feet of water in 1974; its
present capacity has reduced 30 percent to 6.78 million acre-feet. Mangla,
which was completed in five years in 1967 and could store 5.34 million acre-
feet, can now only store 4.46 million acre-feet—a 16 percent drop. (Mangla
has been improved by adding 30 feet to its embankment and 2.88 million
acre-feet to its gross storage capacity. But this new storage will fill only four
out of five years.) Warsak on the Kabul River in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa,
completed in 1960 with a capacity of 2 million acre-feet, has totally silted up
and is now only a hydroelectricity dam. Chashma, with 0.7 million acre-feet
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of storage, was completed on the Indus in Punjab’s Mianwali in 1970 and
has residual capacity of only 0.26 million acre-feet left.
By 1974, when Tarbela, Mangla, Warsak, and Chashma were all online, their
combined live storage capacities totaled about 17.7 million acre-feet of
water. This has dropped now to 11.5 million acre-feet—a loss of 35
percent—causing water, and food, shortages. There is a dire need to
construct more dams to not only replace lost capacity, but to also store
surplus waters in the event of floods.
At the time of the Indus Waters Treaty, the World Bank helped Pakistan
identify other sites where large dams could be constructed: Basha, Akhori,
and Kalabagh. They recommended Kalabagh, but the then government
chose Tarbela. Of these sites, the one that has been chosen for construction
now is Diamer Basha in Gilgit-Baltistan—even though it is not the solution to
Pakistan’s water woes and despite the fact that the most ready-to-construct,
least disruptive, and most beneficial dam would be Kalabagh.
What are the pros of building Diamer Basha? None. The site, located 315
kilometers upstream of Tarbela and about 40 kilometers downstream of
Chilas, lies in a monsoon shadow; it is remote and in a highly seismic zone.
Materiel will have to be transported at great cost over the Karakoram
Highway, which is prone to landslides that will result in construction delays.
According to the environment impact assessment report, a dam failure at
Basha, with its 892-feet height, would affect some 30,000 people; submerge
at least 100 kilometers of the Karakoram Highway (so 140 kilometers of it is
being relocated to higher ground as a precautionary measure); wipe out an
estimated 33,000 prehistoric rock carvings (some of these are also being
relocated); and destroy Tarbela and downstream infrastructure and
population hubs. Basha will also require new transmission lines to be laid for
relaying electricity. When completed, in nine to 12 years, it will be able to
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hold 6.4 million acre-feet of water, and potentially produce 4,500 megawatts
of power.
Akhori is still a better project than Basha. The proposed site in Attock,
Punjab, is central and accessible. The source of water for this dam will be
the overflow from Tarbela, which is presently wasted to sea through a 50-
kilometer canal taking off from the Ghazi Barotha barrage. The stored water
will be regulated into the Indus River through existing barrages and canals.
Like Tarbela and Mangla, this is an earth-filled dam. It is not a complex
project to undertake. The siltation rate of the dam will be low as silt will be
trapped upstream at Tarbela. But because the Akhori site is not on the main
Indus, it will not be able to store monsoon flows like Kalabagh would.
However, its storage utilization will be better than Diamer Basha’s, which
misses the Kohistan and Kaghan flows. Akhori can be constructed within five
to seven years to hold 6 million acre-feet of water, and produce between
600 and 750 megawatts of power.
Kalabagh. With its feasibility and impact studies carried out, detailed design
and engineering work done, and project costs estimated, Kalabagh is a
shovel-ready project. The site in Mianwali, Punjab, borders Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa, and is accessible for construction purposes and to the national
power grid. The site collects not only snowmelt, but also monsoon flows. It is
the only site where surplus monsoon flows can be sorted, and it lies in a
deep gorge where water speeds are high, which means silting will be limited.
Kalabagh can be constructed in a short four to five years—which is less time
than either Diamer Basha or Akhori—to store 7 million acre-feet of water
and produce 3,600 megawatts of quick and affordable power.
Kalabagh will provide regulated water supplies to farmers in all provinces; it
can make another 20 million acres of land cultivable. It is estimated that
Kalabagh will allow Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to irrigate an additional 800,000
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acres of land and become self-sufficient in wheat. Clearly, the first priority
should be to build the Kalabagh dam followed by Akhori. But Kalabagh has
strident opposition, which is why no government has been able to see it
through despite its merits. Among the noisiest are lower-riparian Sindhis
who suspect Kalabagh will lead to less water for their purposes; and upper-
riparian Pakhtuns who fear the opposite, flooding.
If we could sit down with India and reach a settlement in the form of the
Indus Waters Treaty, can’t we do the same among ourselves?
Sindhi nationalists fear the province will not get its due share of water if
Kalabagh happens. Before Tarbela, Sindh’s annual water withdrawals
averaged 35.6 million acre-feet from 1960 to 1967. After Tarbela, this went
up to 44.2 million acre-feet. With Kalabagh, Sindh will receive at least
another 2.25 million acre-feet of water.
Critics also appear to ignore the existence of the Indus River System
Authority (IRSA), set up in 1992 to distribute water among the provinces as
per their shares delineated in the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991. The
federal agency has representation from all provinces. In fact, Sindh has two
members on the IRSA board, which is itself an injustice since the other
provinces only have one vote each. The agency estimates water availability
ahead of the spring and autumn harvests, and calculates each province’s
withdrawals at the end of every quarter. Provinces are also allowed to post
their staff at barrages in other provinces to monitor withdrawals. Sindh
maintains staff at facilities in the Punjab. The mechanism is working. There
has never been a situation where one province has usurped the rights of
another, and Sindh has never registered an objection alleging violation of
IRSA orders by the Punjab.
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Sindhis also fear that Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab could construct
smaller reservoirs to tap Kalabagh waters to the detriment of Sindh. Such
outlets and canals are necessary for struggling agrarian towns and villages
like Karak, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa and for northern Punjab. Both provinces would be well within
their rights to construct this ancillary infrastructure. The 1991 Accord
provides that provinces may do this at any time and at any location as long
as they keep to their allocated water allowances.
Yet others believe that if Kalabagh is built, the sea will come into Sindh. This
is a superstitious and preposterous belief lacking any scientific basis. The
Indus is not keeping seawaters from claiming Sindh. The Indus Delta is
about 50-kilometer wide, and the Sindh coastline is 200-kilometer long. The
Indus couldn’t stop a high-tide deluge even if it were in flood.
Except for a sweet-water belt on either side of the Indus, Sindh has saline
groundwater unusable for agriculture. If the present dams continue silting
and no new ones are made, Sindh’s farmers must get ready to return to
ancient agricultural practices. Everyone will be praying for rain.
Upstream, Pakhtuns fear the Kalabagh dam lake could flood towns like
Nowshera. Kalabagh’s location has lately been fixed at 915 feet above sea
level. Nowshera is situated 25 feet above that. So there is no validity to the
contention that the lake could block Kabul River flows and inundate
Nowshera. Kalabagh would in fact serve to reduce flood volumes through
incidental use of its storage. Similarly, the dam lake cannot also in any way
waterlog Mardan or Charsadda, since their drainage outlets are at a distance
from the proposed site.
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Those who criticize Kalabagh should consider that had it been a problematic
site with adverse effects on any province, the World Bank would never have
recommended it.
Unfortunately, there is a sense of complacency prevailing in Pakistan—both
in government and in the public—as if there is no problem. With this attitude
neither the government nor the people of Pakistan can make the hard
decisions that are required to be made to plan ahead. The Pakistan Peoples
Party unites the federation. It can bring every province to agree on the issue
of Kalabagh. We need to present this issue to the people. It will take political
daring and awareness efforts to highlight the true facts and to change the
very rigid, entrenched positions of Sindhi nationalists and the Awami
National Party. If we could sit down with India and reach a settlement in the
form of the Indus Waters Treaty, can we not do the same among ourselves?
A no-new-dam situation, especially a no-Kalabagh situation, is what
Pakistan’s enemies are fervently praying for. Without any effort on their part
except for a little investment in promoting opposition propaganda, they are
planting the seeds of our economic collapse, large-scale law and order
breakdown, and disunity and distrust among our provinces. If Pakistan has
any priorities, its No. 1 priority should be to build Kalabagh. If we aren’t
going to build this dam, who will?