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The Bulgarian model,recent developments inthe ethnic landscape: Aninterview with Mr AhmedDogan, chairman of themovement for rights andfreedomsIvaylo GrouevPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Ivaylo Grouev (1997) The Bulgarian model, recentdevelopments in the ethnic landscape: An interview with Mr Ahmed Dogan,chairman of the movement for rights and freedoms, European Security, 6:2,84-89, DOI: 10.1080/09662839708407315

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839708407315

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The Bulgarian Model, Recent Developmentsin the Ethnic Landscape:

An Interview with Mr Ahmed Dogan,Chairman of the Movement for Rights

and Freedoms

IVAYLO GROUEV

In 1989-94, Bulgaria achieved an ethnic balance and avoided the escalationof ethnic tensions into open conflict primarily because its main politicalactors agreed to grant a collective political right to the Turkish minority.This resulted in a new ethnic agreement. However, the same right was notgranted to other ethnic groups. After 1989 the Turkish minority in Bulgariafound an original way to become a fully independent political actor. In 1990this minority organized a political party, 'The Movement for Rights andFreedom' (MRF).1 This party represented the Turkish community in thesubsequent parliamentary elections in 1990, 1991, and 1995.

Bulgaria is an intriguing case in the context of the complex, chaotic, andoften dynamic development of ethnic relations in the post-CommunistBalkans. The Bulgarian case remains intriguing because it has not followedthe established models of ethnic relations in post-Communist societies andso challenges many of the stereotypes and cliches about the tendenciesgoverning inter-ethnic relations.

In December 1989, one month after the 'velvet coup d'etat' ousted thelong-ruling chief of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, and 18months before the eruption of war in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria was seen bymany Western observers as on the verge of civil war. The source of this civilwar, so it was stated, were 'irreconcilable ethnic contradictions', whichwould provide the kindling for an open conflict, violent ethnic clashes andeven the break-up of the state.

But Bulgaria did not experience civil war, violent ethnic clashes, or evenserious confrontations. To the surprise of most political analysts, Bulgariamanaged to preserve ethnic peace. This peace came in spite of two majortraumatic events, which had jeopardized Bulgaria's fragile ethnicequilibrium: the Communist government's 'name changing campaign of1985', when Bulgarian Turks were forced to give up their Muslim names

European Security, Vol.6, No.2 (Summer 1997), pp.84-89PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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THE BULGARIAN MODEL: AN INTERVIEW 85

and take Christian ones; and the much more acute crisis of the summer of1989 when some 300,000 Turks fled, leaving the economy in disarray andthe national conscience in shock. As one dissent put it, the nation was in 'astate of coma'.

The forced re-naming campaign against Bulgarian Turks of 1984-85was the last chapter in a long, assimilation campaign. This chapter,however, proved to be of crucial importance for the direction and dynamicsof post-Communist Bulgarian politics. Paradoxically, the peak of Bulgaria'sintense ethnic crisis (1985-89) did not end with the exodus of the ethnicTurks in the summer of 1989 but with their return from Turkey in theautumn of the same year. This exodus and return of ethnic Turks led toconsiderable ethnic tension in the autumn and winter of 1989-90. This wasespecially true in areas of mixed population. However, in the context of acollapsing Communist ideological framework and the evolution of newliberal priorities within a democratic, multi-party polity, the national issuebecame the key issue at the roundtable talks between the BulgarianCommunist Party and the emerging opposition groups.

The break with the policy of forced ethnic assimilation, which theZhivkov government had practiced from 1985 to 1989 was complete. If welook at the development of inter-ethnic relations after 1989 there is clearevidence of a full restoration of minority rights and protections for theTurkish minority according to the Organization for Co-operation andSecurity in Europe standards. Indeed, in 1990 there was another namechanging 'campaign', but this time it was voluntary: most Turks decided toreinstate their Muslim names.

All limitations on the exercise of religious rights of Muslims in Bulgariawere lifted. Over 920 mosques have opened since 1990. Religious literature,including the Koran, in Bulgarian and Turkish languages freely circulate.The study of the Turkish language in schools has been introduced. Thepublication of Turkish newspapers and magazines has been resumed, andthe national radio carries daily programmes in Turkish. Facing the firstchallenges to the institutionalization of civil rights and liberties in thiscomplex transition period, Bulgaria managed to defuse populist and ultra-nationalist forces. Thus, the avenue for a peaceful dialogue and politicalcompromise on the most delicate issues on the national agenda madepossible the institutionalization of ethnic accommodation.

The Bulgarian political actors demonstrated the political will to resolvetheir internal disputes over the ethnic question through compromise andaccommodation and thus avoided violent confrontations or imposedassimilation policies. The fact that Bulgaria's leaders were eager to join theWest gave added weight to consideration of ethnic rights, which were partof the CSCE/OSCE 'basket' on human rights.

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86 EUROPEAN SECURITY

Initially, human rights were granted on an individual basis. But this didnot address the collective concerns of the Turkish minority. In 1990 thatcommunity organized the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as a vehicleto obtain collective political representation. As an ethnic party the MRFbecame a means to champion such rights and a vehicle for political dialogueand compromise on these issues. The lessons of the ethnic crisis of1985-1989 were apparent to political leaders on both sides. Bulgarianpoliticians recognized the serious dangers associated with a policy ofassimilation and sought instead a workable ethnic contract.

On the MRF side its leadership supported the cause of building a newBulgarian state and nation, based on a rebuilt civil society rather thanembracing a nationalist-separatist agenda. Another paradox of post-Communist Bulgarian politics was that the MRF has come to hold thebalance of power in the multi-party system and has become a guarantor ofinternal stability peace, making Bulgarian politics a unique and special casein the general pattern of Balkan ethnic politics.

It is in this context that the author presents his interview with Mr AhmedDogan, Chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

THE INTERVIEW

Q. In the West, Bulgaria is perceived as a country of ethnic tolerance, as anoasis of religious tolerance between Christians and Muslims. Do you sharethis opinion?

A. I not only agree completely with this, I also feel special satisfaction aboutthis perception of my country. The last ten years of my life were dedicatedto this cause. In Bulgaria, we were able to achieve a peaceful solution to thecomplex relationships between the different ethnic and religiouscommunities. This model is known in the West, as the Bulgarian model. Theessence of it is the equal participation of different ethnic and religiouscommunities in the political and cultural process of the country. A primaryprinciple is the seeking out of common values among differentcommunities, and retreating from those values which may divide andantagonize them.

Q. The creation of a political party based on ethnic grounds usually hidesrisks of separatist tendencies, but definitely this is not the case with theMRF. Why?

A. Quite often the exception to a rule becomes the beginning of a newprinciple and new rules. This was the case with the creation of the

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THE BULGARIAN MODEL: AN INTERVIEW 87

Movement for Rights and Freedoms as a party based on ethnic grounds. Apriori, it was perceived that such a party would try to incline towardspolitical separatism. It is clear that in the case of MRF it is not so. MRFbegan as an ethnic party of a national kind and is moving towards becominga national party on ethnic grounds.

This is no surprise, just the opposite. Here we experience an importantprecedent in the new, modern history. This is a new realization of the majorimportance of ethnic parties in the context of the new political map of theworld. Now these parties have the rare historical chance of performing acommon creative function, based on common human and national values.

This is the only chance for them to preserve their political existence anddevelopment. Therefore, the formula is the transformation of ethno-religiouscommunities of potentially destructive factors into common and creativeones. MRF is a political instrument in the process of achieving this goal.

Q. During the last few years, the MRF has successfully played the role of apower balance in the bipolar political space of Bulgaria. Despite that, someobservers in the West were confused by the inconsistent political behaviorof the MRF. In the Parliament, elected in 1991, MRF voted en bloc togetherwith the UDF (Union of Democratic Forces) and that was how the first non-socialist government in Bulgaria came to power.

However, ten months later precisely, with the help of the MRF deputies,the same government received a no-confidence vote. What were the reasonsfor such a reversal of your policy?

A. The main error which the UDF committed after the parliamentaryelections- in 1991, was its attempt to transform the MRF into some sort ofsecondary marginalized organization with declining functions. They werewrong. If the UDF had appreciated the new role of MRF they would nothave been able to commit such a blunder. When the issue was the survivalof a minority, especially when the same minority had played a crucial rolein toppling the previous Communist regime, you did not have the right tobring it to its knees and just formally to consider it as a political partner.From this point of view the political behavior of MRF has always been andstill is, invariably, consistent. In politics there is no partnership 'at anyprice', there are common interests. I believe the past misunderstandingbetween the UDF and the MRF has already been overcome and it will be animportant reminder for our future partnership.

Q. After the Socialists came to power in 1994 (they have an absolutemajority in the Parliament) your party lost its status as a political powerbalance. Now there are at least three small opposition groups in the

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88 EUROPEAN SECURITY

Parliament. What are the goals and the strategies of the party in thissituation? Do you intend to enter new coalitions?

A. The results of the last elections were a serious lesson for the oppositionas a whole. Now our last chance is to unite against the Socialist Party. Andwe are in the process of doing so. Our voters gave us a historical lesson andwe are obliged to consider it carefully. Democratization is possible onlywhen an anti-Communist political force (formation) will lead the country.This is a main principle of the political behavior of the MRF.

Q. Bulgarian foreign policy vis-a-vis the conflict in Bosnia was a policy ofnon-interference. What is the attitude of your party regarding this conflict?

A. The conflict in Bosnia was a prime example of how ethnic and religiousproblems should not be solved. In the early 1990s some western observershad foreseen a similar conflict in Bulgaria but this did not happen. I believethere is no real danger of such a conflict in Bulgaria occurring because thiswill jeopardize not only the status quo in the Balkans but also the verysurvival of the different ethnic communities. This is a serious deterrent tothe explosion of radical nationalism in Bulgaria.

The conflict in Bosnia, in my view, was not motivated by Bosnians.Even the most basic political analysis indicates that it was provoked byforeign forces who were able to make of certain politicians and politicalgroups their instruments.

Q. Do you believe that in Turkey, if there is further political de-stabilizationtowards Islamic fundamentalism, the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria wouldbecome radicalized, or would they remain loyal to their homeland —Bulgaria?

A. This is a very interesting question. First, Turkish society will not toleratedomination by the fundamentalists. Second, the world will not tolerateTurkey run by fundamentalists. Third, the MRF was not and will notfunction according to the political life (status quo) in Turkey. Fourth, thereare no conditions whatsoever for the radicalization of the Turks in Bulgaria.Therefore, I do not see any danger for my country.

Q. Do you believe that the existence of a political party based on ethnicbackground could be a viable Balkan model to absorb ethnic tension and tochannel it into constructive political activity?

A. Yes. I not just believe this. I am confident. There is a tremendous need

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THE BULGARIAN MODEL: AN INTERVIEW 89

for these kinds of parties in the Balkans. The Bulgarian model of solving theethno-religious problems and the role of the MRF in realizing that, is primeevidence of the success of this policy.

NOTE

Emil Konstantinov, 'Pravata na litsata, prinadlezachti kam religiosni, ezikovi i etnicheskimaltisntva v Bulgarskata Konstitutsia ot 1991', in Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsia vBulgaria i na Balkanite (Sofia: Tsenter za izsledvane na demokratsiata, Fondatsia 'FridrihNauman' 1992) pp. 13-20. See also Donka Dimitrova, 'Etnicheskie plashila v pechata itradtsionite modeli na obshtuvane mezdu Hristiani i Musulmani v Bulgaria', in: Vraski nasavmestimost i nesavmestimost mezdu Hristiani i musulmani v Bulgaria (Sofia: FondatsiaMezdunaroden Tsenter po problemite na maltsinstvata i kulturnite vsaimodeistvia 1995); andPlamen Bogoev, 'Bulgarskite Konstitutsii za pravata na maltsinstvata', in Maltsinstvata vBulgaria v kontektsa na choveshkite prava (Sofia: Komitet za zachita na maltsinstvata 1994).

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