THE BRITISH COUNCIL AND BRITISH CULTURAL PROPAGANDA DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD by RICHARD GEORGE SHAKESPEARE A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of M(phil) in 20

th

Century British History

School of History College of Arts and Law

University of Birmingham June 2013

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

Contents

List of abbreviations 3

Introduction 4

Cultural Propaganda and Education in the Near and Middle East 11

British Cultural Propaganda in Europe 27

Fine Art, Film and the New York World Fair of 1939 51

Conclusion 64

i

List of Abbreviations

AEU Anglo-Egyptian Union

AGF Anglo-German Fellowship

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

DOT Department of Overseas Trade

FACBC Fine Arts Committee of the British Council

MOI Ministry of Information

PWE Political Warfare Executive

PRO Public Records Office

SCBENE Sub-Committee on British Education in the Near East

TIDA Travel and Industrial Development Agency

Introduction

British foreign policy during the interwar years has been the subject of

extensive historical study both in Britain and abroad. A variety of schools of thought

have emerged concerning the foreign policy strategy of the British government,

typically referred to as appeasement. While the great depth of study directed to this

specific area has contributed significantly to the understanding of cause, motive, and

effect of British foreign policy in this period, it cannot be interpreted as offering a

complete view of British foreign policy. It is my contention that propaganda produced

and disseminated by Britain during the interwar period can also be seen to be a key

factor in British foreign policy strategy. Not only can propaganda be considered as

having contributed to the overall framework of British foreign policy, it can also offer

a significant and unique viewing glass into British foreign policy aims, with both

short term and long term foreign policy aims portrayed in various mediums of

propaganda in numerous locations and unique situations.

There have been many studies either focusing on or incorporating propaganda

in the interwar period, concerning the propaganda methods of not only Britain, but

also those used by both Mussolini and the Fascist party in Italy and the Nazi party in

Germany. Concerning the propaganda of Germany, Stanley Payne contends that Nazi

propaganda, when coupled with art and culture, would be utilised to build the „new

man‟ and that the focus of Nazi artistic policy stemmed from Hitler‟s personal belief

that „art is the only truly enduring investment of human labour‟1. The significance of

1 S G Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, p.197

2

the utilisation of art as propaganda adds a cultural aspect to the propaganda of Nazi

Germany, as highlighted by David Welch, with acceptable art seen as transcending

traditional class allegiances and presenting a visual representation of the national

community or völksgemeinschaft2.

Italian propaganda produced during the Mussolini dictatorship can also be

seen to contain a significant cultural aspect, with the intention of remodelling Italy to

create a „new‟ man to inhabit a new Rome, during a period of greatness to rival that

reached at the height of the Roman Empire. For example, the extravagant architectural

undertakings such as the building of aqueducts, and sports stadiums should not simply

be seen as methods intended to strengthen the Italian economy while attempting to

lessen the North/South divide, but also as a means of reshaping Italian culture, with a

focus on modernisation, unification and the importance of physical strength.

The study of British propaganda focuses largely upon that produced during

both the First and Second World Wars. This can be forgiven due to the fact that while

both Italy and Germany underwent major transformations with propaganda playing a

pivotal role in helping the dictatorships both gain and then remain in power, the

British experience of the interwar years was far less chaotic and the need for a fully

functioning and highly funded propaganda was by no means a pressing issue.

Historians including Messinger and Sanders study the role of propaganda in the First

World War, focusing upon roles of key individuals involved in the creation of the first

official propaganda bureau at Wellington House3, and the creation and development

of propaganda designed to be used as a weapon4. Nicholas and Senton on the other

hand focus upon British propaganda during the Second World War. Nicholas studies

2 Ed. A McElligott & T Kirk, Working Towards the Fuhrer, pp.97-98 3 G S Messinger British Propaganda and the State in the First World War 4 M L Sanders, British Propaganda During The First World War 1914-1918

3

the relationship between home front propaganda and the BBC, citing the useful nature

of programmes giving advice on how to cope with rationing as well as contributions

to public health campaigns, concluding that if the BBC had not broadcast „the civilian

population‟s understanding of what it should do and what it might expect would have

been seriously undermined, and while that it is impossible to gauge the effect of radio

on British morale it provided information and entertainment with integrity despite5.

Senton also studies the role of the BBC, and how it was used to speak to resistance

groups within Europe and the role of general „psychological warfare‟ produced by the

PWE6.

Compared to the periods of the First and Second World Wars, the study of

British interwar propaganda is negligible, with Philip Taylor providing the largest and

most in depth study dedicated to British propaganda between 1919 and 1939. Taylor

traces the history of the British propaganda apparatus from its post-world war one

decay through to the preparation of propaganda to be utilised during wartime,

focusing upon key individuals and their roles within the formulation of British

propaganda while also attempting to explain the reasons behind the various

organisations created to project Britain overseas7. With regard to cultural propaganda,

Taylor defines this as „the promotion and dissemination of national aims and

achievements in a general rather than specifically economic or political form,

although it is ultimately designed to promote economic and political interests‟8.

However Taylor‟s study of the British Council for Relations with Other Countries*,

the main apparatus for the creation and dissemination of cultural propaganda, is broad

5 S Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC,1939-45, pp.271-274 6 M Senton, Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe 7 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, p.vii 8 Ibid. pp.125-126 * Henceforth referred to as the British Council

4

and relatively chronologic. While highlighting several key contributing factors

concerning its creation; the utilisation of „cultural diplomacy‟ by foreign governments

most successfully those of France and Germany, and that Britain‟s chief concern was

the consolidation and defence of existing interests and thus the „the atmosphere in

which concepts of cultural or intellectual expansion overseas were conceived was

generally absent‟9, Taylor focuses upon general areas of British Council activity such

as improving propaganda directed towards South America and the British Council‟s

close cooperation with the British Travel Association concerning the production and

distribution of films portraying British life, culture, and achievements.

Various in depth studies of specific areas of British propaganda during the

interwar period do exist however. Both Callum MacDonald and Anthony

Adamthwaite have provided studies of very specific areas of interwar propaganda.

MacDonald offers a detailed analysis of the Italian propaganda emerging from Radio

Bari and the various countermeasures employed by Britain between 1934 and 193710

.

MacDonald highlights the importance of radio as a medium of propaganda in an area

of high illiteracy such as the Middle East, and estimates that 60% of radio license

holders were regular listeners to the Bari broadcasts. MacDonald concludes that the

hostile nature of the Bari broadcasts led to Britain changing policy in the creation of

the BBC‟s Arabic broadcasts, and restricted the influence of Radio Bari to Palestine,

an area in which Britain had long accepted the inevitability of challenges to their

influence11

.

9 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

pp.126-127 10 C A MacDonald, Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British

Countermeasures 1934-38 11 Ibid., pp.201-204

5

Adamthwaite differs in both subject matter and approach that MacDonald,

focusing not upon methods of propaganda in development and practice, but the

relationship between the British government and various forms of media, specifically

newspaper and Radio12

. Adamthwaite highlights the problem of news management,

particularly those created by often contrasting statements released by the Foreign

Office and Downing Street, while also pointing out that despite there was great

importance in representing the British position with regard to foreign policy, „official

attempts to silence unwelcome opinion‟ were present in not only the mediums of

newspaper and radio. Official intervention also appeared concerning production of

literature that was deemed to inflammatory in nature during times of international

crises, such as Wiskemann‟s history of Czechoslovakians and Germans, and the

suppression of newsreels that voiced an opinion which contrasted the official policy

of Whitehall13

.

Despite these smaller, more tightly focused studies the general lack of detailed

and specific study of the activities of the British Council and the methods employed in

the promotion of cultural propaganda leads to the focus of this paper. It is my

intention to focus upon specific areas of cultural propaganda produced by the British

Council, and by studying methods of British cultural propaganda in both the Near and

Middle East, and Central Europe attempt to provide an in depth study of the practice

of „cultural diplomacy‟. With regard to the study of cultural propaganda in the Near

and Middle East, the main focus point will be that of Egypt. This was in part due to

key logistical role of the Suez Canal which greatly simplified movements to the rest

of the British Empire in the East such as India, Singapore, New Zealand and

12 A Adamthwaite, The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938 13 Ibid., pp.287-290

6

Australia, Secondly, Egypt was not technically a colony, and although Britain had

enough power to impose occupation, it was far easier to have a degree of pro-British

sentiment amongst key figures in the country. Finally, Egypt was also the site of

propaganda based warfare between Italy and Britain, the extent of which is apparent

when viewing the importance placed upon the cessation of propaganda during the

negotiations leading to the eventual „Gentleman‟s Agreement‟ between the two

nations. Concerning cultural propaganda in Europe, British activities in Italy will

form the subject of a case study, due to the importance of Anglo-Italian relations to

British foreign policy during the 1930s. A study of British propaganda in this period

will allow not only for the methods adopted to be discussed, but also will enable one

to judge the effects of the increasing tension in Anglo-Italian relations upon cultural

propaganda, and indeed to some extent if any cultural propaganda succeeded in

alleviating these tensions. The scope of „cultural propaganda‟ in this paper includes

not only the use of newsreel, cinema and wireless broadcasting, but focuses heavily

upon the role of education. The significance of the role of education as a means of

improving cultural relations was recognised by many British officials, and it is my

contention that cultural propaganda was not intended to solely influence the parent

generation of the 1930s, rather the use of education would enable a positive opinion

of Britain to permeate the youth for generations to come.

The definition used to determine what can be classified as cultural propaganda

will be similar to that used by Taylor, however rather than simply defining cultural

propaganda as the promotion of national aims and achievements with an ultimately

political goal in general terms, I would suggest that the definition should encompass

the ultimate aim of influencing the normal behaviour or thought of a foreign culture.

Thus cultural propaganda, in this paper, will be defined as „the promotion of national

7

aims and achievements in a general form, intending to influence the normal social

conventions of a foreign culture with the ultimate aim of promoting economic and

political interests‟. Although the addition may appear minor, it is significant in

allowing not just displays of British achievement in the cultural sphere to fall into the

category of cultural propaganda, but also allows various programmes of education and

private networks of relations to be categorised in such way.

8

Cultural Propaganda and Education in the Near and Middle East

The British Council played a significant role in organising and disseminating

cultural propaganda in the traditional sense as defined by Taylor. However the

organisation was also heavily involved with incorporating educational institutes into

the machinery of British cultural propaganda, as well as the various forms of

„traditional‟ cultural propaganda which showcased British achievements, aims, and

values. Formed in 1934, the roots of the British Council‟s interest in utilising

education as a means of cultural propaganda in the Middle East can be seen as

developing as early as March 1935, triggered by a report on British cultural

propaganda in Egypt. The report consists of extracts of a despatch dated November

1933 from Sir Percy Loraine, High Commissioner of Egypt, to Sir John Simon in

which concerns were raised on the questions of both maintaining and developing

English Education and culture, which was distributed to members of the British

Council in the newly created Sub-Committee on Education in the Near East to aid the

task of improving British educational influence in Egypt. Loraine felt that if British

political and commercial interests were not to be irredeemably damaged the entire

issue of cultural propaganda must be re-examined by the government14

. Loraine

stated that British „cultural effort‟ was private and sporadic, poorly financed and

staffed, and lacking in organisation and effectiveness when compared to efforts made

by Latin Governments which dominated the field. Loraine further suggested that this

gulf in cultural influence stemmed from the failure of Britain to create a strong

cultural position for herself between 1882 and 1922, and that following the

14 PRO, BW 29/3,British Report on Cultural Propaganda in Egypt, p.1

9

Declaration of Egyptian Independence it was found the France was predominant in

the cultural field. Loraine quoted the pamphlet The Conflict of French and English

Educational Philosophies in Egypt, composed by the American Professor Russell

Galt, which offered a neutral opinion which supported Loraine‟s claims concerning

British cultural influence stating –

„In Egypt, England had an army – France an idea. England had educational

control – France a clear educational philosophy. Because the French did have

such an organised philosophy and the English did not, the French pen has

proved mightier than the English sword.‟

Loraine concluded this negative assessment of British cultural influence by

highlighting the increase in expenditure on cultural propaganda by the French

government, stating that between 1928 and 1931 the amount had doubled, while the

grant at the French School of Archaeology in Cairo had increased six fold. The reality

of the lack of British influence concerning education is confirmed by the fact that in

1930-31, for every Egyptian attending a British school, 9 received a French education,

and that the number of Egyptians at British Schools diminished 10%, while those

attending French schools increased by 10%, and those attending Italian schools in

Egypt increased by 20% during the same period15

.

Loraine outlined an 11 point plan to improve educational and cultural

influence in the Near and Middle East, including the development of the Boy Scout

movement, the formation of a girls school at Cairo and the encouragement of English

Catholic missions to embark upon educational work in the area, and the foundation of

a British University of the Near East to compete with the French University at Beirut.

Other than the creation of a girl‟s school, Loraine‟s suggestions do not feature in the

British Council‟s July report concerning development of British education and culture

in Egypt. However, Loraine‟s despatch can be considered as the first serious attempt

15 PRO, BW 29/3,British Report on Cultural Propaganda in Egypt, p.2

10

to assert British cultural influence in the area. Further encouragement for British

cultural aspirations appeared when an article in the Cairo based newspaper Balagh,

translated in the Egyptian Gazette, approaching the subject of teaching English in

Egypt. Despite the anti-British nature of Balagh, the article suggests that while

Egyptians may be politically bound to say they hate everything British significant

numbers wish to learn the English language and have their children brought up with

British ideas16

. While the report focuses upon educational aspects, including the

provision of lectures on English art and literature and ensuring the availability of

these successful talks, the report also notes the importance of developing cultural ties

through other mediums. The report states that residents of the Near East have excelled

in the performance of sports and games introduced by Britain, and suggests that were

British regiments in Cairo seen to be superior at such games it would also suggest

superiority in other areas, and British prestige would be enhanced by displays of

sporting success on a local scale17

.

Throughout the remainder of 1935 and early 1936, the development of cultural

propaganda in the Near and Middle East was ponderous with much debate concerning

the ideal strategy to adopt. At the second meeting of the Sub-Committee for

Education in the Near East it was decided that the education of children of English

birth should be the priority of educational policy in Egypt, however the foundation of

a British Institute at Cairo was considered to be a high priority aim18

, but due to

mainly financial based issues the project did not become a reality19

. The lack of

16 PRO, BW 29/3, Egypt’s Second Language, in the Egyptian Gazette, July 10th 1935 17 PRO, BW 29/3, Suggestions for Development of British Education, Culture, etc. in Egypt, pp.2-7,

July 4th 1935 18 PRO, BW 29/3, Sub-Committee on British Education in the Near East Minutes, February 14th 1936 19 PRO, CO 732/82/9, Proposals for Expenditure of the British Council in the Near East for the

Financial Year 1937-38, p.19

11

investment in cultural propaganda in the Near and Middle East was not unique

however, and is highlighted by a 1937 memorandum providing estimates of

expenditure of the „Great Powers‟ directed towards propaganda. The memorandum

focuses largely upon expenditure specifically in the field of cultural propaganda

between 1934 and late 1936. The report states that in 1934, the American budget for

cultural propaganda was £140,355,253 of which £1,844,065 was solely directed

towards educational programmes outside America including scholarships for foreign

students. Figures relating to Italian expenditure in the field of „Propaganda and

Prestige‟ amount to £1,139,154, however Italian cultural

institutes were common across Europe and South America, and 3% of Italian

propaganda expenditure focused upon language and culture, with the agencies of the

Dante Alighieri Society and Instituto del Libro being fully utilised as propaganda

organisations20

.

The expenditure granted to the British Council for cultural propaganda in

Egypt did increase due to the desire to fortify and extend their work in Egypt against

the „increasing force of Italian and French Propaganda‟21

, however in early 1938

various schemes were proposed including estimated costs but were ultimately

rejected. These included the creation of a „new‟ English school at Victoria College

with running costs of £10,000, and a proposal for an English school to be created

under Egyptian control at the cost of £250,000. It would not be until post 1938 that

the budget of the British Council would increase to be competitive with rival nation‟s

cultural propaganda expenditure in the Middle East. A number of new grants for

Egypt were allocated following Lord Lloyd‟s visit in 1939, including a number of

non-recurrent grants for the Evening Institute lectures of £2,100, the purchase of the

20 PRO, BW 2/84 Memorandum on Propaganda by the Great Powers, British Council, pp.1-8 21 PRO, BW 29/3, Summary of proposed Expenditure in Egypt produced by Reginald Leeper

12

new site for the British school at Suez at £2,060, and a further £1,500 granted for the

purchase of new land to expand the English Mission College22

.

Despite the economic setbacks regarding the increase of educational and

cultural influence in Egypt, the matter of education was still being taken seriously

with it being recognised that „one of the most important channels yet remaining by

which the flow of British ideas into Egyptian minds can be maintained would seem to

be the British personnel employed by the Ministry of Education‟. A report on

education in Egypt produced in November 1937, forwarded to Lord Lloyd, highlights

the desire for the very best British teachers and lecturers to be used in Egypt, and the

need to address the fact that taking a seat at a university in Egypt leads to reduced

prestige for academics, and that the limited range of salaries available for overseas

educational staff should be improved23

in order to ensure a higher standard of

teaching and a greater success of cultural influence. This report shows not only the

commitment and comparative successes of early British attempts and increasing

educational and cultural influence when viewed against the dominance of French

institutes in the early 1930s, but also serves to highlight the difficulties of maintaining

an effective education system with high quality teaching whilst also conveying British

values to the Egyptian youth. A letter from Colonel Bridge to White describes the

educational system as encountered with Lord Lloyd on a tour of educational facilities

including the British Boys School, St Andrews College and Victoria College24

.

Despite the generally positive tone concerning developments including the immanent

completion of a new hall at the British Boys School and the development of evening

classes with the intention of providing the Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency in

English, annexe A of the letter highlights educational problems in Egypt. The annex

22 PRO, BW 29/5, British Council Grants for Education in Egypt, September 11th 1939, pp.1-3 23 PRO, BW 29/3, Report on Education in Egypt, pp.1-2,6-7, November 1st 1937 24 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 3rd 1938

13

highlights the educational load on British run schools regarding English pupils and

that there is also an educational demand from many sections of the population who

are not British for English education25

. Despite the inability of British schools to

provide education for all non-British youth in Egypt, most families felt it desirable for

their children to learn English as it was seen as a valuable qualification for gaining

employment, with more intelligent students also expressing their desires to take the

London Matriculation class, and that when compared to these qualifications there was

a growing consciousness developing that similar or equivalent Egyptian qualifications

were valueless in comparison. Bridge highlights this decline in the public‟s opinion of

the value of Egyptian qualifications as a positive for British educational expansion,

with a corresponding opportunity opening for the increase of English university

teaching in Egypt26

. However, despite the popularity of British run courses, it was the

priority of SCBENA to focus upon the education of British children abroad, and as

such many Egyptians were refused entry to the institutes.

This provides a mixed assessment of British Education in Egypt, showing that

while the courses offered at British institutes were high in popularity with both British

and Egyptian students alike, demand for these popular courses could not be met, and

highlights the fact that despite the progress made since the late 1920s and early 1930s

where France was dominant in the educational sphere within Egypt, the apparatus of

British education in Egypt was far from complete and able to meet demand. This

ultimately reflects the inability of Britain to achieve the goal of implanting British

ideals and cultural values in the Egyptian youth via the medium of official educational

institutes.

25 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 3rd 1938, Annexe A, p.1 26 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 3rd 1938, Annexe A, p2

14

During early 1939, the British Council began to tackle the issue of the

education of Maltese and Cypriot children in the Middle East. Maltese and Cypriot

pupils at this time either attended Greek run schools, or simply did not have access to

education in the area, with figures showing that of 700 Maltese under the age of 15

only 196 received education at a handful of British schools, while of 661 Cypriots of

the same age, only 22 received British education in Egypt27

. To combat this, a

programme of increased subsidisation of Maltese pupils began at St. George‟s in

Shoubra and St. Austin‟s at Heliopolis, as well as the provision of a free school at

Bab-el-Karasta in Alexandria. This shows a marked effort to increase British

educational influence in Egypt, and despite the outbreak of war on September 1st 1939

the Near and Middle East remained a priority area for the spread and growth of

cultural influence. This point is highlighted, particularly the educational aspect of

British policy, by the opposition by members of the British Council to the proposed

take over of Victoria College by the British Naval Authorities. In a memorandum

drafted by C A F Dundas, Victoria College is described as holding a unique position

in that it is the only British public school in the Near East with no distinction of race

or religion, and as having built up an excellent reputation from Iraq to the Sudan in its

thirty years of existence, with leading men from nearly every county in the Near East

whose „sons are past or present members of the school, reflective of the high level of

influence the college held in the areas during the period28

. Dundas states that were

Victoria College forced to continue work at a temporary location, the last thirty years

of development would be wasted and connections with neighbouring countries would

be broken, while speculating that unless there was no other alternative the

abandonment of Victoria College and other educational institutions would „only have

27 PRO, BW 29/5, Maltese and Cypriot Education, p1 28 PRO, BW 29/5, Memorandum by C A F Dundas on the future of Victoria College, September 5th

1939

15

in the long run a disastrous effect upon the position of Great Britain both during the

war and in the following years‟. However, Dundas also recognised that the Victoria

College situation was fait accompli, but still strongly defended the importance of the

education system in Egypt and the importance of its role in building a new generation

for the following peace.

The programme of investing in education as a means of cultural propaganda

designed to improve cultural relations by the British Council can be described as

being largely successful. During the late 1920s and early 1930s it was clear that

British education in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, trailed significantly behind

the programmes of Italy and France. However, the continued development of an

education network, both for pupils and adults alike helped address the situation and

create a situation in which Britain could compete against the highly organised and

effective education philosophies adopted by the French institutes in the region. The

success of the British programme to educate not only children of British descent but

also those of other nationalities is highlighted in a report on English schools in Cairo

produced in December 1937. The report shows the returns of British and foreign

teachers and pupils at thirteen British run schools in the years 1936 and 1937, and

illustrates the increase in foreign pupils, and also that of British trained teachers. The

total number of pupils in these school rose from 2,086 in 1936 to 2,336 in 1937, with

the total number of teachers increasing from 163 to 171 during the same period, while

the total of foreign pupils receiving British education rose from 1227 to 1384 and the

total of foreign teachers at British schools increasing from 54 to 7029

. An earlier

report dated July 1935 concerning the development of cultural propaganda via the use

of education states that the English Mission College at Koubbeh had achieved the

29 PRO, BW 29/3, British Schools in Cairo: Returns of Teachers and Pupils 1936-37, December 1937

16

target of 400 pupils, mostly of foreign nationality30

. When compared to the figures of

pupils attending the college stated in the report of December 1937, the total of pupils

attending the English Mission College had increased by 20%, which suggests that

there was a high demand for a British based education, while the total number of

pupils at British schools in Cairo increased by slightly over 10% between 1936 and

1937, which again suggests a continued demand for British education. This also

suggests that the methods of the British Council had indeed been successful in

transforming the prospects of British education, particularly in Egypt, and the

numbers of young Egyptians receiving British education and values had increased

dramatically. This points towards the conclusion that British educational schemes in

the Middle East can be described as a successful method of cultural propaganda, with

a large target audience, particularly amongst the Egyptian youth, serving not only as a

means of instilling British values amongst the youth but also in improving the prestige

of Britain, a point highlighted by the desire to obtain British qualifications rather than

the local equivalents.

Despite the mixed success of British educational programmes in Egypt, there

were numerous smaller, more exclusive institutes formed with the intention of

improving cultural relations between Britain and Egypt, the largest of which was the

Anglo-Egyptian Union31

, created in 1936 following the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. A

report focusing on the AEU by a special sub-committee created to consider the

extension of cultural activities sought to develop ways in which the AEU could

increase activity building upon methods that were deemed feasible and implemented

successfully during its first year of its existence. The methods used by the AEU to

30 PRO, BW 29/3, Suggestions for the Possible Development of British Education, Culture etc. in

Egypt, July 4th 1935, pp.1-2 31 Referred to henceforth as AEU

17

spread British culture consisted mainly of the organisation of lectures delivered to

members and their guests, taking place both fortnightly and weekly when available

and demand necessitated the extra lectures. The recommendations of the report were

divided into two sections; direct educational work, and more „definitively cultural‟

work32

, both of which were considered at great length by the sub-committee. Of the

recommendations discussed in the report, those relating directly to education were

deemed to be unnecessary, and outside the sphere of the AEU. However, the

committee did agree to assist the AEU with the broader cultural activities

recommended in the report, and agreed that a cultural director should be appointed to

aid the AEU effectively undertake work of a cultural nature. Accompanying the

recommendations is a list of AEU arranged lectures taking place both at the Union

itself and the lecture hall of the Royal Geographical Society. The programme of

lectures ran from November 1937 to April 1938, covering such topics as Egyptian

Drama and Film, the place of Parliament in British history, the idea of

Commonwealth in the British Empire, and English literature on the Near East. The

lectures took place on the evening, and while the addresses themselves ranged from

30 to 60 minutes, guests arrived early and remained after the lecture itself to socialise.

Despite the continuing attendances of members and guests, the success of the AEU in

promoting British cultural values was limited, as membership of the group was

restricted largely to intellectuals, which lead Colonel Bridge to conclude that the

group was not successful in the field of education due to this limited appeal33

.

The outbreak of war in Europe can be seen as a crucial point in changing

British propaganda policy as a whole; however the work of the British Council in

Egypt remained relatively unaffected by events in Europe. A reorganisation of staff

32 PRO, BW 29/4, Extract of Minutes from 24th Meeting of the Ambassador’s Advisory Committee on

Education, January 14th 1938 33 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 13th 1938, Annexe A, p.4

18

and Offices of the Evening Institute was drafted, and it was arranged that the institute

would only disseminate „news and views as is consistent with the British Council‟s

policy of refraining from any form of political propaganda or interference‟34

. The

British Council‟s work to improve cultural influence in Egypt was also more widely

unaffected by the war in Europe, and the scheme of creating a teacher training college

in Cairo was put into place in November 1939, with courses due to start in December,

three years after it was originally suggested. This shows the importance of education

as a means of improving cultural relations to the British Council, and the outbreak of

war can be seen as a catalyst for improving the quality of teaching staff at British

schools in Egypt, which had been an unrealised aim until this point.

Despite the large amount of effort on the part of the British Council

developing a better organised and more effective British based education within the

Middle East, particularly within Egypt, this was not the only significant approach to

cultural propaganda adopted by Britain in the region. A more overt form of cultural

propaganda adopted by Britain directed at influencing the Middle and Near east can

appeared in the form of BBC broadcasts in Arabic. The nature of the BBC Arabic

broadcast service differed from the work of the British Council in the region in one

major respect; that it was not an improvement on an existing set of apparatus as the

British Council attempted concerning education, but rather a direct response to the

propaganda emanating from a foreign power, in this case Italy.

The possibility of the BBC broadcasting programmes in foreign language was

raised as early as June 1936, in a memorandum entitled „The Possible Use of

Languages Other Than English in the Empire Broadcasting Service‟. It was argued

34 PRO, BW 29/5, Reorganisation of the Staff and Offices of the Evening Institute in Egypt in the Event

of War by C A F Dundas, September 30th 1939

19

that the creation of a foreign language service would have a positive effect on the

projection of Britain and its values, stating that such a programme should be

encouraged as British prestige and influence in world affairs would be increased

abroad35

. However, foreign language broadcasting did not become a reality until

1938, after 3 years of overtly anti-British propaganda had emerged from the Italian

Radio Bari. The broadcasts of Radio Bari were aimed at audiences in the Italian

colony of Libya as well as Morocco, Palestine, Egypt, and the Red Sea region and did

not begin as being hostile towards Britain. The station broadcast Eastern news and

music with the intention of acting as cultural propaganda designed to increase Italian

influence in the Middle East by praising Italy and the Fascist system36

. Rome stated

that the service was intended to „strengthen ties between Italy and the Arab peoples‟,

with MacDonald stating two clear aims for the original purpose of Bari. Firstly, Italy

wished to restore its prestige in the Arab world which had been damaged by the

Senussi massacres during the re-conquest of Cyrenaica. The second was to register

Italian interest in the area, as Italy felt she had been unfairly excluded from by Britain

and France. MacDonald also highlights the point that radio was the ideal medium for

propaganda in the region where many were illiterate with 10,000 individuals being

license holders in Palestine alone by 1935, a figure which continued to rise with Italy

producing cheap radio sets for Arab customers37

. However following the Abyssinian

crisis of September 1935 Radio Bari „abandoned cultural propaganda for an outright

attack on British policy‟38

. A Foreign Office report dated September 24th

1936 stated

that Italian efforts targeted mainly Moslems within Palestine and Egypt as these areas

35 PRO, CO 323/1390/14, Memorandum on the Possible Use of Languages Other than English in The

Empire Broadcasting Service 36 C A MacDonald, Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British

Countermeasures 1934-1938, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.13, no.2, p.195 37 Ibid. pp.195-196 38 Ibid. p.196

20

housed nationalist groups who were strongly opposed to British rule. The report also

notes that the Bari broadcasts had supported the both the September and December

uprisings of 1935 in Egypt, and harboured the intention of inciting rebellion against

British rule by claiming British support for a Jewish war against Arabs, citing poor

treatment of Moslems under British rule as its precedent39

.

Despite the immediate threat to British interests caused by the Bari broadcasts,

progress was slow in developing a service that would counter the high output of anti-

British propaganda. This was partly due to the reluctance of the BBC, priding itself as

being an independent company not under government control, as it was feared that in

addressing part of its programming to foreign countries it would be seen to openly

participate in propaganda and have a negative impact upon the organisations

credibility40

. With these concerns in mind a compromise was eventually reached in

1938, with Sir John Reith acting as the only direct contact between the BBC and the

Foreign Office, thus ensuring the independence of the BBC from Foreign Office. The

BBC Arabic broadcasts began transmitting on January 3rd

1938 and can be judged as

an almost immediate success with numerous reports stating that Italy had began

constructing wireless disturber stations on Sardinia, suggesting that Mussolini feared

the possibility of hostile broadcasts directed towards areas on Italian influence in a

similar fashion to those emanating from Radio Bari.

Finally in the region, the use of film as a means of cultural propaganda was

utilised in the classic sense as defined by Taylor; a means of showcasing British

achievements and aims. A report on film work produced by the Travel and Industrial

Development Committee highlights three key areas for film distribution; British

39 PRO, FO 371/20027, Report on Palestine, September 24th 1936 40 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

pp.193-194

21

Newsreels abroad, the production and distribution of British documentary films

abroad, and British fiction films. Regarding British Documentary films, the British

Council agreed to expand upon the arrangements for the distribution of films in

foreign theatres by distributing films for free, in areas such as the Near East with the

British Council donating £400 and £1,200 in the financial years 1936/37 and 1937/38

respectively for the necessary copies of these „free‟ films across 22 countries41

. There

was however a demarcation between the British Council and the Travel Association

concerning the focus of the types of film to be distributed, with the Council seeking to

utilise films of a cultural or education character, while the Travel Association sought

to focus upon those containing a tourist or industrialist theme.

The minutes of the Joint Committee on Films meeting held in October 1937

outline the plans for the distribution of suitable films in various world regions.

Concerning the Middle and Near East, Primrose stated that he had guaranteed the

distribution of six British films in Egypt, but faced difficulties finalising distribution

in Palestine and Iraq which was delayed until May 1938. Despite this mixed success,

the six films despatched to Egypt were aired in December 1937, and 2 reels of a

prestige film of the Royal Navy was produced and distributed for Cinema release in

early May 1938. Six films were also released in Iraq and ran for two weeks at cinemas

in Basra and Baghdad; however reports stated that the films were of little interest to

the local cinema audience as only a minority were able to understand them42

. In

Palestine, the same six films were considered „extremely suitable and likely to be

popular not only with British policemen and their families, but with the Jewish and

41 PRO, BW 4/26, Report on Film Work, pp.2-3, March 1938 42 PRO, BW 2/35, Report on Distribution of Films by the Joint Committee on Films, May 1938

22

European communities generally‟, and were set to be released one per month over six

months, each showing for a period of 4 weeks43

.

The continued distribution of British produced films throughout late 1937 and

Early 1938 in the region would suggest that the use of film as a medium of cultural

propaganda can be considered a success, due to the continued development and

continued investment the Joint Committee on Films continued to receive from the

British Council. The wide release of these films in cinemas across the Near and

Middle East would also suggest that these films reached a large audience, with the

release of films to schools within Egypt showing that the educational aspirations

behind the British Council‟s use of film had again been achieved on a limited scale.

However, it is difficult to judge the success of the films as a medium of cultural

propaganda in particular whether films showcasing British achievements, for example

the film Precision which dealt with the accuracy of British manufacturing processes44

,

would have a wide appeal to foreign audiences and in turn cast Britain in a more

favourable light. Reports from Palestine stating the films would be deemed a success

are contradicted by those received from Iraq suggesting such films garnered little

interest from local audiences, which suggests that the reception of British Films in the

region varied greatly upon local lines, making it impossible to judge the effectiveness

of British film as a medium of cultural propaganda in the Near and Middle East

during the interwar period.

43 PRO, BW 2/35, Views of the District Commissioner of Jerusalem and the Chairmen of the Palestine

Censorship Board conveyed to E H Samuel in Report on Distribution on Films by the Joint Committee

on Films, Annexe A, part V, March 1938 44 PRO, BW 2/35, Report on Showing of Films at GPO Film Unit by Croom-Johnson, November 12th

1937

23

British Cultural Propaganda in Europe

The work of the British Council in Europe draws many parallels with that undertook

in the Near and Middle East during the mid to late 1930s. The use of education as a

means of increasing cultural influence played a large role in British cultural

propaganda in both regions, with other media such as the use of film both

documentary as well as newsreel playing a supporting role in showcasing British

achievements as well as portraying British life and culture in a positive light.

However, the role of education as a method of cultural propaganda in Europe differed

from that in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, as British educational facilities had

to compete against pre-existing national organisations where it none had been present

in the Middle Eastern region. In place of the variety of pre, primary, and secondary

schools establish in the Middle East catering for both children of British and foreign

descent, the main focus of British education in Europe lay with various „British

Institutions‟, thus so did the potential avenues for improving cultural influence within

Europe.

24

Education and Cultural Propaganda within Italy

Perhaps the most renowned institute was located at Pallaza Antinori in

Florence. The institute was founded in 1918 at the cessation of the First World War

under the aegis of a Committee of English residents and Italian professors with the

support of the British Ministry of propaganda45

, following advice to the British

government from those involved with „the struggle against enemy propaganda‟ to

subsidise a centre for the serious study of English in what was considered the

intellectual capital of Italy. The centre received government funding until 1921

despite a recommendation by the Foreign Office appointed to enquire into British

activities abroad. However, the prestige of the Institute, and in turn Britain, was not

damaged as funding arrived from other sources; originally from Sir Walter Becker, a

British shipping magnate, between 1921 and 1924 and an annual grant received from

the Serena Foundation46

. From 1925 onwards, the Institute survived on the final one

million lire donation by Sir Becker and two grants from Sir Daniel Stevenson and

Miss S R Courtauld, each amounting to £10,000. Despite these sources of private

funding, the 1935 brochure suggests that the economic survival of the institute was

becoming threatened due to the depreciation in value of Sterling, and the conversion

operations in Britain and Italy which reduce interest on investments from 5% to 3.5%.

Lord Rennell highlights the importance placed upon the French institutes located at

London, Rome and Florence, and duly notes that the high level of investment reflects

the important of education means of cultural influence, and further states that

45 BW 40/2, Report on the British Institute at Florence, December 7th 1934 46 PRO, BW 40/2, British Institute of Florence Appeal of Behalf on Lord Rennell, January 1935, pp.1-2

25

„in an age of democracy the friendships of nations depends upon public

opinion, and it should therefore be our constant endeavour to attach and

inform that opinion, especially among the young‟47

The view of Rennell concerning the important role of educational facilities in

strengthening national ties as well as improving cultural relations echo the thoughts of

many within the British Council related to the programme of educational development

in the Middle East. The importance of the Institute was recognised by the British

Council as early as December 1934, with a report stating that there can be no doubt as

to the Institutes success citing the award of 26 Teachers‟ Diplomas in English to

students, with thousands of Italians in turn being taught by ex-students in Government

secondary schools across Italy48

. Despite the noted success of the Institute, the report

concludes by highlighting the need to increase British influence in Italian higher

education, as at the close of 1934 there was only one Chair of English in all Italian

Universities compared to seven French and Eight German Chairs.

In a memorandum on the history and present position of the Institute supplied

to the British Council by Captain Harold E Goad, Director of the British Institute at

Florence between 1922 and 1939, it is noted that the interest of the above mentioned

donations, together with student fees, annual subscriptions from British Universities,

and fees of British and Italian visitors in Florence who subscribe to gain usage of the

library and reading rooms are the main source of funding, but also that donations of

books were received from the Foreign Office, as well as up to date popular British

newspapers. The memorandum concludes with an assessment of the value and future

possibilities of the Institute49

, stating that the success of its work is difficult to gauge,

noting that while between 100-150 ex-students have entered Italian secondary schools

47 Ibid. p.3 48 PRO, BW 40/2, Report on the British Institute at Florence, December 7th 1934 49 PRO, BW 40/2, Memorandum on the History and Present Position of the British Institute at

Florence, February 1935, pp.3-4

26

and have greatly improved the teaching of English, the language still falls behind the

teaching of French and German within Italy, highlighted by the greater number of

university chairs held by students of French and German. The memorandum also

notes that the Institute was „heavily handicapped by need of the strictest economy‟,

with increasing student fees and restrictions on printing being of „doubtful advantage

to its work‟. The desiderata of the Institute were listed as the reduction of fees for

students, the ability to grant scholarships to benefit poorer students, to invite students

of Italian from British universities with the possibility of an exchange scheme, and to

invite well known British lecturers to speak at the institute on a regular basis. The

memorandum concludes that „if these aims are attained, it is confidently predicted that

its work could be greatly extended‟50

.

Taylor also recognises the somewhat strange relationship between the treasury

and the funding available for propaganda, stating that although there was an argument

that qualitative rather than quantitative propaganda was more effective, it was still in

essence a financially expedient argument. Taylor does highlight the rapid increase in

funding available to the British Council, from £500 in 1935 to £330,000 by 193951

however it must also be noted that this budget was not solely for cultural propaganda,

let alone the educational aspects of this work. Thus, the relatively low official funding

available for quasi-official organisations such as the British Institute at Florence

cannot be considered as an aberration, but simply as an unavoidable consequence of

the nature of British propaganda when compared to the fully state organised and

heavily funded apparatus of the totalitarian regimes. This relatively low level of

50 PRO, BW 40/2, Memorandum on the History and Present Position of the British Institute at

Florence, February 1935, p.4 51 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

p.294

27

funding available to the Institute at Florence and other aspects of British propaganda

work can be seen to stem from the historical reluctance of the treasury to invest in

peacetime propaganda. Following the First World War, the Treasury proved reluctant

to accept proposals for peacetime propaganda. While conceding propaganda activities

could not be terminated immediately, it was expected that the Foreign Office would

discontinue ant type of propaganda once it began failing to produce positive results52

.

Cultural propaganda was outlawed entirely and only work of a commercial nature

rather than political should be performed during peacetime. On one hand, it can be

argued that the Treasury distrusted the propaganda apparatus, in particular the

Ministry of Information, due to its accountability to the Prime Minister rather than the

Treasury or Parliament. Conversely, the reluctance to fund British propaganda can be

considered to have developed from the political ideal that any propaganda, to a lesser

extent economic or commercial propaganda, was considered „un-British‟. Thus, the

Treasury was more likely to favour propaganda which would promote British trade

and commercial interest rather than an „uncharacteristic form of self-glorification‟53

.

Despite the inconsistent and often haphazard approach of the Treasury

regarding the funding of propaganda, the continued success of the Institute as a

cultural tool was again highlighted in correspondence between Goad and Col. Bridge,

which focused upon the activities of the Institute regarding British music. Goad offers

a brief description of a small concert performed by Italian musicians, set up by a

student named Floris, who incorporated musicians from the Florentine Youth

Orchestra, and the intentions of Floris to perform another concert focusing upon

contemporary British music, which Goad notes was as unknown as the classic British

52 P M Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, p.71 53 P M Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, pp.71-72

28

works. Goad further states that British printed music was a rare commodity and as

such, many concerts featuring the work of composers of various nationalities

performed little or no British music due to this. Goad also comments on the popularity

of British books, citing the example of the Board of Trade‟s participation at the

triennial International Book Fair held in Florence in 1928 with sales exceeding those

of any other nation represented, and states that the inability of the Institute to fund

such endeavours is common across all areas of cultural expansion, and requests „a few

hundred pounds‟ to provide funding for similar events54

and improve the effectiveness

of the Institute in expanding the projection of Britain. This letter again highlights both

success and difficulties concerning British cultural expansion in Italy, as while it is

suggest that there were numerous opportunities available for exploitation of cultural

gains, lack of funding prevented any serious attempt to promote British cultural

achievements in music or to distribute British literature or books with Britain as the

subject as the DOT had in 1928. As stated in the first chapter, the funding available

for propaganda purposes was limited during the early to mid 1930s, however Goad

succeeded in acquiring a £200 grant in October 1935 the aid the Institutes

involvement in expanding its cultural activities in Florence other than the teaching of

English at a university standard55

.

54 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter from Harold Goad to Col. White Bridge, March 28th 1935 55 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter to Goad confirming grant of £200, October 10th 1935

29

The Abyssinian Crisis and Cultural Propaganda in Italy

The influence of the Institute within Italy was greatly affected by the

deepening Abyssinian Crisis. Throughout 1935 Italy had sought to expand its

influence in Africa by conquering Abyssinia, and despite the Franco-Italian

agreement of January 1935 granting Italy parts of French Somaliland Italian

aggression continued towards Ethiopia. Despite claims of Italian Military build up,

the League of Nations was slow to react, and in late September Abyssinia mobilised

its ineffective army in an attempt to halt hostilities quickly. The League of Nations

deemed Italy as the aggressor, and began the process of imposing economic sanctions

against Italy; leading to strained relations between Italy and countries within the

League, including Britain.

This had a marked effect upon British propaganda, as noted above concerning

the Radio Bari situation in the Middle East, as well as serving to highlight the

importance with which the leading powers now viewed propaganda in regard to

international relations. The issue of propaganda had became a significant one with

bearing upon international relations; the best example being the thorny issue of Italian

propaganda and British countermeasures both in direct response to anti-British

propaganda and representations of Italy becoming a significant factor in negotiating

Anglo-Italian rapprochement between 1937 and 193856

, with Britain stating „The

cessation of propaganda was not a pre-condition of the opening of conversations, but

56 See PRO, PREM 1/276

30

that it was necessary in order to create an atmosphere in which such conversations

could be successful‟57

.

Reports sent from Goad concerning Italian public opinion towards the Institute

at Florence, and in turn Britain and her policy towards Italy suggest that despite his

best efforts to maintain good relations via private networks of friends, the Italian

attitude was one of „aggrieved defiance‟ against the economic sanctions imposed by

the League, with Britain bearing the brunt of hostility58

. Goad also stated that the

number of students for the academic year 1935-36 fell from 250 to 100, attributed to a

distinct boycott of the English language and culture in all secondary schools meaning

that there was no need for prospective teachers to learn English at the time. By March

1936 every Anglo-Italian organisation had collapsed with the exception of the British

Institute, and due to the lack of trade between Britain and Italy, the English language

had lost all commercial value, placing the Institute in a precarious position.

The negative effects of the Abyssinian crisis were apparent not only in relation

to the British Institute, but with all British related activities viewed with hostility by

the Italian public. In a letter from Goad to Dr J W Mackail, Goad states that all things

British are despised, and that the British public had no idea of how strong the

„revulsion of feeling‟ was within Italy. However, more disturbingly on a cultural

level, Goad stated

„the Germans are everywhere triumphant. They are not only ousting our trade

products from Italian markets with long-term contracts….but they are re-

establishing their political and social position with the deliberate design of

undoing our work59

.‟

This suggests that despite the success of the Institute through the 1920s and early

1930s in providing a base for cultural propaganda in Italy, the Abyssinian crisis had

57 PRO, PREM 1/276, De Jure Recognition as a Bargaining Counter, December 29th 1937 58 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter From Goad to Col. Bridge, November 18th 1935 59 PRO, BW 40/2, Extract from a letter from Goad to Dr Mackail, March 24th 1936

31

not only lowered British prestige but had also allowed the cultural propaganda of

foreign countries, in particular Germany, to dominate and undermine British efforts to

maintain friendly relations with Italy via strong cultural ties. The gains made by

Germany in the cultural sphere were further highlighted by Goad in November 1936,

summarising developments regarding German influence in education. Goad states that

Germany was now taught at all Italian universities with full Professorial Chairs

permanently established at Padua, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Rome,

Pisa, Naples and Palermo, with the creation of prizes for Italian students of German as

well as catering for travelling students for Italy to Germany in exchange programmes

between the Goethe Haus of Rome and the Petrarca House of Cologne. It was also

noted that in Rome alone there were four Italo-German institutes including the

German Academy for Artists and the German Archaeological Institution60

, compared

to the sole British asset, the British Institute.

The fortunes of the British cultural programme in Italy again changed in

accordance with general relations between Britain and Italy, however despite the

signing of the Mediterranean Pact there were many reservations with regard to

rebuilding Anglo-Italian friendship61

. The Italian press was described as „satisfied‟

with the agreement, and that Italian public opinion was no longer anti-British, with an

overwhelming feeling of sincere relief that the period of tension between the two

nations over the Abyssinian Crisis had passed. In terms of rebuilding the friendship

and once again increasing British cultural influence Goad proposed several measures

to expand the activities of the Institute; increasing the number of summer schools in

London and providing free tickets for top students, and expanding the current English

bulletin to include a wider subject variety and articles by scholars based outside

60 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter from Goad to Bridge, November 18th 1936 61 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter from Goad to Leeper, January 7th 1937

32

Florence, as well as extending a branch of the Institute outside Florence. The recovery

of the Institute following the completion of the Gentleman‟s Agreement is charted in

the 1937 Annual Report of the Board of Governors. The total number of students

attending the British Institute for the academic year 1936-37 was 203 excluding

external students, compared to 156 for the 1935-36 year, while an extension of the

Institute based in Milan received 20 regular students of which three out of four fifth

year students won the Teacher‟s Diploma62

. The increase in the number of students at

the Institute compared to the previous academic year not only suggests a positive

correlation between perceptions of Britain and international politics, but also shows

that the continued work of the Institute had begun to regain ground lost to German

cultural programmes in the 12 months following the Abyssinian crisis.

Following the success of the British Institute branch at Milan, it was agreed

that a grant of £350 would be made available to continue the expansion to Urbino,

which proved fruitful with the branch achieving attendance of 40 students

participating in three courses on English Literature63

. The academic year 1937-38 was

also the first in which the Institute received a larger subsidy from the British Council,

including the guarantee of a pension of £100 per year to staff at the Institute and the

creation of scholarships offered to Italian students for the London Holiday Course.

The Council also offered a further £600 per annum to provide for an additional

Professor of English who would also act as Assistant Director of the Institute, with the

appointment confirmed in December 1937 of Ronald Bottrall of Pembroke College.

This increased investment from the British Council shows that the British government

not only valued the long standing contribution by the Institute to fostering cultural

relations between Britain and Italy, but also recognised that maintaining good

62 PRO, BW 40/2, The British Institute of Florence Annual Report, November 1937 63 PRO, BW 40/3, Letter from Goad to Bridge, February 14th 1938

33

relations with Italy were of the utmost importance concerning the worsening

European situation. This increased investment also indicated that cultural propaganda

had became a significant part of international relations, and was now recognised as a

key area of foreign policy crucial to achieving the aim of maintaining a European

peace.

The fact that the success of Institute at Florence can be seen to vary greatly

between 1935 and 1938 serves to highlight the vulnerability of cultural propaganda to

changing international relations. It may seem an obvious statement that when the

policy of the British government stood in opposition against that of Mussolini the

popularity of Britain, and in turn its foreign institutes will suffer. Yet one of the

purposes of cultural propaganda is to act as a cushion against the negative effects of

such events, in attempting to maintain good relations and creating an arena other than

that of the political where the British view can be aired with the opportunity to be

understood. The presence of such cultural institutes also serves the purpose of

allowing „Britishness‟ to be viewed as separate from government policy, and that the

concept of „British‟ is not negative despite hostility towards British policy.

The success of the British Institute at Florence was judged officially by the

British Council on two criteria. The first was „its popular success with the local

British Colony in attracting subscribers, and a few prominent foreigners, to popular

lectures and to the use of the library of well known modern books‟. The second

criteria for judging the success of a British Institute was „its success in creating a

number of scholars capable of teaching out language in the schools of their own

country and imbued with a knowledge and appreciation of the higher values of our

34

thought and literature‟64

. By using these criteria, it is possible to chart the

development of the Institute from 1935, when the British Council became the

controlling organisation for the production and promotion of British cultural

propaganda. The figures of both the attendance of pupils studying English at this

higher level and the number of subscribers to the Institute appear in the annual

reports, along with a brief description of the activities undertaken over the previous 12

months, and a summary of the summer course for Italian students held in London.

The number of subscriptions for the academic period correlates with the

number of students attending each academic year, with 250 students for the year

1934-35, falling 103 students and subscribers for the academic year 1935-3665

, rising

to a number of 256 for the year 1936-37, with 300 for 1937-38, and finally 289

students for the academic year 1938-3966

. These figures show that the total number of

students had rose progressively as the Institute expanded to provide branches of

learning in Milan and Urbino. The anomalous figure in this respect is that of the

academic session 1935-36. However this was not due to a failing on the part of the

Institute, rather a reflection of increased international tension following the League of

Nations economic sanctions placed upon Italy following the Abyssinian crisis, and

due to the prominent role of Britain within the League, this manifested in a hostility

towards Britain and its institutions representing her in Italy.

With regard to the second official criteria of judging the success of the

Institute, the number of Diploma‟s granted in the academic year 1938-39 was 22, with

39 students granted the Certificati di Licenza, compared to the award of 4 Higher and

64 PRO, BW 40/2, The British Institute of Florence extract, May 13th 1935 65 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter From Goad to Col. Bridge, November 18th 1935 66 PRO, BW 40/2, British Institute of Florence Annual Report 1935-36, BW 40/4, British Institute of

Florence Annual Report 1937-38 and British Institute Interim Report 1939

35

20 Teacher‟s Diploma‟s awarded in 1936-37, and 26 Diploma‟s granted in 193467

.

This suggests an average of 25 scholars capable of teaching both the English language

and positive values of Britain at a higher standard emerging per year, and taking

teaching positions within the existing Italian education system. Thus, using official

markers to gauge the success of the Institute at Florence, the work conducted in the

educational and cultural sphere can be deemed as a success, with high student

attendance and subscription to the institute, as well as providing a consistent stream of

highly educated scholars imbued with greater knowledge and appreciation of the

higher values of British thought and Literature. This also serves to highlight the long

term strategy of British education policy in relation to cultural propaganda, in that it

was deemed essential to educate a generation of teachers with a good understanding

of Britain who would in turn educate the primary and secondary schools imparting a

similarly positive view of Britain and her culture.

Aside from educational methods of cultural propaganda, private connections

were also utilised. Harold Goad, in the midst of the Abyssinian crisis and the

imposition of sanctions placed upon Italy by the League of Nations, attempted to not

only improve the public opinion regarding the Institute at Florence, but also improve

general opinion of Britain. Due to the hostile public opinion towards Britain following

the sanction imposition, Goad attempted to use private connections with influential

individuals to maintain good relations with Italians, and in turn help ensure the British

Institute at Florence retained its good reputation. Goad states that his personal efforts

to maintain friendly relations were „received with sympathy, and even with a certain

kindly emphasis‟68

. Goad placed a wreath at the memorial to Italian soldiers on

67 PRO, BW 40/2, British Institute of Florence Annual Report 1935-36 and Letter From Goad to Col.

Bridge, November 18th 1935, BW 40/4, British Institute of Florence Annual Report 1937-38 and

British Institute Interim Report 1939, 68 PRO, BW 40/2, Letter from Goad to Bridge, November 18th 1935

36

Armistice Day which was „sympathetically reported‟ in the Italian press, and also held

a reception with over 100 guests held on the afternoon of the same day. Despite many

Italians politely declining Goad‟s invitation apart from former students and institute

staff, suggesting that many were unwilling to attend an Anglo-Italian gathering. Goad

also stated that he continued to frequent Rotary Club meetings, including a planned

visit to the Paris branch on November 27th

to meet a large gathering of British and

Italian Rotarians and discuss the present situation. The efforts of Goad to utilise

private relations to ease Anglo-Italian relations, in particular the attitude towards the

British Institute, were little more successful than the attempts of the Anglo-German

Fellowship. The Institute at Florence did once more see an increase in students from

the academic year 1936/37 onwards, however this can be attributed more to the

improvement in political relations between the two nations and the negotiations for

Anglo-Italian rapprochement which ultimately led to British recognition of Italy‟s

position in Abyssinia rather that the effect of maintaining friendly personal

relationships with individual Italians.

37

Educational Investments in France

Regarding central Europe, the British Council also held a vested interest in

utilising education as a means of cultural propaganda. The British Institute of Paris,

formed in 1894 by Edith Williams, began life as the Anglo-French Guild, before

developing into the British Institute in 1926, which became affiliated to the University

of Paris in 192869

. The Institute at Paris had a similar role to that based in Florence,

mainly educating students to a high level of English offering teaching diplomas as a

means to educate young French pupils in English as well as improving cultural

understanding between the two nations. The Institute catered for both British and

French students, with numbers increasing dramatically following its rebranding from

the „Anglo-French Guild‟ to the British Institute of Paris. For the academic year 1929-

30, the institute catered for 164 French and 74 British students, with 20 and 23 hours

of lectures respectively. This number had increased to 553 French and 222 British

students for the academic year 1936-37, with a further increase in students for the

following year, with 613 French and 256 British students at the school, amounting to

54 hours of lecture time for French students, and 60 allocated to British students70

.

The methods of education implemented by the Institute at Paris were similar in

nature to those used at Florence, such as the use of summer schools and exchange

programmes, the maintenance of a fully stocked library of British literature, and the

use of guest lecturers. The lectures at the Institute were of a similar nature to those

presented at the Institute in Florence and those presented to the Anglo-Egyptian

Union, for example guest lectures for the year 1934-1935 presented subjects such as

69 PRO, BW 31/4, British Institute in Paris: Report by Director, October 7th 1939 70 PRO, BW 31/2, Memorandum on the Need for a New Building, May 1938

38

The Place of the Civil Service in Britain, English Women in Politics, and What

National Government Means71

. The success of these lectures held both at the British

Institute and at the University of Paris attracted audiences of up to 800 people, and

their success was recognised by the British Council who in turn funded a scheme

whereby lecturers would proceed to other French Universities and provincial centres

after delivering two to three lectures in Paris itself.

Due to the relative proximity of the Institute of Paris to Britain when

compared to the Institute of Florence, the organisation of summer courses and guest

speakers was much more common, partly due to easier logistics and significantly

cheaper travel costs. For example, in contrast to the single summer school held in

London on behalf on the Institute at Florence, there were six courses available to

French students, designed specifically to combine a stay in the United Kingdom with

the study of a particular aspect of British culture. Four of the courses took place in

London, three of which covered the subjects of English language and literature with

the remaining course teaching practical dramatic production, with the final two

courses taking place in Cardiff and St Albans, encompassing a commercial course in

focusing upon English banking and commerce and educational and recreational

gymnastics respectively72

. However, despite the appointment of a director at the

Institute, the ultimate control of policy lay with the executive committee in London,

of which Lord Crewe was chairman. This allowed the focus upon higher education to

take a more overtly political role, as the Institute also cooperated with the War office

during 1939 by providing for British officers wishing to take the Interpreter‟s exam,

with candidates taking the course in the Autumn months as well as spending time

71 PRO, BW 31/2, List of Lectures Delivered at the British Institute in Paris 1934-35 72 PRO, BW 31/2, Holiday Courses in the British Isles Suitable for Foreign Students, 1938

39

serving with French military units73

. Despite this obvious preparation for the outbreak

of war, the report of the Director of the Institute of October 1939 focuses largely upon

the successes of the Institute in teaching both French and English to British and

French students respectively, and the number of former students working within the

French education system as a means of quantifying the work of the Institute. The

report states that using the French Census of 1938 showed that of amongst teachers of

English in French Schools, more than 600 were former students of the Institute at

Paris, and that highlighted the extent to which the Institute was able to influence the

French education system as well as stating that Interpreter courses for both French

and British Officers alike, and various „correspondence courses‟ highlighted that the

Institute was „an instrument of the first importance in strengthening and extending

cultural relations between England and France, not only in Paris, but also in the

Provinces in a wide and varied way‟74

. Despite the admitted focus upon higher

education, the report notes that the Institute had increasingly developed its activities

as a centre of cultural propaganda in France, and that these should be further

increased by increasing the opportunities for social contacts between English and

French people within the Institute, encouraging more popular British lecturers to visit

France, and by increasing the amount of elementary English instruction already

provided by the Institute. However, the report notes the negative effects of war upon

the Institute, highlighting the difficulties in enrolling British students during war time

and the economic impact a lack of students would create, estimating a potential loss

of up to £3,031. The headquarters of the British Institute at Paris were moved to

Reading University in October 1939, and continued its educational work, granting

four scholarships to British Students, one of whom hailed from Australia, however the

73 PRO, BW 31/4, British Institute in Paris: Report by the Director, October 7th 1939 74 PRO, BW31/4, British Institute in Paris: Report by the Director, October 7th 1939

40

main focus of the Institute during war time was in appealing to British students with

an interest in France, and providing English lessons to French nationals within

Britain, including members of the Free French Forces.

The Institute continued its educational work throughout war time, and in

abiding by the British Council charter attempted to concern itself with the spread of

ideas about Britain to foreign nationals, with Honorary Secretary Townroe stating that

as late as March 1941 the Institute was approached by Lord Cromer, Captain Bullock

and Oliver Harvey concerning „a plan of action to disseminate information about the

British point of view‟ concerning the war to French residents within Britain as well as

the Free French Colonies75

.

The work of the British Institute at Paris can be seen as a highly successful

endeavour due to the importance placed upon the employment of former students in

the French education system. This illustrates an approach to cultural propaganda by

Britain that not only sought to influence and educate those with intelligence but

desired to influence the views and opinions of former students so that when

embarking upon a career in education, a career which over 600 students did indeed

pursue, future generations would be influenced by the Institute via its former students.

As well as the British Institute in Paris, another key educational facility in the

region was the Paris British School. The school was founded in 1832, was

independently funded and free from control of the British Embassy in France, and

provided a British education for the children of former British soldiers who married

French wives following the cessation of the First World War. The aim of the school

during the 1930s was to educate the British children who would be second generation

75 PRO, BW 31/4, Letter from Townroe to Ifor Evans, March 20th 1941

41

French nationals, in particularly the „lower class‟ of British residents in Paris who

spoke only French at home and provided most of the pupils attending the school76

. In

December 1936 F B Stead compiled a report on the school stating that roughly half of

the 60 pupils present, ranging from the ages of 6-17, had studied previously in French

education, with five attending schools in England, one in Scotland, five more in other

countries and fourteen having never attended school before. In terms of the success of

pupils at the school, the report states that between nineteen students had taken the

British chamber of Commerce exam, with only one failure between 1933 and1936,

while in the subject of Shorthand, thirty-four of thirty-nine students successfully

completed examinations during the same period77

. Stead also asserts that there was a

steady demand for a school of this type in the area, which further suggests that the

school can be seen as a successful means of cultural propaganda, due to the high

number of students able to secure clerical and civil service jobs both in France and

Britain due to a combination of qualifications gained and bilingual abilities. The

reports of Stead and Noble Hall served to nullify the schools‟ minor standing in

comparison to the Institute at Paris, leading to the British Council providing a

recurring grant of £1000 in order to maintain operations78

following a memorandum

based on these reports produced by Henry Pelham, as well an additional grant of £408

in February 194079

. The increased funding of the school again highlights the

importance of education as a means of cultural propaganda, as large numbers of

students attained jobs in the civil service positions of both France and Britain, many

of whom had received an education that also offered positive views on Anglo-French

76 PRO, BW 31/15, M Noble Hall: Notes on Paris British School, December 14th 1938 77 PRO, BW 31/15, Report by F B Stead on Visit to Paris British School, December 1936 78 PRO, BW 31/15, British Council summary of Grants 1939-40, March 29th 1940 79 PRO, BW 31/15, Letter to Sellon, February 3rd 1940

42

relations and had reached a position in which it was possible to assert their personal

beliefs upon others within wider social and political structures.

43

Cultural Efforts in Germany

The focus of the British Council upon education as a means of cultural

propaganda can be seen as a key feature within the overall policy of British

propaganda during the 1930s; that of projecting a positive image of Britain and the

promotion of mutual understanding between Britain and other nations. However, there

were also alternative methods of improving cultural relations with European countries

with the intention of having a more immediate effect upon relations than the long-

term strategy of investing British values via educational facilities. For example, an

attempt to form greater bonds between Britain and German academics can be found

regarding Heidelberg University. The head of the English Department at the

University contacted the British Council stating that although Britain had the

available institutes to develop a greater cultural understanding of foreign countries,

the view of Britain in this manner was completely unsupported in Germany80

. A

lecture programme was designed to combat this; however there were substantial fears

amongst both the British Council and Foreign Office that a reciprocal course of

German lectures would need to be held in Britain. This would mean letting German

propaganda, widely recognised as being a state affair, penetrate Britain where it could

develop freely as there was „no such censorship to exercise a curbing effect‟ as there

would be facing British educational and cultural work within Germany81

. Despite the

difficulties in promoting Britain in Germany, lectures held at German Universities,

distribution of pro-British literature and the creation of essay writing competitions on

the subject of Britain, British influence in the educational sphere can be seen as

80 PRO, BW 32/1, Letter from Head of English at Heidelberg University to Bridge, 1937 81 PRO, BW 32/1, Letter from Phipps to Eden, February 7th 1936

44

negligible, and as such a near total failure in comparison to similar efforts in France,

Italy and the Middle East.

One such alternative strategy was to utilise private networks and independent

groups to maintain friendly relations with foreign individuals holding influential

positions. In Germany for instance, the long term strategy of influencing younger

generations would have been completely ineffective, as the Nazi party had a firm

grasp upon educational institutes, and exerted the utmost control over all aspects of

education ranging from control of the syllabus to the appointment of appropriate

teaching staff. Considering this, the prospect of improving relations and mutual

understanding between Britain and Germany stood a greater chance of success by

simply attempting to improve and maintain relationships between influential figures

of both nations. One such organisation dedicated to this task was the Anglo-German

Fellowship, founded in 1935 by the wealthy British merchant banker Ernest Tennant.

The Fellowship was a non-political organisation, declaring no official link with

British policies, and declared its aim as „promoting better understanding between

England and Germany in the hope of maintaining peace and prosperity in

Europe‟82

.The Fellowship was based upon an existing organisation in Germany, the

Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, whose members included many high ranking Nazi

Party Members such as General Ritter von Epp, Staatssekretӓr Walther Funk, and

Joachim von Ribbentrop as well as numerous Germany ministers and industrialists.

British members of the fellowship included Lord Mount Temple as Chairman and Sir

Raymond Beasley of the Foreign Office, and held an estimated total membership of

600 individuals and business ventures by October 1937, many of which were leading

82PRO, FO 511/3, Anglo-German Fellowship Information Sheet

45

British manufacturers including British Steel Ltd and Dunlop Rubber Company

Ltd83

.Despite the claims of the AGF to be a non-political organisation with a number

of high ranking figures involved, both British and German, the AGF proved to be

ultimately unsuccessful in its aims. This was partly due to British concerns over

German domestic and foreign politics, particularly the anti-Jewish activities that

culminated in the increased pogroms of 1938 culminating in Krystallnacht of

November 9th and 10th. As a result of these events Lord Mount Temple resigned

from his post as Chairman, stating in the times - „I think it most desirable that there

should be good feeling between the two nations, but I think all activities should wait

[for a better time]‟84

. By February of 1939 the AGF had run its course, with Herr

Schallies stating that it had been „a great disappointment to the Nazis as it was hoped

that it could exert great influence during periods of crisis‟, however as it had failed to

do that in September 1938, an indirect reference to the Czech crisis and subsequent

Munich Agreement, it would receive no more official assistance or funding within

Germany and was shunned by Hitler.

On a more traditionally cultural level, the London Philharmonic Orchestra

conducted by Sir Thomas Beecham performed a tour of Germany, performing in

Munich in December 1936. The report of this small tour states that „no effort was

spared by the Party or the government in Bavaria to ensure the success of the visit –

from a political rather than from a musical point of view‟. Beecham and his orchestra

not only performed on the evening of the 17th

, but were also invited to attend a dinner

held by the Lord of Munich on the 16th

and a luncheon held by the Prime Minister of

Bavaria in the afternoon of the 17th

. The concert itself seems to have been negatively

affected by the overtly political way in which the German authorities treated the visit,

83 PRO, FO 511/3, Anglo-German Fellowship: Self History 84 PRO, KV 5/3, Lord Mount Temple in The Times, November 19th 1938

46

with the report describing the atmosphere as „colder than usual at a Munich

concert…due to the fact that genuine music lovers were rather displaced by the

official guests who were there to further Anglo-German relations rather than listen to

the music‟85

. Beecham himself noted this ulterior motive, and in annex of the report it

is stated he felt „disgusted by the tour‟ and wished himself and the orchestra to be

regarded from a musical point of view rather than that in which it seemed they

„appeared that they were no more than objects of political propaganda and living

instances of “Anglo-German Relations”‟86

. This again suggests a failure to succeed in

dissemination cultural propaganda within Germany, as despite the visit being

organised by the British Council it was managed and orchestrated entirely by German

authorities in such a manner as to serve a beneficial political purpose for their own

political ends.

Thus, British efforts in penetrating Germany with cultural propaganda can be

viewed overall as an unsuccessful enterprise when considering both the ineffective

nature of British attempts to utilise education as a means of cultural influence, and the

manipulation of British efforts by Germany to serve the needs of the state, as was the

case with the Philharmonic tour of Munich in 1936. However, a memorandum

assessing advantages and disadvantages of using propaganda to „weaken the fighting

power of the German people‟ in the event of war highlighted the importance of

producing „truthful‟ propaganda in order to achieve success87

. The adoption of this

strategy following the Munich Crisis appeared to show signs of having a positive

effect in the German population. H D Tasker, a British businessman with factories

85 PRO, BW 63/1, Report on the London Philharmonic Orchestra in Munich, December 18th 1936 86 PRO, BW 63/1, Report on the London Philharmonic Orchestra in Munich, Annex, December 18th

1936 87 PRO, CAB 104/89, Memorandum on the Dissemination of Ideas Among the German People to

Weaken Their Fighting Power in War, September 19th, 1938

47

located in Berlin, contacted the British Council stating that his employees had „little

faith‟ in the German press, and that British news was desired by many despite the

anti-British stance forwarded in the state-ran press88

. Although this cannot be

interpreted as a means of cultural propaganda, the utilisation of the reputation of

Britain in honesty regarding news can be seen to represent a small success in the

overall strategy of propaganda in Germany. A cultural approach to Germany arguably

failed; however the use of „honest‟ news shows not only that the German public were

susceptible to British propaganda, but that British propaganda policy was flexible

when needed and could succeed in achieving penetration, albeit limited, in even the

most totalitarian of states.

88 PRO, FO 371/21791, Letter from H D Tasker to British Council, forwarded to Foreign Office

48

Fine Art, Film and the New York World Fair of 1939

As discussed in the previous two chapters, a large portion of British efforts in

the field of cultural propaganda involved utilising educational institutes to improve

cultural understanding of Britain abroad. The long term strategy was to create an

educated generation who would appreciate British culture and values, which would

then in pass this knowledge as positive view of Britain on to future generations via

teaching in the education systems of various countries. However, there were more

specific areas of focus placed upon projecting Britain abroad in a positive light by

celebrating achievements in culture and other aspects such as manufacturing and

engineering. The use of film can be seen as one such example of promoting British

achievements, while the promotion of British art was utilised to specifically represent

British cultural achievements on a global scale.

The possibilities of using film as a means of gaining publicity and promoting

Britain abroad were used throughout the 1920s, with discussions to form a Foreign

Office Film Unit taking place in 1920 with the intention of producing propaganda

films. Although the proposal did not become a reality, the DOT and the Foreign

Office recognised the importance of utilising film to promote British trade abroad,

despite having to rely on individual films produced by private companies to promote

British achievements in manufacturing and trade abroad89

. In the 1930s prior to the

formation of the British Council in 1934 the task of projecting Britain abroad fell to

the Travel Association and the DOT. By 1932, the Travel Association had created its

89 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, p.88

49

own film unit, producing a number of films for non-theatrical distribution to foreign

schools and societies as well as producing short documentary films concerning

various areas of Britain. In April 1936 the Joint Film Committee of the British

Council and the Travel Association was formed, chaired by Phillip Guedalla with

other members including the general manager of the British Film Institute Oliver Bell,

E L Mercier representing the DOT, Colonel Charles Bridge representing the British

Council, and John Grierson in joint capacity as Post Office Film Officer and Film

Advisor to the Travel Association90

.

At the fifth meeting of the Joint Committee, a report on film distribution was

discussed noting both funding from the British Council of £300 for the

Mediterranean, £500 for South America, and for Germany, Switzerland, Belgium,

Holland and the Baltic States £400 to aid the task. Also the various successes and

difficulties faced in certain regions concerning the distribution of British films were

extensively listed. The report stated difficulties concerning distribution of films with

Palestine, however cited success in other ongoing negotiations to obtain theatrical

release of British films in Egypt and in South America. With regard to the distribution

of film in Europe, the meeting noted particularly the success met in Hungary where

the Ministry of Education took films for display in schools, and the positive reception

of the coronation film sent to the British Mission at Warsaw. The Committee agreed

to use the newly available funds not only to aid distribution in the afore mentioned

areas, but to make films available to special requests world wide, citing the positive

reception of the coronation film in Tokyo as precedent for this strategy91

.

However, the internal relationship between the DOT, Travel Association and

British Council was often turbulent, with each department favouring the production

90 P Swann, The British Documentary Film Movement 1926-1946, p.131 91 PRO, BW 2/35, Joint Committee on Films Minutes of Fifth Meeting, October 1st 1937

50

and release of films that reflected their own interests making it difficult for the

Committee to agree on suitable content of films. A report produced by Croom-

Johnson to the Secretary of the British Council highlights these difficulties as they

arose at a showing of films at the GPO Film Unit in November 1937. Croom-Johnson

states that most members of the Committee seemed „engineering minded‟, and likes to

see „an impressive piece of machinery at the end of a film and did not seem to take

account of other forms of British culture‟. Croom-Johnson concluded by highlighting

two major criticisms of the Committee. Firstly, the attitude of the DOT carried too

much weight, citing their insistence to include the sentence „all machines shown in

this film were manufactured in Great Britain‟ at the end of the film British Steel;

raising the possibility the Committee would simply appear a smoke screen for British

trade penetration. Secondly, he gloomily concluded that the Committee was „apt to

underestimate the mentality of foreign film audiences‟, and that in „playing down‟ to

lower class film audiences the sympathy and interest of the intelligent anglophile

students and newspaper readers that should also form the target audience would be

lost, as well as failing to gain the interest of the unintelligent and unimportant

viewer92

.

Despite these internal disputes the Committee distributed films to 23 countries

in Europe, the Middle East, Far East and South America at a cost of £1178 between

April 1st and November 30

th 1937

93, and received further funding from the British

Council of £1200 for the year 1937/38. The continued investment in the Committee

suggests that the importance of film was recognised as been a highly important

method of nation projection, while the high number of films distributed between April

92 PRO, BW 2/35, Report on Showing of Films at GPO Film Unit by Croom-Johnson, November 15th

1937 93 PRO, BW 2/35, Joint Committee on Films Distribution and Expenditure April 1st-November 30th ,

December 1937

51

and November 1930 leads one to the conclusion that the Joint Committee was

succeeding in utilising film as a means of cultural propaganda far better than it had

been under the control of the Travel Association between 1932 and the formation of

the Committee in April 1936.

The work of the Joint Committee in distributing films abroad continued along

the same successful lines well into 1938, with a detailed report of film distribution

produced in May 1938 highlighting the global reach of film as a means of publicising

Britain abroad. In Europe alone the cinematic release of British films provided by the

Travel Association was achieved in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,

Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Films distributed under the auspice of the Joint

Committee achieved cinematic release in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia and

Yugoslavia, while both the Joint Committee and the Travel Association provided film

for non-theatrical shows in the above mentioned countries as well as in Poland,

Germany, Holland, and Italy. In the Mediterranean and Middle East cinematic release

of British films was achieved in Albania, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Malta, Palestine, the

Sudan and Syria, and Turkey while non theatrical showings also took place in

Morocco and Gibraltar. Regarding South America, Mexico and Cuba, the report states

that four films adapted for theatrical distribution with Portuguese and Spanish

subtitles were significantly more popular than those with English commentaries and

localised subtitles. With this in mind it was decided that these films would be

distributed direct from London to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, Mexico

and Cuba. The final section of the report focused upon the distribution and release of

films in the Far East and foreign Possessions. Japan, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies

saw the cinematic release of British films, while the Institute for Research in English

Teaching at Tokyo also received films, while the Chinese University at Shantung

52

received a copy of So This is Lancashire which was aired to an audience of 250

students of the University94

.

The scale of the Joint Committee on Films‟ production and distribution

between its formation in 1936 and mid-1938 can be judged as success in terms of

projecting British life, culture, and achievements to a global audience both in cinemas

across the world and also in private settings, such as clubs and associations such as

the Anglo-Danish Society and the English Club based at Gablonz in Czechoslovakia,

and educational facilities of all ranges. However, the success can only be viewed as

limited due to the inability of British films to penetrate into the markets within the

dictator countries; Germany, Italy and to a lesser degree Franco‟s Spain. The

possibilities of airing British films in Italy was hindered by the hostile nature of

Anglo-Italian relations following the Abyssinian Crisis, while negotiations in Spain

only entailed the possibility of viewing in Nationalist held areas. However, the only

stumbling block concerning the display of these films in Germany was a dispute over

patent rights, however this was rectified in part by the release of a film made by

Doring Film-Werke of Berlin with the cooperation of the TIDA film Unit in 1935,

which was edited into a series of smaller films that remained broadcast throughout

1937 and early 193895

.

1939 presented an ideal opportunity to utilise film for the purposes of cultural

propaganda on an international level in the form of the New York Worlds Fair. The

theme of the fair was „Building the World of Tomorrow‟, and allowed for Britain to

launch a policy of projecting Britain in the United States for the first time96

. The

94 PRO, BW 2/35, Joint Committee Report on Film Distribution, May 1938 95 PRO, BW 2/35, Joint Committee Report on Film Distribution, May 1938 96 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

p.117

53

decision of the British government to participate in the fair was made in May 1937,

with the entry designed to

Foster friendship and goodwill between the United Kingdom and the USA by

showing as much as we can of these Islands and the Empire; our adaptability

to a changing world and the non-rigid character of our Empire-Commonwealth

partnership; in short, to present the greatness of our life and country with

dignity and charm, and thus to enable to millions of Americans who will visit

the fair to know and appreciate us and in due course to visit us‟97

.

The Joint Films Committee cooperated with the DOT to produce film material for the

World Fair, with the Post Office also producing several documentary films including

Spare Parts and British Made, as well as the five British run newsreel companies

producing a series of special editions ran on a five week rotation in alphabetical order.

The newsreels were a popular exhibition during the first season of the World Fair, and

increased further in popularity when the second season opened in 1940 due to the fact

that the British newsreels were often more up to date concerning events unfolding in

Europe than those produced in America98

. British Made focused specifically on the

work of the skilled craftsman within Britain, taking the viewer on a historical journey

from the Chippendale woodcraft of the mid-eighteenth century, through the

development of an industrial boom to the great depression following the Wall Street

crash of 1929, finally arriving at the present with the imminent threat of war99

. The

emphasis throughout the film was the importance of traditional craft being practiced

along side the growth of modern industry, and the strength of which both old and new

techniques would give the rising British generation100

. The total investment regarding

British Made had reached £944 upon completion in August 1939, significantly greater

than the estimates of June which amounted to £192 in addition to the £500 already

97 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

p.117 98 P Swann, The British Documentary Film Movement 1926-1946, p.141 99 PRO, INF 5/62, Draft Commentary for the film British Made 100 PRO, INF 5/62, British Made Commentary Extract

54

invested in filming and editing to this point. The film Spare Parts also received a

great deal of investment, with the total for filming and production arriving at £866101

.

This combined expenditure of £1810 serves to show just how significant an

opportunity the World Fair was in the British policy of national projection on a global

scale. The investment placed upon the entries for British film at the Fair proved a

worthwhile one, with Taylor describing the official British entry as a „triumph for the

projection of England‟, stating that within two weeks of the formal opening, almost

eight million people had visited the site with over half of those entering the British

pavilion. A film of the coronation was one of the most popular British exhibits, and

following a royal visit in June 1939 popularity increased to an even greater level with

an estimated two thousand people passing through the cinema within the British

pavilion per day102

.

Film was not the only means of cultural propaganda utilised by Britain at the

New York World Fair. Both fine art and orchestral music performances were also

presented alongside films and historical exhibitions such as the Magna Carta in an

attempt to showcase British cultural history and achievement. This was not the first

instance of Britain exhibiting art at an international exhibition as a method of

showcasing cultural achievements. Prior to the creation of the Board of Trade

Exhibitions branch in 1912, British involvement in overseas exhibitions was the

responsibility of various Royal Commissions appointed specifically to handle an

individual exhibition. The DOT assumed control of British representation at foreign

exhibitions in 1918; however participation was limited due to the lack of regular sums

to fund such activities in national projection. Despite this, participation at the 1922

101 PRO, INF 5/62, Letter to Primrose, February 26th 1940 102 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

p.119

55

Brazilian Centenary Exhibition and the Paris Decorative Arts Exhibition of 1925 were

deemed as highly successful ventures103

.

The precedent for art exhibitions in the era of the British Council was set in

1937 at the Exposition Internationale de Paris 1937 – Arts et techniqués dans la vie

Moderne, which ran between April and October. The DOT, in cooperation with the

Council of Art and Industry and the Board of Trade, erected and filled a pavilion with

objects of Industrial Art connected with British life such as art in dress such as sport

and games, art connected with travel, and art depicting individual rooms within a

house104

. The Fine Arts Committee of the British Council was represented by six

artists hastily assembled following a plea to Lady Chamberlain from monsieur

Dézzarrois, who had contacted the Bureau of British Women Workers but had

received no reply, meaning as such Britain would have been the only country invited

to not be represented in the field of Fine Arts. As the works of only six artists were

required, Lady Chamberlain contacted Longden who made the necessary

arrangements instantly via telephone and secured the work of Ethel Walker, Vanessa

Bell, Beatrice Bland, Dame Laura Knight, Anna Zinkeisen and Mrs Campbell

Dodgson for loan and display at the exhibition105

.

Fortunately, there was no repeat of the Paris debacle concerning preparations

to include an array of Fine Arts for exhibition at the New York World Fair. As early

as February 1938 preparations began to include Fine Arts at New York, in particular

the contingency that should the British pavilion prove too small to locate an Art

exhibition, Britain should be represented at either New York or the golden Gate

103 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

pp.91-92 104 PRO, BW 31/20, Letter from A Longden to Major J L Wickham, April 22nd 1936 105 PRO, BW 31/20, Letter from the Fine Arts Committee to DOT Secretary General

56

Exposition in San Francisco106

. The pavilion did indeed house a moderate gallery,

including a collection of classic and modern plate, while also providing British works

in sculpture such as Recumbent Figure by Henry Moore and Pax by Frank Dobson, as

well as an exhibit of modern British architecture donated by the Royal Institute of

British Architects. A letter from Louis Beale to Major Wickham noted that the British

pavilion opened with every exhibit completed with an „enormous crowd‟ estimated at

nearly 200,000 stating everyone appeared to be „extremely pleased with what we have

shown‟ on the opening day107

. Of the artistic exhibits present in the British pavilion,

one of the largest was the Exhibition of Contemporary British Art which consisted of

thirteen pieces by seven artists including watercolours by Vivian Pitchforth, John

Nash, Augustus John, Edward Burra and Edward Ardizzone. John‟s work in chalk

drawing and pen-and-wash drawing were also present, as well as sketches by Sir

Muirhead Bone and Henry Moore108

. Despite the number of artists represented at the

exhibit within the pavilion, the FACBC was inundated with applications from British

artists who desired their work to be exhibited at the World Fair. Throughout February

and March of 1939 the FACBC replied to letters from artists and owners volunteering

works for exhibit. Amongst those rejected for exhibition at the World Fair were the

piece Highland Cattle by J D Adams as it was not eligible for display as only

contemporary British art was being represented, with as a series of 85 miniatures of

Royals created in 1911 by Charles Turrell on the same grounds. Pieces by the artists

Frances Drummond and Vera Temple were also turned down due to the fact that the

exhibition was already complete, as well as the sculpture Serenitas in Rebus by A

106 PRO, BW 63/21, Draft Letter from Hudson to Lloyd, February 8th 1938 107 PRO, BW 63/21, Letter From L Beale to Major J L Wickham, May 2nd 1939 108 PRO, BW 63/21, Catalogue of the Exhibition of Contemporary British Art Organised by the British

Council, British Pavilion, New York World Fair, 1939

57

Bertram Pegram109

. The representation of Fine Art at the British pavilion at the World

Fair indicates that the projection of contemporary British cultural achievements was

recognised as a future avenue for the direction of cultural propaganda, and one which

could be used along side historical British achievements to represent the continuation

of British values. The interest within Britain sparked by the inclusion of an artistic

exhibit within the British pavilion suggests that the World Fair offered not only an

opportunity to project Britain abroad, but also allowed the possibility that the positive

impact of the World Fair within Britain would encourage and inspire a future

generation to become involved in art, and continue to produce work representative of

Britain‟s strong cultural heritage.

Finally, British cultural achievements in the field of music were highlighted at

the New York World Fair in a series of concerts featuring the Philharmonic

Symphony Orchestra. The two concerts performed by the orchestra were arranged by

the British Council to take place during „British Week‟ of the World Fair with Sir

Adrian Boult, Musical Director of the BBC, conducting. The premiere at Carnegie

Hall featured Arnold Bax‟s Seventh Symphony, a piece commissioned by the British

Council especially for the event of the concerts at the World Fair. Despite the obvious

aim of showcasing British musical achievements, the only other all-British work of

the evening was an oboe concerto composed by Eugene Goossen, which performed as

a duet for oboe and piano, played by his Brother Leon as somewhat of a novelty for

the audience110

.

The British concerts in New York received a great deal of coverage in the

press, with Musical America stating that the concerts at the Carnegie hall brought a

109 PRO, BW 63/21, Various Letters from the Fine Arts Committee to Artists between February7th and

March 7th 1939 110 PRO, BW 63/10, New York Herald Clipping, June 10th 1939

58

„thrilling climax‟ to the musical festival in connection with the World Fair. The article

also states that the function of the British Council was to „make the life and thought of

the British peoples more widely known abroad, and to promote an interchange of

knowledge and ideas with other peoples‟, and proclaims that the newly composed

symphony by Sir Arnold Bax is an admirable means to that end. The final two pieces

commissioned for the worlds fair by Bliss and Williams premiered at the second

concert, and were equally as well received at the work of Bax, with the article

declaring that the concerto composed by Bliss was „one of the most important works

composed since the turn of the century‟, stating the concert was played with „life and

fire and lusciousness of tone‟ under Boult that all elements converged to create a

performance of absorbing interest111

. The New York World-Telegram also highly

praised the music performed bearing the headline „Last British Concert Acclaimed‟.

The article particularly praised the inclusion of music from nations other than Britain,

and reported that upon the final performance of final concert on June 10th

the large

audience „rendered the composer and soloist with a thunderous ovation‟112

. The New

York Times also noted the inclusion of American music, while the New York Sun also

noted the enthusiasm of applause given by the audience and its large size113

, as did the

New York Journal stating Carnegie Hall had filled to capacity for the show114

. Despite

the attitude of the press suggesting the concerts were a total success, the Brooklyn

Eagle noted that the „sultry atmosphere inside the hall did not make for the best

instrumental efficiency, while the audience sweltered‟, and criticised the performance

111 PRO, BW 63/10, Musical America, pp.1,2-4, June 1939 112 PRO, BW 63/10, New York World-Telegram, June 12th 1939 113 PRO, BW 63/10, New York Sun, June 10th 1939 114 PRO, BW 63/10, New York Journal, June 10th 1939

59

of Debussy‟s Afternoon of a Faun for lacking quality, despite judging the concert as a

whole to be „good‟115

.

In terms of bringing British cultural achievements to an international audience,

the World Fair of 1939 can be deemed as a successful venture on behalf of the British

Council and its affiliated organisations. The British entry also showed that

cooperation between rival organisations vying to represent Britain abroad could be

achieved, with the Travel Association, DOT and British Council working successfully

together to produce a variety of films representing British life as well as documentary

films showcasing British industrial methods and achievements. Taylor also concludes

that in terms of sheer numbers of people reached the British contribution to the World

Fair was a triumph, but also notes that it was an „uncharacteristic performance‟ as

British propaganda was not as coordinated or politically important as it was in the

totalitarian nations116

. However the British entry was well organised and coordinated

with all exhibits present serving to present Britain in a similar manner, somewhat of a

rarity in the 1930s considering the variety of associations involved with the projection

of Britain and the lack of an overarching department coordinating all efforts in

propaganda towards the same ends. The World Fair can also be seen to have stirred

interest within Britain. This indicates that British cultural propaganda not only served

to projection Britain in a positive light abroad, but also had succeeded in securing „as

firm a hold as possible on the minds and interests of the population‟117

, an important

political role of cultural propaganda both home and abroad. Finally, although the

amount of pro-British sentiment created by British involvement in the World Fair is

impossible to measure, the effect may have been a strong consideration in the

115 PRO, BW 63/10, Brooklyn Eagle, June 10th 1939 116 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939 117 Ibid. pp.123-124

60

development of American sympathies towards Britain at a time when the spectre of a

European conflict loomed large. As such, this pro-British sentiment cannot be ruled

out as a major factor in the decision of America to participate in the European conflict

rather than simply focusing war efforts on the threat of Japan.

61

Conclusion

The methods of cultural propaganda discussed in this paper are not

representative of the entire British policy regarding propaganda. However cultural

propaganda was without doubt a key component of the overall system producing

propaganda, and intrinsically linked commercial propaganda with that of fostering a

positive national image when faced with the prospect of a European conflict involving

the dictator nations. Cultural propaganda, and indeed all British propaganda, can also

be considered a key aspect of British foreign policy during the period despite the

limitations caused by the sceptical attitude of the government. Propaganda served to

reinforce a hold on an empire which had been considered by some to be a paper tiger

since the 1910s, an indeed this image was used to support aggressive German policies

under Bismark before the end of the nineteenth century118

.

However, it can be difficult to judge the success of propaganda in altering

perceptions and improving international relations. Official reports composed by

Foreign Office and British Council officials stationed in areas where cultural

propaganda was focused can provide a rough assessment of influence gained or lost

due to certain activities. Equally, correspondence from foreign nationals and civilians

living in countries can provide an idea of how Britain was perceived abroad by

drawing upon their own personal encounters. Effectively judging the extent of

influence created by certain types of propaganda has been an issue encountered by

previous scholars within the field. In her study of the BBC and home front

propaganda, Nichols concludes that were it not for the BBC‟s wartime broadcasts „the

118 J L Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, p.77

62

civilian populations understanding of what it should do and what it might expect

would have been seriously undermined‟. But beyond that it would be hard to state

with any certainty how influential wartime propaganda actually was. Nichols also

notes that it is also impossible to quantify the effects of the broadcasts on the morale

of the population, and that even with the benefit of the Morale Charts produced by the

MOI, it is only possible to conclude that morale rose and fell with the perception of

military success or failure119

. Similarly, regarding the New York World Fair in 1939,

Taylor notes that while British propaganda utilised this event to reach out to millions

of Americans to promote British values and culture, it is impossible to estimate just

how much pro-British sentiment was created by this120

, and in turn how great a factor

propaganda was in gaining American support in the European conflict of World War

Two. Finally, the success of cultural propaganda can also be hard to judge in relation

to wider international events and political relations. For example, the imposition of

sanctions upon Italy by the LON following the Abyssinian Crisis had a negative

impact upon the work of the British Institute at Florence as discussed in chapter two.

However, does the resulting decrease in popularity reflect a failure on behalf of

British efforts in Italy, or can it be argued that a reduction in students for the academic

year 1936-1937 was merely a reaction to the removal of English as a subject taught in

Italian schools? The latter would suggest that a decline in students was a pragmatic

response to the immediate situation; mainly that students would study German or

French as this subject provided a greater chance of gaining employment as a teacher

when the future of English subjects in Italian schools appeared hopeless. As such, it

would be unwise to state that British efforts in the field of cultural propaganda in Italy

119 S Nichols, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-1945, p.271 120 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939,

p.119

63

were unsuccessful without considering the wider context of Anglo-Italian relations in

the immediate post-Abyssinian period.

Bearing in mind the difficulties in assessing the success of propaganda, in

particular the methods of cultural propaganda discussed above, the question of how

effective British efforts were and what, if any, methods proved more fruitful than

others, is a complicated one. With regard to cultural efforts in the Near and Middle

East, the main subject of this paper focuses upon the role of education as a medium of

propaganda. There are two main criteria available to the historian attempting to gauge

the success of this approach to improving cultural relations. The first would be to

consider the number of students attending British-run institutes in the region at this

time and the increase in numbers throughout the period. The second approach to

judging the success of propaganda in the region would be to consider the range of

British influence in terms of numbers of schools in various countries, utilising figures

relating to the distribution of education aids such as films, and the allocation funding

to institutes across the region. With regard to the first point, the number of students

who received a British education in Egypt suggests that the expansion of institutes‟ in

the region after 1936 led to a drastic rise in local students with the total number of

students increasing by 10% between 1936 and 1937. The number of native teachers

who had received a British education also rose during the same period, suggesting that

the long term strategy of educating future generations via those with pro-British

values had began to prove fruitful within the decade.

While this suggests that the use of education as a means of cultural

propaganda was successful in Egypt, the same cannot be said for the entirety of the

Middle East. On April 1st 1941 a nationalist coup took place in Iraq. Known as the

64

Golden Square coup, the uprising against the pro-British government of Abd al-llah

and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said was led by pro-German members of the army and

cabinet. The revolt was supported and partly funded by the Nazi regime121

, and

replaced Nuri as Prime Minister with Rashid Ali with the intention of gaining full

Iraqi independence. The Golden Square Coup can be seen to highlight both the

success and failings of British propaganda in the area. On the one hand, Britain had

ensured good relations with Iraq throughout the interwar years, and had an ally in the

Middle East in the pro-British government of Suri. Conversely, the opportunity for

revolution was seized during the war, and suggests that propaganda had been

unsuccessful in creating an overall pro-British opinion. This can be seen in particular

with regard to the military hierarchy of Iraq, with many high-ranking figures

participating in the uprising, which was eventually quelled by British forces leading to

occupation which continued until 1947.

Similarly, the use of education as a means of cultural propaganda in central

Europe can be classified as a generally successful undertaking. Rather than attempting

to set up British-run schools, education policy in Europe focused on the use of the

British Institutes to increase the understanding of British literature and the cultural

values that it represtented. The study above focuses upon the Institutes located at

Florence and Paris, and both can be seen to have been successful in terms of having

educated a generation of scholars and educators with sympathetic views to Britain.

The Institute at Florence regularly received over 200 full time students per year, while

the number of full time French students of English at the Paris centre increased from

164 in 1929-30 to 613 for the year 1937-38. The methods used to increase an

121 D Patterson, A Genealogy of Evil: Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad, p.114

65

understanding not only included English education for students, but also a variety of

guest lecturers on a variety of subjects based on British society and history as well as

the organisation of numerous summer schools and visits to Britain for both Italian and

French students.

While the Institutes can be seen to have reached many students within France

and Italy, the extent to which we can attribute any signs of success of this type of

propaganda can again be questioned in relation to international events. The negative

reaction within Italy to the Abyssinian crisis and the resultant imposition of economic

sanctions highlights the futility of British efforts when in direct contest against the

will of Mussolini and the Fascist party. Despite the popularity of the Institute amongst

students, English was removed from the curriculum due to Britain‟s involvement with

the League of Nations, and as such the number of students fell enormously in the

following academic year. The institute was to recover its prestige following the

completion of the Gentlemen‟s Agreement in 1938, however the fortune of the

Institute and its relation to wider international politics cannot be ignored. In short, in

can be argued that the Institute at Florence flourished when Anglo-Italian relations

were amicable, while also suffering when relations were hostile with Britain and Italy

in direct disagreement over major issues such as acceptable behaviours in pursing an

expansionist foreign policy. During wartime, the cultural propaganda conducted in

Italy pre-1939 can be seen to have had greater success than that in the Middle East,

particularly that in Iraq. Italian conduct during the Second World War would suggest

that the majority of Italians did not „dislike‟ Britain, a point supported by the

relatively gentlemanly conduct of Italian actions in North Africa. Although it is

impossible to state that this was a direct product of British propaganda activities, it

does suggest that cultural propaganda may well have been successful in instilling to

66

some degree a pro-British mindset within the Italian public, one which transcended

international events. This is highlighted in the case of the Italian resistance movement

immediately following Italian surrender to allied forces, as well as the example of the

instant response of the co-belligerent army and air force in combat against German

forces.

With regard to the use of film to reach a global audience, and art as a means of

showcasing the cultural achievements of Britain, British work in this area can be seen

as a relatively successful undertaking. The development of film as a means of cultural

propaganda accelerated drastically throughout the late 1930s, and can be considered a

successful venture in projecting a positive image of Britain across the world.

Distribution of British film in every continent expanded greatly upon the work of the

Travel Association undertaken in the 1920s and early 1930s designed to increased

tourism by increasing levels of commercial propaganda, and those produced by the

DOT intended to boost British manufacturing in foreign countries. The culmination of

the work of the British Council, Travel Association and DOT regarding film can be

seen as the World Fair of 1939. The significance of British participation in the event

was twofold; firstly it offered the British Council the opportunity to operate in

America, and secondly it also enabled Britain to showcase cultural achievements and

aims for the future to a mass audience consisting of not only the American public, but

also representatives from all countries present at the Fair.

Foreign Exhibits of British arts were handled by specially appointed Royal

Commissions prior to 1918, and then subsequently by the DOT between 1918 and

1936, where upon its creation the British council assumed a leading role in

participation in foreign exhibitions. The 1937 Exposition Internationale de Paris was

67

the first attempt by the British Council to arrange participation in an international

exhibition, and was rushed in preparation with works chosen hastily at very short

notice. However, the participation of Britain at the New York World Fair can be seen

as a significant improvement in the preparation and planning for the event, as well as

showcasing a wider variety of British cultural works.

British cultural propaganda under the direction of the British Council can be

considered a success in several areas. Regarding educational strategies as a method of

improving foreign opinions of Britain, the work in Italy, France and Egypt can be

seen as successful due to the number of students participating in British run courses.

This adapted into a long term key strategy of ensuring teachers and scholars with pro-

British sentiments emerged that would, in turn, educate future generations with these

values. Thus, the importance of foreign youth to the future of British prestige abroad

was recognised, and tackled on a large scale met with an overall success, as was the

increase in production and distribution of British films designed to educate on the

subject of Britain and improve understanding of its history and culture.

However to consider the cultural propaganda methods utilised by Britain in

the period to be an overwhelming success would be ignoring several key areas in

which British efforts can be seen to have made little or no impact. The most obvious

example of the failure of British cultural propaganda to influence a foreign society

can be seen in Germany. This was not due to lack of effort on the part of Britain, but

rather due to the totalitarian nature of the Nazi state which held full control over

educational and cultural institutes as well as having a single, dedicated propaganda

ministry. In comparison to the well-oiled machinery of the Nazi state, attempts to

disseminate propaganda within Germany were met with failure, despite ventures such

as the AGF. The only success evident within Germany in terms of propaganda during

68

this period was the popularity of British news, as many within Germany were acutely

aware of the propagandist nature of the German press and as such the manipulation of

news which continued to be so into the Second World War. The BBC was popular

amongst many nationalities both within the Axis and occupied countries of Europe.

This trust in the BBC can be interpreted as a result of peoples desire to find an escape

from occupying influences, however it can also be seen as a subtle reflection of

British cultural propaganda efforts throughout the 1930s. The trust in British news can

clearly be seen to reflect positively upon British desires to provide truthful, fact-based

propaganda, and thus highlights the success in propaganda policy developed

throughout the interwar years. It could also be concluded that the success of the BBC

was not due to creating a positive image of Britain within Germany, but rather in

influencing opinion and highlighting the undesirable aspects of Nazi rule, such as the

obvious censure of the news and press. This can be seen as the foundations of radio as

a means of wartime propaganda with the intentions of both offering a boost for morale

and gaining civilian support in occupied Europe, but also to undermine the authority

and influence of the Axis.

Overall it is difficult to gauge the success of British cultural propaganda

during this period. There can be strong arguments made to highlight both successes

and failures in various areas, and also that certain approaches to improving cultural

relations were better received than others. However, the work of the British Council

in the field of cultural propaganda can clearly be defined as groundbreaking and

ahead of its time, while the continuation of the organisations activity to the present

day would further suggest the importance of cultural relations in the modern era.

Despite the closure of many of its European and Middle Eastern offices during the

69

Second World War, the Council continued its work based from within Britain offering

educational services to refugees and servicemen alike. Following the Second World

War, the Council continued its work on a much smaller scale, partly due to a decline

in funding by the Foreign Office as well as a series of reports which concluded post-

war intelligence needs would be organised and conducted solely by the Secret

Intelligence Service122

. Despite losing its prominent role at the head of cultural

relations, and the resultant funding cuts, the British council has continued to serve as

an independent organisation focusing upon international teaching and „cultural

opportunities‟. In comparison to existing works focusing upon British inter-war

propaganda as a whole, this paper can be seen as providing a focus upon the less

explored means of „cultural‟ propaganda by highlighting the comparatively subtle and

everyday forms of influence such as education, film, and art as opposed to the more

overt and popular perception of propaganda such as posters and other highly patriotic

forms. In doing so, this paper can be seen to aid the study of British inter-war

propaganda by providing a concise and in depth study into the role of one of the key

players of inter-war propaganda in the British Council, and the various mediums

utilised which, under many circumstances, would not be termed propaganda in the

modern sense.

As of 2007 the Council operated 70 centres in 53 countries, offering

examinations in English to over one million candidates per annum, with the Middle

Eastern region participating in 53 collaborative projects with British schools123

. With

offices in Afghanistan, Israel and Iraq, the British Council can be seen to remain a

fixture in British cultural relations in troubled areas. During a period in which Britain

122 www.britishcouncil.org/about/timeline, 2012 123 Ibid.

70

is again perceived negatively in many regions, the importance of the Council in

building and maintaining cultural relations can be directly compared to that attributed

to the organisation from its creation in 1934 to the outbreak of war in 1939. A

comparison between the two periods could be made in terms of the number of

institutes ran by the British Council, as well as the number of foreign nationals

attending British Council courses.

But despite these successes, a major diplomatic controversy surrounded

British Council operations in Russia during 2007, leading to closure in 2008 amidst

accusations of illegal operation and tax evasion. Russian foreign minister Sergei

Lavrov defended the closure of two offices outside Moscow, stating it was not an

anti-British action but one completely justified by Russian law while also admitting it

was retaliation for the expulsion of Russian diplomats from London in July allegedly

involved in the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko124

. British Council activities have

also been further limited by the closure of branches in Europe designed to allow for a

„huge increase in activities based in the Middle East and Muslim world‟. Cathy

Stephens, the acting director of the Council during this period, stated „the new

strategy will not only prove beneficial to Britain's long-term security and prosperity

but perfectly upholds the council's mission of 'increasing appreciation of the UK's

ideas and achievements overseas'. However criticism arose from many, including

Charles Arnold-Baker, author of The Companion to British History, who feels that the

concept is misguided and will simply alienate British friends in Europe125

.

It would be unwise to directly compare the current role of the institute to that

of the 1930s, as its role can be seen to have changed from that of a vessel of cultural

124 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/13/russia.lukeharding, 125 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/05/helenasmith.theobserver

71

propaganda to one dedicated to learning and education. Despite the difference in core

purpose of the Council, its continued existence and operation serves to highlight the

relationship between culture, politics and economics on an international scale, as well

as ensuring the value of cultural understanding is not neglected in modern society.

While the future of Council activities in Europe may seem uncertain, expansion in the

Middle East ensures that the activities of the British Council will continue for the

foreseeable future. In an age where extremism and terrorism prove a real threat to

British security, cultural propaganda can be seen as a realistic defence mechanism. In

hoping to create a generation with pro-British sympathies via education and the

promotion of cultural understanding, the British Council will again play a large role in

British foreign policy similar to that of its heyday in the 1930s.

72

Bibliography

Public Records Office

BW 2/35 - Joint Committee on Films Minutes 1936-1938

BW 2/84 - Foreign Propaganda

BW 4/26 - Film Series, 1938

BW 29/3 - British Council Egypt and UAR Education 1935-37

BW 29/4 - British Council Egypt and UAR Education 1938

BW 29/5 - British Council Egypt and UAR Education 1939

BW 31/2 - France, British Institute in Paris 1935-37

BW 31/4 - France British Institute in Paris 1938-39

BW 31/15 - The Paris British School 1938-46

BW 31/20 - Fine Art Exhibitions General1936-46

BW 32/1 - Germany, Cultural Propaganda 1935-38

BW 40/2 - Italy, British Institute at Florence 1934-37

BW 40/3 - Italy, British Institute at Florence 1937-38

BW 63/1 - USA, British Council Films 1938

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KV 5/3 - Security Service Files, Anglo-German Fellowship

PREM 1/276 - Relations With Italy, De-jure Recognition, Gentleman‟s

Agreement

74

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