TBI_Cover_1.psd

About the CCRPThe Command and Control Research Program(CCRP) has the mission of improving DoD’sunderstanding of the national security implications ofthe Information Age. Focusing upon improving boththe state of the art and the state of the practice ofcommand and control, the CCRP helps DoD take fulladvantage of the opportunities afforded by emergingtechnologies. The CCRP pursues a broad programof research and analysis in information superiority,information operations, command and controltheory, and associated operational concepts thatenable us to leverage shared awareness to improvethe effectiveness and efficiency of assignedmissions. An important aspect of the CCRP programis its ability to serve as a bridge between theoperational, technical, analytical, and educationalcommunities. The CCRP provides leadership for thecommand and control research community by:

• articulating critical research issues;• working to strengthen command and control

research infrastructure;• sponsoring a series of workshops and

symposia;• serving as a clearing house for command and

control related research funding; and• disseminating outreach initiatives that include

the CCRP Publication Series.

This is a continuation in the series of publicationsproduced by the Center for Advanced Concepts andTechnology (ACT), which was created as a “skunkworks” with funding provided by the CCRP under theauspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(C3I). This program has demonstrated theimportance of having a research program focusedon the national security implications of theInformation Age. It develops the theoreticalfoundations to provide DoD with informationsuperiority and highlights the importance of activeoutreach and dissemination initiatives designed toacquaint senior military personnel and civilians withthese emerging issues. The CCRP PublicationSeries is a key element of this effort.

Check our Web site for the latest CCRP activities and publications.

www.dodccrp.org

DoD Command and Control Research ProgramASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)

&CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

Mr. John P. Stenbit

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)Dr. Linton Wells, II

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASD(C3I)&

DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Dr. David S. Alberts

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied withinare solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent theviews of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Governmentagency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted withoutfurther permission, with credit to the DoD Command and ControlResearch Program, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviewswould be appreciated.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Big Issue : Command and Combat in the Information Age (A Viewfrom Upavon) / edited by David Potts.

p. cm.ISBN 1-893723-10-0 (pbk.)1. Great Britain. Army. 2. Military doctrine--Great Britain. 3. Operationalart (Military science) 4. Military art and science--Great Britain. 5. Information warfare. 6. Command and control systems--Great Britain.I. Potts, David. II. Title.

UA649.B49 2003355.02--dc21

2003000263

February 2003

THE BIG ISSUE: COMMAND AND COMBAT

IN THE INFORMATION AGE

EDITED BY

DAVID POTTS

I n f o r m a t i o n A g e T r a n s f o r m a t i o n S e r i e s

Photographs

All of the photographs used in this publication weredrawn from the Royal Navy, Army, and Royal Air

Force picture libraries, or were provided courtesy ofUK Joint Force Headquarters, or the Media

Operations Group in Headquarters LandCommand.

* * *

Reprint Information

This work was originally developed and released asSCSI Occasional Paper Number 45 (March 2002)

and was designed and typeset byThe British Army Review,

Published by theStrategic and Combat Studies Institute,

Printed in the United Kingdom under arrangementsof Astron Document Services.

i

Table of Contents1. Introduction .......................................................1

Part One: Philosophy

2. Tomorrow’s War - an analysis of the nature offuture conflict. David Potts .........................................................9

3. No Revolutions Please, We’re British - aconsideration of the nature of the contemporaryRevolution in Military Affairs and the innateBritish reluctance to embrace it. David Potts and Jake Thackray .......................29

4. The Holy Grail - the anticipated benefits of theapplication of information age technology tomilitary command and control systems. Jake Thackray ..................................................43

5. Neo Heroic Command - the ‘mask of command’in the information age. David Potts .......................................................59

6. A Command Philosophy for the InformationAge - the continuing relevence of missioncommand. Jim Storr ...........................................................77

7. The Commander as Expert - harnessingintuitive judgement. Jim Storr ...........................................................95

Part Two: Possibilities

8. The Commander-Centric Approach -philosophical principles for command structuresfit for the information age. Jake Thackray ................................................115

9. Beyond Interoperability: Part 1 - newimperatives and challenges at the tactical level. Tim Blad and David Potts ..............................139

10. Beyond Interoperability: Part 2 - informationsharing post 11 September. Paul Lefever .................................................151

11. The Divine Threads - the intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance ‘system ofsystems’. Graham Le Fevre .........................................167

12. 3D Vision - exploiting the third dimension. Graham Le Fevre .........................................177

13. The Case for Manned Reconnaissance.Graham Le Fevre and John Thornton .........189

14. The Delilah Factor – new vulnerabilities in theinformation age. David Potts ...................................................199

ii

Part Three: Prognosis

15. Tactical Combat with the New C4ISTAR.David Potts ...................................................211

16. Whither the Close Battle?Richard Cousens..........................................229

17. Asymmetric Warfare - the new face of warfarein the 21st Century. John Russell.................................................243

18. Once Upon a Time in the Future - a fictionalaccount of a possible future conflict. Jake Thackray ..............................................267

* * *

Afterword - the Imperative for new thinking.David Potts ....................................................315

Glossary of Acronyms .....................................321

About the Authors ............................................329

iii

1

CHAPTER 1

IntroductionBy David Potts

This Occasional considers command and combatin the information age. It is an issue that takes us

into the realms of the unknown. Defence thinkerseverywhere are searching forward for the scienceand alchemy that will deliver operational success.They must reconcile the tantalising possibilities oftechnology with the enduring nature of the mostdemanding aspects of combat, framed by post-ColdWar strategic realities. A small team in the BritishArmy's conceptual 'think tank', the DirectorateGeneral Development and Doctrine, located atUpavon on Salisbury Plain, has been workingtogether on this issue for some 18 months. Whilstnobody has any certain answers, their viewsrepresent some of the current forward thinking withinthe British Army.

They argue that the information age will be definedas much by the blossoming of regional conflict andglobal terrorism as by the technology. However, thetechnology offers us the potential to change the waywe choose to fight and this notion lies at the core ofthe so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. But, bydelivering a military hegemony to the United States,the RMA may have acted as a catalyst for evendeeper and more fundamental change. Stronger

forces may be at work, which will, in a genuinelyrevolutionary way, redefine the nature of war andconsequently the capabilities required to wage it.Either way, the facts are inescapable - the age welive in demands Armed Forces characterised by newthinking, new concepts, new doctrine, new tacticsand new organisations, fired by committedleadership and enabled by state of the artinformation age technology.

Part One addresses a range of philosophical issues.in the opening scene, Tomorrow's War, the editorexplores the nature of future conflict and the fragilityof many of our current assumptions. He alsoprovides some insights into the nature of tacticalengagements in the information age. In NoRevolution Please, We're British, he and JakeThackray analyse the nature of RMAs and the innateBritish reluctance to acknowledge or embrace them.This has a potentially incalculable opportunity costthat we have paid dearly once or twice in our militaryhistory. Jake then goes on to describe The Holy Grailof a fully digitised and networked command systemand the potential benefits it could yield.

John Keegan argued that the 'mask of command' inthe Cold War, nuclear age was 'Post-heroic', in Neo-heroic Command the editor picks up on this themeand examines the mask of command in theinformation age. Jim Storr then rounds off thissection with two pieces. The first on CommandPhilosophy argues that Mission Command isenduring and is indeed a pre-requisite for thesuccessful exploitation of information age commandsystems. In the second he stresses the importance

The Big Issue2

of seeing the Commander as Expert decision-maker.He analyses how decisions are actually made andargues the importance of harnessing and developingintuitive judgement.

Part Two highlights the possiblities and some of thechallenges. Jake Thackray opens by describing ACommander-centric Approach to future commandstructures and investigates a range of issue such asspan of command, hierarchies, the evolution ofechelons, deputies, and the impact of reaching backto the home base to draw on support there.

Tim Blad then discusses issues that take us BeyondInteroperability at the tactical level, including thedisparity that will exist between digitised and non-digitised forces and the inherent frictions of multi-nationality. In a related piece, Paul Lefeverexamines information-sharing post-11 Septemberand considers the issues this raises at the strategicinter-governmental level.

In The Divine Threads Graham Le Fevre exposesthe architecture and command and control (C2)arrangements required to exploit our investment innew Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisitionand Reconnaissance assets. He then offers anexciting 3D Vision of the potentially revolutionaryimpact that aerial surveillance systems will have onhow we understand the battlespace. This leads intoThe Case for Manned Reconnaissance, co-authoredwith John Thornton, in which the continuingrequirement for manned reconnaissance isexplained and asserted.

Chapter 1 3

The last morsel in this section is The Delilah Factor,an editorial piece on the new vulnerabilities thatreliance on digital systems will bring and some of thechallenges posed by Network-centric Warfare.

Part Three offers a prognosis for the future - if thevisions expounded in Part Two materialise and thechallenges are substantially overcome, what then?Tactical Combat with the new C4ISTAR depicts theprofound impact these new systems might have onhow we will fight and offers insights for the future ofland force and joint tactical combat. In Whither theClose Battle, Richard Cousens examines the Britishlove affair with the close battle and concludes thatthis aspect of combat will change fundamentally inways that will impact upon the very structure of theArmy. John Russell then offers an immenselyimportant and thought provoking piece onAsymmetric Warfare, which he argues is the trueface of battle in the 21st Century. Jake Thackrayrounds off with Once Upon a Time in the Future, afictional narrative of a future conflict. It is not a flightof fancy, as Jake has tried to depict capabilities thatwill actually be in-service in 10 years or so. Inevitablysome will find the scenario conservative, othersunlikely, but Jake has succeeded in bringingtogether many of the threads of argument in thepreceding pieces in a lively, imaginative andinteresting way.

Finally, the short Afterword challenges conventionalwisdom and underscores the imperative for newthinking. The Big Issue can be dipped into, or readfrom cover to cover. There is something foreveryone, whether an armchair theorist, a planner,

The Big Issue4

capability developer, 'warfighter', technocrat,bureaucrat, academic, or interested layman. It soarsthrough strategy and policy and swoops down onrelevant tactical and procedural detail. Think of it asa ball - it has now been passed to you - if you runwith any of the ideas herein, the pass will have beenworth the making.

Chapter 1 5

PART ONE

Tomorrow’s War

No Revolutions Please, We’reBritish

The Holy Grail

Neo-heroic Command

A Command Philosophy for theInformation Age

The Commander as Expert

CHAPTER 2

TOMORROW’S WARBy David Potts

‘There was black dust along the roadway fromthe bridge onwards and it grew thicker in Fulham.The streets were horribly quiet….I saw altogetherabout a dozen [dead bodies] in the length of theFulham Road….the black powder covered overthem…one or two had been disturbed by dogs’.

H G Wells1

Who has seen tomorrow’s war? No one.However, we have had glimpses of its various

scenes, acted out on a global stage and etched intothe public imagination by an all-pervasive media.2 Itsmanifestations have taken many forms in its variedappearances from the Gulf to Rwanda, Somalia, theBalkans, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Palestine andnow Afghanistan. But amid scenes of chaos,barbarism and traditional courage – the definingcharacteristic of warfare in the information age is thereal-time coordination of numerous weapons overgreat distances, creating an unprecedented combatcapability – something that has been unimaginableprior to the emergence of information agetechnology. But although technology can confergreat advantage, it cannot of itself determine thenature, course or outcome of war. There is no easy

9

formula for war now or in the future – ‘there are inwarfare no constant conditions’.3

But what of the events of 11 September – a blip, orthe face of wars to come? For a moment it seemedthat the fatal hijackings and coincident anthraxattacks threatened to catapult the world into someghastly synthesis of the information age and theplague ridden middle ages? Perhaps they are simplythe manifestation of so-called ‘asymmetry’4 –essentially unconventional forces, tactics andtechniques applied against our vulnerabilities and toobviate our strengths? The short answer is that wedo not know – yet. Time will tell, as John Updikeobserved in the immediate aftermath – we will onlyreally understand the true significance of 11September when we look back on it from someyears in the future.5 Stock prices have recoveredremarkably quickly, much more quickly than afterPearl Harbour, to which 11 September is inevitablycompared. Perhaps even more remarkable is thespeed with which the US, with a little help from somefriends, not least the Northern Alliance, has broughtdown the Taleban regime in Afghanistan – a countrymost would have imagined was beyond its effectivestrategic reach, in view of its position in central Asiaand the unhappy experience there of Britain and theSoviet Union. If nothing else, the events of 11September have brought into sharp focus areminder of the horrors of war – the unthinkable ispossible, no contingency is too awful to envisageand no home base is inviolate.

But the threats and challenges defence forces facedon 10th September have not gone away. There will

The Big Issue10

be no clearly definable, two-dimensional battlefield –there will be a battlespace. It is potentially trulyglobal: it stretches from wherever our forces aredeployed, back through their lines of communicationto the home base of all participants and embracesanywhere abroad where we have interests andvulnerabilities that can be attacked or exploited by aruthless adversary. It encompasses the land, thehigh seas, the ocean depths, airspace, space, cyber-space, the electro-magnetic spectrum, and theminds of men. Consequently, military operationshave become infinitely more complex, but they havealso retained many enduring features.

The ‘spectrum of conflict’ is no longer (if it ever was)a neat, easily comprehended linear escalator – withpeace at one end and war at the other – it is acontinuum within which lie a range of military andnon-military conflict prevention, conflict and postconflict activities.6 The distinction between these isblurred and it is possible to conduct all three forms ofoperation simultaneously in the same theatre ofoperations. Such a view is coherent with Krulak’svision of the 3-Block War7 – in which we findhumanitarian, peace keeping and warfightingoperations being conducted at the same time and inthe space of three city blocks. Some now questionwhether conventional force on force warfighting islikely to be a reality in the future. The answer is aresounding yes, but it will be very different and ishighly likely to include the elements of the 3-BlockWar and asymmetry, mixed together and spread likea bloody jam. The implied polarity in some Britishmilitary thinking that distinguishes betweenwarfighting and other operations as alternatives is

Chapter 2 11

misleading: they will occur simultaneously, in thesame theatre of operations, or in different, but linkedtheatres as part of the same conflict and in whollyunpredictable circumstances. Vietnam is anindicative model with force on force warfighting andrevolutionary guerrilla warfare occurringsimultaneously. However, the difference post 11September, is that we must expect our enemies toalso attack our home base and our friends andinterests around the world in horrific and novel waysand on a scale that we are only beginning to imagine– some Chinese writings describe this as‘Unrestricted Warfare’.8

Unrestricted Warfare is actually a very wideconcept that goes beyond violent action and canoccur outside the moral boundaries the West hasset for the conduct of its wars. It encompasses‘non-military war operations’ to embrace cyberattack, economic, monetary, social, political,cultural, psychological and ecological dimensionsas well as ‘new terror war’ (the synthesis ofmaniacal terrorism and weapons of massdestruction). It transcends all boundaries andlimits. It is, paradoxically, the logical response tothe US military hegemony delivered by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. The West’sseeming invincibility in symmetric ‘conventional’combat means that any canny foe (and we mustassume they are all canny) will seek to fight us onterms of his, rather than our, choosing and that thiswill include a range of techniques that will be asappalling as they are effective and unforeseen.

The Big Issue12

However, while some potential adversaries willoperate without constraint, legal and moralconstraints have had, rightly, an increasing influenceon the conduct of operations by Western forces. But,warfare has now become constrained in a somewhatritualistic construct in which almost no one is to getkilled. Collateral damage, the killing of innocent thirdparties (usually civilians) or the destruction ofschools, hospitals and other humanitarian icons isstrictly taboo, while avoiding the loss of livesamongst own forces has become, in some cases, anobsession that constrains commanders. Mostbizarrely of all is an increasing squeamishness at theidea of killing the enemy – examples of this moralconfusion abound from reactions to the sinking ofthe Belgrano, to the Gibraltar killings and the BasraHighway. All this barely a generation after the USand UK carpet bombed German cities and the USdropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima and aplutonium bomb over Nagasaki.9

The current web of rules of engagement and theexpectation of near-bloodless conflict are merelymanifestations of mankind’s eternal struggle toimpose some rules and order on the most terrible ofall human activity. These rules vary from generationto generation and are, inevitably the product of manyfactors: the art of the possible offered by theavailable means, the moral basis of the culturesengaged in the conflict and, crucially, the stakes –the higher the stakes, the less constrained webecome. Our own antecedents have acted outsideaccepted boundaries on many occasions. In themiddle ages, for example, a code of chivalryregulated the conduct of knights and the treatment

Chapter 2 13

they could expect from their enemies. The code wasshattered by the unchivalrous10 use of massedarchers by the English from Crecy onwards and,later at Agincourt, slaying, rather than ransoming,captured French knights. While in their War ofIndependence the American rebels’ use of ambushand hit and run tactics placed them entirely beyondthe Pale at that time.11

We cannot assume that our enemies will abide byour own moral codes, indeed we should assume thecontrary and expect them to ruthlessly exploit ourown constraints and sensibilities. Nor can weassume that our current legalistic construct willendure – faced with a clear and recognised threat ofsufficient proportions it is quite conceivable that theWest would adapt or break its own rules. Despite thecivilising influence of the Ottawa convention, otherhorrific weapons will remain, or appear, in thearsenals of many conventional and unconventionalforces – laser damage weapons optimised to blindopponents, chemical and biological weapons, flameand fuel/air explosives to name but a few. With orwithout rules, the information age battlespace will bea terrible place to be.

Causes of war abound today and will do so in thefuture, barring the realisation of some Utopianvision. An increasing world population will, inevitably,continue to battle for decreasing natural resources –whether water, oil, minerals, or any of the otherelements necessary to sustain industrial or post-industrial economies and with hideously inequitableconsumption. The great question of our century willbe ‘what to do about Lazarus?’. We can no longer

The Big Issue14

throw him scraps from our table. In the informationage, even the poorest peoples access informationand know that we in the West are enjoying a mostsumptuous banquet. Without a seismic shift inwealth, education and opportunity towards thedeveloping world, the scope for genuine grievancesescalating to conflict, and the exploitation of thosegrievances by ruthless maniacs, will abound.12

Beyond the potential for conflict between the ‘haves’and the ‘have-nots’, other, equally significant issuesexist: religious conflict, the battles for national andcultural identity, tribalism, rogue states, terroriststates13 and criminal states14 will all be actors on thediverse stage of conflict in the information age.Nuclear states will become an increasingly painfulhangover from the Cold War, especially those statespossessing both nuclear weapons and the seeds ofconflict – India and Pakistan being topical examples.

Against this backdrop, many countries around theworld will continue to fund and man large standingArmies of varying quality, with many unsavourycountries equipping themselves with Western

Chapter 2 15

Orphanage, Kigali, Rwanda

armaments or former Eastern Block equipmentbrought up to a formidable specification by theinsertion of Western technology. If the UK wishes toact in its national interests abroad, and meet theobligations incumbent upon it as a P5 nation, it mustfield and maintain balanced forces capable ofconducting the whole range of operations describedabove. We must be able to prevail against localised,highly capable conventional threats and to escalaterapidly as the situation dictates. Losing ourconventional force on force warfighting capability –one possible, though so far improbable reaction to11 September, – would mean that form of warfightingitself could become our asymmetric threat – ie thethreat to which we had no credible response. Suchan approach would be like cancelling one’s fireinsurance in response to a flood. This does notmean that the nature and balance of ourconventional capabilities will not change, on thecontrary, they must change, or we risk defeat bymore adaptive adversaries.

If we accept that hypothesis, what kind ofbattlespace do we imagine conventional Westernforces inhabiting when they are deployed on theinevitable expeditionary operations and what mighttactical actions look like?

These tactical actions will occur in themultidimensional, limitless and ill-definedbattlespace already described. Ground terrain willrange from desert and mountain to jungle andsprawling urban areas – it is an increasingly, evenbewilderingly, complex place to be. There will becoalitions, possibly shifting in composition during the

The Big Issue16

course of operations and alliances too, but these arelikely to be replaced in the battlespace by coalitionsof the willing. All of the national contingents deployedto any conflict scenario will bring with them a rangeof capabilities, agendas and interoperability issues(technical, doctrinal and cognitive). Other actors inthe battlespace will include Non-GovernmentalOrganisations, Other Government Departments,supranational, national and local agencies, as wellas contractors servicing and supporting variousparties to the conflict.15

We will operate, of course, within the rules thatpertain at the time, but also in accordance with ourdoctrine. This will continue to be predicated on theManoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command,which allows subordinate commanders at all levelsthe freedom to use their own initiative to achievetheir commanders’ intent. Manoeuvrism is notmerely physical manoeuvre: it is conceptual and isabout exploiting enemy weaknesses with the aim ofshattering his will and cohesion. But it always hasbeen about a careful balance between attrition andmanoeuvre – in Sun Tzu speak, it is about thejudicious application of Cheng ‘normal’ and Chi‘extraordinary’ force in infinite combinations.16

Successful forces in the information age willcontinue to have the capabilities to apply both,indeed the most successful forces will be those thatcan combine a range of capabilities in the mosteffective way. However, although attrition will benecessary in certain circumstances and is to beexpected and catered for, it is the application of‘extraordinary’ force to break the will of the enemy

Chapter 2 17

that is ‘the acme of skill – to subdue the enemywithout fighting is the supreme excellence’.17

Information superiority will be at the kernel of theapplication of both extraordinary and normal force.In itself, this is not new. Commanders have alwayssought the best possible information on their ownforces, allies and their enemies, as they sought topeer through the ‘fog of war’. But information hassometimes added to, rather than diminished the fog– as Clausewitz observed, ‘Great part of theinformation obtained in war is contradictory, a stillgreater part is false and by far the greatest part is ofdoubtful character’.18 However, in the informationage, space-based, aerial and remote sensors,harnessed to digital processing andcommunications, supplemented by more traditionalcapabilities, will provide commanders withunprecedented knowledge of their battlespace. Theinformation age commander will be able to routinelydo what Wellington always wished to do – ‘see theother side of the hill’. The classic ‘reverse slopeposition’19 of the Cold War era will be as observablein detail as it would be if it were on a forward slopeor a flat plain.

Nevertheless, the battlespace will continue to be aplace of immense danger, violence and chaos. Aswell as striving to regulate activities within it throughRules of Engagement and to operate in accordancewith our doctrine (which must be developed andadapted as circumstances change), we will alsoseek to impose some order and structure on theotherwise chaotic and indefinable whole – asNorman Mailer would have it ‘Keys in the left pocket,

The Big Issue18

change in the right’. To this end there will continue tobe some form of framework of operations, currentlycharacterised by deep, close and rear operations –a conceptual tool to think with, rather than a spatialconstruct. As we move into the future this frameworkmight begin to seem tired and quaint, but for themoment it serves as a useful means to categoriseand describe actions in the battlespace and howthey might change as we proceed further into theinformation age.

Deep operations are not simply about geography;they expand the battlespace conceptually and inboth space and time. More significantly, deepoperations are about attacking the enemy’svulnerabilities, shattering his cohesion and crushinghis will to fight as well as – or even instead of –destroying his combat forces. Attack helicopterswere shown to be able to do both brilliantly in theGulf, but were, for a variety of reasons, impotent inKosovo and played a limited part in Afghanistan. Butneither are deep operations simply about long-rangeprecision fire or air manoeuvre by combinations ofattack helicopters and heliborne troops.20 They aremuch more about the simultaneous attack of theenemy throughout the depth of the battlespace andon multiple levels – destruction, psychologicalattack, military support to economic embargo and soon. But precisely focused on his key vulnerabilities –isolating him, confusing him, degrading andoverloading his command system and denying himoptions and opportunities.

Information operations will therefore play a majorpart in deep operations, in destabilising and de-

Chapter 2 19

coupling the enemy from his support at home andabroad and in both shaping his perceptions andundermining his will. Combat operations may occurin support of information operations as well asinformation operations supporting action by combatforces. Indeed, in certain circumstances informationoperations may prove decisive. For example inSierra Leone, British forces under (then) BrigadierDavid Richards conducted highly successfulinformation operations that brought theRevolutionary United Front21 to heel and included arange of actions, embracing, inter alia, thedemonstration of force and the will to employ it.

Effective, long-range links between sensor, deciderand shooter along with truly integrated firepower are

The Big Issue20

Sierra Leone - Beach assault in support of info ops

already a battlewinning reality. The media hasexplained in great detail, to the widest of audiences,how unmanned aerial vehicles over Afghanistanacquired targets that were processed in Tampa,Florida, and attacked by missiles launched from theIndian Ocean, or by bombs dropped from aircraftbased in continental USA, or the Middle East and, insome cases, guided onto target by Special Forces.This is the contemporary reality of deep operationsin the information age.

Today, our doctrine talks about deep operations asshaping the conditions for successful closeoperations, but, as we move into the future, deepoperations themselves will be increasingly decisive.Nevertheless, close operations will continue to berequired in some form – it is all too easy, forexample, to overlook the importance of the roleplayed by the surrogate local ground forces inAfghanistan, who were needed to eject the Talebanfrom their various strong-holds and to alter thedynamics of the situation on the ground.

As the information age progresses, the nature andprosecution of close operations will change. Thefocus for this form of combat, in the terms of ourcurrent structures, will be the brigade level andbelow. But even at this level, high quality, relevantinformation will soon be provided by operational andstrategic level assets, which, when combined withlocally gathered information, will give brigadecommanders and their subordinates an undreamedof information advantage over their adversaries. Thiswill enable rapid decision-making and action and theapplication of appropriate and timely effects –

Chapter 2 21

including joint firepower. In conventional ‘force-on-force’ armoured warfare, platforms will be moredispersed, commanders will manoeuvre with greaterconfidence and precision and there will be a shift inemphasis from direct to smart indirect fire. The thirddimension will be exploited to the full, withunmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) providing a rangeof capabilities. Even at the lowest tactical levels,short range and micro UAVs, linked to smart indirectfire systems, will soon provide battlegroups withlethal organic indirect firepower that has thepotential to supersede direct firepower as thedecisive weapon of choice. The future infantrymanwill become much more of a ‘sensor’ or a caller foreffect than the deliverer of firepower through crewserved or hand held direct fire weapons. There willalso be fewer infantry, possibly operating in smaller,more isolated teams. Tanks will be increasinglylethal and will continue to be important in someoperations, not least from a force protectionperspective and as a powerful statement of intent,but their predominance will fade as attackhelicopters and UAVs proliferate with deadly links toa range of lethal indirect fire capabilities. Massedarmour, by our enemies against us, will be a thing ofthe past – consigned to history on the BasraHighway and lost in the mythology of Cold Warexercises on the Hanover Plain. In offensiveoperations, we can expect to engage dispersed, wellconcealed and protected targets – and this will haveimplications for our own equipment, organisationand tactics.

But the kind of armoured warfare described will notoccur in isolation. It might be the manoeuvrist

The Big Issue22

exploitation of conditions created by the use orthreatened use of long range firepower, enabled bycombinations of special forces, light forces andrapidly deployable light armour. It might also be ahighly localised occurrence as part of the ‘3-BlockWar’, occurring alongside, and enmeshed with,humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Or itcould occur in a defined time and space in order tochange the dynamics of a situation, which would beexploited by other lines of operation, especially atthe political level. It is much less likely to be seenagain as mass on mass manoeuvre warfare in whichthe fielded land force of one antagonist is pitchedagainst that of the other in order to decide an issueof strategy or policy.

There will also be enemies against whom we mustfight, who will operate below the lowest threshold ofour more technical warfighting capabilities and interrain, especially urban terrain (Mogadishu andGrozny) but also jungle and swamps (Sierra Leone),where our advantages are minimised. Against suchenemies, close combat will be essential. But even insuch circumstances, information age technologies

Chapter 2 23

British tanks in Kosovo

must harness strategic and operational level assetsto provide tactical commanders with the bestpossible information, actionable options and adecisive advantage. Even basic developments suchas automatic positioning data, for example, will payreal dividends in scenarios such as Mogadishu,where one of the most vexing challenges waslocating friendly forces in order to extract them fromthe maze of threatening streets.

Rear Operations are not just about what is going onbehind us. The battlespace will be much less clearlydefined in terms of linearity and geography. Rearoperations can be defined as those that provide thecommander with the freedom to act unhindered bythe enemy and which sustain and protect his force.

The prevalence of cheap, but effective UAVs, forexample, will provide new priorities for GroundBased Air Defence, which will need to be ubiquitous– perhaps leading to a revival of All Arms Air Defencecapabilities with numerous platforms being able toswitch into air-defence mode. They might alsooperate under the threshold of the air superiorityfighters in which the West is currently investing$billions. NBC detection, protection anddecontamination capabilities will be enduring andcrucial elements of force protection. Forces will berequired, whose specific task will be to defendagainst the asymmetric attack of vulnerable rearareas, headquarters and logistics.

Information age technologies, particularly in thefields of asset tracking, remote diagnostics andpredictive data will revolutionise logistics. It will

The Big Issue24

become much more focussed toward actualrequirements with resources targeted or directed tomatch need, rather than over-insurance throughinundation. This will allow reduced logistic drag anda smaller logistic footprint, while increasing flexibilityand the ability to sustain expeditionary operations.

Increasingly, rear operations may embrace a widerange of mission support functions carried out in thehome base – including intelligence, legal support,course of action analysis and operational analysis aswell as rear-based logistics. At the strategic level,once a major expeditionary operation is underway,rear operations might also embrace operations,defensive or pre-emptive, to protect the Home Baseand our interests abroad outside the immediatetheatre of operations. But clearly such actions canconstitute an operation in their own right and mayeven become the pre-eminent form of operation.

In summary, warfighting and conflict in general willbe inevitable, and its characteristics will be enduring:bloody and complex with no immaculate warfarepanacea or technological silver bullet that will allowthis to be done without misfortune and loss of humanlife. Secondly, many of the old frictions andvulnerabilities will exist alongside new ones in acomplex, ill-defined battlespace in which multipleforms of conflict will occur simultaneously. Thirdlyand most importantly of all, there are newopportunities (technical, conceptual andorganisational) that we must seize, if we are tosuccessfully prosecute warfare, in all its forms, in theinformation age.

Chapter 2 25

NOTES1 H G Wells, The War of the Worlds, Penguin Books 1946,

‘Dead London’, p 174. The terrible imaginary scenes ofdevastated London that Wells describes were the work ofMartians, but potentially they could be the work of anyenemy whose alien moral values dehumanise innocentvictims – indeed, only a few years before publication ofWells’ book, similar horrors had been visited upon Londonby the Luftwaffe and V-weapons.

2 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare,Peoples’ Liberation Army Literature and Arts PublishingHouse, Beijing, February 1999, pp 84 and 116.

3 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Wordsworth Editions 1993,Chapter 6, ‘Void and Actuality’, p 113.

4 This has been widely envisaged as a form of conflict bynumerous Western military think-tanks, although nonewould be so arrogant as to suggest that they predicted theprecise form, timing or targets of Bin Laden’s attacks onthe US.

5 Interview for the BBC Today programme.6 Christopher Bellamy, Spiral Through Time: Beyond

‘Conflict Intensity’ SCSI Occasional Paper No 35, 1998.7 ‘In one moment in time, our Service members will be

feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providinghumanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will beholding two warring tribes apart – conductingpeacekeeping. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethalmid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three cityblocks. It will be what we call the three block war.’ GeneralCharles C Krulak, USMC.

8 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, op cit, pp 8 and 33 wherethey argue that understanding this concept has genuinerevolutionary significance in terms of mankind’sperception of war.

9 The Japanese surrendered 6 days after Nagasaki, but theimpact of allied bombing on German war production andon the will of the German people and their leadershipremains debatable.

10 See in particular M Knox and W Murray, The Dynamics ofMilitary Revolution, 1300–2050, Chapter 2, ‘England’s14th Century RMA; J F C Fuller, Decisive Battles of theWestern World, Volume 1, Grenada Publishing, London,1970 (first published 1954), pp 295-319; and JohnKeegan, The Face of Battle, Jonathan Cape, London,

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1976, pp 107–112 where Henry V’s orders to kill of theprisoners is discussed (downplayed and justified).

11 The Americans engaged the British in View 1 and View 2warfare simultaneously, using both fielded armies andguerrilla tactics as well as attacking the UK home basewith privateers (notoriously, Paul Jones, who, for example,attacked and captured the Drake off the Copeland Islandsnear Belfast Lough on 13 April 1778). At Lexington andConcord 800 British regulars were harassed from thecover of trees, hedges and buildings, resulting in 273casualties. J Fortescue, The War of Independence, TheBritish In North America, Greenhill Books, London, 2001(first published 1911), pages 213-232 describes Morganand Sumter’s effective guerrilla operations in SouthCarolina. Page 93 raises the issue of the mistreatment ofBritish prisoners after Saratoga – officers were separatedfrom men and many were never seen again.

12 Former US President Bill Clinton, Dimbleby Lecture, TheStruggle for the Soul of the 21st Century, 14 December2001. “We have to make a world where there are fewerterrorists, where there are fewer potential terrorists andmore partners. And that responsibility falls primarily on thewealthy nations, to spread the benefits and shrink theburdens”.

13 There is a view that state sponsored terrorism will declineand cease to be a real threat, as states respond to the 11September wake-up call and side with their economicvested interest as part of the world community, rather thanrisk reproach and isolation.

14 Ironically, even bizarrely, the nineteenth century OpiumWar, fought against the Qing Dynasty, forced the Chineseto accept the importation of opium and marks Britain asthe world’s first narcostate. An earlier example of Britishstate-sponsored crime is Drake’s privateering –underwritten by ‘Letters of Marque’ from his monarch atthe time.

15 It is conceivable, that at some point in the future,commercial companies will deliver support services toforces on both sides in a conflict – perhaps in the future wewill need to give more thought to how we will treatcontractors supporting our enemies with services andmateriel.

16 Sun Tzu, op cit, Chapter 5, ‘The Posture of an Army’, Page109.

17 Ibid, Chapter 3, ‘Offensive Strategy’, Page 105.18 Carl Von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 1832, translation

published by Penguin Classics 1982, Page 162.

Chapter 2 27

19

20 The complexities inherent in commanding and controllingsuch a capability across the boundaries of the Air, Landand Maritime components is not to be underestimated.

21 Information Operations in Sierra Leone included ahelicopter lift of light guns that were flown across thebeach, the overt movement and deployment of highlycapable forces and maintaining a tough ‘come and get it’attitude in the local media.

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Enemy HILL Reverse Slope

29

CHAPTER 3

NO REVOLUTIONSPLEASE, WE’RE

BRITISHBy David Potts and Jake Thackray

‘There is no weightier problem common to theGeneral Staffs of all peaceably-minded countriesin modern times than the decision for what yearto plan the reequipment of its forces with a newarmoury.’

Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940

“US Forces are gradually incrementingthemselves towards failure.”

Adm William Owens, USN (Retd), from an addressto the Australian Land Warfare Conference,

November 2001

Nowadays we do not have revolutions, we’reBritish - we have a constitutional monarchy and

a form of democracy that has evolved over someone thousand years. Revolutions, from thecontemporary British perspective, are foreigninventions that result in the likes of Robespierre,Lenin, Stalin, Mugabe and other such grotesqueand unforeseen outcomes. It is therefore whollyconsistent with British national and military culture

that Liddell Hart and Fuller’s thoughts and writingson the potential of armoured warfare would be slowto catch on in the UK, but would be seized uponelsewhere to devastating effect and to our verygreat cost.

Historical Perspective But it was not always thus. The 14th Century saw adistinctly British Revolution in Military Affairs.1 Thelongbow was the technology,2 but it was not the onlyfactor. In fact the English army at Bannockburn in1314 was probably substantially composed onlongbow-men and this defeat may have prompted areview of organisation and tactics.3 The massedarchers (11,000 at Crecy4) worked in close co-operation with dismounted men-at-arms, whosechargers were used for pursuit after the battle waswon. Crucially, the knights in the English army werepaid by the King, while the French maintained thefeudal model of Lords bringing large retinues ofmen-at-arms in discharge of feudal obligation. Hewho pays the piper calls the tune and so this was akey factor underpinning unity of command in theEnglish army. The French could perhaps have takenrefuge behind their city walls, but the countrysidewas laid waste in a deliberate stratagem to forcethem to come to battle on English terms.

The victories brought by this RMA were breathtaking– invariably outnumbered by around two to one, theEnglish inflicted huge losses on their enemies atrelatively little cost to themselves. In 1346 at Crecy,sixteen charges by French knights left 1,500 of themdead for minimal English losses. At Agincourt, 68

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years later, Henry V’s force of about 6,000 defeateda French force of 25,000, inflicting 5,000 casualties,including 500 noblemen at a cost of some 200English casualties. A key ingredient in theseastounding successes was leadership – leadershipin battle, coupled with the leadership to develop andemploy new weapons with new tactics and neworganisations. In modern parlance, the Englishweaponry, organisation, strategy and tactics couldbe described as asymmetric.5 In terms of timescale,which is also instructive, the RMA can be seen tospan about a hundred years.

Other RMAs have occurred from time to time – theprogress of musketry is particularly insightful. The17th Century RMA was precipitated by thematchlock musket and arguably began with theDutch victory over the Spanish at Nieuwpoort in1600. But it was not until the end of that century thatpikemen disappeared from the order of battle to bereplaced entirely by the flintlock fusil and thebayonet. Hardly a revolution in timescale, especiallywhen one considers that musketry had been used togreat effect in the Italian wars of the 16th Century –the Duke of Alba, for example, had introducedmusketeers into virtually every unit in the 1550s.6

However, the late 16th Century saw neworganisations and tactics emerge from the ‘DutchSchool’7 with great rectangular battalions of pikemenbeing replaced by extended lines which gave greaterflexibility to the use of cavalry, infantry and artilleryand allowed more effective and sustained use offirepower by successive ranks alternating betweenfiring and loading their muskets. These ideas were

Chapter 3 31

developed further by Gustavus Adolphus, whointroduced a shorter pike and a lighter musket thatcould be reloaded more quickly and did not requirethe support of a traditional forked rest. He alsoemployed lighter artillery that could be moved aboutthe battlefield and concentrated onto the enemy’smost vulnerable points, coupled to new tactics forthe offensive use of cavalry. The Swedes typicallyconcentrated musketry and artillery against theopposing infantry, after which cavalry chargesopened up the holes in the enemy lines and werefollowed up by the pikemen. These tacticsunderpinned victories for Gustavus Adolphus andhis successors at Breitenfeld, Lützen, Wittstock andJankow and gave Sweden a period of hegemony inEastern and Central Europe.

But here again, if this period in the early 17thCentury can be viewed as an RMA, we see acombination of innovations in technology,organisation, tactics and, crucially, leadership toenvision, realise and employ effectively. The otherstriking similarity with the 14th Century RMA is thelong timescale – more evolutionary thanrevolutionary – perhaps the modality is one ofevolutionary timescale, but delivering arevolutionary outcome.

As we turn to our own era, when we think of anRMA in the information age we must ask where itall began. The seeds may have been sown inBletchley Park, where the codebreakers gave theallies an information edge of strategic significance– but it was in America, not Britain, that that thefurther development of the code-breaking

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technology led to the computer age. Realistically,however, when we talk of the current RMA, wethink of precision weapons, digital communicationstechnology, satellites and micro-processing –which have combined to provide the technicalimpetus to an RMA.

The Current RMAThe possibilities offered by information agetechnology are tantalising. In the commercial arenathose businesses that succeed have a developedunderstanding of how to exploit technology tocommercial advantage in their field.Characteristically they innovate and adopt newbusiness organisation and procedures withoutachieving the consensus to do so from every vestedinterest group.

But 80 – 90% of information technology projects failto meet their performance goals. 80% of all suchprojects are delivered late and over budget.8

Commercial companies who make poor informationtechnology investment decisions are liable to beplaced at a competitive disadvantage: ultimately,they lose business and either go bankrupt or aretaken over. Defence planners can ill-afford to beplaced in similar circumstances. Against thisbackdrop, the reluctance of defence organisations toadopt wholesale, revolutionary change fromplatform- to network-centric warfare concepts isunderstandable. Military capability improvement hasinstead been largely dependent on incrementalchange to structures, processes and people in orderto gain benefits from new technology, particularly

Chapter 3 33

within defence organisations perceived as beingsuccessful at what they do (largely, thoseorganisations successful in their last major conflict).Change models developed for business structureshave a similar relevance for military capability. TheYetton9 model, for example, can be adjusted frombusiness to military terms:

Fig 1 – The Yetton Model for Planned Incremental Changeto Military Capability

In this case it can be seen that a description ofmilitary capability (such as, for example, thatdescribed in the SDR) leads to analysis and re-design of the structure which provides that capability.This re-structuring leads to change in the processescarried out within different parts of the structure,which in turn leads to a requirement for therecruitment, training and retention of people to carryout these new processes. New technology is thenused to allow these people, processes andstructures to provide the capability described. Assuch technology is introduced, user experience

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allows for continued refinement of the processes,but only within the existing structure. A trulyrevolutionary change in military capability, however,based on emergent technology, requires the modelabove to be spun on its axis:

Fig 2 – The Yetton Model for Revolutionary Change toMilitary Capability

In this case, the existence of emergent technologyforces the recruitment, training and retention ofpeople able to envisage an entirely new structurewhich might allow most benefit to be drawn from it.Adoption of this new structure, just as before, forcesadoption of new processes. This time, however, thecapability produced has not been pre-described, andcan therefore properly be considered revolutionaryin nature. An historical example of such a changemight be the development by the Wehrmacht of theconcept of blitzkrieg.10

In this example, despite the fact that the Britishwere the first to put tanks into the field (in 1916)and to establish a formation devoted to the

Chapter 3 35

development of armoured warfare techniques, theExperimental Mechanised Force of 1927-28, a lackof resources and of commitment in the 1930s led toBritish capability in this area dropping badly behindin the runup to WWII. In Germany, however,Guderian’s concepts, developed from Fuller’s anddescribed in his ‘Achtung Panzer’ were seizedupon by Hitler. Under Hitler’s patronage, Guderian11

was able to ensure the formation of three panzerdivisions by October 1935. Process invention andrefinement followed – careful and rigorous analysisof lessons from training and experimentation andfrom operations (Austria, Czechoslovakia andPoland) to continually innovate and develop.12

Vindication of this revolution in warfare came withthe fall of France over six weeks during May andJune of 1940. Consideration of this historicalexample, moreover, indicates why suchrevolutionary change is difficult to achieve insuccessful military organisations. The impetus to

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Fig 3 – The Yetton Revolutionary Change Model appliedto the Development of Blitzkrieg

the development of all the elements of blitzkriegwas the defeat and humiliation of World War Oneand the size and capability restrictions placed uponthe German Army by the Versailles treaty.Technology-based revolutionary change was acatalyst in a complex environment that includedracist ideology, expansionist strategic intent and amilitary command culture of ‘Auftragstaktik’. Again,as with earlier RMAs, we see a dynamic synthesisof innovative exploitation of technology, allied tonew doctrine, organisations, tactics andoutstanding leadership. Similar circumstances didnot prevail in either the French or British Armies,neither of which had the added impetus of recentnational defeat and humiliation.

From the above analysis, therefore, it is evident thattrue revolutionary change in military capabilitycannot be planned for, but merely envisioned byforward-thinking theorists and developed towardsover time, possibly decades. By and large,successful military organisations during periods ofrelative peace do not make large-scale shifts infunding and investment based on the musings oftheorists: instead, proven technologies are used toallow incremental change. If Network CentricWarfare concepts are to be developed in order tobetter assess the revolutionary claims of theiradherents, therefore, some method must be found ofbearing the enormous costs of such development.

One European nation, for example has taken aconscious decision to let go (literally sell off) legacycapabilities that have no utility in the NCW conceptsemerging for the information age, in order to be able

Chapter 3 37

to invest adequately in more future-proofcapabilities. The consequent defence spendingprofile is illustrated below:

But is the choice really that stark? What is NCW? Isit just American jargon, or is there substance to theconcept that demands our attention?

Martin van Creveld, for example, mapped out thedevelopment of command into broad stages.13 Hepostulated a long ‘Stone Age’ period – everythingpre-dating the Napoleonic system. Thereafter, hemaps out progress with relatively rapid technologicaladvance: the telegraph (American Civil War andWars of German Unification), wire (World War One),radio (World War Two) and finally computers andhelicopters of the Vietnam era. It might be temptingto imagine that digital technology primarilyconstitutes the next stage in the evolution ofcommand. That its exploitation in the military

The Big Issue38

environment is essentially a communications,information system or staff process issue – thesubstantive outcome of which will be a moreeffective command and control system – and that itcan be left primarily to those responsible fordeveloping our command and control systems. Thisis emphatically not the case. Information agetechnology will allow us to fight in an entirelydifferent way, if that is what we chose to do.

A robustly networked force will be integratedvertically by the network, through all commandechelons – strategic to tactical and down to thelowest tactical level. It will also be integratedhorizontally across all functions and components.The network will abolish constraints of geography,enabling robust integration throughout a theatre ofoperations and between theatres of operations – thiswill become especially important as enemiesincreasingly seek to operate outside thecompartments we would wish to set for thebattlespace. Finally, the network, through theimmediacy of information, abolishes time delaybetween an event and knowledge of it, givingeveryone the same ‘event horizon’ in timeregardless of distance.

Over time, information age technology will alloweffects based operations in a single integrated jointbattlespace. The emphasis will be on exploitingnetworked capabilities to apply integrated jointeffects to precise effect – which is not to be confusedwith precision, because an area weapon might benecessary, depending upon the desired effect!Potentially, any combination of means could be

Chapter 3 39

brought together at will at any time and place in thebattlespace in order to achieve a specific effect.There will be greater emphasis on connectivitybetween sensors, weapon platforms and C2 nodesand less emphasis on numbers of weaponplatforms. As the balance of capability shifts fromreliance on mass (platform centric) to reliance oneffective integration and connectivity it becomes‘network centric’.

The diagram on page 41 could be argued adabsurdum; it would clearly be nonsensical to implythat only tiny numbers of networked weapons andsensors are required. On the contrary, significantnumbers are required and they are expensive. Thereis therefore a fundamental balance of investmentshift required in every equipment project. In a‘platform centric’ environment the determinant is toensure that the platform being procured is the bestpossible – that it has the best gun, ammunition,protection, engine and other platform specificfeatures. The second determinant is to acquire asmany of these platforms as can be justified andafforded. In a ‘network centric’ environment theprimary consideration becomes acquiring ‘network-ready platforms’ that can be networked with otherweapons and sensors and C2 nodes. By being partof the network the platform is more effective thaneither intrinsic platform capability or absolutenumbers would provide.

This shift in emphasis is of such fundamentalimportance that it needs to be mandated asacquisition policy in any armed force that is seriousabout exploiting NCW and related concepts.

The Big Issue40

Chapter 3

41

NOTES1 C J Rogers, in Knox and Murray Ed, The Dynamics of

Military Revolution 1350-2050, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2001, Pages 15-34, of which this paragraph is ashort précis.

2 Cannons were also used at Crecy (10 of them), but theireffectiveness is not known.

3 The Flemish victory at Courtrai is widely recognised thegenesis of the idea that, suitably organised, dismountedmen-at-arms could defeat mounted knights.

4 At Crecy, the English fielded 3,900 knights, 5,000 men-at-arms and 11,000 archers. The French fielded 12,000mounted knights, 6,000 Genoese cross-bow men andsome 20,000 local militia and footsoldiers, plus a ‘division’of cavalry under King John of Bohemia.

5 This is asymmetry within force on force warfare, asopposed to asymmetric warfare – a wider conceptexplored in Chapter XVII.

6 S J Lee, The Thirty Years War, Routledge, London, 1919,p 43.

7 Maurice of Orange, William Louis and Count John II ofNassau.

8 OASIG/DTI report to the Economic & Social ResearchCouncil UK, Jan 96.

9 Professor Philip Yetton of the Australian Graduate Schoolof Management has written widely on leadership style,decision-making and information technology. 10 Thishistorical example and the factors surrounding thedevelopment of Blitzkrieg have been much simplified inorder to make this particular point concisely. Nonetheless,the tank was the cornerstone equipment of Blitzkrieg, andGuderian both its chief architect and executant. See, forexample, Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, 2nd Ed,Cassell & Co Ltd, 1951.

11 Guderian was a career Signals officer.12 Murray and Knox, op cit, pp 154-174.13 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge MA, 1985.

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43

CHAPTER 4

THE HOLY GRAILBy Jake Thackray

As it begins to ‘digitise’ its command and controlsystems, the British Army will enter the

information age. The benefits of this investment willpervade every aspect of military effectiveness; somepotential benefits have yet to be imagined. There willbe improved decision-making (better decisionsfaster), resulting in improved combat effects and,consequently, more advantageous outcomes inbattlespace engagements. Initially, we will be betterat operating in the way we do now, but over time,new concepts will become possible. This chaptertherefore considers the initial benefits of digitisingcommand and control systems and then looksahead to longer-term possibilities.

Doing Things BetterTo begin with, to aid understanding, it is necessaryto think of the potential benefits of digitizingcommand systems in the context of the terms ofreference within which we understand command andcontrol now. In order to exercise commandeffectively, commanders at all levels must maketimely decisions and take appropriate action. Theoutcome of digitizing the command system must beto inform, make, disseminate and act upon better

decisions faster. In terms of our presentunderstanding of decision making models, thebenefits sought for decision making and action canbe understood with reference to the decision-actioncycle – Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act – (the socalled OODA Loop1). The outcome should be anaccelerated and qualitatively improvedDecision/Action cycle, resulting in a significant,although as yet unquantified, capabilityenhancement to combat forces.

• Observe is primarily concerned with thecollection of information on enemy forces andthe environment. It requires a robust mix ofISTAR sensors on a variety of platforms,ranging from space-based systems throughaerial to terrestrial systems.

• Orientation has two aspects. The first is theprocessing (collation, evaluation, analysis anddissemination) of the information provided bythe ISTAR systems, including turninginformation into intelligence. This requiresrobust and effective C4I. The second aspect isthe collection and processing of information onthe status of own, friendly and neutral forcesand agencies. The integration of both aspects =situation awareness (the understanding of theoperational environment in the context of thecommander’s mission).

• Deciding requires the time and ability to think,plus the effective presentation of accurate,timely and relevant information, the capacity toseek supplementary information and freedom

The Big Issue44

from information overload through effectiveInformation Management (IM) techniques.

• Act includes the rapid formulation anddissemination of orders and instructions throughrobust and effective C4I. Digitization shouldgreatly enhance the commander’s freedom ofaction by giving him greater scope in time andspace and enabling the more rapid and effectivefocusing of integrated combat power.

The OODA loop model has limitations, not least ofwhich is that it could be argued that it really beginswith decide - decide what to look for, or at. It also haslimitations as a model for C2 in the information age,when collaborative planning occurs simultaneouslyacross functions and in several layers of thecommand structure. Similarly, the idea ofcompetitive OODA loops breaks down in OtherOperations, where the modality can be to spend a lotof time considering what to do and then havingdecided, chose one’s moment to act in the mostopportune circumstances. Some of these limitationsof the OODA loop are returned to later.

Nevertheless, it is envisaged that these anticipatedimprovements to the decision-action cycle will in turnyield improved combat effects – specifically tempo,surprise and survivability, leading to better tacticaloutcomes. For example:

• Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative toa conventional, symmetric enemy. The effectiveexploitation of situational awareness will enablebetter and faster decision-action relative to thatof such an enemy allowing a commander to ‘get

Chapter 4 45

inside the enemy decision-action cycle’ – a keyobjective of mission command – by exploitinginformation and acting upon it before the enemyhas time to react. Linked to this, simultaneityseeks to overload the enemy commander, whois attacked or threatened from so many anglesat once that he is denied the ability toconcentrate on one problem at a time, or evenestablish priorities between problems. This canbe achieved through better collaborativeplanning between components and levels ofcommand and by the improved execution of co-ordinated action throughout the battlespace.Improved tempo is one of the single mostimportant dividends from digitising the commandsystem, consequently any attributes of adigitised force (platforms, structures, tactics)that inhibit tempo should be eschewed andthose that enhance tempo should be embraced.

• But while increased tempo is the key benefit,other wide-ranging and linked benefits include:surprise, increased lethality and survivability.Surprise can be achieved through improvedintegration and more timely dissemination ofintelligence, which will enhance situationawareness and tempo, enabling timely pre-emptive action and the apparently suddenmassing of effects. Improved tactical agility intheatre will be based on situational awareness,greater tempo, quicker reaction and adaptableCombat Service Support. Lethality will beimproved through the integration of ISR andfirepower, including robust and effectivesensor/decider/shooter links, better weapon

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selection, rapid fire-planning and reduced speedof engagement timings. The emphasis will be onmassing effects for the minimum decisive periodthrough better synchronisation of indirect fire,direct fire, Close Air Support, Aviation andoffensive EW. Longer-range precisionengagement of targets will be enabled by newweapon and ISTAR capabilities entering service.Survivability will be improved through superiorsituational awareness, effective Combat ID,2

increased tempo, improved C4I redundancy andresilience to command and control warfare. Thiswill allow superior risk management, greaterdispersion and hence reduced losses of bothequipment and personnel.

These benefits can be said to flow from an over-riding condition, described variously as informationsuperiority, knowledge superiority, decisionsuperiority or cognitive dominance. This is acondition where superior decisions and consequentbattlespace actions are allied to superior informationoperations and perception management to createconditions where the adversary is frozen out of alloptions at all levels and is reduced to a condition ofdecision paralysis, cognitive inferiority and nearperpetual surprise. The enemy is unable to managethe tempo of operations, or to effectively anticipateand proactively counter one’s actions and he ispsychologically isolated in the battle for perceptionsboth abroad and in his domestic constituency.

Chapter 4 47

Doing Better ThingsAs we build on the initial introduction of digitaltechnology, we will deepen our understanding of thetechnology and the challenges and opportunities itpresents. In the US, the move toward entirely newC2 processes and structures has been describedwithin the concept of Network-Centric Warfare. Thekey elements of the NCW Concept are: that arobustly networked force improves informationsharing; that information sharing enhances thequality of information and shared situationalawareness (SA); that shared SA enablescollaboration and self-synchronization, andenhances sustainability and speed of command; andthat, finally, all these in turn dramatically increasemission effectiveness.3 Adherents to NCW conceptshave recognised that these do not yet represent afully-developed warfighting capability; indeed,embodiment of these concepts has been describedas ‘…(a) monumental task (which) will span aquarter century or more’.4 The risk inherent inattempting to embody these concepts, during aperiod of static or contracting defence budgets andcompeting priorities, is obvious. The cost, and loss inshort-term capability required for any future shift ininvestment away from traditional areas (which NCWtheorists have described as platform-centriccapabilities), would be significant. Furthermore, suchcosts would be borne merely in order to explore thenew capabilities which NCW might offer. Militaryplanners are largely conservative by nature: a logicalresponse to the unlimited potential consequences oftheir failure. Given that a revolution cannot, by

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definition, be planned for nor achieved in stages, itappears highly unlikely that the truly revolutionaryconcepts envisaged within the theories of NCW willbe achieved in the timeframe, unless some methodof developing these within existing resourceconstraints is achieved. This is, arguably, the keyresearch and development challenge facing modernmilitary forces over the next two decades.

Unless a significant level of disruptiveexperimentation takes place, the coherentdevelopment of equipment capabilities to enableNCW will not occur. It is now widely understood thata properly planned and resourced jointexperimentation strategy will be essential, otherwisewe confine ourselves to the realms of hypothesis.Warfighting experiments will be essential to supportthe development of networked capabilities. The USexperience with large-scale experiments suggeststhat the expense involved in establishing networksabove the critical mass required prevents suchestablishment on a sufficiently regular basis to allowfor assured conclusions to be reached. The UKexperience, in merely attempting to establish a‘digitization focus’ within an existing deployablebrigade demonstrated the difficulties inherent inresourcing experimental forces by the dual-hattingprocess. Multinational co-operation might offer onesolution to this problem and in any event must bepart of any effective experimentation strategy in anera of multinational expeditionary operations.

Much of that written about NCW hitherto hasfocussed on the use of information-age capabilitypackages to improve existing military

Chapter 4 49

effectiveness: in other words, processimprovement, rather than process invention. Theprocess improvements described make obviousgood sense: few military theorists or practitionerswould debate the value of greater situationalawareness, allowing for better collaborationbetween disparate force elements, contingentsand components, and thus increasing tempo. It isthe wider, unproven assertion of the NCWtheorists – that greater integration of C4ISRacross time, space, function and echelon willallow for self-synchronization5 and thus thepotential for a fundamental re-assessment of howthe chain of command is used to direct militaryactivities – that might truly be consideredrevolutionary in nature. The combat powerdelivered by forces, so networked, will be greaterthan the sum of the parts. This assertion appearsrevolutionary precisely because it makes littlesense to military organisations defined by theirexisting hierarchical processes.

At the heart of the so-called NCW revolution is anemerging recognition by its adherents that theOODA Loop, used above to define the C2 process inmilitary hierarchies, is not a model best suited todescribe this process in the Information Age. TheOODA Loop is too simple to model correctly thediffering C2 processes, both in terms of function andtimescale, which are carried out by HQs at differinglevels of command. As a result, the assertioncontinues, the capabilities and functions managed ateach of these levels are stovepiped and largelyuncoordinated. An information age approach to

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C4ISR, however, allows for the model6 in Figure 1 tobe adopted.

Fig 1 – The Information Age C2 Process7

In the model, three domains define military activity:the physical domain, consisting of the operatingenvironment (all battlespace entities outsideC4ISR processes and systems), the informationdomain (the C4ISR processes and systemsthemselves), and the cognitive domain (the mindsof the participants – where perceptions,awareness, understanding, beliefs and valuesreside, and where, as a result of sensemaking,decisions are made). Within these domains, the

Chapter 4 51

C2 process is adaptive, and consists of a numberof interacting elements:

• Battlespace Monitoring. In the physicaldomain, monitoring systems of all kinds providereports on the environment, friendly, enemy andneutral forces. These reports are then fused(either automatically or manually), transmitted,received, stored and displayed by systems inthe information domain.

• Awareness. Awareness is the quality that thecognitive domain brings to the informationprovided by battlespace monitoring. It is afiltration of this information by the cognitiveprocess – by previous knowledge and beliefsabout the current situation.

• Understanding. Understanding followsawareness. It is a recognition of what thefiltered information presented actually means –in essence, it is the ability of the brain to ‘lift thefog of war’: to correctly perceive the currentsituation and to understand its significance.

• Sensemaking. Once understanding has beenachieved (and the amount of understandingrequired will be subjective, and dependent onthe time available for cross-referencinginformation with other sources) sensemakingtakes place. This is the process by which anunderstanding of the current situation is alliedto a sense of how the situation might develop,how such development will impact on the end-state required, and what activity must takeplace if the required end-state is to be

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reached. The completion of the sensemakingprocess is the making up of one’s mind –arriving at a decision.

• Command Intent. Command intent is theoutcome of sensemaking. It usually consists ofa communication from commander tosubordinates concerning the current situation,the end-state required and the steps needed toachieve it.

• Battlespace Management. Battlespacemanagement is the process by whichcommand intent – its first element – istranslated into activity in the physical domainby force elements. It consists of action in thecognitive and information domains to passinstructions, directives, plans and orders tosubordinate formations.

• Synchronization. Synchronization completesthe process. Force elements, aware of whatthey are to achieve and supported byappropriate enablers, attempt to achieve theend-state described.

NCW terminology apart, there is, arguably, little todifferentiate between the above model and theOODA Loop. Adoption of this model, however, andthe richer concepts it contains, allows for a betterunderstanding of the capability improvement offeredif an information age C4ISR network issuperimposed upon it (next page).

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Fig 2 – Networked Information Age C2 Process8

The imposition on the above model of aninformation-age C4ISR network has the effect of‘squeezing’ the activities in the cognitive domain – iethose activities which must take place beforeeffective battlespace monitoring (now achievedthrough an ISR system of systems) is translated intoeffective battlespace management (now achievedthrough a seamless information grid). This meansfar less time is spent in preparing force elements forsynchronization, because the C2 elements in thesevery units are privy to the same quality of information(and through collaborative working techniques thesame decision-making processes), as their superiorHQs. Effectively, they are able to prepare

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themselves for action before being ordered to do so.Ultimately, as ISR capabilities and those of theinformation grid increase, this ‘squeezing’ effectwould result in the battlespace monitoring andbattlespace management ovals merging, allowingfor immediate self-synchronization. Such self-synchronization would imply that the understanding-sensemaking-command intent oval would now besuperfluous at that particular level of command, thusallowing for removal of that level. This is arevolutionary concept.

This improved understanding of the highercommander’s intent and a more developed andwidely shared understanding of the operationalsituation at all levels of command should, it mightbe argued, provide the conditions in whichmission command should flourish. It should alsoenable a force to achieve an unprecedentedtempo of operations and effectiveness ofmanoeuvre and engagement.

Martin van Creveld and others believe that thosewho propound such revolutionary concepts areself-delusional. He argues that technologically-advanced command systems have never lived upto their promise of producing greaterbattlefield(space) certainty. Firstly, becausewarfare and the human activities within it are asoften irrational as they are otherwise; and secondly,because warfare consists at its heart of a clash ofwills, each with relatively unconstrained freedomsof action. Finally, he points out the self-defeatingdilemma – that more information takes more time toprocess, meaning that at some stage in the

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decision-making process intuitive judgement takesover (even if this is the intuitive capability to knowwhen ‘enough is enough’).

Fig 3 – Self-Synchronization and Command De-Layering

If, however, we are to believe that a technologicalrevolution has taken place, and that van Creveld’sviews pre-date it,9 then NCW and its underlyingconcepts such as self-synchronization must befurther investigated and developed. Candidatetechnologies include, but are not limited to:asymmetric communications methods (in order toallow for rapid dissemination of battlespacemonitoring and management information); adaptive,self-managing networks (in order to allow forceelements to quickly transit between ‘superior’entities in order to seize fleeting opportunitieswhenever they occur); a range of novel

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communications bearers, antennas and electronicwarning and defensive systems (to provide theubiquitous information grid required for self-synchronization); and artificially-intelligent decisionsupport systems.

The resultant command system will be characterisedby a robust network of weapons, sensors anddecision nodes. This in turn will lead to a networkedcombined joint force operating with agility andfleetness of foot, through delegation of executionwithin the command intent to the lowest practicablelevel. The entire combat power of the force willpotentially be at the fingertips (pressel switch) ofevery individual soldier. This is the antithesis of thecentrist ‘long screw driver’ so many fear will be theoutcome of digitizing the command system. But it isin the realisation of concepts such as self-synchronisation that the benefits of information agetechnology lies. This has particular relevance to theincreasing emphasis on medium and small-scaleoperations in the prevailing strategic environment.

Experimentation will be the key to successfulinnovation and the key to successfulexperimentation, like all good things, will be to do ita little and often. Large-scale occasional binges willalso be required, but the conditions for successshould be set by a preceding series of smaller morefocussed events to address specific issues. Thepotential impact of NCW might, therefore, berevolutionary, but the approach to realising it mustbe evolutionary and will take some time. Equally,however, we will also fail if we remain in ourintellectual comfort zone and do not attempt to grasp

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some of the more challenging concepts andpossibilities that require us to ‘think out of the box’.This means that some disruptive largescaleexperimentation will be required that has little or nocurrent training value because the capabilities andorganisations envisaged in the experiment are not inbeing. We need to be open to envisaging entirelynew ways of doing things and to rise to the doctrinal,organisational and cultural challenges thereof.

NOTES1 The OODA Loop was derived from Lt-Col Boyd’s

observations on his own decision/action cycle as a USAFfast jet pilot fighting MIG-15s in the Korean War. It remainsa useful tool but its limitations need to be understood.

2 Combat ID lessens the potential for fratricide. It isachieved through a combination of Tactics, Techniquesand Procedures (TTP), Target Identification (TID), andSituational Awareness.

3 NCW Report to the US Congress, US DoD, Jul 01.4 Ibid.5 ‘Synchronization’ in UK parlance, might be described as

‘integration’: the ability of disparate force elements tobetter support the activities of others, and in doing socreate a synergistic effect.

6 This is a summary of the issues explored in more detail inAlberts, Garstka, Hayes & Signori UnderstandingInformation Age Warfare, CCRP, Aug 01. (Download fromdodccrp.org).

7 By kind permission of Dr David Alberts.8 By kind permission of Dr David Alberts.9 Command in War was written in 1985, well before NCW

and the current RMA had been identified.

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CHAPTER 5

NEO HEROICCOMMAND

By David Potts

It was not the Legions that crossed the Rubicon,but Caesar.

Napoleon

…he doth bestride the narrow worldLike a Colossus; and we petty menWalk under his huge legs and peep aboutTo find ourselves dishonourable graves.

William ShakespeareJulius Caesar, I, ii, ll 134-7

John Keegan described commanders in the ColdWar nuclear age as ‘Post Heroic’1– the

imperatives of Mutually Assured Destruction and thestatic command infrastructure required commanderswho were the very antithesis of the heroicAlexandrine model. An exception, arguably, waspresident Kennedy, a charismatic Commander-in-Chief in the heroic mould. However, it is doubtfulwhether the general public could name even ahandful of senior military men from this era – in theUS, Al Haig perhaps, but more so for his role asSecretary of State than as SACEUR; MacArthur ofcourse for Korea and Westmoreland for Vietnam.From a British Army perspective, during the Cold

War there was a stove-piped UK national chain ofcommand to Corps level and thence to the NorthernArmy Group, which was commanded by a UK 4-Star.In the UK today, the odd Cold War era GOCNorthern Ireland might be remembered – Harry Tuzofor example, and others who commandedadventures outside the Cold War mainstream(Woodward and Thompson in the Falklands), butgenerations of senior British, NATO commandershave vanished into obscurity.

However, the end of the Cold War has heralded anew era of expeditionary operations that haveimposed enormous challenges on our seniorcommanders, catapulting them into chaotic anddangerous situations in distant corners of the world2

and, through television, into the homes of thenation. It is the synthesis of these specialcircumstances with the impact of informationtechnology that defines the nature of command inthe information age.

General Schwarzkopf heralded this new model –both he and the war he commanded were portentsof what was to come. Whilst remaining more or lessin his ‘bunker’ in Riyadh, he nevertheless galvanisedhis forces, the Middle-east region and the coalition,while astonishing the world with Patton-like orations,illustrated by videos of the latest precision strike andbeamed to a global audience his predecessors couldnever have imagined reaching. He commanded thelast cavalry charge of its millennium and at the sametime lifted the curtain on a new way of warfare for the21st century.

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British armour in the Gulf War

Although there have been a number of notableexceptions, the forces taking part in contemporaryoperations have been characteristically multinationalin nature, usually ‘coalitions of the willing’. Coalitionsmust be built and maintained, capitals consulted,policy influenced, governments and heads of state inthe theatre of operations assuaged and cajoled anda kaleidoscopic variety of military capabilities,cultures and agendas forged together. This bringsspecial challenges for commanders today, and in thefuture, requiring what can only be described as ‘vice-regal’ commanders3 in the mould of the long Britishtradition exemplified by Marlborough at Blenheim,Wellington at Waterloo, Mountbatten in the Far Eastand Alexander in Italy.

This chalice is not just passed to seniorcommanders, but, in the UK Armed Forces, isroutinely passed to one-star officers, either ascommanders of the standing Joint ForceHeadquarters, or to formation commanders whoseheadquarters are now routinely tasked to take on

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the JFHQ role. In Sierra Leone, for example,Brigadier David Richards4 and his one-starsuccessors there worked alongside the UKAmbassador in direct support of the Sierra Leonegovernment, while shoring up the UN forces andcommanding a UK joint force that fluctuated tosome 5,000 personnel. As the commander on thespot, his actions shaped the strategic outcome ofthis national expeditionary operation. His progresscould be followed daily by his political masters andby an interested viewing public. Even thisapparently national operation had a fundamentallyinternational flavour with UN involvement and thekeen interest of Sierra Leone’s neighbours.

Gen Sir Rupert Smith (DSACEUR)(right) with Lt Gen Reith, Task Force

North, Albania

Leadership of the Allied CommandEurope Rapid Reaction Corps(ARRC) has given UKcommanders the opportunity tocommand expeditionaryoperations in a NATO non-Article

V context (General Walker in Bosnia and GeneralJackson in Kosovo). But we have also providedsenior commanders to major UN (Generals Roseand Smith in UNPROFOR) and OSCE (Maj GenDrewienkiewicz in the Kosovo Verification Mission)operations. This is unsurprising – as a nexus power5

the UK is uniquely placed to perform a coalition-building role, providing both the political and militaryleadership for coalition operations. The UK’sposition, in geographic, linguistic and historicalterms make it well-placed to play a leading role in

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multinational military effort, and it is the central pier,both physically and intellectually, in the Atlanticbridge. International legitimacy will continue to be apolitical imperative for most operations, and as longas the political advantage offered by multi-nationalityoutweighs the military friction inherent within it, suchoperations are expected to be the norm in the future.This places especially demanding challenges on ourcommanders, who will require more than a touch ofambassadorial diplomacy, saintly perseverance andChurchillian strength of character.

Brig David Richards, Joint Task Force Commander, withthe UK Ambassador to Sierra Leone and political and

civil affairs advisors

Contemporary and future conflict will bringcommanders some relatively new challenges andfrictions, including political and legal constraints,media interest and the immediacy of information.This applies to any military involvement in all formsof conflict, whether undertaken on a national ormultinational basis. War is an instrument of policy.6

Forces will be deployed on operations, of whateverscale and intensity, to achieve a political purpose.Political control and involvement is therefore bothinevitable and legally necessary7 – interference and

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involvement from the highest level in tactical issuesis to be expected.8 Developments in communicationsnow allow open video links between capitals andTheatre headquarters; Ministers, senior officers andofficials will want to use them, and to speak tocommanders, not their senior staffs. This may alsoapply to those in alliance or coalition capitals – thedemands on the commander’s time and attentionare obvious. Commanders will need to beremarkably astute to avoid the innumerable politicalbear traps.

Gen Sir Michael Rose at Gorazde

Nevertheless, a commander should receive hisformal political control from the international bodyunder whose auspices the operation is beingconducted. This could be from, for example, theUN, OSCE, NATO, EU or an ad hoc coalition – witheach organization having a widely differentcapability to focus the political intent of itsmembership into the kind of guidance militarycommanders need. As one COMARRC observed,‘Political guidance can be really helpful – if you get

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it’.9 Decisionmaking can be tardy at the strategiclevel: KFOR, for example, did not receive a NATOACTORD until 10 Jun 99, by which time they werelargely deployed in Macedonia, under nationalfunding arrangements. Continued efforts arerequired to mature the Pol/Mil interface and C2capability of international organizations, especiallythe UN,10 so that they can provide the kind ofguidance military commanders need.Commanders will be required to operate incircumstances where the situation on the ground iscomplex, even chaotic, and the political guidancereceived is unclear. This calls for great wisdomand perspicacity.

Other Operations are increasingly multifunctional,and not necessarily dominated by a militaryagenda.11 Diverse friendly and neutral actors arepresent on such operations. These agenciesbecome additional points of contact for thecommander, placing additional demands on his timeand attention, and can have a significant impact onmilitary planning and the outcome of key aspects ofan operation. Commanders should be prepared forthis impact, both by pre-deployment andinstitutionalised training, and supported by the betterintegration into multinational HQs of military ordeployable civilian staff with expertise in theseareas. More importantly, the complexity of OtherOperations requires an ‘integrated’ approach to thepolitical, diplomatic, military, civil, legal, humanitarianand economic lines of operation. Commanders needto be able to think and operate across the fullbreadth of all lines of operation, creating unity ofeffort amongst all those involved.

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Contributing nations, in both warfighting and otheroperations, will have their own national perceptionsand political agendas. The commander of multi-national forces will need to be alert to this and willhave a key role in promoting coalition cohesion and‘keeping everyone on-board’ – this is, in a sense, aclassic ‘rear operation’. Timely liaison will berequired with troop contributing nations’ capitals, bythe commander personally and by people with firsthand knowledge of the operational circumstances.However, in pursuing coalition cohesion, acommander must not lose sight of his mission.Coalition cohesion will be the multi-national force’scentre of gravity – opposing forces will realize thisand are likely to adopt tactics to attack it: forexample; Iraq’s Scud attacks on Israel wereprobably intended to produce a reaction which mightfracture the international coalition. Commandersneed to recognise threats to coalition cohesion anddevelop proactive plans to counter them.

The realities observed in Bosnia by one UNcommander will undoubtedly persist:

‘Every troop contributing nation had its ownnational command structure within the main UNstaff, and each nation had its own politicalagenda as well as a chief of contingent who heldthe national red card.’ 12

The need to achieve consensus on political andmilitary strategic issues can create friction in theoperational planning process and hinder thecommander in allocating tasks and responsibilities tohis force elements. Generating an effective and

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Chapter 5 67

harmonious headquarters takes time andcommanders need to devote their own time andconsiderable personal energy to bilaterals withNational Contingent Commanders and to building aclose relationship with them. But however vexingmodern command arrangements might be, they areunlikely to be as taxing as those in the Schellenbergcampaign of 1704, which obliged Marlborough andthe Margrave Lewis of Baden, as the pre-eminentnational contingent commanders, to take turns ascommander of the allied force on alternate days.13

Senior officers from five contingents working together

It is apparent, therefore, that the commander’s timeand energy will need to be directed towards dealingwith the political level in various capitals andinternational bodies, building cohesion within theforce through his personal efforts, interfacing with anincreasing range of agencies and players in thebattlespace and rising above the pressures of themedia. Ever-increasing demands on their time andattention will challenge commanders to prioritisetheir own activities on matters additional to the

‘normal’ military business of operational command.Additionally, for linguistic and other reasons,subordinate national contingents may also needmore time than is usual to comprehend and act upontheir orders. This means the commander may haveless time than he would expect for his own decision-making and planning; HQ ARRC, for example,operate on a 1/4 – 3/4 rule rather than 1/3 – 2/3.14

1st Bn Coldstream Guards, Vitez. 1993

A key challenge for commanders of multi-nationalforces is that of forging a common purpose acrossthe breadth of outlook, training and capability foundin the coalition. A number of tensions and frictionsadd complexity to the already daunting task ofachieving unity of effort. Commanders must meshdifferent national doctrines, weapon systems,logistics and degrees of military expertise together,ensuring equality of risk and suffering across thecoalition, playing to the strengths of the nationalcontingents to make best use of expertise,capabilities and command states. They must also,somehow, ensure that the excellent performance of

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some contingents is not seen in relation to under-performance by other contingents.

Operations are also inherently joint in nature.Operational Level commanders will be faced with anespecially complex task of integrating multinationaljoint capabilities. C2 tempo and culture will varysignificantly between services within individualcontingents. There may also be widely varyingdegrees of ‘jointery’ with some contingents being instove-piped components, and this could impact onthe commander’s ability to conduct truly jointcampaigns and thereby generally add to the frictionsof command.

Arguably, in political terms, the importance of anoperation will be directly proportional to the level ofmedia interest, rather than to the scale of theoperation. Operations will be conducted under thefull and real time glare of the world’s media –particularly when offensive operations are underway,casualties are taken, or setbacks occur.Commanders must be able to handle theinternational media directly and through appointedstaff. This can be a matter of personal style, in thatsome commanders (General Smith) have preferreda staff interface, whilst others (General Rose)appeared to favour direct personal engagement withthe media. Regardless of personal style, the battlefor public opinion may mean added pressure for thecommander himself to interface with media, ratherthan leaving it to a spokesman; but preparingproperly for a press conference or interview can betedious and time consuming. All commanders inexpeditionary operations will require a responsive

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and comprehensive media operations capability,including staff, communications and IS.15 It willcontinue to be vital to transmit information rapidly tothe strategic and political levels of command in orderto counter potentially adverse near-real-time mediareporting. The use in media briefings of imageryfrom the theatre of operations is now common. Theburgeoning demands of Information OperationsCampaigns may also be expected to increase in thefuture. This vital requirement brings with it the addedpressure of ensuring that all constituencies –including multinational contingents – in the Area ofOperations are addressed appropriately.

Targeting can be a highly political activity. From ourown national experience, the sinking of the Belgranostands out as a stark example with politicalresonance nearly 20 years later. Involvement of thepolitical level in targeting is to be expected andcatered for in circumstances where the attack of theselected target, or the means chosen to attack it, canbe expected to have a political impact. The lessintense the operation, the more likely that thepolitical level will be able to involve itself in targeting– and the discernible trend is very much toward lessintense operations than were envisaged in the ColdWar or witnessed in the Gulf. The process andprocedural, including media and evidential, issuesthat this implies can be assisted greatly by moderncommunications and information technology. Themost challenging aspect is the degree of implicittransparency, conflicting as it will with operationalsecurity, timeliness and other operational factors.Commanders need to be supported by staff who can

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handle the political and inter-linked mediadimensions of targeting and its outcome.

Peace Support Operations pitch commandersagainst each other intellectually and face to face. Inwarfighting, one could postulate that commanders,particularly senior ones, tend to sit on top of amilitary chain of command and direct the lower levelcommanders who then take the action that impactsdirectly upon the enemy. Commanders, in a sense,fight each other through the medium of the forcesunder their command. In Peace Support Operations,opposing commanders and leaders at all levels tendto deal with each other face to face. The emphasis ison personal interaction in talks and negotiations.This is backed up by knowledge of the capabilities ateach others’ disposal, an understanding of eachothers’ willingness and capacity to use thosecapabilities effectively, and a profound awareness ofthe political significance of the dialogue and itsimpact on other factions and actors - in the theatreand outside it. Commanders will be personallytested to see how they and their troops react tospecific, sometimes well orchestrated, incidents.Thus, whilst command in Peace Support Operationshas innumerable similarities with command on allother forms of operation, there are subtle differencesthat need to be understood and prepared for.Commanders will require prenegotiation informationand knowledge of their adversary’s intentions,second and third agendas, options, state of mindand even the advice they have been given.

At the lower tactical level, the Balkan ‘road block’ isof course the classic example of this sort of scenario.

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British forces often joke that the ambition of everySerb youth was to run his own ‘road block’. In theKosovo campaign, Pristina airport was, in a sense,General Jackson’s ‘road block’. General Clarke hassubsequently accused General Jackson of failing tosee the strategic picture and of viewing the issuefrom the narrow perspective of an operationalcommander.16 In General Clarke’s view, action bytroops on the ground to confront the Russians wasessential, both for the success of the mission and toput the Russians in their place, thereby determiningthe basis of NATO’s relationship with Russiathenceforth. Arguably, this approach is indicative of aCold War, or warfighting mind-set. General Jacksonsaw no merit in confronting the Russians on theground – the airport had no role to play in his plansand the situation could easily escalate unpredictably,from confrontation to conflict. Instead, heestablished a direct personal relationship with theRussian commander on the ground and therebyaltered the dynamics of the whole situation. Thisapproach is indicative of the crucial importance ofcommander-to-commander personal relationships inmulti-faceted PSO. Arguably, General Jackson’stactics, far from being overly focussed at theoperational level, had real strategic impact andhelped shape a more co-operative relationship withRussia that has paid dividends in Afghanistan andbeen a milestone on the road to NATO’s newrelationship with its old adversary.

However, the recent warfighting phase of theAfghanistan conflict has given us a quite differentinsight into the nature of command in the informationage. General Franks has orchestrated the military

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campaign in central Asia from his headquarters onthe other side of the world in Tampa, Florida –surrounded, even cocooned, by literally thousandsof supporting staff. His role has appeared to becloser to that of a coordinating maestro thananything recognizable as command in the heroicmould. His media appearances, initially infrequentand uncertain, became more confident as theoperation unfolded and more recently he has beenposing easily for the cameras with his Commanderin Chief, confirming his status as the man of themoment. His command modality may exhibit manyPost-heroic traits, but he could not truly be describedas a Post-heroic commander – because he wagedoffensive operations, projecting the combat power ofa super power into the heart of a far away continent.This is the antithesis of Post-heroic command. Butabove all else, he has exhibited the definingcharacteristic of all great generals – he deliveredvictory. He might also be illustrative of a newcommand paradigm for the information age – he sawand he conquered, without personally going there.

But the war also saw a more familiar, direct andtangible command and leadership style provided byothers. At the tactical level, General Dostum and hisfellow khans and warlords provided a kind ofmedieval command and leadership to their tribalarmies. Junior commanders of US and BritishSpecial Forces and Marines will have undoubtedlyhad their leadership tested in the most challenging ofcircumstances. While at the strategic level, Mr Blair’spresidential tour de force of personal diplomacyappeared to galvanise the coalition. Finally, as theemphasis in the conflict switched rapidly from

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warfighting to nation building, Major General JohnMcColl arrived in Kabul in circumstances he couldnot have imagined only a few months previously.

Maj Gen John McColl in Kabul

In ancient Greece a hero was aman of superhuman strength,courage or ability, favoured bythe Gods. These are, in asense, the qualities we demandof our commanders in theinformation age. Superhumanstrength of character to face the

immense challenges of contemporary operationsand to rise above the daily frustrations and thepolitical and media exposure. Courage to do whatneeds to be done in the face of critics and doubtersand despite the inevitable setbacks and mishaps.Ability founded on demonstrable expertise – a trackrecord of successful command at relevant levels inthe widest possible range of operationalcircumstances. And favoured by the Gods – asNapoleon said when he heard favourable reports ofthe young Ney, ‘Yes, he might be good, but is helucky?’ From a military perspective, the informationage will be defined as much by the passing of theCold War and the resultant blossom of conflict andterrorism around the world, as by the technology.The mask that command will wear in this era isforming as the era unfolds, but the indications arethat it is already displaying many qualities that couldbe fairly described as ‘Neo-heroic’.

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NOTES1 John Keegan, The Mask of Command, Random House,

London, 1999 (first published 1987), pp 311 – 351.2 Some not so distant – witness Brig Alec Birtwhistle in

Cumbria winning the admiration of the nation in the Footand Mouth battle!

3 Although historically in the UK, with the notable exceptionof Wellington, we seem to retire them from public life at theapex of their powers.

4 Now Major General Richards.5 The UK is a member of the UN P5, G8, NATO, EU, OSCE

and Commonwealth and is the nexus of theseorganisations.

6 Carl von Clausewitz et al.7 For the UK, ‘the authority of the Crown is represented by

the Government of the day and in mechanismsestablished by law and the Royal Prerogative. A range ofpowers is vested by Statute and Letters Patent in theDefence Council under the chairmanship of the SofS forDefence’, British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0-01), 5.11.

8 Goose Green is perhaps the most controversial examplein recent British history – a battle, in particular its timing,fought at the behest of politicians to show early militarysuccess to a wavering world, rather than out of militaryexpediency.

9 Taken from an after-dinner speech given by General SirMike Jackson, published in Gary Sheffield and GeoffreyTill (Eds), The Challenges of High Command in the 20thCentury, SCSI Occasional Paper No 38, based onproceedings of SCSI/JSCSC/Dept of War Studies RMASandhurst Joint Conference, Bracknell, Oct 1998.

10 ‘The UN Secretariat is not structured to fulfil the role ofwhat could be described as a strategic or operational levelHQ’ – ‘Command, Control, Cohesion and Coherence inPeace Support Operations’ in Sheffield and Till, op cit.

11 Ibid.12 Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace, Harvill Press,

London, 1998, Page 106.13 See for example, F Taylor, The Wars of Marlborough,

Oxford, 1921, pp 147-185 and F W O Maycock,Marlborough’s Campaigns, Allen and Unwin, 1913, pp 34-47.

14 This means the superior HQ uses 1/4 of the time available,allowing 3/4 of the time for subordinate HQs to conduct their

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planning – a 1/3 to 2/3 ratio would be a norm in UK nationaloperations.

15 Media management is a wider issue than the provision ofmedia advisers in HQs. The UK’s Media OperationsGroups, which may be tailored to meet the requirements ofdifferent operations, and can include Mobile News Teams,provide commanders with the ability not just to managethe reporting of news, but to create and transmit their‘own’ media reports.

16 Wesley Clarke, Waging Modern War, Public Affairs, NewYork, 2001, pp 397-403.

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CHAPTER 6

A COMMANDPHILOSOPHY FOR THE

INFORMATION AGE:

THE CONTINUINGRELEVANCE OF

MISSION COMMANDBy Jim Storr

Introduction

British Military Doctrine espouses MissionCommand, a philosophy of decentralised

command based on trust and initiative. Its originscan be traced at least as far back as the NapoleonicWars, although not necessarily in British practice. Itsmore immediate provenance lies in German practicein both World Wars. It was adopted formally by theBritish Army in 1987 and subsequently became acornerstone of British Defence Doctrine.1, 2

The twenty-first century brings new challenges, newperspectives and perhaps also new opportunities.There must be some doubt as to whether a

command philosophy born in high-intensity warfareand adopted in the closing years of the Cold Warretains its relevance. This chapter considers thenature and origins of mission command, discussessome of the challenges facing it, and then discusseswhether it is still valid as a doctrine for British forcesin the first decades of the twenty-first century.

The Nature of Mission CommandMission Command is fundamentally a decentralisedstyle of command, relying on initiative, theacceptance of responsibility and mutual trust. Its keyelements are:

‘timely decision making, the importance ofunderstanding the superior commander’sintention and, by applying this to one’s ownactions, and a clear responsibility to fulfil thatintention. The underlying requirement is thefundamental responsibility to act, or in certaincircumstances to decide not to act, within theframework of the commander’s intent’.3

The key elements are those of responsibility, intentand the contract of trust. The responsibility ofcommanders of all ranks is well understood andestablished. The responsibility to act as bid is notnew either; it is, in effect, duty. The identification ofthe commander’s intent per se is relatively new, and‘intent’ is perhaps an issue that still requires furtheranalysis. However, put simply, commanders havelong expressed their intent in the orders they give.

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What is perhaps novel is the identification of acontract of trust. The superior trusts his subordinateto act; to act within the commander’s intent; and toact sensibly in the circumstances he finds himself,which are not necessarily those the superiorenvisaged when composing his orders.Consequently the subordinate may act in a way thecommander did not envisage, but which thecommander would endorse were he aware of thecircumstances. Conversely the subordinate truststhat the superior has given him the direction andresources appropriate to the job, and that thesuperior will support him in exercising his initiative.

The existence of a contract of trust is important.Under Mission Command superiors should state aminimum of control measures, so as not to constrainsubordinates’ freedom of action.4 This grants thesubordinate considerable latitude. In an environmentof trust and initiative, such latitude also speeds theproduction, dissemination and comprehension oforders, thus increasing tempo. Mission Command isintended to avoid the production of long and detailedorders, and to allow initiative and the seizure offleeting opportunities. It can only work where bothparties trust each other to act appropriately.

Mission Command is endorsed doctrine. This doesnot imply that it is ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’; but that it isagreed, is authoritative, and is taught. It implies thatthe Services collectively wish their commanders toact in accordance with its tenets where appropriate.Importantly, it is espoused behaviour: the way theServices wish their commanders to act. Similarly it isdoctrine, not dogma; hence guidance, not

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instruction. It acknowledges that there may besituations where a commander does not employMission Command and (for example) issues longand detailed orders which tell the subordinateexactly how to act. There is a risk that such apossibility may become an excuse for not employingMission Command at all. That eventuality wouldillustrate a difference between espoused andenacted behaviour.

The Origins of Mission CommandThe Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were thefirst conflicts in which large bodies routinelymanoeuvred separately off the battlefield, butcombined to fight at the same time and place. Theconcept of the ‘corps d’armée’ was made to workacross significant distances, up to several hundredmiles, with only rudimentary communications.Although campaigns might be planned in detail inadvance, once corps were on the move onlyoccasional dispatches carried on horseback couldguide the actions of their commanders. Yet corpscould be manoeuvred to meet on the battlefield or,perhaps more importantly, to fix or delay an enemyuntil sufficient strength was assembled to bringabout his defeat.

Trust was clearly a key issue. Commanders-in-chieftrusted their corps commanders in part because theyhad to. Armies were too big to move en bloc, andgenerals learnt to act in concert not least throughhard experience. Analogous circumstances alsoobtained at sea. Nelson wrote to Collingwood:

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‘I send you my plan of attack, as far as a mandare venture to guess at the very uncertainposition of the enemy may be found in; but it is toplace you perfectly at ease respecting myintentions, and to give full scope to yourjudgement for carrying them into effect’.

Nelson’s only signals at Trafalgar were, firstly, hisinspirational ‘England expects ...’; secondly, aninstruction to anchor after the engagement (ie, not tobreak into a general pursuit) and, thirdly and finally,‘Engage the enemy more closely’. Having expressedhis intent in conference prior to the battle, Nelsonclearly expected his ‘band of brothers’ to get on withit. And his intent was quite categoric: ‘No captainshall do very badly who lays his ship alongside thatof an enemy’. Mission Command is anything but anexclusively land concept.

The provenance of Mission Command can befollowed most easily in Prussian and subsequentlyGerman Army practice. Scharnhorst had taught atStaff College in 1809-14 that the French successesof 1806-7 had been won by the

‘complete and aggressive responsiveness ofFrench commanders to the will of Napoleon ...,even without orders, and miles distant’.5

Moltke the Elder observed the sheer difficulty ofcontrolling armies of 200,000 men or more in themid-nineteenth century and considered thatcommanders should be

‘assigned general missions, related tofundamental, clearly understood objectives, and

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then instructed to accomplish those missions bycarrying the fight aggressively to the enemy’.6

After the Franco-Prussian war Moltke wrote that

‘a favourable situation will never be exploited ifcommanders wait for orders. The highestcommander and the youngest soldier must beconscious of the fact that omission and inactivityare worse than resorting to the wrongexpedient’.7

The First World War eventually saw decision makingdecentralised down to the lowest possible levels.The infiltration tactics which were the Germanresponse to the conditions of trench warfare reliedon the section commander, and possibly even theindividual soldier, acting on his own initiative insupport of the commanders’ intent. On the 21stMarch 1918, the first day of the Spring Offensive, aGerman stormtrooper was captured afterpenetrating nearly as far as a British brigade HQ. Onquestioning as to his orders he said simply ‘soweiter, so beßer’ – ‘the further, the better’. A moreconcise statement of intent would be hard toformulate. He and his comrades worked in anenvironment of trust: trust that his superiors wouldsupport and reinforce any penetration that theymade (although in his particular case, somethingclearly didn’t quite work).

The effectiveness of the Wehrmacht at the tacticallevel is almost legendary. That effectiveness, ifsometimes perhaps more legendary than real, is theproduct of many factors. Nonetheless it seemsreasonable that the Wehrmacht’s command style –

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‘Auftragstaktik’ or ‘mission command’ – was onesuch factor. The Wehrmacht’s ability to generate adhoc battlegroups from fragments of units, tocounterattack strongly even before the precisenature of a threat had been identified, and the tempoits units often demonstrated all indicate a loose,flexible and decentralised command philosophy.That philosophy is very much at odds with thestereotype of the inflexible and dogmatic Germanofficer portrayed in films.8

It is perhaps a truism that the victor learns least inwar; or at least that the loser learns most. It doesappear that post-war British and US practiceadopted little from the Wehrmacht. Indeed it was notuntil a generation of officers who had no personalexperience of the Second World War came to powerin the British Army that issues such as commandphilosophy even began to be considered.9 AsCommander 1st British Corps and subsequentlyCommander NORTHAG (and CinC BAOR), GeneralSir Nigel Bagnall studied both Wehrmacht andIsraeli command philosophies.10 The introduction ofMission Command into British Army practice andsubsequently British joint doctrine flowed directlyfrom General Bagnall’s work in the late 1970s andearly 1980s.

Challenges in the Early Twenty-FirstCenturyWe can identify five challenges to the doctrine ofMission Command in the early part of the twenty-firstcentury. They lie in the areas of the spectrum of

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future operations; the information revolution;asymmetric threats; blame culture and litigation; andthe need to sustain the human quality of the Britisharmed forces.

If Mission Command was born in high-intensitywarfare there must be a question as to its relevanceto a wider spectrum of operations. The question iswhether decentralised decision making, trust,responsibility, and shared intent, supporting higher-tempo operations, is relevant or appropriate inPeace Support Operations (PSO), not least becauseof the possibility that actions at tactical levels canhave operational or even strategic impact. Thispossibility has been described as the concept of the‘strategic corporal’.

The answer must be an emphatic ‘yes’. The strategiccorporal in PSO may be required to think just asquickly, and his action may have equally momentousconsequences, as if he were being shot at. Indeed,on occasion, he may be shot at. Arguably whatmakes today’s scenarios different is not the range ofpossible operations so much as the possibility ofimmediate and direct communications fromgovernment to section commander: a consequenceof the information revolution.

The time and space aspects of the informationrevolution require consideration. It may betechnically possible for a government minister tocommunicate directly with a section commander: butonly one at any one time. All the other sectioncommanders deployed in that and other theatres,and their commanders, have a job to do 24 hours a

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day. Governmental involvement may be appropriatein some instances (a topic to be considered later),but across a whole expeditionary force it is simplynot practical. For most commanders most of thetime, the established chain of command will be theirnormal source of direction. Evidence from PSOssuggests that armies which are obliged to refer alltactical decisions back to national capitals cannotdisplay the flexibility and tempo which their lessconstrained peers enjoy.

This is the domain of the ‘long handled screwdriver’;the ability of the senior commander, or perhaps moreworryingly the government minister, to closelymonitor and direct low-level activities in a farawaytheatre from his desk in his capital city. In part thisissue arises because ‘he can’. Not only does modernIT allow it, but the relatively low level of activity inPSO (compared with war) gives him a relativelylimited range of incidents to get involved with at anyone time. Therefore he can involve himself with theone roadblock, the one shooting, the one targetingdecision that is happening when his attention fallsthat way. When conflict becomes more intense hisability to get involved in all such incidents decreases.

This might be called the Province of the Five ‘Ins’:Interest, Involvement, Influence, Intervention andInterference. Governmental interest in militaryactivities is a sine qua non. It is highly desirable tohave some ministerial involvement. Ministerialinfluence in military operations is normal, and notleast transmitted through CDS’ Directive to theJoint Force Commander. In a democracy thepossibility for ministerial intervention must always

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exist, not least when things start to go wrong.However, at what point do all these becomeministerial interference? Is it merely when theminister insists on something with which the tacticalcommander disagrees?

A more reasoned view is that managing the politicalinterface (the Sixth ‘In’, which encompasses theother five) is the operational commander’s job.11

Increasingly, not least through formal measuressuch as attendance at the UK Higher Command andStaff Course, senior commanders are learning tomanage such political involvement. In some cases itmay be a case of gently educating the ministersinvolved. That is far from suggesting that theproblem will go away, and never recur. But it doessuggest that Mission Command can, and should beallowed to, prosper. To do so senior militarycommanders must manage the Five Ins, allowingjunior commanders to do their jobs whilst ministersdo theirs.

Asymmetric threats are a further issue. Much of thehigh-intensity warfare in which Mission Commandevolved was broadly symmetric. Can we extrapolatefrom there to highly asymmetric threats? Again, theanswer is probably ‘yes’. Arguably, to a majorwestern democracy, the chief concern raised byasymmetry is that of surprise. Given warning,western nations can deploy their sophisticatedintelligence services to identify and investigate thethreat. Their defence scientific bases can developtechnical counters, and their sophisticated industrialcapabilities can manufacture them. They have highlytrainable armed and police forces with which to

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respond, once the appropriate response has beendeveloped. However, taken by surprise,considerable damage can be done before thecounters are developed and deployed. If surpriseoccurs, the best defence is rapid and appropriatecounteraction. The commander on the spot must actquickly and appropriately; probably in a novelmanner, but one which supports his superiors’overall intent. That will only happen in a commandenvironment in which he is trusted to use hisinitiative and act effectively. In other words, all therequirements of Mission Command remain valid.

A further threat to Mission Command lies in the twinareas of blame culture and litigation. Their combinedeffects are insidious and potentially corrosive. Onthe one hand, if something goes wrong, somebody isusually blamed. There is a ‘fall guy’, not leastbecause the Media, with their need for immediatebut often simplistic messages, want someone to beseen to be blamed. Mission Command only works inan environment of mutual trust. One importantelement of that trust is acceptance by the superior ofwell-intentioned mistake. Maintaining that elementrequires that the superior shoulders any blamehimself if necessary. A further element of trust isloyalty upwards. If a superior makes a well-intentioned mistake the subordinate can sometimesact to mitigate its consequences (if he understandsthe overall intent). In both cases, for either party toblame the other erodes trust and hence the socialfabric of Mission Command.

The prevalence and the fear of litigation are similarlycorrosive. If a commander feels that he may be

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taken to court as a consequence of his actions, hewill tend to be highly conservative; to plan in greatdetail; to allow subordinates little freedom of action.He will tend to seek precise direction from superiors.Conversely, in some circumstances a superior mightdeliberately be so vague that he cannot be heldaccountable for what his subordinates actually do(‘…ah, but, I didn’t tell him to do that.’) In both thesecases the social fabric of Mission Command is onceagain torn.

The prevalence of litigation in modern society makesthe fear of it insidious: it is reflected in articles byjunior officers.12 Overcoming that concern requires,firstly, that it be recognised. Secondly, it requires thechain of command to take visible steps to supportthose at risk (in the courts if necessary), andpossibly a review of legislation to identify if andwhere such risks occur. It may be that newlegislation is required to protect junior commandersengaged in legitimate and well-intentioned activitieswhich do not yet enjoy protection under the law.13

A further issue is the need to sustain the humanquality of our armed forces. Mission Commandrequires initiative. If we are to retain high-calibrepeople capable of thinking and acting quickly andeffectively under stress, we need to retain a doctrineor philosophy (such as Mission Command) thatsupports those characteristics. If we do not, the goodwill leave and only the obedient, subservient andunimaginative will stay.

There is here however an element of circularargument: we see those who display initiative and

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can think and act quickly as good; and we promotea doctrine that supports those characteristics. This isnot actually a problem: it suggests that our basicvalues, evolved over centuries of conflict around theWorld, are accurately reflected in a doctrine that wehave enunciated only recently.

Continuing RelevanceThe relevance of Mission Command to the twenty-first century can be considered from a number ofdirections. Firstly, it is a sensible response to anenvironment which is seen to be increasinglycomplex. Complexity theory suggests that the mosteffective way of managing highly interrelated anddynamic problems is by the decentralisation ofdecision making and action to close to the source ofthe complexity.14 War and armed conflict of anynature is hugely complex, dynamic, adversarial andhuman. If anything, it will become even morecomplex and dynamic as IT allows greater and moreimmediate connectivity between people. Thusdecentralising decision making to close to thepeople who are at the seat of the conflict is the bestlong-term strategy.

Complexity has another aspect which theinformation revolution exacerbates. Complexproblems generate huge amounts of information.That information, which can often be dealt withadequately near to the source of complexity, risksthat the local actor responds inappropriately from aglobal context. One response to this is to ensure thatthe actor understands the overall intent. That is,Mission Command once again. The other alternative

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is to centralise by passing all the informationupwards. Unfortunately, the amount of informationpassed between a group of people increasesroughly with the square of the number involved (aconsequence of many-to-many informationstrategies), whilst their ability to deal with it onlyincreases linearly. Thus increasing the number ofpeople dealing with complex situations (for example,by increasing staff sizes in HQs) is flawed in the longrun. This is a somewhat simplistic explanation; andIT can and does assist the transmission, handlingand storage of information; but it highlights asignificant issue. Decentralisation and local flexibilitywithin the overall intent are the best options.

Pragmatism is a further issue. Pragmatically,Mission Command seems to work, with caveats. Itmay have taken the British Armed Forces a long timeto enunciate, but it does seem to reflect what theyhave learnt that does actually work in practice.Pragmatism is a peculiarly Anglo-Saxon virtue.15, 16

Although armed forces have often been chargedwith excessive conservatism (which might explainthe British Army’s seeming reluctance to adoptdoctrine at all in the 1980s), it is perhaps fairer to saythat, fundamentally, they tend to be pragmatic.Realising that what works in conflict is institutionallyneither easily learnt nor easily remembered, they errtowards caution. Since Mission Command seems towork, the British Armed Forces would be justified inbeing very reluctant to abandon it.

However, there are caveats. Firstly, armed forcesmust practice what they preach. Espoused andenacted behaviour are rarely identical. The latter,

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when observed objectively, tends to be a fairerreflection of deeply-held values than the former.Research and substantial anecdotal evidenceindicates that, in the Army at least, there have beenoccasions where commanders talked MissionCommand, but in practice allowed their subordinateslittle freedom of action. There may be many reasonsfor this, but it is a matter for concern.

Secondly, Mission Command requires a certainminimum standard of training. There is no point ingiving subordinates freedom of operation whenthey simply don’t know what to. It can sensibly beargued that the highly orchestrated plan for theBattle of the Somme was at least in part arecognition that many of the Kitchener Divisions inthe BEF were relatively untrained, and capable oflittle more. The results speak for themselves. Thededuction is to reinforce the need for thoroughtraining. That may be a valid long-term objective,but may not help in immediate circumstances.

Thirdly, not least because Mission Commandrequires a contract between both parties, it can beproblematic when working with other forces or withthe forces of other nations. Not only must bothparties accurately understand the overall intent, buttheir understanding of Mission Command must bereasonably similar. There have been well-described(if slightly sensitive) examples of where forces fromother nations have simply not comprehended thefreedom of operation which the British practice ofMission Command affords. Conversely this author(for one) has been more than mildly surprised by the

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ruthlessly literal interpretation of Mission Commanddisplayed by the Bundeswehr, for example.

As we have seen, Mission Command empowerspeople. This might sound a trite managerialsound-bite, but it has real value. People who areallowed to exercise their own judgement aregenerally well-motivated compared with thosewho are not. They tend to make bettersubordinates, better superiors in due course, andwhere appropriate learn from their mistakesbecause they have (within reason) been allowedto make them. A subordinate who is never allowedto make decisions may never make mistakes, butequally surely will never learn from them.

Mission Command and Self-Synchronisation Finally, as we introduce information-age commandsystems we should see an improved understandingof the higher commander’s intent. We should alsosee a more developed and widely sharedunderstanding of the operational situation at alllevels of command. These are the conditions inwhich mission command should flourish.

Moving beyond our contemporary understanding ofmission command, is the US concept of self-synchronisation – an essential element of NetworkCentric Warfare. This envisages commanders andeven section level teams and individuals, armed withthe commander’s intent and highly developedsituational understanding, doing what needs to bedone without traditional orders.17 The nomenclature

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jars somewhat and gives the concept, to British ears,an air of improbability. But in essence, this idea is notnew. German doctrine in the 1930s stated that ‘theemptiness of the battlefield requires fighters whothink and act on their own and can analyse anysituation and exploit it decisively and boldly’.18 TheGerman system demanded that when necessaryartillery, infantry and other supporting [arms] shouldco-ordinate and act together without direction fromabove.19 Self synchronisation involves thebroadening and deepening of such a developedform of Mission Command throughout every leveland across every functional area of a Combined,Joint Force.

The paradox, therefore, is that while many will fretthat the information age spells the end of missioncommand, it actually creates conditions where sucha command philosophy is the essential bedrock forsuccess. We can therefore look forward to arenaissance of Mission Command.

NOTES1 Design for Military Operations – The British Military

Doctrine, Army Code 71451, 1989, pp 41 and 49.2 The British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 0-

01, 1996, pp 4.8-9.3 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Volume 2 Command,

Army Code 71564, April 1995, Paragraph 0210.4 Idem, Paragraph 0210d.5 A Genius for War. The German Army and the General

Staff, 1807-1945. T N Dupuy, London 1977, p 35.6 Idem, p 67.7 Idem, p116.8 Idem, p 10.9 FM Sir Nigel Bagnall was commissioned in February 1946

and commanded an Armoured Division from 1975 to 1977.

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He and his peers were the first divisional commanders tohave had no personal experience of WW2.

10 Deterrence and the Defence of Central Europe: TheBritish Role from the Early 1980s to the End of the GulfWar. Sangho Lee, PhD Thesis, King’s College London,August 1994, pp 80-83.

11 Interviews with General Sir Rupert Smith, Admiral Sir JohnWoodhouse, Major General David Richards andCommodore Christopher Craig, May–July 2001.

12 ‘Attack!!! Attack… Attack ???’ James Coote, ArmyDoctrine and Training News (ADTN) 14, Winter 2000-1, p41.

13 ‘Tempo and the Minimisation of Casualties’, J P Storr,ADTN 15, Spring 2001, pp 20-1.

14 Coping with the Bounds. Speculations on Non-Linearity inMilitary Affairs. Tom Czerwinski, Institute for NationalStrategy Studies, Washington, 1998, pp79-95.

15 Philosophy, Richard H Popkin and Avrum Stroll,Heinemann, London 1989, p235.

16 The 17th Century Philosophers: The Age of Reason.Stuart Hampshire, New American Library, New York, 1984.pp 17 and 20.

17 The disruption caused by the fuel tanker strike in the UKduring winter 2000 is an example of selfsynchronisation.Lacking any national leadership or formal organisation, butarmed with an intent to move the government on the fueltax issue, and informed by mass media, telecoms and theinternet, disparate groups acted in concert to createhavoc. Another non-military example is the internationalanti-capitalism movement, which appears leaderless andunorganised, but does produce concerted anarchic action.

18 ‘Truppenführung’, published in 1933, in Knox M andMurray W, The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300 –2050, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p 159.

19 Idem, p 160.

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CHAPTER 7

THE COMMANDER ASEXPERT

By Jim Storr

British military doctrine describes the threefunctions of a commander as leadership,

decision making and control of assignedsubordinates.1 Good commanders are seen asexpert decision makers, in addition to any qualitiesas leaders and directors of their forces. Tacticaldecision making may take place in situations that aredangerous, dynamic, confusing, unclear andpossibly overloaded with information. It is in thatenvironment that good commanders are required tobe expert decision-makers.

Digitization is intended to support commanders, andhence support (and possibly assist the developmentof) expert decision-makers. This suggests a need tounderstand how decision makers become expert.That would allow us to help commanders becomeexpert decision-makers, and in the longer termimprove the quality of tactical decision making in theArmy. This is primarily a mental and not atechnological issue. Information Technology (IT)may, or may not, assist the process.

This chapter considers how decision makersbecome expert, in order to establish implications for

training future commanders. It starts by consideringhow armies currently train commanders to makedecisions. It then discusses how commandersactually do make decisions and compares the two. Itconsiders how decision-makers develop expertise,and makes deductions for training and learning.

Rational Choice StrategiesMost Armies have a methodology for decisionmaking that has been described as traditional,theoretical, predominantly prescriptive. Theyprovide a procedure for ‘how to do it’.2 The standardmethod for making decisions, typical to manyarmies and businesses, is to decide on an aim,consider all the relevant options, define all theimportant evaluation criteria, weight the importanceof each criteria, evaluate each option on eachcriterion, and select the winner. They can dedescribed as ‘Rational Choice Strategies’ (RCS);the Estimate is one such process.3

However, rational choice strategies are notnecessarily the best suited to tactical decisionmaking. Such strategies should be reliable (all thingsbeing equal, they should give good and consistentresults); they can support quantitative analysis; theyinform novices of things they do not know; they arerigorous; and they are very widely applicable. Theyare useful in teams, since they allow all members tocome to a common understanding of the advantagesand disadvantages of each option. However,observation of exercises shows that there is rarelytime or information to make rational choicestrategies work as well as they should. Research

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indicates that they do not ensure that novices makegood choices (although it does help them describetheir choices subsequently), and they are usually nothelpful for experienced decision-makers. The latterare often frustrated at being shackled to a process,when they already know what they intend to do.4

Indeed there is evidence that if people are forced touse rational choice strategies they make worsedecisions, not better.5

Naturalistic Decision-makingThere is extremely strong scientific evidence thatmost decision makers do not use rational choicestrategies as taught, and that expert decisionmakers should not do so.6, 7 The relevant field ofresearch is called Naturalistic Decision-Making(NDM). It addresses the way that people actuallymake decisions in natural or realistic situations.There is a large body of research in this area and anumber of overlapping acronyms. NDM theory is analternative view to rational choice strategy. Itcounters many traditional theories of decisionmaking. It attempts to understand how individualsand teams actually make decisions in complexenvironments, and is particularly applicable to expertdecision-makers.8 This chapter will use the term‘naturalistic methods’ to refer to the methods thatdecision-makers normally use in tactical situations.9

Naturalistic methods apply to ill-structuredproblems in uncertain, dynamic environments inwhich the goals are shifting, competing or ill-defined. Those situations also have action orfeedback loops, are time-pressured, have high

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stakes, multiple players, and organisational goalsand norms. Naturalistic methods are highlyappropriate to many tactical situations.10

Rather than generating and comparing alternativecourses of action (COAs), as in rational choicestrategies, naturalistic methods depend on therecognition of a situation as being similar to, ortypical of, situations with which the decision maker isalready familiar. The decision maker can thenenvisage a solution to the problem which, based onhis experience, is probably ‘about right’. With furtherthought, that ‘about right’ solution can be developedinto a highly suitable plan. ‘Recognition’ and‘envisaging’ are not entirely conscious: decision-makers frequently become aware of a problem and‘just know what to do’. Sometimes they are not evenaware that they have actually made a decision.

Naturalistic methods therefore only consider onesolution, until and unless the decision-makerrealises that that working solution won’t work. Thatrealisation then prompts the identification of asubsequent solution, and so on. This is a very shortdescription of naturalistic methods, and does notnecessarily do justice to their power and value.11

None of these aspects should be seen as criticisms:the next section describes how NDM and RCScompare in appropriate circumstances. It isimportant to stress that NDM is an effectivedescription of how the human brain appears toactually work, even when engaged in rational choicestrategies (for example, when conducting anestimate). In using rational choice methods, thedecision-maker often becomes aware (and often

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quite early) of what his intended solution will be. Hethen spends considerable time justifying the choicehe has in practice already made – ‘situating theappreciation’. To that extent rational choicestrategies as taught have been described as acharade or even a pantomime.12 That is not to saythat rational choice strategies are not useful. Theiruse is discussed in the next Section.

An understanding of naturalistic methods helps usunderstand intuition, or at least intuitive decisionmaking. Contrary to assumption, intuition is probablynot inherited (there is no evidence that one is ‘bornwith it’13) nor is it necessarily the preserve of seniorofficers. Indeed it is entirely possible that somesenior officers will never develop it.

Intuition depends on the use of experience torecognise key patterns that indicate the dynamics ofthe situation.14 It is largely subconscious: thedecision-maker ‘just knows what to do’. Since it islargely based on experience of similarcircumstances, one can see how some seniorcommanders, with the appropriate experience, mayhave intuition that works in those circumstances.However, some types of people are more likely thanothers to reflect on their experiences, and perhapsmore likely to develop intuition than others. Peoplewho do not reflect are perhaps unlikely to developintuition, even if they are quite experienced. Somesenior officers may fall into that group.

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ComparisonsNaturalistic methods may describe what decision-makers actually do, but that does not imply that it isthe most appropriate approach in all circumstances.On some occasions it will not be. Naturalisticmethods will be suited to situations of greater timepressure, where the decision maker is moreexperienced, where the situation is dynamic, andwhere goals are ill-defined. Conversely, rationalchoice strategies are better suited to situationswhere the selection of COA must be justified; whereconflict of opinion within decision-making teamsmust be resolved; where the best possible solutionmust be obtained; where time is not at a premium;and where greater computational complexity isrequired or (perhaps) is simply available.15

Note that there is some evidence that in tacticaldecision making the best possible solution is notnecessarily the most desirable: the ‘80% solutionnow’ may well be more effective than the bestpossible solution obtained some time later.16

Critically, however,

‘Recognitional strategies [that is, naturalisticmethods] that take advantage of experience aregenerally successful, not as a substitute for theanalytical method [ie, rational choice strategies]but as an improvement on them. The analyticalmethods [ie, RCS] are not the ideal; they are thefallback for those without enough experience toknow what to do.’17

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This is highly significant, and has several majorimplications:

• Firstly, although some rational choice methodsmust be taught to novice decision makers, afteran initial introduction, training for decisionmaking should concentrate not on the methodsof decision-making but, on the building up ofrelevant experience.

• Secondly, in the appropriate circumstancesexperienced decision makers will make betterdecisions when they use naturalistic methodsand, in due course, rely on their intuition. Thereare pitfalls to naturalistic methods (for example,prior experience may be misleading), but thereare ways of training decision makers torecognise and account for them much of thetime.18 And just because naturalistic methods orintuition sometimes provide a wrong solution,there is no guarantee that rational choicestrategies used in the same circumstanceswould have produced a better solution.

• Thirdly, naturalistic methods can give solutionsthat are just as detailed as rational choicestrategies, if the decision maker has asufficiently rich bank of experience.

However, enthusiasm for naturalistic methods mustnot be allowed to overtake all use of rational choicestrategies. One does not develop the requisiteexperience without exposure; there arecircumstances when naturalistic methods are notappropriate; and the cry of ‘intuition’ does not excusesloppy decision making.

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It is perfectly reasonable to expect, and allow,commanders to use naturalistic decision makingmethodologies in the right circumstances. Giventhose circumstances, they will tend to makedecisions that are equally good or better, and beable to make them quicker, than when using rationalchoice strategies.

Experts and ExpertiseExperienced decision-makers, using naturalisticmethods, are highly likely to generate good firstdecisions without having to develop and evaluateseveral options. They can do so under extreme timepressure.19 It is not that they refuse to consideralternative courses of action; they don’t have to.20

Thus not only can they decide well using naturalisticmethods; in many occasions they should and will.Research into naturalistic methods has allowed anunderstanding of how decision makers becomeexpert. The decision-maker engages in deliberatepractice, and each opportunity for practice has agoal and evaluation criteria. By doing so repeatedly,he compiles an extensive bank of experience. Indoing so he must obtain accurate, diagnostic andtimely feedback. He also enriches his experiences,by reviewing past situations, in order to derive newinsights and lessons from mistakes.21

A very few people appear to be able to generaliseand abstract enormously, and become highly expertbased on very little personal experience. However,biographies seem to suggest that expert battlefielddecision-makers become so largely because theyconsciously reflected on their experience. Patton,22, 23

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Manstein,24 Rommel25 and possibly Zhukov26 areparticular examples. There are a few historicalexceptions. Napoleon appears to have been a highlyrational thinker (he excelled at maths and sciencesat school27), but also seems to have beenexceptionally (and possibly giftedly) intuitive.28 Soalthough he pored over maps and returns for longhours, he does not appear to have consciouslyreflected on past experience to any great degree.Instead, typically, he would ride out onto thebattlefield before dawn and his battle plan wouldcome to him. He would ‘just know what to do’.Conversely, some experienced commanders maynever become expert decision-makers. If they lackthe predisposition to reflect on their experiences,those experiences will afford them little advantage.To become expert, decision-makers must build up alibrary of relevant experiences. The gifted few needrelatively little experience, because (subconsciouslyor consciously) they can extrapolate and learn muchfrom relatively little experience. Veterans will oftenbe expert decision makers in situations within theirpast experience. However, not least because thisprocess is partly subconscious, they may not be ableto explain why they would make certain decisions;they ‘just know what to do’. This would suit themwell, but hinder the process of passing on expertiseto subsequent generations.

Thus not only is it entirely sensible to allow andencourage commanders to use naturalistic decisionmaking methods, but it is necessary to do so if wehope to make most of them into expert decisionmakers. Expert decision-makers do use naturalistic

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methods in the appropriate circumstances, and tendto reflect consciously on their experiences.

Training and LearningThe implications for training future commandersstem directly from an understanding of how decisionmakers become expert. It is important to repeat thatthere is evidence that if people are forced to userational choice strategies they make worsedecisions than if they are allowed to use naturalisticmethods.29 It is also important to note that training inrational choice strategies does not make expertdecision-makers. On the contrary, that risks slowingthe development of decision-making skills.30

The sheer number of instances of decision-makingin relevant situations will be a key driver inproducing expert decision-makers. The need is formore, not longer, instances of decision making. Atraining exercise which requires a commander tomake one decision laboriously, being forced to userational choice strategies, will be of much less valuethan one which requires him to make severaldecisions about a raft of similar situations insuccession. This has major implications for thetraining of commanders.

Rational choice strategies allow the novice toexpose his thinking to his instructor, which is oftenseen as an advantage. However, it is arguablyirrelevant, since training in rational choice strategiesdoes not make novices into expert decision makers.It is relatively unimportant that a novice explain howhe has made a particular decision. What is more

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important is feedback as to whether or not it was anappropriate decision. There are three deductions:

• Firstly, feedback is crucial, and it must be timely,relevant and informative.

• Secondly, extensive feedback as to method isvirtually irrelevant. The criticism that a novicedid not perform a particular step in an Estimatedoes not help him become a better decisionmaker. What is important is that the decisionmaker becomes aware of the key aspects ofthe situation which prompted the decision.Such ‘cues’ are what allows him to recognisean appropriate solution: hence ‘RecognitionPrimed Strategies’.

• Thirdly, the decision maker should becomeincreasingly aware of how he actually makesdecisions. This is a highly individual issue, but itis a key aspect of developing expertise.

Teaching decision-making methodologies shouldmove away from process-related towards output-related assessment. Furthermore, part-task teachingof decision-making methodologies is only of value tothe absolute novice, because one of the key issuesof any decision making is the integration of allaspects of the situation.31

Feedback is important, but so is an environmentwhich tolerates well intentioned mistake. If juniorcommanders are to be encouraged to make rapid,naturalistic, possibly intuitive and ‘about right(‘80%’)’ decisions, then those decisions they getwrong should be seen not as failures but as valuable

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opportunities from which to learn. Tolerance of well-intentioned mistakes is also an important feature ofMission Command. Tactical Exercises WithoutTroops (TEWTs) are an easy way of allowing juniorcommanders to make decisions in a benignenvironment. In a TEWT the consequences of ‘right’or ‘wrong’ are equally imaginary.

There is a serious risk in employing naturalisticmethods that the feedback provided will teach falselessons, which will in effect be a template forsubsequent decisions. That is a valid and relevantcriticism, but three counter-arguments can be raised.

• Firstly, given solutions that are believed to bevalid, naturalistic methods constitute a betterway of teaching decision making than rationalchoice strategies. The key is the identification ofvalid solutions in the first place, not thedecision-making methodology employed.

• Secondly, naturalistic methods allow for a widerrange of potential situations to be experiencedwithin a given amount of time, because moresituations can be considered than when using(and debriefing) rational choice strategies. Thustraining using naturalistic methods is more likelyto result in the selection of a valid solution in asubsequent decision, because the decisionmaker has a wider library of experience.

• Thirdly, much of the concern over teaching falselessons reflects the fact that many instructors,themselves taught using rational choicestrategies, are not particularly experienceddecision makers (whatever else they may be).

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In practice, instructors who themselves areexposed to a larger number of solutions fromtheir students learn from that exposurethemselves. Systemically, training usingnaturalistic methods would benefit both thestudents and the instructors in the middle tolong term.32

Tactical decision making is relatively difficult,important and infrequent for many commanders. Itmay become frequent on operations, but the issue ishow to prepare them for operations prior todeployment. Difficulty, Importance and Frequency(DIF) analysis is a standard tool of training design.33

In general, a skill that is difficult, important andinfrequent should be over-taught. Long trainingcourses and in-barracks training should giverepeated opportunity for decision making, in theknowledge that skill fade will occur. Training fortactical decision making should concentrate on alarge number of instances, give immediate feedbackas to output not process, and be permissive of well-intentioned error.

In summary, to train commanders to become expertdecision makers requires a revised approach. Thefirst few steps, perhaps in the first term or two as anofficer cadet, will be to teach the mechanics ofrational choice strategies. Thereafter training shouldconcentrate on exposing him to a large number andwide range of problems, and give him feedback as tothe outcome of his solution. The trainee should beencouraged to reflect on his decision, and whatfeatures of the situation prompted the given solution.He should not be criticised on his decision making

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methodology, but rather on the suitability of thesolution to the problem as presented.

Relevance to the Information AgeA potential challenge to the use of naturalisticmethods arises from the advent of battlefielddigitization. The argument is that IT will allow acommander a better understanding of thebattlespace on which to base his decisions, andmore time to make them. Judgmentally,commanders will not need to rely on ‘hunches’ and‘guesses’ because they will be at liberty to do things‘properly’. To use a strong analogy, beforedigitization, command is like stud poker: you knowwhat some, but not all, of your own cards are, andhave little idea what cards the opponent holds. Withdigitization, command is like chess: you can(potentially) see all the pieces. What remains largelyunknown is the opponent’s intentions.34 GrandMasters are expert decision makers, and routinelyemploy naturalistic methods. Even in major matchesthey can make moves as fast as once per sixseconds, not least because they practice a lot.35

However, although chess is adversarial anddynamic, the consequences of taking longer to makea better decision are not critical in most matches,whereas operational (hence decision making) tempois a major factor on the battlespace. Digitization isintended either to allow them to have a betterunderstanding of the situation, or allow them tomake decisions even earlier; or possibly both (ie,better decisions faster). Furthermore, the benefit ofbetter understanding of the situation is not the ability

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to make a better decision, but to be more confidentthat his chosen solution is the right one (because itfits the real situation). We should design IT tosupport expert decision makers and enable acompetent decision maker to become expert.Rational choice strategies do support situationswhere greater computational complexity is requiredor, perhaps, is available.36 However, that suggeststhat we should adopt rational choice strategiesbecause they support the use of IT. The real objectis to have IT support decision makers in the art ofmaking a decision, rather than primarily supporting adecision making process managed for a commanderby his supporting staff. This suggests a need to useIT to allow commanders to fight a large number ofengagements in varying scenarios in differentenvironments. It could also allow them to useexperience captured in an online record as well asfrom memory.

The formal military decision making process for theinformation age must also support naturalisticdecision making. Steps are being made in thisdirection by the ongoing development in the Army,for example, of a new effects-based process37

framed around the way in which it is believedcommanders actually approach tactical problems. Inthe Joint arena, as our understanding of Effects-Based Operations matures an effects basedapproach to campaign planning will follow. As thisoccurs, it will be important not to snare commandersin staff-managed, computer-supported processes,but to develop methodologies to support thecommander in exercising his intuitive judgement and

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to exploit the depth of experience and expertiseembodied in his persona.

If the information revolution delivers anything to ourcommanders, it must free them up to think aboutproblems and to exercise their judgement.38

NOTES1 Army Doctrine Publication Volume 2 Command, Army

Code 71564, April 1995, Paragraphs 0107-0110 andFigure 1.1.

2 ‘Towards Better Knowledge: a Fusion of Information,Technology and Human Aspects of Command andControl.’ Kallmeier et al, Journal of BattlespaceTechnology Volume IV Number 1, March 2001. ISSN1440-5113, pp 34-43.

3 This Paper will generally avoid the use of the acronym‘RCS’ in order to assist readability. On occasions its usewill be appropriate.

4 Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. GaryKlein, MIT Press, London 1998, pp 28-9.

5 Idem, p 34, quoting Wilson and Schooler.6 ‘Evidence of Naturalistic Decision Making in Command

and Control’. Raphael Pascual and Simon Henderson, inNaturalistic Decision Making, Caroline E Zsambok andGary Klein ed, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, NewJersey. ISBN 0-8058-1873-1, 1997, pp 217-66.

7 Klein op cit p103.8 Kallmeier loc cit.9 The acronym NDM will, like RCS, generally be avoided:

see Footnote 3 above.10 Kallmeier loc cit.11 For a fuller (and very readable) description, see Klein,

Chapters 1-3.12 Coping with the Bounds. Speculations on Non-Linearity in

Military Affairs. Tom Czerwinski, Institute for NationalStrategy Studies, Washington, 1998, p152.

13 Klein p 31.14 Ibid. Italic throughout original.15 Klein, p 95 and table 7.1.16 J P Storr, ‘Real People, Real Decisions: Designing HQs to

win Wars.’ British Army Review Edition123, Winter 2000.

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17 Klein p 103. Italics added.18 Klein describes a particular methodology known as

Recognition-Primed Decision Making.19 Klein p 167.20 Idem p 17.21 Idem p 104.22 George S Patton Jr, War as I Knew It, Riverside Press,

Cambridge MA, 1944, passim.23 Martin Blumenson, Patton – The Man Behind the Legend

William Morrow, New York 1985, passim.24 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Presidio, Novato,

California, 1994, passim.,25 David Fraser, Knight’s Cross, A Life of FM Erwin Rommel,

Harper Collins, London 1993, passim.26 Aaron Lieberwitz, Zhukov: Man of Legend, Presidio,

Novato, California, 1974, passim.27 Richard Holmes (ed), The Oxford Companion to Military

History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. pp 620-1.28 Professor Richard Holmes, personal communication.

Professor Holmes wrote the entry at Footnote 27.29 See above, and Footnote 4.30 Klein op cit p 30.31 Idem pp168-9.32 Major Jim Ball, US Army Exchange Officer, (British) Army

School of Training Support, personal communication. TheAuthor is grateful to Major Ball for his input into thissection.

33 Ibid.34 Marc Widdowson, [VEGA plc], Lecture: The Principles of

War in the Information Age. RMCS Shrivenham, Sep2000.

35 Klein, op cit p 273.36 See above and Footnote 15.37 Developed at the Combined Arms Staff Trainer (North) in

Catterick.38 The Author is grateful to Mrs Liz Wheatley and Dr Simon

Henderson of the QinetiQ Centre for Human Sciences fortheir most helpful comments on this paper.

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PART TWO –POSSIBILITIES

The Commander-centricApproach

Beyond Interoperability: Part 1

Beyond Interoperability: Part 2

The Divine Threads

3D Vision

The Case for MannedReconnaissance

The Delilah Factor

CHAPTER 8

THE COMMANDER-CENTRIC APPROACH

TO MODERNISINGCOMMAND

STRUCTURESBy Jake Thackray

In the British System, a field commander issupported. Period. That is the rule. A fieldcommander is given mission-type orders, notdetailed and continuing guidance. It is awonderful, traditional approach, one thatembodies trust in the commander andconfidence in his judgement as the man on thescene. The American military has always aspiredto this model, but has seldom seemed to attain it.

Gen Wesley K ClarkWaging Modern War

Introduction

General Clark’s observation was made inreference1 to his well-publicised disagreement

with General Mike Jackson during the Kosovocampaign. It is tempting to react to it with a degree

115

of self-satisfaction: it does, after all, coincideexactly with current British defence doctrine. Itshould instead, perhaps, be taken as a salientwarning. It is an observable truth that theintroduction of our digitised command technologiesis largely a response to the US concept now widelyknown as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) andtheir various army programmes of change, nowunder the banner headline of Transformation. Wemust be, and are, grateful to our Americancolleagues for their continued generosity andwillingness to share with us their experiences andideas of their ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. But thewholesale adoption of procedures which suit theirway of commanding and controlling operationsmight possibly constrain ours, leaving us less,rather than more, capable.2 It is thereforeimperative that we modernise our commandstructures in ways that suit our command cultureand way of operating with the planned capabilitiesthat will actually be available to our commanders.

The Commander-centric ApproachThe purpose of a command structure is to enable thecommander to exercise effective command, throughleadership and decision making and to access andco-ordinate rapidly a range of organic andsupporting capabilities to achieve his intent. Inessence, therefore, command – comprisingleadership and decision making – is enabled byCommand and Battlespace Management, one ofwhose products is the co-ordination of Joint effects.All of this is underpinned by Command Support,

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comprising Communications and InformationSystems, and life support. The UK ‘style ofcommand’ places significant emphasis on thequalities of individual leaders, imbued with intuitivedecision making skills developed through trainingand experience, supported by staffs whose role ismore mechanistic in nature. Such a style can bedescribed as ‘Commander-Centric’ and gives rise tothree premises:

• Leadership. Leadership is a personal quality,and any future command structure should beadaptable to different leadership styles. Theappropriate style will also vary with the level ofcommand. The key is for the structure toprovide the commander with as many commandoptions as possible, to allow maximum flexibilitywithin affordable limits. The training anddevelopment of leaders to populate thestructure must also be seen as an integral partof the overall command system.

• Decision Making. Commanders need timelyand relevant information in a form thatsupports their personal decision makingprocess, including their intuitive judgement.Intimate support must be provided from onlythose staff whose role is to provide suchinformation and directly support decisionmaking; others do not require close physicalcontact with the commander.

• Co-ordinating Capability. The commandstructure must enable the commander to accessand co-ordinate rapidly a range of organic and

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supporting capabilities to achieve his intent.This is a ‘control’ function that is carried out bythe staff on behalf of the commander, thoughthe commander must retain an element ofcontrol to deal with major changes to thesituation, thus allowing him to carry outcontinuous mission analysis.

The Span and Levels of CommandThe span of command is the number of subordinateorganisations given to one commander to commanddirectly. Factors acting to increase the span ofcommand include: an increased rate of informationprocessing, increased delegation of authority tosubordinates, increased freedom of action ofsubordinates and a greater availability of informationand intelligence in which the commander hasconfidence. Arguably, these may all be delivered byinformation age digitized technologies. Other factorsmight include a more benign operationalenvironment or the close mutual understanding andbond of trust between commanders and theirsubordinates that has developed through workingtogether over a long period of time.

Conversely, a greater complexity of tasks and forces(multinationality for example), increased battlespacedynamics and a range of physical, psychological andinterpersonal stressors3 on commanders all conspireto narrow the span. Other factors acting to narrowthe span include the complexity and demands of thechain of command in which the commander findshimself operating – for theatre commanders inmultinational PSO, the arrangements can be

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bewilderingly complex. The number of points ofcontact is another factor and could include, forexample, local police, government authorities,agencies, Non-government organisations and anyone of a number of other in-theatre actors orfactions. Added to which are the demands of themedia and the need to visit and ‘glad-hand’ multi-national contingents. All of these factors reduce thetime available for the commander to ‘command’ andconsequently constrain his span of command.

Therefore, although it is recognised that in benignenvironments, certain types of operation allow for awidening of the span of command, there are realworld imperatives counterbalancing the weightdigitization may lend to arguments for its wideningon a universal basis.

For UK forces, it is also difficult to envisage howdigitized command and control capabilities wouldsensibly enable the removal of a level of commandduring the next decade. Whilst information couldflow freely up and down a chain of command, itwould not necessarily add to ‘knowledge’ at eachlevel if it is not interpreted in some way to draw outthe relevant factors. But, as the flow of informationimproves and as collaborative planning tools beginto enable multiple layers of command to contributesimultaneously to the development of a plan, it islikely that levels of command will become moreporous. Nevertheless, levels of command exist inpart to provide a hierarchy of manageable spans,4

but, more crucially, they exist because differentfunctions are carried out at each level – functionsthat would need to be aggregated either up or down

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the hierarchy if de-layering took place. Brigade levelHQs are, essentially engaged in the close battle. Atthe divisional level we see deep operations takingpre-eminence, rear operations coming into play and,increasingly, multinational factors impacting on thecommand structure. At the corps level we see afundamentally multi-national HQ orchestrating theefforts the national contingents and, unless there isa 4-star Land Component HQ, being heavilyinvolved in campaign planning.

Within the close battle, we might see a change in therelationship between brigade and battlegroupheadquarters as brigade commanders acquire theirown ISTAR assets and gain access to better andbetter information. This coupled with the capability torapidly develop plans and disseminate intent andorders, might lead to circumstances where thebattlegroup headquarters will add less value to theoverall process, as sub-unit commanders will beable to act within the brigade commanders intent.This will be especially so in simple terrain where thewhole brigade area is a single environment. Incomplex terrain there are micro-environments, whichcreate frictions at the lowest levels, the fullengagement of every level of command would berequired to develop plans that will work at each level.In these circumstances (Northern Ireland, forexample) the emphasis on developing andexecuting plans can move down to the battalion orcompany level, or even below, with brigadesproviding more of a co-ordinating framework.

Again, as with the span of command, there is noconceptual or practical basis for removing a

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particular layer in the tactical chain of command ona universal basis. This does not mean that a slavishstructure is envisaged from brigade level to corps inevery operation. On the contrary, commandechelons have already evolved as indicated below.This shows that, theoretically, any tactical formationHQs might have to command at the operational levelin certain circumstances.

Fig 1 – The Evolution of Command: Levels For DifferingOperations

When this occurs, its superior tactical level formationHQs in the peacetime structure are dispensed withand the headquarters, with appropriate modularaugmentation, works directly to the nationalcommand in the home base.

Headquarters DesignA modular approach such as that in Figure 2 wouldallow HQs to concentrate or disperse, dependingon the situation and would allow them to take onextra responsibilities when needed. Such an

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approach would provide the inherent flexibilityneeded to allow formation HQs to flex betweenacting as tactical HQs or at the operational level. Allformations and units require a ‘core’ set of modulesthat give them a tactical warfighting capability,optimised for the delivery of Joint effects. A secondset could be those modules required to enable a LCtactical HQ to play its part in the Joint commandstructure, as either a JFLCC or JTF HQ. A third setmight be those modules required for multinationaloperations, particularly outside an ARRC contextand the fourth set comprising those modulesrequired for Other Operations at the tactical level.As every HQ would have a ‘core’ Joint warfightingset, the number of sets required would be driven bythe force structure. Sets 2 – 4 could be drawn uponfor training5 and operations on an as requiredbasis, and so the overall number of these setswould be driven by Defence Planning andConcurrency Assumptions.6

Current HQ structures at formation level do notprovide the C2 capability needed to supportsustained warfighting.7 They have neither the staffnor the expertise to allow for continuous operation ora seamless transfer of authority on change ofcontrol. Disparities exist between the output possibleat one level of command, and the input which thenext level down can utilise. Planning capability atDivisional Level, for example, ‘can become quicklyexhausted in comparison to that achievable withinHQ ARRC’.8 In the future, fully empoweredheadquarters capable of 24-hour operation are likely

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Fig 2 – Modular HQ Structure

to be essential (in order to allow for fleetingopportunities to be grasped at all levels).Mechanisms for providing these need to beexplored. Distributed databases (and the necessarypool of expertise) may enable reserve or flankingHQs to temporarily assume command of otherformations. The desegregation of planning andexecution at certain levels might also be considered.Equally, the possibility of ‘pairing’ formation HQs toprovide identical shifts, each tasked with planningand execution might be considered.9 Suchdevelopmental work should also include explorationof the separate but linked issue of the provision ofalternate HQs at all levels. Innovations such asdistributive planning and collaborative planning,where different levels of command and horizontalfunctional areas all participate concurrently in thedevelopment of a plan, will have implications for HQstructures, as there is an inevitable relationshipbetween process and organisation.

HQs also evolve during campaigns. Initially, enablingcapabilities allow for the arrival and ReceptionStaging Onward movement and Integration of forceelements. As the campaign progresses, Transfer ofAuthority where appropriate, preparation10 for andthen the conduct of operations is followed bycampaign termination, extraction and, finally,recovery; or, equally, transition through conflictprevention, conflict and post conflict activities. Theactivities – and their relative importance to eachother – and hence of staff divisions can differconsiderably during different stages of thecampaign. Ultimately, any HQ facing the changingrequirements of a campaign must have the capability

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to grow, reduce, divide and merge seamlessly bothin terms of its infrastructure, staff activity andfunctionality therein. Similarly, the rank of thecommander will need to change during the course ofan operation as its complexity, profile and scale waxand wane. This could be achieved by adjustmentswithin the deployed HQ rather than necessarilyinvolving the deployment of a new HQ as well as anew commander.

Command Post DesignCPs at all levels of command must promote humaninteraction (and particularly the need to generateshared intent and shared SA), support the rapid flowof information into, out of and throughout theCommand Post, and enable the management of theintegration of effects in the battlespace. There are anumber of different models under development or inservice with the armies of different nations to meetthese requirements. The US and most of our allieshave already digitised their Army C2 systems. IBCTTOCs, for example, provide a multi-screen briefingwall for commanders and staffs. On the other hand,the Swedish ROLF11 development project providesan electronic birdtable solution, derived from anexhaustive human factors study to derive the bestCP solution that would promote human interaction inmulti-disciplinary groups. This form of CPenvironment would be more instinctively familiar tothose schooled in the UK ‘bird table’ style of working.

Chapter 8 125

The StaffThe competition for skilled manpower will continueto be an intense one, especially within theinformation technology fields. It may therefore benecessary to concentrate expertise where it isrequired, rather than making it available to allregardless of need. Such a methodology might befacilitated by a modular approach, though this bringswith it a concomitant risk of a lack of trust andunderstanding between commanders and non-permanently attached staff, without which missioncommand is impossible to achieve. For such anapproach to succeed, therefore, the need for coreHQ elements to train alongside other modules –either physically or electronically – will be central.

During the next decade, the volume of informationavailable is unlikely to be matched by a comparableincrease in automated processing capacity. HQscould, therefore, increase in size (the current USexperience) which would increase vulnerability andlead to a requirement to disperse staff cells. Thechallenge is to so utilise technology as to allow thisincreased volume of information to be managed andused, whilst bearing down on overall numbers ofstaff, or risk oversized and unresponsive HQs.

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Decision support systems could in the future providea significant increase in operational tempo, byreducing the processing time required by specialisthuman staffs. Such technologies and concepts arealready well-developed, and increasingly capable ofbeing used within specific military applications.Unsurprisingly, given the nature of theirenvironments, these applications have up to nowbeen of most value to the air and maritimecomponents. Land Manoeuvre support systems,however, are now available commercially, offering,for example, integrated battlespace intelligenceframeworks which allow users, inter alia, to projectfuture enemy movement from current behaviour anddoctrinal expectations. Systems such as these areknown as inference engines, and can provide thelink between data fusion techniques (whereby objecttracking data can be fused by the use of powerfulmathematical algorithms) and artificial intelligence(AI) systems. AI systems are underpinned by thedevelopment of techniques such as neuralnetworks12 and are increasingly sophisticated.

As new capabilities enter service and we begin toenvisage possibilities of fighting the LandManoeuvre Joint battle in different ways, we mayfind that our traditional staff structure constrainseffectiveness. New responsibilities might be addedincrementally to the existing G1–G9 and functionalcap-badged staffs. This may involve duplication,and an increased use of cross-staffing and ad hocgroupings – but it is an evolutionary approach. Analternative would be to develop a staff structurebased on analysis of the C2 processes, which needto take place at HQs at different levels. Models

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which describe C2 processes, their dependenciesand the information flows between them alreadyexist, at the single-Service and Joint levels. Suchtools could be exploited to support processmodelling that might be predicated on the effectssought in the battlespace and analysed against thecore and enabling capabilities each HQ is requiredto co-ordinate. One example of a resulting staffstructure might therefore be effects based. It isrecognised that such an approach would requiremuch development and experimentation, and couldnot take place without consideration ofmultinational issues.

DeputiesThe demands placed upon leaders and their staffsare likely to increase in the future as operationsbecome more complex. The need for a deputy insome form, anathema to the command-led andChief of Staff focussed system bequeathed byMontgomery and Guingand, is therefore likely tobecome a fruitful and interesting area of debate.There is a question mark over the quality of officerthat could be found for the Deputy role, is he to be ofcommander in waiting quality, or more in the mouldof the traditional unit second in command? AsClausewitz observes:

‘An immense space lies between a General andhis Second in Command, for the simple reasonthat the latter is in more immediate subordinationto a superior authority and supervision,consequently is restricted to a more limitedsphere of independent thought… and in whom

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129

Fig 3 – Process Modelling for Staff Structures

constant discharge of routine duties hasproduced a decided poverty of mind’.13

The function of such an individual is unclear incircumstances where the commander is available formuch of the day (and night) and it is arguably besttaken on by an officer who is in his commander’smind, but who has a ‘day time job’ to do too. A viableoption might be to formalise the arrangementwhereby the senior ‘effects officer’, or fire supportofficer takes on the role. But the growth inimportance of ISTAR, as operations perhapsbecome more ‘Find led’ is such that the deputy mightbe better placed and more in the commander’s mindif he was the principal ISTAR officer. But that impliesthat ‘Find’ is an end in itself, rather than the servantof firepower and manoeuvre?

A possible generic role might be planning for futureoperations within the commander’s intent. At the unitlevel such a role would sit well with the unit Secondin Command. While at component level, a suitablerole might be to represent the commander’sinterests at the CJTFHQ, with an emphasis oninfluencing the campaign plan, targeting andinformation operations, particularly if our sisterservices were to opt for placing their componentcommanders there. If the Deputy does have to placehimself somewhere to represent the commander atsome interface, it is difficult to see how, onoperations of even moderate intensity, he can be sorepresented by an officer with a busy day-time job ofFinding the enemy or orchestrating fire support atthe tactical level. In large-scale operations, with aland component deployed in a number of countries,

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but engaged on the same operation, it might beappropriate for the Land Component Commander tolocate himself at the CJTFHQ. In which case anumber of deputies or assistant commanders mightbe required to deploy forward in order to look afterspecific geographical or functional areas.

LiaisonLiaison is a requirement of any command supportsystem. Strong liaison teams should be deployedupwards, downward14 and sideways to support therapid dissemination and understanding of thecommander’s intent. In the future liaison down willassume critical importance, especially inmultinational operations.

Liaison teams may bring with them the capability toaccess digitised C2 and decision support capabilitiesfrom the superior HQ. More crucially, they should bein their commander’s mind and culturally tuned tothe receiving HQ. Such teams, led by experiencedofficers at the appropriate level, have a key role toplay in ensuring a closeness of fit15 between thecommander’s understanding of his own plan and hissubordinate commanders’ understanding of it. It isan emerging truth that, in an era of increasing CIScapabilities, the need for personal interactionbetween different units, formations, components andcontingents remains as much of an imperative as ithas throughout history. Future structures mustensure that liaison capability, enabled by digitisedCIS but focussed on human representation, is at theheart of HQ design.

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ReachbackIt will become technically feasible, though notnecessarily desirable, for elements of some stafffunctions to be conducted outside the traditionalarea of operations; either in a more secure area in-theatre or in the home base. One key attribute ofreachback is that it might allow deployed forces toaccess powerful national capabilities such as J2/G2fusion and COA Analysis tools. Other advantagesinclude a smaller C2 footprint in theatre and theability to concentrate expertise at key nodes.

Disadvantages include a potential for a loss ofmutual understanding, the co-ordination of effortdifficulties apparent when one rear-based agencyserves more than a single customer, vulnerability oflinks to C2W and a potential lack of in-theatrecapability to cope with worsening situations. Theapproach to the use of reachback on operationsshould be pragmatic and stem firstly from ananalysis of those functions that must be carried outin the Area of Operations in order to achieve themission. This is particularly so in Other Operationswhere so much of the C2 function is about inter-action with a wide range of actors in the battlespace.

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Reachback can then be used to obviate therequirement to deploy other C2 capabilitiesunnecessarily, or to access powerful capabilities thatcannot or should not be deployed to theatre.

However, it is interesting to speculate as to howcommand structures might be affected by thetheoretical evolution of a future reachback capability.In Figure 4 below, the ‘today’ row shows the currentHQ structure for Land Component formation HQs. Ateach level of command, a small forward HQ exists,with a main and rear HQ based inside the area ofoperations (alternate HQs have been omitted forclarity). No in-theatre capability exists for rear-basing(other than at Component Level), nor may any HQelement organic to, or in support of, deployedformations be home-based (direction is, of course,received from higher level HQs in the home base).Clearly, the lower the level of HQ, the lessopportunity exists for reachback, in order to preservethe integrity of smaller HQs.

Initially, better situation awareness, underpinned bya robust CIS, allows for the small ‘Tactical’ HQ tobecome an improved, more capable ‘Forward’ HQ.Main HQ also enjoys an improved capability tointegrate Joint effects throughout the battlespace.

Further improvements (stage 2) to CIS resilience,capacity and coverage might allow the Rear HQ tobe relocated from its location in the area ofoperations, to a rear-based secure area in-theatre.The requirements of logistic SA (a combination of ‘J3SA’, asset picture and monitoring of the logisticprocess) would entail some elements of logistic

Chapter 8 133

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134

Fig 4 – Possible Impact on Deployed HQ Structures of a Maturing Reachback Capability

Chapter 8 135

staffs remaining forward, however). Simultaneously,more capable inter-theatre CIS allows an embryonicsupport capability to be home-based.

Later (stage 3), significant improvement in C2capability embedded within the Fwd HQ could allowmuch of the effort conducted in Main HQ to betransferred there. Similarly, Main HQ could passother functions to the Rear HQ in-theatre, whoseresponsibilities would incorporate a range ofMission Support activities. The home base now hasa substantial range of capabilities (eg J2, COAAnalysis, legal and logistic) on which deployedcomponent and formation commanders can draw.The transfer of capabilities between HQs by thisstage is such that the new nomenclature becomesappropriate: ‘Fwd’ HQ becomes a Comd HQ; ‘Main’is the Control HQ, and ‘Rear’ is the MissionSupport HQ.

In a further development (stage 4) the C2requirements of the operation are examined andonly the C2 capability required in-theatre isdeployed. Factors would include: the nature of theoperation; the C2 connectivity required in theatreand the threat to strategic CIS links. C2capabilities not required in-theatre would remain inthe home base. In addition, staffs would now beable to draw on powerful home-based analysis andplanning capabilities.

Finally, (not shown in the diagram) it is possible toconceive of a very small forward ‘Command HQ’deployed in the theatre of operations, with a larger‘Battlespace Management HQ’ carrying out control

functions from a relatively safe area in, or close to,the theatre of operations and substantial MissionSupport being provided from the home base. Theseideas will take some readers outside their comfortzone, but the potential will exist to exploit suchconcepts in circumstances where a small, rapidlydeployable command footprint is essential. Thecapability to exercise effective command in such aconfiguration should be the desired end-state of acommand-centric approach to modernisingcommand structures.

NOTES1 Wesley Clarke, Waging Modern War, Public Affairs, New

York, 2001, pp 397-403.2 Evidence other than anecdotal as to UK/US differences in

the ‘way of command’ also exist: see, for example, the USDefense Communications Agency report into comparativenational command methods Headquarters EffectivenessProgram summary Task 002 (McLean, VA: DefenseSystems Inc, Sep 83).

3 Glynis Breakwell and Keith Spacie, Pressures FacingCommanders, SCSI Occasional Paper No 29, p 5.

4 Both the US ‘Pentomic Division’ restructuring and BAOR’sEx WIDE HORIZON experiments, both of which involvedthe removal of the brigade level of command, foundered,largely due to a perceived inability for command to beexercised effectively over such a broad span.

5 ‘Bolting on’ modules will not allow an effective C2capability unless sufficient training between modules takesplace.

6 The significant resourcing issues associated with theprovision of these extra modules, and the additionalburden placed on, inter alia, the training organisation, arenot underestimated. Cost/benefit analyses of the modularoption, and any others developed, will be required as partof developmental work in order to better inform investmentdecisions.

7 During Op GRANBY, the strength of 1 (UK) Armd Div Mainincreased from 45 offrs and 46 ORs to 76 offrs and over100 ORs. At the same time, 7 Armd Bde Sig Sqn Gp

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trebled in size. Despite such augmentation, C2 capabilitywas, arguably, largely exhausted by the end of the 100-hour Land Operation. It is, however, noted that the current1 (UK) Armd Div HQ establishment is larger than itspredecessor’s at the height of the Op GRANBYdeployment.

8 Anecdotal evidence from HQ ARRC.9 Such an approach is seen within the JRRF Concept, which

might be further developed.10 Force preparation, in its widest sense, also includes the

peacetime management of resources, also carried out bymost LC tactical HQs. A debate is required into whetheroperational C2 would be improved if deployable HQs weredivorced from routine resource management (in themanner of the JFHQ and others). That debate is notexplored further here.

11 ROLF 2010: the way ahead and the first step, TheSwedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2000.

12 A computational technique (normally a software emulationrather than a piece of hardware) which achievesenormous processing power through the multipleinterconnection of simple processors, rather thanoperation of a single, powerful processor. In the brain,neurons send synaptic messages to each other,continually modifying their level of excitation on the basisof messages received, resulting in ‘learning’. Neuralnetworks are therefore very useful in pattern-matchingproblems, and in decision-making where input data isimprecise or incomplete.

13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport,Penguin Classics, Page 155.

14 This is, in broad terms, a new requirement, madenecessary by increasing complexity of forces (especiallyMN) and tasks.

15 General Sir Rupert Smith believes that lack of this‘closeness of fit’ is a key factor in command breakingdown.

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CHAPTER 9

BEYONDINTEROPERABILITY:

PART 1By Tim Blad and David Potts

‘History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions inwaging war. Allied failures have been sonumerous and their inexcusable blunders socommon that professional soldiers had longdiscounted the possibility of effective allied actionunless available resources were so great as toassure victory by inundation. Even Napoleon’sreputation as a brilliant military leader sufferedwhen students… came to realise that he alwaysfought against coalitions – and therefore againstdivided counsels and diverse political, economicand military interests.’

Dwight D Eisenhower1

Those who espouse an expeditionary ethos andexpect to operate in a joint/multinational

environment must endeavour to achieveinteroperability with their allies. Achieving C2interoperability is a complex undertaking, madecritical by the rapid pursuit of digitization, theincreasing frequency of operations and an ever-wider range of bedfellows. ‘Unity of Command’

under a single commander whose authority is clearlydefined and absolute, is increasingly accepted asbeing almost Utopian in the context of the practicalrealities of contemporary multi-national operations,largely due to national chains of command reachinginto theatre headquarters and below.

The traditional NATO understanding of C2interoperability has been largely based on technicalissues such as common message formats and datapresentation protocols.2 Such an understanding isunsuited to post-Cold War multinational operations.An emerging US concept, which describes the richerconceptual depth of interoperability required is thatof ‘co-operability’.3 The term describes the sharedunderstanding which only cognitive and doctrinalinteroperability can provide. In the UK, this is termed‘interoperability of the mind’. A similar Germanconcept is ‘einheit im denken’, – literally, ‘unity inthought’. This implies a depth of common militaryeducation and training to produce officers of qualitywho approach problems in the same way – it doesnot imply a lack of originality or flexibility of mind, butrather a confidence and mutual understandingbased on shared military education and values.

Wellington commented that the ‘battle of Waterloowas won on the playing fields of Eton’ – meaningthat the officers had all gone to the same school.This is what our national staff college and highercommand courses provide nationally today. In anera of multinational operations we must look at waysof doing this internationally – one way of developing‘co-operability’ or ‘unity in thought’, for example,would be to establish a world class institution to

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develop commanders and senior staff for multi-national appointments.

Unity in thought should contribute to ‘Unity ofApproach’ to a given set of circumstances foundedon common doctrine and procedures. Achieving thiscan be challenging, even in an alliance contextwhere a body of alliance doctrine exists, but it is allthe more challenging in ad hoc coalitions wherethere might be no previously agreed doctrine. In bothalliances and coalitions the challenge iscompounded by the need not just to have writtendoctrine, but a common understanding of themeaning and practical application of that doctrine.This can be developed through good workingrelationships and training.

Whilst Unity of Command on multi-nationaloperations might be a chimera, Unity of Effort will bean essential pre-requisite to success. This requireseveryone to be working to achieve the same endswithin the commander’s intent – which must bedisseminated and understood throughout theCombined Joint Force. There will be innumerableelectronic aids to disseminate intent: videoconferencing and whiteboarding (live sketching andplanning using map overlays and NATO symbology)are enjoying a vogue. There is also a considerablebody of anecdotal evidence to suggest that symbolslaid over a map convey commander’s intent, plansand orders more readily in a multi-nationalenvironment than text. However, understandingintent will be a richer and more complex issuecompounded by linguistic and cultural differences aswell as divergent ‘implicit understanding of intent’.

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This arises from different expectations of actionrequired or effort needed to achieve the missionfrom one contingent to another – ranging from givingup at the smallest setback to surmounting allobstacles. Direct personal contact, wheneverpossible, between commander and commanded, willtherefore be essential to ensuring Unity of Effort anda common understanding of command intent.

Command philosophy too will vary from contingentto contingent. Some nations have ingrained theconcept of ‘mission command’ into their militarycultures, allowing subordinates considerablefreedom of action to take the initiative within thecommander’s intent as circumstances change.Others expect to command, and be commanded, bydetailed orders – with a commensurate need forfrequent reporting back to superiors and furtherdirection as circumstances change. As Drs Albertsand Hayes observed in Command Arrangements forPeace Operations:

‘When forces with fundamental differences inunderstanding of the degree of information theyshould report, the detail that should be containedin directives, and the degree to whichsubordinate organizations should take theinitiative, are placed in one organization; thepotential for confusion is massive’.

So, for the foreseeable future, we must work towardsa common understanding of Mission Command tomaximize our effectiveness on multi-nationaloperations, while recognising and accommodatingdifferent approaches. We also need to understand

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that Mission Command is not a dogma to beadhered to slavishly, it is a philosophy to be appliedintelligently. In particular, we must recognise theneed in Information Operations, for example, for acentral message and acknowledge the challenge ofarticulating intent with clarity in the complexscenarios in which multinational forces often findthemselves. Mission Command also requiressubordinates to have considerable contextualinformation with which to frame the highercommander’s intent. In PSO this will include politicalawareness and a very broad situationalunderstanding at quite low levels of command – fromwhich flows a multitude of training, educational andinformation needs issues that are unlikely to be ableto be addressed as ‘on-the-job’ training with coalitionpartners who are strangers to this kind of commandphilosophy. Commanders will, therefore need torecognise that sometimes subordinate HQs fromother nations require more detailed orders and thatequally, there will be occasions when the superiorHQ is either from another nation or is an unfamiliarmulti-national HQ and differences in commandculture will have to be accommodated.

States of command are the device by whichcoalitions are subordinated and organized. Theygive legitimacy and confer authority. NATOCommand States, developed for the Cold War, haveonly been tested in the Bosnia and Kosovodeployments, where, arguably, they have beenfound wanting. COMKFOR reported recently, forexample, 39 operational employment variations andlimitations amongst his 39 contingents. There isalso evidence that national caveats would survive in

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a multinational warfighting coalition. CinCCENTCOM4 and COMBRITFOR5 both reported thatthe move of 1st (UK) Armoured Division into theOrBat of VIIth (US) Corps, during Op DESERTSTORM, had more to do with ensuring a pivotal rolefor the UK contribution to the operation and forceprotection issues, than it did to any improvement inforce correlation. Whilst ideally, commandersshould have sufficient freedom to deploy forceelements at the tactical level without reference backto Capitals, in reality, constraints on the employmentof national forces are a fact of life. Illustrativenational caveats should be applied in peacetimetraining to practise commanders and staffs inmanaging their impact on plans and operations.During preparations for specific operations,whenever possible, commanders should work tominimize the extent to which such restrictions areapplied, ideally pre-transfer of authority, byinvesting time in ensuring that national authoritieshave confidence to place their forces under theircommand. Once deployed, the caveats become yetanother complicating factor to take into account inthe employment of national capabilities.

Force Protection (FP) and Rules of Engagement(ROE) can be areas of friction andmisunderstanding.

‘If commanders learn through experience thatforce preservation is valued more by theorganisation than is boldness, with its attendantdangers, an entire army’s approach to war willreflect as much.’ 6

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Nevertheless, a greater focus on FP and ROEissues is an inevitable consequence when wars area matter of national choice, and not nationalsurvival.7 The human cost of war (on both sides) willinfluence public support for its execution.Multinational operations will compound this issue,since different nations will be more or lesssusceptible to changing levels of public support fortheir actions, and particularly those nations with apowerful, independent – and often sceptical – press.An agreed lexicon of ROE/FP measures could becompleted under the direction of an internationalbody such as the UN8 as a force preparationmeasure. It would provide a useful tool forcommanders, and greatly simplify these complex –and therefore time-consuming – issues. Whilstcommanders must work toward establishing acommon basis for ROE and FP postures, they mustalso be prepared to work in circumstances whereROE, ROE interpretation and FP policy varies fromcontingent to contingent. ROE and FP posture musttherefore be considered as an integral part of thecapability of each element of the force and as afactor in the allocation of missions and tasks.

As forces modernize and introduce information age(digital) technology, they will adopt new ways offighting - in particular they will trade mass for tempo.The difference in operating tempo of the mostdigitized forces (the US) and that of analogue9 forceswill be stark. Superficially, a digitized US force couldreduce its tempo to accommodate the battle rhythmof less digitized contingents. But digitized forces relyon tempo as the source of their combat power.Slowing down forfeits that advantage and risks

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increased casualties.10 Therefore, whilst forcemodernization has the potential to increaseopportunities for interoperability, it also brings with itnew challenges which could potentially undermineUnity of Effort in multi-national forces – potentiallylow tempo may remain one of the greatest militarydisadvantages of multi-nationality, especially whenfacing a single nation opponent. For this reason,whereas multinationality at company level may bepossible in Other Operations, multinationalformations at brigade level or below would beunlikely to generate the tempo required forwarfighting. The challenge for the commander isbalancing loss of tempo by the most capableelements of the force, with the risks inherent in thatfor them, against the inclusion of the least capable,in a way that achieves the aim. Part of the answerlies in treating C2 capability as a factor in assigningmissions and tasks – just as a commander wouldconsider the numbers and effectiveness of acontingent’s tanks or artillery.

It will also be necessary for digitally capable superiorHQs to provide digitised liaison teams downward tobring appropriate links and functionality tosubordinate HQs. Paradoxically, therefore, therequirement for human liaison in the information agewill be greater than ever before – especially in multi-national operations. The key will be empowered,trained and equipped Liaison Officers of appropriaterank that can provide the ‘lubrication’ to make thesystem work smoothly.

Special arrangements will have to be made for thesharing of intelligence in the new information

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environment. ‘Intelligence is guarded very jealouslynationally and very understandably so.’11 The swift,transparent and honest passage of informationbetween the CJTFHQ and contingents within amulti-national force is vital to the generation andfostering of the spirit of trust, which in turn leads toUnity of Effort. Despite this, nations and long-standing allies will not be persuaded to share theirentire intelligence picture with all coalition partners.Greater co-operation and experience may allowreleasability to be reviewed, but such reviews willthemselves only take place within national circles.Commanders must walk the tightrope of preservingsecurity, whilst at the same time ensuring that nocontingent or individual government is presentedwith significant surprises. This will become evermore challenging as we conduct operations withincreasingly unusual bedfellows – informationsharing with the Russians, for example, is somethingwe will need to get used to.

But in the longer-term, all of these efforts will be atbest marginal if nations develop divergent conceptsfor the exploitation of information age technology. Acommon understanding of the potential impact of thetechnologies and the opportunities to exploit themwill lie at the heart of interoperability. There is a needfor an internationally agreed vision of coalitionoperations in the information age, shared at least bythose countries that are able and willing to lead suchoperations. This needs to be underpinned by multi-national experimentation, otherwise it remains anuntested hypothesis. Such experiments would haveexplicit benefits leading to solutions to specificproblems, but they would also have an invaluable

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implicit benefit – a shared understanding of how theoperational art might evolve in the information age.

But irrespective of advances in informationtechnology, there are some human interoperabilityissues that simply will not go away. The mostobvious of these is language. English is now verymuch the ascendant language in business circlesand in international popular culture. It hasconsequently emerged as the language of choice ofNATO’s nascent multi-national High ReadinessForce Land headquarters. This means it is all themore important for native English speakers to beable to speak other languages, in order to buildmutual understanding and respect.12 Languagetraining must therefore become an integral part ofofficer development if the UK is to continue to play aleading role in the kind of operations envisaged inthe information age.

The other great enduring issue will be food. Allarmies march on their stomachs and taste varieswidely. Anecdotal evidence from a number of recentevents indicates that food will remain a keyinteroperability issue. In our rush to digitise

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everything else, we must not forget the chefs – theyneed to access the finest ingredients!

NOTES1 Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, New York,

Doubleday, 1948, page 4.2 Interoperability: ‘the ability of systems, units or forces to

provide service to and accept services from othersystems, units and forces and to use these services soexchanged to enable them to operate effectively together’.(APP-6)

3 Coalition Military Operations – the way ahead through co-operability, US-CREST/FRS/RUSI/SWP Report Apr 00.

4 H Norman Schwarzkopf – It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Bantam,Oct 1992, p. 449.

5 Sir Peter de la Billiere – ‘The Gulf Conflict: Planning andExecution’, RUSI Journal, Winter 1991.

6 ‘Take no Prisoners’, Eikenberry, Parameters, Summer1996, pp 109-118.

7 ‘On the other hand, the less intense the motives (for war),the less will the military element’s natural tendency toviolence coincide with political directives’, Clausewitz, OnWar.

8 This work is currently being scoped in ABCA.9 Analogue forces are forces that have not been digitized.10 Maj Gen J P Kiszely – ‘Battlespace Digitisation – The

Implications for Interoperability’ RUSI 15 Nov 00. GenKiszely observes that “analogue forces might become SunTzu’s cheng, ordinary force (useful role might be fix).Digitized: Sun Tzu’s chi, extraordinary force (best suited tostrike); but fix = close = large casualties”

11 Taken from an after-dinner speech given by General SirMike Jackson, published in Gary Sheffield and GeoffreyTill (Eds), The Challenges of High Command in the 20thCentury, SCSI Occasional Paper No 38, based onproceedings of SCSI/JSCSC/Dept of War Studies RMASandhurst Joint Conference, Bracknell, Oct 1998.

12 At a recent conference in Paris, Maj Gen Quiel, COSEUROCORPS, delivered his formal speech in French andanswered questions in English, French and Germandepending upon the native tongue of the interrogator.When asked about language he said, to rapturousapplause, “I am not here as a German officer, but as a

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multi-national officer and as such I should be able toconverse in the language of a force’s major contingents”.

151

CHAPTER 10

BEYONDINTEROPERABILITY:

PART 2By Paul Lefever

Nothing helps a fighting force more than correctinformation. Moreover it should be in perfectorder, and done well by capable personnel.

Che Guevara

The advantages are nearly all on the side of theguerrilla in that he is bound by no rules, tied byno transport, hampered by no drill books, whilethe soldier is bound to many things, not the leastby his expectation of a full meal every so manyhours. The soldier usually wins in the long run,but very expensively.

Field Marshal Lord Wavell

Introduction

The events of 11 September 2001 heralded a newform of terrorism in which the unthinkable

becomes the possible. The willingness of religiouslymotivated terrorists to engage in a policy of selfsacrifice in order to achieve their perceived aims has

brought a new dimension to criminality. The conceptof an adversary prepared to abandon all thepreviously held tenets of self preservation in pursuitof an objective throws many of our preconceived andaccepted military theories into disarray andnecessitates a review of many aspects of ourapproach to combating this threat.

The immediate examination of events leading up toSeptember 11th has highlighted a lack ofcoordination between various security and otheragencies worldwide. It has also identified the lack ofan international ability to integrate disparate piecesof information and intelligence about people andevents into a coherent picture of terrorist activity.Closer to home, the emerging chain of eventsleading up to 11 September demonstrated theability of both foreign and British nationals withconnections to terrorist organisations to move freelybetween the UK and other countries. Many in themedia express concern at how difficult it can be tokeep track of people in the United Kingdom whetherthey be terrorists, asylum seekers, benefitfraudsters, paedophiles or simply common orgarden criminals. A further complication is thatfundamentalist terrorists operate within the folds ofthe fabric of society.

The United States is following a policy of attackingthe heartland or root of terrorism, the states thatsponsor terrorism or harbour terrorists. The UK, byits support of the US in this endeavour, has aligneditself with this same policy. It seems likely thereforethat the UK will find itself increasingly involved inoperations of a similar nature to those in which it

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has been variously involved in Palestine, Malayaand Northern Ireland over half a century;operations falling under the generic title of CounterTerrorist (CT) operations. Nations’ realisation oftheir exposure to fundamentalist terrorism hasbrought a new willingness to band together incommon opposition to terrorism. This has resultedin the previously unthinkable sharing of informationand intelligence between the NATO countries andRussia, nations of the Indian sub-continent and arange of other unlikely bedfellows united by thenew threat.

In the UK, one result of this new appreciation of thenature of fundamentalist terrorism has been arealisation that more must be done nationally toidentify and counter the threat. The Armed Forceshave always been charged with the last ditch task ofrepelling invasion in the defence of the home base.Now, it seems entirely possible that the ArmedForces and more specifically the Army will have anadditional role, that of defending the nation from the‘enemy within’. CT operations will therefore have twodimensions; Search and Destroy in the terroristhomelands and Protection of the Home Base.

Good intelligence is the key to the effective conductof all military operations but in CT operationsintelligence is fundamental to success. Typically, theinformation from which military intelligence isderived is drawn from military sources; collected bynational and international military collection assetsand exchanged with the Armed Forces of othernations. But the nature of terrorism is that theterrorist works alone or in discrete cells concealed

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within the fabric of the population of a country. Hehas no recognisable deployment pattern orsignature equipment to betray his presence neitherhas he conventional tactics or doctrine. He presentsan unquantifiable threat operating within the mosttenuous of geographical boundaries.

Meeting the intelligence requirements arising fromCT operations is probably the most difficult taskfacing the intelligence community in the whole ofthe Spectrum of Operations. The key to fulfillingthis task is information. Information derived from‘conventional’ military sources and agencies and‘New Information’ which will be derived from newsources different from those from which militaryinformation is normally derived. The majority ofthis information will be about people and thepatterns of their lives for it is through detectinganomalies in these patterns that the terrorist canbe identified. Fortunately, very large stores ofinformation about people exist today, stored inextensive databases scattered across a variety ofnational and international commercial andgovernmental organisations throughout the world.It is the sharing of this ‘New Information’ that mustnow be addressed.

Information in the CivilEnvironmentInformation is regularly shared between commercialcompanies, usually for a price. Extremely largedatabases exist recording many millions ofconsumers’ intimate details: sex, age, address,

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comprehensive likes and dislikes, financialclassification, spending patterns and much more.These enable marketing organisations, retailers andmanufacturers to build consumer profiles ofconsiderable depth and accuracy enabling them totarget appropriate products at likely customers.

Increasingly, interfaces are being establishedbetween commercial and law enforcementinformation systems. Linkages between MotorInsurance databases, those operated by theStatutory Vehicle Licensing Authorities and thePolice carry clear advantages. Other areas wherepotential exists for meaningful linkages are betweenCustoms and Excise, the Inland Revenue, banksand airline ticketing systems. The potential benefitsaccruing from linkages of this nature are positive andclearly make a direct contribution to the conduct ofthe business of law enforcement in which those onone side of the interface are involved. However, thisis not a one way information flow and there arereadily identifiable commercial benefits toorganisations who agree to share their data withthese statutory bodies; a reduction in false claims oninsurance companies is but one obvious benefit ofthis type of arrangement.

Information about people is also held by a widerange of Other Government Departments (OGD).The Security Service and SIS, the ImmigrationService, the Inland Revenue, HM Customs andExcise, DHSS, NHS, the Office of National Statistics,Regional and Local Authorities and many othergovernment organisations maintain large databases

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of information covering numerous aspects of anindividual’s life.

In the main, information in the civil environment isabout people but increasingly, large amounts of dataabout physical entities is being digitised and stored;construction details of roads, railways, bridges andtunnels, building plans and details of communicationand distribution networks. Information is also freelyavailable about shipping movements and details ofairline and road and rail transport schedules arefreely available. Environmental information isincreasingly stored in databases: meteorologicalrecords, river and tidal flow records.

Quite clearly, much of this information has militaryrelevance to the conduct of Counter Terroristoperations both within the country and overseas.However, before any use can be made of this data asurvey would have to be made in order to determinethe location, format and relevance of suchdatabases. This would be a major task and ascoping of the size of the problem and thedevelopment of contingency plans for its resolutionwould be a sensible precautionary move. Theimplementation of such plans would almost certainlyrequire changes in primary legislation to allowaccess to these databases.

Information in the MilitaryEnvironmentOver recent years, NATO has embarked on a seriesof initiatives for the sharing of information andintelligence between Alliance nations. These include

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standardised formatted messages, commonintelligence database structures and data standards,Alliance wide bearer systems and StrategicCommand C2 systems enabling the sharing ofinformation and intelligence between thecomponents of Strategic Commands. Wellunderstood protocols are in place for the protectionof national intelligence and NATO agreements existfor the maintenance of the security of informationand intelligence released for use within the Alliance.In addition to arrangements for information andintelligence sharing within the Alliance, individualmember nations have bilateral and multilateralarrangements for information and intelligencesharing with other Alliance partners.

Much of the most basic infrastructure required forinformation and intelligence sharing between thenations of the Alliance is either in place now or existsin conceptual form and could be implementedrelatively quickly. As with most matters in theAlliance the impetus for progress depends verymuch on political will and the events of 11September will have sharpened the imperatives inthis area very considerably. The state of affairswithin NATO whilst not perfect, does allow theexchange of information and intelligence in arelatively seamless manner and the potential existsfor an expansion and upgrading of these facilities.

With one or two notable exceptions such as treatyorganisations around the Pacific Rim, formalarrangements for information and intelligencesharing outside the Alliance have been virtuallynon existent. There is now a new willingness on

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the part of nations such as Russia to shareinformation with others. This highlights the needfor the development of technical and proceduralprotocols to ensure that the maximum benefit isgained from what is potentially a major expansionin the amount of information and intelligenceavailable for use in CT operations. Languages willpresent problems in the sharing of information andintelligence for the immediate future. The timetaken to acquire a language skill at a levelappropriate to interrogating a foreign languagedatabase or evaluating a foreign languageintelligence report is years rather than months.However, the rapid development of linguistictranslation software coupled with a targetedprogramme of language training would alleviatethis problem within a year or two of its inception.

The Technological ChallengeIn the commercial world data about people is asaleable commodity. Names are sold for a fewpounds a thousand, companies are bought and soldfor prices based on the contents of their customerdatabases. Physical data is equally highly regarded,Ordnance Survey, the Hydrographer and theMeteorological Office sell their data to customers theworld over either as bits and bytes or as products;maps, charts, weather forecasts. The majority ofcommercial databases are configured for theconvenience of their owners and with very fewexceptions such as in banking and other financialinstitutions, they are rarely engaged in the routineexchange of data. There is therefore very little

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impetus towards data standardisation across thecommercial world.

It is likely that commercial databases will be basedon one of the more widely used software packages.In this case, the use of some form of translationsoftware would allow the straightforward importationof civilian data into military databases wherenecessary. Civilian data may also be held in custombuilt databases for which no translation softwareexists and in this case purpose built translationsoftware would have to be commissioned. Thiswould impose time and resource penalties some ofwhich could be avoided by early identification ofthose essential databases which are configured onnon-standard software. Once these have beenidentified, either some alternative source of the datacan be identified or an assessment of the resourceimplications of using data from these databases canbe made.

Two major routes to gaining access to shared datapresent themselves for consideration:

• Wholesale Data Import. If very large quantitiesof commercial data are to be made available tothe Armed Forces from outside sources, thenarrangements for the military storage, retrieval,interrogation and transmission of the data mustbe in place before the outset of CT operations.The provision of large volume data storage doesnot present a problem today but decisions aboutthe format in which it is to be stored and thecompatibility of the storage format with nationalC2 and G2 systems will have to be made before

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any data is transferred. Bandwidth problemsbedevil military C2 systems and the need tomove very large volumes of data into andbetween military organisations will presentproblems requiring early resolution. Theprovision of large bandwidth bearer systemsbetween static locations is relativelystraightforward but if these same quantities ofdata are to be provided to locations which areeither mobile or have the potential formovement, then Direct Broadcasting by Satellite(DBS) or some other more advancedtechnological solution will have to be employed.

• A Networked Solution. An alternative approachto the acquisition of data would not involve thetransfer of the contents of databases but wouldrequire the acquisition of the rights to search fordata in existing databases through interfaces.This would, to all intents and purposes, involvenetworking the relevant databases. Whilst thiswould pose an element of technologicalchallenge, it would remove the need for theArmed Forces to move very large quantities ofdata, and to store and manage them. It would infact remove many of the high cost overheads ofdata ownership. The legal implications of suchan arrangement are far reaching and clearlymany guarantees of data security would have tobe in place before commercial organisationswould agree to allow the Armed Forces accessto their databases.

On balance the Networked Option offers the moreattractive solution but in practice, because of the

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difficulties involved in setting up networkingarrangements with databases in non-NATO nationsand with commercial organisations, it is likely that amix of both methods of sharing data would form theeventual solution.

The possession of large quantities of data or havingthe ability to access the same data through anetwork is a potent tool for meeting the intelligencerequirements of CT operations. The wider thebaseline of information that is available to theanalyst, the better the intelligence that he produceswill be. However, information is only one part of theintelligence equation and if the best use is to bemade of the information, then appropriate softwaremust be in place. Earlier mention has been made oflink analysis software which enables relationshipsbetween any entities to be defined. There will be arequirement for other software capable of patterndetection and matching, of keyword search and ofother means of assisting the analyst to correlate andvisualise the vast amounts of information which willbe presented to him. All these applications will belinked to powerful intelligent search engines capableof scouring very large databases containingdisparate types of information and retrieving data ofsignificance to the analyst.

It is unlikely that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will beavailable to the intelligence analyst for theforeseeable future and the human analyst willremain at the very core of the process for at least thenext five if not ten years. There will be a degree ofinformation fusion available which will help to reducethe volume of information retrieved from networked

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or individual databases into a manageable flow butin the near term this is likely to be a relatively crudetool and it will be some years before trulysophisticated information fusion is possible.

The introduction of complex IT systems; databases,networks, search engines and analyticalapplications will bring in its wake a new hierarchy ofsupport personnel; systems managers, systemsengineers and systems designers all of whom willhave to be accommodated either in existing budgetprovisions or through new money. In this same vein,the costs of widening access to information will beconsiderable and until the data which will be neededcan be identified and quantified the resourceimplications will remain unknown. Data sharing andthe enhancements that this will provide to CToperations will come at a price and that price maybe high.

The Military Benefits of InformationSharingThe basic CT intelligence requirement can becrudely summarised as ‘Who does What withWhom, When and Where do they do it, and Why?’.These are very complex questions but, providedthat one small part of the equation can be identified,then with access to very large stores of data andwith the appropriate software, linkages andassociations can begin to be teased out into acomprehensive picture from which the intelligencerequirements can be met.

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In order to identify the benefits of informationsharing, it must be placed in the context of possibleCT operations. These can be divided into twoprincipal categories:

• Search and Destroy. Operations conductedoutside the United Kingdom. Taking the fight tothe terrorists’ home base and destroying theirinfrastructure, training and sustainmentorganisations. Punishing the sponsors of stateterrorism and deterring potential sponsors andpaymasters. Detaining terrorist leaders,demoralising terrorist followers and destabilisinglinked terrorist groupings.

• Protection of the Home Base. Undertakenwithin the United Kingdom as Military Aid to theCivil Power (MACP) operations and thereforeunder police primacy. Encompassing activitiesappropriate to the operational situation includingKP and VP Guards, Cordon and Search, VCPand PCP checks, escort duties and patrolling ofurban and rural areas including reconnaissanceand surveillance operations.

Illustrative of the intelligence requirements linked toCT operations are those shown in the matrix (nextpage) and from this it can be seen that much of theinformation required to meet them will be held innon-military, non-governmental databases.

The Intelligence Process in CT operations is nodifferent from the same process conducted in anyother type of operation. The difference lies in thesources of the information from which theintelligence is derived. What September 11 proved

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164

was that much of the information relating to eventson that date probably already existed in a databasesomewhere. Had that information been available toan organisation with the ability to retrieve and makeuse of it, it is conceivable that the outcome mighthave been different.

There is little doubt that if wholesale access wereavailable to ‘other military’ and commercialdatabases then both the ability to meet CToperations’ intelligence requirements and to providemeaningful and timely indications and warningsabout terrorist activity would be greatly enhanced.

An EndstateIt is clear that if we are to effectively pursueinternal and external CT operations in the future,access must be gained to existing but previouslyunavailable sources of information andintelligence. In order to make these available, itmay be necessary for new primary legislation to beenacted and in some areas for old shibboleths tobe laid to rest. Access by the military to theinformation contained in civil databases must beaccompanied by unequivocal guarantees of datasecurity. These will be essential to gaining theacceptance of both the public and of law makers tothe military use of the information contained in civilpersonnel databases.

We are fortunate in the United Kingdom that the firstdemonstration of raw fundamentalist terrorism tookplace somewhere else. It might however just aseasily have been here. The question that must be

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asked is whether we would have been any betterinformed or prepared than the United States to meetthe threat of such an event or indeed, after theevent, whether we are now much better preparedtoday. The provision of new information for use in thederivation of military intelligence is ultimately, like allmilitary decisions, one that will be dependant onpolitical will. The potential exists for a quantumimprovement in the provision of intelligence supportto CT operations. The implications of putting in placethe arrangements that would enable thatimprovement to take place are far-reaching but notoverly intrusive when compared to the effects of amajor terrorist act.

The choice presented here is somewhat stark. Thepotential for information sharing exists, the benefitsare undeniable but there are costs both in financialresources and loss of civil liberties. These must bebalanced against the potential effects of terrorism.

‘The will to conquer is the first condition ofvictory!’

Marshal Foch

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CHAPTER 11

THE DIVINE THREADSBy Graham Le Fevre

‘…it is the divine manipulation of the threads andis the treasure of the sovereign…’ 1

Sun Tzu(on information gleaned from networks of spies)

In the future Intelligence, Surveillance, TargetAcquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR),

supported by effective Command, Control,Computers and Communications (C4), must providetimely, accurate, relevant and assured informationand intelligence in the right form to support decisionmaking, planning and execution of operations bycommanders at every level of command. Supportingcommanders is the primary function of C4ISTAR.When manoeuvring and executing operations,especially at the lower tactical levels, commanderswill require precise, real time intelligence on theenemy and the environment and may even need tohave a ‘dialogue’ with a specific sensor or itscontroller. Precise requirements of commanders willof course vary with the level of command at whichthey are operating – decision-making timescales, forexample, will expand at higher levels.

C4ISTAR must also serve other related purposes,such as supporting Information Operations and

Media Operations, where a capability to rapidlyexploit imagery will be essential. Information forevidential purposes can be expected to assumeincreasing importance, but the crucial factor here isthe audit trail2 for the handling of information thatmay be used as evidence, rather than the quality ofthe information. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)will be an enduring requirement with BDA for non-lethal capabilities, including Information Operations,bringing new challenges. ISTAR will also have a rolein Combat Search and Recovery Operations.

Future operations will require a better understandingof the environment and it is expected thatconsiderable amounts of environmental data andfused environmental information will become readilyavailable to all users.

C4ISTAR must support the application of singleservice and joint effects, especially firepower,which has unique demands of immediacy,responsiveness and resolution. Any changes to ourfuture close battle capabilities will inevitably bepredicated on an enhanced ISTAR capability,supported by capable C4, linked to precisionattack. This places a high premium on providingtimely and accurate information for targeting, andputting effective Sensor-Decider-Shooter links andprocesses in place.

A ‘System of Systems’ approach must be taken tothe organisation of collection assets3 acrosscomponents and in the multi-national environment.Such an approach is where each collectioncapability is considered as one element of a larger

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whole, the whole being co-ordinated and controlledto ensure maximum efficiency is gained from eachelement. The mix of ISTAR assets must be robustensuring that the essential interplay between them,including cross-cueing, can be achieved, but theremust be no over reliance on any one type of asset.A cultural shift is required from reliance bycommanders on ‘owning’ the collection assets as theonly way to meet their intelligence needs. They musthave confidence in the service provided by highlycapable assets, as well as access to information,held at higher and joint levels of command,supplemented by those assets under thecommander’s direct control.

Traditionally intelligence has been developed usingthe Intelligence Cycle, with greater emphasis placedon Direction, Processing and Dissemination ratherthan Collection, often because of the paucity ofISTAR collection assets at all levels of command.The increase in collection capability that is alreadybeing fielded demands a change in emphasis, wheredue weight is given to collection planning and the co-ordination of the collection effort in a way that hasnot been possible or necessary up to now. This mustbe applicable across the levels of command as wellas within each level, requiring staffs to take a muchbroader view of collection requirements andavailable collection assets than has traditionallybeen the case.

Whatever happens organisationally as capabilitiesand processes develop, the commander will stillrequire intimate, expert intelligence staff support tohelp him define his Critical Information

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Requirements, ‘…of all those in an army close to thecommander, none is more intimate than the spies’.4

They must also be able to present the intelligenceproduct to him that they have drawn from allavailable sources and to which they have appliedexpert judgement.

The ISTAR collection assets allocated to each levelof command must be commanded at the levelcommensurate with their reach (in both time andspace) and co-ordinated. ISTAR must be missionorientated and commanders must ensure thatmissions allocated to lower levels of command arematched by appropriate ISTAR collection assetsand C4. Individual system mission planning is likelyto remain within the command element of thatsystem, but co-ordination between systems will bevital to ensure that sensors are in the right place atthe right time and can provide the coveragenecessary to meet the commander’s requirements.This needs to be achieved whilst also minimisingduplication of effort, and taking full account of thecapabilities and limitations of the various systems inthe light of the prevailing operationalcircumstances.5 ISTAR staff must be augmentedwhen additional ISTAR assets are allocated toensure that the commander can co-ordinate andintegrate the resources he has been given.

Figure 1 illustrates a generic C2 structure that couldbe applicable at all levels of command. Informationand intelligence is received from assets controlled atlevels above and below any given level of command,as well as from assets controlled directly by thesubject level of command. The ISTAR Cell is

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171Figure 1. Generic ISTAR C2 Model

responsible for the ‘System of Systems’ co-ordination of organic collection assets, includingcoordination with assets at differing levels ofcommand. It also carries out single source analysisof reports from individual systems under control ofthe subject level of command. It could be a cellembedded in the Main HQ, or remoted from it, as asatellite HQ, depending on the operational situationand level of command. At the Corps level it wouldremain embedded, as there is little imperative toremote it. Whether remote or embedded, from anISTAR process perspective, it and the G2 cell shouldbe seen as a holistic entity. The ISTAR Cell receivesdirection from the G3 and G2 staff, but is also closelylinked with other branches to support bothmanoeuvre and fire support, for example.

A single nominated officer, with the necessary staffsupport, should be responsible for ISTAR at everylevel of command. He should be mission focused,ensuring that assets are deployed to best effect anddynamically re-task assets to achieve thecommander’s intent as circumstances change. Hemust not impede the passage of informationbetween the collection assets and those who needthe information, nor should he allow ISTAR todevelop into a ‘stovepipe’.

The C2 model, replicated at each level of command,would sit within a wider C4ISTAR architecture. Thearchitecture should allow access to informationwherever it may be held, the ability to pass RequestsFor Information (RFI) and tasking to different levelsof command, the ability to control the collectionassets within a level of command and to disseminatethe intelligence produced. There are a number of

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possible options for an overall C4ISTARarchitecture, which are described below:

• Reachback is where supporting processes arecarried out at a location out of theatre.6

Reachback might provide an overall reduction inISTAR manpower, but would require majorinvestment in strategic communications7 and ahome based supporting intelligenceinfrastructure and would also risk a loss of‘theatre feel’ by analysts. It would also requirean in-theatre reversionary capability shouldcommunications fail.

• Centralisation is where all of the staffprocesses are carried out at a single location inthe Area of Operations. It would removeprocesses from lower levels of command, andhelp reduce footprint, but this might affect thetimely passage of information as well asresponsiveness. It would require a considerablechange to the operational level architecture andplace a burden on theatre communications. Likereachback it would require a reversionary modeshould communications fail and, in itself, wouldprovide a single point of failure.

• Dispersal is where individual, or groups ofprocesses are carried out in different locationsat all levels of command. Dispersal wouldfragment the infrastructure, would place asignificant extra burden on tacticalcommunications, and would make the co-ordination of the ISTAR ‘System of Systems’more difficult.

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A federated architecture is effectively a combinationof reachback, centralisation and dispersal. Itensures that key processes are centralised at eachlevel of command, but aspects of reachback anddispersal are also embedded. It would allow thecommander, at each level, to control his ISTARassets while accessing and contributing to the richweb of information available from assets held atother levels of command.

It is expected that the future C4ISTAR architecturewill be based on the federated approach as shown inFigure 2. The diagram is a fantastic simplificationand does not, for example, capture the cross-cueingbetween sensors, or sensor to shooter links. It couldapply at each level of command from battlegroup tocorps.8 It shows the linkages that need to be madeacross levels of command, and it supports the C2model shown at Figure 1. Importantly it feeds, and isfed, by the Common Operational Picture (COP),understanding that at the higher tactical level itcoalesces into the Purple COP or Joint OperationalPicture (JOP) whilst at the lowest tactical level it isclearly single service. The intent of such anapproach is to enable commanders at the tacticallevel to benefit from the investment in operationaland strategic systems, whilst at the same timeenabling assets controlled at the tactical level to beemployed and exploited to best effect.

Such an architecture is not radically new, but isevolutionary. Importantly it provides flexibility and thebasis for further development as our collectioncapabilities improve. From the commander’sperspective it should provide him with confidence

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Chapter 11

175Figure 2. Generic ISTAR C2 Model

that his direction is being met and that the resultingintelligence is timely, as robust as possible and ofthe ‘resolution’, or level of detail, that he requires.

Development work is already underway to realise afuture Federated C4ISTAR architecture, with mucheffort focussed on the improved co-ordination ofwhat are currently disparate stove-piped elements.The key challenge will be to deliver the processingpower (human and digital) and the Communicationand Information Systems (CIS) infrastructure torealise the intent of the ISTAR architecture - to allowthe tactical level of command to benefit frominvestment in operational and strategic systems,while enabling tactical assets to be employed andexploited to best effect.

NOTES1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter 6, ‘The Use of Spies’.2 Often referred to as data tagging.3 Potentially all organisations have a capability to collect

information but for the purposes of this paper the focus ison those organisations whose primary role is I, S, TA or R.

4 Sun Tzu, ibid.5 For instance the employment of manned systems requires

consideration of additional factors such as personnelprotection.

6 There is no formal definition of reachback, but it isconsidered to mean reaching back to capabilities out oftheatre in the home or Alliance/Coalition base. Drawing oncapabilities placed in a safe, or relatively safe, area in-theatre is considered to be part of centralisation.

7 Despite the US military’s major investment in militarysatellite communications almost 60% of DoD satellitecommunications are passed via non-military satellites(source US Space Warfare Centre).

8 It could equally apply to command levels in othercomponents and in the Joint Environment.

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CHAPTER 12

3D VISIONBy Graham Le Fevre

‘…the technology that is available to the USmilitary today and now in development canrevolutionise the way we conduct militaryoperations. That technology can give us theability to see a “battlefield” as large as Iraq orKorea – an area 200 miles on a side – withunprecedented fidelity, comprehension andtimeliness; by night or day, in any kind ofweather, all the time. In a future conflict, thatmeans an Army corps commander in his fieldheadquarters will have instant access to a live,three-dimensional image of the entirebattlefield…’

Admiral Bill Owens, USN.1

Rommel was so determined to see the enemy’sdispositions for himself that he often flew over

the front line in his Storch reconnaissance plane,sometimes taking his Chief of Staff with him onthese perilous excursions.2 A number of aerialsurveillance systems entering service will providecommanders with the bird’s eye view Rommel sodesperately sought, without them having to leavethe relative safety of their command posts. TheAirborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) and theReconnaissance Pod for Tornado (RAPTOR) will

provide commanders with near real time imageryand when combined with Unmanned AerialVehicles, soon to be ubiquitous, will revolutioniseland force commanders’ perspectives at every levelof command. Gone is the aerial photograph as astale snapshot in time – perhaps delivered too late– and in comes still and moving imagery, real time,where you want it, when you want it to supportplanning, manoeuvre and target engagement. Thisis perhaps the single most significant change to acommander’s ability to see his own battlespacesince Frederick the Great raised a telescope to hiseye and was able to establish his headquarters in afixed location overlooking the battlefield, rather thanhaving to rush around it, as was the practice ofGustavus Adolfus a century before.3

But this particular ‘revolution’ in capability has beena long time coming. At the beginning of the 20thCentury, technology, tradition and force structuresmeant that the capability to acquire informationwithin the military ground environment was deliveredby ground based reconnaissance forces andespionage. The First World War saw many changesin military technology and methods of operation but,from an ISTAR perspective, was probably mostnoticeable for the introduction of mobile4 airreconnaissance and observation platforms. The useof air reconnaissance increased between the Firstand Second World Wars and by 1945 airreconnaissance was an important and wellestablished collection capability.

However the next real conceptual and technologicalleap did not come until the second half of the 20th

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Century. The Cold War, and the requirement forintelligence gathering at ‘strategic’ ranges bysuperpowers divided by oceans and the polar icecap, drove the development of high flying, longrange and long endurance airborne reconnaissanceand surveillance systems. These systems carriedsensors supporting imagery, Signals Intelligence(SIGINT) and other more specialist areas. The rapiddevelopment of satellites from the late 1950sonwards meant that sensors could be placed outsidethe atmosphere providing greater endurance, rangeand coverage with less platform vulnerability.

Fielded airborne ISTAR systems within NATO nowcarry a very wide variety of sensors supportingImagery Intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT andMeasurement And Signature Intelligence (MASINT).The UK itself has an extensive airborne collectioncapability. These systems, linked to furtherdevelopment of other tactical as well as strategicand operational level airborne systems, will providethe UK military with a really comprehensive airbornereconnaissance and surveillance capability. TheArmy has traditionally focussed on its ground basedcollection assets, developing its processes based ona fairly two dimensional view of the battlefield. At thestrategic level the balance has already shifted to amuch more multi-dimensional view of the

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SR-71 Blackbird

battlespace. The challenge the Army faces is how tochange its mindset to become properly 3-dimensional and exploit the strategic systems andthe newer operational and tactical level airbornesystems to improve its Situational Awareness.

ASTOR The ASTOR programme has been underway forsome time, equipment is now being built and the firstelements of the ASTOR unit will start to form at RAFWaddington next year. It has a maturing Concept ofOperations and all of the principal elements of thesystem are well defined. ASTOR will be an all-weather, day/night radar imaging surveillancesystem able to detect and recognise moving andstationary ground targets in Near Real Time (NRT).

The system will comprise high-flying air platforms,exploitation Ground Stations (GS) and theassociated communications architecture. The airplatforms are based on the Bombardier GlobalExpress business jet, equipped with a long range,dual-mode Radar System (DMRS). ASTOR’s GS willbe capable of supporting levels of command from adeployed Joint Task Force HQ downwards. TheASTOR system will have a comprehensivecommunications suite that will enable the target area

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data to be passed directly, in near real time, from theair platform to those HQs with ASTOR GS where theexploitation will, for the most part, take place. Thismethodology is designed to overcome much of thedelay traditionally associated with airborne imagerycollection systems. However, the system will retain acapability for data exploitation on-board the AP.

ASTOR will be able to provide radar coverage ofsignificant areas of ground for long periods of time.It will be fielded as a Joint capability and is likely tobe commanded as a national asset. There will becompeting demands placed on the system with theUK National Contingent Commander (NCC) orJoint Task Force Commander (JTFC) providingdirection. However in order to support tacticalcommanders it is expected that direct taskingauthority could be allocated to the brigade level.GS should be allocated down to brigade level, butthe limited number to be acquired will not be ableto support all formations within a division sizedforce. On warfighting operations, when formationHQs need to move, two GS will be provided toensure 24 hour coverage. Any GS within range ofthe aircraft can receive moving target indicator(MTI) data but synthetic aperture radar (SAR) islimited to only two GS at any one time. The needfor line of sight between aircraft and GS willinfluence siting of the latter. GS can be located upto 1 km away from the HQ they support but requirea direct line connection to pass information.

The fielding of ASTOR means that for the first timewithin the British Armed Forces an operational levelsystem will provide broad area radar imagery

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coverage of the battlefield. The ability of ASTOR tomonitor and accurately locate activity over arelatively large area will permit rapid tacticalplanning and the efficient cueing of other sensorand attack systems. ASTOR, in the vast majority ofits operations, will be working as part of anintegrated and Joint ‘system-of-systems’, coveringseveral levels of command all the way down tobrigade level. It will directly contribute to thedevelopment of the Land Component situationawareness as well as being able to effectively crosscue other collection assets.

RAPTORRAPTOR is a new generation air reconnaissancecapability that is now coming into service. It willconsist of a number of pods and Data Link GroundStations (DLGS). The pods have a sophisticatedelectro-optic/infra-red capability that can be used atlow and medium flight levels. The pods are self-contained, with their own integral communicationssuite, and can be carried by the GR45 variant ofTornado. The pod will be able to execute a largenumber of tasks per mission, comprising spot,stereo, area and line searches. The system willsupport the taking of swathes of imagery of

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considerable width per pass with airborne re-taskingco-ordinated by the navigator.

The pod will be able to communicate its imagery viaa line of sight downlink to a bespoke DLGS. In-flightexploitation and tethered or selective data link willallow rapid exploitation of the imagery anddissemination of the resulting IMINT. The DLGS isan air transportable and NBC compatible cabinsuitable for a Main Operating Base (MOB). It can bedeployed elsewhere if there is a requirement toreduce the data link range, however its groundmobility is very limited. RAPTOR products andinformation and intelligence gleaned from them willbe disseminated through the CIS architecture tothose who need them.

UAV DevelopmentsThe UK’s current experience of UAVs is based onthe Phoenix system, NATO experience with USUAVs in the Balkans and views of how othercountries have been using their UAVs. Phoenix hasonly been in service for three years and yet the

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concept of how it should be used has alreadychanged quite considerably. It is no longer seen asjust a Target Acquisition system, but as a multi-capable system with broad ISTAR utility.

UAVs have the potential to establish a persistentdwell over a target area. This allows the enemy, orobject of interest, to be tracked continuously untilthey are engaged by strike or manoeuvre assets, orother appropriate action is taken. By being under thecontrol of every level of command, commanders willpotentially have their own aerial view of precisely thearea they are interested in for as long as they remaininterested, subject to system limitations andoperational circumstances. This is a trulyrevolutionary capability, the potential impact of whichis yet to be fully understood.

Outside the UK UAVs under development, and inservice, have ranges that vary from metres tothousands of kilometres and ceilings that range froma few metres to well into the stratosphere. Generallyspeaking the size of the UAV relates to its ceiling,range, payload and endurance. A UAV that has anextended range and that can reach significantheights is likely to be of significant size, a shortrange UAV could be only a matter of feet in size,whilst at the lowest end a micro UAV could go downto the size of an insect. Up until now UAVs,especially the larger ones, have been considered tobe sophisticated air platforms that require theplatform controller to have a knowledge of avionicsand the theory of flight. However the increasingsophistication of the software, and the greater use ofautomation within UAV systems, is rapidly reducing

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the skills required of any pilot/operator. Developingsystems are already at the stage where the operatorneeds minimal skills to be able to fly the air vehicleas the software carries most of that burden.

There are three potential systems architectureoptions for UAVs. These are:

• Satellite Relay. A UAV that is controlled via asatellite relay has great flexibility as to where,and how far away, the GS elements could belocated. It has considerable potential range andis not inhibited by terrain.

• Airborne Relay. A UAV that is controlled via anairborne relay, often another UAV of the sametype, is much more restricted. GS elementsneed to be in relatively close proximity to therelay platform but the UAV on mission could bea considerable distance from the relay UAV.

• Line of Sight. A UAV that has no relay can onlyoperate within Line Of Sight (LOS) of the GS;this will restrict the reach of the system.

All systems require GS in sufficient numbers toenable the efficient working of the UAV system. GScan be either ‘dumb’ ie they can only receive datafrom the Air Vehicle or active when they control theAir Vehicle and become known as Ground ControlStation (GCS). Such stations are likely to begeographically located where they can receive datafrom, or communicate with, the Air Vehicles. TheUAV system architecture must allow the free flow ofinformation from the tasker to the controller to theanalyst and the end user. We should expect that

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ISTAR UAV systems will be resourced with aGCS/GS architecture that allows the product to bedisseminated to whoever requires it.

Airspace Management and Co-ordination is vital forair operations and all UAV activity must be co-ordinated as part of the larger air situation. Generallythe higher and further the air vehicle flies the greaterthe complexity of co-ordination, although very highflying UAVs may require less co-ordination as theywill fly above the height envelope of most other airvehicles.6 Air Traffic Control (ATC), especially inpeacetime or on operations conducted within acivilian airspace management environment, iscrucially important to the effective use of UAVs.Procedures must be put into place to ensure that theoperational use of UAVs is not unnecessarilyrestricted. The procedural complexity of ATC willrequire properly trained personnel.

The amount of logistics support required by asystem will vary. A small, expendable UAV will havea relatively small logistics requirement, whereas alarge, long range UAV will have a logisticsrequirement more akin to an aircraft. The amount oflogistics support required by a system is likely tohave a bearing on whether it has true tacticalcapability or requires the type of infrastructureassociated with a fixed site, such as an airfield.

Future UAVs could be used for many different tasksbut there are likely to be three primary ones: carryingsensors, acting as a communications relay andcarrying a payload that achieves an effect, this couldrange from physical destruction ie a bomb to

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information broadcast such as a PsyOps message.Information gathering UAVs are used primarily tosupport planning, operations (manoeuvre) andtargeting. The key requirement for tasking is that theperson who needs to task a UAV must be able to doso rapidly, be assured that the task will beundertaken, and that the information gathered will bepassed back rapidly. The further removed therequester is from the UAV task co-ordinationfunction/cell the less responsive the system. Whenspeed of response to information received must bein seconds and minutes any delay can bedetrimental to effectiveness.

There is always a requirement for the timelydissemination of information or intelligence. This isparticularly important at the lower levels of tacticalcommand where the immediacy of response to adetected threat can be critical to the battle outcome.In the short to medium term C4 capability willconstrain the dynamic use of UAVs and require themto be controlled close to the level of command atwhich they are to be tasked, otherwise theimmediacy of the imagery from the 3rd dimensionwill be prejudiced. However it is important torecognise that the products of all UAVs should bedistributed to all who need them, of whatevercomponent or level of command. The C4Iarchitecture, and in particular the distribution of GSmust ensure that this can be achieved. In principle,the key is having authority to task a system in theknowledge that it is responsive enough to providethe required information in the timeframe in which itis needed and to be able to hold the system on task,

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providing a continual flow of imagery to supportengagement and manoeuvre.

ImplicationsThe introduction of these systems will provide ISTARto underpin planning, manoeuvre and targeting forthe Land Component from corps level down tobattlegroup. Combined with information from othersystems, this will provide commanders at theselevels with an unprecedented understanding of theirown battlespace. Planning, manoeuvre and theapplication of firepower will be much improved. Inparticular, the immediacy and sustained flow of theinformation provided by UAVs that can responddynamically as circumstances change, has thepotential to revolutionise the way commanders thinkabout and use ground and consequently hasimplications for weapons, organisation and tactics.

NOTES1 Adm B Owens USN, Lifting the Fog of War, Farrar Straus

and Giroux, New York, 2000, p 14. Adm Owens is a formerVice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 See David Fraser, Knight’s Cross, Harper Collins, London,1993.

3 For a historical perspective, see Martin van Creveld,Command in War, Harvard University Press, CambridgeMA, 1985.

4 Tethered air balloons with observers had already been inuse for many years.

5 The GR4a will continue to fly the Tornado Infra Red RecceSystem (TIRRS).

6 High flying UAVs will still need to transit through multiplelevels of airspace to reach or descend from their operatingaltitude.

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CHAPTER 13

THE CASE FORMANNED

RECONNAISSANCEBy Graham Le Fevre and John Thornton

‘I trust that none of my officers considers that theaircraft can be used for anything other thanobservation and dropping hand held bombs. Theresponsibility for reconnaissance remains whereit has always been with the cavalry!’

Field Marshal Haig

The UK military’s plans for ISTAR equipmentacquisition are based, to a large degree, on the

acquisition of increasingly complex technicalsystems which provide a remote view of thebattlespace. These systems will provide thecapability to undertake wide area and focusedsurveillance. Yet they remain remote from theirtarget and, even when systems, such as unattendedground sensors, can be placed on the ground theyonly provide a partial picture.

Paradoxically, therefore, in an era in which space-based, aerial and remote sensor systems proliferate,there is an enduring, even increasing requirement,for manned reconnaissance. However, the termmanned reconnaissance can be misleading as it

implies, perhaps, that there is manned andunmanned reconnaissance. This is too simplistic –all forms of ISR have a ‘man in the loop’ somewhere.ASTOR, for instance, is a remote stand off system,but it is manned by aircrew and analysts. The idea‘manned reconnaissance’ does not thereforeconcern all forms of information gathering thatrequire a ‘man in the loop’. The distinction is twofold:the activity is reconnaissance, which impliesinfiltration and penetration of the enemy’sbattlespace; and ‘the man’ is so placed that he is atsome risk in carrying out this activity. Equally,manned reconnaissance is not the prerogative ofground forces. Manned aerial reconnaissance in fastaircraft, for example, viewed by the RAF as acontinuing and essential part its capability, is anelement of the manned reconnaissance equation.

From a ground force perspective, a key advantageof ground-based manned reconnaissance is that itspresence on a piece of ground can alter its status tobeing in one’s own hands. The overflight of thesame by manned or unmanned assets, merely

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Armoured Reconnaisance in the Gulf War

provides information. For example on 8 June 1940Rommel expressly ordered his ReconnaissanceBattalion Commander (Von Luck) to “push throughto the west for about 30 kilometres… take the hilland establish yourself there until I arrive with thetanks. Do not look left or right, only forward all thetime”.1 Von Luck succeeded in his mission aftersome difficulty and by 9 June had captured the littleport of Fécamp. Other similar examples include, ofcourse, the capture of the Remagen Bridge on 7March 1945 by Lieutenant Timmermann. A morecontemporary example, perhaps, is Baghramairbase, where a company of Marines went in,ostensibly for reconnaissance purposes. Theimpact of their being there had strategic significancein a way that aerial reconnaissance of the samewould not. Granted, their position appearedprecarious – but that is precisely the risk/gainequation of manned reconnaissance.

Manned reconnaissance will continue to contributedecisively to Joint ISTAR and to targeting for Jointstrike assets. It will cue combined arms Air andGround Manoeuvre and should make an effectivecontribution to all the components of capability:manoeuvre, firepower, information, command andcontrol, deployment, protection, sustainability anddomination of the electromagnetic spectrum. It canact both as a sensor and as a discriminating‘decider’ within the ‘sensor to shooter’ system. Itmay enable freedom of movement through flank andeconomy of force tasks making use of organicmobility, firepower, protection and surveillance.Using indirect fire, manned reconnaissance should

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be capable of area denial, security of Lines ofCommunication and of key points.

It is also inherently flexible and can conduct othertasks such as regulating movement or switchingrapidly to a liaison role, by virtue of having goodcommunications and high quality people at all levelsof command. For example, Von Luck, again, in thefall of France in 1940, was able to switch rapidly to aliaison role and thereby facilitated Pétain’s surrenderat Bordeaux.2

In Other Operations, covert manned reconnaissancewill have a key role to play – tasks could includegathering evidence and cueing other agencies to, forexample, effect an arrest or to carry out some otherform of action. The more sensitive the surveillancemission, the more specialised the unit carrying it outwill need to be.

Uniquely, and particularly in Other Operations whenthere will be a premium at all levels on being able toacquire information from third parties, mannedreconnaissance can interact with the populace andother parties in the battlespace. This implies a needto dismount from a vehicle or to operate on foot forsustained periods. The mix of platforms and team-level structures may have to be adjusted betweenwarfighting and Other Operations and from onescenario or environment to another. This will requirea range of manned reconnaissance capabilities andargues for an increasing light infantry, or dismountedformation level patrol element.

In conflict prevention, the strategic mobility ofmanned reconnaissance will contribute to rapid

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effect. The ability to achieve, quickly, both presenceand coverage of a wide area is a task for a militaryforce in which manned reconnaissance has a keyrole to play. As ground forces they can build theconfidence that enables both civil-military co-operation and HUMINT operations. Mannedreconnaissance forces may appear benign but retainthe ability to escalate with organic weapons andaccess to Joint fire support. Equally, overt mannedreconnaissance can monitor and negotiate to ensurecompliance or to reduce tensions.

The flexibility of manned reconnaissance allows it toswitch roles and functions rapidly from Warfightingto Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping and backagain. It can be used in both an overt and covertmanner, switching between modes as the situationdemands. Ground-based systems with the tacticalmobility to reach then loiter in outlying areas canmonitor a situation and provide a visible presence.Stand-off and remote systems might not havesufficient discrimination3 and will certainly not becapable of interaction to defuse, arbitrate orenforce. Manned systems will be most suited toobtaining evidence of infringements by former

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Reconnaissance Patrol in Sierra Leone

belligerents, reconnaissance in support of therestoration of civil infrastructure, the enduring andlocal provision of security and, if required, supportto humanitarian operations.

Manned reconnaissance will apply missioncommand including the ability to self re-task to seizeand retain the initiative. Though range may bereduced it will have an all-weather, 24 hour capabilitywith endurance. It can penetrate cover, dismountedas necessary, to see inside buildings, tunnels andcaves or beneath dense foliage. By being on theground, manned reconnaissance can makeassessments on routes and going in which acommander can have sufficient confidence on whichto act. It can also fully identify the extent and natureof resources (dumps, stores, construction materiel,etc) and infrastructure (road, rail systems, water,power, production facilities, etc).

Crucially, manned reconnaissance can force theenemy to react and, if suitably configured, canchoose to fight for information. Boldness inprobing, recognition of opportunities to exploit, forexample, by seizing bridges or terrain and byattacking HQs, logistic or communications siteswill be enduring characteristics.

Key to ground-based manned reconnaissance is thefact that the soldier’s own sensory capabilitiessupplement that of the technologies at his disposal.This might appear initially to be a glib statement,however technology has not managed to produce asingle sensor package equivalent to the humansenses integrated with an effective intelligence

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direction and analysis system – the human brain.The essential quality of a human being to be able todirect his senses, cross cue between them, re-directeffort, collate and analyse the information received,and all within a few milliseconds, is still beyondtechnology. The overall benefit of a human linkeddirectly to a sensor, or indeed doing the sensing,remains critical to the overall ISTAR mix.

Reconnaissance Trooper

However, the use of manned reconnaissance risksloss of life, or capture, which will have a greatermedia impact than the loss of unmanned systems.Manned systems operating away from the mainbody of the force will remain at high risk4 and thecomplications of inserting, supporting with firepowerand extracting a penetrating ground-based force willendure. Sustainment will be challenging for all formsof manned reconnaissance, particularly medicalsupport and casualty evacuation, which placesfurther troops and assets at risk.

Communications links to small ground-basedteams will also be challenging, whether mounted ina vehicle or dismounted. Challenges will includedistance, terrain (especially as mannedreconnaissance is most suited to complex terrain)

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and security. Mobility will be constrained by speedof movement on the ground whether on foot orvehicle borne, by obstacles such as rivers, whichcould require organic mobility support. Moreover,all ground movement is likely to increasesignatures - particularly to MTI detection. Theproblem of combat identification is common to alltypes of manned reconnaissance and in somecases, co-ordination of deployment will beconstrained by a ‘need to know’ culture. Insertionand extraction are particular Combat ID challengesand these can be linked to the process of re-tasking, which can be time consuming in certaincircumstances where the assets must berecovered, re-briefed and re-inserted.

But the disadvantages of manned reconnaissanceare far outweighed by the advantages. It willsometimes produce information of operational orstrategic significance and sometimes it will produceoperational or even strategic effect just by being inthe right place. A key advantage is in ‘micro-recce’,which provides invaluable detail to the level ofcommand at which it is generated. However, itsecures its place in the order of battle by its ability todiscriminate intelligently in circumstances wherestrike assets must be employed within restrictiverules of engagement and in its ability to moveamongst and interact with people.

NOTES1 Von Luck, H, Panzer Commander, Praeger, New York,

1989, p 35.2 Idem, pp 39-44.

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3 To discriminate between former belligerents, DisplacedPersons, NGOs, agitators, criminals, civil populationethnic groupings, etc, is an essential for successful postconflict activity.

4 Armoured Reconnaissance in particular is vulnerablewhen operating far ahead of the main force.

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199

CHAPTER 14

THE DELILAH FACTOR– NEW THREATS AND

VULNERABILITIESBy David Potts

‘Their wild eyes met his as the bloodshot eyes ofthe prairie wolves meet their leader ere herushes on at their head in the trail of the bison,alas! only to fall into the hidden snare of theIndian.’

Herman Melville1

The ‘electronic flank’ is an area of vulnerability thatwill require increasing and stinting attention.

Potential adversaries can acquire sophisticatedcommercially available capabilities with which toattack our information systems. These attacks couldhave operational, or even strategic impact and forrelatively little cost compared to, say, developing along-range weapon with which to strike a distantheadquarters. There is therefore a pressing need forsome form of ‘Red Team’ analysis of the nascenttactical network and its vulnerabilities. Networks willneed to be robust enough to remain effective in ahostile command and control warfare environment.

Networks will also need to be stable enough androbust enough to continue to operate and fight with

them in the face of system failure. There is muchtalk of the importance of reversionary modes, butwe need to be realistic as to what these are. Oncea force has become digitised, traded mass fortempo and become accustomed to informationfeeds from a whole variety of aerial and stand-offsensors, it will have developed a command tempoand a way of fighting that simply does not lenditself to reverting to chinagraph pencils and papermaps. Procedures will need to be developed sothat the fall-back position to a digital environmentis another digital environment. For example, if anapplication closes down, use another application,if a workstation fails move to another one, or if allof a particular command post’s systems fail, revertto an alternative digitised command post. Thisshould be easier than trying to revert to ananalogue, or pre-digital mode, especially asdistributed databases should mean that all of theinformation in a command post could be held andautomatically updated at its alternateheadquarters, for example. Reversionary modeswill also change over time – systems beingintroduced now will seem reversionary comparedto subsequent technology generations.

The widespread use of GPS for military purposesalso brings with it new vulnerabilities. The system’sglobal, all weather capability for precision weaponaiming, position reporting and time synchronisationunderpins many of our information age capabilities.Programmes and projects such as BOWMAN,Tomahawk and Brimstone are and will continue to beever more dependent on the system’s capabilities.

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It would be foolish to imagine that potential enemieswill not attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of GPS.The satellites which transmit the GPS signals arepotentially vulnerable to space warfare from physicalattack or the effects of an electromagnetic pulse(EMP). However, the spacing of the individualsatellites within the system would mean that eachsatellite would have to be individually targeted. Amore realistic threat is jamming or ‘spoofing’.Spoofing is the deliberate transmission of falsesignals with the intent to produce a false position,velocity and time output from a receiver. Spoofing isrelatively easy, but can be prevented by encryption.The most significant threat is from low-cost jammers,which are now available commercially for only a fewhundred dollars. Movement behind shielding terraincan counter jamming, though the tactical situationmay not allow this. Technical solutions includeadaptive spectral filters to counter jammers;integration of GPS with Inertial Navigation Systemvelocity data; and the use of controlled receptionpattern antennas that cancel jammers by formingareas of extremely low gain in the radiation pattern.These solutions, although feasible, are moreexpensive than the GPS system they would be usedto protect.

Tempo drag is a possibility as allies digitize theirforces in varying timescales and to varying levels ofcapability. In a multi-national force, formations withless advanced C4I will not be capable of operating atthe same tempo or on the same battle rhythm asfully digitized formations. This gap in C4I capabilitywill have to be managed by commanders in thesame way as other capability shortfalls are now2 – by

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allocating appropriate missions and tasks or byallocating additional resources.3 Doctrine,techniques and procedures will need to bedeveloped in international fora to manage potentialtempo drag. The challenges inherent in this willincrease over time as digitised forces become moreand more adept at operating in a digitisedenvironment and adjust their force structures andtactics accordingly.

‘Information overload’ is the single most citedpotential drawback of Digitization. Staff in officesalready live under the tyranny of email and there is areal fear in many quarters that Digitisation willextend all of the worst aspects of this phenomenoninto the battlespace. It is easy to imagine busy staffofficers groping their way through a blizzard of suchcommunications from subordinates, superiors andflanking forces. This is a real issue – of courserigorous information management will help, but thesituation will still arise on occasion.

Worse still is the prospect of information free-flowinginto the planning process, providing constantupdates and refreshes, so that a decision is neverreached. Or, alternatively, planning paralysis whilestaff seek out every last obtainable detail ofpotentially available information to inform a decisionthat might consequently be delayed beyond thepoint where taking it is effective. These spectres arenot valid reasons for shrinking away from the visionof the network, but they are real concerns and dounderscore the importance of having clearlyingrained methodologies for the effectiveexploitation of information and, crucially, knowing

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when enough is enough. Above all, perhaps,commanders will need to understand that in gettinginside the decision cycle of the enemy, the key is tomake a good enough decision quickly, rather than aperfect decision when the moment has passed.

Linked to this is the threat to our cognitive powers ofdecision support tools and any number of planningaids that are envisioned for the future. The risk isthat the key staff and even commanders maybecome so overly immersed in managing thesesystems – providing input to them and assessingtheir outputs – that they simply forget to analyse thesituation for themselves. The most important aspectof decision making is thinking, drawing on one’s ownexperiences and applying judgement based on adeveloped understanding of the real world.

Combat occurs in the physical domain, not in theinformation domain. Commanders will need to havea feel for the difference between ground truth anddisplayed information. UAV video feeds, ASTORmoving target trails and displayed icons will tell acommander where everything is, with someimperfections, and may even show with someveracity where his own forces and those of theenemy are in relation to each other. But in vileweather, in complex terrain, or when casualties arebeing taken, there is no substitute in Land warfarefor genuine Fingerspitzengefuhl derived from firsthand knowledge of the actualities.

At the lowest tactical level, ground needs to be readand understood. The fact that a UAV can see atarget does not, for example, automatically mean

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that a friendly direct fire system can actually see andengage the target, even if it appears to be in line ofsight of it on a display screen. There could be tallgrass, hedgerows, debris, smoke or any number ofbattlefield frictions and fogs that prevent the targetbeing seen and engaged. This is perhaps just amatter of training, but one senses the potential for agood deal of friction between levels of command,especially in complex terrain.

There is also a risk of fighting ‘Red Icons’ rather thanthe enemy. This is particularly so in circumstanceswhere a red picture has been compiled in some allknowing superior headquarters and injected intoeveryone else’s battlepicture. There might be atendency to attempt to engage these icons without areal understanding of either the latency of theinformation, or perhaps that the icons may havebeen disaggregated from a centre of mass by a ruleand are therefore displayed as a mathematicalprojection of reality, rather than actual positions.Avoiding this requires technical solutions to the wayinformation is displayed as well as operatingprocedures and a grasp of the difference betweendisplayed information and ground truth.

Despite all of this information on enemy forces, therewill still be surprises, and at every level – tactical,operational and strategic. Even in relatively recenttimes the West has been surprised by its enemies.The crossing of the Yalu River by the Chinese and ofthe Suez Canal by the Egyptians are text bookexamples. The Tet Offensive achieved simultaneoussurprise throughout the entire depth of the Americandeployment in Vietnam and, most recently of all, the

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attacks of 11 September shocked and stunned theworld, including those whose business it was to seethese sorts of things coming. We will continue to besurprised, either because the other fellow concealshis whereabouts and movements, or deceives usinto believing he is elsewhere, or that he is notpresent in the strength we imagined. For example,despite impressive aerial surveillance and bombing,the Serbian Army in Kosovo withdrew with much ofits combat power intact as a direct consequence ofits effective concealment techniques. We will alsofail at some time in the future to draw the appropriateconclusions from the facts that are presented to us.In the information age, we will still find occasion torecoil in shock and announce that ‘we neverbelieved he would do that!’

We will also continue to kill the wrong people, onoccasion. It seems unbelievable that despitespending billions of dollars on state of the artsurveillance systems and having an enormousintelligence bureaucracy, the United States stillmanaged to partially destroy the Chinese Embassyin Belgrade. Subsequent investigations haverevealed that this was an error, a classic ‘cock-up’. Itis the sort of thing that could happen again and theconsequences could be much more adverse. Suchmishaps highlight the extent to which chance and illjudgement can be determining factors in warfare andserve to undermine the more extravagant Western,and especially US, claims for information superiority.

Effective information operations are predicated on athorough understanding of the target set. It isdoubtful if the West, and particularly the US, can

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really develop a sufficiently sophisticatedunderstanding of the impact of informationoperations messages on potential target audiencesworld-wide. This will constrain the effectiveness ofsuch operations, which is, in any case, almostimpossible to measure. Difficulties are compoundedby the impossibility of compartmentalising messagesand audiences – the domestic message ends upbeing beamed around the world. The images of thealleged terrorist prisoners being held in Cuba by theUS is a case in point – photographs taken andreleased by the US authorities seem to have had apositive reaction in the US, but much of the world is,rightly or wrongly, horrified. Information Operationshave a vital role to play in operations, but we need tobe more honest with ourselves as to howperceptions can be shaped to advantage and whatour own limitations are in this field. In recent conflictsour enemies (for example, Sinn Fein et al) appearedto be better at this game than we, constrained,rightly, as we are by all the trappings of liberaldemocracy and a free press.

Some of the concepts underpinning network centricwarfare are arguably implausible. Self-synchronisation, for example, is difficult toenvisage working in circumstances whereresources are constrained. This may occur eitherbecause resources are intrinsically scarce, orbecause they are scarce relative to the scale of thetarget array. In such circumstances there will be aneed to prioritise and sequence engagementsmore centrally, leading potentially to the centristcontrol and timetable warfare to which NCW isintended to be the antithesis.

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The operational art for the information age, spawnedor defined by NCW, appears to be one centred onintegrating the effects of long-range air and sealaunched weapons, linked to space-based and aerialsensors. This has two failings.

The first is that in many circumstances it is simplynot cost effective to attack the target with suchexpensive systems. The second is that it isfundamentally attritional and the time will comewhen an enemy will simply soak this punishment,possibly even to the point of running downoperational stocks to dangerously low levels.

It also requires air superiority. It must be assumedthat no potential adversary would be able to survivefor long in air to air combat with the US. Equally, itmust be assumed that no potential adversary wouldtry to fight the US in the air. But innovations inground-based, theatre air defence are a differentmatter and it must be assumed that potentialadversaries are energetically exploring this field.This networked long-range attack collapses as aform of warfare as soon as the defender develops anair defence capability to counter the threat.

‘As long as airpower can defeat the anti-airpower, then this recipe for warfare willcontinue to flourish. But if we reach a stage inwhich there are numerous directed energyweapons, real-time, long range, that can trackand acquire instantaneously… then the equationwould be reversed’.4

The greatest strength of this form of warfare is alsoits greatest weakness. Namely, that it has conferred

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upon the US, and by association, its allies, such anair of invincibility in conventional ‘force on force’warfare that it has become a powerful catalyst forother forms warfare, labelled variously as‘asymmetric’, or ‘unrestricted’ warfare. Conceivably,such forms of warfare could, in time, render thenetworked conventional force irrelevant. But networkbased capabilities will have a vital role to play insupporting intelligence gathering on secretive anddiffuse enemies and in executing novel attacksagainst them, wherever they might be.

Information age technologies and NCW conceptshave the potential to deliver a decisive advantage inall forms of combat, including asymmetric warfare.But in exploiting these technologies and concepts,the Delilah Factor must be acknowledged andproperly addressed.

NOTES1 In Moby Dick.2 For example when a subordinate formation has little

organic artillery or has an unduly slow or vulnerable MainBattle Tank.

3 It is not immediately clear what additional resources mightmean in a C4I context, but it might include enhancedliaison teams or mechanisms to provide shared access toparticular planning tools for example.

4 General Wesley Clarke, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 Jan 02.

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PART THREE –PROGNOSIS

Tactical Combat with the NewC4ISTAR

Whither the Close Battle

Asymmetric Warfare

Once Upon a Time in the Future

CHAPTER 15

TACTICAL COMBATWITH THE NEW

C4ISTARBy David Potts

This chapter considers the impact of the newC4ISTAR on the way we might conduct tactical

combat in the future. It firstly describes the possibleimpact on armoured manoeuvre forces engaged inan expanded close battle in the 2010 timeframe. Itthen outlines a concept for joint tactical combat andpoints to the essence of the operational art in theinformation age.

The Expanded Close BattleEven at the lowest tactical level (brigade andbattlegroup), high quality, relevant information willsoon be provided by operational and strategic levelassets, which, when combined with locally gatheredinformation, will give commanders an undreamed ofinformation advantage over their adversaries. Thiswill enable rapid decision-making and action and theapplication of appropriate and timely effects –including joint firepower. This will change the wayland forces fight at the tactical level – with greateremphasis on achieving decision in the deep battle

211

and a greater stand-off in the close battle. This willbe accompanied by a shift in emphasis from directfire, ground-based platforms to aerial and indirectfire systems. As a consequence, it is possible thatthe functions in combat paradigm of ‘Find, Fix andStrike’ could evolve into ‘Find, Track, Strike, Exploit’.This is of crucial significance as the functions shapeour understanding of the very nature of manoeuvre.

The divisional context, in which brigades sit, is itselfchanging considerably. Think of a UK Division in1990 and compare that to what we know of a UKDivision in 2010. Firstly, in 1990, even at theDivisional level, information from strategic andoperational level assets could be characterised astoo little too late. In 2010 information fromoperational and strategic level assets is expectedto be readily available. But crucially, the Divisionallevel of command will itself control a range ofcapable ISTAR assets that contrast most starklywith the paucity of assets around 1990, whendrones, EW and sound ranging, for example, werereal Cinderella capabilities. This is indicated onpage 263, together with other anticipated majorchanges in capability.

UAVs will provide real-time information and acapability for persistent dwell over targets deliveringlive imagery to allow tracking, engagement andBattle Damage Assessment. This is a quantum leapin capability compared to an aerial photograph by amanned aircraft or drone providing a still snapshot intime with a latency of hours or even days. Similarly,the division can expect to have its own ASTORGround Station permanently allocated in operations.

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This contrasts sharply with the situation in 1990/91when the UK had no such capability. Even in the USArmy during the Gulf War, JSTARS was in its infancyand a terminal could not be made available to VII USCorps. The consequent difference in perception ofevents between General Schwarzkopf, who hadsuch a terminal and Lieutenant General Franks, whodid not, is well documented.1

By 2010 the UK division’s EW capability will havebeen modernised twice since 1990. COBRA andASP will provide an effective counter-battery targetacquisition system, effectively replacing and verysubstantially upgrading the Cymbeline MortarLocating Radar capability, previously held in thebrigades’ Direct Support Artillery regiments.Armoured reconnaissance, although fewer innumber, will also become more effective as CVR(T)is replaced by an ISTAR platform based on theFuture Rapid Effect System (FRES). The whole willbe integrated much more effectively by digital

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1990 DIVISION 2010 DIVISIONISTAR Arty Drones, Arty

Patrols, Armoured Recce.

ASTOR, UAVs, EW, STA Patrols, Weapon Locating Radar, HUMINT, Armoured Recce.

AVIATION LYNX/TOW AH64DDIVISIONAL ARTY

M107 & M110 MLRS, GMLRS, IFPA

GROUND MANOEUVRE

CHALLENGER 1, Warrior FV 432

CHALLENGER 2, Warrior MRAV, FRES.

communications and processing and with newcommand and control, organisations and doctrine todeliver an integrated, recognisable ISTAR capability.

The combination of these factors, ISTAR, betterintegration with joint capabilities and a more effectivedigital command system will make the division a veryformidable adversary, perhaps capable ofdominating an area of operations as much as 200kilometres wide and perhaps 120 Kilometres deep.2

The reach and effectiveness of the divisionalartillery will have improved with the introduction ofMLRS and subsequently of improved, longer-range munitions. But the indirect fire assets,whose projected ranges make them unlikely to beable to concentrate fire across the divisionalfrontage, will need to be allocated down tobrigades. Indeed, the enemy is most unlikely tooblige us by massing his forces in future and wecan therefore expect to see increased emphasison the engagement of fewer and smaller, well-concealed or mobile targets. This too couldencourage further decentralisation of artillery.

The Apache AH64D will have replaced Lynx/TOW toprovide a genuine deep attack capability at corpsand divisional level, as well as a remarkably capableISTAR platform. The use of this asset at thedivisional level would deliver unstoppable combatpower to a UK Division.

The brigades will be focused on the close battle, but,by 2010, with increasing emphasis on longer-rangeindirect fire engagement and with brigade areas ofoperation in excess of 50 Kilometres Square.

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Brigades will take on many of the attributes of adivision today and will be more capable ofindependent action than presently. As with thedivision, it is anticipated that this level of commandwill be able to benefit from information gathered atthe strategic and operational level. It will also haveorganic ISTAR assets when deployed on operations– the contrast with the UK brigade of 1990 could beas stark as shown below:

We are half way through this journey in terms oftime, but perhaps only 20% through it in terms ofcapability improvement. The dramatic changes inISTAR and command and control systems will occurfrom the middle of the present decade onwards.

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1990 2010Cymbeline Mortar Locating Radar

ASTOR Ground Station UAVs Armoured Reconnaissance (including Forward Air Controllers) Dismounted Reconnaissance Patrols EW HUMINT

Their impact is therefore a matter of conjecture atthis stage, but we have had insights from our ownexercises and experiments and from those of ourallies to suggest that there will be profound changesin how we will fight at this level of command. Thebrigade commander will have timely, accurate andrelevant information on his enemy enabling him toengage earlier, with a wider selection of weaponsystems and to more precise and lethal effect. Hewill be able to manoeuvre with confidence anddevelop the situation out of contact with the enemy,preserving both his own combat power and histactical options. He will be able to act rapidly andtake a genuinely manoeuvrist approach to exploitenemy weaknesses and seize opportunities.

Over time, as experience with this kind of ISTARcapability grows, we will see changes to brigadeorganisation and tactics. The expanded area ofoperations will have implications for indirect fireassets. It may require greater emphasis on morecapable mortars at battlegroup level, or the pushingdown of AS90 batteries to that level. Brigade levelfirepower will be longer-range assets, such asMLRS, attack helicopters and airpower.

There should also be fewer surprises – there willprobably always be some surprises, but,conceivably, there should be much fewer of them.This has implications for reserves – it does notimply that they are not needed, but that theycould be smaller, or perhaps not held at everylevel of command, or constituted differently insome way. A commander should also have morenotice of needing to commit his reserve and this

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too should influence their composition andposture. The balance of the purpose of a reservemight also change from that of reacting tounexpectedly adverse events, to one of exploitingopportunity – this too would affect the form andposture of reserves.

Battlegroups too will be able to access relevantinformation from assets held at higher levels ofcommand as well as being pushed time criticalinformation from whatever level of command, orasset, that has generated that information. It isanticipated that as digitised command and controldevelop, particularly the automation of aspects ofISTAR planning and processing, battlegroups shouldbe provided with more focussed and tailoredintelligence support than at present. Planning will bebetter informed and they will be able to manoeuvrewith much greater confidence – dominating largerareas and bringing combat power to bear moreeffectively. The command tempo will be improved byC4ISTAR and digitised command systems as well asby improved command doctrine, such as effectsbased planning – already beginning to impact now.

Despite the ISTAR capability envisaged at theBrigade level, battlegroup commanders will requiretheir own ISTAR assets to provide that fine graindetail and immediacy so essential at this level ofcommand. The precise mix of assets will depend ona variety of factors, including the mission, enemy,terrain and operational priorities. There will also bean interplay with the brigade level ISTAR and incircumstances where brigade assets can providebattlegroup commanders with much of the

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information they need, there will be less of animperative to expand the ISTAR mix at thebattlegroup level. But in complex terrain where lowerlevels of command need very detailed andimmediate information and the scope for theunexpected is greater, the Brigade level will be lessable to meet the immediate needs of battlegroups.

There will undoubtedly be an enduring requirementfor a scouting capability in light armoured vehicles.But this could be supplemented, as required, byother capabilities such as tanks, snipers, engineersor anti-tank guided weapons. The most excitingaddition to the armoury will be the UAVs and theirassociated Ground Stations, which will providebattlegroups with their own ‘eye-in-the-sky’ real-timeinformation to support planning, manoeuvre andengagement with indirect fire and joint systems.

The table above is purely indicative of the range ofassets that might be found in a future ISTARgrouping at the battlegroup level. As the groupingexpands, sub-unit level command would be

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Fd Sy

MAMBA EW

Armd Recce

TACP/ FAC

ATGW

WR/AI PI

SnipersISTAR Cell

Scout Tp/PI

FOOs/ MFCs

UAV ground station

Engr Recce

Core CapabilityPossible additional capabilities for warfighting

Possible additional capabilities for Small Scale PSO

ISTAR Offr

CR2 Tp MI HUMINT

required together with an effective architecture toensure the assets can be commanded and co-ordinated effectively and their information exploitedand acted upon.

Crucially, the ISTAR grouping, whether a scout troopor a sub-unit sized grouping, must have all theappropriate linkages to apply the firepower availableto the force. The integration of effects andbattlespace management will, therefore, be keyfunctions at this level of command.

Effective command and control systems and theautomated support to the tasking, managementand cross cueing of assets will be the sine quanon of effective ISTAR at brigade and battlegrouplevel. Without appropriate C4I, there is a risk thatinformation overload, coupled to the burden ofcommanding assets beyond the capability of thecommand team, could turn ‘recce pull’ into‘ISTAR drag’.

Joint Tactical Combat At first sight, the term joint tactical combat appearsto be a contradiction in terms. Joint has come to beassociated in our thinking with the operational levelof command,3 which is an entirely false horizontalbarrier. The Joint Force Commander and his staffare of course operating at the operational level. Butindividual platforms, for example, operating in ‘asingle integrated joint battlespace’ are operating atthe tactical level. This could mean that they areworking, as now, within a component frameworkwhere the Land Forces are commanded by a Land

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220

Component Commander and assets from othercomponents are supporting him, or indeed that hisassets are supporting another component, air ormaritime, or special forces for example. But it mightalso involve closer integration of ISTAR, manoeuvreand strike assets into a joint framework with greateremphasis on joint capabilities and joint command.

Such a shift in emphasis is especially relevant to theprecise application of force to achieve specificeffects in a complex battlespace where, increasingly,tactical action has operational impact and strategicsignificance. The diagram on page 272 provides asimplistic and stark schematic of a tactical actionthat is inherently joint.

Any number of permutations is possible in thediagram on page 272. The UAV could be operatedby the Air Component and launched from over1,000 kilometres distant, or even from anothercontinent; or it could be a operated by the Maritime

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Component and launched from a ship, or groundforces might be operating it from only a few hundredkilometres away. Equally, the aircraft could be froman airbase or a ship and might even belong to acontingent from another nation. The ground basedmanned reconnaissance could be special forces,marines or an army patrol. Variations are alsopossible on the combinations of sensor and strikeassets. For example: EW could acquire a target, aHQ perhaps, ground based or aerialreconnaissance could corroborate and discriminateand the strike asset could be a sea launched cruisemissile or a combat UAV. Whatever is happening isboth joint and tactical and doing this well shouldobviously be one of the much sought after positiveoutcomes of our investment in digital technology. Itis also precise – it represents the application ofprecisely the required force to achieve a specificeffect without unintended consequences. A keyfeature should be that the ‘decide’ function inexecuting the action is delegated within commandintent (Mission Command) to the lowest practicablelevel, rather than micro-managed centrally.

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Developing this theme further, recent experience inAfghanistan has suggested to some that:

‘the purpose of manoeuvre forces is to find theenemy, to locate him, to determine the outline ofthe enemy force, to find those specific points onthe ground that are most vulnerable to attack byfire, to observe them, to separate civilians frommilitary, deception from real targets and then tosuperintend going after those targets’.4

This is clearly about using special forces, GroundManoeuvre and ground based mannedreconnaissance capabilities to provide a frameworkthat enables the effective application of Jointfirepower. The capacity to discriminate andsuperintend is clearly especially important whenoperating within restrictive rules of engagement –the most likely circumstance in the future operatingenvironment. However, Afghanistan is nottomorrow’s war – it is already yesterday’s war,although it obviously provides powerful signposts.The circumstances might prove unrepeatable: abenign airspace environment, a benign maritimeenvironment, a benign electromagnetic environmentand an obliging surrogate ground force of about80,000 troops.

A more likely future scenario is one where light andlight mechanised ground forces create a frameworkof secure operating bases to enable special forcesoperations, manned reconnaissance and specialistHUMINT operations. This also establishes an overtpresence and begins to facilitate and supporthumanitarian and other non-military lines of

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operation, which might need to go on concurrentlywith the engagement of targets in the same theatreof operations (the 3-Block War). Favourableconditions are also then created for follow-on forcesto enter theatre and do whatever needs to be done,whether that be manoeuvrist warfighting withoverwhelming combat power enabled by newtechnologies, or nation building. The core enabler toall of this is an effective network over which therequisite information can be passed and processedwith the necessary timeliness and granularity – thisis the key area for development and investment. Butthere will be organizational implications too as thetwin imperatives, of the need for first echelon forcesto deploy rapidly and to operate jointly at the tacticallevel, drive us toward the increasing optimization ofsome forces for this form of joint combat.

Whilst environmental components can be given thelead for both enabling and taking action in thebattlespace, we should try to envisage alternative,more dynamic models. Conceivably, if a balanceddeployed joint force is enabled by a robust network,it will be possible to form joint task or effects-based

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teams of sensors, manoeuvre and strike assets toachieve specific effects in the battlespace. Theseteams could be networked together and formed andreformed as the situation demands. The deployedcomponents then become the basis of managingforces in or within reach of the theatre of operations,rather than the basic command constructresponsible for executing tactical actions. This is notas alien as it sounds – think of Northern Ireland andthe model there of framework patrolling by the Armywith ‘strikes’ against terrorists being carried out in anintegrated way by other agencies. Alternatively, anew construct might emerge based on sensingforces, strike forces and manoeuvre forces.5

Whatever the outcome, an agile and razor-sharpcommand structure will be required to exploit thepotential offered by a robustly networked joint forcein which command intent is understood throughoutand execution can be delegated to the lowestpracticable level.

But it is tempting to ask whether, fundamentally, thejoint tactical combat described is really anything

Chapter 15 225

new? It still requires a blend of fire and manoeuvre,otherwise it risks becoming a fantastically expensiveattritional slog.6 Perhaps all this merely serves tohighlight a debate that has been with us at leastsince massed archers took the field at Crecy:whether we envisage manoeuvre supported byfirepower or firepower supported by manoeuvre? or,perhaps it just fuels debate on the efficacy ofairpower versus ground forces? These argumentsobscure the real issue, which is that information agetechnology and the imperatives of the operatingenvironment are changing the form and purpose ofboth firepower and manoeuvre. The relationshipbetween them is changing too and is now potentiallyso dynamic that the balance could be adjustedrapidly within operations as the situation develops –combining cheng (normal force) and chi(extraordinary force)7 in infinite combinations, acrossall components and contingents, to achieve specificeffects in a complex battlespace. These preciseeffects will, in turn, often be exploited outside themilitary domain to create advantage in other lines ofoperation. This will be the essence of the operationalart in the information age.

NOTES1 General Norman Schwarzkopf, It doesn’t Take a Hero,

Bantam Books, 1992, pp 533-540.2 Allies who have already digitised some of their forces

would recognise these parameters, but what a UK Divisionwill actually be capable of will depend very much on theprecise capabilities of C4ISTAR assets and weapons yetto enter service.

3 A Land Force Commander could be operating at theoperational level and must be versed in the ‘operationalart’. This is especially so in Land-centric Other Operations.

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4 Major General Robert E Scales (USA Retd), quoted inJane’s Defence Weekly, 2 Jan 2002, Page 24.

5 See Admiral B Owens USN, Lifting the Fog of War, Farrar,Straus and Giroux, New York, 2000 for advocacy of aconstruct based on Find, Strike, Manoeuvre andSustainment. D A MacGregor, in Digital War, R L Bateman,Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1999, pp 171-192 foradvocacy of a model based on Deep, Close and Rear.

6 See J A Antal, in Bateman, op cit, pp 153-170, which putsthe case for the continuing need for unhinge adversariesthrough manoeuvre in conjunction with firepower.

7 Cheng (normal force), Chi (extraordinary force), Sun Tzu,The Art of War.

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CHAPTER 16

‘WHITHER THE CLOSEBATTLE ?’By Richard Cousens

‘C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre’

Gen Bosquet (at Balaklava)

There is a general assumption in Western armiesthat the close battle is the pivotal and most

significant aspect of warfare. This has certainly beenthe case in past history, but there are someindications that the Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA) might be indicating the eclipse of the closebattle if not its demise.

This brief chapter explores our love affair with theclose battle and its continued relevance for thefuture. The aim is to describe our vision of the 2015battlefield together with the significance of the closebattle within it, in order to identify some difficultdecisions on the horizon. It explores emerging UKthinking on the framework of the future battlefieldand identifies some bitter pills that may require to beswallowed. It will also suggest that we are havingdifficulty in identifying the true potential of digitizationand that we are hampered by a cultural malaise thatis emotionally wedded to the equipment programme,rather than to the concepts to which the equipment

should be subordinate. But UK conceptual thinkingfor the battlefield of 2015+ is mature andeffervescent and that, following a fixation withpeacekeeping, we are now focussing back onwarfighting – the gold standard. This chapter alsoexplores a particularly sensitive idea – the notionthat the primacy of the manoeuvre elements in theprosecution of decisive operations is fading and thatconsequently the significance of the close battle ischanging too. The chapter concludes with a signpostto possible changes in our structures over the next15 years.

Dr Michael Evans recently published a paper entitledClose combat- lessons from the cases of AlbertJacka and Audie Murphy. In it he makes thedefinitive statement that ‘close combat has been thedefining feature of war in the past and is likely toremain so in the future’. He concludes that: ‘successin war usually requires first-class infantry to closewith and to finish off the enemy. There is no otherway of winning’. He also refers to the ‘mysticalappeal of close-quarter combat’, referring to a ‘longhistory of eager participants’. Finally he offers thethought that ‘men at arms, not military machines givewestern society the mythology to nourish its mutualpride and traditions’. Most soldiers can readilyidentify with all these sentiments. They stem fromour history, our culture, our tradition and heritage.The walls of infantry messes all over the world areadorned with tributes to those who fought and diedin bloody close combat. Below is but one example ofthe pivotal significance of the close battle in war:

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‘When dawn came, it was found that friend hadbayoneted friend, foe foe, and that the .303bullets poured so furiously inwards, had goneequally furiously outwards to the other side of theperimeter and there settled in many an Australianlimb. From that time onwards the order was thatthe enemy was to be engaged at night only withbayonets – and we gunners, who had previouslyused bayonets solely for the purpose of openingcondensed milk and bully beef tins, now had toview these beastly weapons in a new and moreserious light which filled us with dismay.’

There is no better description of the bloody nature ofthe close battle at its closest than that of RussellBraddon in The Naked Island describing the battlefor Malaya in December 1941. It reinforces allMichael Evans’ remarks and most soldiers wouldidentify strongly with them. There is certainly nodenying that some close combat will indeed be anenduring feature of war, but one has to ask whetherthis is becoming an institutional comfort-blanket thatis masking a genuine Revolution in Military Affairs?Is it an excuse for clinging to branch-specificstructures that have less and less relevance in abattlefield involving the orchestration of capabilityrather than branches and cap-badges? It givesperhaps gives credence to Field Marshal Slim’sremarks that:

‘Generals have often been reproached withpreparing for the last war instead of for the next– an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen andtheir political leaders, too frequently, haveprepared for no war at all.’

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There is no need to deviate from the aim byexploring the nuances of the RMA debate. They arefamiliar to most thinking soldiers. Michael Evans hasaddressed the issues in depth in his recent paper onAustralia and the RMA in which he concludes byremarking that:

‘The designation of information capabilities as aseparate capability grouping – with more fundingthan that assigned to improving current strategicstrike – is perhaps the most fundamentalindication of how Australia has come to view theknowledge edge as the foundation stone of itsmilitary capability in the 21st century.’

This too is the foundation of the British approach andit is best described by Dr Tim Benbow of OxfordUniversity in a parallel paper to that of MichaelEvans in which he explores the various RMA schoolsof thought: ‘radicals, visionaries, moderates andpessimists’. This chapter takes a radical standpoint.

It is no secret that, as we prepare to re-focus theBritish army for high-tempo expeditionaryoperations, we are equipped with major equipmenttypes that weigh over 30 tons that are a legacy of aprevious era – configured for continental warfighting.The problem is that if one evolves from today – oreven yesterday, there is a danger of compoundingthe error. Only by making a clean conceptual breakfrom the present can we design an army for 2015+and we are making some strides in this direction.Making this conceptual break is a real challenge forus, we still have some officers who have a romanticfixation with the 1(BR) Corps structures in Germany

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and there is often an assumption that all thecapabilities deployed in Germany must be replicatedin the future – ie the evolutionary approach. There isno more precise description of the need to breakwith the present than that offered by General GordonSullivan (former US Army Chief of Staff) and MichaelHarper in their book entitled Hope Is Not a Method.In it they explore the need to look back from thefuture rather than evolve from the present.Strategically, this is perhaps the key point of thischapter from which all else stems.

‘Looking back from the future begins by goingback to the most basic questions: what is yourpurpose as an organisation; what business areyou in? What will your purpose tomorrow be?What will the characteristics of your strategicenvironment be? What will it take to win intomorrow’s markets? Don’t ask yourself what the“next” organisation will look like. The “next”organisation is constrained by today; it mustevolve from today’s organisation. By imaginingthe “after next” organisation, you can take offtoday’s blinkers and imagine your organisation ina world unconstrained by its present reality. Thistechnique does not deny the reality of the presentbut rather helps you think beyond it.’

In short – if we focus on tomorrow, we are almostguaranteed to get it wrong. The key therefore is tofocus on the day after tomorrow.

Warfighting will remain the benchmark against whichto train and prepare. Operations in Bosnia, Kosovo,Macedonia and Sierra Leone notwithstanding, we

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remain an army configured for high intensitywarfighting in the belief, to put it crudely, that you can‘dumb down’ to peacekeeping but you cannot ‘dumbup’. Secondly, asymmetric attack will become amore prominent feature of warfighting and we mustbe configured to conduct asymmetric attackourselves as well as defence. In the light of thehorrific attacks in Washington and New York inSeptember 2001, this is the understatement of thecentury nevertheless we must not pretend thatbecause the term is currently in vogue it is new, it isnot. Thirdly – the preservation of fighting spirit and aunique ethos goes without saying. We accept that aregimental system is inextricably enmeshed with theethos and fighting spirit of the British army and thatit provides the enduring foundations of the moralcomponent of its fighting power. These then are theconstants – what about the changes? Themultinational dimension of warfighting will increase;future adversaries will be more diverse andunpredictable and are unlikely to accept the moraland legal constraints that impinge upon us.Operations in 2015+ will be set within a jointcampaign with the army commander drawing onjoint capabilities to a far greater degree than today –facilitated by digitization. Indeed the availability anduse of information will profoundly change the waythe army operates. This is the most important pointof all and it merits expansion.

Brigadier Jim Wallace, recently retired from theAustralian Army, has written extensively on theeffects of digitization and in a recent paper statedthat: ‘one of the main motivations for digitization inadvanced western military establishments is the

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belief that the process will impose a new order onthe inherent chaos of the battlefield’. He rightlyidentifies the enhancement that digitization brings todecision-making and emphasises the need for it tobe balanced by firm battlefield leadership. But, in thecontext of 2015, digitization is much more thancommand and decision-making and the British armyhas been slow to appreciate the more holisticbenefits to warfighting as a whole. As for theAmericans, the debate has been fogged by the GulfWar which was perceived to be revolutionary butactually was not. In his book, The Next World War,James Adams suggested that:

‘The 1991 Gulf War was the last hurrah of thearmed forces and generals who had trained onthe legacy of the Second World War. War hadchanged its form with the arrival of stand-offweapons and precision guided munitions.’

He noted that though the equipment had changed,the tactics had not and observed that:

‘Mile after mile of tanks, armoured personnelcarriers and fuel trucks; serried ranks of tentsmarching in perfect order over the horizon andrunways shimmering in the desert heat.’

So what are those changes in tactics and structuresthat digitization will facilitate? In short – the doctrine?

The constants are the manoeuvrist approach andthe notion that tempo is the key to success.Manoeuvre warfare theory will continue to be thedoctrinal bedrock for the British approach. As for thechanges we expect, they include: terminology, more

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emphasis on capabilities that enhance tempo andgreater interoperability through common doctrine.Herein, for example, lies considerable scope for arevitalised and more dynamic ABCA programme.

In 2015+ what is the relevance of the traditionalframework of the battlefield (deep, close and rear)in battlespace that is acknowledged to bedispersed, noncontiguous and non-linear? Does itcontinue to have relevance when operations areprogressively enemy-focused rather than terrain-focused and where holding information isarguably more significant than holding ground?How can one describe close and rear operationsin such an environment?

Once again there is merit in identifying constantsand changes. In deep operations the constantsmight be summarised as follows:

• The corps, division, brigade and battlegrouphierarchy remains valid: whereas today thelowest level at which deep operations areprosecuted is division, we believe that around2015 it will become brigade;

• Attacking the enemy’s centre of gravity;

• The need to commit ground forces in deepmanoeuvre;

• The difficulty in the indirect engagement ofmoving targets.

But the changes are far more significant and far-reaching and perhaps point to the eclipse of closeoperations as we know them:

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• Deep attack will be increasingly joint andintegrated;

• Deep operations will be increasingly decisive;

• There will be much greater reach – long rangeprecision artillery, air manoeuvre, EW and thecontribution of both maritime and air, fixed wingand long range missiles, will deliversynchronised fire at ranges out to 300kilometres or more; digitization is the enabler –not just the enhancement to C2 but also thesensor to shooter links;

• Air Manoeuvre will deliver greater operationalimpact than ground manoeuvre;

• Planning will be much more complex.

As for close operations, some form of close combatcontinues to be inevitable but the changes areprofound:

• There are an increasing number of alternativesto striking including, perhaps, isolation andneutralisation;

• The range and volume of the close combatzone will increase rendering existing capabilitiesinadequate and a legacy of the analogue era.The RMA really bites here;

• Sensor and shooter will be much more difficultto conceal;

• Huge changes in the way that combat armsfight;

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• More capable infantry. Fewer, digitallyempowered, light – lean – lethal;

• Armoured effect less likely in decisiveoperations – they are unlikely to be there. Theireffect will be from much more dispersedlocations;

• Artillery – hugely significant and much moreintegrated. The demise of dedicated FOOs andincreasingly joint effects;

• Much greater contribution by aviation andhence, if there is a close battle, it is likely to bea product of air manoeuvre – not groundmanoeuvre with a hugely reduced logistic drag.

But what do we mean by ‘fewer but more capable’infantry? At a recent infantry trial of battle groupthermal imagery installed in Warrior, a corporalremarked ‘who needs close recce now?’ He had agood point. He was sitting in a Warrior AFV withbetter firepower, mobility, protection and surveillanceequipment than his colleagues in a CVR(T)-equipped recce platoon and would not offer theunique signature of a recce unit. We are arguablywedded to the concept of manned recce but, withthe technology now available, do we need dedicatedrecce platoons any more? The scope is huge: equipthe mortar platoons with 120mm mortars and top-attack precision-guided munitions and dispense withanti-tank platoons but, above all, equip the soldier tocue and initiate effect from fire units which may notbe integral to his unit. The days of the decisive closebattle at less than 2000 metres surely must benumbered? The see, tell, act cycle can now include

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the manoeuvre elements and suddenly the potentialexists for an infantry company commander to see, totell and act at ranges far deeper than today. Theanswer for us lies in the FIST programme – FutureInfantry Soldier Technology. It is the UK equivalent ofthe US Land Warrior programme.

FIST has particular potential in urban operations toowhich remain an area in which concepts, tactics,techniques and procedures have changed little since1945. The British approach is to acknowledge thatclose combat remains one of the most demandingtasks of all but that the trend should be to makeclose combat less close. Thus while developmentswill never completely negate the need to close withthe enemy, the aim will be increasingly to locate theenemy, neutralise his capabilities and break hismorale and will to fight while at a distance. We oweit to our soldiers to use technology to take them outof the loop where technology can deliver. Somecurrent USMC modelling of urban warfare projects acasualty rate of 33%. No small army such as ourscan afford to sustain such a rate from such an old-fashioned, close and attritional activity. There has tobe another way.

Of course rear operations continue but those whocling to the linear divide between rear and otheroperations may be mistaken. The battlespace will bemore seamless and the US concept of ‘anexpanding area of close combat’ is very attractive.The need for any commander to maintain hisfreedom to manoeuvre and to support and sustainoperations while preserving his force will be

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increasingly important. It represents a role formedium forces.

There will be a definite impact upon future structuresas a result of some of the conceptual thinking that Ihave outlined. There was a prophetic article in TheEconomist of 6 Jan 01 entitled ‘Wars of Intervention’which sums up the strategic drivers nicely:

‘As late as 1938, Britain’s Neville Chamberlaincould get away with calling Czechoslovakia “afar-off country of whose people we knownothing”. That is a vanished past. Now, except fora few sealed-off corners of Africa and Asia, whata ruler does to his people is swiftly revealed bycamera, satellite and internet to a large,interested and reasonably well-informedaudience; and, if what he does is outrageousenough, the audience is likely to want somethingdone about it.’

The UK Defence Future Strategic Concept paperindicates that the UK is likely to have to deployforces more rapidly in order to deliver strategiceffect. The emphasis is not just on rapid deploymentbut on operational impact once deployed – what wecall ‘rapid effect’ which requires sufficiently capableforces to be effective in theatre in order to deter, pre-empt or contain a crisis ie – a ‘medium’ capability.We see that a medium capability will be based onthe enhancement of existing forces; in particular themerging of light and mechanised infantry into lightmechanised infantry; and improving the inherentlight armoured characteristics of armoured recce,taking advantage of enhancements in firepower,

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digitization and ISTAR. Significantly there is anopportunity to do this within the current equipmentprogramme through what is known as the FRESconcept to develop a group of armoured platformsthat have broad utility, greater tactical and strategicdeployability and greater commonality. FRES standsfor Future Rapid Effect System and might blend thearmoured battle group support vehicle (ABSV),multi-roled armoured vehicle (MRAV), and the futurecommand and liaison vehicle (FCLV). This is achallenging issue but the key point is that thetransition towards medium forces is well under way.

Structures are bound to change, but note that thereference is to a regimental system and not theregimental system. The emphasis for groundmanoeuvre on balanced forces, versatility, hightempo and a growing ‘medium’ capability may beginto prove that the traditional distinctions betweenarmour, armoured infantry, mechanised and lightforces become less helpful. Similarly the traditionalboundary between firepower and manoeuvre couldbecome blurred in close combat leading to a muchcloser integration between the two. Indeed we arelikely to acknowledge the subordination ofmanoeuvre to firepower and an effects-basedapproach. Hence not only whither the close battle?But also whither the directorates on infantry andarmour as separate entities?

In The Australian Army In Profile Captain GlennJones wrote an excellent piece on the 12th/16thHunter River Rifles. His conclusion is a classic:

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‘The history of the regiment is proud andhonourable. Its continuing success is groundedin its traditions, values and its ability toincorporate change as needs have changed overa century of continuous capability.’

He has identified the central theme. Status quo is notan option and the current generation of staff collegegraduates in the UK are not as wedded to the pastas some of their predecessors – particularly havingbeen educated at a joint staff college. Ownership ofassets is no longer an issue – the key is the ability tocue those assets in order to produce effect as deepas possible. The close battle will indeed, as MichaelEvans suggests, be an enduring feature of war butnot the defining feature of war. Our love affair withclose combat leads perhaps to backwards lookingevolution when what is required is a lust for the deepbattle and forward-looking revolution.

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CHAPTER 17

ASYMMETRICWARFARE

By John Russell

‘Get ready for the future, it is murder.’

Leonard Cohen

Asymmetry is topical and the term pervadescurrent military litarature, particularly in the

United States. While the existence of asymmetry iswidely acknowledged, it is usually regarded as aconstant, which can be met within the compass ofour existing capabilities and doctrine, and thatconventional force-on-force warfighting will continueto predominate. The Army has had a long tradition ofoperating against irregular enemies and theasymmetric threat is generally regarded as merely a21st Century expression of these types of opponentsand only an adjunct to the main business ofwarfighting. So has anything changed? Theasymmetrists argue strongly that it has. Theirargument is not that asymmetry is something new,but that in its present guise it represents adiscontinuity, a fundamental change in warfare.Whereas the Gulf War is seen as the prototype for anew form of warfare, the asymmetrists argue that itwas the final manifestation of manoeuvre warfareand an anachronistic throwback to World War II in

Europe but with updated weapons and systems.They assert that western nations are designingarmies for yesterday’s war, the war they would like tofight rather than the war they are likely to fight, andthat these nations have profoundly misunderstoodthe nature of the asymmetric threat.

The fundamental premise of asymmetric advocates1

is that warfare undergoes generational change dueto political, social and economic factors rather thanjust the technological. Thus it was not thedevelopment of massed, rifled artillery, barbed wireand machine-guns that brought about the warfare ofthe Western Front in the Great War but rather theevolution of the entire political, economic and socialstructure required to wage war of this type and scale.Asymmetric proponents see such a change takingplace today and that the weapons and systemsbased on the information revolution, althoughaffecting the future of war, are not in themselves thefuture and that other stronger forces are at work.

The asymmetrists argue that society’s conditions arenow in place for a change to a new generation ofwarfare, which they term the Fourth (1st – massedmanpower, 2nd – massed firepower, 3rd –manoeuvre). The title some have given to thisgeneration is ‘Netwar’ in which antagonists will fightin the political, economic, social and military arenasand communicate their messages through acombination of networks and mass media. Thisgeneration is likely to be based more on ideas ratherthan military technology; this is a crucial point.Warfare will not be the relatively clear-cut, hightechnology ‘stately dance’ of conventional war but

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rather extremely complex, mainly low-intensityconflicts. In these conflicts it will be hard todifferentiate between war and peace, militaryoperations and crimes, front and rear, combatantsand non-combatants. Fighting will involve anamalgam of military tactics from all four generationsand the concepts of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ willprobably cease to exist.

Our current approach to warfare views the future asmuch like the present but with steady advances intechnology enabling changes to our operationalconcepts and continued dominance over any likelywarfighting opponents. However, this technologicalapproach, summarised by some as the Revolutionin Military Affairs, is likely to be ill-suited to many ofthe opponent types we could meet in the 21stCentury. Furthermore, history2 suggests thattechnological supremacy is at best ephemeral, thatfaith in a technological ‘silver bullet’ is misplacedand that there are other forces stronger thantechnology at play.

Fundamentally warfare falls into two categories:symmetric and asymmetric. However, thesecategories are likely to be blurred and it is possiblethat a war could start symmetrically but change toasymmetric if one of the combatants consideredthat it best served his interests. Additionally, there isno reason why a number of the weapons andtechniques of asymmetric warfare could not beused in symmetric warfare, further blurringdistinctions. The French identify a third category –dissymmetric warfare – which is included below forthe sake of completeness.

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• Symmetric warfare involves combatants withbroadly similar aims, strengths, assets, doctrineand moral codes. As pure symmetry will resultin a stalemate, protagonists seek to break thesymmetry by strengthening or developingwinning capabilities, changing the conduct ofoperations or reducing the opponent’scapabilities. This need to break symmetrymeans that there is always, to a greater orlesser extent, asymmetry within warfare.However, ‘asymmetry within warfare’ is whollydifferent from ‘asymmetric warfare’.

• In asymmetric warfare there is a total orextremely strong difference between theopponents’ aims, capabilities, courses of actionand moral codes. An asymmetric threat impliesthat one side is incapable, either due to his owninability or the strength of the force opposinghim, of confronting an opponent in aconventional manner, using similar means orweapons. Instead he will use weapons andtactics in ways that are unplanned for orunexpected to foil, off set, reduce or circumventtechnological superiority. Asymmetric attacksgenerally exploit vulnerabilities and have astrong psychological as well as physical impact.They can also be designed to goad theadversary into an inappropriate response, thusundermining their legitimacy in the eyes of theirconstituencies. Asymmetric warfare canthreaten the homebase far more directly andwith a greater variety of methods of attack thansymmetric warfare. Vulnerabilities generated byasymmetry will need to be identified. By

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addressing these vulnerabilities symmetry willbe restored, albeit to a new form of warfare.

• The thinking behind the French concept ofdissymmetry is not entirely clear but itappears to be based on a major imbalancebetween the combatants either in the stakesor the performance of assets but not in thebroad nature of the assets or the conduct offighting. There is a strong resemblancebetween the opponents.3

Outlined below is a synopsis of the key types ofasymmetry compiled from the extensive researchalready undertaken both here and in the UnitedStates. This summary is by no means definitive, butdoes encapsulate the key elements of the concept,as it is currently understood. The types are notmutually exclusive and it is likely that more than onecould apply to any given situation.

• Asymmetry of interest, whether real orperceived, is considered by some to be themost basic asymmetry of all. Essentially itoccurs when one antagonist, usuallyeconomically and militarily weaker, sees itssurvival or vital interest at stake, while anopponent is only protecting or promoting lessthan vital interests. In these circumstances theweaker adversary is likely to seek ways ofdeterring an opponent from involvement in agiven situation. This can be achieved byconvincing an opponent that the potentialcosts are too great and/or the potentialbenefits too small.

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• Asymmetry of will exists when one antagonist,usually with a higher stake, is willing to acceptgreater risks, bear greater costs or undertakeactions which a less committed opponent mighteschew, possibly on moral or legal grounds. Inorder to exploit a perceived asymmetry of will,an adversary may seek to accentuate his ownwillingness to pay any price ‘for the cause’ whileat the same time seeking to undermine theweaker will of his opponent. In the context ofthe UK and our allies, some adversaries alreadyperceive a disparity of wills which they canexploit, for example, aversion to casualties andexcessive collateral damage, and our sensitivityto domestic and world opinion.

• Asymmetry of values occurs betweenadversaries with widely differing values andbeliefs – both of society and individual. Suchopponents are also unlikely to share ourpriorities, moral constraints and legal principles.They may be unwilling to conform tointernationally regulated or understoodstandards of behaviour, and may simply notcare about ‘public opinion’. Indeed, some non-state groups are probably not constrainedwhatsoever by any Western democratic moralor ethical convictions. They may be willing toabsorb or inflict large numbers of casualtiesand major damage to infrastructure, or exploitcapabilities that we are unwilling or unable tomatch. Examples of such actions could includeethnic cleansing, terrorism, human shields,child soldiers and the threat of, or use ofWMD/WME. The aim would not be to defeat us

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militarily but to constrain our freedom of actionor even to deter us from becoming involved atall. The danger of such an approach (for theadversary) is that their action might transform asituation into one of vital national interest for us(or our allies) thereby removing certain self-imposed constraints and inviting adisproportionate response.

• Asymmetry of strategies and tactics willbecome increasingly common. The Gulf War,the ongoing campaign against SaddamHussein, and the Bosnia and Kosovo aircampaigns have shown potential adversariesthat there is little to be gained from force onforce confrontations with NATO. It is thereforelikely that our opponents will seek to employdissimilar strategies and tactics that aredesigned to avoid Alliance strengths (dominantmanoeuvre, precision engagement, informationsuperiority etc) and exploit weaknesses (egforce protection concerns, legal constraints,coalition faultlines). Asymmetric opponents mayalso choose to disregard the concepts of victoryand defeat, both of which belong to the inter-state model of warfare.4 They are also likely toselect ground which will give them markedadvantage and reinforce the effect of otherasymmetries. For instance fighting in urbanareas would involve to a greater or lesserdegree asymmetries of will, values,technologies/capabilities, organisation and time.

• Asymmetry in technologies and capabilities isnot new in itself. Conflict has always been

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characterised by disparities in technology.These disparities have often proved to bedecisive, although clever adversaries havefound ways to counter technical superiority.Historical examples can also be found ofweaker adversaries seeking to gain advantagefrom novel technologies as a counter to a morepowerful opponent’s conventional superiority.The availability of leading edge technologies onthe world’s arms markets provides theopportunity to overmatch a western army in oneor more key capabilities, for instance TI or gun-launched ATGM. The asymmetric opponent isnot burdened with lengthy research andprocurement cycles and the necessity to equiplarge, structured organisations. Indeed, buyingoff the shelf is in itself an asymmetric approachto developed nations’ long procurement cycles.His training requirement is minimised as the useof the technology does not have to encompassthe complexities of an equipment’s use inwarfighting. At the opposite end of thetechnological scale, an asymmetric opponentcould decide to ignore technology and attemptto overwhelm us through massed infantry, socalled human wave attacks. Against suchattacks, forces which have traded manpower forexpensive, and therefore limited, precisionweaponry designed to combat other hightechnology forces will be vulnerable to beingoverwhelmed.

• Organisational asymmetry has often providedone antagonist with a significant advantage overanother. That said, for some 50 years we have

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been faced by adversaries who have essentiallybeen organised along similar lines to ourselves.In the future, we are just as likely to face non-state groups organised as networks or simplynot organised at all. These groups may nothave any organised command structure orcentralised means of co-ordinating activity.Potential adversaries may also be made up ofloose federations of disparate groups with veryfew common beliefs or shared objectives. Bydesign or default, such organisationalasymmetry could provide an adversary withsignificant advantages.

• Asymmetry of time occurs because the Westhas little appetite for long and protractedengagements. All US operations, for example,must have a clear ‘exit strategy’ with rapid effectthen early withdrawal, a goal shared by many.An asymmetry of time may occur when oneantagonist enters a conflict willing to see itcontinue for a prolonged period, while theiropponent is only able to sustain collective willfor a short engagement. In this case, perceptionis reality, and an adversary may only need toappear willing to engage in a protracted conflictto deter Western intervention.

Asymmetric ActorsThe range of actors who could employ asymmetrictechniques is very broad. However, categorisationof these actors is not easy due to their variety andby compartmentalising them can obscure theircomplexities. For instance, the Taleban regime

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was an autocratic system of religious fanaticsgoverning by a system of internal terrorism whilefighting something approaching a conventionalwar against the Northern Alliance, cutting across atleast three categories.

However, while many of the potential adversaries toa greater or lesser degree pose a threat to the UKthey do not necessarily pose a direct threat to theArmy, either as a deployed force or in the homebase. It is the state employment of asymmetrictechniques against deployed forces that is a greaterdirect concern to the military, rather than the otherdisparate actors whose impact will largely be politicaland pose a security rather than a Defence threat.

Western nations face a dilemma when wishing toconfront opponents prepared to operate outside theaccepted norms of warfare and the laws that governit. This is particularly relevant to the non-state actorfor whom the traditional constraints are immaterialand for whom the primary targets will be the peopleand civil infrastructure, as well as the military. For the

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Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front

democracies this is the nightmare scenariodescribed by Martin van Creveld,

‘Either modern states cope with low intensityconflict, or else they will disappear; the suspiciongrows however, that they are damned if they doand damned if they don’t.’ 5

The Range of Asymmetric ThreatsThe variety, availability, lethality and effectiveness ofasymmetric threats represents not only the mostsignificant element of asymmetric warfare but alsothe most significant change. Whereas non-stateactors in former times would have had the ability tocause damage at the tactical and maybe operationallevels, they did not have the access to weapons andsystems that could generate disproportionate effectat the strategic level by attacking targets in-theatreand, most significantly, in the homebase. There aretwo key points about asymmetric threats. First theymust be significantly different from those capabilitiesor options available to our own forces; thus whatmatters are ‘the differences that make a difference’.Secondly, that regardless of type, the weapons heldor used by an asymmetric opponent are themselvesof lesser importance than the effect they create inthe mind of the attacked.

Fundamentally, the range of asymmetric threats fallinto three categories: weapons of mass destructionor effect, information operations and other tacticalconcepts. All three offer possibilities for causingdisproportionate effect and the potential to be usedat the tactical level but migrate their effects upwards

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to the strategic level. Many of the threat technologiesare no longer strictly military, such as informationsystems and biotechnology. It is not the intention inthis section to describe the detailed characteristicsof each threat but rather to provide a generaldescription of their asymmetric aspects.

The most spectacular and potentially lethal effectsare those connected with weapons of massdestruction or effect.

• Nuclear. For a state actor, possession is thekey factor as use of a nuclear device remainsincredible due to the risk of massive response.However, if faced with an apocalyptic situationit is possible that some state actors couldconsider their use. Although some non-stateactors could build a crude nuclear weapon itwould probably be easier to steal or buy one.Despite the considerable difficulty in infiltratingand emplacing a nuclear device, if this couldbe achieved it would be very difficult toestablish responsibility and even harder tomount a response in kind. Devices based onscattering radioactive materials rather than anuclear explosion are relatively easy toproduce and could be used to create a ‘dirty’area. However, the use of nuclear devicesshould remain the least likely form ofWMD/WME attack as there are easier andpotentially equally effective alternatives.

• Biological. Biological weapons based on theuse of pathogens or toxins are easier and lessexpensive to produce than either nuclear or

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chemical weapons and it is more difficult totrace an attack’s sponsorship. Biological agentscan cause casualties on a scale similar to thatof nuclear weapons or threaten the food supply.Their relatively low cost of production is withinthe capabilities of basic civil bio-technologistsand they must be considered attractive to somepotential adversaries. Biological agents offer thegreatest advantages at the strategic level wherethey can be delivered6 covertly and far moreeasily than nuclear devices, are more deniableand can achieve strategic effect. The cost andproblems generated by the UK’s foot and mouthdisease outbreak will not have gone unnoticed.

• Chemical. Chemical weapons are generallyconsidered to be the least potent of theWMD/WME triad as they do not have theapocalyptic leverage of the other two. However,they are the easiest to procure and there is lessstigma attached to their use. Indeed, the use ofchemical agents by the Iraqis and an impureSarin attack on the Tokyo underground by theJapanese Aum Shinrikyo cult have furtherreduced any taboo against their use. Similar tobiological weapons, their use in-theatre by astate actor would risk a massive response,which again would not be in the asymmetricactor’s interest. However, the threat of use maydamage an alliance and split away thosenations less well-prepared to deal with chemicalattack. If used as a last resort, chemicalweapons could achieve disproportionate effect ifused against allied units or civilian populationsas this would stress host nation and military

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medical facilities and therefore political unity.However, the greatest threat is strategic;chemical weapons could achieve very markedeffect if threatened against or used in cities.

Information Operations (IO)IO are actions taken in support of objectives thatinfluence decision makers by affecting theinformation and/or information systems of otherswhile protecting your own information and/orinformation systems. The conduct of offensive IOposes a clear asymmetric threat to the West, with itsincreased reliance on information and informationsystems as a vital component of decision making. Inmany cases we rely entirely on technology to deliverinformation to military decisionmakers. Thattechnology is often connected through commercialnetworks and therefore via routes that are bothpublicly accessible and outside military control.Ironically, the more we digitise, the more vulnerablewe become.

The West is becoming increasingly vulnerable tocyber-based IO. This is not only in the military sectorbut also in the civilian and commercial sectors.There is the threat that asymmetric opponents mayuse IO strategically to cause mass disruption to civilsociety. A cyber war could slow the decision makingprocess of the governments involved. The real threatis not the amateur hacker but the highly skilled andtrained products of government agencies orcorporate intelligence branches that work on theopen market. Cyber warfare does not however onlyconcern damaging systems but also intelligence

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gathering, counter-intelligence and disinformation.Connected with cyber warfare is the prospect of warin space. The temptation to attack Western space-based systems would be irresistible.

The Soviet Union embraced high altitude nuclearinduced EMP as an integral part of its strategicwarfighting concept. However, since the end of theCold War we have tended to ignore the threat to ourelectronic systems and the huge expansion in thenumber and range of equipments with integratedcircuits has left us technically and operationallyvulnerable. The threat posed by EMP and HPMweapons is an adjunct to IO and arises from theirability to strike at the heart of the information,decision making process and the command andcontrol structures that support it.

IO are not however purely technical and the use ofnon-technical IO against a much more capable andtechnologically advanced force was demonstratedmore than adequately during the Kosovo campaignwhere, despite NATO’s supposed informationsuperiority, Belgrade would seem to have ‘won’ thedeception, psychological and perception war.7

Other Tactical ConceptsFighting in urban areas offers them opportunity togenerate maximum political impact; absorb ourstrength; cause mass casualties; degrade ourmanoeuvre and Find capabilities; minimise ourability to strike at distance by use of ‘hugging’ tactics;and provide civilian inhabitants for use as a weapon.The cover provided by urban areas allows the

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enemy to merge with the civilian population andavoid the limitations of a defined front line. Closeattacks can be mounted at times and places of hischoosing and provide opportunities for theemployment of novel tactics, such as suicide truckbombers. The problems we will experience willcreate a wide variety of IO opportunities, which canbe mounted against us. Urban areas, particularlycities, provide the maximum opportunity for theexploitation of our unwillingness to engage inattritional battles, our sensitivities toward civiliansand our aversion to collateral damage. Any statedunwillingness and lack of capability on our part tofighting in urban areas is likely to increase thelikelihood of asymmetric enemies forcing us toconfront them here.

Terrorism will appeal to many groups and weakstates as an attractive option to blunt the influence ofthe West. It is not a new phenomenon and hasgenerally been relatively ineffective as a means toachieve significant political change. Historically ithas had its roots in ethno-cultural or ethno-religiousdifferences between a group and a state. So whathas changed? First, while such roots still exist, thetechniques of terrorism are finding wider expressionin single-issue fanatical groups such as animalliberationists and the nihilistic members of al-Qa’eda. Secondly, terrorist access to andemployment of the range of asymmetric threatsdescribed in this section could drastically alter theirrelative ineffectiveness.

Terrorism seeks to collapse the enemy from within.In its ‘purest’ form it will attempt to bypass the

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enemy’s military strength and strike directly at hishomeland at civilian targets. Terrorism will use ademocratic society’s freedoms, openness and legalsystem as weapons to be used against it. Terrorismis, by its very nature, asymmetric as it aims toachieve military-like results against an opponentrelatively cheaply and with little ‘friendly’ bloodshed.The terrorist ‘battlefield’ is highly dispersed andincludes the whole of the enemy’s society.Successful application of terror closely mirrors mostof the characteristics of manoeuvre warfare.8

Future terrorists will be less hierarchically organisedbut better networked than they are today. They areless dependent on state sponsorship and are,instead, forming loose, trans-national affiliationsbased on religious or ideological affinity and acommon hatred of the West, particularly the US.Their diffuse nature will make them moreanonymous yet their ability to co-ordinate masseffects will increase.

Technological SurprisePotential asymmetric opponents are able to acquireon the open market a wide range of leading edgeweapons and systems.9 The purpose of suchacquisitions will be to achieve a decisive andunexpected technological advantage over an enemyat the tactical, operational and/or strategic level;otherwise known as technological surprise.Technological surprise may achieve weapon systemsuperiority or unexpected parity, enable a change intactics, doctrine and capability. It can prevent defeat,prolong conflict and cause heavy casualties. It has

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been made more likely by rapid advances intechnology, which is more affordable, and the heavycompetition in the arms market where arms areprovided for cash and there are few if any ethicalconstraints. System modernisation can berevolutionary rather than evolutionary asgenerations can be skipped and there is little or norequirement to run on legacy systems. Weapons canbe hybridised or modernised by component; forinstance T–55 can be vastly improved by theaddition of a larger calibre gun, defensive aids suitesand improved night fighting and fire control systems.State asymmetric players are known to exchangeinformation regarding Western weapon systems anddoctrine. Technological surprise has particularrelevance to rapid reaction forces, which arevulnerable to overmatch in terms of both equipmentand mass. Weapons can be acquired specifically todefeat such forces, such as sophisticated sea minesto deny SPODs and vehicle signature abatementkits to defeat precision attack weapons. Helpfully theIranians have distilled the various measures neededto defeat a coalition force, particularly one includingthe US, as shown below:

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Make the Americans go home by:

• Defeating early entry force

• Causing casualties

• Stripping away key elements

• Destroying ‘icon’ systems/units

• Trading space for time

• Fragmenting alliances

Icon systems provide tempting targets due to thepsychological impact of their damage or destruction;hence the Serbian determination to shoot down aF117A and the suicide craft attack on the USS Colein Aden harbour.10 Icon systems can be relative tothe theatre in which they are used. Thus a Chinookmight be an icon system in Sierra Leone but notelsewhere. UK icon systems could be attackhelicopters and, in the future, ASTOR; theirdestruction would have a powerful psychologicaleffect on both sides and it should be presumed thatsuch targets would be afforded a high priority.

Sabotage, subversion and espionage are all fellowtravellers with asymmetric warfare. Asymmetricopponents are able, should they so wish, to operateoutside the norms of Western cultural acceptance.These norms are well-known and come under theumbrella of respect for human rights; examples are:avoidance of civilian casualties, non-use of childrenas combatants, fair treatment of prisoners asgoverned by the Geneva Convention, non-use ofanti-personnel mines and operating within a legalframework. The asymmetrist can therefore employ‘weapons’ which directly counter these norms andhave significant psychological effect.

Cynical Exploitation of CiviliansRefugees can be used deliberately. The Serbians11

used terror and atrocities to trigger the flow of asmany Kosovar Albanians as possible into Albaniaand Macedonia. This was no random ethniccleansing but a systematic policy intended to swampNATO logistics, complicate and distract Allied

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decision making, weaken alliance resolve and gaintime to consolidate control of Kosovo. The effect wasintensified by the ‘denationalisation’ of the refugeesby the destruction of all forms of identity and proof ofproperty ownership and their brutal impoverishmentin order to make their survival entirely dependent onoutside aid.

Deliberate close co-location of civilians to military orinfrastructure targets, otherwise known as ‘hugging’or human shield tactics, will present a majortargeting dilemma. Examples at the tactical level areSerbian civilians ‘occupying’ Belgrade’s bridges overthe Danube and the reported use of children tosurround a Somali gunman in Mogadishu while helay on the ground in a fire position aiming through awoman’s legs.

The deliberate causing of civilian casualties islikely to have greater political impact thanmilitary. Casualties among the latter are to somedegree accepted due to the hazards of theprofession; the same is not true for civilians.Mass civilian casualties, particularly in thehomebase, will have an extremely sobering effecton political decision making.

Warlords and WarriorsAsymmetric warfare will be dominated by warlordsand ‘warriors’ rather than soldiers. They are beingmet increasingly: Arkan and his Tigers, Foday Kallayand the West Side Boys, General Aideed and theSomali Technicals, Chechen mafia/fighters, theSouth China Sea pirates. The warrior lifestyle is

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characterised by shifting allegiances, habituation toviolence and no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers,they follow no rules other than their own and tendnot to obey orders they do not like. For the Westernsoldier, trained to operate within tight codes ofbehaviour, both military and personal, the warriorprovides a challenging enemy. Warriors will onlystand and fight conventional forces when they knowor believe that they have overwhelming advantage;instead they will snipe, ambush, bomb and create IOincidents. The increasing numbers of female soldiersin Western armies will provide rich pickings for suchincidents. Rape, pillage, terror and ethnic cleansingare all also within the warrior job specification. Itwould, however, be very dangerous to dismisswarriors as militarily incompetent. The SomaliaNational Alliance’s (SNA) study of US tactics allowedthem, when the opportunity presented itself inOctober 1993, to spring an effective tacticalcounterstroke against US Special Forces (resultingin 18 US killed and 73 wounded), and few in ourArmy would dismiss the skills, however repellent, ofthe South Armagh PIRA.

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A ‘warrior’

In summary, it is dangerous and simplistic to over-emphasise Western technological dominance andits current hegemony in conventional ‘force-on-force’symmetric conflict as a basis for success in futurewarfare. It is also clear from the analysis thatasymmetric warfare itself has many shades andvariations of shades. Asymmetry and conventionalforce-on-force symmetric conflict are not black andwhite alternatives and we need a great deal of newthinking to close with the many complex implicationsof asymmetry in all its guises. However, we shouldtake comfort from our long historical legacy offighting colonial and post-colonial operations againstirregular foes. The core of our capability to do sosuccessfully has been effective intelligence, anability to operate amongst people and the fightingspirit of all our Services – exemplified, in this context,by our Light and Special Forces. This must now bedeveloped and melded with state of the art C4ISTARand weaponry to deliver commanders a decisiveadvantage in this, most ghastly, form of warfare.

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Omagh

NOTES1 The majority of this section is ascribed to Lt Col Hammes,

‘The Evolution of Warfare: The Fourth Generation’, USMCGazette Sep 94.

2 At the close of World War II the US military had the atomicbomb, millions of battle-hardened soldiers, unprecedentedmobility, systematic training, global logistics, excellentbattlefield communications and a host of other capabilitiesfrom sophisticated artillery co-ordination to medicalevacuation helicopters. Yet, slightly less than five yearslater in Korea, that same military was fought to a standstillby a fourth rate army backed by a third rate.

3 Future Engagements by Ground Forces. CEMAT4 Such disregard is neatly illustrated by a conversation

between a US officer (Col Summers) and a NorthVietnamese officer (Col Tu) in April 75. “You know younever defeated us in the field”, said Summers. “That maybe true”, replied Tu, “but it is also irrelevant”.

5 Martin van Crefeld, On Future War. Quote extracted fromIntroduction to SCSI Occasional Paper No 36, Sep 98.

6 It was once thought that biological weapons would not beused due to the difficulties associated with the culture oftoxins and the methods of dispersal. It now appears (NewScientist 1 Sep 01) that the Aum Shinrikyo cultsuccessfully cultured and then released a non-virulentstrain of anthrax in Tokyo (in addition to the Sarin attack).

7 Timothy L Thomas, ‘Kosovo and the Current Myth ofInformation Superiority’, Parameters, Spring 00.

8 Application of strength against weakness; defeat anddisrupt rather than hold ground; precise application offorce at critical points and times against points ofweakness; and defeat the enemy by destroying his willand desire to continue by seizing the initiative andapplying constant and unacceptable pressure at the timesand places that the enemy least expects.

9 At the Battle of Little Big Horn, many Indians wereequipped with Winchester repeating rifles bought fromtraders; Custer’s troopers fought and died using single-shot breech-loaders.

10 Icon systems need not be military; the World Trade Centrewas very much an icon ‘system’.

11 An alternate view is that the KLA coerced their own peopleto leave their homes in order to magnify the ethniccleansing and add to Milosevic’s demonisation. Eitherway, civilians were used as asymmetric ‘weapons’.

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CHAPTER 18

ONCE UPON A TIME INTHE FUTURE

By Jake Thackray

How it All BeganWWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening. You’re watching Headline News atsix. Another continent: another crisis. It seems nowthat the food shortages and civil unrest in theGeneric African State threaten to undo all that thatyoung nation has achieved in the 40 years since itsindependence from Britain.

“In scenes reminiscent of the worst tragedies tohave befallen Africa over the past 15 years, thecollapse of what was once the only prosperouscountry in the region seems to be a matter of weeks,if not just days away. The footage from thenumerous refugee camps strung along the border isparticularly harrowing. Despite the presence of aidagencies and volunteer organisations from Britainand around the world, the death toll is reported to beseveral hundreds every day, and rising.

“The picture is no less devastating in the teemingstreets of the GAS’s capital, New Pewsey. There,gangs of youths, armed with a hodgepodge of

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weaponry, openly flaunt their rejection of the rule oflaw. Across large swathes of this troubled city, policeand GAS Defence Force units appear powerless torestore order. The worsening situation has resultedin the recall of many diplomats, expatriate workersand their families from the GAS. Nonetheless, it isestimated that many thousands remain, trying totough it out in this ravaged landscape. Here inLondon, the foreign Office is instructing all UK andEU nationals not to visit the GAS for any reason,unless and until the situation improves.

“Meanwhile, on its borders, the activities of the Sub-Saharan alliance, and in particular those of thealliance’s largest and most powerful country,Goldland, continue to threaten to destabilise theentire region. It’s large and capable armed forceshave conducted a number of large-scale exercisesclose to the border, and there have been a numberof small-scale border incidents with the borderpatrols of the GAS. There is much speculation that itis the SSA, and in particular Goldland, who arebehind the general lawlessness in the GAS,speculation categorically denied by Goldland’sleader yesterday.

“We’ll have more on this story later in this bulletin.Other news, now. Heathrow’s Terminal 5construction site was disrupted again today byenvironmental and anti-capitalist protesters angryabout what they see as…”

Another continent: another crisis. It was not thatthe international community ignored the

worsening situation in Africa until it was too late – it’sjust that it had to take its place in a seemingly ever-lengthening queue. Public outrage and sympathyhad simply run out.

Looking back, nothing that happened in the worldsince 2002 should have come as a surprise. What’smore, things could have been much, much worse.There had been no discontinuities: none of theworld’s players had imploded (well, none of the onesthat matter, anyhow). Amazingly, there’d been nouse of nuclear weapons, anywhere. People said thatthere’s been no organised use of bioweapons,either, but then, who could tell? Somehow, however,most of us had kept getting just a little bit richer (orat least entertained the hope that our children wouldbe). Somehow, most of the world’s surface remainedable to sustain life. Somehow, hope endured.

And it was fortunate that hope enjoyed such anenduring quality, because on occasions in that firstfifteen years of the 21st Century, it appeared that itmight be all but extinguished. The chasm betweenrich and poor nations continued to widen, and thesuffering endured by those on the wrong sideseemed to beggar adequate description. Lack offood – despite a world-wide surplus – lack of waterand lack of medical care bedevilled the marginalisedregions, and nowhere more than in sub-SaharanAfrica. That troubled continent also experienced theworst ravages of disease – the AIDS pandemic chiefamongst them.

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Environmental disaster was a frequent visitor:drought followed flood followed famine with all theseeming regularity of seasonal change. But it couldso easily have been the Middle East, Indian sub-continent; Indonesia; or that arc of instabilitybetween Russia and its Southern States.

The world wasn’t interested in Africa. The action wasin the Pacific. In late 2014, the enmity with which theUS and China faced each other across the Pacificthreatened – again – to explode into somethingworse. Again Korea, the DMZ and the 38th parallelprovided the foci for tension. The rapid USdeployment to South East Asia was all that the late1990s architects of transformation could havewished for. The trouble was, the Chinese got therequickly too, and showed no signs either of leaving orinvading. Both sides settled down to the stand off:neither willing either to precipitate action nor to loseface. The world’s two most capable military forceswere therefore distracted and fixed.

For us here in Europe, and exactly 100 years afterthe Archduke’s visit to Sarajevo, the Balkansproblem still continued to confound everyone. Thesons and daughters of those first UN troops whomade their way into Bosnia in 1992 now stood guardat key points throughout the Balkans. They worenational uniform, but they operated under the controlof the EU Military Council and its land, air andmaritime directorates. Every year the Europeanmedia agonised over the cost in lives and treasure,but in the end, the troops stayed. Meanwhile,Russia’s post-Communist torpor and seemingly

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never-ending border skirmishes with the nations ofthe Trans-Caucasus continued.

And the UK? Still awkwardly balancing therequirements of the by-now well-developedEuropean pillar of NATO and the Atlantic Bridge. Westill had the ability to project at least some poweraround the world: HMS Trafalgar, delivered in 2013complete with its 50 Joint Strike fighters, was due tobe joined by a sister launching from Belfast in 2016.Our Army could deploy a division to accompany itsAir Assault formation, and the RAF’s Typhoons werestill as good as anything Seattle might build. What’smore, the MOD had won its intense political battle tokeep up the huge training effort involved inmaintaining a military force made up from bothRegular and Reserve elements, intrinsically boundtogether, which was able to fight wars, and not justpolice troublespots.

* * *

In Africa, the irony for the GAS was that it had founditself a victim of its own success; in a continent ofdespair, it remained the one, bright, shining hope. AsAfrica fractured, its relatively stable government, itsmodest trading success and well-ordered societymade it stand out from its neighbours. There, in whatwas termed the Sub-Saharan Alliance (SSA),various despotic regimes controlled societies eitherby the gun, or bribery. Goldland, the dominantpartner in the Alliance, maintained a large, and verypowerful army, funded from the profits of the druglords and other criminal based activities. Able to puttogether three divisions of armoured and

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mechanised forces, they had invested in a numberof advanced technologies; technologies which themore unscrupulous of the world’s armsmanufacturers had queued up to sell them. Theymaintained one of their divisions close to the border,where it presented a visible and obvious reminder tothe GAS of Goldland’s capabilities. The others werealways kept near the capital – better to keep orderamongst the population. An iron grip was maintainedon the people of Goldland, and inevitably, rapidmigration into the GAS followed, welcomed at first,but increasingly resented as the welfare systembuckled. It was a tough journey, but it could bemade, and thousands of them risked the journeyevery day and every night. Once inside the GAS,they disappeared into the shanty towns and villages.As the world’s population steadied, and as part ofAfrica’s actually reduced, that of GAS exploded.

The GAS government could, possibly, havemaintained control. Left alone, and with somefinancial help from outside, they might have turnedthe situation around. They weren’t to be left alone.They had something that their neighbours wanted, aresource more valuable than all the drug money andmineral wealth in the continent. Their neighbourswanted water.

Water was scarce throughout sub-Saharan Africaand food production remained the single greatestuser of water. GAS’s traditional, small-scaleirrigation schemes, developed with World Bankassistance to better harness local resources, wereenough – just – to meet their needs. Not so acrossthe GAS’s borders. There, a lack of irrigation water

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due to poor investment was beginning to make eventhe most pliant farmers turn rebellious. An alternativeexisted: the mountain range in the east of the GAScontained – if it could be harnessed – a waterresource vast enough to meet all projected needs.

Moreover, the GAS’s neighbours need not invade –not yet, at least. The border was still easily infiltrated,and the migrant population easily coerced intodisobedience, sabotage or tribal atrocities.Eventually, the GAS would simply disappear underthe weight of its burgeoning, uncontrolledpopulation. The rump of the country could eitherbecome a client or could be annexed militarily atleisure. As far as the UN was concerned, GAS wassuffering from a crisis of its own making.

In February 2015, after months of attempting to holdthe GAS together, its president formally requestedmilitary assistance from the UN, ‘to restore andensure order throughout the nation’. The SecurityCouncil, however, although willing and able to drawup a Resolution supporting GAS’s request, still didnot enjoy the services of a dedicated military force.Continental Europe and the US couldn’t help; Russiawas too busy policing its noisy southern neighbours.The GAS was not a small country, and whoever diddeploy there would need to deploy in strength, andmight be there for a while. No-one was volunteering,and it looked as if no-one would.

The thump which reverberated across the GAScapital, New Pewsey, in the early hours of 4th Marchwas gruesomely familiar. The growing dangerevident in dispersed embassies had forced the UK

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and other Commonwealth nations into a rough-and-ready combined diplomatic presence in the country.That presence was now a scene of carnage. Within24 hours, it became clear that over 400Commonwealth diplomats, financial and militaryadvisors and their families, including some 80children, had perished. Designed to warn nations off,the bomb, just as others in the past, had the reverseeffect. The UK spun up the readiness of its JointReaction Force, specialists in what militaryorganisations called ‘rapid effect’. Other Europeancountries offered their support. Echoing eventsunknown for more than fifty years, theCommonwealth nations did the same. The multi-national forces that formed the Coalition were thusborne out of the long-established relationships of thepast; NATO, less the US in this case, Europe and theCommonwealth. Larger, heavier formations in eachof these nations began their preparations, too.Selective Reserve activation took place at militarybases throughout Britain. The first reconnaissance

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Amphibious Ready Group

and advanced command elements supported by anAmphibious Ready Group poised offshore and an aircomponent above, landed on New Pewsey airport’sonly useable runway on 12th March. The fact thatthis happened to be Commonwealth Day was anirony lost on no-one involved.

Some Corner of a Foreign Field

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WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special editionof Headline News Insight Report. Well, here we goagain, and, as the Prime Minister told the House ofCommons yesterday, did we really have a choice?The massacre of so many UK, EU andCommonwealth citizens in the early hours of lastThursday morning has left most of us shocked anddazed. The Prime Minister said that it was an actthat could not be ignored, and that future suchattacks could not be discounted. And so, onceagain, and in concert with our allies both close tohome and from thousands of miles away, youngBritish men and women have set off to some cornerof a foreign Amphibious Ready Group field. Whatwill they find there? How will they operate? Whatcan we expect them to do, and, most importantlyperhaps, when can we expect them to return? Thisrapid deployment has raised these and many otherquestions. To answer them, I’m joined in the studiotonight by someone who was, until his retirementlast year, one of the British Army’s most senioroperational commanders. Now, you were involved inmany operations of this kind during your service,

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right back from, as many of us will recall, some ofthe first deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo in thelast century. Do you see much that’s familiar here?”

“Well, yes I do, and, of course, that’s no surprise. Allmilitary operations come down in the end, one wayor another, to servicemen and women going to do adirty job in nasty conditions that no-one else will do.This is no different. The point here is: can they dothe job?”

“Well, yes, that’s the 64,000 dollar question. Do youthink we have the right people to do it?”

“We’ve certainly got the right people. The bestpeople, frankly, in the world, bar none. But thequestion we should all be asking is – have we gotenough of the right people? What we’re looking athere, or so it appears to me from this nice, warmstudio, is a classic peacekeeping operation in anear-enough collapsed state. Now, these sort ofoperations are very, very complex. They take a lot ofpeople to get right. There’s no obvious enemy, norare there any obvious friends amongst all thesearmed militias that we can see on the streets ofNewtown and elsewhere. We need to beeverywhere, all the time, and that soaks up troops.At the same time, someone’s got to get to grips withthe food situation over there, to make sure the relieforganisations can actually do their jobs. Again, noteasy. And it’s a big country, don’t forget, for whichwe have very little current intelligence. Mark mywords, we’ve got our work cut out.”

“And what if we can’t get the job done? What then?”

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“Then nothing. At least, not in the current climate. Asfar as the UK’s concerned, there’s nothing else inthe cupboard. This works – or we say goodbye tothe GAS.”

“Some viewers will be asking themselves why we’resending such an advanced and capable force todeal with what, as you’ve said, is in fact a largepeacekeeping operation. Why all the tanks? Whythe attack helicopters? Why the Joint StrikeFighters?”

“You need to bear in mind two things. First off – don’tforget just how much force protection these big,advanced systems, equipments and weapons offeryou. They scare the hell out of anyone who mightfancy having a go – and that’s a good situation forany soldier to be in. Second, since before the turn ofthis century, British forces have never, everdeployed to any situation without being prepared forit to get worse. If it looks like peacekeeping, it mightend up as warfighting, is the theory. All the big kit?Well, think of that as an insurance policy.”

“Well, let’s hope it’s a policy we don’t have to claimon. Thank you very much indeed. This has been aHeadline News Special Insight report. Goodnight.”

The retired General certainly earned his appearancefee when he pointed out that these sort of operationsare complex. The British Land ComponentCommander faced an organisational nightmare: Histhree divisions – one British, one European and oneCommonwealth were all structured differently, hadwidely differing logistic needs, offered a variety of

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capabilities and a huge range of equipment typesand systems. Under normal circumstances, hewould have liked at least three months with them totry and get them working well together – but timewas one resource he didn’t have. Besides, whateverpreparations he’d like to make were inconsequential– there was an overriding political imperative, drivenby public opinion back home in all the capitalsinvolved – to get on and do something. Stabilise thesituation, hand out the food, restore law and orderand come home – after all, that’s what armies werepaid to do, wasn’t it? His staff looked at the forceestablishment figures, and the size of the problem,and shook their heads. He couldn’t prepare forwarfighting and maintain peace and order in theGAS at the same time. It had to be one or the other,and the decision was made for him. Reluctantly, heordered his divisions to disperse to differentgeographical areas of the country, with orders tostabilise the situation and provide assistance to aidagencies within their boundaries. A powerful reserveforce – that prerequisite for successful militaryoperations throughout history was a luxury he couldnot afford, and yet he had to afford it. Withreluctance, he allocated the reserve task to the UK’sAir Assault Brigade. It was the most potent offensiveweapon he had – able to strike over 300 Km acrossthe GAS’s borders if needed, and here he was – ashe privately confided to his Chief of Staff – ‘using itlike some sort of glorified airborne fire brigade’.

At least, thought the General, as he left his twice-daily press conference, he could depend on acommand and control system which would allow himto communicate to his forces quickly and securely.

Between them, the UK’s FALCON andCORMORANT CIS systems provided a highcapacity, robust network from his own HQs down toall his component divisions, and up to the CombinedJoint Task force HQ in New Pewsey, as well as to theair and maritime components and their forces. Moreimportant, perhaps, was that some Herculean, iflargely unnoticed, efforts had allowed the protocolswhich governed data exchange between thecontingents and components, to be unifiedthroughout the coalition. Were it necessary, he or hisstaff – or any other staffs, for that matter, could seekout crucial information, wherever it existed,anywhere across the force. Nor was the Generalunder any illusion that critical information andcapabilities could be provided from elsewhere in thecoalition, either. He, and the generations of youngerofficers who served under him, had been brought upbreathing the doctrine of inter-component liaisonand integration. In his own case, his firstappointment as a lieutenant colonel back in 1999had been as Directing Staff at the then new Joint

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Services Command and Staff College. He’dcompleted two ‘Joint command earning’ tours sincethen, as well as passing all three modules of theJoint Training and Operations Centre’s SeniorCommand Course. He didn’t just ‘talk Joint’ – heliterally had no experience of any other way ofconducting operations. Whereas his two keyadvisors would in the past have been his combatengineer and firepower officers, they now wore darkand light blue uniforms respectively, and the Generalwas well aware that a similar relationship wasenjoyed with his trusted representatives at the Airand Maritime Component HQs, too. Although heregarded it as something of a poisoned chalice, heand his staff also had the capability to communicateout of theatre, to each of the national capitals, to theGAS’s government agencies, and to the otherdepartments and organisations without whomintegrated operations, of which military activity wasbut one part, was impossible. The difficulty was,each of these players had their own national,international and corporate agendas, and trying tomaintain a cohesion between them was anenormous task. Each of them had their own internaland external audience, and each of them requiredinformation to keep them unified behind their aims.Information was everywhere, immediately, and inquantities unimagined by previous generations ofmilitary chiefs.

And information was crucial, to the way they alloperated. They depended on it like no other militaryforce in history. They had all, to a greater or lesserdegree, traded mass for tempo over the previousfifteen years. The theory was that their digitised

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systems – BOWMAN had, despite everything, beenworth the wait – and the situational awareness thatcame with it, made each of them so much morecapable, allowing their commanders and crews tomake decisions, and to translate such decisions intoeffective action, much more rapidly than hitherto.Information, moreover, was provided by a plethora ofsources; a range of intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance systems that appeared, on the faceof it, to be staggeringly capable. ASTOR was thejewel in the crown, of course, providing him – and hisfellow component commanders – with (supposedly)24 hour coverage. Synthetic Aperture Radar,however, was merely one facet of what, by 2015,had developed into true ISTAR system of systems.Whether it was his capability to see out beyond 200Km, using Watchkeeper and other UAVs, or ground-based manned reconnaissance, or indeed assetsheld by other components, such as the RAPTORstand-off tactical air reconnaissance package, andspace-based surveillance systems, he could dependon an electronic picture of his area of operations likeno other commander before him. Of course, thisplethora of information, sources and product hadbrought problems with it, too. Staffs at all levelscontinuously demanded highly detailed information –so better to brief their superiors – and were thenoverwhelmed when their browsers delivered it. Thecontinuing development of broadband data systemsenabled this huge amount of information to bepushed around, but it was only with the introductionof the first battlefield intelligent agents in 2010 thatthe processing issue started to resolve itself.Software, capable – for the first time – of accurately

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sifting, sorting and presenting intelligence and otherinformation, had really made a difference. Fewerdecisions meant fewer staffs, and for the first timesince the 1990s, HQs started to actually get smallerinstead of larger. So successful had theirintroduction been that staff at every level had cometo accept the wisdom of their simple, trafficlightgo/no-go indicators as much as they accepted the‘truth’ of the icons which marched across their three-dimensional topographic displays.

The General wasn’t so convinced: he’d once beennaïve enough to believe the absolute truth of anintelligence briefing – as a 20 year old secondlieutenant waiting to attack the Argentinean positionsat Goose Green 33 years before. He’d stayed alivethat day, and on operations ever since, due to hisdiscovery of an instinct for knowing what his enemywas thinking, not what the intelligence picture saidhe was doing. He wondered, for a moment, if hisinstincts would hold good this last time – he had afeeling he would need them.

Keeping the Motor Running

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WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special featurefrom Headline News Report, continuing our look atsome of the amazing technology that the British andcoalition forces have at their disposal in the GAS.Now, we’re all familiar with that little red light thatstarts blinking on the dashboard when we’ve left theoil change for too long. If we want the car to keeprunning, it means a quick detour to the nearest

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garage. But imagine if, while you were having yourbreakfast before you set off on your journey, new oilwas delivered to you, because your car had told thenearest garage it needed some? Or a replacementoil filter? or a light bulb? Well, it’s just that sort ofsmart technology which our major vehicles andweapon systems use now, and it’s changing thewhole way the British Army and its allies dobusiness.

“A major refit programme, which only ended lastyear, re-equipped our Challenger 2 tanks with a hostof add-on features that their original designers backin the 1980s could never have envisaged. It’s anoptional extras package you’re not likely to seedown at your local showroom, that’s for sure. Anti-missile detectors and deflectors were only the firstelements; add that to a battlefield interrogationdevice which automatically tells friend from foe, andJames Bond’s Q would be turning green with envy.

“But it’s what you can’t see that’s really impressive.For the first time, these tanks have the automaticcapability to inform each other of ammunition usage,fuel supply – even how much wear is left in theirclutch assemblies. For those that understand thesethings – it has massively ramped up their ‘ MeanTime Between Failure’ Figures. For those that don’t– it means they just don’t break down. And thatchanges everything. Remember, the automotivepower needed to shift one of these things isequivalent to that needed for an express train. Theengine, on the other hand, has to fit in a space notmuch bigger than a mini. Tanks always used tobreak down – it was a part of military planning. Now,

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by and large, they don’t, and that means militaryplanners have got the equivalent of a whole newweapon system to use – a tank they can depend on.And these improvements aren’t limited just to thetanks, either: right across the vehicle fleet, digitallinkages that go right down to assembly level – evenhow many pallets are loaded on an individual truck,mean that, instead of waiting for vital supplies forhours or days, they can usually be called up inminutes.

These days, they say the British Army regardstempo as the most important weapon in its armoury.If that’s so, it’s due in no small part to this sort ofamazing technology. Technology which allows theroutine to happen like lightning.”

The debate about the relative merits, necessity andimportance of close and deep operations had ragedwithout ceasing, ever since the 1991 Gulf War haddemonstrated the awesome impact of deep strikesystems. Whilst this debate continued, however, noone with an ounce of military knowledge doubted fora moment that the critical element in the frameworkwas that of Rear Operations. It didn’t matter how yousought to bring the enemy to his knees: unless youhad the freedom to prepare, to move, to reinforceand re-supply throughout your own area – and alongyour lines of communication – then you would bedefeated. They used to say that poor Generalsdiscussed tactics and good ones logistics: by 2015there weren’t any Generals who couldn’t discusslogistics, and nor were their logisticians who failed to

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recognise that ‘rear’ operations meant a great dealmore than combat service support.

Rear operations enabled virtually every type ofmilitary activity, and never more so than in the typeof deployment that was being conducted by thecoalition. In this situation, the normal roles ascribedto armed forces appeared to be standing on theirheads. The ‘close operations’ were those activitiescarried out by troops in and around the sprawlingrefugee camps. Food distribution and medicalassistance were the front line activities. ‘DeepOperations’ were those being carried out toreconnect the infrastructure – the water, transportand electricity networks. And rear operations?Ironically, in this case, they were being conducted bythe very troops who would normally be expected tobe in the thick of the action. The fighting troops – theinfanteers and cavalrymen – their job was to makesure the supply routes stayed open, and the townsand cities policeable. Rear operations in the LandComponent, a task which had somewhatdismissively left in the past to ill-equipped reserveformations, were now the central business for anintegrated force package of identically equipped andtrained regular and reserve task forces. Militarythinkers back in the 1990s had seen thisphenomenon coming, and had argued with somesuccess, for the tools to do the job well. It was assimple to achieve as ensuring that surveillancesystems could look backwards as well as forwards.What was the point, it was argued, of being able tosee over 100 km into enemy territory, if you had ablank screen 10 km to your rear. At least one of the

ASTOR platforms was kept on permanent ‘look-back’ mode.

There was, furthermore, no question that rearoperations had to be conducted on a Joint basis.There was little point in maintaining an increasedintelligence overwatch on key vulnerabilities andcritical force elements if threats against them couldnot be countered rapidly and effectively. And thiscould only be guaranteed by the integration of allcomponents across the area. The rear operationscommanders presided over a highly complex andrapidly-changing battlespace – made all the moredifficult to manage due to size, and multinationalityof the deployed force. The GAS’s civil infrastructure,the aid agencies and international organisations andeach of the coalition contributors all needed realestate, access to life support and facilities. Unlessco-ordination took place, freedom of manoeuvrecould not be maintained. The protection issuessurrounding these disparate and often vulnerableelements were considerable, and, though there hadbeen no attack on coalition forces, it was feared bymany to be inevitable. The targets were just tooinviting to ignore.

Enormous strides had been made in the fields oflogistics and combat service support over theprevious decade. In its way, it was at least equal tothe developments that had taken place insurveillance and strike systems. As ever, though -and it showed that some things never really changed– no one really found digitised asset-tracking andautomated warehouse management anything like assexy as new missiles and guns.

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It was called ‘directed logistics’ and its aim was toovercome the age-old paradox of manoeuvrism. Ifyou wanted to manoeuvre rapidly around thebattlefield, you couldn’t do so whilst dragging alumbering logistic tail behind you. On the other hand,if you divested yourself of this tail, then you’dmanoeuvre rapidly all right – but only until you eitherran out of fuel, or spares, or both.

Directed logistics, enabled by the digitised systemsvalued so much by the surveillance and commandcommunities, broke this paradox – well, that wasthe theory, anyhow. Because such an accuraterecord could be kept of both resource usage andavailability, and such a complete track of assetsmaintained, overstocking was, largely, aphenomenon of the past. Logisticians – good ones,anyway – had always tried to keep a littlesomething back for the rainy day. Quartermasters,whether in 2015, 1915 or 1815 all knew that ‘storeswas for storing’. Now, despite the fact that thephysical environment had not changed (logisticforces were still more vulnerable than fightingtroops, and were still, therefore, shepherded to therear) prediction had replaced over-caution. With fullasset visibility, cross-decking of material could takeplace at every level of command, from sub-unitthrough to formation. Full vehicle systemsintegration allowed for ‘self-demanding’: theprocess whereby platforms automaticallyrequested re-supply – or anticipated repair – fromthe logistics organisation. This had revolutionisedthe turgid process of military CSS forward planning(though BMW had been doing it for thirty years). Atthe same time, the reduction in overall stocks in

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theatre both on wheels and warehouse stored, hadmeant a reduction in the numbers of logisticstroops required. Not only were their fewer drivers,but the universal adoption of web-based storesmanagement had drastically reduced the numbersof store managers and distributors.

There were many who trumpeted this remarkableway of doing business as a ‘Revolution in LogisticAffairs’, and it was, indeed, far more revolutionarythan anything that was taking place elsewhere. Thepress came to see the revolution for themselves, butsaw instead trains being loaded from the quayside.‘Some revolution’ they thought, and went to findbetter library pictures elsewhere. The loggiesgrinned at one another, rolled up their sleeves andwent back to winning the war.

Beyond Gethsemane

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WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“This a Headline Newsflash. Headline News hasreceived reports in the last few minutes that seem toindicate that a British logistics base in the GAS hasbeen attacked by some form of poison gas. We’regoing straight there now, where we have a livesatellite link up with the British Forces HQ inNewtown and the coalition spokesman, MajorAndrew Maclean. Major Maclean, can you give usand indication of what’s taken place?”

“…You’ll appreciate that we don’t have a full pictureyet here, but I am able to confirm that the UKReception and Staging area, some 50 Km north of

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where I’m standing, came under mortar fire withoutwarning, earlier today. It appears that the mortarseach carried some form of crude chemical warhead,all of which detonated inside the perimeter of theinstallation. It appears that the type was some formof non-persistent agent, but—”

“Which units were involve, and can you tell us thecasualty count?”

“You’ll understand that we don’t release unit detailsuntil we’ve informed the next-of-kin, and thatprocess is not yet complete. As far as casualties areconcerned, I’m afraid I have to report that, as of anhour ago, we have 277, that’s two hundred sevenseven fatalities on site, of which 38 are UKpersonnel—”

“Who were these others, major, and how is that somany of them died? You said this was a Britishinstallation.”

“The other victims were locally-employed labourers,none of whom were in possession of chemicalprotection equipment…er…we have another 67 UKpersonnel suffering from chemical injuries, but noneare critical, right now.”

“How did this happen? Why weren’t we betterprepared for this?”

“It’s far too early to say for certain, of course, but wewill be reviewing our chemical defence capabilitiesthroughout the operational area, and—”

“A little late for that, some will say, Major. Who arethe families of those killed to blame for this failure in

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Well, it just goes to show that tactical level issuescan have strategic level impact. Major Macleanthought that blame didn’t enter into it. Not from hisperspective, it didn’t, but it certainly did back inLondon. This was an operation of choice, notnecessity, and there were those who would havechosen differently. The UK forces had gone intotheatre with, supposedly, the best force protectionpackage on offer. So, how had this happened? For awhile, and until the end of a particularly emotionaland bad-tempered emergency Commons debate, itappeared that the UK might actually withdraw. Thevideo conference between the Prime Minister andthe UK contingent commander later that day left thelatter in no doubt as to how precarious both theirpositions were.

The public was also shocked to discover that, of the38 British dead, 20 weren’t even service personnel.

our procedures, if that is, indeed, what hashappened?”

“Everyone here has nothing but sympathy for thefamilies who have lost loved ones here today, but Ineed to remind you, and those watching tonight, thatthis is a military operation, and military operationsalways entail risk. Sometimes, we will takecasualties. We’ll take more before this difficultcampaign is over, I can virtually promise you. No-one’s to blame – blame doesn’t enter into it.”

“Major, I imagine you and the rest of the British HQthere have much work to do. We’ll let you get onwith it. Thank you for joining us here tonight, andgood luck.”

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The logistics base was only partially run by theBritish Army. It was, in fact, the collection anddistribution point for the Army’s operational pool ofvehicles. Here, hundreds of tanks, armouredcommand cells, land rovers, trucks and othervehicles were married up with soldiers familiar withthese same equipments in the training fleet. Thisbusiness had been almost entirely contracted out –it was by far simpler and cheaper to do so – and theterms of the contract extended to the delivery of thefleet into the theatre distribution point. Contractorswere almost everywhere in the area of operations:they provided additional strategic comms links; theydelivered on-site support to the specialist ITsystems; they managed vehicle fleets and morebesides. In the aftermath of the attack, it wasexpected that these contractors would quit theoperation – getting killed, after all, wasn’t part of thecontract, but surprisingly few did. They had beentrained and equipped by the British Army for justsuch an eventuality. Many of them also expressed akinship with the men and women in uniformalongside whom they served (so many of them wereex-servicemen, anyhow); those that didn’t ruefullyadmitted that the money was just too good to ignore.

That apart, there was little to cheer the UK HQ thatnight. They’d been hit, badly (and, privately, the staffknew that they were at fault, that their procedureshad been found wanting: although the initial attackforced everyone under cover, no one donned theirNBC respirators quickly enough – at least not till thesmell and the cloud were on top of them. The fact isthat the threat had not been recognised. No one hadexpected a chemical attack. Well, they would from

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now on). But how could they strike back? No onewas claiming responsibility and the perpetrators hadvanished, presumably for good. What was gallingwas that strategic SIGINT resources, deployed intotheatre under the strictest secrecy, gave thecommander a good steer that the attack had beenco-ordinated by the SSA. Telephone and data trafficin and out of the capital showed it as clearly as asigned confession. It was evidence, but not the sortthat could used in the court of world opinion. LikeEnigma and the Bletchley code-breakers, the Britishhad a capability they couldn’t admit to for fear oflosing its effectiveness.

Instead, the entire Coalition reviewed its forceprotection posture, tightened procedures, andtrained hard in chemical defence. Their ability tosupport the aid agencies dropped, but, for themoment at least, soldiers throughout the forcedecided that they needed to do a little more lookingafter themselves, or they wouldn’t be around to helpanyone else.

It was an irony, then, that the next hammer blow tostrike the GAS was one that the coalition forcescould do absolutely nothing about – and nor couldthey be blamed. Just as contractorisation had seenmore civilians based in the Area of Operations, sonew technology – and in particular high bandwidthstrategic comms links – had seen more and moremilitary staffs being based at home. They called this‘reachback’ and the idea was that the ‘footprint’ in-theatre could be much reduced, and personnel couldcontribute a range of analysis and decision supportfrom the UK Intelligence staffs, mission planners and

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logistic specialists – all of whom would have beendeployed in previous expeditions – now assistedtheir colleagues 5,000 miles away. They did so froma grandly-titled – but visually unimpressive – MissionSupport Facility, a couple of dozen portakabins co-located with the SKYNET 5 downlink hub atCorsham in Wiltshire. ‘Reachback’ was a goodtheory, but it only worked in practice if the homebase was a more secure and safer place to operatethan the Area of Operations.

The incendiary device which almost razed theCorsham facility to the ground 48 hours after the gasattack lent the lie to that notion. Thankfully,casualties on this occasion were light, though theyincluded the suicide bomber who had driven her fueltanker through the Corsham perimeter fence. But itwas the loss in capability that was important. Thehub went down – admittedly only for a few hoursbefore commercial standby links were re-engineered– but the support facility could not be so easilyreplaced. For an uncomfortably long period, thereachback planning and analysis capability thateach of the components depended upon wasn’tthere. Reversionary modes existed – the architectsof the reachback capability had insisted upon itthroughout development, but they couldn’t be ascapable as the primary systems. Again, there wasmuch head-scratching on the MOD Main Building’smezzanine floor. How to defend against this? Thesombre mood wasn’t helped, first, by an admissionfrom the head of Special Branch that his people hadnot been able to penetrate subversive groupsthought to be sympathetic to the SSA and second,from the Director General Information that internet

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attacks on UK Defence and Government InformationSystems were increasing every day. If this continuedit would rapidly lead to the loss of some systemsunless he took radical quarantine action. Of coursenone of these attacks affected the MOD’s stand-alone high-security links – they were protected bysome of the highest-rated cryptographic techniquesin the world, after all. Neither were these ‘attacks’particularly complex and highly-skilled feats ofcomputer engineering (most of them were merelysimple viruses with automatic re-broadcastattachments), but their impact on low-security,supposedly firewall-protected targets was rapidlybecoming a real problem. Shutting these down forquarantine would not only reduce capability yetfurther; it would also announce to anyone whowished to take notice that the UK was suffering from‘cyber attack’ and could only deal with the problemby hitting the off button. Around the UK, alert statesat MOD and associated contractor sites ramped up– in some cases regional military units wereassigned guard of key installations. It appeared, tothose whose job it was to think of such things – that‘mission-creep’ was now something that happenedat home, too.

Nothing Changes for the Infantry…

WWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special editionof Headline News Insight Report. With me tonight,coming live from the UK deployment to the GAS, isCorporal James Chilman, who’s been with the UK

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force in that country for – well, how long now,Corporal?”

“I’ve been here about six weeks or so now.”

“And what’s your role in all this?”

“Well, I’m a Section Commander in the 1st RoyalGreen Jackets Battlegroup. I command seven otherblokes, and we operate either inside or, moreusually, outside a Section Warrior vehicle. Our jobis…well… same as the infantry’s job’s always been,really – we get stuck in and kill as many of theenemy as we can, as quick as possible, before theykill us.”

“Well, they say nothing changes for infantrymen likeyou, and the job you have to do. How true is that? Isit exactly the same as operations we’ve known in thepast?”

“The basics are the same, no question – but all thisnew kit makes a hell of a difference when weactually go into combat.”

“Perhaps you could take us through some of it – itlooks to me pretty much like what soldiers haveworn or carried for years. What’s so different?”

“It might not look much different, but everything youcan see here gives me and my men more chance ofkilling the enemy and, hopefully, staying alive whilstwe do it. If you look at this rifle, first—“

“That’s one of those old SA80s isn’t it?”

“With about a thousand modifications – yeah. Withthis sight, I’ve got a combined TI, II and night vision

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view of the battlefield And what’s more, it links upfrom this sight into this head-up display in myhelmet. I can see round corners, and shoot roundthem too. It’s also linked to this grenade launcher,too. With this I can lob a 40mm grenade out to 250mand I’ll know exactly where it will land. It’s brilliant.And everything’s linked up into this computer in mypocket – it tells me if I’m running out of ammo,where my muckers are, if there’s a system fault,whatever. But, if you were to ask me, the best thingof all is this sensor-to-shooter business. Because Iknow where everything is, and everyone else knowswhere I am, I can call down fire instead of having tofire myself. I’ve called up attack helicopters, strikefighters, artillery, the lot. Remember, my main jobwhen I get out there is hiding. If I don’t have toshoot, well, it makes hiding a whole lot easier.”

“It certainly sounds impressive. Why don’t they gothe whole hog and automate everything? Why dowe still need to send you out to do the killing?There’s a lot of talk about robotics and unmannedvehicles.”

“Well, er, that’s a bloody good question actually.You’d have to ask someone in charge, I suppose.But I’ll tell you this – I think all this Gucci kit is wellimpressive – but I’ve never, in ten years in the Army,ever been issued with anything that didn’t breakdown at least once when I got my hands on it, so Isuppose we’re there to make sure it happens if stuffgoes wrong.”

“Corporal Chilman, I know you’re busy, and I’d liketo say thanks for coming on the programme tonight.

I know that your wife Tina and your children arewatching tonight. Do you have any messages forthem?”

“Just to say Ryan, Taylor, be good for your mum,keep your feet off the sofa, and I’ll be back homesoon.”

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As invasions go, this one hardly looked likeBARBAROSSA. As the hotchpotch of pick-up trucks,four wheel drive utility vehicles and minibuseslurched across the border from Goldland and into theGAS, it looked – as the ASTOR operator said to theanalyst sitting next to him – more like a refugeecolumn than anything else. Again, hindsight allowsus to reasonably ask the question: what were theSSA thinking of? From our perspective, the invasionwas the strategic blunder – no matter how much(unexpected) success it appeared to enjoy at thetime. Everything was going their way, or so itseemed: their asymmetric attacks had hurt thecoalition, where it felt the pain most – it had killedpeople. Furthermore, their policy on covert fundingand arming of militia groups had continued to leavethem relatively blameless in the eyes of the mediaand therefore the world. Why change that? Again,their action was meant to be pre-emptive, and it was

meant to hurt the coalition so badly that withdrawalwould be the only option – after all, went their logic –look how the Coalition resolve wobbled when theylost a few dozen casualties. What would they do ifthey suffered hundreds? Or thousands? As irrationalas the SSA’s decision to launch an invasion mighthave been, their assessment of the coalition’s centreof gravity – its count of friendly casualties – and theirtactical methodology of getting to it, were right on themoney. It was an invasion with no objective tocapture, and with no territory to dominate. Theycame across the border with the sole aim of killingpeople until their enemies’ leaders decided the killingwasn’t worth it.

Because at first it didn’t look like an invasion, itwasn’t given the reception normally afforded one. Itwas seen coming. As well as the ASTOR feed(whose product was being relayed to HQ 1stArmoured Division) a Watchkeeper UAV was able togive a vehicle count – getting on for 50, whilst thereconnaissance vehicles strung out on piquet dutyalong the border maintained a silent watch. As weknow, an enormous investment had been made into‘finding’ technology. It paid off, too: the enemy waswell and truly found. So, why weren’t they fixed, orstruck? Well, no combat indicators were identified bythe surveillance assets to suggest a threat. Noarmour, no tracked vehicles, no heavy weaponry, nosupport from the air. No electronic signaturewhatsoever – no radios, cell phones, nothing. Atleast six vehicles in the convoy were clearly busesfull of refugees, amongst them a significant numberof women and children. The outcome was that thisparticular refugee convoy (admittedly larger than any

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seen before) would be treated like any other. Thenearest battlegroup – in this case, the RoyalHighland Fusiliers about 10 km up the road – couldintercept it, search it and then escort it to the nearestaid centre.

The first direct action of the war was to be as violentas it was brief. As the convoy approached the hastilyset-up checkpoint, the first few vehicles slowed andstopped. The refugees began approaching thecheckpoint on foot. As they did so, without warningthe Defensive Aid Suites on the three Warriorsfacing them barked out their alarms. The threatappeared to come from the refugee vehicles, buthow? Almost before the gunners could slew theirturrets in their direction, beam-riding AT missiles,guided by unseen marksmen in the buses,unmasked from the pick up trucks behind the distantridgeline, launched, dipped, struck and detonated.The platoon’s Warriors were instantly destroyed: thetroops inside them wiped out.

We all know now what happened next. Again,hindsight allows us to realise that the outcome of theclose operation on the ground was never really indoubt, despite the enemy’s initial success. We cansee now that the quality of our Ground Manoeuvreforces, backed up with substantial artillery and jointfirepower allowed us to quickly regain the initiative,irrespective of the surprise achieved by Goldlandand the SSA. Their ruse of using fake refugeecolumns worked (at first) just as it was intended todo: it drew in our forces on the border, and gavethem the opportunity to launch the main body of theirattack elsewhere. But it was never going to work. It

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played to our strengths, for the first time in thecampaign. That’s not to say the enemy capitulatedwithout the hardest of fights, though: the 1stArmoured Division, attacked by Goldland was forcedinto a defensive battle whilst the coalition’s air forcesstruggled to close the door behind the invasionforce. Once again, the Goldland forces provedthemselves expert in forcing elements of thecoalition to operate on their terms – not ours. Theycouldn’t defend against very high-level aerial attack,so they forced us to low levels by never placingthemselves where they could be attacked withoutthe risk of significant collateral damage. Low levelattack risked losses from light, shoulder-launchedanti-aircraft missiles. Most missed, or were decoyed– the defensive counter measures on the coalitionaircraft were state of the art – but they made thesuccessful prosecution of air attacks extremelydifficult and hazardous. Despite the best efforts ofthe Coalition Forces Air Component Command, andsome well-documented heroism on the part of bothits land and sea-based pilots, the air forces could notquite stop the SSA’s invasion force in its tracks, norentirely slam the door behind it. This didn’t stop themtrying, though. On the ground, too, the SSA showedthemselves unexpectedly skilled in placingthemselves where we could only manoeuvre againstthem with difficulty. More than anything, they knewhow to negate our technological advantage by theuse of complex terrain, which the towns and villagesprovided. These became their vital ground, and wehad to go and get them. Vicious, small unit closecombat – that most demanding of all humanactivities – was still needed.

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Although close combat presented the same uniqueand enduring challenges to soldiers on both sides ofthis battlefield, one thing had changed. These closeoperations were no longer as close as they werebefore: direct battlefield engagement distances hadmoved inexorably outward: from 1, 2 or 3 kilometresincreasingly to 4, 5, even 10 kilometres. Theincreased capability of sensor systems, improvedbattlefield awareness and a range of direct, near lineof sight and beyond line of sight systems could berapidly deployed to attack the enemy in anincreasing volume of the Close Operations area.GPS enabled combat troops to work individually,while knowing the location of others and with accessto a range of direct and indirect fire systems. Fromthen on, things started to work the coalition’s way.‘The integration of Joint effects’ is a dry and doctrinalterm: for the Goldland division, what it meant wasthat destruction came from all sides, and withoutwarning. Our investment in technology had paid off.ISTAR assets could link right down to the artillerybattery, the armoured vehicle, or the FIST-equippedsoldier. High tempo, enabled by digitalcommunications and C2 systems, allowed chances

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to be seized as they presented themselves, nothours later. Infanteers fought, where necessary,either from their platforms or on their feet. Eitherway, they were devastatingly effective, either bycalling down fire themselves, or by applying it, withunheard of accuracy. Tanks, guns and sappers allplayed their part: the traditional relationshipsbetween each strengthened, not weakened – by theinformation-age technologies common to all. Asever, good workable procedures evolved out ofoperational necessity. Ultimately, though, thisengagement – the largest for the British Army sinceWW2 – would have been lost, irrespective of thetechnology used, were it not for the fighting qualitieswhich allowed the coalition to withstand the early,significant reverses.

After a week of little sleep, caused by the constantdemands of the operation, particularly dealing withmulti-national and host-nation concerns, and theever-present media, the land ComponentCommander was able, finally, to report to the JTFHQ that the Goldland attack had been repulsed. Thecoalition had, however, lost over 300 dead, and bothhe and his superior knew that statistic reflectedvictory for the SSA. The news he received was bothgood and bad. The good was that the coalition’s

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political support was holding up, despite thecasualties. There would be no withdrawal. The badnews was that this support would not hold for ever,and certainly not if the casualty level increased muchfurther. The bottom line was – there could be nolarge-scale, ground-based invasion of SSA territory– the projected losses were simply untenable. So,however this war was to end, it wouldn’t do so witha set piece invasion across the ground like Kuwait.Someone was going to have to come up withsomething more clever. Fortunately for the coalition,the Deep Operations Group in its HQ had somethingjust so clever in mind.

A Revolution in Military AffairsWWN WORLD-WIDE NEWS

“Good Evening, and welcome to this special editionWWN Insight Report. As regular viewers will know,we’ve spent some time over the last few weeks, andsince the coalition operations began in the GAS,focussing on some of the key equipments andweapons in use with the British forces in theatre,and on some of the men and women who operatethese systems in combat. Tonight, via our satellitefeed, we’re able to enjoy a live link-up with CaptainDavid Amlot, in command of 669 Squadron of theArmy Air Corps. Captain Amlot, can you hear me?”

“Yes, loud and clear.”

“Captain, I don’t need to remind you of theoperations that have been carried out over the pastdays by coalition forces. You pilot one of the key

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weapons in the British armoury, that’s for sure. Howcome we haven’t seen Apache involved in anycombat? Isn’t that what we bought it for?”

“Well, that’s true, but you need to remember that thefighting that’s taken place up to now has been verymuch focussed on the shanty towns and cities of theGAS. It’s very difficult for us to carry out offensivemissions in this kind of terrain without running therisk of causing civilian casualties, and as the BritishCommand HQ has pointed out, we’re not here to dothat. I can assure you, however, that we haven’tbeen wasting our time – we’ve been training hard,and we’re more than ready for action when the timecomes—”

“If the time comes, some might say, Captain. And ifit does, how many of these Apaches have we gotover there, and what sort of capability do they bringto the fight? After all, they cost £21 million apiece,don’t they?”

“It would clearly be wrong of me to talk about howmany assets we have or don’t have with us, Glen,but I will say that the Apache gives us the ability todeliver an overwhelming amount of precisionfirepower, almost wherever we like. I’ve been flyingthese things for over ten years now, and I can tellyou, eight Hellfire missiles, a pod of rockets and athousand rounds of 30 mm cannon is enough tospoil your whole night’s sleep.”

“You sound confident –but we’ve taken losses –substantial ones. How do you know we won’t do soagain?”

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“There’s risk for all of us on operations, and I’m notgoing to pretend we all don’t think of that every timewe go up. But I can tell you that I’ve never beenmore confident in anything I’ve ever flown in thanthis airframe. And it’s not just this, of course: you’vegot to remember that, since they developed the AirManoeuvre command system, I can sit in my cockpitand call up a picture from just about any sensor onthe battlefield. I can call in fire from other Apaches,fast jets, artillery, even ships. I can report in towhatever HQ is planning or controlling the Op, and Ican do it right away. That’s also good for the rest ofthe Air Assault Brigade, too. All the infantrycommanders on the ground, or even when they’reairborne in the Chinooks. They all know exactlywhat’s going on – they’re never blind. We knowwhere the enemy are, and believe you me, if they tryto run, they’re just going to die tired.”

“Captain, when and if that takes place, good luckfrom all of us here. This has been a WWN SpecialInsight report. Goodnight.”

By and large wars aren’t won (or lost) at the tacticallevel. They’re won or lost at the strategic or politicallevel. Campaign planning allows you to undertakemaritime, air, and land operations, sequenced orsimultaneous, aimed at – eventually – attacking theenemy’s centre of gravity. Do this well, and stop himdoing it, and you win the war. What the coalition wasplanning now was something so ambitious that itcould – might – break this paradigm. They wanted towin the war with a single engagement. Actually, itwasn’t that revolutionary an idea; for years, the huge

investment on deep strike systems – and particularlyAir Manoeuvre – had been made on the basis that itcould have decisive operational or even strategicimpact, as well as tactical value.

If you desire, as a soldier, to project an effect 200 to300 km beyond your own troops, you need to stopthinking like a soldier. The battlespace out therewas as much ‘owned’ by the Air and Maritime forcesas it was by the Army. Much effort had been carriedout in the previous decade on how this battlespacecould best be exploited, and this effort was about topay off. Joint planning teams were already based ineach HQ, now able to work in virtual collocation.Mission rehearsals and refinement took place withina single, unified synthetic environment. An outlineconcept already existed, but such was thecumulative value of the assets involved, and theimpact if failure resulted, that every detail needed tobe worked out. The final go/no-go decision wouldonly be made by the CJTFC, and the criteria for ago decision would be 90% forecast of success. Likemost military operations, timing was key. Unlikemost operations, however, these timings could notbe allowed to change.

For the first time, special forces and strategic humanintelligence assets (they used to be called spies) hadbeen able to work out in advance the movements ofGoldland’s leader. In 48 hours time, he wouldaddress a rally in the capital’s central footballstadium. In this case, for the first time in the war wehad the chance to attack their Centre of Gravity.Absolute power rested with this man, and with theArmy and militias he either funded or controlled.

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Neutralising him, however, was only part of the task.Somehow, the Presidential Guard Goldland division– kept, until now, out of the fighting as a strategicreserve – had to be destroyed, too. Whilst that forceexisted, the possibility of one dictator being replacedinstantly by another, equally as powerful, existed aswell. Finally, even if all this were achieved, it wouldnot be, of itself, enough. Somehow, the people in thecapital, and in the rest of the SSA, needed to bepersuaded that the void that they left behind couldbe filled. The mission, then, depended on a complexinformation operation: at the instant that the militarystrike took place, a network of electronic andpsychological warfare assets had to ensure that ourinformation, and only ours dominated thebattlespace. Management of the Electro-MagneticSpectrum between the myriad of systems emittingsignals throughout the battlespace, was, fortunately,now an active process. It was made possible by anautomated capability which de-conflicted users’requirements and provided close to ‘frequencies ondemand’. When the Commander finally sat down forhis decision brief, his planning team on the other endof the video link had, they hoped, put it all together.Their synchronization matrix needed to be dividedbetween four screens because of its complexity, butit did make sense. They had identified the enemy’smain weakness, and this was the only way to exploitit. The Commander listened patiently until the end.He had no questions. He had, after all, beenpersonally involved at every stage of the planningprocess. He gave the order.

We all know the rest, of course. Some say it was justa lucky move – others have described it as a feat of

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arms as successful and significant as the Inchonlandings in Korea. The official report downplayed allthat, of course, merely attributing success to thesuccessful imposition of superior doctrine on anunfamiliar situation, but, undeniably, it did work, justas it had been planned.

The General commanding 1st (UK) ArmouredDivision hadn’t been enamoured with the idea ofusing his formation to psychologically fix the enemy,particularly as he’d enjoyed no time forreconstitution, but there was little choice. It was risky– the Division was hardly more than 60% combateffective – but it worked. Its noisy approach to theborder forced Goldland into a counter-move with thePresidential Guard Division. This was enough:ISTAR systems were able to plot sufficient enemymovement and concentration areas for the nextphase of the operation to begin. 1st ArmouredDivision, its job done, halted.

The air forces, unconstrained for the first time by therules of engagement, which had largely held it backthus far, punched a series of corridors through theairspace – corridors punctuated by precision strikesnot only from the air, but from long range precisionartillery and, for the first time, TLAMS launched fromoffshore for the first time in this operation. Theintegration of these effects and the deep operationby 16 Air Assault Brigade was impressive enough:more so was the tempo that was achieved. Active,positive airspace procedures allowed eachcomponent’s systems to work at their fastest. TheInformation Operations mission was unfolding withsimilar speed. The cell phones, mobile laptops and

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radios operated by the SSA were disabled inswathes in Phase 1: in Phase 2 each of them –supplemented by additional self-rebroadcast radios– began displaying and replaying the Coalition’smessage to stay calm, to stay put and to stay alive.The effort that had gone into airborne TV and civilradio broadcast, in particular, paid off in spades. Aseries of pre-recorded messages were beameddown across the UHF and VHF range. Theaudacious ‘capture’ of the SSA’s websites, andsubsequent link to webcams broadcasting events inthe capital, provided an instant world-wide audiencefor the Coalition’s activities.

This deep manoeuvre was not without its reverses,of course, since it remained impossible to removeall risks. A well camouflaged anti-aircraft gun – 40years older than the soldier manning it – opened upat close range on a hovering Apache. All thedefensive aids suites in the world couldn’t deflectthe stream of lead which struck throughout the

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airframe. Saved from fatal splinter injuries by theirbody armour, the crew managed to guide theircrippled aircraft to a thumped landing – whilst theirwingman, having destroyed the anti-aircraft gun,activated the emergency link to the orbiting CombatRecovery controller.

Incidents like this apart, the mission was a success,by any yardstick. The shock and destructive powerof the AH Regiments had their intended effect. Thefirst strikes took out the key command vehicles,cutting off the head of the force.

Thereafter, the Goldland Division, deprived ofdirection, simply stopped moving coherently. Therewas no organised response. The air assault infantry,inserted at key locations in the division’s area, wasable to direct more withering and murderouslyeffective indirect fire. Selective close combatoperations quickly whittled the remaining GoldlandDivision’s combat power down to nothing in a fewhours. The appearance of coalition forces,simultaneously, at the rally was enough to paralyseGoldland’s leader and his bodyguards: by the timethey’d started to think about escape, Special ForcesTeams had disabled them – temporarily, using NonLethal techniques - an act designed not to causepanic. The opening of a Chinook tailgate to revealGoldland’s last elected ruler – long since exiled butstill revered – was both an inspired piece of theatreand a huge risk. He was surrounded not by armedtroops, but by international aid agency staff; hespoke the language of rebuilding and the crowdslistened. In the space of 30 minutes, just as planned,a successful tactical engagement in support of

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information operations had operational impact,which altered the strategic circumstances,irrevocably. The Coalition, as a whole, took a deepbreath, and prepared to move into the SSA: not tofight a war, but to cement a fragile peace.

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Afterword

Glossary of Acronyms

About the Authors

AFTERWORD: THEIMPERATIVE FOR NEW

THINKINGBy David Potts

‘Murder your darlings.’

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch

Deploying massed force, employed to achieve adecision against other such forces in a defined

battlespace, is giving way to deploying forces tocreate the conditions in which a decision might beachieved outside the military domain.1 The militaryline of operation in a campaign is therefore not justone of a number of lines of operation, it issubordinate to and constrained by others:diplomatic, political and economic and increasinglyby Information Operations, directed from the highestpolitical level, and legal considerations. War aims, oreven the desired endstate, will often be unclear atthe outset of operations when there may be animperative to act to alter the adverse dynamics of asituation and to begin to create the conditions thatmight allow possible endstates to be discerned. Incoalition operations there will be compromises aboutends, ways and means and there may even be aneed for constructive ambiguity as to ends in orderto maintain coalition cohesion.

315

The form of warfare that seeks to achieve a decisionin a defined timescale is intensely Western, formingduring 2,000 years or more of conflict betweenvarious European powers and exported to theAmericas and elsewhere. It achieves results throughface to face struggle, by those who believe they canand must prevail in such a struggle, in a definedbattlefield and within a narrow timeframe. Analternative form of warfare is not European at all andseeks results neither through decisive engagementnor in a defined timescale.2 The capacity to confrontadversaries with such a perception of timescalerequires endurance. This includes preparing anddeploying successive follow-on forces, remainingcommitted, adapting over time as circumstancechanges and shaping perceptions over a long haul.Confronting those who seek to avoid decisiveengagement involves applying force precisely atcarefully chosen moments to create opportunitiesthat can be exploited by other lines of operation. It isa fundamental shift away from the notion that amassed force can be committed for a one shotdecisive action.

The setting of warfare is also changing – operationswill occur amongst people. Massed force andconcentration of force become redundant concepts.Instead, there is a need for a specific effect at aprecise time and place. Therefore, while we mightstill need hierarchical component constructs todeploy forces into a theatre of operations, or towithin striking distance of a theatre of operations,and to manage them there, the execution of tacticalaction must be finessed and Joint.

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Old forms of warfare have taken a new and lethaltwist. The emergence of ‘New Terror War’ 3 hasreminded us of just how thin the crust of civilizationcan be.

Fuller argued that the history of warfare was one ofconflict between the city dwellers and the nomads,4

civilization and barbarism – into which category fallsthe 20th century wars between democracy andtotalitarianism. Huntingdon5 has updated andexpanded this idea. War between civilizations(Christendom, Islam, China, India et al), he argues isnow too awful to contemplate. For Huntingdon, thesolution to a decent future for all of humanity lies incivilizations standing together against barbarism,otherwise they risk hanging separately. This isexactly the battle-line that has been drawn,superficially at least, in the war against terrorism andit indicates that bloc-on-bloc and state-on-statewarfare are receding as the basic strategic constructin which wars occur. We must now increasinglyanticipate coalition operations with ever moreunusual bedfellows – Russia and China, for example– with all that that implies for our pre-conceptions offuture conflict.

Added to all of this, information technology is helpingto shape the age we live in. It is shrinking the globalvillage yet further and has unleashed an area ofhighly competitive economic activity that impacts onalmost every aspect of our daily lives and is alteringthe pattern of wealth creation on a global scale. Italso underpins a distinctly American form of warfareand an apparent American hegemony inconventional force on force combat. How can we in

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the UK exploit this technology to military advantage?What kinds of forces will be required if we are tosucceed in the strategic circumstances describedand what will be the essence, for us, of theoperational art in the information age?

This Occasional has attempted to answer suchquestions, but it is impossible to do so with certainty.All that one can be certain about is that this is a timefor new thinking. There is no cow so sacred that ourthinking should be constrained by the assumptionthat its importance now implies it has a part to playin our military future. Take for example the Principlesof War – inviolate, perhaps – but if they are to beuseful as a guide to thought and action they need tobe relevant. New Principles of War for theinformation age6 are therefore proposed:

A minor essay could clearly be offered in explanationand justification of each principle, including why itwas a principle of war rather than an operationalimperative. But that would miss the point – the newprinciples are not offered because they are in any

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way intrinsically valid. They are offered purely tomake the point that we must ‘murder our darlings’.No assumption, no principle of doctrinal certitude, noprecious equipment programme, or existing forceelement should be allowed to constrain or skew ourthinking about what the military future might hold andhow best to prepare ourselves for it.

The most costly failings we could allow ourselvesnow would be narrowness of vision and poverty ofaspiration. We must not allow ourselves to reducethe possibilities before us to fit our pre-conceptions– we must instead let go of preconception and openour minds, nationally and internationally, to anumber of hypothetical futures that can be exploredand refined through experimentation. If we do that,we could seize opportunities we have yet to imagine.

NOTES1 Sir Rupert Smith, Wars in Our Time, World Defence

Systems, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2001.2 John Keegan, The Penguin Book of War, introductory

remarks, 1999.3 Chinese Peoples Liberation Army terminology for the

synthesis of maniacal terrorism and weapons of massdestruction (see Chapter II).

4 J F C Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World,Grenada Publishing, London, 1970 (first published 1954).

5 Samuel Huntingdon, The Clash of Civilizations, New York,Simon and Schuster, 1996.

6 See R R Leonard, The Principles of War for theInformation Age, Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1998, for anin depth analysis of this issue. Leonard examines the USprinciples (different in emphasis from the UK principlesabove and including, for example, ‘Unity of Command’,although derived from J F C Fuller’s list in 1921). Heargues that they are not principles of war at all, butprinciples of battle in industrial age, symmetrical, landwarfare. He does not propose new principles, but

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“eschews any attempt to formulate aphorisms for a futureconflict that we can scarcely envision, let alone control”.

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321

GLOSSARY OFACRONYMS

ABCA America, Britain, Canada andAustralia

ABSV Armoured Battle Group SupportVehicle

ACTORD Activation Order

AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle

AH Attack Helicopter

AI Artificial Intelligence

AP Air Platform

ARRC Allied Command Europe RapidReaction Corps

ASP Advanced Sound Ranging Post

ASTOR Airborne Stand Off Radar

AT Anti Tank

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATGM Anti Tank Guided Missile

ATGW Anti Tank Guided Weapon BAORBritish Army of the Rhine

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BEF British Expeditionary Force

C2 Command and Control

C4I Command Control CommunicationsComputers and Intelligence

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillanceand Reconnaissance

C4ISTAR Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,Target Acquisition, andReconnaissance

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation

CDS Chief of the Defence Staff

CENTCOM Central Command

CinC Commander in Chief

CIS Communications and InformationSystem

COA Course of Action

COBRA Counter Battery Radar

COMARRC Commander Allied Command EuropeRapid Reaction Corps

Combat ID Combat Identification

COMBRITFOR Commander British Force

COMKFOR Commander Kosovo Force

COP Common Operational Picture

CR2 Challenger 2

CSS Combat Service Support

CT Counter Terrorist

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DBS Direct Broadcasting by Satellite

DHSS Department of Health and SocialSecurity

DIF Difficulty, Importance and Frequency

DLGS Data Link Ground Station

DMRS Dual Mode Radar System

DMZ Demilitarised Zone

DVLC Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse

EO/IR Electro Optic/Infra Red

EU European Union

EW Electronic Warfare

FAC Forward Air Controller

FCLV Future Command and Liaison vehicle

FIST Future Infantry Soldier Technology

FOO Forward Observation Officer

FP Force Protection

FRES Future Rapid Effect System

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia

GOC General Officer Commanding

GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch RocketSystem

GPS Global Positioning System

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GS Ground Station

HPM High Powered Microwave

HQ Headquarters

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team

IFPA Indirect Fire Precision Attack

IM Information Management

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IO Information Operations

ISR Intelligence Surveillance andReconnaissance

ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance TargetAcquisition and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters

JFLCC Joint Force Land ComponentCommander

JOP Joint Operational Picture

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target AttackRadar System

JTFHQ Joint Task Force Headquarters KFORKosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

KP Key Point

LC Land Component

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LCC Land Component Commander LOCLine of Communication

LOS Line of Sight

MACP Military Aid to the Civil Power

MASINT Measurement and SignatureIntelligence

MFC Mortar Fire Controller

MI Military Intelligence

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System MOBMain Operating Base

MRAV Multi Role Armoured Vehicle MTIMoving Target Indicator

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC Nuclear Biological and Chemical

NCC National Contingent Commander

NCW Network Centric Warfare

NDM Naturalistic Decision Making

NHS National Health Service

NORTHAG Northern Army Group

NRT Near Real Time

OGD Other Government Departments

OODA Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act

OSCE Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe

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P5 Nation Permanent Member of the UNSecurity Council

PCP Pedestrian Check Point

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PSO Peace Support Operations

PsyOps Psychological Operations

RAPTOR Reconnaissance Pod for Tornado

RCS Rational Choice Strategies

RFI Request for Information

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROE Rules of Engagement

SA Situational Awareness

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

SDR Strategic Defence Review

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIS Secret Intelligence Service

SNA Somalia National Alliance

SPOD Sea Port of Disembarkation

STA Surveillance and Target Acquisition

TACP Tactical Air Control Party

TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops

TI Thermal Imaging

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TIRRS Tornado Infra Red ReconnaissanceSystem

TLAMS Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

TOC Tactical Operations Centre

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

VCP Vehicle Check Point

VP Vital Point

WFE Warfighting Experiments

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WME Weapons of Mass Effect

WR Warrior

Glossary of Acronyms 327

329

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The authors work in the British Army’s conceptual‘think tank’, the directorate General of

Development and Doctrine, located at Upavon onSalisbury Plain. Most, but not all, are members ofCommand Development Branch (comdsp.bas@gtnet.gov.uk). This is a small team of six personnelwhose focus is the conceptual and doctrinaldevelopment of the Army’s Command, Intelligence,Surveillance, Target Acquisition andReconnaissance capabilities in a joint and multi-national context, with particular emphasis on theexploitation of information age technologies. All ofthe serving authors attended the Army’s Commandand Staff Course. The views they have expressedare entirely their own.

Colonel Richard Cousens has an infantrybackground and commanded a regular infantrybattalion in the airmobile and mechanised roles. Heserved for 3 years in the USA as senior BritishLiaison Officer to the US Army, where he wasinvolved in both the Force XXI and Army After NextExperiments. It was during this period that hebecame interested in the conceptual implications ofdigitization. He subsequently became responsiblefor infantry Force Development and was, untilrecently, Director Defence Studies (Army) workingfor the Director General Development and Doctrine.

Colonel David Potts has an artillery backgroundand commanded a regular regiment in the depth fireand target acquisition roles. He has served at unit

level in the UK, Germany, Northern Ireland, Belizeand with the UN. He served on the staff in the UKMOD Joint Operations Centre during the Gulf Warand the humanitarian relief operation in NorthernIraq and was Military Assistant to two successiveArmy Board members. For the past two years he hasbeen responsible for the development of the BritishArmy’s Command and ISTAR capabilities. He holdsa bachelor’s degree in American Studies fromNottingham University and Carroll College,Wisconsin, and won the Commandant’s Prize on theArmy Command and Staff Course in 1989. He wasappointed a MBE in 1991.

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Blad is an Engineerofficer who has served in the UK, Germany andNorthern Ireland. He has extensive experience onthe Staff and has been active in internationalcommand and control interoperability for the pastthree years, particularly in the fields of informationexchange requirements, messaging andsymbology. He chairs and attends a very widerange of international panels and working groups inNATO, ABCA and other fora. He recently movedwithin Upavon to become the co-ordinating focus forall of the Directorate’s international activity. Heholds a master’s degree from Cambridge inengineering and law.

Lieutenant Colonel Graham Le Fevre has abackground in ISTAR at the Strategic, Operationaland Tactical levels. He has served in ISTAR relatedposts in the UK, Northern Ireland and Germany. Hehas been an instructor at Sandhurst and anexchange officer with the US Army working within

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their digitization programme. He was the senior J2officer within the British Joint Task ForceHeadquarters on Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone.His responsibilities within Command DevelopmentBranch were the authorship and coordination of pan-Army ISTAR concepts and doctrine. He holds abachelor’s degree in Mediaeval and Modern Historyand a master’s in Military Studies. He recently leftCommand Development Branch to command aMilitary Intelligence battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel John Russell is an infantryofficer. He has had extensive service in NorthernIreland and during the 1980s with the British Army ofthe Rhine in Germany. In 2000 he served as the HQKFOR liaison officer to the Kosovo Protection Corps.For the past year he has been working as a memberof the Army’s Force Development Branch,responsible for the long-term development of thefuture British Army. He holds a bachelor’s degree inGeography, Modern History and Archaeology andwas appointed a MBE in 1992.

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Storr is an infantry officerwith considerable experience of working in army andjoint force headquarters. Recent appointmentsinclude work on battlefield digitization andoperational research. He has a bachelor’s degree incivil engineering, a master’s in defence technology,and will submit his doctoral research thesis on ‘TheNature of Military Thought’ in May 2002. He won theRoyal United Services Institute’s Trench GascoignePrize in 2000 and is a member of MENSA.

About the Authors 331

Lieutenant Colonel Jake Thackray is a Signalsofficer and has served in regimental appointments inEngland, Northern Ireland and Germany. He studiedat the Royal Military College of Science atShrivenham for his bachelor and masters degrees,both of which were related to the development ofInformation Age military technologies. He wasDeputy Chief of Staff for logistics, personnel andadministration with the British Army’s 7th ArmouredBrigade and later commanded a brigade signalssquadron. He recently left Command DevelopmentBranch and now commands a Signals Regimentproviding support to NATO’s Allied CommandEurope Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Lieutenant Colonel John Thornton is a Royal TankRegiment Officer who has seen regimental service inUK and Germany. He has served on the staff of abrigade headquarters in the UK; with HeadquartersARRC in Germany; as a member of the DirectingStaff at the Royal Military College of Science,Shrivenham; and on the seagoing staff of the UKmaritime component commander. His currentresponsibilities are the development of concepts forGround Manoeuvre; including armoured forces,manned reconnaissance and urban operations. Heis also the focal point in the Directorate for the futuredevelopment of the UK contribution to the ARRC. Heholds an honours degree in Humanities.

Paul Lefever, in ‘a former existence’, carried outregimental duties in Northern Ireland and Germany,attended the National Defence College and was astaff officer in NATO Headquarters. He also filledAttaché and Adviser posts behind the Iron Curtain

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and in the New World. He is now a SeniorIntelligence Officer, whose principal responsibilitiesare the development of national and internationalLand intelligence doctrine and the design ofintelligence databases. He is both author and editorof a range of NATO publications and StandardisationAgreements dealing with the derivation, recordingand exchange of information and intelligence data inthe multinational environment. He is a leadingmember of a variety of international intelligence andintelligence related working groups.

About the Authors 333