THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTICSEPTEMBER, 1939 MAY, 1945 BASIC FACTSTHE LONGEST CONTINUOS MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF WWII (9/39-8/45)WHERE?N.ATLANTICS. ATLANTICCARIBBEAN SEAGULF OF MEXICOWHO?AXIS: GERMAN KRIEGSMARINEALLIES: ROYAL NAVY (U.K.), ROYAL NAVY (CANADA), U.S. NAVYWHAT?100+ CONVOY BATTLES1000 SINGLE-SHIP BATTLES

MAJOR ADVANCES & WEAPONSGERMANS:U-BOATS (UNTERZEEBOOT): GERMAN SUBMARINESSURFACE RAIDERS: SURFACE SHIPS USED TO ATTACK CONVOYSPOCKET BATTLESHIPS: SMALLER-SIZED BATTLESHIPS USED TO ATTACK CONVOYSENIGMA MACHINES: MESSAGE ENCODING MACHINESCHNORKEL: SUBMARINE-MOUNTED AIR /VENTILATION DEVICE ALLIES:DESTROYERS: SMALL, FAST, AGILE WARSHIPS USED FOR CONVOY ESCORTING AND SUBMARINE HUNTINGA.S.D.I.C.: ALLIED SONARDEPTH CHARGE: PRESSURE / DEPTH DETONATED UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVEESCORT CARRIERS: SMALL-SIZED ARICRAFT CARRIERS USED FOR SUBMARINE HUNTINGM.A.C SHIPS: MERCHANT AIRCRAFT CARRIERSHF/DF (ALSO CALLED HUFF-DUFF): HIGH FREQUENCY DIRECTION FINDER (RADAR)HEDGEHOG: SHIP-MOUNTED UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE MORTARLEIGH-LIGHT: RADAR-GUIDED AERIAL SEARCH LIGHTB-24 LIBERATOR: LONG-RANGE U.S. BOMBER USED FOR SUBMARINE HUNTING KEY INDIVIDUALS & STRATEGYGERMANS:GRAND ADMIRAL ERICH RADER: COMMANDER, KRIEGSMARINEVICE-ADMIRAL KARL DONITZ: COMMANDER OF U-BOATSALLIES:U.K.:ADMIRAL SIR PERCY NOBLEADMIRAL SIR MAX HORTONU.S: ADMIRAL ERNEST KING, COMMANDER, U.S. FLEETSTRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:GERMANS:DISRUPT/CUT OFF SUPPLIES & SHIPPING THAT ALLOWED BRITAIN TO FIGHTFORCE BRITS. TO SIGN PEACE TREATYPREVENT SECOND FRONTALLIES:KEEP ATLANTIC SHIPPING LANES OPENKEEP BRITS. SUPPLIEDU.S. WANTS TO KEEP BRITS. ALIVE UNTIL U.S. ENTERS WARELIMINATE GERMAN NAVAL THREAT BEFORE EVENTUAL INVASION OF EUROPETHE NORTH ATLANTIC & MAJOR PORTS

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSESSTRENGTHS:AXIS:EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWSGOOD NAVAL SHIP DESIGNSINITIATIVE / MOMENTUM AFTER GERMAN SUCCESS OF 1939ALLIES:NUMBER OF SHIPSIMPROVING ANTI-SUBMARINE TECHNOLOGY (ex. A.S.D.I.C. sonar)AERIAL SUPREMACYAIRCRAFT CARRIERSWEAKNESSES:AXIS:LACK OF AERIAL COVERLACK OF SURFACE SHIPSALLIES:DISTANCE OF VOYAGESIZE OF CONVOYSVULNERABILITY OF MERCHANT SHIPSAIR GAP IN ATLANTIC

VICE-ADMIRALKARL DONITZ,KRIEGSMARINECOMMANDER OFU-BOATS

ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING, U.S.N. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET

WINSTON CHURCHILL, BRITISH P.M. ADMIRAL SIR PERCY NOBLE, R.N.

WWII WAR BOND POSTERS

COURSE OF BATTLEINITIAL BASIC TACTICS (Sept.,39 May,40)GERMANS:ATTACK MERCHANT SHIPSHOW? U-BOATS, SURFACE RAIDERS, PLANES, etc.WHY? U-BOAT FLEET IS SMALL AT FIRSTALSO MINE BRITISH PORT CITIESBRITISH:CONVOY SYSTEM CREATED***ESCORT SHIPS USED TO PROTECT CONVOYS***DEFINE ESCORT: SMALLER, FASTER NAVAL SHIPS USED TO HUNT / ATTACK SUBMARINES(EX.: DESTROYERS)PROBLEM: CHURCHILL WANTS MORE AGGRESSIVE STRATEGYRESULT? ANTI-SUBMARINE HUNTING GROUPS FORMEDAIRCRAFT CARRIER GROUPS USED TO HUNT U-BOATSPROBLEM (again): U-BOATS TOO ELUSIVE FOR A.C. GROUPSALLIED SONAR NOT ADVANCED ENOUGH YET ALLIED ATLANTIC CONVOY

WWII ROYAL NAVY DESTROYER

ROYAL NAVY DESTROYERS

WATCH DUTY, NORTH ATLANTIC CONVOY

GERMAN SUCCESSTHE HAPPY TIME: JUNE, 1940-FEB., 1941OCCUPATION OF FRANCE = DIRECT ACCESS TO ATLANTIC PORTS FOR KRIEGSMARINEEFFECT?U-BOAT RANGE INTO ATLANTIC INCREASESBRITS LOSE BIGGEST ALLY (AT THAT TIME)BRITS. HAVE TO DIVERT MORE FORCES TO MEDITERRANEAN SEARESULT? FEWER SHIPS AVAILABLE FOR CONVOY ESCORTU-BOATS ATTACKS VERY SUCCESSFULEXAMPLE:JUNE OCT., 1940 = 270 ALLIED SHIPS SUNKWHY? GERMAN WOLFPACK SYSTEM

THE WOLFPACK SYSTEMDEFINITION:MULTIPLE U-BOAT ATTACKS ON CONVOYSORIGIN:GERMANS HAD DECYPHERED BRIT. NAVAL CODESMOVEMENT / LOCATION OF CONVOYS COULD BE MORE EASILY PREDICTEDTACTIC:U-BOATS SPREAD OUT IN LINE ACROSS EXPECTED PATH OF CONVOYU-BOAT FIRST TO SIGHT CONVOY SIGNALS TO OTHER U-BOATSU-BOATS MOVE TO GATHER FOR ATTACKATTACKS OFTEN MADE AT NIGHTRESULT?VERY SUCCESSFUL BECOMES PRIMARY GERMAN ATTACK METHODEX.: 9/21/40 CONVOY HX 72 (42 MERCHANT SHIPS) ATTACKED 4 U-BOATSLOSSES = 11 SHIPS, 2 BADLY DAMAGED

GERMAN U-BOATACE, OTTO KRETSCHMER47 SHIPS SUNK274,333 TONS OF SHIPPING

SURFACE RAIDERSDEFINE: SURFACE SHIPS (naval and disguised merchant ships) USED TO ATTACK CONVOYSUSED MOSTLY FROM LATE 1940 EARLY 1942NOMRALLY OPERATED IN GROUPS OF 2-3 TYPES OF SURFACE RAIDERS:POCKET BATTLESHIPS (smaller, less heavily armed naval versions of full-scale battleships)FULL SIZED BATTLESHIPS (ex. BATTLESHIP BISMARCK)ARMED MERCHANT SHIPSGERMAN BATTLESHIPS WERE BOTH FAST & HAD EXCELLENT NAVAL ARTILLERY (GUNNERY)EX.: BATTLE OF THE DENMARK STRAIT, May 1941BISMARCK SINKS H.M.S. HOOD1415 KIA ON H.M.S HOOD, 3 SURVIVORSSURFACE RAIDER THREAT EFFECTIVELY ENDS W/ SINKING OF BISMARCK, May 19412200 KIA ON BISMARCK, 100 P.O.W. GERMAN POCKET BATTLESHIP GRAF SPEE

GERMAN SURFACE RAIDER

GERMAN BATTLESHIP BISMARCK

BATTLESHIP BISMARCK

ROYAL NAVY BATTLESHIP H.M.S. HOOD

HMS HOOD(R) EXPLODES AFTER BEING HIT BY BISMARKS SHELLS

EXPLOSION & SINKING OF H.M.S. HOOD, Sat., May 24, 1941

ALLIED ADVANCESSONAR: A.S.D.I.C.ALLIED SUBMARINE DETECTION INVESTIGATION COMMITTEEUSED BY DESTROYERS TO FIX U-BOAT LOCATION BEFORE ATTACK BEGANM.A.C.s: MERCHANT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS MERCHANT SHIPS CONVERTED INTO CATAPULT-LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT CARRIERSHEDGEHOG: SHIP-MOUNTED, MULTIPLE WARHEAD, ANTI-SUB MORTAR LAUNCHERLEIGH-LIGHT: AIRCRAFT-MOUNTED, RADAR OPERATED SEARCHLIGHTHF/DF (HUFF-DUFF) HIGH FREQUENCY, DIRECTION FINDER; RADAR SYSYEM USED TO LOCATE U-BOATS

DEPTH CHARGE

HEDGEHOG

DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK

LEIGH-LIGHT ATTACK ON U-BOAT

OPERATION DRUMBEATJAN. JUNE, 1942WHAT? EXTENSION OF U-BOAT ATTACKS TO N. AMERICAN COAST & MED. SEACAUSES?ALLIED SUCCESSES IN MID/LATE 1941U.S. ENTERS WAR AFTER PEARL HARBOR ATTACKGERMANS HAVE TO CHANGE TACTICSRESULTS:GERMANS ATTACK U.S. COASTSUCCESS MERCHANT SHIPS HEAVILY TARGETED157,000 TONS OF SHIPPING SUNKU.S. FORCED TO USE CONVOYS W/ BRITS. & CANADA ALLIES GAIN THE UPPER HAND WHY?IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY ALLOWS MORE ACCURATE ANTI-SUB. ATTACKSGROWING INVOLVEMENT OFU.S. NAVYCANADIAN ROYAL NAVYU.S. ENTRY INTO WAR (& MILITARY POWER & SUPPLIES )U-BOAT LOSSES INCREASE (ESPECIALLY AFTER MID-1942)BLACK MAY, MARCH MAY, 1943 SERIES OF VISCIOUS BATTLES IN N. ATLANTICMARCH MAY = 70 U-BOATS SUNKDONITZ HALTS U-BOAT OPS. IN N. ATLANTICBATTLE OF ATLANTIC IS NOW IN ALLIES FAVOR

WHY THE ALLIES WONALLIED TECHNOLOGY BEGAN TOIMPROVE ANDBEGAN TO SIMULTANEOUSLY EFFECT U-BOATSINCREASED ALLIED RESOURCES (Ships, Aircraft, Aircraft Carriers, Anti-Sub. Weapons, etc.)MORE AERIAL SUCCESS (Long-Range Planes, Escort Carriers, Leigh-Light, etc.)DECODING OF GERMAN ENIGMA MACHINE MESSAGESEFFECT?INCREASE IN U-BOAT LOSSES THE GERMANS CANT REPLACERESULTS?GERMANS FAIL TO STRANGLE SUPPLIES TO BRITAINBRITAIN BECOMES FOCUS OF BUILD-UP FOR INVASION OF EUROPE2-FRONT WAR WILL HAPPEN (AFTER GERMANS INVADE RUSSIA)

AUGUST, 1942 MAY, 1943

Grumman F-4-FFighters on deck of U.S.S. Santee

GRUMMAN F-4-F WILDCAT FIGHTER,U.S.NAVY

GRUMMAN TBF AVENGER TORPEDDO PLANE, U.S.NAVY

TBF AVENGERS IN FORMATION

AVEBGERS IN CARRIER LAUNCH

GERMAN ENIGMAMACHINE

CASUALTIES & FINAL TOLLALLIES:30,248 KIA / LOST AT SEA**3500 MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK175 NAVAL SHIPS SUNK14.5 MILLION TONS OF SUPPLIES LOST**SOME SOURCES CLAIM MUCH HIGHER TOTAL (50,000+)GERMANS:25,870 KIA OUT OF TOTAL FORCE OF 40,9005000 POW 696 U-BOATS SUNK / DESTROYED OUT OF TOTAL U-BOAT FORCE OF 830 CASUALTY RATE: HIGHEST CASUALTY RATE FOR ANY BRANCH OF ANY MILITARY FORCE OF ANY NATION IN WWII63% FATAL75% OVERALL

THE ONLY THING THAT REALLY FRIGHTENED ME DURING THE WAR WAS THE U-BOAT PERILIT DID NOT TAKE THE FORM OF FLARING BATTLES AND GLITTERING ACHIEVEMENTS IT MANIFESTED ITSELF THROUGH STATISTICS, DIAGRAMS, AND CURVES UNKNOWN TO THE NATION, AND INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO THE PUBLIC.WINSTON CHURCHILL DISCUSSION QUESTIONWHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE EFFECT IF THE GERMANS, NOT THE ALLIES, HAD WON THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC?