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The Battle of Savo IslandAuthor: 6th grader, 11 year old

USS Chicago (in foregroud) mauvering off Tulagi on August 9 1942.80-G-K-386 Naval History & Heritage Command.

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The Guadalcanal Campaign, codenamed Operation Watchtower, was a military campaign during World War 2. The first American offensive of the war was triggered by reports in early 1942 that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal island. If they succeeded, Japanese planes based on the airfield would be able to disrupt the supply line from America to Australia, so the allies decided to invade Guadalcanal. However, the first naval battle of the campaign, the Battle of Savo Island, was a stunning defeat for the allies. This was mainly due to the ignorance, incompedentnes, and unpreparedness of the allies.

On August 7 1942, the invasion started, with American marines storming ashore on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo. This was the first American offensive of the war. The invasion, codenamed Operation Watchtower, was supported by a fleet of more than 80 warships, including the carriers of Task Force 61, the Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. At the start of the campaign, Japanese strength on Guadalcanal was 2,800 personnel, with 2,200 being forced laborers; and on Tulagi were 900 Japanese naval troops.

Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo were assaulted by about 7,000 Allied personel, and Tulagi was quickly taken on August 8th, while the latter two were taken a day later. Guadalcanal was invaded by 11,000 marines, and the airfield was soon taken. The Japanese abandoned the facility but not the island.

The commander of the allied expeditionary forces and TF 61, Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher, was concerned about the possibility of losing his carriers, which were low on fuel. Thus he ordered his carriers to withdraw from the Solomon Island area on the evening of August 8, despite heavy criticism that leaving the invasion transports without carrier support would have left them vulnerable to both surface and air attack. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) responded by sending a force consisting of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, Kinugasa, the light cruisers Tenryū, Yūbari, and the destroyer Yūnagi, under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. The IJN were experts in night fighting, and Mikawa hoped to strategically exploit this advantage by engaging the Americans on the night of August 8 to 9.

The torpedoes they carried, type 93 “Long Lance,” were extremely deadly and far superior to any allied torpedo. It could bring a 1000 pound warhead as far as 40,400 meters.

The Japanese force was sighted in the St George Channel on the morning of August 8 by the submarine USS S-38, which itself was too close to fire torpedoes. The reports were considered vague and were ignored.

At 10:20 and 11:10 the force was again sighted by two Royal Australian Air Force Hudson aircraft. The first

USS Saratoga at Pearl Harbor on June 6 1942.80-G-10121 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command.

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Hudson erroneously reported the force as “three cruisers, three destroyers, and two seaplane tenders.” When they failed to receive acknowledgement of their report, the crew returned to base to report the sighting at 12:42. The second Hudson falsely reported the force as “two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one unknown type.” The second Hudson’s radio also failed, but it finished its patrol and landed back at base at 15:00. For reasons unknown, these reports were only sent to the Allied fleet at 18:45 and 21:30.

Mikawa had launched 4 floatplanes from his cruisers earlier and the floatplanes reported two groups of allied ships off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Mikawa sailed down the New Georgia Sound (also Known as “the Slot”) completely undetected towards these two islands.

Meanwhile British Vice Admiral Victor Crutchley decided to split the force under his command into three smaller forces to cover the allied transports unloading in the area between Guadalcanal and Florida island. A southern force consisting of the Australian cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra, the American cruiser USS Chicago, and the destroyers USS Bagley, and USS Patterson. This group patrolled the area between Lunga Point and Savo island.

A northern group was made up of the cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria, USS Quincy, and destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson. The Northern group conducted a box shaped patrol between the Tulagi anchorage and Savo island. The final eastern group consisting of the HMAS Hobart, USS San Juan, and two destroyers were to patrol between Florida island and Guadalcanal. Crutchly placed two radar equipped destroyers, USS Blue and USS Ralph Tabot west of Savo island.

At this time the allied forces were not aware of the limitations and advantages of radar, which then was a new piece of technology. Captain Bode of the Chicago was under the false impression that his radar would give away his

position. He only allowed one sweep from his fire control radar every half an hour. The last sweep before the engagement was too early to detect the Japanese forces. As will be shown later, this would turn out to be a crucial mistake.

USS Ralph Tabot circa August 7-8 escorting the Operation Watchtower invasion convoy. HMAS Australia is dimily visible in the far right.USMC 61603 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command.

The Postioning of the allied forcecs before the Battle of Savo Island.U.S. Navy / Public Domain

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In the evening, the commander of the allied amphibious forces, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner called a conference to discuss the schedule of the invasion. Crutchley was to attend the conference and he left the southern group in HMAS Australia. This placed Captain Bode of the Chicago in command of the southern group. At the conference Turner, Crutchley, and Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift who was the marine commander at Guadalcanal, discussed the report of the Japanese force that included the misidentified “seaplane tenders”. They decided that it wouldn’t be a threat because seaplane tenders were not supposed to engage in surface actions.

As the Japanese force neared the Guadalcanal area, Mikawa ordered three floatplanes to be launched for a final reconnaissance sweep. Several allied ships sighted or heard the planes, but none of them thought it as a threat, and the planes were not reported to Tuner of Crutchley. The formation approached in a 3km column led by Chokai. Between 00:44 and 00:54 on August 9 Japanese lookouts spotted the Blue 9km away. Minutes later the Japanese force sighted the Ralph Tabot. A few minutes after that, Japanese lookouts spotted Bode’s southern force. At 1:38, the Japanese began launching salvos of torpedoes at the southern force. At the same time, lookouts on the Chokai spotted the allied northern force.

At 1:43, the Patterson spotted a ship, most likely the Kinugasa, and sent a warning by signal lamp and radio. The Patterson went to full speed and began to fire star shells to illuminate the Japanese column.

At the same time the Japanese float planes overhead dropped flares over Canberra and Chicago. Captain Frank Getting of the Canberra immediately ordered full speed ahead, a reversal of an initial turn to port, and for her guns to engage any visible targets. Less than a minute later Chokai and Furutaka opened fire at Canberra, joined a moment later by Aoba and Kako. Within 3 minutes, Canberra was savaged by a concentrated barrage of more than 30 Japanese shells, killing Captain Getting and other senior officers. At once Canberra’s boilers were destroyed, killing all power and light on the ship.

During the engagement, the Chicago never fired its main battery. A torpedo from Kako struck the Chicago’s starboard side, a second torpedo hit but failed to explode, and a shell struck the mainmast. The secondary five inch batteries managed to hit the Tenryū, killing 23 men, but the darkness hid larger targets. Chicago continued to steam west for 40 minutes, but most importantly, Captain Bode neglected to inform Crutchley or any other allied ship in the area about Mikawa’s force. This act of incompedentnes would be a massive mistake.

The Japanese cruiser Chokai firing her main battery during exercises in 1933. NH 73024 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command.

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Meanwhile, Mikawa’s force continued steaming, rounding Savo island on a counterclockwise course, heading towards the allied northern force. As the Japanese ships headed on their way, the Tenryū, Yūbari, and the Furutaka took a more westward course. This way, the northern force would be enveloped and attacked from two sides.

While Mikawa’s ships were combating the southern force, the three cruisers of the northern force were tracing a box shaped patrol pattern 5 miles aside, with the Vincennes leading the Quincy, with the Astoria at the rear. The ships were cruising at a leisurely 10 knots and all three captains were asleep. The crews of the ships were at “condition II”, meaning that half the crew was on duty while the other half rested. Crewmen of all three cruisers all either heard the warning from Patterson or saw the flares from the engagement with the southern force, but it took time to go to general quarters from condition II. At 1:40, Japanese cruisers began firing torpedoes at the northern force. At 1:50, the Japanese force lit the Americans up with their searchlights and opened fire.

The Astoria had gone to general quarters at 1:49, and at 1:52, the main battery director sighted the japanese cruisers and opened fire. The Astoria’s captain, William Greenman, was awakened to see that his ship was in action, feared that Astoria was firing on friendly ships, and called a ceasefire. As shells landed all around his ship, the captain ordered firing to resume a minute later. Chokai had however found the range and the Astoria was pounded by cascades of shells. Minutes later, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Kako joined Chokai in shelling Astoria. Shells struck the Achillies heel of the cruiser, hitting the aircraft hangar setting the float planes and other highly flammable material such as gasoline, lubricating oil, and ammunition on fire. As Astoria’s engineers were trying to get the ship to full speed, shells hit the boilers and the power plant began to fail, just as the ship reached 15 knots. By 2:08, the Astoria was moving at a meager 7 knots. The sixth enemy salvo penetrated turret 1 on the bow killing everybody inside. Soon, turret 2 jammed and Captain Greenman found that he could only direct his guns by turning the entire ship. At 2:15, the gunfire targeting Astoria finally relented. At 2:16, one of Astoria’s turrets fired at and missed the Kinugasa, instead hitting one of Chokai’s turrets, putting it out of action.

When the Japanese started attacking the northern force, the Quincy was still going to general quarters. The captain gave the order to open fire, but the gun crews weren’t ready. Minutes later the Quincy was caught in a crossfire between the Aoba, Furutaka, and Tenryū. Quincy was savaged multiple times by shell hits. Aoba’s first shells struck the hangar, setting four out five of the SOC Seagull float planes on fire, washing the well deck with flames. The float planes could not be jettisoned while on fire, and by the time the fire hoses were ready to use, there was no pressure left on the line. The Quincy’s captain ordered his ship to charge the eastern Japanese column, but was hit by two torpedoes from Tenryū, causing heavy damage. In the meantime, one of the salvos she had managed to get off had hit the bridge of the Chokai, 6 meters away from where Admiral Mikawa was standing. At 2:10,

Quincy on fire and sinking while caught by Japanese searchlights. NH 50346 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command.

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shells hit Quincy’s bridge heavily damaging it and killing or wounding everybody stationed there including the captain. At 2:16, a torpedo from Aoba hit the Quincy, putting the main battery out of action. A single torpedo had hit the ship, leaving the power plant inoperable. Having learned that the captain was dead and that the secondary control station at the rear of the ship was destroyed, the Executive officer decided it was time to abandon ship. Quincy sank by the bow at 2:35.

The Vincennes has also seen the flares from the southern engagement. When Japanese forces illuminated the northern force, the Vincennes hesitated to open fire, believing that friendly ships were illuminating them. Shortly later the Kako opened fire at the Vincennes, finally causing her to open fire back at the Kako. Her captain, Frederick L. Riefkohl ordered the speed increased to 25 knots. At 1:55, two torpedoes from the Chokai hit the ship, inflicting heavy damage. A number of other japanese ships joined the Kako in shelling the Vincennes, hitting her up to 74 times. At 2:03, Vincennes was hit by a torpedo from the Yūbari. With all of her boilers destroyed, the Vincennes came to a halt, burning heavily, and finally sank at 2:50 after Riefkohl ordered the crew to abandon

ship.

During this northern engagement, the two destroyers, the Helm and the Wilson failed to consistently sight the Japanese force. Both fired at the Japanese column but failed to inflict or take any damage.

At 2:16, the Japanese force ceased fire at the northern force. Soon they spotted the radar picket Ralph Tabot and illuminated her with searchlights and opened fire, causing heavy damage. The Ralph Tabot managed to hide in a rain squall and escaped.

At 2:16, Mikawa called a conference with his staff to discuss whether they should go back and attack the allied transports that

were unloading. Ultimately, they decided not to because of many reasons. First, the Japanese force was scattered around the place, and would take time to regroup. Second of all, the force had expended

almost half of their torpedoes, meaning that they would have to reload their torpedo tubes, a time consuming process. The ships had also spent most of their ammunition, and most importantly, by the time Mikawas force

HMAS Australia after the Battle of Savo island on August 9.80-G-13492 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command.

The American destroyers USS Blue and USS Patterson taking the crew off the fatally damaged HMAS Canberra.80-G-13488 courtesy of the Naval History & Heritage Command

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reached the transports, it would already be dawn, leaving them vulnerable to air strike by the carriers that Mikawa falsely believed were there. Therefore, at 2:20, Mikawa ordered his force to retire.

At 4:00, the Canberra was still afloat and the Patterson tried to come alongside to assist her, but was driven away by internal explosions on the Canberra. Though it was raining, it had little effect on the multiple fires burning internally. Once all the survivors had been taken away, the Canberra was scuttled by the destroyers USS Selfridge and USS Ellet.

Meanwhile, the Astoria was dead in the water, and burning heavily. There were also many internal fires. Bucket brigades were battling the flames on deck, but the water was seeping inside causing her to list. Later in the morning the 5 inch magazine for the secondary batteries detonated, courtesy of an internal fire. By now, the destroyer Bagley was there to assist the cruiser. But even though the fires on deck were under control, the internal fires were blazing out of control. The Astoria’s list increased to 10 degrees then to 15, and her stern was settling while her bow was visibly rising. When the stern was almost under the waves, Captain Greenman ordered the crew to abandon ship.

This concluded the worst defeat in US Naval history. Three allied heavy cruisers were sunk, and one was scuttled. There were no losses on the Japanese side, but the Kako was torpedoed at 8:10 on August 10 by USS S-44, while it was heading back to base. At first Mikawa was highly praised for his victory, but as it became apparent that he had missed an opportunity to sink the allied transports, he was intensely criticized. But the mistakes were mainly the domain of the allies, for example Captain Bode of the Chicago for not informing any other ship about Mikawas force, the unpreparedness of the allied northern force, and the delay before sending the sighting reports. Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations from 1942 to 1945, called it the “blackest day of the war.”