- ,'.'''.' - . r ..... _______ .. __________ .. ___ .. _________ . ___ _ ___ ..... ___ , , AD/A-003 053 THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA t MA Y 1 TO MAY 11 INCLUSIVE, 1942. STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL ANALYSIS Richard W. Bates Naval War College Prepared for: Bureau of N-..val Personnel 1947 DISTRIBUTED BY: Nlttollli TechnlClllnfo...uon Service U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE f f I ,." l t: l f' I i i I t I I i . -.,..-... ............. , - , ... _- +,........ '- . .. '"' ......... a I". C'las!llfication BD/ A - (/J/J3 DOCUM'ENT CONTROL l'AT A . oR & 0 , {Sf'c:"ur'ty (",.,,0'''.''0" ot ""0, bod,v of Itb!l(tr.C" ltnd Itnnot,Hinn nlll.", llf.' etlfCHftd w/lftn over.1I r.-p"" " ("a llled) I ORIGINATING ACTIVITV (Corpora,. author) la. RFY "IT !ECUAITV CLA''''''CATION tJNCWSIrllD N.yal War Coll ... 2b, GROUP Newport, Rhocla I.lalld 3. RIE"'ORT TITLIE Th. ..ttl. of the Cor.l s . May 1 to May 11 Illcluely 1942. Str.t laal and Tactlcal Analy.l -4, OIESCRI"'TIVIE NOTIES (Typ. 01 r.porland Indu.ivlf d., ) lattl. lYaluatlO1l 8, AU THON,., ('1,., nam., middle Initial, I , nam.) Hchard W. Bat II, "'IE"'ORT OATil: 7a. TOTA ... NO. OF PAGES 1947 17g ._1'GUa CONTRACT OR GRANT NO, lIa, ORIGIN"'TOR'S REPO"l NUM!lI!:A.1I b. PAOJI!:C T NO c. lib. OTHIER REPORT NO'S' (Any oth., numbe,. Ihal ma" b. a '",ed th,. ,.po,t) d. , '0. OIlTAt!lUTION ITATIE"'ENT Diltribution of this document is tln11m1ted. .,. SUPPLIEMI!:NT ........ NOTES !PONSOR'NG MIL'T"'''Y AC,'VITY Nav.l W.r Coll Newport. Rhode hlalld " .... !I.T ..... CT attina pr.c.d.llt in naval hi.tory, th. Battl. of th. Coral S.a va. the fir.t .. jor DAyal &DS.I .. ant ill bieh the outcome wa. d.terwin.d by air only; there ... no gun actiOll b.tween .uffae hip Th. J.pana.e and Alli.d forc.. tc destro, aaeh other simultaneoualy by lIleana of earri.r-baa.d air att.ea. Allied and Japan... data ar. the baai. of thia r.cord vb.rein th. and diapo.it1on. of th. for c Ild the import.nt weather faetora are .ddr d and tha three pba ... of th. battle op.ration. ar. r.counted. Plat.. and diaar'" clarify th. cour.. of th ctiOll, .nd battle 1 8011 r. dr.wn fro. the eneoUDter. Whil. the 10.. of the carri.r Laxin.tOIl r.preaent.d a rioua blow to the u.s. Na.,. ... thi. batUe va. an Allied .uce and laid tha aroUlldvork for miaappr.henaioll. by th. J.pan commalld, r ultinl in th.ir thorou.h d.feat .t Midway. Hl'Pf Udll' I,d hy NATIONAl iTCllNletli IN rORMI\ T ION SF.NI( I u . n,"p,Htr1\"rd ,d Cn'!,!] ."\ t ' v/\ . ;-'11.1I (PAGE 1) SIN Security Classification .. ' J ,T, . . I '. " " j ervisell the Action AiMir Commander Combined FIllet. Steos In The Striking Force Seeka to Re-engage, and Finally Retires from Are. 11th of Other Japineee Forcea May 8th, 9th, 10th Md 11th The Effect of the Battle Buttle lessons 2. Command va Divided Command 3. Planning-Importunee of Adc.c,unte and Thorou6h Plana 5. Planning va 6. Taetieul & StrlltegicEl.l Ulle c'f Weather 7. NeCCG8ti;y for Ade4uate fiell-Coordlnatfld ::Jetrch OpEll'ution 8. Un\;eslrability of Rigid ::Jet,reh Artla Border Linea 'M Y'.ll .... lf. \ -v-_ f!a 106 105 108 107 107 109 .Loa 109 l09-1U 114 115 115 115 116 116 117 117 --.-.... --................ ---------......... , ? " ( I r At (1$ $U. +4+'4#"4 $' ..... !4W4 4 ., "Q4Ioo; __ ................ ....... "'_ .. _.." .............._P7" __ ........-;: .. ,+F_ .. _____ ....----..-.-.- a. .eee.aity for COllb1ned Trdnllle of Shol'tl 117 Ba.ed Aircraft and rleet Un1h. 10. Reee ity for Faat, Recon-naUaance Land Plane. for Dn'eloping and Track1nl Contacta 118 11. T.-ain1n, Value of Early Action in War 119 U. A Strike i. Esr.entia1 1n Air Strlkoe 119 IS. Iaportance of superior Technology Deaonutrated 106 Changing Areas During FUe11ng lfO 16. Tecbno1011cal Device. lU.t be Fully Exploited 120 16. M.eelelt, for Tlaely and Effective Recog-n! tiOD 121 I 17. Rap1ae .. ent of Pilote and Planee 121 15. LOiletiel 1"" ...... 19. CryptographIc 122 1 I 20. Anti-alrcratt Formations 12S 21. 'Clalal ot o..a,a Intl1ctQd b,y Aircraft 106 OaIbat Appra1.al, carrier Taak Pore. Caamuderc: R .. r AdIIIlr&l 'fadaichi Hara, I.J .1. 125-1:28 Japan.,. Task I F0110W8 Coahut Apprbisal Organisatlon of !aak roree Seventaen - AppElndlx II , &1mm817 CJf ,Japanese D6IIIage) ) Follows Appendix II SWaaar,y of Alliod Damage ) -VI-'". . .. ..- . .;.;,." ., ._--., __ ___ -""""-;4"'''''''.'''';-'''', -- .... '" _., -.---Plate I Croll section oJ.' the 1100 ( -11), May Follows Plat. l! erolil seotl.)n of the AtAAoaphere, !.lOO( -11), 7 Nuy Follows Plate III Cros. Seotion of the 1100(-11), 8 May FolloW8 ?lute IV Schematio Diagram! of Attack 0" 8 May. Foltows P.SS. ?luta V Plot of YORJ(TO"'N'e RadRr ContBcte, 8 May 191:-':, FOl\.ow3 Plata VI Cha.rt from 11lS-1l:2.J, a Muy. Follows P.:37. Pluta VII Task Forct! 17 Tr(&ck Chart frOID FOll.ow8 P.98. Dlagrll/ll A Action Area, May 4-0, SMck of book. 8-1 Allied Air Search Areae. &ck or bocik. B-2 Baslc Air Search Plan. Dlagr.m C Battle of the CORAL April 1942 to S MUY D1RgrkID D Batt.1o of the CORAL tiEA, lI_y \1942 to 2400, 4 May 1942. Diagram E Diugrlllll F Diagram G Battle or the CORAL SEA, 4 lay to 2400, 6 lay 1942. Battlo of the CORAL SEA, 240l), 6 Illy to 2400, 7 May 194k. Battle of the CORAL SEA 7 1942 to 2400 11 lay SMcle of book. B .. ck of book. Back bf book. Back of book. Back of book. Back of book .. . .... -VII--I 1 J 1 j 1 1 I t 1. This analY.i. of the of the Coral Sea ... prepar.d by the Naval "ar College. It 18 bued on information, trca both Allied and Japane .. "auree., which i. wider, mora complete mel more up to date than that to of a1milar material puhllahed during the war. 2. All information from all .OurC8S wAS not avail.ble to the NAval Jar Collflge. For that rea Bon, oe,,' facts and oircwlltance& mo.)' come t.o l1r.ht, from time t.o tim. whlch !Day change &Jome of the analys produced herein. S. Th. Battl. of thIS Cord :;ea Wflt> th" fil'8t real war teet of the tlLcticd fOl"lllation. of the Fleet as w .. ll 8.8 the tactted ability of tha principal Comrrumders. The pages of hhtory halve invllr,t,ably re-vealed defer.h and it would have beCin nothing ahort of mirllculou15 hnd such d.fecte not beon in thie actIon. 4. As a result of battle leaeons learned, and as quickly applied, the abUi ty of the Navy to conduct warf.re Shadily improved. h t1nle went on, the lesson 110 often forgotten, thut the teat of battle h only test "hich proves the combat ubility of W8S relearned. The ability or the lack of ability of tha vlU'ious in the art. of war became apparent.. V"lor alone was shown to be insufficiwt, for valor ia not an attribute of only one race but is an attribute end a heritage of many racas. The indi.penl&ble for was to be the ability in combat to apply the scifnce of war to active !Dilittiry situations. 5. The pl'811f1nt Benior officers of the Nllvy are well aware of til .. reaeone tor changee in eetablished doctrines and in the development' of new onel5. But this CMlUlot nf'cesBurlly be aaid of the COIIlIIIunders of the futura, who very prob8.bl)' Wlll be inexporiencad in COIDII\&nd in war. 6. all ca.menta and critici8IDs are designed to be constructive. 17 indicating what appear to he Bound and unsound dec1elontl, and the ap-parent rea.one for arriving at th .. , it i. hoped to provoke earnest thought .. ong prospective ca.manders and thus to improve profeSSional jud.ent in coaaand. -VIII-.. ...... ' . " I __ ... ; _-...= ___ m- ___ - SIiIoI' ..... ____ ,_, __ ____ ....-.IIh. earl1 dq. ot th. War .. a due to the la." lUI. ot h.r 0_ aircratt both laDd and .hlp ba.ed 1a _ph1bloul operat1ODI aDd in air oOYer, and bc.bln, op.raUOIl.. It will be Ihom later that the A1l1ed layal forc.. in the Coral Sea rel1G4 pr1aarl17 on I.ra7 . md baaed airoraft tor th.... .... operation.. AI a r.lUlt, err 17 appear. to haY. bad 11ttle intoraatlon al to ttte nature ot the air operation. ba.1n, oonducted b1 tb. Artq. III yl or the aulpecwd prelenoe of an .nta)'" ,trikinl toroe, the tollbw1nC a lcaaent ot alroratt, ., ot 26 Apr11. WI adel 4.th IIOTOYAIIA YOI[OSUIA Ba,. TAIIAI AIR QROtlP 611' Grp. Air Qrp. Air Qrp. TJpe as Ship-board Z.ro Ship- Typ. 1 TJpe 97 ti,hter. board Land itt. Land Att. Fqu, (Claud. 1.) t1,hters Plan .. PUn boat' (ZO. 11) (Batt7 11) (NELL 11) (IUVIS 11) VunulD.au 8 1. 11 (Rabaul) bbaul 2 a bbaul 14. IA.. 24. "8 ar IT 28 "14 Th xact 41epoalt1on ot th ... lud ba.ed aircratt on the int.r-Tan1nC bet ... the 25th, ot Apr1l and the 4.th ot 18 Dot oerta1D, lNt it 11 mom tba\. OIl th 0miD, ot th. 4.th of the YOI[OSUU AIR GROUP ft. ba.tJd with at leut 12 tl71na boat, at LAZ. Atter rec.1y1n, word ot the attaok on taLAQI th... t171n, boata .. re dlepatched on I.arohe. to the .alt-.. rd upon th. ca.plet1OD, ot wb1oh. the)" return.d to SHOR'fW[) ISLAlD.* Thl., ... 1dent17, .eant a chanee or operating ba .. and WI. a .ouod chana' 10 yie. at the Deed tor arch in the area. .outh ot TULAGI. Th. ne.d tor a chan,. in relatl poa1tlOD to the reconna1.aance ObJ.ctiy. ft. apparoot to the J.pan.... r, OD tor ,010& tir.t to SHORT-LAID bland sad lator to both SHORTLAND Ialand and TULAGI becau TULAGI *War DiU"J ot 25th Ur Flot1lla, 1 April to 11 -&7 1& .... 2. WOO 181125. b- .t - '. * I r i I I i I i .t f f ... not .ar. on the 4th, ill new ot tb .llUed attaok, and freedo. ot aotion ... obtained at SHORTLAND liland. SOM ... ldenc. teDd. to .how that all ot the.e aplane:J operated troa SHORTLAHD laland tor tollowiDI ... k, but th1. appear. to b. 1D error, a. 1. 1Dd1oated by th. tollowina aesian-.nt ot alrcratt a, 01 t61IA1,uB itb 12t12tDA. JOI1lstlK.ua AIR GRP. IUlm. I!!.!. TJp. Zero T)'pe a8 T1Pe 1 'l)'pe 98 'I'Jpe 91 Shipboard Shipboard Attack Land Ut. rlT1DC rilhter tlehter Plane PbDe Boat (ZIjU 11) (WW2LW (IITTI1U CULL 11) (MAVIS ll) Rabaul 12 , 11 24 S La. 8 Sb"rtland S MAli 8-la -17 U- 12 , The a 1puaent ot 8 MAVIS to TULAQI ... 10110al 1 aa8lUcb a. th1a per-.1tted arch .. or th. y1tal ar.a. to a rad1u. ot (0)-860 .11e. to the louthw.rd ot that ba... Thll a .. t p.ralttec1 an ad."uat. dailJ 'e&rob ot two 15 ctor. and, probabl,y, !Dolud.d the ar.a b.t .. en 11a1 t1Ac bear-iDI' leso and 185 fro. TUUOI. OD. bVIS r.port.dq operatlq out of' RtJS-S!J..L I.land .. I abot down b7 a IORlTOII co.bat air patrol at 0810 OD 5 Iq 1a Lat. 14-65 a, LoDe. UD-01 1.** Another .. eneaeed and d .... ec:t 10 Lat. 150-52' a and LoDe. 181.0-25' I. at 1045 OIl 10 Iq b7 11-P-2 011 troa .OUIJA.... Th two aotloD' took plac. b.t ... D tb. tt.1tlDc be&r1DC' iIldlcated &boy. aod t_d furth.r to tabl1.h th. taot that tlT-1111 boat. wer. op.rat1q fro. th. TOUGI area OD aDt'. aft.r 5 1Iq. OD the other bud, 1 t i. poal1ble that ca. ot tb e plaD hay. been operat-iDe out ot SRORl'LUD, a. th. aboYe aoUoo took pl.ce YW7 el0'. to th. s)() .11e radiu. rra. that b ... S!vob An .. Search ar... "re .8tabl1abad CD 1 April A. tollo ... *War M&rJ ot 21th Air notlU&, 1 April to 11 1M2, WOO 111125. "AeUOD report USB IORI'l'O., Serial OM, IIa7 11, 1M2 ....w.r DlaJ"7 usa TdOID (A'S) 10 IIq 1M2 ___ .... _____________ __ t_rl ____ __ _ 1 1 r .0 " r I ,;wspe 4 A4 n 4+ ..... , t I . ....... ., Lillitillg No. ot hit Point geadna. Q.1atsce tJ,rora..". P WAUL 450_750 111188 2 '" RABAUL 760_1050 8JO mileo 2 R RABAUL 186_1660 fl)O milol 2 t LA! lSOo_l8)o 800 lIilea 2 Z 1.A! 18)0-19QO X> aiha 2 Shortly afterward, 3nd prior to the 26th of April, an additional pat-rol area oalbd the KOO .ector ... a. indioated belowr Lia1t1ng No. ot 6ea D .. e B,arW. gi&hnoe KOO RABAUL 1700_2100 650 milu S .. The disposition of forces bet.een 1 April and 4 May ahow. nothing but fighter. ba.ed at tAl, and other evidenoe tends to indioate that no other planes were ba.ed at that field at that time. The SALAMAUA field waa too tor heavy aircraft... It is theretore reaaonuble to assume that the aearchea from LA! wer. by MAVIS flyln boat.. Ina .. uch a. theae flying boMt. ..re not operating from LA! during the Coral Sea Operation .fter " May, it 13 considered that the aectors frOil this point ot origin .ere probably not .earoh.d Arter that The 100 .ector, however, co-vered a con.ld.rable portion ot .ector. Y and Z possibly have been to .vantualtty. Th. objective ot the earch.a was the protection of own foroes thru recoonaillance and thadowing to locate And trail any enaIIY foroes in the area.*** In vi ot th bov. obJ.ctiv, ,18 not considered that the8e aearoh- were the be.t that could h.ve been .Mde with the planea available .1 they could .carcely cover the area adequately, e.peciMlly in vie. of the weather at t1111 tlae. The J.pan .. e had &IIple planes and pilot., and, it thi reA had b.en given the atr.t.g10 laportanoe it merited, .dditional plan , it :,.o ry, cogld bav, b.en aupplbd. It will b. not.d tbat .. archea oov.r.d tlv. SO .. ctorl with two plaue. assigned for .aoh .ec-tor and on. 400 .eotor wi tb thr.. plan.. aseilDed. Th.r. 11 no tnfol'll-.tlon available on th. Coral S arob , but Japanete diaaru. tor *War Diary ot 26th Air not1l1a, 1 April to 11 lay 1942, WOO 181725. **05885 (Paciflc Raval An.ly.i. 01y11ioo Interrog.tion ot J'panese Ottio1al., R.v. Ro. 97. ***War Dlarr ot 25th Air Plot11l., 1 April to 11 May 1942, woe 161725. -10- __ r -...... It 1 I IUL I I i f - .' .. ...... oth.r &rl4, indioat. that tb. plan usually out and, art.r aar!nl alon, the arc to cuv.r tb. radlu. ot vi.lbility, r.turn.d dlr.ot17 to the ba... 10 radar 'q!l1P1.pt .a. 1A.t.Ul,d .LA ,zaRM'" pllAl' " iMp UI In addition to tb. land-ba d .iroraft and patrol plan tb. J.p-an ulI.d ... plan oouth, unit., oc::.po d ot ihor't ran,. r.ooana18.- incl. tlo.t bi-plano., .1tb.r tTP' Z.ro (PITtS) or typ. i6 (DAVIS) or both, whlch op.r.t.d trQl t.nd.r. or troa ahor. b.... b1 Under.. Tb unit. nre _pl01ed to .upent the DOl'IIal arob.. in u tl' .. tabl1.h .dvano.d ba tor provldln, .ir , .. rob ot an .r.a not otbar-wl ,.arch.d, and to provide air cov.r .urtao. toro... Th. Japan r.alis.d, 10 th1. conn.ot.\on , that tb. air oov.r provid.d b7 the .all carri.r SHORO tor the Mor b,7 Iova.lon 'oro. W8' not and a .. lin.d two .... plan. tenduI, tbe BIJIRIlA'" Mana and the KAIIUA"A MaN .lth tb.lr att.obed aircratt to th.t dut, to auc-.nt tb. SHOHO', .iroraft. Both ot the., tend.rs Wire .t DEBOlME on lay 8tb.* Tbo weath.r condltion. in thi. ar w.r. ,.n.r.lly ,ood axc.ptlD, when a cold front paa d ov.r it. A. Japan pr.ctlc .... , on blttine a bad n.th.r ar.a to r.tir. to ba , thl. n.turally l.,.ened the value ot the rche. and a.siat.d in aaking lt po ibl. tor Alli.d tore to strike without warninl. J'PID'" D.pl0Yment N.v.l Foro Th. str.t.gic d.plo,a.nt ot tb. J.pane fore at tb. tt.. of the Battle ot the CORAL S1" wal in fUrtherance ot the basic plan to sd b.se. farther louth tor prot.ctiv. purpos It will b ppar.nt tb.t thi. d.ploya.nt consi.ted ot flv Ul,r.C. support.d by land ba d aircraft. t.nd.r b d aircraft and aub-mMrlnea, and that .. ch irouP toward8 its de8tination more or l.ss ind.p.ndently. Tber ere evidently two Icb.dul.d, on., a minor one and d.siined priaarlly to obtain baae for air r.connaissance, the capture or TOLAGI--the other, a aaJor one, the capture and occupation of PORT MORESBY by .ea. Thos8 ,roupa were .ovinl southward the oover ot land baa.d aircraft, as .ell ot patrol and tloat plan.s. Tbe Japanea. 8 doctrine appeiU'a to have b.eu to accOlllpl1sb all a.rial r.con., .. 1asance through medium bombera, flying boats (pGtrol plan ), rloat planes, and sbip-ba8ed aircraft not carrier ba d . Th.y seldo. ua.d their carrier planea tOl' s.arch but instead used the above planes, tthus leaving th.ir *OperatiQn MO and the Battle or the CORAL SEA. Combat Report No.1, South Seas Force, Occupation 'orce (Coabat Report Nc. 7, CruDiv 6) .. eriod 25 Apr. 1942 to 11 Ma;r 1942. -11---I j j 1 I I 1 r , oarrier baaed plan.. ..aUaDle to aake up a liaziau. .tr .... .t.r1k1ng torce, .1no. non. ot th. carri.r plan ne.d be u.ed tor .ooutiDI.* !bert .. re oooa.ioD., bo .... r. wben th. Japane tound urlent tor arob by oar-ri.r plan and th1 .... the oa durln, th. Battle ut th. Coral S.a. Tbll practio. ot u.1n, land ba .. d a.1rcratt to coyer tbe ar .. 1n whicb carri.r. ar. operat1o, 1. .ouod and 1a th. 10gioa1 a.thod to b ... pl01.d, .0 lon, a. it oon t1oue. to b. adequate and can be relied upon to turnhb th. lntor.ation required tor the .eouritr ot the toree. 1ovolved. In thls oa.e it ... not ad.quate eith'r .id., tor the Japane Str1k1nc Poroe and T' 17 .. r. eaoh able to reach their launohin, polition .. min The first operation wa. the oocupation of TULAGr. At th. tlme ot itl occupation on kar S--it bad been .vacuat.d b7 th. Au.tra11an. aD May 2--the deploya.nt ... a. indicated in Diacraa (C,. It will be noted thAt at tbe th. TULAGI Iova.lon Faroe had oocupild TULAGI, about 0820, MaJ 'S, other Japane.e foro movina aouLn were looated about al fo11owl fro. w.at to ea.t& (a) The PORr MORESSl Inva.loo Force waa at anchor 10 RABAUL, (b) The Caverins Force .... a over 150 aU .. to tbe we.tward ot TOLAO! and aouth of HEW CEORGIA Ialand, (c) The SUpport 'orce .aa in tbe aame area and wa. 60 al1ea we8t ot the Coverinl Force, (d) The TULAGI Force wal at TOLAGI, (e) Tbe Strlk1nC 'orce ... about 6&0 al1es north at or TULAGI and on a aoutheaaterly courae, and (t) The Subaarine Foroe location 1. Dot known exactl1. but all six torpedoed. Greek ahip oft HOUKE! OD 7 May.** The co.posltlon of tbeae force. 1. ahown in Appendix "I". It .hould be noted tbat whereaa the obJ.ctiTe of the TULAGI and PORT MORESBY Invaaion Force .... aol.1y capture and occupation". the objective at the other rorcea was protective". The Striking Force .aa a typioal bilbly mobUe car .. ier forc i tb two t!r.t line carriera, *Tactic a .. played by Japane Air Forc in attacks on Navkl and rchant Sbippinll Op-S5 A.I.D. AS Par 1 or AUI. 1945 **War 01&17 USB TANGIER (AV-B) 7 May 1942 -12-.. , ., i 1 .-the SHOIAKU and ZUIKAKU, and with a screen of two heavy cruisers, the MYOKO and HAGURO and sb. destroyers, the SHIGURE, YUGURF., ARIAlCE, SHlRAURO, USHIO, AKEBONO; the Covering Force was a force ot four heavy cruisers, the !OSk, KlNUGASA, ![AKO and PURUTAKA plus a SDall type carrier (CVL), the SHOHO, which is an ex-submarine tender and ex-oiler, and one the SAZANAUI; the Support Farce was a light. force of two light cruisers the TENRYU' and the TATSUDA with gunboat8, minesweepers and auxiliarles; the Submarine l"crce DS pr1maril a submlil'ine activity with six submarines, the RD-5:5, RO-54, I-22, 1-24, r-28, and I-29, with two tenders, the ISHIRO snd the HOYO-MARU. None of these shiae were equipped witb radar and one of the carriers were fitted with "homing" devi,!!!.. The tasks assigned these combatant forees by the Japanese were as their names (a> striking Force (1) To cover PORT MORESBY Invasion Force. (2) To destroy Allied Fleet (which might on the Icene) I (3) To destroy by air raiding operations on TOWNSVILLE, AUSTRALIA, and American planes and ships being 'delivered. there. (Actually, this task was left to the discretion of the Striking.Force Caa-maIlder) (b) Covering Force (Referred to by as PORT MORESBY PrinCipal Unit of Main Bod) (1) To cover operations of both TULAGI ard PORT MORESBY InVasion Forcea. (e) SUpport Force (1) To support SOUTH SEAS Units. (This both the TULAGI and PORT MORESBY (d) Submarine Force (l) To destroy enemy st:i.'1.king forces which come into the Co'!"&! Sea. (2) To destroy enemy shipping. (3) To reconnoiter* *Full Translation of the PORT MORESBY Operation, May 1942-V01. V, Doc. 18665 (WDI 56) . ! ,l ...... __ ". \ The Striking rorce was designed to meet the threat of the Allied ligbt carrier task forces from tbe south as well as land based aircraft from Aus-tralia. It will be remembereu that Allied carrier tf!sk forces, which had beretotore operated in the CORAL SEA, had, with one exception, consisted of one carrier In this one exception, two ot these carrier groups bad been employed in t.he attack on LAE and SALAllAUA. The Japanese appear to bave believed tbat this type ot a single carrier task torce would con-tinue to be _ployed by the Wies and that they would meet one group with the SARATOGA only. They; therefore, tOl"lled a carrier task force or two carriers, whicb was designed on the premise tbat the otfensive power of the two silllHar carriers i8 mUCll greater than that of one carrier engaged in a silllilar operation. The Covering Force was evidently designed to cover the landings at both TULAGI and PORT MORESBY with priority to the latter operations and to provide security for the PORT MORESBY Invasion Force. Although the SHORO was a 25 knot CVL, nevertheless, so long as she as part of the Covering Force, she restricted its freedom ot action, as the AOBA class were SS knot cNisers. However, sbe was very .vulnerable ano. was therefore.placed witb the Covering Force tor protection. She could pro-vide patrols, all' aearcbes for lilllited sectors, and ber planes could be ot conSiderable value, botb in defense ot the cruisers and t,ransports, and in support ot the at PORT MORESBY. Tb6 lone destroyer, wbich is believed tO'be a plane guard tor the SROHO, is considered entirely inadequate for screen. The fact that only one destroyer was provided tor these cruisers suggests tbat already the Japanese were finding that they did net bave sufficient forces adequately to support their many tasks. Later in the war, vessels not adequately were usually destroyed by Allied submarines. The assigned this group were inadequate against Allied forc .. believed to be in the area, unless used in concentration with carrier forces and land based air forces. Should this group not be employed with carrier forces or with land based air, it could be destroyed piecemeal by strong enemy raiding torces. Also, without a destroyer screen it was subject to sub.arine even thougb air cover thru an inner air patrol was provided. A study along this line by the Japanese would probaD17 have indicated to them the necessity for mutual support and concBntration, and the timing, at least, ot the arrival ot the various units in the Soutb Sea area might have been changed. This is especially so regarding the earlier arrival of tho Striking Force. As it was, fail-ure to do this adequately caused the 108s of the SROHO. The SUpport Force was designed to assist in escorting both the TULAGI and PORT MORESBY Invasion forces as well as to support landing operatioDs by guntire, aineaweeping and kindred activities for that type of operation, and appears to have b"en adequate tor the purpose, althouch the lack ot L,....-.........." '., .. I , i 1 .... ' .." ....... -............... _." deltroyer8 lert the foree vulnerable to 8Ubmarinel. The SUbmarine Force was pr1Jlaril1 a lublar1ne actlvit1 with neo8saary tenaera. The taske asslgned this torce were doubtful ot aocoaplisbaent except in a m08t ainor way, because 1 t 1s almost 1JIpossible tor six lub-marines adequatel1 to reconnolter a large area or to 80 cover an area al to insure the destruction or damage of striking forces which come into the area. Why the Japaneee did not use more submarine. to laplsment the relatively sketcbT air reconnai8sance, is not known. AI will be shown later, a submarine contact by a plane of TF 17 caused CTF 17 to consider himself discovered by" the enemy- Actually, no Jar-3Dese submarine reported TF 17. This would indicate that more submarines were required if the area was to be properly reconnoitered. The Striking Force was far distant trom TOLAGI on 5 It was tran8-porting 18 planes (Zero type) trom TRUK to RABAUL for the Tainan Air Group, knd has chosen the morning 01' that day to transter 9 01' th_. The reaain-ing 9 were transterred on the aorning of the 4th. The dotted lines show where these transters were made. The Striking Force a180 fueled on the morning 01' the 4th. Wh7 the Commander ot the Striking Force cho8e to tran-sfer bis planes at this time is not apparent. Copies of his orders state that the Striking Force was directed to directly support the South Seal Units, one of which was the TULAGI InVasion Force. AS the TULAGI operatlou was scheduled tor early morning 01' lIay 5rd, it appears that his location violated the factors of securit1 and concentration. Be was certainly not in position to cover the TULAGI Invaslon rorce fro. any direction except-ing from the north, which was the least probable direction, as enemy infor-mation showed that Allied 8urface and carrier force. were operating in the southern part of the CORAL SEA. It is possible that either Commander 4th Fleet or Commander Striking Force had decided that there would be no attack on TULAGI by Allied forces, and therefore the Striking Force 1I8.S being held baCk in the area north of TULAGI and beyond the reach of Allied planes, until the Port esby Invasion Force had left RABAUL. Then the Striking Force would head south and west at high speed to catch any Allied carrier force which might attempt to interfere with the PORT MORESBY attack. The Japanese apparently did not weigh very heavily the Allied capab-ility of attacking TULAGI. Instead, they appear to have decided that the Port Moresby Invasion Force would be to sole objective. Had they consid-ered the Allied capability of attacking their torces at TULAGI and had they positioned their forces to counter this action, th., a1ght have caught CTF 17 with reduced forces. The Covering Force evidently covered TULAGI from the west at a dist-ance of about 150 miles,because of its dual covering function and because .-101)5 --, ..... _ .. '_ .. -.0 .. '.1 '. i :I 1 r I ot the iaportanoe ot the PORT MORESBY operaUClI1. the Japanese appartlDt17 did not think that TULAGI w ... uttic1ent17 attractive to tbe Allied Coa-maader to warrant attack in torce, and theretore the CoyerlDl roroe re-aained at aucb a distance troa TULAGI aa would per.it it to .oye to the support ot TULAGI by air iulediately, and yet, at the a .. e tae would pemit it to retum to PORT MORESBY at L"l econOilical apaed and, in till. to oover the Port Moresby Invasion rorce. Aa a matter ot teot, the COY-ering rorce actually covered the TULAGI landing b.y .. pl071nc three (8) carrier tighterl and attack planes in that operation.* Tbia OoverlDi rorce would bave been ot little value against a talt carrier task group ot the tn>e _ployed by the Allied toroel, unless _ployed in coorclin-etion and concentration witb a Japanftse talt carrier talk torce or with land based air in strength. In this cODQection, it should be atrelsed that concentration at sea today not mean necessarily that ahipi ault be wIthin visual signal distanoe ot each other, although with radio ail-ence In this tactor is serious consideration. It doel mean, howc:" .. r, that they must be 80 disposed as to be able to coordinate their ettort with other friendly units in the most etrective .anDer. JAPANESE fWIl It rill bI.t noted trOID the chart or air searches that the Auatrall&!'1 land baled air searches covered the SolOilOD. Sea, the SolOllClll Islanda and limited portions ot the Coral Sea. Tbe searches acrocs the Solomon Islands reached their max1mua radius about 45 aile, beyond the eastern shores nt thoee islands. Tbe Japanese apparently knew that. So they sent the Strik-ing Force south on courses which carried it Just clear or these searches and clear ot the coast watchera. ThUS, unless discovered by a subaarine, this rorce would be an unknown torce ot great strength which would b: avail-able tor a ISUdden strike against any Allied torces which attempted to tnt.er-rere' with either the PORT MORESBY Operation or the TOLAGI Operation, although the latter operation ae_ important enousb. It la, ot course, a tact that 1t it i8 desired to bring an ena.y into a vulnerable pOSition, 1000ething be values, web as PORT 1I0RF..BBY, IIlUSt be threatened and he aust teel cOllpel1ed to e%pose himselt in order to protect it, or, lID opportunity must appear to be presented to the weaker adversary to inflict a relative1r greater 108s on the stronger than he expects to Burrer himselt. Such an opportunity would to have been presented by TULAGI. The Japanese thought that the Allied Caamander would be aware ot the movement ot the PORT MORESBY Invasion Force and send a torce into the Coral Sea to intercept it.** They planned that, ohould an Allied toree in-terfere , they would destroy it by a sin,'lle or double envelopa.nt or bOth. They estimated that this fore. would come into the Coral Se, oetween SAR *saOHO Action Report 17, of 16 dated lay 7, 1942, IDC #160465 KSuppl_ental Report-Truk-Baval &: Naval Air Field Te8111 IS, USSBS. I I t r t f I f I I I " t I' , CRI!TOBA1 I.l.nd .nd ESPIRITU SANTO I.l.nd ln dir.otioD and would th.n ... d w .. t to po.ition .outh ot PORT V.ORESPY. They to have overlooked the ll1portanoe ot TULACI to the Allied co_nd.r, 11' .... roh 1'1'011 ther' would .treot the A iUed tr.edoll ot .otion in the CORAL by reoonnoit.rins muoh tarther to the .outh. In thi timet. theyw.r. onoe ."in in .rror. In the tir.t pl.o. there w on. torOl. TF 17, iD the .outh.rn part ot the CORAL SEA .t the time ot -hi sti .. t., whioh o.rrier toroe had r.turn.d to the CORAL, SEA troll TONG1TABU on May 1 .ttu 7 d.Y"upke.p .nd provhlonlnl. It had proo.eded vi. oour.e .outh ot the NEW HEBRIDES. In the pl.o there WIl. .nother o.rrler toro.. TF 11. whioh had p d b.t.e.n BFATI .nd EROMlNGa or .bout SOO .il.. .outh ot wh8re .xploted by the J.pan.... aDd whiGh had be.n dlreoted to join TF 11 OIl "y 1. Their ti_tie that Allied toro would know ot the PORT MORESBY toro nd would ,.nd yor to .top it. to b. oorr.ot. Th.ir tl .. t. ot pOIition .... however, in '1'1'01' .nd o.u.ed the failure of the J.pane pl.n.. Had the the thoulht of' the Alli.d objeotive .Dd view.d it tra. the oon- ot podtiOD ..... ,.. and oppo.ed .nd tr."dolJl ot lotion, th.y would probahly .t the enemy ot trom the .outh where hi uoport .nd henoe hi',treedom ot .otion lay. r.ther th*n trom the e t where he r.adily be di.oovered by J.pan ir-or.tt .nd .ubmarine.. The)' lIIilht eXplot.d ,al.o that hi would be in Ire.t.1' .tr.nrtb than h.retofor. and UDd'1' tb. 00 .. 1' ot Alli.d l.nd-b d airor.ft. The oap.bility or .pproaoh tro. the t .hould b n oon-.ider.d but .hould be.n Ii l .... r i"port.noe than th.t troa the .outh. If,,"'98r. the J.pane "1" hopef\tl ot their tr.p. Th.y ... r. alwaY' thinkinS of' C.nn.e -- or oper.tioD with ... ktoro" in th. venter and or double enoirclement with foro on the enelllY'. w k tlank - They thi t LETT! r.uLF where thelr wavy wa. de.tro,.d pi.oeme.l, .nd th.y att.mpt.d it at the CORAL SEA. wh.re wl11 be .ho-D later, the .. aker toroe r.tu d to be h.ld. Th.y ott.n thoulht in tel''' ot laDlus the lIIIIa11 carrier SHOHO and the destroyer SAZANAUI, reversed course and headed southward for TULAGI. It would be of interest to know why Commander Covering Force divided h18 command into two such relatively weak groups. Neither group was effective. The first group bad no air cover except what could be provided by land and float planes; the group was especially weak when compared with an Allied carrier task force. This latter group ste&led south at high speed and endeavored to track the Allied task force wbich bad attacked TULAGI and which was believed to be about miles south of that place, but bad no success. It reached its former patrol area, some 20 to 30 .ildS otf the south coast of the NEW GEORGIA Islande, arriving there about 2400, May 4th. The SUpport Force, which was returning from the NEW GEORGIA Area, was, apparently, heaaed for rendezvous 40 mi188 northwest of VELLA LAVELLA wheh it received word of the attack on TULAGI. It did not take action against the Allied carrier forces which had attacked TULAGI thut day and continued on towards its rendezvous. At 2400, May 4th, it was about leo miles south-west or SHORTL.t.ND Island. *Co.bat Report Ho. 1, CruDiv 6, dat.ed 11 July 1942, WDC 118)997, -40-I r I '"/ ', ..", ....... . west of SHORTLAND liland .,. The TULAGI Inva.ion Force was dissolved at about 1200 4th and its units, not required at TOLAGI, were directed to Join other units gen-erally connected with the PORT MORESBY Operation. mIS" OF Tl 17. II!,,'[ 4th the action been co.pletod at May 4th, TF 17 plus the CHICAGO less the HAMMANN Bno the PERKINS continued to the south 1n retire-ment and headed for the M&y 5 rendezvous. The and the had left behind on "Search and Rescue" operktions. The PERlIIS eearched UDsuccesstul17 during the night for the crew of a lost torpedo plane and the HAMMANN recovered pilots frca the two fighters which h&d landed on GUAD-ALCANkt Island.* Thus was initiated b,y CTF 17, after the Battle of the Coral what appear to have been two of the first, if not the first, instances of Air Sea Rescue in the "estern Pacific of avbtors downed in with the Japaneee. Tbat such rescues were of unquestioned taportance more and more evident as the Pacific War progressed. Not only did they taprove the mOrLle of &irmtln, and t.hus their fighting qualities, but, also, they eaved for the Country trained aimeD scarcely replaceable. The Japanese, on the other hand, did not mate much effort to eave pilots. They estjmated the value of their original pilots, most of whoa had enjoyed long peacetime and combat training, and they did not feel that these pilots were particular17 iaportant to success. They sacrtflced protective features in aeroplane design in order to obtain better performance, and failed to establish Air-Sea Rescue on a very effective scele. Thus their origind pilots were gradually expended. However, at the time of the Coral Sea Japanese pilots, in a large part, were still original pilots and their coa-bat quality wae high. The aorcle of TF 17 was now n. a higher pitch than ever and the task force was convinced that it had destroyed a large part of t.he Japanese Navy. At about evening twilight, on.May 4th, CTF 17 Commander Cruisers to nominate two cruisers to go into SAVO Island lo clean up the cripples on the following dawn. Comm&nder Cruisers noainated the and ASTORIA. For some realSon, not as yet explained, the attack was cBller. off. This was a wise decision, the two cruisers would have been caught by the Japanese Striking Force, by the Japanese Covering Force bOd by Japanese land based eir power.** This incident is introduced here merely to indicate the extreme confidence which permeated the Allied Command anq to show how necessary it is for the commander to supervise the developing action with great care. Fort-unately, CTF 17 in apparently reestimating the Situation, arrived at the con-*Action Report, CTF 17, Serial 0782 dated day 27, 1942, Para. 12, p.4. *.Interrogation of Captain T.M. Shock, U.S.N.t former Commanding Officer, Naval War College, 1 October 1945. -41-: 7 * t n et _ , , . r 1 i J ,;; .,:-. \ f olu.lon that auoh an attaok ... unwi EVENTS TOLAO! AID 'HSIMA -,rom 24M \liy if to 21M Vay " The .. ather oondltiona on May 5th and 6th were bad in oertain ar.a. of the CORAL SEA. The oold front to the aouth ot GUADALCANAL had reaohed lta moet northerly politi on byway 4th and by May 5th had begun to DlOve 110wly .outhward, talc1ng on the oharaoteriltioe at a warm front. A. t .. lelDl-permenent p1"l9uure area louth of NF:ff CALEDONIA moved towarda the loutheast, the are. had oome more and more under the inf1uenoe ot the wind oiroulation to the on M*y 5th, the front from. pOlition aorol. RENNELL Island in a dir8otion towardl HrSIMA and east-eoutheaat toward. NFf The task foroe 1n the vioinity of l()o S. and E. enoountered tY!"li ,'al trade wi.nd weather wi th partly oloudy eklel I the base of t,he ournu lue ":,, "Is at 20(\() feet and tOPI at 7000 feet. Wlnda were s('utheasterJ.y, 1,"5 knot!!, and were quite eteady, both in dlreotion and vel ooi ty. The next day, May 6th, part of the front had moved to a pOlition I!Ibout 150 mi les south of HENNELl, Islllnd u a warll'l front; the remainder nad oon-tinued r"rthW8rll o. un NEW' GUINF..A and the NEW HEl!RIDES At 0816 on the mort.lng 01. May;', TF 17 whioh had retired throughout the night without inoident, rendelvoueed with TF 11 and TF 44 .t Latitude 150-00' S 150-,1:)' r. The IOC.lMANN had rejoined prior to this tiwme ..... -.2 dFe ..,..tr;cw;,rof:eae .... s-6 .......... ;;;: ...... - .. .. "-....:;. .:- : ,. :1 I , , I I \ _+-...1. r -'d 11 ; { I. i r I f I ! ! ! I i t f f r' Had thil been done, the tinal phaee of the Battle ot the CORAL SEA would, probably, have been on the 6th rather than on the 8th. Thi. re-port wa., a. u.ual, 1naoOUi'ate tor there were many more ships in 17 .,. than those repor ted by the plane, and ther e were 2 oarr ie rs. Suoh lnao-ouraoies in reporting of enemy foroel oannot but have an adver.e .freot upon any oommander, and may advereely atfeot hi. mental proo s .in the solution of his military problems. THE OFF MISIMA From 2400 },tillY 6th to 2400 May 7th On the mornlng of May 7th, TF 17 was in a oloudy area assooiated with the front whioh then extended northwest and just to north ot its po.ition. In the early morning were .trata-oumulus oloud. oovering 5/10 of the sky. By noon the Whole sky over the task foroe WI.. oovered with frontal alouds, oumulus, altostratus and oirrus. This sky did have sut.rlolent breaks in the olouds 80 that the task was er.-abled to launoh and plan;e without diffioulty. ViIi\'il1ty"A' 10 to 15 miles exoept in soattered rain squall. 1n the areB where it was red\;oed to leu th .. n mile. "'he ,,1nt! was eut to eutsouthea.t;, blowing at 12 to 22 knots fI.'ld Inorea81 '01": in to as muoh as SO knco'c;s in the shower areas.. The frontal area ended about mileB to the north ot TF 17. In this area to the north, the weather was fine, with unlimited oeiling and with in of 20 mile. and an ealterly wind of 7-15 mile. per hour. As TF 17 moved northwestward on the morning of May 7th. 17 ordered that air searohes be made in an eftort to looate the moet suitable objeot-ives for !lotion and to obtain poaitive or negative information regarding enemy of _hose movements no information had been reoeived sinoe the previous afternoon. At 0619, the YORK't'IJRN launohed 10 soouting planu (SBD) to searoh the seotor hetween 3250-0350 (T) to a distanoe of 25J miles. This embraoed most of the Arohipelago and the CORAL SEA to the north and oast of t.he LOUISIADE. Arohipelago. All of theae soouts oompleted their se.rohel .,.ith the eY-oeption opf the soout with the leotor med i.n 0670 (T'. This II o out returoed. after oovering about 165 mile., be. oau.e of bad weather. This ot returning, when bad weather wa. .as sound for early days of 1942, beoause none of th6 oarrier airoratt involved were equipped with or other advan-oed navigation.l devioe., the pilot. nothIng when in fog or lim-ilar1y den.e weather. 17 felt that all 3 enemy might be within .triking distanoe and he .tated afterwards that the searoh to the was not oompleted due to b.d weather.-Thus the retirement ot thi. plane denied CTF 17 the positive or negative intormati'ln that he was seeking alXl, necessarily, oontu.ed hie estimate. This .hows the etfeot of inoomplete searoheo, .nd streftses the neoessity .The B.ttle of the ciiRAt. m, Aerolol!:Y I)ffloe of Chier of Naval operations, April 1944. -53-1 J I , I " r .. t t t " .. _ ...... . tor a pilot to oarry out hi. loouting talk it it il humanly possible. Hil relponllbility to bi. balio plan i. exaotly the lame a. the ,.e.pon libility ot thl Captain ot a lurtaoe oombatant shi? to hi. basio plan. ften a pilot tinds his balio plan ohallenged he must then and there re-eltimate hi. balio .ituation as does the Captain ot a surtaoe oombatMnt Ihip. By 0626. May 7th. TF 17 was In T,atl":ucie 13.20'S., T,ongitude 154 21'E. CTF 17 here rle+.acherl T.G. the Group consisting ot the heavy crui.ers AUSTRALIA and CHICAGO, the light HOBART and the de.troyerl PERKINS and WALKE plus the FARRAGUT, all unde,. the oom mand ot Rear Admiral J.G. Craoe, R.N. He .ent thIs ,roup on ahead to at+.aok enemy tranlport. and orui.ers which were reported to be heading tor PORT MORESBY Tia JClfARD PASAAGE. CTF 17 Itated that he had detaohed this beoau.e he expeoted an ail' duel with enemy oarrier. presontly, and it wa. pOlaibl. that hia taek toroe would sutrer heavily. By detaohing thle group he hoped to have it tree trom damage and there tore able to drive baok the port More.by Foroe.-Fubl"e student. of this battle will. no doubt, view th1.a reasoning ot CTF 1, with great intere.t, a. he appear. to have minimized the Jap oapability of attacking the Supoort Group whioh wa. operating with out air cover. The Support Group was attaoked by the Japane.e, it wal a detinite menaoe to their planned operation: it was al.o attacked by three U.S. Army bombers because ot faulty reoognition. Fortunately, it e,o'ped wi thout damage. eTr 17, in addition, appe.rs to have minimiaed the etteot that detaohment ot the Support Group might have on hil anti-airor.tt detenle Perhaps he Was motivated, in this detachment of the Support Group by the thought that neither of the Auatrallan oruiaers had maneuvered with TF 17. The Support Group in no .ay aooomplilhed it. misaion. It retired mishap. It thereby was laved tor later aotion, but it wa. 10lt to the Battle ot the SEA tor whioh it wa. Ita detaohment appears to have two however. one was to oontu the a. to t.he !trenr.t.h looation ot the Forces --the other wai to oause the Japanese to exoend on 'this surfaoe foro. their land balod air power whioh might otherwise been direoted TF 17. Me.awhile, eTF 17 oontinued on to the northweltw.rd. At 0736 a YORK-TOWN acout reported 2 Japanese heavy cruiser. in Lat. 10.40' S., Long l5So. 15' E. on oourse 3100(T), .pe.d lZ Imot.. These .hips ohal'enged him by , flalbing light. At 0745 a YORKTOWN loout shot down a twin fleat single engine se&plane over MISIMA leland. ane hour .ncl twenty minutel late,. another YOPKTOWN soout shot down a similar .deplane in 110.35'S, Long. 1560-43 'E. All of these oonteots were at a oonsiderable d\stanoe from TF 17 and, they did diaclos. the faot that an Allied oerrier .Statement byCW-l':' to COIIIII\OOore R.W. Batis, U.S.N., Re.d of the Department ot Naval War College - October 1946 Comhat Report #7, CruDive, Period 25 Apr. 1942 to 11 May 1942, dated 17 1942, WDC # 160997 - p.S. -54- 'Sf., __ __ II. Crt "';; !:'z,ur.' tltr 'tMrr. *'t ott., "raw ..... ' ...... "! oeM :1, tntw .. J , [i I i ! I.,' was within roo milea, thq did not necessarily indicate its 10catiOD with any degree of accurMeT. At 0815 a YORKTOWN scout reported 2 CV and 4 CA in Lat. 100-OS' S., Long. 1520-27 E, 1400 (T), speed 18-20 knots. This contact appears to have been correct in longitude but somewhat orf in latitude. Preparations were iJDIlIediately atarted to launch attack groups from both carriers. CTF 17 apparently felt confident that these were boo of the three en.-y carrierb in the area and he was determined to destroy them as 600n as He, therefore, directed thnt a ca.-bined attack group be launched fro. both the LEXINGTON and 1Vhlle making the above pr.aparations an unide:ltifled radar contact .!1ppeared on the screen at 0633 on bearing 2950(T) distant 50 miles. An element of the combat air patrol was vectored out but failed to intercept the contact. At 0926, the LEXINGTON commenced her attack group. About one half hour later at 0944 the YORKTOWN commenced launching her attack group. When this order to launch planes was issued and raceived is not known. The LEXINGTON War Diary states that at 0915, CTG 17.5, Air Group Operation Order Number One was placed in effect with objective enemy carrier. If this order was the one initiating the launching of the air groups, then the launching was commenced within eleven lIlinuteG of its by the LEXINGTON and within twenty-ninem1nutes of its issuance by the YORKTOWN. Launching took place within 210 lIliles of the 0815 reported position of the enemy carriers, &Od by 10&0 both of the attack groups were well on their way to the targets. The LEXINGTON Attack Group conaisted of 15 VB of Bombing SLj.uadroD Two, each armed with one 500 pound bomb ano two 100 pound bombs; 10 VS of Scout-ing Squadron TWO, eacb armed with one 1000 pound bomb; 12 VT C'f Torpedo Squadron Two armed with torpedoes; and 10 VF of Fighter S4uadron Two. The LEXINGTON Air Group Commander accompanied his Air Group with 3 additional VSB, each of them apparently armed with bOlllbs. The YORKTOWN Attack Group consisted of 17 VS of Scouting S'iUadrOD Five; 8 VB of Bombin.g S4uadron Five; 10 VT of Torpedo Squadron Five; and 8 VF of Fightlng Squadron Forty-Two. In this latter Air Group, the VS and VB were each armed one 1000 pound bomb, the VT with torpedoes. The YORKTOWN Air Group Commander was not launched with his air group but in YORKTOWN as Fighter Director Officer. The YORKTOWN search groups returneJ aboard the YORKTOWN shortly after the Attack Groups had. been launched, and it was then discovered that; due to an improper arrangement of the pilots' code contact pad, the cont&ct re-port or 2 enemy carriers and 4 heavy cruisers in 100-03t S., Long. 1520-27' E. was in error. For, instead of these ships, what the pilot had actually seen, was 2 heavy cruisers and 2 destroyers. Thus the attack groups had been launched un a false mission. This indicates the necessity -55- 1 1 I I i j .. tor lneuriDC tbat all pl10ts are adequately trained, and exarcl.a tha proper precautioa8 in ca.municatlona, as well as ln combat technlque. Errora ot tb1a kind, which aq sas sllght at tha tima, aq force the Coamander into an unsound dacision. OTF 17 was now placed ln tbaposltion of having to de term ina whether his alr plan should be changed, or whather it should, instead, be carr led out. Se wa. in a sarioul position. No carriers bad been seen .od yet, it the ana1ye1s of the previous dq was correct, three of thaD were in the araa. No information is avallable as to hie reactions Ilt thh point. Poasibly the course of'action of recalling the planes auggest9d itself. However, ha had tbe moral courage to resist this pUggestion, tor it was apparent that he was in batter posltion to receiva an attack wi th his attack planes ill the air than ha wae with th_ on deck, and, basidee, were they not well on their .ay? Tbat this decision was wise ftS apparent, in viaw ot tha report received at tI'Olll OOlllSoWespac1 t.hat at 0748, an !ray B-17 had aichted, in Lat. 10o-M' 5., Long. 152"'-SS' E., 1 carrier, lS .iscellaneouu warships sud 10 trbnsports on course 2850 (T). The plot of this report indicated that it waD probablv tho same torce, or part ot the same torce that had been reported the although it appeared to be about S5 miles the southeast of the original contact. A study of the Japanese posit'ons at this time, as now available, shows that thb latter contact, as m.i.de by the Army ,wa" actually made on the Port loresby Invasion Force anct that the carrier reported was not in company with this force but was, instead, about 25 miles to the northeast. The carrier had not yet been located and was not located until about 1055 whan the LEXINGTON Attac-K Group, which was in the van, u.de contact with the en8a1' north of IIISiliA and r.oted 1 CV, 2 or IS CA'. and 1 or 2 DD'e in the force aigbted.* At 1021, err 17 receiVed a dispatch from the NEOSHO, repeated sever--al t1.llas, atating that Ihe .as being bOllbed by three aircraft in Lat. lSO-SO'S., Long. 15&0-08' E. She ha!! previously reported lighting a&l17 planes in tbis aUle poai tion at v9SO. C'1'F 17 stated later that he did not know what type ot aircraft had attacked the NEOSHO and that it would hllLv. been extr_ely valuable infOl"llation to have mown tha\ thay were carrier planes. A study of locations and dbtances involved would indicate that the place where the NEOSHO and SIllS were bombed was, apparent.17, beyond the range of land based boabar. traa RABAUL and, tharefore, the planes were ao't probably carriar planee. At 1100 a Hction or the y.' ._,WN coabat air patrol .hot down a nw-AHASHI tlJing boat about 15 'f' .. 'om the task force. This plane had been picked up by radar at 1044 bdEU 1, J 0450 dietance 41 .11es closing. When first sighted the Japanese was st ... bg into the wind at about 20 knots, but, as the attack approached, it commenced a&neuver-inl. Tbe first attack waa apparently i48de by the LEXINGTON Air Group COII-'*Report of action, Scouting Squadron Two, CORAL SEA, 181' 7, 1942. -56- ... ___ __ __ M ____ __ ( , i, l ! i [ r.,r t , t I mander with hi. two wing plane., for the SHOHO reported that the fir.t attaok wa. made by dive nllne. made Al-thoujl:h it wall the prantine in those dflys fer the Air r.roup Commander to lead attaoks, this praotioe " .. found to be unwi .. a. hh balio funotion i. the overall taotio.l of his group involving t.rg.t dee1gnation and ooordin.tion ot .ttaok. 1 he mRk the tir.t attaok, he ally violate" thtlt re.ponsibility .nd expo .,. himself unno .... rlly to the hazard. ot .nti-airor.ft tire at olo.e range. This attaok group or ! div. bomber. was tol1owed at 1110 by the 10 VS of Soouting TWo whioh was not partioular1y etfeotivw, making, &t the moat, .everal near mi,.ea. After thh attaok had h,en oompleted, the SHOHO end.avored to launoh Idditiona1 fighters. anJ. apparently, suo-oeeded in 3. As she already had 3 in the air, this would ind-ioat. that her sole .ir defense oonsisted, at the most, of 6 fighter During the time that the SHOHO 1aunohing the above .dditional 3 p1.n.s, .he was he.vily .tt.oked by the reme,ining .tt.ok squ.drons 'ot the LEXINGTON .nd by the .tt.ok group from the YORKTOWN, foroing her to 0 1.unohing and to take eva.ive aotion. Thi. attaok oovered the period be-tween 1120 .nd and , fairly oontinuou., so that the hit. m.de by anyone ,quadron oannot be detennined . The SHOBO reported that ,he bad been hU by 2 bomb. at.ll20 whioh die.bled her .tter flight deok elevator, and about the me time reoeived a torpedo hit on her .tarboard quarter, whioh oaused her to lose he.dw.y The ord.r of .ttaok .ppean to h.ve been .bout a. tollow.: between' 1111 and 1122. both remaining LEXINGTON squ.dron.; 1125 to 1130, YORKTarN Air Group. Squadron TWo .nd Torpedo Squ.dron TWo attaoked in a ooordinated attaok .nd reported that, as they oommenoed their they noted no .Tinenoe nf fire on the SHORO and thkt the o.rrier wa. oirolin, .t high apeed. Bombing Squadron TWo reported hitting the SHORO at 1120, with 1000 paund bomb. and thi. oheok. with the SHOHO'. report._ The torpedo pl.ne r. greatly helped by the bombing .ttaok and .. r bl_ to gain an po.ition bator. dropping their torpedoe Thi. squadron reported that it, torpedoes .. re dropped between 1119 and 1122 .nd made num.rou. hit,. rbi. that olo.e ooordination exi.ted between Squadron two and Torpedo Squadron TWo. Thft .uoo ot these two .qu.dron. plainly .howe the great 'Value or ooordinflted ,attaob. Th. YORKTOWN Air Group app.rently onmmenoed it ttaok .rter the in-itial attaok by soouting Squadron TWo had been oompleted, and at about the .ame time or .hortly atter the other quad ron. ot the LEXINGTON Air Group had oommenoed their attaok. Soouting Squadron it. fir.t ;W.r Diary of thi SHOHO, IDe 10. 160486, Group 26, fte. 26J, p.i. ... r.S.r" . W .. ! .... __ rtr" __ ___ ______ """", , \'''.', .-, ........... . boab at 1126 and wal,followed ver,y In the attack by BoabtDa Squadron Plve and Torpedo rive. AI the carrier wa6 apparently almolt dead in the water with her fore and aft axi. into the wind, the YORKTOWN pilot. were presented a very favorable target ,ituation. The Iquadrons undoubtedly made -&D7 hitl but claimed mucb more BUCO I than tb. Japan e admit. (a) LE.UNGTON Soouting lad ron Two Bombing Squadron Two Torpedo Squadron Two (b) YORKTOWN Scouting Squadron,Five Bombing Squadron Five Torpedo Squadron Five Total bombing bits claimed Total torpedo bits claimed Damage Inflioted Hits Hits claimed on carrier 2 6 9 claimed on carrier 9 6 10 22 19 , Tho Japanese admitted lS bomb hits and 7 torpedo hits. This shows the great difficulty in e$timating hits on a target being hit by many bombs and torpedoes at the same time. Suffice it to say, that at 1135 theSHOHO sunk.* Scouting Squadron Two claimed one bomb hit with a one hundred pound bomb on a cruiser and Bombing Squadron Five claimed one hit or near miss ',dth a 1000 'pound on a similar type vessel. The target in eacb case was claimed to bave lunk shortly afterward. Japanese rscords, bowever, ahow the SHaHOto bave been the only sbip damaged or sunk in this action. Tbe combined air groups claimed tbat during tbe course of this attack they shot down 9 enemy fight and 2 enemy scout bombers. One additional twin float seaplane was shot down near MISIMA Island while en route to the Target. The SHOHO records indicate,however, that at the height of the at-tHC'C ahe had only 6 fighters in the air, and the t>ilots of three or the:d planes were later recovered at DEBOYNE Island, where they had made *i&r"Diary of the SHOHO, WDC #160465, Group 25, Item 25J, p.2 1 1 1 I r f l I l t I '\ I t t a foroed in the vioinity of one of their aplan. tenaer Airoraft losses s1J,t.a1,.,ed by 1'P' 17 in "hh flt.bok inoluded 1. "ut it cou ld have occurr .. ed in plot; in the mind or the LEXINGTON' 5 Captfl in; or evl'O in the mind of CTG 17.5, Commander A.1r. In any cuse, it indicLltes the importboce of report lng immedlr.tely to the Force Communder any new InformLtlon on en-emy contucts. Act-ubi1y, these plLlnes could not hu.vt been Iflndlng on a' car-rier, for the plot from infcrnwUon now available sh(wl:I t.hht t.he enemy cur-riers were, c..t the time, c..t leust, 95 mllt:s away. Th -y may, bowevCJr, have been clrcllng in order thut they lQight be p.,uided heme hy c!lrectiun f\nrier bearings from thf:ir During the eurly ufternoon CTF 17 hud decided tilL! . the enemy continue on towards POHT and would probuhly pass through JOMARD by morning. Although he had not located the two carriers additional to thr :;;HOHO to be in the area, he felt that at least ono of them woula accomrany the Port Moresby Force. Therefore he hud ue-cidf ,j to haad to the northwestward during the night to intercept t.nat force, th& dest.ruction of which, '''us his primary objectiv However, the conflicts with enemy plunes, sbove referred to, und the fact the LEXINGTON hud reported thut the enemy carriers were fairly caused him to hif.> decision. For he now was fllced with n sit-uation which chnll,nged his basic plan. What should he do? He cons:l.dered making a nilht attack against the enemy currier force, but decided .gainst an attack on the sound ground that the informution was too doubtful, (1nl1 besides, eome of it, espoclully that from the LEXINGTON, 1\'as now t.hree hours' old Rnd t.herefore would not indicute the enemy's poal tion very BC-curutely. He felt also thbt he could not spare a strong enough ralding force, for the Support was away, and the remaining ships were rel1ulred for the deftmse -,1' his commund. Ehould he detach them on a night search and attack, and should they not be able to rejoin by daylight, he feared that not only th.y,but also the LEXINGTON and YORKTO\\'N might have to cope with u Jlsastrous air uttuck next morning beraro rejoining could be .ffected.- Perhlps hI' regrett.ed now thut he had detached the Support Group. F.owever, it was well that he dec;:ided as he did, had such sn attack been luunc}",d it would have failed, I!S the enemy carriers were, 5.5 previously stated, 9S ruther than 30 miles away. o CTF 1" cont.inuedoon a Boutheabterly course, bond, I::.t 2400 was in Lat. 14 S., Long. 155 -56' E. ATTACK ON SUPPORT GROUP - May 7th TG Rupport Group, r.ontinued on to the westward at knots. At 0810 un enemy twin float monoplane was sighted by the CHICAGO, *eTF 17 Action Report-Battle of Coral Sea, 8er. OOlOh, dated 27 May 1942, para. 19, p.6 & 7. .!O' . : ' .. ' , ...... ..,. ... "J .-\..it -62- ____ _ .......... _' ... b .J1 i I I .. ----------.. . .,. _"'''N""AW " but it remained beyond gun range for ono-half hour at a diltanoe of ap-proximately 20,000 yardl. During the morning two additional oontaotl were made, both on Army noonnai .. anoe bomben. one of thuo oontaot .... at 0940, the other at 1136. At about 1300, appro:dmate1), 12 so-oaHed Jap ... ne .. oarrier baaed dive bomb.r. approaotwd th_ format.ton but retired .ithout attaoking. Wh.,re theu planll o_m. from il not but it il aSlumed that they .ere fighter, from RABAUL +.hat had beoome leparated from the bomberl and torpedo whioh they had been eaoorting. At 1345 radar indioated thab a group ot plant. was approaohing and wa. about 26 miles away. At 1357 thi. group wa',lighted and proved to be 10 enemy monoplane.. All ehins .that bore oDened fire but made no hit.. The retired at At 1416 radar indioated a of planel afiOO(T) di.tant 75 mil and, at 1426, another oontaQt wal made on a group of plane, be.ring 03()O(T) d1etant 46 mUe,. At about 1438, 12 twin eugine Japaneu airoraft made a torpedo attaok, approaohing from doad ah.ad. Tho Support Group opened fir. and, during the attaok, suooeeded in down 5 or the enemy planes. Thi. torpedo plane attaok was pu.hed well home. A number of the plan managed to get into t.h,. tormaUon llnd .trafed the variou. ships a. they paued. only 8 torp' ) traoks were observed I theu were apparently direoted, 3 against Al" J'RALIA, 1 .. gainst HORART and" a!':ainlt CHICAGO.. TWo torpedo planes were shot down 'before they dropper! their torpedoes and another two torpftdoos may have made erratio run. due to damage reoeived by the plsnes before they were released. Thi. 1s the I1mple.t ind ioation of the need for aool':-ate gunfire at lon,. ran.,;e again.t plane. of thi. type. Suoh must be de.troyed before they oan arri,. at the desired pOIJltiou Upon the oompletion of attaok. a group of 19 alti-tude bomber. appeared dead astern of the ta.k foroe, made their approaoh, and at 1440 from .uoh a high level (15000-20000 feet) that the A.A. bat-teries had no etfeot. All bombs missed. Th. of aim of these hori-zontal bomber. appear. to hllve been the AI'STRALU whioh was etraddled by bombs. two of whiah were oloee enough near mi,s a. to .hake... The pat-tern of thi. bomb attaok was about 500 yards in diameter '0 that it appearo to have a well ooordinated Imall pattern attaok. The faot that it misaed .a. unfortunate from the Japanese viewpoint. The Japanese made an effort in this attaok to ooordinate the torpedoes with the bombs, and suo-aeeded to the extent +'hat rell within +.wo minutftl after the tor-pedoes hed oUlled. The indivi