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The August 14, 2003 BlackoutOne Year Later:

Actions Taken in theUnited States and CanadaTo Reduce Blackout Risk

Report to the U.S.-CanadaPower System Outage Task Force

Natural Resources Canada

U.S. Department of Energy

August 13, 2004

The August 14, 2003 BlackoutOne Year Later:

Actions Taken in theUnited States and CanadaTo Reduce Blackout Risk

Report to the U.S.-CanadaPower System Outage Task Force

August 13, 2004

Natural Resources Canada

U.S. Department of Energy

Acknowledgments

As co-leads of the staff to the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, weare pleased to release this report, which has been prepared jointly by electricitystaff at the U.S. Department of Energy and Natural Resources Canada. Its authors,however, wish to acknowledge the support and cooperation provided by theircolleagues at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Federal EnergyRegulatory Commission, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, andthe North American Electric Reliability Council.

David H. Meyer Nawal KamelU.S. Department of Energy Natural Resources Canada

ii � The August 14th Blackout One Year Later: Actions Taken To Reduce Blackout Risk �

ContentsPage

Box

Key Accomplishments—and Major Challenges Still Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Figure

Major Actions Since August 14, 2003 to Reduce Blackout Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

� The August 14th Blackout One Year Later: Actions Taken To Reduce Blackout Risk � iii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Institutional changes to strengthen North America’s reliability infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Actions to clarify existing reliability standards and develop new standards where needed . . . . . . . . . . 4

3. Actions to improve monitoring and ensure compliance with reliability standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4. Remedial actions to correct the direct causes of the August 14, 2003 blackout (by June 30, 2004). . . . . . 5

5. Actions to improve operator training and certification requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

6. Actions to improve operators’ real-time tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

7. Actions to strengthen practices for voltage management and provision of reactive power . . . . . . . . . . . 6

8. Actions to improve system protection plans and practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

9. Actions to strengthen the physical and cyber security of the bulk power systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

10. Actions to improve the response of the Canadian nuclear power sector to eventsinvolving the loss of off-site power supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The August 14, 2003 Blackout One Year Later:Actions Taken in the United States and Canada

To Reduce Blackout Risk

Introduction

On August 14, 2003, the largest power blackout inNorth American history affected eight U.S. Statesand the Province of Ontario, leaving up to 50 mil-lion people with no electricity. On August 20, theleaders of the United States and Canada estab-lished the U.S.-Canada Power System OutageTask Force and gave it a two-part mandate: (1) toidentify the causes of the power outage, and (2) tomake recommendations to reduce the possibilityand scope of future outages. The Final Report ofthe Task Force, released on April 5, 2004, pre-sented 46 recommendations for action.

Shortly after the formation of the Task Force, ateam of electricity experts from government agen-cies in the United States and Canada, from theNorth American Electric Reliability Council(NERC), and from the electricity industry wascreated to aid in investigating the causes of theblackout and developing the Task Force’s recom-mendations. Even before the Final Report wasissued, however, work was under way on severalfronts to address problem areas that had beenidentified in the investigation.

After the issuance of the Final Report in April2004, the mandate of the U.S.-Canada Power Sys-tem Outage Task Force was extended for a year,underscoring the two governments’ commitmentto ensuring that the recommendations would beimplemented. In the period since the release of thereport, government agencies, NERC, and the elec-tricity industry have continued to pursue a widearray of initiatives to reduce the risk of futureblackouts. Some actions have already been com-pleted. Other actions launched analyses or pro-cesses that will not be completed for severalmonths or, in some cases, even longer.

One effect of the complexity of North Americanbulk power systems is that in order for the suite ofactions undertaken over the past year to be

effective, those actions have had to be diverse butstill appropriately focused and well-coordinated.Overall, these requirements appear to have beenmet. Many of the actions, though worthwhile inthemselves, have acquired greater significancebecause they leverage and reinforce each other.An example is the synergistic relationshipbetween the restatement of reliability standards inclearer, more specific language and programs formonitoring compliance and gauging the readinessof organizations to meet their responsibilitiesunder challenging conditions.

The aggregate result of these actions has been toreduce significantly the risk of future black-outs—even though that risk can never be elimi-nated entirely. Further, despite these actions, theneed for the U.S. Congress to enact the reliabilityprovisions in pending legislative proposals (H.R. 6and S. 2095) has in no way diminished. It remainsessential to enact the legislation to establish thejurisdiction of the U.S. Federal Energy RegulatoryCommission (FERC) for reliability matters over allparticipants in the U.S. portions of the NorthAmerican bulk power systems, to provide a solidlegal foundation for the certification of an electricreliability organization (ERO) that will developtechnically sound reliability standards, and tomake compliance with such standards mandatoryand enforceable under U.S. law.

The actions taken over the past year fall under tenbroad headings:

� Institutional changes, many of them by govern-ment agencies, to strengthen the institutionalinfrastructure for maintaining electric reliabil-ity in North America.

� Actions to clarify existing standards anddevelop new standards where needed.

� Actions to improve monitoring and ensuringcompliance with reliability standards.

� Remedial actions to correct the direct causes ofthe August 14 blackout.

� The August 14th Blackout One Year Later: Actions Taken To Reduce Blackout Risk � 1

� Actions to improve operator training and certifi-cation requirements.

� Actions to improve operators’ real-time tools.

� Actions to strengthen practices for voltage man-agement and provision of reactive power.

� Actions to improve system protection plans andpractices.

� Actions to improve the physical and cyber secu-rity of the bulk power systems.

� Actions to improve the response of the Cana-dian nuclear power sector to events involvingloss of off-site power supplies.

The sections below present more detail on theactions taken under these headings. Actions thatrespond to or fulfill some of the 46 recommenda-tions in the Task Force’s Final Report are so noted.Some of the most significant actions are displayedin a graphic (Figure 1). It was not practical, how-ever, to incorporate all of the actions discussedbelow into the figure. In addition to the actionsdiscussed below, the Northeast Power Coordi-nating Council (NPCC) hosted workshops in NewYork City (April 28, 2004) and Toronto (July 7,2004) to discuss regional blackout issues andappropriate responses.

2 � The August 14th Blackout One Year Later: Actions Taken To Reduce Blackout Risk �

Key Accomplishments—and Major Challenges Still Ahead

Accomplishments

� As presented in the Task Force’s Final Report, the investigation team identified the direct causes ofthe August 14, 2003 blackout and recommended that FirstEnergy, MISO, ECAR, and PJM implementspecific remedial actions before June 30, 2004. NERC teams have independently verified that, withminor exceptions, these actions were completed by that date.

� NERC teams conducted 23 readiness audits at some of the largest utilities and other electricity organi-zations across the Eastern Interconnection to assess the capability of these entities to meet their reli-ability responsibilities, even under adverse circumstances.

� The Task Force held a workshop on May 14, 2004, hosted by FERC, with NERC and other interestedparties to develop a common understanding of the need to restate and clarify NERC’s existing reliabil-ity standards, and a process and timeframe for that effort.

� The United States and Canada established a Bilateral ERO Oversight Group to address institutionalissues concerning an international framework for reliability.

� Government agencies in the two countries and NERC have cooperated to track progress on actionsrelated to implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations.

� With few exceptions, individual grid operators in North America’s interconnected bulk power sys-tems received at least five days of emergency preparedness training before June 30, 2004.

� NERC extended the life of its existing Urgent Action Standard 1200 (which concerns the physical andcyber security of the bulk power systems) to August 2005. NERC has also worked with the industryon an aggressive plan to develop a successor version (Standard 1300) by that date.

Major Challenges Still Ahead

� Enactment of reliability legislation by the U.S. Congress.

� Completion of the revision of NERC’s existing standards.

� Certification of the ERO by government agencies and approval of its standards.

� Independent funding for NERC (or the ERO) and the regional councils.

� Reform of the roles, responsibilities, and boundaries of the regional councils.

� Enhancement of the overall security of the electricity sector.

1. Institutional changes to strengthenNorth America’s reliabilityinfrastructure

The actions under this heading are generally oftwo types: (1) Those taken by government agen-cies to enable them to address reliability mattersmore effectively, and (2) those taken by NERC tostrengthen and better focus its capacities andthose of the 10 regional reliability councils.

Government actions

� Agencies in the United States and Canada havecreated a standing Bilateral ERO OversightGroup, the function of which is to provide con-sistent, coordinated government guidance andinput to NERC and its regional reliability coun-cils. This group, or something functionally sim-ilar, will be needed indefinitely. On the U.S.side, the participating agencies are the FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission (FERC), theDepartment of Energy (DOE), the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS), and (as needed) the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).On the Canadian side, the participating agen-cies are Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), theNational Energy Board (NEB), Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), theCanadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC),and the provincial and territorial agenciesresponsible for electric regulatory matters. Thisaction fulfills Task Force Recommendation1-D.

� The Council of Energy Ministers in Canada hascreated a Federal-Provincial-Territorial Group(FPT Group), as a Canadian subset of the Bilat-eral Group. The FPT Group will coordinate thedevelopment of reliability-related policies andactions by Canadian federal and provincialagencies. This action, and subsequent actionsby the FPT Group, will fulfill Task Force Rec-ommendation 1-C.

� The Bilateral Group has designated a team towork in cooperation with the North AmericanElectric Reliability Council (NERC) to track and


Major Actions Since August 14, 2003 to Reduce Blackout Risk

report on the status of actions to implement the46 recommendations of the U.S.-Canada PowerSystem Outage Task Force. This action, andactions such as publication of this report, willfulfill Task Force Recommendation 5-A.

� The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-sion (FERC) created a new reliability division tohelp ensure the reliability of bulk power sup-plies and assist the Commission in consideringreliability impacts in its decisions. Staff fromthis division have participated in the 23 readi-ness audits conducted by NERC betweenmid-February and June 30, 2004. These actionspartially fulfill Task Force Recommendations9 and 18.

� In a policy statement of April 19, 2004, FERCreaffirmed its standing policy that the Commis-sion will approve applications to recover pru-dently incurred costs necessary to ensure bulkelectric system reliability. The same statementalso reaffirmed that the Commission will takereliability considerations into account beforeauthorizing a new independent system operator(ISO) or regional transmission organization(RTO) to become operational. This action ful-fills Task Force Recommendations 4 and 6.

NERC actions

� In June 2004 NERC launched a review of theroles, responsibilities, and boundaries of theregional reliability councils. The principalproduct of this review will be a report and rec-ommendation to the NERC Board for consider-ation and action at the Board’s mid-October2004 meeting. For additional details and docu-ments related to this review, see NERC’s website, http://www.nerc.com/~filez/roleofregions.html. This action, and subsequent delibera-tions and actions, will contribute to fulfillmentof Task Force Recommendation 3-C.

� NERC clarified the standards defining Reliabil-ity Coordinator and Control Area functions,responsibilities, capabilities, and authorities.The investigation of the August 14, 2003 black-out found that effective responses to the unfold-ing emergency were impeded by confusionamong some of the parties immediatelyinvolved about their respective roles andresponsibilities. NERC’s action will partiallyfulfill Task Force Recommendation 20.

2. Actions to clarify existing reliabilitystandards and develop new standardswhere needed

The Task Force Report found that NERC needed tomake its standards more specific and easier toenforce, that new standards were needed on somesubjects, and that NERC efforts to restate its stan-dards needed to be accelerated.

Government actions

� FERC commissioned a firm specializing in util-ity vegetation management, CN Utility Con-sulting, LLC, to analyze the transmission lineoutages related to vegetation managementinvolved in the August 14, 2003 blackout, ana-lyze the vegetation management practices ofthree Midwestern utilities, and identify bestpractices in vegetation management. Note:Inadequate tree-trimming near transmissionlines was a major cause of the August 14 black-out and previous blackouts in North America.For CN Utility Consulting’s report to FERC, goto FERC’s website at http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/uvm-final-report.pdf.

� On April 19, 2004, FERC issued an order requir-ing transmission owner to file reports with theCommission on their practices for managementof vegetation in transmission right-of-wayareas.

� In the policy statement FERC also issued onApril 19, 2004, the Commission affirmed thatNERC standards are minimum requirementsand that regional reliability councils have theoption of setting more stringent requirements.This action is part of FERC’s implementation ofTask Force Recommendation 1-B.

� U.S. and Canadian agencies sponsored a publicworkshop at FERC headquarters on May 14,2004, with NERC and other interested parties todevelop a common understanding of the need torestate and clarify NERC’s existing reliabilitystandards, and a process and timeframe for thateffort.

NERC actions

� NERC made post-blackout changes tostrengthen existing Policy 5 (Emergency Opera-tions), Policy 6 (Operations Planning), and Pol-icy 9 (Reliability Coordinator Procedures).


� NERC approved a plan to replace all of its exist-ing operating policies and planning standardsin February 2005 with a new version of its stan-dards that will include compliance metrics foreach standard. This action, when completed,will fulfill Task Force Recommendation 25.

� NERC initiated procedures to develop new stan-dards on three subjects:

� Vegetation management. When completed,this action will fulfill Task Force Recom-mendation 16.

� Calculation of transmission line ratings.When completed, this action will fulfill TaskForce Recommendation 27.

� Operator training and certification. Whencompleted, this action will contribute toimplementation of Task Force Recommen-dation 19.

3. Actions to improve monitoring andensure compliance with reliabilitystandards

Government actions

� FERC’s policy statement on April 19, 2004declared that adherence to reliability standardsis required under its Open Access TransmissionTariff. This action fulfills Task Force Recom-mendation 1-B.

� Canada’s Council of Energy Ministersinstructed the FPT Group to determine whatactions by provincial legislatures or regulatoryagencies are needed to make compliance withreliability standards mandatory and enforce-able in Canada. This action, and subsequentactions, will fulfill Task Force Recommenda-tion 3-C.

NERC actions

� In October 2003, before the Task Force hadissued its reports, NERC requested CEOs of allreliability coordinators and control areas to ini-tiate organizational self-assessments and certifythat their organizations were in compliancewith NERC and regional reliability council stan-dards and good utility practices. This requestfocused in particular on problem areas identi-fied in preliminary findings from the blackoutinvestigation.

� NERC strengthened its compliance audit pro-gram by requiring the regional reliability coun-cils to report significant violations of NERC orregional standards within 48 hours of occur-rence, and to provide quarterly reports on allviolations. Audit teams will conduct onsiteinvestigations if necessary to determinewhether a violation occurred and the circum-stances of the violation. This action partiallyfulfills Task Force Recommendations 17-A and17-B. (Note: “Compliance audits” are retrospec-tive, and focus on possible violations of stan-dards. “Readiness audits” are forward-looking,and focus on whether the parties are fully pre-pared to maintain reliability, under adverse cir-cumstances if necessary.)

� NERC created a readiness audit program, underwhich NERC teams (including some FERC staff)conducted 23 readiness audits [includingFirstEnergy, the Midwest Independent SystemOperator (MISO), and PJM Interconnection(PJM)] between mid-February and June 30.Twenty-five more audits will be completed byDecember 31. Final reports by readiness auditteams are posted for public review on NERC’sweb site. This action will fulfill Task ForceRecommendations 18-A and 18-B.

� NERC developed and approved guidelines forpublic disclosure of the results of readiness andcompliance audits, including the identities ofviolators of standards. This action supportsimplementation of Task Force Recommenda-tions 17 and 18.

4. Remedial actions to correct the directcauses of the August 14, 2003 blackout(by June 30, 2004)

Government action

� On December 24, 2003, FERC issued an order toFirstEnergy directing that firm to retain an inde-pendent expert to prepare a study of the ade-quacy of transmission and generation facilitiesin northeastern Ohio. FirstEnergy submitted thestudy to FERC on April 22, 2004, and affirmedthat the results of the study were being incorpo-rated into the company’s planning andoperations.


NERC actions

� In February 2004, before the Task Force pub-lished its Final Report, NERC issued very spe-cific directions to FirstEnergy, the MidwestIndependent System Operator (MISO), PJMInterconnection (PJM), and the East CentralArea Reliability Coordination Agreement(ECAR) concerning a series of remedial actionseach organization was to take in its respectivearea by June 30. The Task Force strongly sup-ported all of these actions in its Final Report ofApril 5.

� NERC reviewed and approved detailed compli-ance plans submitted by FirstEnergy, MISO,PJM, and ECAR showing how they wouldaccomplish the required actions by June 30.

� NERC provided on-site oversight and assistanceto the four organizations, and verified that allrequired actions were completed by June 30except for a longer-term review being con-ducted by ECAR as directed.

The above three actions, when fully completed,will fulfill Task Force Recommendation 15.

5. Actions to improve operator trainingand certification requirements

The Task Force’s Final Report found that inade-quate training of operators to recognize and copewith emergency conditions was a major cause ofthe August 14 blackout, and several previousblackouts. In recognition of this:

� NERC issued a new requirement for operatingentities to provide operators with five days ofemergency preparedness training by June 30and five days annually thereafter.

NERC and FERC are designing parallel but coordi-nated studies of operator training requirements,including reviews of training practices used inother industries (e.g., nuclear plant operations, airtraffic control, airline pilots) that require operatorsto be prepared to deal immediately and effectivelywith unusual or adverse conditions. The results ofthese studies will help to guide a revision of NERCrequirements concerning grid operator trainingand certification.

These actions, when completed, will partiallyfulfill Task Force Recommendation 19.

6. Actions to improve operators’real-time tools

The Task Force also found that in the August 14,2003 blackout and in several earlier blackouts inNorth America, there was a clear need forimproved real-time tools that would enable opera-tors across a broad regional area to view a commonscreen and discuss an evolving problem at an earlystage in its development. Major actions inresponse to this need are discussed below.

Government/industry action:

� Even before the August 14, 2003 blackout, DOEand industry experts were planning an effortcalled the Eastern Interconnection Phasor Pro-ject. This project will establish a network oftime-synchronized data recording instrumentsacross the Interconnection that will provideparticipants with common information andearly warnings of possible disturbances. Apilot-scale network involving 20 or so instru-ments will be activated and tested beginning inAugust 2004. Over a period of years the pro-ject’s sponsors expect the network to beexpanded geographically and to integrate datafrom as many as 350 instruments across theEastern Interconnection.

NERC actions:

� NERC is implementing a plan to provide opera-tors with hourly updates concerning unplannedequipment outages. On August 14, 2003,MISO’s operators were hampered in theirefforts to understand and deal with mountingproblems because some of their diagnostic toolswere using data that was no longer accurate.

� NERC has created a Real-time Tools Best Prac-tices Task Force (RTBPTF) to identify best prac-tices for building and maintaining real-timenetworks, and develop guidelines based onthese practices. This task force will present rec-ommendations in April 2005 for specific,auditable requirements for inclusion in newstandards concerning real-time tools foroperators.

When completed, these three actions will fulfillTask Force Recommendation 22.


7. Actions to strengthen practices forvoltage management and provision ofreactive power

The Task Force Final Report found that inade-quate preparations for voltage management andthe provision of reactive power were contributingfactors in the August 14, 2003 blackout and in ear-lier blackouts in North America. Relevant actionson this subject include:

� On February 10, 2004, the NERC Board requiredECAR to conduct an extensive evaluation of itsreactive power and voltage assessment prac-tices and requirements, and to report its find-ings and proposed changes to the Board by June30. ECAR complied with this directive.

� The Board also required the NERC PlanningCommittee to evaluate the effectiveness ofexisting reactive power and voltage controlstandards in all 10 NERC regions, and recom-mend improvements by February 2005.

These actions will partially fulfill Task ForceRecommendation 23.

8. Actions to improve system protectionplans and practices

The Task Force’s Final Report found that onAugust 14, 2003 the automatic activation of zone 3relays on transmission lines in northern Ohio andsouthern Michigan accelerated and broadened thespread of the blackout. It also found that there wasa need for broader reliance on pre-plannedunder-voltage load shedding programs in order tobe prepared for emergencies, and a need toimprove the coordination of relay protectiondevices and load shedding programs.

Relevant actions in this area include:

� NERC required all transmission owners to eval-uate zone 3 relays on lines 230 kV and higher tominimize tripping under inappropriate condi-tions. These evaluations are to be completed bySeptember 30, 2004, and needed changes are tobe completed by December 31, 2005.

� NERC required each regional reliability councilto investigate the benefits of Under-VoltageLoad Shedding in its respective area and reportits findings by February 1, 2005.

� By June 2005, a NERC System Protection andControl Task Force will review the regional

findings and propose recommendations con-cerning load shedding programs.

When completed, these actions will partially ful-fill Task Force Recommendation 21.

9. Actions to strengthen the physical andcyber security of the bulk powersystems

Although the Task Force found no evidence link-ing the August 14, 2003 blackout to maliciousacts, it identified a number of security-relatedmatters of concern in the electricity sector. TheU.S. DOE and DHS, Public Safety and EmergencyPreparedness Canada (PSEPC), NERC, and indus-try officials have collaborated over the past yearon a number of actions, including:

� DHS and NERC launched a Cyber Log Analysisproject in October 2003, designed to distin-guish, summarize, and prioritize threateningcyber activity directed against the electricpower infrastructure.

� In August 2004, with government and industrysupport, NERC approved a 1-year extension ofthe existing Urgent Action Standard 1200 untilAugust 2005. Cyber Security Standard 1300,which is now being developed, will thenreplace the existing standard.

� NERC is working with the industry to design aneducational program on physical and cybersecurity for industry personnel responsible forcorporate physical security, cyber security, sys-tem operations, and compliance with securitystandards.

� NERC, DHS and PSEPC are working to imple-ment procedures to reduce the risk of inadver-tent disclosure of sensitive criticalinfrastructure information.

� NERC, DHS, and PSEPC are preparing a bilat-eral (Canada-U.S.) study to develop ways tomitigate infrastructure vulnerabilities andupdate vulnerability assessment methodolo-gies. The objective of the study is to reduce therisks and vulnerabilities associated with ashared electricity infrastructure and cross-border interdependencies.

� DOE, in cooperation with NERC and DHS, isdeveloping the electricity-sector component ofthe U.S. National Infrastructure ProtectionPlan.


� NERC, in cooperation with DHS, DOE, andPSEPC, is expanding and refining plans for anElectricity Sector Information Sharing andAnalysis Center.

� In cooperation with DHS, DOE, PSEPC, andvendors, NERC is identifying ways to improvethe security of grid control systems and elec-tronic protection devices.

� NERC has worked with the industry to establisha data base to identify spare transformers avail-able for emergency situations. NERC is assess-ing the need to expand this data base to includeother critical equipment.

When completed, these actions will wholly orpartially fulfill Task Force Recommendations 32,36, 42, and 44.

10. Actions to improve the response ofthe Canadian nuclear power sector toevents involving the loss of off-sitepower supplies

The Task Force’s Final Report included two rec-ommendations pertaining to the Canadian nuclearpower sector.

� Recommendation 45 called on the CanadianNuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to reviewoperating procedures and operator trainingassociated with the use of adjuster rods, withthe objective of accelerating the restart ofnuclear units. The CNSC is responding to thisrecommendation as part of its ongoing workwith licensees to ensure safe operation of theirreactors.

� Recommendation 46 called on the CNSC to pur-chase and install backup generation equipmentat CNSC for use in emergency situations. Thiscapacity has been installed and will be opera-tional in mid-August 2004.


Acronyms

CNSC Canada Nuclear Safety Commission

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

ECAR East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement

EIPP Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project

ERO Electric Reliability Organization

FE FirstEnergy

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (U.S.)

FPT group Federal-Provincial-Territorial group (Canada)

ISO Independent System Operator

MISO Midwest Independent System Operator

NEB National Energy Board (Canada)

NERC North American Electric Reliability Council

NPCC Northeast Power Coordinating Council

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRCan Natural Resources Canada

PJM PJM Interconnection

PSEPC Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

RTO Regional Transmission Organization


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