the ‘third demographic transition’ and the...
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Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
Conference Nuremberg 10/11 May 2010..
The Demography of Migrants in Germany
The ‘third demographic transition’ and the consequences for Europe’s populations
D.A. Coleman
Oxford Centre for Population Research
University of Oxford
Topics
Western populations – into an unknown world.
The ‘third demographic transition’: useful concept,
or pretentious hubris?
Migration – its magnitude, trend and future.
Projections of migration impact on population.
Ethnic transition - an inevitable future?
Why does it matter, if at all?
The long-term impermanence of ethnicity.
European countries – more immigration altogether
than to the US.
Net immigation to EU-15, EU27, gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2008 and net inflow
to USA 2001-2008 (thousands). Sources: Eurostat, US Dept of Homeland Security.
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Net immigration to EU-15
Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)
Net immigration to EU27
Net immigration to USA
Foreign immigrants to the EU according to
geographical region of citizenship. Source: Eurostat 2008
Effect on population – old and new members of the EU.Source: Sobotka 2010
Natural increase, net migration and total population increase (per thousand) in the ‘new’ and ‘old’ member states of the European Union, 1985-2009
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Popula
tion c
hange, per th
ousand …
...
Natural increase, per 1000
Net migration, per 1000
Total population increase, per 1000
EU-15 (member states as of 2003)
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Popula
tion c
hange, per th
ousand …
...
Natural increase, per 1000
Net migration, per 1000 (estimated)
Total population increase, per 1000 (estimated)
EU-12 (new member states in 2004 and 2007)
Source: Eurostat 2010
Effect of projected level of migration upon
population sizes of selected countries, 2008 - 2050.(Source: Eurostat 2008)
Effects of projected levels of international migation on percent population
change, selected European countries 2008 - 2055. Source: Eurostat 2008
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
No
rway
UK
Sp
ain
Fra
nce
Net
her
lan
ds
Ital
y
Cze
ch
Rep
ub
lic
Hu
ng
ary
Ger
man
y
Per
cen
t ch
an
ge
20
08
- 2
05
5
With migration
Without migration
Comparison of net immigration with births and
natural increase, selected European countries. Selected Western European countries 2007
Comparisons of live births, net immigration and natural increasePopulation Live Natural Net Immigration
1st Jan08 births increase immigration as percent
of births
data in thousands percent
Spain 44475 488 107 702 144
Switzerland 7509 74 13 69 93
Italy 59131 563 -7 494 88
Norway 4681 58 17 40 68
Belgium 10585 121 20 62 52
Austria 8299 76 2 31 41
Greece 11172 110 2 41 37
Denmark 5447 64 8 20 32
UK 60817 771 195 175 23
France mét 61538 784 268 70 9
Germany 82315 683 -141 48 7
All in table 355968 3792 483 1752 46Source: Eurostat
Demographic and ethnic consequences.
Foreign-origin population (various definitions) selected countriespercent of total population
All foreign Western Non-Western
background background background year
Denmark 9.5 3.1 6.4 2009 Statistics Denmark 2009
Germany 18.7 7.7 11.3 2008 Statistisches Bundesamt 2010
Netherlands 19.6 8.8 10.8 2008 Garssen and de Coin 2009
Norway 10.6 3.8 6.8 2009 Brunborg pers comm 2010
Sweden 15.9 9.7 6.3 2002 Statistics Sweden 2003
Sweden 18.6 2009 Statistics Sweden 2009
England 15.2 3.5 11.7 2007 ONS 2009
Canada 13.4 2001 Belanger and Malenfant 2007
New Zealand 12.7 2001 Statistics New Zealand 2005
US 21.0 2010 US Census Bureau 2008
Note:
In Continental European projections, 'foreign background' populations comprise foreigners born abroad plus persons
born in the host country with one or two foreign-born parents. Third generation regarded as 'native' (i.e. Danish etc).
'Western background' refers to origins in European countries and English-speaking world overseas. 'Non-Western'
background refers to origins in developing world , or in low and medium Human Development Index countries.
UK: ethnic minorities. 'Western background' is 'Other White'. Germany: W/NW author's estimate.
Canada : data only for 'visible minorities' not including 'First Nations'.
New Zealand; 'European' and 'Maori' populations not counted as 'foreign origin'.
USA: White non-Hispanic, Black and Native American not counted as 'foreign origin'.
The paradigm. Projection of the US population by
race and Hispanic origin.
Projection of the US population by race and Hispanic origin, 2010--2050 (percent). Source: US Census Bureau 2008.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Asian non-Hispanic
More than one race non-Hispanic
Hispanic (all races)
Indigenous populations
Projected growth of populations of post-war
immigrant origin, selected countries 2000 – 2050.
Projected growth of population of immigrant origin 2000-2050, selected countries,
percent of total population. Red/brown - English speaking world. Green - European.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
per
cen
t
United States 2008-based
UK 2006-based projection with ethnic shift
Canada 2001-based
New Zealand 2005-based
UK 2006-based non-white only
Netherlands 2009-based
Norway 2009-based
Germany medium variant
Austria low immigration no naturalisation
Denmark 2009-based
UK population by major ethnic group 2006 –
2101 – a long range projection.Percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006 - 2101, including
inter-generational ethnic change from 'Other White' and 'Mixed' to 'White British'.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061 2066 2071 2076 2081 2086 2091 2096 2101 2106
British, Scottish, Irish
Non-white ethnic minorities
Other White
UK population projection 2051 by age, sex and ancestry:
British +Scottish+Irish , and post-war immigrant.Assumptions for total population as GAD Principal Projection 2008 (net migration 180K;
TFR 1.84)
UK population 2051 projection by age and origin (1000s).Assumptions for total population: migration, TFR as in GAD Principal Projection 2008.
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
Males British origin Males foreign originFemales British origin Females foreign origin
UK population by major ethnic group, ‘standard’ scenario
(net immigration 180,000 / year, convergent fertility) and
‘natural change’ scenario (zero migration), percent, 2006-
2056.Percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006 - 2056, standard
scenario and natural change scenario.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056
British, Scottish, Irish
British, Scottish, Irish natural change only
Non-white ethnic minorities
Non-white ethnic minorities natural change only
Other White
Other White natural change only
UK population 2006 – 2101: percent ‘White British
and Irish’ under various scenarios.UK population 2006-2101; percent White British and Irish under various scenarios
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
20
06
20
11
20
16
20
21
20
26
20
31
20
36
20
41
20
46
20
51
20
56
20
61
20
66
20
71
20
76
20
81
20
86
20
91
20
96
21
01
Standard scenario
Reduced migration
Balanced migration
Natural change
Ethnic mobility
Prospects for migration
More migration Less migration
• Chain migration, ‘cumulative causation’, arranged marriage.
• Growth of ‘human rights’ legislation, pressure group influence, EU.
• Population ageing, workforce shortages.
• Failure to reform labour market, retirement age, welfare.
• Continued third-world population growth, income differentials (especially Africa).
• Third world instability, unrest, asylum claiming.
• Global warming, forced climate migration.
• Persistent effects of economic crisis.
• Projected economic decline in Europe (e.g. Norway).
• Economic maturation in some sending countries (e.g Central Europe, India, Brazil).
• Demographic change in sending countries (population decline in Eastern Europe; population ageing and workforce shortages in China).
• Increase in voter hostility in receiving countries; policy changes towards restriction.
• Demographic recovery in West, workforce reforms.
Net migration can go down as well as up.
Germany 1954 – 2007. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
Migration to Germany 1954 - 2007, by citizenship.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
- 300 000
- 200 000
- 100 000
-
+ 100 000
+ 200 000
+ 300 000
+ 400 000
+ 500 000
+ 600 000
+ 700 000
+ 800 000
19
54
2)
19
56
2)
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Net migrationGermans including aussiedlerForeignersGermans without aussiedler net flow
Divergent trends
Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2008, thousands.
Source: Eurostat
-100.00
-50.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Denmark
Germany
France
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Switzerland
New immigration countries: Spain and Italy. Source: Eurostat
Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2008 (thousands). Source: Eurostat.
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
800.001
99
7
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Spain
Italy
Sweden – a relatively constant projection of migration: Immigration and
emigration 1960-2008 and forecast 2009-2060. Source: Statistics Sweden
Another (relatively) constant future migration
projection. Netherlands 2009 – 2050, thousands. Source: Garssen and van Coin 2009
‘Non-Western’ immigrants ‘Western’ immigrants.
Norway – a projected reversal of migration trends (1). Source; Statistics Norway 2009
Norway – a projected reversal of migration trends
(2). Source: Statistics Norway 2009.
Norway: Projected reduction in migration (3).Source: Statistics Norway 2009.
France 2005: Gross inflow by reason for
admission (percent) to show the importance of
family migration (39% of total).Table 1. France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) by group of nationalities according to reason
for admission (percent)
Group of countries All
Min
or
Stu
den
t
Wo
rker
Fam
ily
of
fore
ign
er
Fam
ily
of
Fre
nch
Vis
ito
r
Inac
tive
Ref
ug
ee
Oth
er
num
ber
% f
rom
eac
h
gro
up
of
cou
ntr
ies
All EEA 100 7.7 2.6 33.9 5.7 3.8 0.0 45.5 0.0 0.9 42876 20.7
Turkey, Switz’land 100 11.9 14.9 10.7 15.1 24.2 2.7 2.2 17.7 0.6 24404 11.8
Africa 100 8.2 16.7 1.4 16.8 41.1 3.9 5.3 4.5 2.0 95309 45.9
Asia 100 5.4 45.7 6.2 10.3 13.5 5.9 1.7 10.0 1.4 29274 14.1
Americas 100 6.3 39.8 8.7 8.6 20.1 12.0 1.5 2.2 0.8 14941 7.2
Other countries 100 4.7 27.6 17.5 12.5 13.0 15.5 2.1 6.2 1.1 756 0.4
Total Non-Europe 100 8.1 23.7 4.4 14.6 31.6 4.9 3.9 7.2 1.6 164685 79.3
Grand total 100 8.0 19.4 10.5 12.8 25.9 3.9 12.5 5.7 1.4 207561 100.0
Source: INED statistiques sur la flux d'immigration.
http://statistiques_flux_immigration.site.ined.fr/fr/admissions/
Controlling family migration – Denmark 1999 –
2005.
Net immigration to Denmark by broad category of purpose of entry. 1999 -
2005 (percent). Source: data from .Statistics Denmark
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asylum
Family reunion and formation
Labour
Education
Other and unknown
Netherlands 1995 - 2007 : trends in migration
after revision of family migration and asylum policyhttp://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2656-wm.htm
Controlling family migration: immigrant or resident origin of partners of Turks
marrying in the Netherlands, 2001-2008. Source: Statistics Netherlands.
http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2944-wm.htm
Netherlands population projections – some
successive revisions.Netherlands 2005- 2050. Successive projections, percent of population of foreign
orgin ('Western' and 'non-Western') and for 2003 without migration. Source: CBS.
10
15
20
25
30
35
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
percent foreign-origin 2003-based
percent foreign-origin 2004-based,
medium variant
percent foreign-origin 2009-based
percent foreign-origin with zero
migration, 2003-based
Denmark- successive population projections.
Denmark - percent of population of non-Danish origin ; four projections.
Source: Statistics Denmark 1997, 2002, 2004, 2009.
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2002-based 16 - 12k migration
1997 - based 13.2k migration
2004 based
2009-based
1997-based zero migration
Implications
Ethnic change sharpens focus on the pros and cons
of diversity. Does more mean better?Some arguments against Some arguments in favour
Undemocratic; no electoral sanction for ethnic transition (?)
Magnifies social divisions, confuses national identity.
Requires (unwelcome) revision of law, custom, history.
Transforms citizen equality into corporate state of group rights.
Erodes trust, solidarity regarding collective welfare.
Secular societies fear public influence of strong religious views.
Tension between tolerance and preservation of fundamental principles.
Freedom of speech curtailed. conflict of interest between generations.
May eventually displace ‘majority’ population.
More lively, outward-looking tolerant society.
Promotes intellectual and business innovation.
Necessary and desirable consequence of international competition for talent for economic growth.
Contradictory evidence on ‘trust’ and ‘solidarity’, short-term issue, related to poverty.
Positive experience in social and health care for older generation.
A necessary consequence of essential immigrant care of elderly, other vital social functions.
Potential conflicts of interests will weaken as integration proceeds.
Younger generations take diversity of their cohort for granted.
The faces of the future? People of
mixed origins.
Projection of UK ethnic minority populations, 2006 – 2056 (thousands).
‘Balanced’ migration scenario (75,000 net inflow ethnic minority, 75,000
net outflow ‘White British’.).
Projection of non-white ethnic minority populations, UK 2006-2056, balanced
migration. Some groups omitted for clarity.
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056
Mixed
Bangladeshi
Indian
Pakistani
Other Asian
African
Caribbean
Chinese
An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations.Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups
(percent).
UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic
group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
200
1
200
5
201
0
201
5
202
0
202
5
203
0
203
5
204
0
204
5
205
0
205
5
206
0
206
5
207
0
207
5
208
0
208
5
209
0
209
5
210
0
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
Probabilistic projection 2001-2100: Mixed populations as a
proportion of the total UK population.Source: Coleman and Scherbov 2005.
Uk,Mixed,Both Sexes
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2060
2065
2070
2075
2080
2085
2090
2095
2100
Year
Pro
po
rtio
n
Fracti les
S er gei 's Offi ce PI II, fil e: D:\I IASA2005\Minorities \resul ts\[ chart s_OK_2100_ok_new2_2_del.x ls] ,01-Mar -05 13:22
Long-term ethnic convergence? Data from
ethnic origin of mothers and infants, England and Wales 2001 census. Note: this analysis assumes zero relatedness in the first generation.
Conclusions
Migration paramount in demographic dynamics.
Divergent patterns; policy important.
Ethnic change already substantial, some irreversible.
Ethnic transition not inevitable, but likely (e.g. US).
Popular opposition forcing some policy changes –
e.g. marriage migration.
Mixed opinions on implications.
Inter-ethnic union may underwrite real long-term
change and integration.