TableofContents

FromthepagesofTheArtofWarTitlePageCopyrightPageSUNTZUTHEWORLDOFSUNTZUANDTHEARTOFWARIntroductionDedicationPREFACETHEARTOFWAR

SunTzuonTheArtofWarI.LAYINGPLANSII.WAGINGWARIII.ATTACKBYSTRATAGEMIV.TACTICALDISPOSITIONSV.ENERGYVI.WEAKPOINTSANDSTRONGVII.MANOEUVRINGVIII.VARIATIONOFTACTICSIX.THEARMYONTHEMARCHX.TERRAINXI.THENINESITUATIONSXII.THEATTACKBYFIREXIII.THEUSEOFSPIES

THEARTOFWAR

SunTzuonTheArtofWarI.LAYINGPLANSII.WAGINGWARIII.ATTACKBYSTRATAGEMIV.TACTICALDISPOSITIONSV.ENERGYVI.WEAKPOINTSANDSTRONGVII.MANOEUVRINGVIII.VARIATIONOFTACTICSIX.THEARMYONTHEMARCH

X.TERRAINXI.THENINESITUATIONSXII.THEATTACKBYFIREXIII.THEUSEOFSPIES

APPENDIX:THECOMMENTATORSFORFURTHERREADING

FromthepagesofTheArtofWar

“TheartofwarisofvitalimportancetotheState.Itisamatteroflifeanddeath,aroadeithertosafetyortoruin.Henceitisasubjectofinquirywhichcanonnoaccountbeneglected.”

(chapterI,paragraphs1-2)

“Allwarfareisbasedondeception.”

(chapterI,paragraph18)

“Thereisnoinstanceofacountryhavingbenefitedfromprolongedwarfare.”

(chapterII,paragraph6)

“Hencetofightandconquerinallyourbattlesisnotsupremeexcellence;supremeexcellence

consistsinbreakingtheenemy’sresistancewithoutfighting.”(chapterIII,paragraph2)

“Ifyouknowtheenemyandknowyourself,youneednotfeartheresultofahundredbattles.Ifyouknowyourselfbutnottheenemy,foreveryvictorygainedyouwillalsosufferadefeat.Ifyouknow

neithertheenemynoryourself,youwillsuccumbineverybattle.”(chapterIII,paragraph18)

“Wecannotenterintoalliancesuntilweareacquaintedwiththedesignsofourneighbours.”

(chapterVII,paragraph12)

“Rapidityistheessenceofwar.”

(chapterXI,paragraph19)

“Iftheenemyleavesadooropen,youmustrushin.”

(chapterXI,paragraph65)

“Besubtle!Besubtle!anduseyourspiesforeverykindofbusiness.”

(chapterXIII,paragraph18)

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SUNTZU

STRATEGY, ESPIONAGE, DECEPTION, military tactics—these are the themes elucidated in theancientChinesetextTheArtofWar,theindispensablehandbooktoasubjectthathasoccupiedkingsandgeneralsformillennia.Littleisknownaboutthehistoricalfigureofthebook’sauthor,SunTzu.The earliest accounts of his life were written hundreds of years after he died, and the survivinginformationiscloudedbylegend.ThoughttohavelivedinthefifthcenturyB.C.,atroughlythesametimeasConfucius,SunTzuwas

bornasSunWu—Sunwashisfamilyname,Wuhisgivenname,andTzuanhonorifictitle.Hisfamilywas part of a clan of experts on arms and fighting; in that era, clans and families “owned”information, just as in themedievalEuropean guilds fathers passed on specialized knowledge andtrainingtotheirsons.SunTzu’steachingsaremostlikelyacombinationofhisclan’sideasandhisown,aswellasconceptsassociatedwithearlyTaoism.Throughout ancient times, the political and social climate ofChinawas characterized by violent

upheaval, the rise and fall of great dynasties, and almost continuous military conflict. Sun Tzufollowedtheprofessionofhisclanand,onthebasisofhisgrowingreputation,enteredtheserviceofHoLu,kingofthestateofWu,asatravelingadviserforhire.Hismilitarystratagemsintriguedtheking, and Sun Tzu eventually became general of the king’s army. Employing psychology, deceit,strategic power, and diplomacy as the fundamental arts of combat, Sun Tzu defeated numerousopponentsandcreatedasystematictreatiseonwar.MilitaryhistoryoffersdramatictestimonyofSunTzu’swisdom—theadoptionofhismethodsby

theleadersofhistory’sgreatarmies,andthefailureofthosewhodisregardedthem.

THEWORLDOFSUNTZUANDTHEARTOFWAR

c.1700-c.1027B.C.TheShangDynastyis thefirstdocumentedChinesecivilization.Citiesarebuilt,andwritingandtechniquesofbronzemetallurgyaredeveloped.c.1027 The ChouDynasty begins. The golden age of Chinese philosophy, including theworks ofConfuciusandLaoTze, itwill lastuntil221B.C.Thefirstpartof theChouDynasty,knownas theWesternChouDynasty,willlastuntil772B.C.,whentheChineserulersareforcedeastbybarbariansfromthenorth;thekingiskilled,buthissonestablishesanewcapitalatLoyang.772 The Eastern Chou Dynasty begins; its first part, the Spring and Autumn period, is a time ofcontinuouswarsforsurvivalamongmanysmallcity-states.TheChouemperorsteadilylosespoweras the feudal lords realizehe canbebeaten, asprovedby thedefeat in thewest.By the endof theSpring and Autumn period (around 481 B.C.) only about a dozen consolidated central states willremain.685-643 An early state hegemony is established under DukeHuan of Qi. He introduces new stateinstitutions suchas taxation, a state-fundedarmy,and stateownershipofnatural resources;healsoestablishesanallianceofcentralstatestoopposethepowerofthelargesouthernkingdomofChu.632AnewhegemonyofJinisestablishedunderDukeWen.c.551 Confucius is born in the northern state of Lu. Over the course of his life, he rises from awarehousemanagertobecomeoneofhistory’sbest-knownteachers.546ThestateofSun,whichisborderedbythewarringstatesofChuandJin,invitesadelegationofelevenstates tosignanonaggressionpact.Thepeace lasts fortyyearsandgives the largerstatesareprievefromseveralhundredyearsofconstantwar.544SunWuisborninthestateofChi.Laterhewillbegiventhehonorific titleSunTzu,meaningMasterSun.514TheruleofKingHoLuofthestateofWubegins.510SunTzuenterstheserviceofHoLu.506Theforty-yearpeacebrokeredbythestateofSunin546B.C.isbrokenbythestateofWu,whichwasnotpartofthepeaceagreement.500 To defend against marauding barbarians from the north, the northern Chinese states beginbuildingwallsthatarelaterconnectedtoformtheGreatWallofChina.496KingHoLudiesofwoundssustainedinbattle.AlthoughSunTzu’sdeathisneverconfirmed,itisassumedhedidnotoutlivetheking.482WugainspowerandbecomesthedominantstateinancientChina.479Confuciusdies,leavingmanyfollowerswhospreadhisteachingsaboutthepropermanagementofsociety,basedonsympathyor“human-heartedness.”472ThestateofWuisdefeatedbytheupstartstateofYue.c.403 The Eastern Chou Dynasty’s Warring States period begins; it is characterized by a powerstruggle between the large states of China, each trying to gain control over the entire area. The

WarringStatesperiodwilllastuntiltheendoftheChouDynasty,about221B.C.

c.380SunPin,adescendantofSunTzu, isborn.SunPin is thesupposedauthorofTheLostArtofWar,whichisconsideredacompanionpiecetoTheArtofWar.SunPinwillachievegreatfameasageneral,andhiswritingswillbuildonideasandtacticsfoundinSunTzu’sseminalwork.221B.C.ChinaisunifiedundertheharshruleofCh’inShihHuang-ti.TheChouDynastyendsandtheCh’inDynastybegins.Bureaucraticgovernmentisestablished,andawrittenlanguageisstandardized.Roadsandcanalsarebuilt,asismuchoftheGreatWall.91TheShihChi(HistoricalRecords),thefirstknownhistoryofChina,iscompleted.ItincludesoneoftwoancientbiographiesofSunTzu.1stcenturyA.D.TheWuYuehCh’un-ch’iuappears.ItcontainsabiographyofSunTzuthatdetailshisfabledarrivalintotheserviceofKingHoLu.TheWuYuehCh’un-ch’iu isentertaining,butitismostlikelyaromanticizedembellishmentofthetalesfoundintheShihChi.1772TheArtofWaristranslatedintoFrenchbyFatherJ.J.Amiot,aJesuitwholearnedofSunTzuandTheArtofWarwhilehewasamissionaryinChina.ThetranslationisprobablyreadbyNapoleon.1905 In Tokyo, the first English translation ofThe Art ofWar, byCaptain E. F. Calthrop, appearsunderthetitleSonshi,theJapaneseformofSunTzu.1910LionelGilespublisheshisEnglishtranslationofTheArtofWar.1972AnarchaeologicaldigunearthsalosttextofTheArtofWarintheShantungprovinceofmodernChina.Thetextcontainslongsectionsofthirteenchaptersthatarealreadyknownaswellaspassagesfromfivelostchapters.Thetextsappeartohavebeenburiedaround140B.C.

INTRODUCTION

Itismereillusionandprettysentimenttoexpectmuchfrommankindifitforgetshowtomakewar. As yet nomeans are knownwhich call somuch into action as a great war, that roughenergy born of the camp, that deep impersonality born of hatred, that conscience born ofmurderandcold-bloodedness, that fervorbornofeffort in theannihilationof theenemy, thatproudindifferencetoloss,toone’sownexistence,tothatofone’sfellows,tothatearthquake-likesoul-shakingwhichapeopleneedswhenitislosingitsvitality.FriedrichWilhelmNietzsche,Human,AllTooHuman(1878)

War...isinitsessence,anditisamainconditionofitssuccess,tokindleintofierceexerciseamong great masses of men the destructive and combative passions—passions as fierce andmalevolentasthatwithwhichthehoundhuntsthefoxtoitsdeath....Destructionisoneofitschiefends.Deceptionisoneofitschiefmeans,andoneofthegreatartsofskillfulgeneralshipistodeceiveinordertodestroy....Itwouldbedifficulttoconceiveadispositionmoreremotefromthemoralsofordinarylife,nottospeakofChristianideals....Hardlyanyonewillbesoconfidentofthevirtueofhisrulersastobelievethateverywar...isjustandnecessary.W.E.H.Lecky,TheMapofLife(1899)

WAR ISAHOWLING,BAYING JACKAL.Or is it the animating storm? Suicidalmadness or thepurifyingfire?Animperialist travesty?Or thegloriousexplosionofavirilenationmademanifestupon theplanet? Inall recordedhistory, thisdebate is recent,as is the ideaofpeace todescribeanactivestatehappierthanamereinterregnumbetweenfisticuffs.Astoundingasitmayseem,warhasconsistently won the debate. In fact, it never had serious competition—not until August 24, 1898,anyway,whenCzarNicholasIIofRussiacalledforaninternationalconferencespecificallytodiscuss“themosteffectualmeans”to“arealanddurablepeace.”Thatwasthefirsttimenationswouldgatherwithout a war at their backs to discuss howwar might be prevented systematically. Nicholas wassuccessful.HisfirstPeaceConferencewasheldin1899.Itwasfollowedbyasecond,in1907.Thesemeetingsgaverisetoaprocessinwhichtheworldgainedacommoncodeofinternationallaws.Itwasamomentwhenpeaceandthetrialsofwarwereunderthemicroscopeofthecivilizedworld.

Offinaveryquietcornerofthisstage,therealsoappearedtwoscholars:one,aghost,SunWu—thisisSunTzu’sactualname;Sunisthefamilyname,andTzuanhonorific—amemberofaChineseclanofexpertsonarmsandfighting,whohadlivedsome2,400yearsearlier; theother,a librarianandstudentoftheChineseclassics,LionelGiles,whopublishedhistranslationofTheArtofWarin1910.He, too, was a son of eminence—his father was the great sinologist Herbert Giles—and hetransportedSunTzu’surgentinjunctionsonthenatureofwaracrossvastreachesoftimeandculture;the taskwasextraordinary, the impetusbehind italmost saintly.The influenceof theworkof thesetwomen colors our lives even as this text iswritten.But it did not comewithout effort, and eventoday, with a century of English-language scholarship on Asian literature, religion, and societies

behindus,thereisstillmuchtopuzzlethegeneralreader.WorldWar I and its carnagewould soon burst upon theworld, leaving an estimated 25million

dead,twicethetallyforallthewarsofnineteenth-centuryEurope.Nicholasandhisentireclasswoulddisappear amid the terrors of revolution in Russia, China, andMexico, to name but the grandestuprisings.WorldWarIIwouldfollowwithnofewerthan60milliondead,andonitsheelsawhirlofwarsforindependence,civilwars,andthesurrogatewarsofVietnam,Korea,Africa,theBalkans,andtheMiddleEast—all in all, a century-long testament to the failure of humanity’s best intentions. Itwould be an odd soul who did not find himself feeling as Abraham Lincoln did in his SecondInauguralAddress,onMarch4,1865,astheAmericanCivilWarwasending:“Fondlydowehope—ferventlydowepray—thatthismightyscourgeofwarmayspeedilypassaway.”Yetittakeslittleexperiencetounderstandthefutilityofbelligerencealone,asSunTzuwrote:“[H]e

whoisdestinedtodefeatfirstfightsandafterwardslooksforvictory”(chap.IV,paragraph15).Ontheworld frontor the levelof the individual, the issue isnot force,notarms—it is strategy. InhisstudyofMaoTse-tung,modernwarfare’smostardentstudentofSunTzu,RobertPaynenotes:“SunWu’s ideas on war are exceedingly adaptable, . . . nearly all of them demonstrating how thecommanderofasmallforcecanovercomeapowerfulenemy,givensuitableconditionsofhisownmaking.TheseapothegmshaveapeculiarlyChineseflavor,hardheaded,deeplyphilosophical,oftenshowingadisturbingknowledgeofthehumansoulunderstress”(RobertPayne,MaoTse-tung; see“ForFurtherReading”).ButhowdidSunTzuknowwhatheknew?Wheredidhegethisinformation?Canwetrustit?Sometime (most historians suggest about 500B.C.) during theSpring andAutumnperiod of the

EasternChouDynasty(seesection“TheWorldofSunTzuandTheArtofWar”),astrikinglyseriousfellow,dressedinsimplemonkishgray,thelivingmannamedSunTzu,contemplatedthemadnessofhis times as deeply and clearly as he could. According to modern Chinese scholars, Sun Tzubelonged to an extended familywhosemembers for generations hadmade their living asmilitaryadvisers. The revelations SunTzu provides uswould have been a combination of the journeymanideastaught(andpreserved)byhisclan,aswellashisown.HewouldalsohavebeenimbuedwiththeideasweassociatewithTaoism,whichwereverymuchapartofthetimes.ForemostamongthemforasupremelydisciplinedmilitaryadviserlikeSunTzuwouldhavebeen

twocommands,bothofwhichrequiredmethodicalanddeliberatedecisions.Firstisthemandateforthestrongandtheknowledgeabletohelptheweak.Eveningouttheplayingfieldcarriedthechargeofreligious duty for these advisers. Along with that comes the question of virtue, “the mandate ofHeaven.”ThatmeantSunTzuwouldhaveassessedtheintrinsicvirtueoftheweakerandthestrongerpowers, adhering to the rule of t’ienming, “themandate ofHeaven,” as described in theClassicalChinesetextTheBookofDocuments.AsBurtonWatsonexplains,would-beconquerors,“bytheirjustandvirtuousactions, receivefromHeaven—avague,half-personalizedspiritualpowerwhichrulestheuniverse—acommandtosetupanewrule.Solongasthesuccessiveleadersofthenewdynastycontinuetofollowthevirtuouscoursewhichfirstentitledtheirpredecessorstothemandate,Heavenwillcontinuetosanctiontheirpower.”Butiftheydonotmaintainvirtue,allbetsareoff:Iftheysinkinto“negligenceandevil,”Heavenwillbestowitssanctionuponanothergroupofleaders.“Inotherwords, it isvirtuealone thatentitlesa ruler to rule,andwhenhesetsasidevirtue,hesetsaside therighttocallhimselfasovereign.Thethroneisconferred...onlyforaslongasthedynastyprovesworthyofit”(Watson,EarlyChineseLiterature).SunTzuwouldhaveconsideredtheseissuesquiteseriously.Evengiventhefrailtyofallhumanflesh,sayingsequivalenttoourcommonphrases“It’s

notmyproblem”and“It’sjustbusiness”oreventheexcuseofthe“tyrannyofthebottomline”wouldhavebeenunthinkable.Theresultingdocument—forSunTzuwasamanofthearistocracyandcouldwrite—isatreatise

thathascomedownthroughhistorytobecalledSun-tzuping-fa,SunTzuontheArtofWar,justSunTzu (the customary nomenclature theChinese use instead of a book title), or, as inmanymoderneditions,TheArtofWar.ForSunTzu,war,likemostofmankind’ssocial,biological,andfinancialactivities, followedcertainpatterns thatcanbedistilled into laws.Hecodifiedhisobservations intothefirstmilitarytreatiseinrecordedhistory.Significantly,hewasnotonlythefirsttoteachthatthesidethatcontrolsthoselawsofengagementwins,butthelong-terminfluenceofhisandcertainothertexts meant that Imperial China, once it had taken shape, rarely needed to wage war outside itsboundaries.AtthetimeLionelGilesmadehistranslation,infact,Chinawasconsideredsomethingofateddybearamongthebellicosehotheadsofempire.SoGilesinthistranslationisbraidingthetwowarring streams of thought about war—that it is senseless butchery and that it serves as a sacredrestorativetothebodypolitic—intoaworkthatcautionsagainstwar,thenarguesforhowitmaybestbecarriedout.Thisisanextraordinarydocumentatanextraordinaryturningpointinworldhistory.Equally important, though perhaps startling toWestern ears, is the statement that SunTzuwas a

humanist.Headv-catedwagingfast,offensivewars,onceonehadmadedeliberatecalculationsanddecided that war was the only reasonable alternative. Why? Fewer deaths, less destruction of thecountryside, and thus less hardship on the farmerswho lived there andworked the land.Thiswashumanismwithanedge,however,sincefarmersandpeasantsalsoserveasconduitsforinformationandsourcesforfoodandshelterforarmiesinthefield.Moreover—andthishasinspiredAmericanas well as Asian generals—Sun Tzu taught that the less destruction of the land, people, andinfrastructure, themorethevictorwouldgain,andtheeasier itwouldbetoconvert thevanquishedintocitizens,notrebels.Adigressiononthemajorcentersofcivilizationmightbehelpfulhere:AtthetimeSunTzutrodthe

earth,Chinawouldhavebeenevolvingfornearlytwomillennia.EuropeandRussiawerebarbarianlandsandMesopotamiawasindecline,butAthenswasatitsascendance—thisisaboutthetimeofthePeloponnesian Wars. India was well developed, with a highly organized social structure. Indeed,thoughitwouldfixonclassissuesmorethanactualcombat,byabout300B.C.whatmightbecalledtheIndianArtofWar,theArthaSastra,wouldbecomposedbyKautilya.Thanks to the intrepid work of anthropologists and archaeologists, not to mention the Chinese

passionforcompilinghistoricalrecords,weknowsomethingofthetimesandthecultureof500B.C.China alreadypossessed awritten language andmost of the characteristics thatmade it oneof themostadvancedempiresontheplanet.Wellbefore1600B.C.,theChinesehadinventedandwereusingmetal casting. By Sun Tzu’s time, though they did not work gold, they produced exquisite jadeobjects,jewelry,unsurpassedceramics,andhugebronzestatues.Theyhadhorse-drawnchariotsandformidableweaponsofwar.TheChinesewerenotexplorersorwanderers.Others,oftenbarbarians,came to them,especially

alongthefabledSilkRoad,buttheChinesedidnottravelmuchuntilhistoricaltimes.Earlyon,theyfounded scoresof complexcities, arrangedwith threewell-definedareas situatedwithinorbehindretainingwalls;theseprotectivewallsoftenfigureinSunTzu’scalculations.Forexample,thewallofChouwasmadeofpoundedearth30feethighand40feetthick.Anygeneralwouldhavetothinkhardabout surmounting that! The typical urban layout, according to historian J. M. Roberts (A Short

HistoryoftheWorld),was“asmallenclosurewherethearistocracylived,alargerone,inhabitedbyspecialized craftsmen andmerchants, and the fields outsidewhich fed the city.”Commercebustledandmercantilestreetsincludedjewelry,foodandclothingshops,and“taverns,gamblinghouses,andbrothels.”Every commentator, however, will point out that for all the wonders of its cities, the heart of

Chinesesocietyis inthecountryside.ThepowerofthelandownersoverthepeasantsaswellasthelandduringthetimewhenSunTzuwroteisdifficulttoimagineforthosewhohaveexperiencedtherootlessnessof contemporary society.Thearistocracynotonly controlled the landmuchas feudallordswouldsome1,000yearslaterinEurope,buttheyownedthecarts,thelivestock,theimplements,andeven thepeople.AsRobertspointsout, addingan importantdimension toSunTzu’sadvice togenerals in encouraging troops: “Labourers could be sold, exchanged, or left by will”; in otherwords, many members of the infantry would have been serfs. Also, in those times the noblemanalwayshadamonopolyonarmaments,and“onlynoblemencouldaffordtheweapons,armour,andhorses[ofwar].”HighlydevelopedasChineseculturewas,theeraoftheSpringandAutumnperiod,duringwhich

SunTzu composed his treatise,was outstandingly brutal.More than one hundred feudal states andprincipalitieswerereducedtoaboutforty,inaprocessthatcontinueduntilabout403B.C.,whenthestateofCh’inofficiallysplitintothreepartsandtherewereonlysevenimportantstatesleft.Theyearbegan theWarring States period, which ended in the unification of the empire under Ch’in Shih-huang-ti,thefirstemperoroftheCh’inDynasty,whotookpowerin221B.C.ClassicalChineseatthetimeSunTzuwrotewasamatterof“pronouncements,”aswasalsotruein

earlyWestern andNear Eastern civilizations; consider, for example, the pithymaxims ofMarcusAureliusandHesiod.AndparticularlyinthecaseofdocumentssuchasSunTzu’smilitarytreatise,clans and families in a sense “owned” information—just as in medieval European guilds fatherspassedontheirgoldsmithingorotherspecializedtrainingandloretotheirsons;thetransmissionofthisinformationwasaccomplishedinbothphysicalandverballessons.Awrittenversionwouldhaveserved solely as a mnemonic, and the language was therefore often startling and symbolic, likepoetry.Further,bothasanaidtomemoryandalsobecauseoftheintrinsiccharacteristicsofthelanguage,

which consists of single syllables ending inmutable vowel sounds, there is a tendency inChinesewriting“tousebalanced,parallelphrases,andtotreatideasintheformofnumericalcategories—thefive felicities, the three virtues, etc.” (Early Chinese Literature). This gives the language anunparalleled drive and power but, as with poetry, makes it almost impossible to translate whileretaining its original efficiency and style.And in a strong divergence from theWesternRomanticideal, the Chinese made no distinction between belles lettres and didactic literature, betweenphilosophy, say, and storytelling ormilitary treatises. The EmperorWan ofWei even referred toliteratureas“avitalforceintheorderingofthestate.”Thedistinguishingmarkofwritingwasitsrefinementoritsvulgarityofexpression.“Good”meant

works of whatever stripe that were “morally sound in content, clear in thought, and expressed insuitably gracious and dignified language” (Early Chinese Literature). Meanwhile readers avidlysoughtworks—thisisalsocharacteristicofhighcultureinGreeceandIndia—thatexploredwhatthetwentieth-centurypoetStephenSpender(inTheMakingofaPoem)wouldcall“thathumanexperiencesoneglectedinmodernart—theartofruling,theartofbeingaprinceandbeingresponsibleforthe

useofpower.”ThemoralandsocialcontentoftheancientChineseworldwasthoroughlyscrutinizedandreflected

uponbySunTzu.Asaresult,hiswasanapproachtohumanfrailtysoelasticandcapacious—andsotruenotjusttotheChinese,buttothehumanway—thatitsitseasilywithWesternandEasternmilitaryestablishments, and still can form the basis for hilarious, long-running Korean sitcoms, kung-fuactionflicks,sightgagsinHollywoodcomedies,countlessboost-your-aggression-quotienttomesbybusiness-schoolprofessors, andcusp-of-religious-enquirybooks. It’sbeenanendlessmarvel sinceitsfirst“publication”some2,500yearsago.Forwriters in theWest fromHugoGrotius (De jurebelli et pacis, 1625) to PresidentTheodore

Roosevelt (The Winning of the West, 1889), wars, like the great forest fires of summer, cleansesociety of its Darwinian detritus and give backbone to those who survive. John Milton’s Satandistilleditas:“th’unconquerablewill,/Andstudyofrevenge,immortalhate,/Andcouragenevertosubmitoryield/Andwhatiselsenottobeovercome?”(ParadiseLost,book1). Ifwe learnaboutwar from themovies, inwhichheroes rise from innumerablewounds in seconds flat to fightwithnary a shiver of fear, it does seem a clean, albeit loud, exercise, and reading the clipped, clearpronouncementsofSunTzuwouldmakeitseemall theeasier.Buthistoricallywar issynonymouswithmudandthorns,withdysentery,typhoid,andfamine.Thebestmilitarymindsmaydisagreeonmanypoints, butonone theywill alwaysconcur:Theonlyway topreventwar is toknowhow towage andwin it better than your enemy. So, first, let us examinewhatwe thinkwar is, how it isdefined,andthenproceedtohowitiswaged.WestorEast,AsiaorEurope,warconjuresdeceptionasmuchasdestruction.TheoldHighGerman

word forwar—the rootof theEnglishword—waswerre, “to confound.”Andwars, asopposed tobeer-hallbrawls,arenota“blindstrugglebetweenmobsofpeople”butratheranengagementoraseriesofthembetweenwell-organizedmasses,movingasateam,actingunderasingle,overarchingwill,anddirectedagainstadefiniteobjective:anothercountryorallianceofcountries.Thisdefinition(adaptedfromtheEncyclopediaBritannica,eleventhedition)iskey.Thenineteenth-centuryPrussianscholarCarlvonClausewitzamplifiesthatdescriptiontogiveusa

preciseunderstandingoftacticsversusstrategyinhismonumentalworkVomKriege(OnWar):Theconductofwar...consistsintheplanningandconductoffighting....[Fighting]consistsofagreaterorlessernumberofsingleacts,eachcompleteinitself,...called“engagements.”... This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing theseengagements themselves,andofcoordinatingeachof themwith theothers inorder tofurthertheobjectofthewar.Onehasbeencalledtactics,andtheother,strategy.

Warsarepolitical.Theyderivefromthewillofonepolis,orpeople,againstanother,usuallyinacontesttodeterminewhichwillexercisesovereigntyoverland,asinterritorialwars,orbeliefs,asinreligious or ideological wars. Either way, war requires a definite objective and a definite enemy.Terrorismisnotwar;itisanimportanttacticofwar.Thedistinctionisneitherarbitrarynorsmall.Togivesomerecentexamples:TerrorismwasusedwithextraordinaryefficiencybytheNazisinWorldWar II (a large invading nation against aweaker one), by thewould-be Israelis in their quest forstatehood fromEngland (a small force against a larger one), and byFrance as it battledAlgerianindependence fighters (a large force against a weaker one). The scholar Francis Dummer Fisher,citedbyhistorianBarbaraFields (HumaneLetters:Writing inEnglishAboutHumanAffairs,2003),writes,“Warisnotdefinedbydamage,howevergreat,butbyanintenttoconquer.”ProfessorFields,

anexpertontheAmericanCivilWaratColumbiaUniversity,continues:Just as mass murder is not necessarily terrorism, so mass murder and terrorism are notnecessarilywar. Indeed, their perpetrators often choosemassmurder and terrorismpreciselyforlackofthepoliticalstanding,power,resources,ornumberstowagewar....Anyattempttodestroylifeandproperty,withoutanobjectiveofconquest,isacriminalact,anditsperpetratorsmeritprosecutionundercriminalstatutes.Butsuchanattempt isnotanactofwarexcept inaloose,metaphoricalsense. . . .When thewordwar is taken to justify thearbitraryexerciseofpowerintheabsenceofwar,metaphoricallanguagemaybecomeaninstrumentoftyranny.

Onpaper,thesedistinctionsseemtrite,buttheybespeakrealandperilousdifferences—differencesforwhicha seriousmonkadmonishedallwhowould fight tocalculate theoddsandconsequenceswith a bookkeeper ’s punctiliousness, and then engage heart and soul. Long before SunTzuwas ababy and no doubtwell into the future, nationswill get their dander up overmatters thatmystifysubsequentgenerations.SunTzuremindsusthatempires,intheOrientorOccident,arelostwheninadequatemenbecome

leadersandwagewarforbasereasonsornoreasonatall.Westernhistoryisrifewithaptexamples:EnglandlostitsAmericancoloniesbecauseofthefizzle-headedKingGeorgeIIIandhistaxmen;thedisasterthatwasWorldWarIowedmuchtothefollyofaristocratsbentontryingoutnewweapons;eventheCrusadesresultedfromarroganceandthemisbegottenvanityofrulerswhodidnoresearchbefore they attacked Palestine. The arch-conservative cartoonistDavid Low once quipped, “I havenevermetanyonewhowasn’tagainstwar.EvenHitlerandMussoliniwere,accordingtothemselves.”Theissueofa“definiteobjective”isasessentialtothesuccessfulmilitarymindasitsabsenceisto

adefeatedone.SunTzuoftenadvisesshiftingpointsofattacktobaffletheenemyandtrouncehim.Forexample,inchapterXI,paragraph37:“Byalteringhisarrangementsandchanginghisplans,hekeeps the enemywithoutdefiniteknowledge.By shiftinghis campand taking circuitous routes, hepreventstheenemyfromanticipatinghispurpose.”Theprincipleheremimicsawolfpackattackingabearfromeverydirection.Oneonone,thebearwouldnaturallysucceedagainstasmallerenemy,butwithhisenergiessplayedonsomanyfronts,hecanbedefeated.Throughout the centuries, there is a deliciously romantic quality to China’s intellectuals. Their

passionforknowledgeandfortransmittingittoothersiswell-nighaloveaffair.ThegeniusofSunTzu speaks toEveryman, but his heritage speaks particularly to that belief immanent in both highWestern, especially Greek, andAsian cultures—“that a coherent and logical explanation of thingscouldbefound,thattheworlddidnotultimatelyrestuponthemeaninglessandarbitraryfiatofgodsordemons”(AShortHistoryoftheWorld).Inmore recentmemory, readerswhomightwant toconjure theirown imageof thespiritualand

intellectualimpetusthatconceivedandproducedTheArtofWarmightrememberthephotographofasmall, slender man standing alone before an advancing tank during the 1989 T’iananmen SquareUprising.HecouldaseasilyhavebeenSunTzuorhisdescendantSunPin,authorofatextthathascometobecalledTheLostArtofWarorTheArtofWarII.SunTzu’sworkisauniqueadmixtureofsimplicity,anutterabsenceofself-importance,suffused

bytheauthoritybornofexperience,andabreath-takingdeterminationandpassionfor“ordering”—for setting the record straight, for getting out the truth, whatever that might be, whatever theconsequences.Inthepagesthatfollow,youwillnotfindthewickeddelightNiccolòMachiavelli,theRenaissance Italian author ofThe Prince, took in describing the deceptions and stratagems of the

profaneworld.The Art ofWar is quintessentially Chinese: wise beyond its pages, cryptic, simple,wonderfullyprofound—andatitsroot,pacific.

DallasGalvin is a writer and journalist specializing in international affairs and the arts. She hasreportedonmilitaryaffairs inLatinAmericaandAsiaandproduceddocumentaries for theNATOAlliance.

TomybrotherCaptainValentineGiles,R.C.

inthehopethatawork2400yearsold

mayyetcontainlessonsworthconsiderationbythesoldierofto-day

thistranslationisaffectionatelydedicated

—LionelGiles

PREFACE1

byLionelGilesTHESEVENTHVOLUMEOF“Mémoiresconcernantl’histoire,lessciences,lesarts,lesmœurs,lesusages,&c.,desChinois”[Memoirsconcerningthehistory,sciences,arts,habits,customs,etc.,oftheChinese; published at Paris in 1782] is devoted to the Art of War, and contains, amongst othertreatises, “LesTreizeArticles de Sun-tse” [TheThirteenArticles of SunTzu], translated from theChinesebyaJesuitFather,JosephAmiot.PèreAmiotappearstohaveenjoyednosmallreputationasa sinologue in his day, and the field of his labours was certainly extensive. But his so-calledtranslationofSunTzu,ifplacedsidebysidewiththeoriginal,isseenatoncetobelittlebetterthananimposture.ItcontainsagreatdealthatSunTzudidnotwrite,andverylittleindeedofwhathedid....Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw awonderful development in the study of Chinese

literature,notranslatorventuredtotackleSunTzu,althoughhisworkwasknowntobehighlyvaluedinChinaasbyfartheoldestandbestcompendiumofmilitaryscience.Itwasnotuntiltheyear1905that thefirstEnglishtranslation,byCaptainE.F.Calthrop,R.F.A.,appearedatTokyounder thetitle“Sonshi” (the Japanese form of Sun Tzu). Unfortunately, it was evident that the translator ’sknowledgeofChinesewasfartooscantytofithimtograpplewiththemanifolddifficultiesofSunTzu.He himself acknowledges thatwithout the aid of two Japanese gentlemen “the accompanyingtranslationwouldhavebeenimpossible.”Wecanonlywonder,then,thatwiththeirhelpitshouldhavebeen so excessively bad. It is not merely a question of downright blunders. . . . Omissions werefrequent;hardpassageswerewilfullydistortedorslurredover....From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe that the present translation is free. It was not

undertakenoutofanyinflatedestimateofmyownpowers;butIcouldnothelpfeelingthatSunTzudeservedabetterfatethanhadbefallenhim,andIknewthat,atanyrate,Icouldhardlyfailtoimproveontheworkofmypredecessors....Afewspecialfeaturesofthepresentvolumemaynowbenoticed.Inthefirstplace,thetexthasbeen

cutupintonumberedparagraphs,bothinordertofacilitatecross-referenceandfortheconvenienceof students generally. The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen’s edition, but I havesometimesfounditdesirabletojointwoormoreofhisparagraphsintoone.[A]...featureborrowedfrom“TheChineseClassics”istheprintingoftext,translationandnotesonthesamepage;thenotes,however,areinserted,accordingtotheChinesemethod,immediatelyafterthepassagestowhichtheyrefer.Fromthemassofnative[Chinese]commentarymyaimhasbeentoextractthecreamonly....ThoughconstitutinginitselfanimportantbranchofChineseliterature,verylittlecommentaryofthiskindhashithertobeenmadedirectlyaccessiblebytranslation.

THEARTOFWAR

SunTzuonTheArtofWar

I.LAYINGPLANS

1.SunTzusaid:TheartofwarisofvitalimportancetotheState.

2.Itisamatteroflifeanddeath,aroadeithertosafetyortoruin.Henceitisasubjectofinquiry

whichcanonnoaccountbeneglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s

deliberations,whenseekingtodeterminetheconditionsobtaininginthefield.

4. These are: (1) TheMoral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5)Method and

discipline.

5,6.TheMoralLawcauses thepeople tobe incompleteaccordwith their ruler,so that theywill

followhimregardlessoftheirlives,undismayedbyanydanger.

7.Heavensignifiesnightandday,coldandheat,timesandseasons.

8.Earthcomprisesdistances,greatandsmall;dangerandsecurity;opengroundandnarrowpasses;

thechancesoflifeanddeath.

9.TheCommanderstandsforthevirtuesofwisdom,sincerity,benevolence,courageandstrictness.10. ByMethod and discipline are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper

subdivisions,thegradationsofrankamongtheofficers,themaintenanceofroadsbywhichsupplies

mayreachthearmy,andthecontrolofmilitaryexpenditure.

11.Thesefiveheadsshouldbefamiliartoeverygeneral:hewhoknowsthemwillbevictorious;he

whoknowsthemnotwillfail.

12.Therefore,inyourdeliberations,whenseekingtodeterminethemilitaryconditions,letthembe

madethebasisofacomparison,inthiswise:

13.1.WhichofthetwosovereignsisimbuedwiththeMoralLaw?2.Whichofthetwogeneralshasmostability?3.WithwhomlietheadvantagesderivedfromHeavenandEarth?4.Onwhichsideisdisciplinemostrigorouslyenforced?5.Whicharmyisthestronger?6.Onwhichsideareofficersandmenmorehighlytrained?7.Inwhicharmyistherethegreaterconstancybothinrewardandpunishment?

14.BymeansofthesesevenconsiderationsIcanforecastvictoryordefeat.

15. The general that hearkens tomy counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be

retainedincommand!Thegeneralthathearkensnottomycounselnoractsuponit,willsufferdefeat:—letsuchaonebedismissed!

16.Whileheedingtheprofitofmycounsel,availyourselfalsoofanyhelpfulcircumstancesover

andbeyondtheordinaryrules.

17.Accordingascircumstancesarefavourable,oneshouldmodifyone’splans.18.Allwarfareisbasedondeception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem

inactive;whenwearenear,wemustmaketheenemybelievewearefaraway;whenfaraway,wemustmakehimbelievewearenear.

20.Holdoutbaitstoenticetheenemy.Feigndisorder,andcrushhim.

21.Ifheissecureatallpoints,bepreparedforhim.Ifheisinsuperiorstrength,evadehim.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.Pretend to beweak, that hemay

growarrogant.

23.Ifheistakinghisease,givehimnorest.

24.Attackhimwhereheisunprepared,appearwhereyouarenotexpected.

25.Thesemilitarydevices,leadingtovictory,mustnotbedivulgedbeforehand.

26.Nowthegeneralwhowinsabattlemakesmanycalculationsinhistempleerethebattleisfought.

Thegeneralwho loses a battlemakesbut fewcalculationsbeforehand.Thusdomany calculationsleadtovictory,andfewcalculationstodefeat:howmuchmorenocalculationatall!ItisbyattentiontothispointthatIcanforeseewhoislikelytowinorlose.

II.WAGINGWAR

1.SunTzusaid:Intheoperationsofwar,wherethereareinthefieldathousandswiftchariots,asmany heavy chariots, and a hundred thousandmail-clad soldiers,with provisions enough to carrythemathousandli,theexpenditureathomeandatthefront,includingentertainmentofguests,smallitemssuchasglueandpaint,andsumsspentonchariotsandarmour,willreachthetotalofathousandouncesofsilverperday.Suchisthecostofraisinganarmyof100,000men.

2.Whenyouengageinactualfighting,ifvictoryislongincoming,themen’sweaponswillgrow

dullandtheirardourwillbedamped.Ifyoulaysiegetoatown,youwillexhaustyourstrength.

3.Again,ifthecampaignisprotracted,theresourcesoftheStatewillnotbeequaltothestrain.

4.Now,when yourweapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your

treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then noman,

howeverwise,willbeabletoaverttheconsequencesthatmustensue.

5.Thus,thoughwehaveheardofstupidhasteinwar,clevernesshasneverbeenseenassociatedwith

longdelays.6.Thereisnoinstanceofacountryhavingbenefitedfromprolongedwarfare.

7.Itisonlyonewhoisthoroughlyacquaintedwiththeevilsofwarthatcanthoroughlyunderstand

theprofitablewayofcarryingiton.

8.Theskilfulsoldierdoesnotraiseasecondlevy,neitherarehissupply-wagonsloadedmorethan

twice.

9.Bringwarmaterialwithyoufromhome,butforageontheenemy.Thusthearmywillhavefood

enoughforitsneeds.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a

distance.Contributingtomaintainanarmyatadistancecausesthepeopletobeimpoverished.

11.Ontheotherhand,theproximityofanarmycausespricestogoup,andhighpricescausethe

people’ssubstancetobedrainedaway.

12.Whentheirsubstanceisdrainedaway,thepeasantrywillbeafflictedbyheavyexactions.

13, 14.With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be

strippedbare, and three-tenthsof their incomeswillbedissipated;whileGovernment expenses forbroken chariots,worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,protectivemantlets,draught-oxenandheavywaggons,willamounttofour-tenthsofitstotalrevenue.

15.Hence awise generalmakes a point of foraging on the enemy.One carload of the enemy’s

provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender isequivalenttotwentyfromone’sownstore.

16.Nowinordertokilltheenemy,ourmenmustberousedtoanger;thattheremaybeadvantage

fromdefeatingtheenemy,theymusthavetheirrewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should berewardedwho took the first.Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and thechariotsmingledandused inconjunctionwithours.Thecapturedsoldiersshouldbekindly treatedandkept.

18.Thisiscalled,usingtheconqueredfoetoaugmentone’sownstrength.

19.Inwar,then,letyourgreatobjectbevictory,notlengthycampaigns.

20.Thus itmaybeknownthat the leaderofarmies is thearbiterof thepeople’s fate, themanon

whomitdependswhetherthenationshallbeinpeaceorinperil.

III.ATTACKBYSTRATAGEM

1.SunTzusaid:Inthepracticalartofwar,thebestthingofallistotaketheenemy’scountrywholeandintact;toshatteranddestroyitisnotsogood.So,too,itisbettertocaptureanarmyentirethantodestroyit,tocapturearegiment,adetachmentoracompanyentirethantodestroythem.

2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence

consistsinbreakingtheenemy’sresistancewithoutfighting.

3.Thusthehighestformofgeneralshipistobaulktheenemy’splans;thenextbestistopreventthe

junctionof theenemy’sforces; thenext inorder is toattack theenemy’sarmyin thefield;and theworstpolicyofallistobesiegewalledcities.

4.Theruleis,nottobesiegewalledcitiesifitcanpossiblybeavoided.Thepreparationofmantlets,

movableshelters,andvariousimplementsofwar,willtakeupthreewholemonths;andthepilingupofmoundsoveragainstthewallswilltakethreemonthsmore.

5.Thegeneral,unabletocontrolhisirritation,willlaunchhismentotheassaultlikeswarmingants,

withtheresultthatone-thirdofhismenareslain,whilethetownstillremainsuntaken.Sucharethe

disastrouseffectsofasiege.6.Therefore theskilful leadersubdues theenemy’s troopswithoutanyfighting;hecaptures their

citieswithout layingsiege to them;heoverthrows theirkingdomwithout lengthyoperations in thefield.

7.WithhisforcesintacthewilldisputethemasteryoftheEmpire,andthus,withoutlosingaman,

histriumphwillbecomplete.Thisisthemethodofattackingbystratagem.

8.Itistheruleinwar,ifourforcesaretentotheenemy’sone,tosurroundhim;iffivetoone,to

attackhim;iftwiceasnumerous,todivideourarmyintotwo.

9.Ifequallymatched,wecanofferbattle;ifslightlyinferiorinnumbers,wecanavoidtheenemy;if

quiteunequalineveryway,wecanfleefromhim.

10.Hence,thoughanobstinatefightmaybemadebyasmallforce,intheenditmustbecapturedby

thelargerforce.

11.NowthegeneralisthebulwarkoftheState:ifthebulwarkiscompleteatallpoints,theStatewill

bestrong;ifthebulwarkisdefective,theStatewillbeweak.

12.Therearethreewaysinwhicharulercanbringmisfortuneuponhisarmy:—

13.(1)Bycommandingthearmytoadvanceortoretreat,beingignorantofthefactthatitcannot

obey.Thisiscalledhobblingthearmy.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being

ignorantoftheconditionswhichobtaininanarmy.Thiscausesrestlessnessinthesoldiers’minds.

15. (3)By employing the officers of his armywithout discrimination, through ignorance of the

militaryprincipleofadaptationtocircumstances.Thisshakestheconfidenceofthesoldiers.16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal

princes.Thisissimplybringinganarchyintothearmy,andflingingvictoryaway.

17.Thuswemayknowthattherearefiveessentialsforvictory:

1.Hewillwinwhoknowswhentofightandwhennottofight.2.Hewillwinwhoknowshowtohandlebothsuperiorandinferiorforces.3.Hewillwinwhosearmyisanimatedbythesamespiritthroughoutallitsranks.4.Hewillwinwho,preparedhimself,waitstotaketheenemyunprepared.5.Hewillwinwhohasmilitarycapacityandisnotinterferedwithbythesovereign.

Victoryliesintheknowledgeofthesefivepoints.

18.Hencethesaying:Ifyouknowtheenemyandknowyourself,youneednotfeartheresultofa

hundredbattles.Ifyouknowyourselfbutnottheenemy,foreveryvictorygainedyouwillalsosufferadefeat.Ifyouknowneithertheenemynoryourself,youwillsuccumbineverybattle.

IV.TACTICALDISPOSITIONS

1.SunTzusaid:Thegoodfightersofoldfirstputthemselvesbeyondthepossibilityofdefeat,andthenwaitedforanopportunityofdefeatingtheenemy.

2.To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our ownhands, but the opportunity of defeating the

enemyisprovidedbytheenemyhimself.

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of

defeatingtheenemy.

4.Hencethesaying:Onemayknowhowtoconquerwithoutbeingabletodoit.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemymeans taking the

offensive.

6.Standingonthedefensiveindicatesinsufficientstrength;attacking,asuperabundanceofstrength.

7.Thegeneralwho isskilled indefencehides in themostsecret recessesof theearth;hewho is

skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one handwe haveabilitytoprotectourselves;ontheother,avictorythatiscomplete.8.Toseevictoryonlywhenitiswithinthekenofthecommonherdisnottheacmeofexcellence.

9.Neitherisit theacmeofexcellenceifyoufightandconquerandthewholeEmpiresays,“Well

done!”

10.Toliftanautumnhairisnosignofgreatstrength;toseesunandmoonisnosignofsharpsight;

tohearthenoiseofthunderisnosignofaquickear.

11.Whattheancientscalledacleverfighterisonewhonotonlywins,butexcelsinwinningwith

ease.

12.Hencehisvictoriesbringhimneitherreputationforwisdomnorcreditforcourage.

13.Hewinshisbattlesbymakingnomistakes.Makingnomistakesiswhatestablishesthecertainty

ofvictory,foritmeansconqueringanenemythatisalreadydefeated.

14.Hencetheskilfulfighterputshimselfintoapositionwhichmakesdefeatimpossible,anddoes

notmissthemomentfordefeatingtheenemy.

15.Thusit is that inwarthevictoriousstrategistonlyseeksbattleafter thevictoryhasbeenwon,

whereashewhoisdestinedtodefeatfirstfightsandafterwardslooksforvictory.

16.Theconsummateleadercultivatesthemorallaw,andstrictlyadherestomethodanddiscipline;

thusitisinhispowertocontrolsuccess.

17.Inrespectofmilitarymethod,wehave,firstly,Measurement;secondly,Estimationofquantity;

thirdly,Calculation;fourthly,Balancingofchances;fifthly,Victory.

18.MeasurementowesitsexistencetoEarth;EstimationofquantitytoMeasurement;Calculationto

Estimationofquantity;BalancingofchancestoCalculation;andVictorytoBalancingofchances.19.Avictoriousarmyopposedtoaroutedone,isasapound’sweightplacedinthescaleagainsta

singlegrain.

20.Theonrushofaconqueringforceisliketheburstingofpent-upwatersintoachasmathousand

fathomsdeep.Somuchfortacticaldispositions.

V.ENERGY

1.SunTzusaid:Thecontrolofalargeforceisthesameinprincipleasthecontrolofafewmen:itismerelyaquestionofdividinguptheirnumbers.

2.Fightingwithalargearmyunderyourcommandisnowisedifferentfromfightingwithasmall

one:itismerelyaquestionofinstitutingsignsandsignals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain

unshaken—thisiseffectedbymanœuvresdirectandindirect.

4.Thattheimpactofyourarmymaybelikeagrindstonedashedagainstanegg—thisiseffectedby

thescienceofweakpointsandstrong.

5. In all fighting, the directmethodmay be used for joining battle, but indirectmethodswill be

neededinordertosecurevictory.

6.Indirecttactics,efficientlyapplied,areinexhaustibleasHeavenandEarth,unendingastheflowof

riversandstreams;likethesunandmoon,theyendbuttobeginanew;likethefourseasons,theypassawaybuttoreturnoncemore.7.Therearenotmorethanfivemusicalnotes,yetthecombinationsofthesefivegiverisetomore

melodiesthancaneverbeheard.

8.Therearenotmorethanfiveprimarycolours,yetincombinationtheyproducemorehuesthan

caneverbeseen.

9.Therearenotmorethanfivecardinaltastes,yetcombinationsofthemyieldmoreflavoursthancaneverbetasted.

10. Inbattle, therearenotmore than twomethodsofattack—thedirectand the indirect;yet these

twoincombinationgiverisetoanendlessseriesofmanœuvers.

11.Thedirectandtheindirectleadontoeachotherinturn.Itislikemovinginacircle—younever

cometoanend.Whocanexhaustthepossibilitiesoftheircombination?

12.Theonsetoftroopsisliketherushofatorrentwhichwillevenrollstonesalonginitscourse.

13.Thequalityofdecisionislikethewell-timedswoopofafalconwhichenablesit tostrikeand

destroyitsvictim.

14.Thereforethegoodfighterwillbeterribleinhisonset,andpromptinhisdecision.

15.Energymaybelikenedtothebendingofacrossbow;decision,tothereleasingofthetrigger.

16.Amidtheturmoilandtumultofbattle,theremaybeseemingdisorderandyetnorealdisorderat

all;amidconfusionandchaos,yourarraymaybewithoutheador tail,yet itwillbeproofagainstdefeat.

17.Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated

weaknesspostulatesstrength.

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing

courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength withweaknessistobeeffectedbytacticaldispositions.

19. Thus onewho is skilful at keeping the enemy on themovemaintains deceitful appearances,

accordingtowhichtheenemywillact.Hesacrificessomething,thattheenemymaysnatchatit.

20.Byholdingoutbaits,hekeepshimonthemarch;thenwithabodyofpickedmenheliesinwait

forhim.

21.Theclevercombatant looks to theeffectofcombinedenergy,anddoesnot require toomuch

fromindividuals.Hencehisabilitytopickouttherightmenandtoutilisecombinedenergy.

22.Whenheutilisescombinedenergy,hisfightingmenbecomeasitwerelikeuntorollinglogsor

stones.Foritisthenatureofalogorstonetoremainmotionlessonlevelground,andtomovewhenonaslope;iffour-cornered,tocometoastandstill,butifround-shaped,togorollingdown.

23.Thustheenergydevelopedbygoodfightingmenisasthemomentumofaroundstonerolled

downamountainthousandsoffeetinheight.Somuchonthesubjectofenergy.

VI.WEAKPOINTSANDSTRONG

1.SunTzusaid:Whoeverisfirstinthefieldandawaitsthecomingoftheenemy,willbefreshforthefight;whoeverissecondinthefieldandhastohastentobattle,willarriveexhausted.

2.Therefore theclevercombatant imposeshiswillontheenemy,butdoesnotallowtheenemy’s

willtobeimposeduponhim.

3.Byholdingoutadvantagestohim,hecancausetheenemytoapproachofhisownaccord;or,by

inflictingdamage,hecanmakeitimpossiblefortheenemytodrawnear.

4.Iftheenemyistakinghisease,hecanharasshim;ifwellsuppliedwithfood,hecanstarvehim

out;ifquietlyencamped,hecanforcehimtomove.

5.Appearatpointswhichtheenemymusthastentodefend;marchswiftlytoplaceswhereyouare

notexpected.

6.An armymaymarch great distanceswithout distress, if itmarches through countrywhere the

enemyisnot.7.Youcanbesureof succeeding inyourattacks ifyouonlyattackplaceswhichareundefended.

Youcanensurethesafetyofyourdefenceifyouonlyholdpositionsthatcannotbeattacked.

8.Hencethatgeneralisskilfulinattackwhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattodefend;andheis

skilfulindefencewhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattoattack.

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you

inaudible;andhencewecanholdtheenemy’sfateinourhands.

10.Youmayadvanceandbeabsolutelyirresistible,ifyoumakefortheenemy’sweakpoints;you

mayretireandbesafefrompursuitifyourmovementsaremorerapidthanthoseoftheenemy.

11. Ifwewish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered

behindahighrampartandadeepditch.Allweneeddoistoattacksomeotherplacethathewillbeobligedtorelieve.

12.Ifwedonotwishtofight,wecanpreventtheenemyfromengaginguseventhoughthelinesof

ourencampmentbemerelytracedoutontheground.Allweneeddoistothrowsomethingoddandunaccountableinhisway.

13.Bydiscovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves,we cankeepour

forcesconcentrated,whiletheenemy’smustbedivided.

14.Wecanformasingleunitedbody,whiletheenemymustsplitupintofractions.Hencetherewill

beawholepittedagainstseparatepartsofawhole,whichmeansthatweshallbemanytotheenemy’sfew.

15.Andifweareablethustoattackaninferiorforcewithasuperiorone,ouropponentswillbein

direstraits.16.The spotwherewe intend to fightmustnotbemadeknown; for then the enemywill have to

prepareagainstapossibleattackatseveraldifferentpoints;andhis forcesbeing thusdistributed inmanydirections,thenumbersweshallhavetofaceatanygivenpointwillbeproportionatelyfew.

17.Forshouldtheenemystrengthenhisvan,hewillweakenhisrear;shouldhestrengthenhisrear,

hewillweakenhisvan;shouldhestrengthenhisleft,hewillweakenhisright;shouldhestrengthenhisright,hewillweakenhisleft.Ifhesendsreinforcementseverywhere,hewilleverywherebeweak.

18.Numericalweaknesscomesfromhavingtoprepareagainstpossibleattacks;numericalstrength,

fromcompellingouradversarytomakethesepreparationsagainstus.

19.Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, wemay concentrate from the greatest

distancesinordertofight.

20.Butifneithertimenorplacebeknown,thentheleftwingwillbeimpotenttosuccourtheright,

therightequallyimpotenttosuccourtheleft,thevanunabletorelievetherear,orthereartosupportthevan.Howmuchmoresoifthefurthestportionsofthearmyareanythingunderahundredliapart,andeventhenearestareseparatedbyseveralli!

21.Thoughaccording tomyestimate the soldiersofYüehexceedourown innumber, that shall

advantagethemnothinginthematterofvictory.Isaythenthatvictorycanbeachieved.

22.Thoughtheenemybestrongerinnumbers,wemaypreventhimfromfighting.Schemesoasto

discoverhisplansandthelikelihoodoftheirsuccess.

23.Rousehim,andlearntheprincipleofhisactivityorinactivity.Forcehimtorevealhimself,soas

tofindouthisvulnerablespots.24.Carefullycomparetheopposingarmywithyourown,sothatyoumayknowwherestrengthis

superabundantandwhereitisdeficient.

25.Inmakingtacticaldispositions,thehighestpitchyoucanattainistoconcealthem;concealyour

dispositions,andyouwillbesafefromthepryingofthesubtlestspies,fromthemachinationsofthewisestbrains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the

multitudecannotcomprehend.

27.AllmencanseethetacticswherebyIconquer,butwhatnonecanseeisthestrategyoutofwhich

victoryisevolved.

28.Donotrepeatthetacticswhichhavegainedyouonevictory,butletyourmethodsberegulatedbytheinfinitevarietyofcircumstances.

29.Militarytacticsarelikeuntowater;forwaterinitsnaturalcourserunsawayfromhighplaces

andhastensdownwards.

30.Soinwar,thewayistoavoidwhatisstrongandtostrikeatwhatisweak.

31.Watershapesitscourseaccordingtothenatureofthegroundoverwhichitflows;thesoldier

worksouthisvictoryinrelationtothefoewhomheisfacing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant

conditions.

33.Hewhocanmodifyhistacticsinrelationtohisopponentandtherebysucceedinwinning,may

becalledaheaven-borncaptain.

34. The five elements are not always equally predominant; the four seasonsmakeway for each

otherinturn.Thereareshortdaysandlong;themoonhasitsperiodsofwaningandwaxing.

VII.MANOEUVRING

1.SunTzusaid:Inwar,thegeneralreceiveshiscommandsfromthesovereign.

2.Havingcollectedanarmyandconcentratedhisforces,hemustblendandharmonisethedifferent

elementsthereofbeforepitchinghiscamp.

3.Afterthat,comestacticalmanœuvring,thanwhichthereisnothingmoredifficult.Thedifficulty

oftacticalmanœuvringconsistsinturningthedeviousintothedirect,andmisfortuneintogain.

4.Thus, to take a longandcircuitous route, after enticing the enemyoutof theway, and though

starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice ofdeviation.

5.Manœuvringwithanarmyisadvantageous;withanundisciplinedmultitude,mostdangerous.

6.Ifyousetafullyequippedarmyinmarchinorder tosnatchanadvantage, thechancesare that

you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves thesacrificeofitsbaggageandstores.7.Thus,ifyouorderyourmentorolluptheirbuff-coats,andmakeforcedmarcheswithouthalting

dayornight,coveringdoubletheusualdistanceatastretch,doingahundredliinordertowrestanadvantage,theleadersofallyourthreedivisionswillfallintothehandsoftheenemy.

8.Thestrongermenwillbeinfront,thejadedoneswillfallbehind,andonthisplanonlyone-tenth

ofyourarmywillreachitsdestination.

9.Ifyoumarchfiftyli inordertooutmanœuvretheenemy,youwill losetheleaderofyourfirst

division,andonlyhalfyourforcewillreachthegoal.

10.Ifyoumarchthirtyliwiththesameobject,two-thirdsofyourarmywillarrive.

11.Wemaytakeitthenthatanarmywithoutitsbaggage-trainislost;withoutprovisionsitislost;

withoutbasesofsupplyitislost.

12.Wecannotenterintoalliancesuntilweareacquaintedwiththedesignsofourneighbours.

13.Wearenotfittoleadanarmyonthemarchunlesswearefamiliarwiththefaceofthecountry—

itsmountainsandforests,itspitfallsandprecipices,itsmarshesandswamps.

14.Weshallbeunabletoturnnaturaladvantagestoaccountunlesswemakeuseoflocalguides.

15.Inwar,practisedissimulation,andyouwillsucceed.Moveonlyifthereisarealadvantagetobe

gained.

16.Whethertoconcentrateortodivideyourtroops,mustbedecidedbycircumstances.

17.Letyourrapiditybethatofthewind,yourcompactnessthatoftheforest.18.Inraidingandplunderingbelikefire,inimmovabilitylikeamountain.

19.Letyourplansbedarkandimpenetrableasnight,andwhenyoumove,falllikeathunderbolt.

20.Whenyouplunderacountryside,letthespoilbedividedamongstyourmen;whenyoucapture

newterritory,cutitupintoallotmentsforthebenefitofthesoldiery.

21.Ponderanddeliberatebeforeyoumakeamove.

22.Hewillconquerwhohaslearnttheartificeofdeviation.Suchistheartofmanœuvring.

23.TheBookofArmyManagementsays:Onthefieldofbattle,thespokenworddoesnotcarryfar

enough:hencetheinstitutionofgongsanddrums.Norcanordinaryobjectsbeseenclearlyenough:hencetheinstitutionofbannersandflags.

24.Gongsanddrums,bannersandflags,aremeanswherebytheearsandeyesofthehostmaybe

focusedononeparticularpoint.

25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advance

alone,orforthecowardlytoretreatalone.Thisistheartofhandlinglargemassesofmen.

26. In night-fighting, then,makemuch use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of

flagsandbanners,asameansofinfluencingtheearsandeyesofyourarmy.

27.Awholearmymayberobbedofitsspirit;acommander-in-chiefmayberobbedofhispresence

ofmind.

28.Nowa soldier ’s spirit iskeenest in themorning;bynoonday ithasbegun to flag; and in the

evening,hismindisbentonlyonreturningtocamp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an armywhen its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it issluggishandinclinedtoreturn.Thisistheartofstudyingmoods.

30.Disciplinedandcalm,toawaittheappearanceofdisorderandhubbubamongsttheenemy:—this

istheartofretainingself-possession.

31.Tobenearthegoalwhiletheenemyisstillfarfromit,towaitateasewhiletheenemyistoiling

and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’sstrength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemywhose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from

attackinganarmydrawnupincalmandconfidentarray:—thisistheartofstudyingcircumstances.

33.Itisamilitaryaxiomnottoadvanceuphillagainsttheenemy,nortoopposehimwhenhecomes

downhill.

34.Donotpursueanenemywhosimulatesflight;donotattacksoldierswhosetemperiskeen.

35.Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.Do not interferewith an army that is returning

home.

36.Whenyousurroundanarmy,leaveanoutletfree.Donotpressadesperatefoetoohard.

37.Suchistheartofwarfare.

VIII.VARIATIONOFTACTICS

1.SunTzusaid:Inwar,thegeneralreceiveshiscommandsfromthesovereign,collectshisarmyandconcentrateshisforces.

2.Whenindifficultcountry,donotencamp.Incountrywherehighroadsintersect,joinhandswith

yourallies.Donotlingerindangerouslyisolatedpositions.Inhemmed-insituations,youmustresorttostratagem.Inadesperateposition,youmustfight.

3.Thereare roadswhichmustnotbe followed, armieswhichmustnotbeattacked, townswhich

mustnotbebesieged,positionswhichmustnotbecontested,commandsofthesovereignwhichmustnotbeobeyed.

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics

knowshowtohandlehistroops.

5.Thegeneralwhodoesnotunderstandthese,maybewellacquaintedwiththeconfigurationofthe

country,yethewillnotbeabletoturnhisknowledgetopracticalaccount.

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he be

acquaintedwiththeFiveAdvantages,willfailtomakethebestuseofhismen.7.Henceinthewiseleader ’splans,considerationsofadvantageandofdisadvantagewillbeblended

together.

8. Ifourexpectationofadvantagebe tempered in thisway,wemaysucceed inaccomplishing the

essentialpartofourschemes.

9.If,ontheotherhand,inthemidstofdifficultieswearealwaysreadytoseizeanadvantage,we

mayextricateourselvesfrommisfortune.

10.Reducethehostilechiefsbyinflictingdamageonthem;maketroubleforthem,andkeepthem

constantlyengaged;holdoutspeciousallurements,andmakethemrushtoanygivenpoint.

11.Theartofwarteachesustorelynotonthelikelihoodoftheenemy’snotcoming,butonour

ownreadiness to receivehim;noton thechanceofhisnotattacking,but ratheron the fact thatwehavemadeourpositionunassailable.

12.Thereare fivedangerous faultswhichmayaffect ageneral: (1)Recklessness,which leads to

destruction; (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by

insults;(4)adelicacyofhonourwhichissensitivetoshame;(5)over-solicitudeforhismen,whichexposeshimtoworryandtrouble.

13.Thesearethefivebesettingsinsofageneral,ruinoustotheconductofwar.

14.Whenanarmyisoverthrownandits leaderslain, thecausewillsurelybefoundamongthese

fivedangerousfaults.Letthembeasubjectofmeditation.

IX.THEARMYONTHEMARCH

1.SunTzusaid:Wecomenowtothequestionofencampingthearmy,andobservingsignsoftheenemy.Passquicklyovermountains,andkeepintheneighbourhoodofvalleys.

2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for

mountainwarfare.

3.Aftercrossingariver,youshouldgetfarawayfromit.

4.Whenaninvadingforcecrossesariverinitsonwardmarch,donotadvancetomeetitinmid-

stream.Itwillbebesttolethalfthearmygetacross,andthendeliveryourattack.

5.Ifyouareanxioustofight,youshouldnotgotomeettheinvadernearariverwhichhehasto

cross.

6.Mooryourcrafthigherupthantheenemy,andfacingthesun.Donotmoveup-streamtomeetthe

enemy.Somuchforriverwarfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any

delay.

8.Ifforcedtofightinasalt-marsh,youshouldhavewaterandgrassnearyou,andgetyourbacktoaclumpoftrees.Somuchforoperationsinsalt-marshes.

9.Indry,levelcountry,takeupaneasilyaccessiblepositionwithrisinggroundtoyourrightandon

yourrear,sothatthedangermaybeinfront,andsafetyliebehind.Somuchforcampaigninginflatcountry.

10.ThesearethefourusefulbranchesofmilitaryknowledgewhichenabledtheYellowEmperorto

vanquishfourseveralsovereigns.

11.Allarmiespreferhighgroundtolow,andsunnyplacestodark.

12.Ifyouarecarefulofyourmen,andcamponhardground,thearmywillbefreefromdiseaseof

everykind,andthiswillspellvictory.

13.Whenyoucometoahillorabank,occupythesunnyside,with theslopeonyourright rear.

Thusyouwill at once act for thebenefit of your soldiers andutilise thenatural advantagesof theground.

14.When,inconsequenceofheavyrainsup-country,ariverwhichyouwishtofordisswollenand

fleckedwithfoam,youmustwaituntilitsubsides.

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural

hollows,confinedplaces,tangledthickets,quagmiresandcrevasses,shouldbeleftwithallpossiblespeedandnotapproached.

16.Whilewekeepaway fromsuchplaces,weshouldget theenemy toapproach them;whilewe

facethem,weshouldlettheenemyhavethemonhisrear.

17.Ifintheneighbourhoodofyourcampthereshouldbeanyhillycountry,pondssurroundedby

aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must becarefullyroutedoutandsearched;fortheseareplaceswheremeninambushorinsidiousspiesarelikelytobelurking.

18.Whentheenemyiscloseathandandremainsquiet,heisrelyingonthenaturalstrengthofhis

position.

19.Whenhekeepsaloofandtriestoprovokeabattle,heisanxiousfortheothersidetoadvance.

20.Ifhisplaceofencampmentiseasyofaccess,heistenderingabait.

21.Movementamongstthetreesofaforestshowsthattheenemyisadvancing.Theappearanceofa

numberofscreensinthemidstofthickgrassmeansthattheenemywantstomakeussuspicious.

22.The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a

suddenattackiscoming.

23.Whenthereisdustrisinginahighcolumn,itisthesignofchariotsadvancing;whenthedustis

low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out indifferent directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood.A few clouds of dustmovingtoandfrosignifythatthearmyisencamping.

24.Humblewordsandincreasedpreparationsaresignsthattheenemyisabouttoadvance.Violent

languageanddrivingforwardasiftotheattackaresignsthathewillretreat.

25.Whenthelightchariotscomeoutfirstandtakeupapositiononthewings,itisasignthatthe

enemyisformingforbattle.

26.Peaceproposalsunaccompaniedbyasworncovenantindicateaplot.

27.When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical

momenthascome.28.Whensomeareseenadvancingandsomeretreating,itisalure.

29.Whenthesoldiersstandleaningontheirspears,theyarefaintfromwantoffood.

30.If thosewhoaresent todrawwaterbeginbydrinkingthemselves, thearmyissufferingfrom

thirst.

31.If theenemyseesanadvantage tobegainedandmakesnoeffort tosecure it, thesoldiersare

exhausted.

32.Ifbirdsgatheronanyspot,itisunoccupied.Clamourbynightbetokensnervousness.

33.Ifthereisdisturbanceinthecamp,thegeneral’sauthorityisweak.Ifthebannersandflagsare

shiftedabout,seditionisafoot.Iftheofficersareangry,itmeansthatthemenareweary.

34.Whenanarmyfeedsitshorseswithgrainandkillsitscattleforfood,andwhenthemendonot

hangtheircooking-potsoverthecamp-fires,showingthattheywillnotreturntotheirtents,youmayknowthattheyaredeterminedtofighttothedeath.

35.The sight ofmenwhispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to

disaffectionamongsttherankandfile.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many

punishmentsbetrayaconditionofdiredistress.

37.Tobeginbybluster,butafterwardstotakefrightattheenemy’snumbers,showsasupremelack

ofintelligence.

38.Whenenvoysaresentwithcomplimentsintheirmouths,itisasignthattheenemywishesfora

truce.39.If theenemy’stroopsmarchupangrilyandremainfacingoursforalongtimewithouteither

joiningbattleor taking themselvesoff again, the situation is one that demandsgreat vigilance andcircumspection.

40.Ifourtroopsarenomoreinnumberthantheenemy,thatisamplysufficient;itonlymeansthat

nodirectattackcanbemade.Whatwecandoissimplytoconcentrateallouravailablestrength,keepaclosewatchontheenemy,andobtainreinforcements.

41.Hewho exercises no forethought butmakes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by

them.

42.Ifsoldiersarepunishedbeforetheyhavegrownattachedtoyou,theywillnotprovesubmissive;

and,unlesssubmissive,theywillbepracticallyuseless.If,whenthesoldiershavebecomeattachedtoyou,punishmentsarenotenforced,theywillstillbeuseless.

43.Thereforesoldiersmustbetreatedinthefirstinstancewithhumanity,butkeptundercontrolby

meansofirondiscipline.Thisisacertainroadtovictory.

44.If intrainingsoldierscommandsarehabituallyenforced,thearmywillbewell-disciplined;if

not,itsdisciplinewillbebad.

45.Ifageneralshowsconfidenceinhismenbutalwaysinsistsonhisordersbeingobeyed,thegain

willbemutual.

X.TERRAIN

1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2)entanglingground;(3)temporisingground;(4)narrowpasses;(5)precipitousheights;(6)positionsatagreatdistancefromtheenemy.

2.Groundwhichcanbefreelytraversedbybothsidesiscalledaccessible.

3.With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny

spots,andcarefullyguardyourlineofsupplies.Thenyouwillbeabletofightwithadvantage.

4.Groundwhichcanbeabandonedbutishardtore-occupyiscalledentangling.

5.Fromapositionofthissort,iftheenemyisunprepared,youmaysallyforthanddefeathim.But

iftheenemyispreparedforyourcoming,andyoufailtodefeathim,then,returnbeingimpossible,disasterwillensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called

temporisingground.

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be

advisablenottostirforth,butrathertoretreat,thusenticingtheenemyinhisturn;then,whenpartofhisarmyhascomeout,wemaydeliverourattackwithadvantage.

8.Withregardtonarrowpasses,ifyoucanoccupythemfirst,letthembestronglygarrisonedand

awaittheadventoftheenemy.

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully

garrisoned,butonlyifitisweaklygarrisoned.

10.With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should

occupytheraisedandsunnyspots,andtherewaitforhimtocomeup.

11.Iftheenemyhasoccupiedthembeforeyou,donotfollowhim,butretreatandtrytoenticehim

away.

12.Ifyouaresituatedatagreatdistancefromtheenemy,andthestrengthofthetwoarmiesisequal,

itisnoteasytoprovokeabattle,andfightingwillbetoyourdisadvantage.

13.Thesesixare theprinciplesconnectedwithEarth.Thegeneralwhohasattainedaresponsible

postmustbecarefultostudythem.

14.Nowan army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising fromnatural causes, but from

faultsforwhichthegeneralisresponsible.Theseare:(1)Flight;(2)insubordination;(3)collapse;(4)ruin;(5)disorganisation;(6)rout.

15.Otherconditionsbeingequal,ifoneforceishurledagainstanothertentimesitssize,theresult

willbetheflightoftheformer.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is

insubordination.When theofficers are too strongand thecommonsoldiers tooweak, the result iscollapse.17.Whenthehigherofficersareangryandinsubordinate,andonmeetingtheenemygivebattleon

theirownaccountfromafeelingofresentment,beforethecommander-in-chiefcantellwhetherornoheisinapositiontofight,theresultisruin.

18.Whenthegeneralisweakandwithoutauthority;whenhisordersarenotclearanddistinct;when

there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenlyhaphazardmanner,theresultisutterdisorganisation.

19.Whenageneral,unabletoestimatetheenemy’sstrength,allowsaninferiorforcetoengagea

largerone,orhurlsaweakdetachmentagainstapowerfulone,andneglectstoplacepickedsoldiersinthefrontrank,theresultmustbearout.

20.Thesearesixwaysofcourtingdefeat,whichmustbecarefullynotedby thegeneralwhohas

attainedaresponsiblepost.

21.Thenatural formationof the country is the soldier ’s best ally; but a powerof estimating the

adversary,ofcontrollingtheforcesofvictory,andofshrewdlycalculatingdifficulties,dangersanddistances,constitutesthetestofagreatgeneral.

22.Hewhoknowsthesethings,andinfightingputshisknowledgeintopractice,willwinhisbattles.

Hewhoknowsthemnot,norpractisesthem,willsurelybedefeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result invictory, thenyoumust fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if

fightingwillnotresultinvictory,thenyoumustnotfightevenattheruler ’sbidding.

24.Thegeneralwhoadvanceswithoutcovetingfameandretreatswithoutfearingdisgrace,whose

only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of thekingdom.25.Regardyoursoldiersasyourchildren,andtheywillfollowyouintothedeepestvalleys;look

onthemasyourownbelovedsons,andtheywillstandbyyouevenuntodeath.

26.If,however,youareindulgent,butunabletomakeyourauthorityfelt;kind-hearted,butunable

toenforceyourcommands;andincapable,moreover,ofquellingdisorder:thenyoursoldiersmustbelikenedtospoiltchildren;theyareuselessforanypracticalpurpose.

27.Ifweknowthatourownmenareinaconditiontoattack,butareunawarethattheenemyisnot

opentoattack,wehavegoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.

28. Ifwe know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our ownmen are not in a

conditiontoattack,wehavegoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.

29.Ifweknowthattheenemyisopentoattack,andalsoknowthatourmenareinaconditionto

attack,butareunawarethatthenatureofthegroundmakesfightingimpracticable,wehavestillgoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.

30.Hencetheexperiencedsoldier,onceinmotion,isneverbewildered;oncehehasbrokencamp,

heisneverataloss.

31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victorywill not stand in

doubt;ifyouknowHeavenandknowEarth,youmaymakeyourvictorycomplete.

XI.THENINESITUATIONS

1. SunTzu said: The art ofwar recognises nine varieties of ground: (1)Dispersive ground; (2)facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6)seriousground;(7)difficultground;(8)hemmed-inground;(9)desperateground.

2.Whenachieftainisfightinginhisownterritory,itisdispersiveground.

3.Whenhehaspenetratedintohostileterritory,buttonogreatdistance,itisfacileground.

4.Groundthepossessionofwhichimportsgreatadvantagetoeitherside,iscontentiousground.

5.Groundonwhicheachsidehaslibertyofmovementisopenground.

6.Groundwhichformsthekeytothreecontiguousstates,sothathewhooccupiesitfirsthasmost

oftheEmpireathiscommand,isgroundofintersectinghighways.

7.Whenanarmyhaspenetrated into theheartofahostilecountry, leavinganumberof fortified

citiesinitsrear,itisseriousground.8.Mountain forests, rugged steeps,marshes and fens—all country that ishard to traverse: this is

difficultground.

9.Groundwhichisreachedthroughnarrowgorges,andfromwhichwecanonlyretirebytortuous

paths,so thatasmallnumberof theenemywouldsuffice tocrusha largebodyofourmen: this ishemmed-inground.

10.Groundonwhichwecanonlybesavedfromdestructionbyfightingwithoutdelay,isdesperate

ground.

11.Ondispersiveground,therefore,fightnot.Onfacileground,haltnot.Oncontentiousground,

attacknot.

12.Onopenground,donottrytoblocktheenemy’sway.Ongroundofintersectinghighways,join

handswithyourallies.

13.Onseriousground,gatherinplunder.Indifficultground,keepsteadilyonthemarch.

14.Onhemmed-inground,resorttostratagem.Ondesperateground,fight.

15.Thosewhowerecalledskilfulleadersofoldknewhowtodriveawedgebetweentheenemy’s

front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the goodtroopsfromrescuingthebad,theofficersfromrallyingtheirmen.

16.Whentheenemy’smenwerescattered,theypreventedthemfromconcentrating;evenwhentheir

forceswereunited,theymanagedtokeepthemindisorder.

17.Whenitwastotheiradvantage,theymadeaforwardmove;whenotherwise,theystoppedstill.

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of

marchingtotheattack,Ishouldsay:“Beginbyseizingsomethingwhichyouropponentholdsdear;thenhewillbeamenabletoyourwill.”19.Rapidity is theessenceofwar: takeadvantageof theenemy’sunreadiness,makeyourwayby

unexpectedroutes,andattackunguardedspots.

20.Thefollowingaretheprinciplestobeobservedbyaninvadingforce:Thefurtheryoupenetrate

intoacountry,thegreaterwillbethesolidarityofyourtroops,andthusthedefenderswillnotprevailagainstyou.

21.Makeforaysinfertilecountryinordertosupplyyourarmywithfood.

22.Carefullystudythewell-beingofyourmen,anddonotovertaxthem.Concentrateyourenergy

andhoardyourstrength.Keepyourarmycontinuallyonthemove,anddeviseunfathomableplans.

23. Throw your soldiers into positionswhence there is no escape, and theywill prefer death to

flight.Iftheywillfacedeath,thereisnothingtheymaynotachieve.Officersandmenalikewillputforththeiruttermoststrength.

24.Soldierswhenindesperatestraitslosethesenseoffear.Ifthereisnoplaceofrefuge,theywill

standfirm.Iftheyareintheheartofahostilecountry,theywillshowastubbornfront.Ifthereisnohelpforit,theywillfighthard.

25.Thus,withoutwaitingtobemarshalled,thesoldierswillbeconstantlyonthequivive;without

waitingtobeasked,theywilldoyourwill;withoutrestrictions,theywillbefaithful;withoutgivingorders,theycanbetrusted.

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do awaywith superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself

comes,nocalamityneedbefeared.

27.Ifoursoldiersarenotoverburdenedwithmoney,itisnotbecausetheyhaveadistasteforriches;

iftheirlivesarenotundulylong,itisnotbecausetheyaredisinclinedtolongevity.

28.On theday theyareorderedout tobattle,your soldiersmayweep, those sittingupbedewingtheir garments, and those lyingdown letting the tears rundown their cheeks.But let themoncebebroughttobay,andtheywilldisplaythecourageofaChuoraKuei.

29.Theskilfultacticianmaybelikenedtotheshuai-jan.Nowtheshuai-janisasnakethatisfound

intheCh’angmountains.Strikeat itshead,andyouwillbeattackedbyits tail;strikeat its tail,andyouwillbeattackedbyitshead;strikeatitsmiddle,andyouwillbeattackedbyheadandtailboth.

30.Askedifanarmycanbemadetoimitatetheshuai-jan,Ishouldanswer,Yes.ForthemenofWu

andthemenofYüehareenemies;yetiftheyarecrossingariverinthesameboatandarecaughtbyastorm,theywillcometoeachother ’sassistancejustasthelefthandhelpstheright.

31.Henceit isnotenoughtoputone’strust inthetetheringofhorses,andtheburyingofchariot

wheelsintheground.

32.Theprincipleonwhichtomanageanarmyistosetuponestandardofcouragewhichallmust

reach.

33.Howtomakethebestofbothstrongandweak—thatisaquestioninvolvingtheproperuseof

ground.

34.Thustheskilfulgeneralconductshisarmyjustasthoughhewereleadingasingleman,willy-

nilly,bythehand.

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus

maintainorder.

36.Hemustbeabletomystifyhisofficersandmenbyfalsereportsandappearances,andthuskeep

themintotalignorance.

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite

knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy fromanticipatinghispurpose.38.Atthecriticalmoment,theleaderofanarmyactslikeonewhohasclimbedupaheightandthen

kicksawaytheladderbehindhim.Hecarrieshismendeepintohostileterritorybeforeheshowshishand.

39.Heburnshisboats andbreakshis cooking-pots; likea shepherddrivinga flockof sheep,he

driveshismenthiswayandthat,andnoneknowswhitherheisgoing.

40.Tomusterhishostandbringitintodanger:—thismaybetermedthebusinessofthegeneral.

41.Thedifferentmeasuressuitedtotheninevarietiesofground;theexpediencyofaggressiveor

defensivetactics;andthefundamentallawsofhumannature:thesearethingsthatmustmostcertainlybestudied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings

cohesion;penetratingbutashortwaymeansdispersion.

43.Whenyouleaveyourowncountrybehind,andtakeyourarmyacrossneighbouringterritory,

youfindyourselfoncriticalground.Whentherearemeansofcommunicationonallfoursides,thegroundisoneofintersectinghighways.

44.Whenyoupenetratedeeplyintoacountry,itisseriousground.Whenyoupenetratebutalittle

way,itisfacileground.

45.Whenyouhavetheenemy’sstrongholdsonyourrear,andnarrowpassesinfront,itishemmed-

inground.Whenthereisnoplaceofrefugeatall,itisdesperateground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose. On facile

ground,Iwouldseethatthereiscloseconnectionbetweenallpartsofmyarmy.

47.Oncontentiousground,Iwouldhurryupmyrear.48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of intersecting

highways,Iwouldconsolidatemyalliances.

49.Onseriousground,Iwouldtrytoensureacontinuousstreamofsupplies.Ondifficultground,I

wouldkeeppushingonalongtheroad.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat. On desperate ground, I would

proclaimtomysoldiersthehopelessnessofsavingtheirlives.

51.Foritisthesoldier ’sdispositiontoofferanobstinateresistancewhensurrounded,tofighthard

whenhecannothelphimself,andtoobeypromptlywhenhehasfallenintodanger.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their

designs.We are not fit to lead an army on themarch unless we are familiar with the face of thecountry—itsmountainsandforests, itspitfallsandprecipices, itsmarshesandswamps.Weshallbeunabletoturnnaturaladvantagestoaccountunlesswemakeuseoflocalguides.

53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit awarlike

prince.

54.Whenawarlikeprinceattacksapowerfulstate,hisgeneralshipshows itself inpreventing the

concentrationoftheenemy’sforces.Heoveraweshisopponents,andtheiralliesarepreventedfromjoiningagainsthim.

55.Hencehedoesnot strive toallyhimselfwithallandsundry,nordoeshe foster thepowerof

otherstates.Hecarriesouthisownsecretdesigns,keepinghisantagonistsinawe.Thusheisabletocapturetheircitiesandoverthrowtheirkingdoms.

56.Bestowrewardswithoutregardtorule,issueorderswithoutregardtopreviousarrangements;

andyouwillbeabletohandleawholearmyasthoughyouhadtodowithbutasingleman.57.Confrontyoursoldierswiththedeeditself;neverletthemknowyourdesign.Whentheoutlook

isbright,bringitbeforetheireyes;buttellthemnothingwhenthesituationisgloomy.

58.Placeyourarmyindeadlyperil,anditwillsurvive;plungeitintodesperatestraits,anditwill

comeoffinsafety.

59.Foritispreciselywhenaforcehasfallenintoharm’swaythatitiscapableofstrikingablow

forvictory.

60.Successinwarfareisgainedbycarefullyaccommodatingourselvestotheenemy’spurpose.

61.Bypersistentlyhangingon the enemy’s flank,we shall succeed in the long run inkilling the

commander-in-chief.

62.Thisiscalledabilitytoaccomplishathingbysheercunning.

63.Onthedaythatyoutakeupyourcommand,blockthefrontierpasses,destroytheofficialtallies,

andstopthepassageofallemissaries.

64.Besterninthecouncil-chamber,sothatyoumaycontrolthesituation.

65.Iftheenemyleavesadooropen,youmustrushin.

66.Forestallyouropponentbyseizingwhatheholdsdear,andsubtlycontrivetotimehisarrivalon

theground.

67.Walkinthepathdefinedbyrule,andaccommodateyourselftotheenemyuntilyoucanfighta

decisivebattle.

68.Atfirst,then,exhibitthecoynessofamaiden,untiltheenemygivesyouanopening;afterwards

emulatetherapidityofarunninghare,anditwillbetoolatefortheenemytoopposeyou.

XII.THEATTACKBYFIRE

1.SunTzu said:There are fivewaysof attackingwith fire.The first is to burn soldiers in theircamp;thesecondistoburnstores;thethirdistoburnbaggage-trains;thefourthistoburnarsenalsandmagazines;thefifthistohurldroppingfireamongsttheenemy.

2.Inordertocarryoutanattackwithfire,wemusthavemeansavailable.Thematerialforraising

fireshouldalwaysbekeptinreadiness.

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a

conflagration.

4.Theproperseasoniswhentheweatherisverydry;thespecialdaysarethosewhenthemoonisin

the constellation of the Sieve, theWall, theWing or theCross-bar; for these four are all days ofrisingwind.

5.Inattackingwithfire,oneshouldbepreparedtomeetfivepossibledevelopments:

6.(1)Whenfirebreaksoutinsidetheenemy’scamp,respondatoncewithanattackfromwithout.

7.(2)Ifthereisanoutbreakoffire,buttheenemy’ssoldiersremainquiet,bideyourtimeanddo

notattack.8. (3)When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it upwith an attack, if that is

practicable;ifnot,staywhereyouare.

9. (4) If it is possible tomake an assaultwith fire fromwithout, do notwait for it to break out

within,butdeliveryourattackatafavourablemoment.

10.(5)Whenyoustartafire,betowindwardofit.Donotattackfromtheleeward.

11.Awindthatrisesinthedaytimelastslong,butanightbreezesoonfalls.

12.Ineveryarmy,thefivedevelopmentsconnectedwithfiremustbeknown,themovementsofthe

starscalculated,andawatchkeptfortheproperdays.

13.Hencethosewhousefireasanaidtotheattackshowintelligence;thosewhousewaterasanaid

totheattackgainanaccessionofstrength.

14.Bymeansofwater,anenemymaybeintercepted,butnotrobbedofallhisbelongings.

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without

cultivatingthespiritofenterprise;fortheresultiswasteoftimeandgeneralstagnation.

16.Hencethesaying:Theenlightenedrulerlayshisplanswellahead;thegoodgeneralcultivates

hisresources.

17.Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be

gained;fightnotunlessthepositioniscritical.

18.Norulershouldput troops into thefieldmerely togratifyhisownspleen;nogeneralshould

fightabattlesimplyoutofpique.19.Ifitistoyouradvantage,makeaforwardmove;ifnot,staywhereyouare.

20.Angermayintimechangetogladness;vexationmaybesucceededbycontent.

21.Butakingdomthathasoncebeendestroyedcannevercomeagainintobeing;norcanthedead

everbebroughtbacktolife.

22.Hencetheenlightenedrulerisheedful,andthegoodgeneralfullofcaution.Thisisthewayto

keepacountryatpeaceandanarmyintact.

XIII.THEUSEOFSPIES

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousandmen andmarching them great distancesentailsheavylossonthepeopleandadrainontheresourcesoftheState.Thedailyexpenditurewillamounttoathousandouncesofsilver.Therewillbecommotionathomeandabroad,andmenwilldropdownexhaustedonthehighways.Asmanyassevenhundredthousandfamilieswillbeimpededintheirlabour.

2.Hostilearmiesmayfaceeachotherforyears,strivingforthevictorywhichisdecidedinasingle

day.Thisbeingso,toremaininignoranceoftheenemy’sconditionsimplybecauseonegrudgesthe

outlayofahundredouncesofsilverinhonoursandemolumentsistheheightofinhumanity.3.Onewhoactsthusisnoleaderofmen,nopresenthelptohissovereign,nomasterofvictory.

4.Thus,whatenablesthewisesovereignandthegoodgeneral tostrikeandconquer,andachieve

thingsbeyondthereachofordinarymen,isforeknowledge.

5.Nowthisforeknowledgecannotbeelicitedfromspirits; itcannotbeobtainedinductivelyfrom

experience,norbyanydeductivecalculation.

6.Knowledgeoftheenemy’sdispositionscanonlybeobtainedfromothermen.7.Hence the use of spies, ofwhom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3)

convertedspies;(4)doomedspies;(5)survivingspies.

8.Whenthesefivekindsofspyareallatwork,nonecandiscoverthesecretsystem.Thisiscalled

“divinemanipulationofthethreads.”Itisthesovereign’smostpreciousfaculty.

9.Havinglocalspiesmeansemployingtheservicesoftheinhabitantsofadistrict.

10.Havinginwardspies,makinguseofofficialsoftheenemy.

11.Havingconvertedspies,gettingholdoftheenemy’sspiesandusingthemforourownpurposes.

12.Havingdoomedspies,doingcertainthingsopenlyforpurposesofdeception,andallowingour

ownspiestoknowofthemandreportthemtotheenemy.

13.Survivingspies,finally,arethosewhobringbacknewsfromtheenemy’scamp.

14.Henceitisthatwithnoneinthewholearmyaremoreintimaterelationstobemaintainedthan

withspies.Noneshouldbemoreliberallyrewarded.Innootherbusinessshouldgreatersecrecybepreserved.

15.Spiescannotbeusefullyemployedwithoutacertainintuitivesagacity.

16.Theycannotbeproperlymanagedwithoutbenevolenceandstraightforwardness.

17.Withoutsubtleingenuityofmind,onecannotmakecertainofthetruthoftheirreports.

18.Besubtle!Besubtle!anduseyourspiesforeverykindofbusiness.19. Ifasecretpieceofnews isdivulgedbyaspybefore the time is ripe,hemustbeput todeath

togetherwiththemantowhomthesecretwastold.

20.Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is

alwaysnecessary tobeginby findingout thenamesof theattendants, theaides-de-camp, thedoor-keepersandsentriesofthegeneralincommand.Ourspiesmustbecommissionedtoascertainthese.

21.Theenemy’s spieswhohavecome to spyonusmustbe soughtout, temptedwithbribes, led

awayandcomfortablyhoused.Thustheywillbecomeconvertedspiesandavailableforourservice.

22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and

employlocalandinwardspies.

23.Itisowingtohisinformation,again,thatwecancausethedoomedspytocarryfalsetidingsto

theenemy.

24.Lastly,itisbyhisinformationthatthesurvivingspycanbeusedonappointedoccasions.

25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this

knowledgecanonlybederived,inthefirstinstance,fromtheconvertedspy.Henceitisessentialthattheconvertedspybetreatedwiththeutmostliberality.

26.Ofold,theriseoftheYindynastywasduetoIChih,whohadservedundertheHsia.Likewise,

theriseoftheChoudynastywasduetoLüYa,whohadservedundertheYin.

27.Henceitisonlytheenlightenedrulerandthewisegeneralwhowillusethehighestintelligence

ofthearmyforpurposesofspying,andtherebytheyachievegreatresults.Spiesareamostimportantelementinwar,becauseonthemdependsanarmy’sabilitytomove.

THEARTOFWAR

withNotes,CommentariesfromtheChineseMasters,andanAppendixby

LionelGilesandDallasGalvinONTHETRANSLATION,NOTES,ANDCOMMENTARIES

byDallasGalvinLIONELGILESWANTEDTOALLOWhisreaderstounderstandthetextofTheArtofWarasSunTzuintendedit.Toachievehisambitionwouldrequirethreetasks:creatingatextabletostandaloneasaworkinEnglish;indicatingwheretheoriginaltextwasuncertain;andprovidingEnglishreaderswith some measure of the commentary—the history lessons, the strategic debates, the thoughtfulqualifications—thatthetypicalChinesestudentwouldreceive.ThusalongwithhistranslationofTheArtofWar,Gilesprovidedcopiouscriticalnotes.Wehavereproducedthem,withemendations,alongwiththetextasGilesoriginallyconceivedit.Inaddition,GilespresentedcommentaryfromsomeofthemostimportantthinkersonmilitaryandhistoricalmattersthroughoutChinesehistory.Gilesunderstoodhewasblazingatrail.AtthetimeoftheFrenchRevolution,Chinahadbeenthe

world’slargestempire.In1910Englandheldthetitleandwasfeelingtheresponsibility.Thiswasthemoment of high British Empire—a decade after the Boxer Rebellion, fifty years after the IndianMutiny,andeightsincethebitterlyfoughtBoerWar—whenimperialreachwasconsolidatinginAsiaandAfrica.Nevertheless,asanEnglishspeakerGileswasflyingsolo.EversincetheEnlightenment,theFrenchand theJesuitshadmadestrides in translatingChineseartsand letters for theWest.TheGermans, the Russians, and particularly the Japanese had begun to study and translate the greatChineseclassics.Inthisrealm,however,theEnglishwerejustgearingupforwhatwouldbecomeagoldencenturyofAsianlanguagescholarship.In1905CaptainE.F.Calthrop,R.F.A., hadpublished anEnglish translationofTheArt ofWar in

Tokyo,undertheJapanesenameforSunTzu:Sonshi.AssistedbytwoJapanesemilitarymen,hehadworkedfromaJapaneseversionofthetext.GilesdismissedCalthrop’sworkassubstandardandnotscholarly, and other scholars have rejected it too.At the turn of the nineteenth century,Calthrop’swork did not face quite the scholarly depredation that it would by the 1930s, but it was clearlyunacceptable.Giles’seffortin1910wasthefirsttranslationintoEnglishofSunTzu’sTheArtofWarbyaserious

sinologist. With a text some 2,400 years old, Giles confronted a language and a sensibility atconsiderable remove from his own, and he worked years before the great “Orientalists”—ArthurWaley, IvanMorris,DonaldKeene,BurtonWatson, JamesLegge, JohnFairbank,OwenLattimore,and scores of poet-translators—would fairly invent Asian studies for English speakers. Yet Gilesachievedhismission.Hisversioncananddoesstandalone.Itisstillstudiedbymilitarymenandisbelovedbygeneralreaderswhohavenoconnectiontocombat.Formore than fiftyyears, theGiles translationwas thedefinitiveedition—ithadnocompetitors.

Butattheopeningofthetwentiethcenturyhisfeatwasneithereasynorassured.Aquickscanofthe

original Chinese text frames the issues: Thewriting is neat and brief—like a haiku poem.And inseveralinstances,itmakesnoearthlysenseinEnglishorChinese.Weneednotinvestigatetoodeeplytodiscoverwhy.WhenweencounterworkslikeTheArtofWarweareonthelongcuspofanoraltradition.AsArthurWaleywrites,“Theearliestuseofconnectedwriting...wasasanaidtomemory...[I]tspurposewastohelppeoplenottoforgetwhattheyknewalready,whereas,inmoreadvancedcommunities, the chief use of writing is to tell people things they have not heard before”(introductiontoTheBookofSongs,p.11).Acompletelyaccuratetranslationiscategoricallyimpossible,alwaysahopefulapproximation.But

translatorsworkinginEuropeantonguesrarelyconfrontthePandora’sboxGilesdid.Hesucceeds,butnotwithoutinfelicitiesandcompromises.Guidinghisreadersintothisfabulous,ancientworld,heintroduces English words to descant the laconic Chinese text—sparingly, but he does. Latertranslatorswill argueagainst thispractice,but theywillhaveaccess toaversionof the text that is“purer”byathousandyears.Andothertranslatorswillreflectthereigningliteraryandculturaltrendsoftheirtimes.Thatisthe“way”oftranslation—DrydenandPope,evenFitzgeraldsetthestandardfortheirperiods,butnowtheysound,ifnotquaint,morelikethemselvesthanatruerenderingofothermen’swords.Languageisalivingthing,andaschangeisessentialtolife,itischaracteristicofourwords. We read Dryden’s translations of Homer, Ovid, or Virgil for the devilish brilliance ofDryden’s own lyricism, and even his vocabulary seems odd now, a thing apart. InThe Art ofWarGiles found some measure of himself—citizen, thinker, pioneer, and, most especially, educator.That’sprobablywhythisworkstillstands.LionelGileshadtocarveapassagewaybetweenWestandEast,Classicalandcontemporary,yetstill

keeptothetextSunTzucomposed.Inthenotes,Gilesnailsculturalandhistoricalobservations,plusthe interpretations of the commentators, to the relevant phrases he translates. It is often delightfulreading,butcumbersome.Hewondersaloudabouthischoicesandargueswiththeinterpretationsofotherscholars,whileofferingwiseobservationsabouttheworldanditsbellicosepropensities.Thenotesbreaktherhythmsoftheoriginal,herdingthetextasasheepdogmightintofieldsofmilitaryhistory,corralsofinterpretivequeries.Thenotesareofunevenlength,naturally,anddonotaccompanyeveryitem.Wehavemaintained

the style of the original notes but have edited them for relevance; for example, they includedescriptionsofGiles’smethodsandrationalesforthetranslation,butsuchacademicdiscussionisofinterestonly to linguistic scholars,andwehaveeliminated ithere.When, for thisedition,wehaveselectedonlypartofanote,wehavenotusedellipsestoshowthat,intheoriginal,textprecedesorfollowstheselection,butwehaveusedellipsestoshowomittedwordswithintheselection.MerewordscanbridgeonlypartoftheepochalculturalchasmthatexistsbetweenSunTzu’stime

andsubsequenteras,evenfortheChinese.Gilesalsofacedtextualinterpolationsandcorruptionsthathadaccretedlikebarnaclestotheoriginaloverthemillennia.Forcenturies,thebestscholarsinChinahadchewedovercertainideograms,arguedoverentirelines(ortheirabsence),andfoughtovertheveracityofvariantsoftheoriginal,justasWesternscholarsdebatetheauthorshipofHomer ’sIliadand Odyssey and the provenance of Shakespeare’s plays. Over the centuries, a great scholarlyliteraturedevelopedtoexplicatethethornypassages,towonderovertheideograms,andtoferretoutbogusadditions.Giles provides us with the most pungent and trenchant of them here in selections from the

commentaries.Whatagift!TheauthorsincludeWangHsi,Ts’aoTs’ao,TuYuandhisgrandsonTu

Mu,LiCh’üan,MêngShih—someof themost illustriousnames inChinesemilitaryandhistoricalliterature.TheyelucidatethenumberedpointsSunTzumakeswithexamplesfromChina’s3,000-yearhistory,inamethodthatisaclassicChineseteachingdeviceandcharacteristicofChineseexpositorystyle.Apart from the delicious entrée they give us toChinese culture, the commentaries present aprintapproximationforthemodernreaderofhowaninstructivetreatisemighthavebeentransmittedatthetimeofSunTzu.AspartofhisoriginalintroductionGilesincludeddescriptionsofthemajorChinesecommentatorshecitesinthenotes;theyappearinthiseditionintheAppendix.Inthisedition,wehaveintroducedrelevantexcerptsfromtheworkofWesternwritersandthinkers,

ancientandmodern—generals,poets,politicalleaders,andotherobservers.

SunTzuonTheArtofWar

I.LAYINGPLANS

[WhentheenemylaunchedasurpriseattackonCaesar ’ssupplytrain]Caesarhadeverythingtodoatonetime:toraisethestandard. . . ; tosoundthetrumpet; torecall thesoldiersfromthefortifications; to summon those who had proceeded some distance to seek materials for arampart;toformabattleline;toencouragethemen;andtogivethesignal.Agreatpartofthesearrangementswaspreventedbytheshortnessoftimeandthesuddenapproachandchargeoftheenemy. Under these difficulties, two things proved of advantage: the soldiers’ skill andexperience...andthefactthatCaesarhadforbiddenhisseverallieutenantstodepartfromtheirrespectivelegionsbeforethecampwasfortified.JuliusCaesar,DeBelloGallico(58-51B.C.)

SunTzusignalstheimportanceheassignstoplanningbyopeningTheArtofWarwithitsdiscussion—and then reiteratingmanyof thepoints from thischapter throughsubsequentchapters.Whilewecannotknowwithcertaintywhether theGreeksand theRomansstudiedSunTzu’swork, theymusthaveknownitatleastindirectly.AcrossthecenturiescaravansariespliedtheSilkRoad,exchangingculturaltidbitsfarlessvaluablebetweenChinaandempirestotheWest.DG

1.SunTzusaid:TheartofwarisofvitalimportancetotheState.2.Itisamatteroflifeanddeath,aroadeithertosafetyortoruin.Henceitisasubjectofinquiry

whichcanonnoaccountbeneglected.3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s

deliberations,whenseekingtodeterminetheconditionsobtaininginthefield.4. These are: (1) TheMoral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5)Method and

discipline.

ItappearsfromwhatfollowsthatSunTzumeansbyMoralLawaprincipleofharmony,notunlikethe Tao [method or way] of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by“morale,”wereitnotconsideredasanattributeoftherulerinparagraph13.

Wehaveherethefundamentalproblemofethics,thecruxofthetheoryofmoralconduct.Whatisjustice?—shallweseekrighteousness,orshallweseekpower?—isitbettertobegood,ortobestrong?WillDurant,TheStoryofPhilosophy(1926)

5,6.TheMoralLawcauses thepeople tobe incompleteaccordwith their ruler,so that theywillfollowhimregardlessoftheirlives,undismayedbyanydanger.

If,forexample,goodmeantintelligent,andvirtuemeantwisdom;ifmencouldbetaughttoseeclearly their real interests, to see afar the distant results of their deeds, to criticize andcoördinatetheirdesiresoutofaself-cancelingchaosintoapurposiveandcreativeharmony—this,perhaps,wouldprovidefor theeducatedandsophisticatedman themoralitywhich in theunletteredreliesonre-iteratedpreceptsandexternalcontrol.WillDurant,TheStoryofPhilosophy(1926)

7.Heavensignifiesnightandday,coldandheat,timesandseasons.

WangHsi[see“Appendix:TheCommentators”]...mayberightinsayingthatwhatismeantis“thegeneral economy ofHeaven,” including the five elements, the four seasons,wind and clouds, andotherphenomena.

ThoughfromtheearliesttimestheChineseweremonotheistic,bySunTzu’seravariouslesserdeitiesassociatedwiththeseasonsandtheelementshadtakenhold.DG

8.Earthcomprisesdistances,greatandsmall;dangerandsecurity;opengroundandnarrowpasses;thechancesoflifeanddeath.

For Sun Tzu, heaven and earth conjure the conditions and the situations, asmuch as the physicalterrain,wherebymorallawismademanifestandplayedout.DG

9.TheCommanderstandsforthevirtuesofwisdom,sincerity,benevolence,courageandstrictness.

ThefivecardinalvirtuesoftheChineseare(1)humanityorbenevolence;(2)uprightnessofmind;(3)self-respect,self-control,or“properfeeling”;(4)wisdom;(5)sincerityorgoodfaith.Herewisdomandsincerityareputbeforehumanity,andthetwomilitaryvirtuesof“courage”and“strictness”[are]substitutedforuprightnessandself-respect.

10. ByMethod and discipline are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its propersubdivisions,thegradationsofrankamongtheofficers,themaintenanceofroadsbywhichsuppliesmayreachthearmy,andthecontrolofmilitaryexpenditure.11.Thesefiveheadsshouldbefamiliartoeverygeneral:hewhoknowsthemwillbevictorious;he

whoknowsthemnotwillfail.12.Therefore,inyourdeliberations,whenseekingtodeterminethemilitaryconditions,letthembe

madethebasisofacomparison,inthiswise:13.(1)WhichofthetwosovereignsisimbuedwiththeMoralLaw?I.e.,“isinharmonywithhissubjects.”

(2)Whichofthetwogeneralshasmostability?(3)WithwhomlietheadvantagesderivedfromHeavenandEarth?(4)Onwhichsideisdisciplinemostrigorouslyenforced?

Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D.155-220), who was such a strictdisciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standingcrops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn!However,inlieuoflosinghishead,hewaspersuadedtosatisfyhissenseofjusticebycuttingoffhishair. Ts’aoTs’ao’s own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: “When you laydownalaw,seethatitisnotdisobeyed;ifitisdisobeyed,theoffendermustbeputtodeath.”

(5)Whicharmyisthestronger?Morallyaswellasphysically.

(6)Onwhichsideareofficersandmenmorehighlytrained?TuYu quotes [another commentator]: “Without constant practice, the officerswill be nervous andundecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering andirresolutewhenthecrisisisathand.”

(7)Inwhicharmyistherethegreaterconstancybothinrewardandpunishment?That is,onwhichside is there themostabsolutecertainty thatmeritwillbeproperlyrewardedandmisdeedssummarilypunished?

Itiscertainlyfortheinterestoftheservicethatacordialinterchangeofcivilitiesshouldsubsistbetween superior and inferior officers, and therefore it is bad policy in superiors to behavetowardtheirinferiorsindiscriminately,astho’theywereofalowerspecies,suchaconductwilldampthespiritsofanyman....Cheerfulardorandspirit...oughtevertobethecharacteristicofanofficer...fortobewellobeyeditisnecessarytobeesteemed.JohnPaulJones(1776)

14.BymeansofthesesevenconsiderationsIcanforecastvictoryordefeat.Whodoeswhat,andhowtheactivitiesareorganized(incounterguerrillaorguerrillawarfare),isfar lessimportant thanunderstandingthemissionandbeingdeterminedtoaccomplishitbymeansnotinconsistentwiththemission.Solongasasufficientnumberunderstandthemissionandwhatitimplies,seektoaccomplishitwithadedicationandanintelligencenotsubstantiallyinferiortothatoftheenemy,andreceiveadequatepoliticalsupport,thecounterguerrillaeffortshouldnotusuallybedifficult.Lt.Col.CharlesBohannanandCol.NapoleonValeriano,CounterguerrillaOperations(1962)

15. The general that hearkens tomy counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one beretainedincommand!Thegeneralthathearkensnottomycounselnoractsuponit,willsufferdefeat:—letsuchaonebedismissed!

TheformofthisparagraphremindsusthatSunTzu’streatisewascomposedexpresslyforthebenefitofhispatron,HoLü,kingoftheWuState.

16.Whileheedingtheprofitofmycounsel,availyourselfalsoofanyhelpfulcircumstancesoverandbeyondtheordinaryrules.17.Accordingascircumstancesarefavourable,oneshouldmodifyone’splans.

SunTzu,asapracticalsoldier,willhavenoneofthe“bookishtheoric.”Hecautionsusherenottopinour faith toabstractprinciples;“for,”asChangYüputs it,“while themain lawsofstrategycanbe

statedclearlyenoughforthebenefitofallandsundry,youmustbeguidedbytheactionsoftheenemyinattemptingtosecureafavourablepositioninactualwarfare.”OntheeveofthebattleofWaterloo,LordUxbridge,commandingthecavalry,wenttotheDukeofWellingtoninordertolearnwhathisplansandcalculationswereforthemorrow,because,asheexplained,hemightsuddenlyfindhimselfCommander-in-chiefandwouldbeunabletoframenewplansinacriticalmoment.TheDukelistenedquietlyandthensaid,“Whowillattackfirstto-morrow—IorBonaparte?”“Bonaparte,”repliedLordUxbridge.“Well,”continuedtheDuke,“Bonapartehasnotgivenmeanyideaofhisprojects;andasmyplanswilldependuponhis,howcanyouexpectmetotellyouwhatmineare?”

18.Allwarfareisbasedondeception.

Thetruthofthispithyandprofoundsayingwillbeadmittedbyeverysoldier.Col.Henderson[Lt.Col.G.F.R.Henderson,authorofStonewallJacksonandtheAmericanCivilWar(1898)andTheScienceof War (1905)] tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especiallydistinguishedbythe“extraordinaryskillwithwhichheconcealedhismovementsanddeceivedbothfriendandfoe.”

Thisisthegreat,famouslinefromTheArtofWar,quotedthroughtheages.DG

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seeminactive;whenwearenear,wemustmaketheenemybelievewearefaraway;whenfaraway,wemustmakehimbelievewearenear.20.Holdoutbaitstoenticetheenemy.Feigndisorder,andcrushhim.21.Ifheissecureatallpoints,bepreparedforhim.Ifheisinsuperiorstrength,evadehim.22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.Pretend to beweak, that hemay

growarrogant.

WangTzu,quotedbyTuYu,saysthatthegoodtacticianplayswithhisadversaryasacatplayswithamouse,firstfeigningweaknessandimmobility,andthensuddenlypouncinguponhim.

23.Ifheistakinghisease,givehimnorest.24.Attackhimwhereheisunprepared,appearwhereyouarenotexpected.

TowhatFederalsoldierdiditoccur,onthemorningofChancellorsville,that[GeneralRobertE.] Lee, confronted by 90,000Northerners,would detach the half of his own small force of50,000toattackhisenemyinflankandrear?...[TheBattleofChancellorsville]tookplacein

May 1863. Lee’s maneuvers, in conjunction with General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’sdevastatingsurpriseattack,arestillstudiedinmilitaryacademies.GeorgeFrancisRobertHenderson andSirThomasBarclay, “War,”Encyclopedia Britannica,eleventhedition(1910)

25.Thesemilitarydevices,leadingtovictory,mustnotbedivulgedbeforehand.

This...isperhapsthebestsensetobegotoutofthetextasitstands.Mostofthecommentatorsgivethefollowingexplanation:“Itisimpossibletolaydownrulesforwarfarebeforeyoucomeintotouchwiththeenemy.”

26.Nowthegeneralwhowinsabattlemakesmanycalculationsinhistempleerethebattleisfought.

ChangYütellsusthatinancienttimesitwascustomaryforatempletobesetapartfortheuseofageneralwhowasabouttotakethefield,inorderthathemightthereelaboratehisplanofcampaign.

Thegeneralwholosesabattlemakesbutfewcalculationsbeforehand.Thusdomanycalculationsleadtovictory,andfewcalculationstodefeat:howmuchmorenocalculationatall!ItisbyattentiontothispointthatIcanforeseewhoislikelytowinorlose.

II.WAGINGWAR

Coinisthesinewsofwar.FrançoisRabelais,GargantuaandPantagruel(1532)Anarmymarchesonitsstomach.NapoleonI,quotedinMémorialdeSte-Hélène,byEmmanuel,comtedeLasCases(1823)

Themain themes of this chapter—the costs of war, the speedwithwhich it is waged, the need tosecuregoodlinesofsupply,andtherequirementoffastmovement(fluidity)—areessentialtobattle,beitguerrillaortraditionalwarfare.Particularlyinthecaseoffluidityanditsconcomitant,negativespace,theseconceptswereatonetimeconsideredquintessentially“Asian”bymilitaryhistorians.Europeanculture,contrariwise,theywouldclaim,putitsstockinmasses,blocks,andbulk.Broadly

conceived,thinkofskyscrapersandepicpoetryversuspagodasandhaiku,boxingversustaichi,thehuge destroyers ofWorldWar II versus kamikazes. Apples and oranges, of course, but that’s thepoint. The images pose for us a singular difference in cultural emphasis and era. InfluentialanthropologistFranzBoasinsistedthat“great”culturescouldbedivinedbythesizeoftheircitiesandmonuments, their accumulation of goods. In the media-dense, peripatetic world of today, wheremultinational peacekeeping forces exchange notes across borders, those differences are meltingaway, but inAmericanwars as recent asKorea andVietnam, the differences literally gave rise tosuccessorlossinbattleafterbattle.ThefirsttranslationofTheArtofWarintoaWesternlanguagewasbyaFrenchJesuit,Jean-Joseph

M.Amiot,inthelate1700s,anditcausedagreatstir.WecanbereasonablysurethatNapoleonIwasawareofthemilitaryandscientificideasoftheChinese.Hewouldhaveseentheworkasconfirminghisownstrategiccredooffluidity:notbeingwheretheenemyexpectsyou,appearingalwayswherehe least expects, andextraordinary speed inbattle.Napoleon insisted inhisMaxims: “Onemust beslowindeliberationandquickinexecution.”DG

Ts’aoKunghasthenote,“Hewhowishestofightmustfirstcountthecost,”whichpreparesusforthediscoverythatthesubjectofthechapterisnotwhatwemightexpectfromthetitle,butisprimarilyaconsiderationofwaysandmeans.

1.SunTzusaid:Intheoperationsofwar,wherethereareinthefieldathousandswiftchariots,asmanyheavychariots,andahundredthousandmail-cladsoldiers,

The swift chariots were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for the attack; the heavychariotswere...designedforpurposesofdefence....ItisinterestingtonotetheanalogiesbetweenearlyChinesewarfareandthatoftheHomericGreeks.Ineachcase,thewar-chariotwastheimportantfactor,formingasitdidthenucleusroundwhichwasgroupedacertainnumberoffoot-soldiers....Weareinformedthateachswiftchariotwasaccompaniedby75footmenorinfantry,andeachheavychariotby25footmen,sothatthewholearmywouldbedividedupintoathousandbattalions,eachconsistingoftwochariotsandahundredmen.

withprovisionsenoughtocarrythemathousandli,

2.78modernligotoamile.ThelengthmayhavevariedslightlysinceSunTzu’stime.

theexpenditureathomeandatthefront,includingentertainmentofguests,smallitemssuchasglueandpaint,andsumsspentonchariotsandarmour,willreachthetotalofathousandouncesofsilverperday.Suchisthecostofraisinganarmyof100,000men.2.Whenyouengageinactualfighting,ifvictoryislongincoming,themen’sweaponswillgrow

dullandtheirardourwillbedamped.Ifyoulaysiegetoatown,youwillexhaustyourstrength.Thegreatestgooddeedinwaristhespeedyendingofthewar,andeverymeanstothatend,solongasitisnotreprehensible,mustremainopen.CountHelmuthvonMoltke,“OntheNatureofWar”(1880)

3.Again,ifthecampaignisprotracted,theresourcesoftheStatewillnotbeequaltothestrain.Commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism and military defense. And historysufficientlyinformsus,thatthebravestachievementswerealwaysaccomplishedinthenon-ageofanation....Themoremenhavetolose,thelesswillingaretheytoventure.Therichareingeneralslavestofear,andsubmittocourtlypowerwiththetremblingduplicityofaspaniel.ThomasPaine,CommonSense(1776)

4.Now,when yourweapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and yourtreasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then noman,howeverwise,willbeabletoaverttheconsequencesthatmustensue.5.Thus,thoughwehaveheardofstupidhasteinwar,clevernesshasneverbeenseenassociatedwith

longdelays.

This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. [Sixcommentators suggest] that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer throughsheer forceof rapidity.HoShih says: “Hastemaybe stupid,but at any rate it savesexpenditureofenergyandtreasure;protractedoperationsmaybeveryclever,buttheybringcalamityintheirtrain.”Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old,wealthbeingexpended,anemptyexchequeranddistressamong thepeople; truecleverness insuresagainsttheoccurrenceofsuchcalamities.”ChangYüsays:“Solongasvictorycanbeattained,stupidhasteispreferabletocleverdilatoriness.”Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste

being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much moreguarded,namelythat,whilespeedmaysometimesbeinjudicious,tardinesscanneverbeanythingbutfoolish—ifonlybecauseitmeansimpoverishmenttothenation....

In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator willinevitablyoccurtothemind.ThatgeneraldeliberatelymeasuredtheenduranceofRomeagainstthatofHannibal’sisolatedarmy,becauseitseemedtohimthatthelatterwasmorelikelytosufferfromalongcampaign ina strangecountry.But it isquite amootquestionwhetherhis tacticswouldhaveproved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Cannae [a huge defeat for theRomansunderhissuccessor];butthisonlyestablishesanegativepresumptionintheirfavour.

FabiusMaximusCunctator,Quintus,Romanstatesmanandmilitarycommander,wasknownas“theDelayer.”Hisuseof longdelays in theSecondPunicWarworedown the resistanceofHannibal’sCar-thaginianarmyanddecimatedtheirsupplylines,givingRomeasavagevictory.DG

6.Thereisnoinstanceofacountryhavingbenefitedfromprolongedwarfare.Wehearwarcalledmurder.Itisnot:itissuicide.BritishPrimeMinisterJamesRamsayMacDonald(1930)

7.Itisonlyonewhoisthoroughlyacquaintedwiththeevilsofwarthatcanthoroughlyunderstandtheprofitablewayofcarryingiton.That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realise thesupremeimportanceofrapidityinbringingittoaclose.

8.Theskilfulsoldierdoesnotraiseasecondlevy,neitherarehissupply-wagonsloadedmorethantwice.Oncewarisdeclared,hewillnotwasteprecioustimeinwaitingforreinforcements,norwillheturnhisarmybackforfreshsupplies,butcrossestheenemy’sfrontierwithoutdelay.Thismayseemanaudacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to NapoleonBuonaparte,thevalueoftime—thatis,beingalittleaheadofyouropponent—hascountedformorethan either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat [foodsupplies].

I don’twant to get anymessages saying, “I am holdingmy position.”We are not holding agoddamned thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly, and we are notinterestedinholdingontoanythingexcepttheenemies’balls....Ourbasicplanofoperationisto advance and to keep on advancing regardless of whether we have to go over, under, orthroughtheenemy.Wearegoingtogothroughhimlikecrapthroughagoose.Gen.GeorgeS.Patton,speech to theThirdArmyon theeveof theAllied invasionofFrance

(1944)

9.Bringwarmaterialwithyoufromhome,butforageontheenemy.Thusthearmywillhavefoodenoughforitsneeds.10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a

distance.Contributingtomaintainanarmyatadistancecausesthepeopletobeimpoverished.11.Ontheotherhand,theproximityofanarmycausespricestogoup,andhighpricescausethe

people’ssubstancetobedrainedaway.12.Whentheirsubstanceisdrainedaway,thepeasantrywillbeafflictedbyheavyexactions.13, 14.With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be

strippedbare, and three-tenthsof their incomeswillbedissipated;whileGovernment expenses forbroken chariots,worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,protectivemantlets,draught-oxenandheavywaggons,willamounttofour-tenthsofitstotalrevenue.15.Hence awise generalmakes a point of foraging on the enemy.One carload of the enemy’s

provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender isequivalenttotwentyfromone’sownstore.

Becausetwentycarloadswillbeconsumedintheprocessoftransportingonecartloadtothefront.

16.Nowinordertokilltheenemy,ourmenmustberousedtoanger;thattheremaybeadvantagefromdefeatingtheenemy,theymusthavetheirrewards.

TuMusays:“Rewardsarenecessaryinordertomakethesoldiersseetheadvantageofbeatingtheenemy;thus,whenyoucapturespoilsfromtheenemy,theymustbeusedasrewards,sothatallyourmenmayhaveakeendesiretofight,eachonhisownaccount.”

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should berewardedwho took the first.Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and thechariotsmingledandused inconjunctionwithours.Thecapturedsoldiersshouldbekindly treatedandkept.18.Thisiscalled,usingtheconqueredfoetoaugmentone’sownstrength.19.Inwar,then,letyourgreatobjectbevictory,notlengthycampaigns.

Yours is the profession of arms, thewill towin, the sure knowledge that inwar, there is nosubstituteforvictory.Gen.DouglasMacArthur,speechatWestPoint(1962)

20.Thus itmaybeknownthat the leaderofarmies is thearbiterof thepeople’s fate, themanonwhomitdependswhetherthenationshallbeinpeaceorinperil.

InChinesehistoriographyitisstillthewilloftheindividualwhichdirectsthecourseofhistory.BurtonWatson,EarlyChineseLiterature(1962)

Icame,Isaw,Iconquered.JuliusCaesar,quotedinPlutarch’sLives(A.D.75)

III.ATTACKBYSTRATAGEM

The general himself ought to be such a one as can at the same time see both forward andbackward.Plutarch,Moralia(A.D.75)

1.SunTzusaid:Inthepracticalartofwar,thebestthingofallistotaketheenemy’scountrywholeandintact;toshatteranddestroyitisnotsogood.So,too,itisbettertocaptureanarmyentirethantodestroyit,tocapturearegiment,adetachmentoracompanyentirethantodestroythem.

The Denma Translation is worth comparing here (see “For Further Reading”). Closer to theastringent sound and pared rhythms of theClassicalChinese text, it reads: “In sum, themethod ofemployingthemilitary—Takingastatewholeissuperior.Destroyingitisinferiortothis.Takinganarmy whole is superior. Destroying it is inferior to this. Taking a battalion whole is superior.Destroyingitisinferiortothis.Takingacompanywholeissuperior.Destroyingitisinferiortothis.Takingasquadwholeissuperior.Destroyingitisinferiortothis.”DG

2.Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence

consistsinbreakingtheenemy’sresistancewithoutfighting.Hereagain,nomodernstrategistbutwillapprovethewordsof[SunTzu].Moltke’sgreatesttriumph,thecapitulationofthehugeFrencharmyatSedan,waswonpracticallywithoutbloodshed.

3.Thusthehighestformofgeneralshipistobaulktheenemy’splans;

I.e.,asLiCh’üansays,intheirveryinception.Perhapstheword“baulk”fallsshortofexpressingthefull force of [the Chinese term], which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby onemight becontent to foil theenemy’s stratagemsoneafter another,but anactivepolicyof counter-attack.HoShihputthisveryclearlyinhisnote:“Whentheenemyhasmadeaplanofattackagainstus,wemustanticipatehimbydeliveringourownattackfirst.”

thenextbestistopreventthejunctionoftheenemy’sforces;

Isolatinghimfromhisallies.WemustnotforgetthatSunTzu,inspeakingofhostilities,alwayshasinmindthenumerousstatesorprincipalitiesintowhichtheChinaofhisdaywassplitup.

thenextinorderistoattacktheenemy’sarmyinthefield;

Whenheisalreadyinfullstrength.

andtheworstpolicyofallistobesiegewalledcities.4.Theruleis,nottobesiegewalledcitiesifitcanpossiblybeavoided.

Another sound piece ofmilitary theory.Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained fromdissipatingtheirstrengthbeforeKimberley,Mafeking,orevenLadysmith, it ismorethanprobablethattheywouldhavebeenmastersofthesituationbeforetheBritishwerereadyseriouslytoopposethem.

Kimberley,Mafeking,andLadysmithwereallimportantearlydefeatsfortheBritishagainsttheBoerinsurgency.TheBritish regularsbadlyunderestimated their colonial foes inwhatwasessentiallyawarforindependence:theSouthAfricanWar.Thedetailsofthesiege,thebattles,andthefinalBritish

response areworth examining in greater detail both to captureGiles’s fullmeaninghere and alsobecause theyread likeapetridishexemplarofSunTzu’sadmonitionson tactics.Turn to theearlywritingsofWinstonChurchillforapithyexaminationofthewarfromtheperspectiveofaparticipantwhoselifewasdeeplyaffectedbyit.The gist ofGiles’s comment, however, is that theBoers (DutchSouthAfricans) initially had the

jumpontheBritish.Theydissipatedtheirmilitaryenergies,however,in“small,”brutalengagements,such as the siege at Ladysmith, which they besieged from October 1899 through February 1900,causing the deaths of several thousand citizens. This gave the British time to dispatch formidableregiments from England. Because of its strategic geography, South Africa was important to theBritishEmpirebothforitsconsiderablenaturalresourcesandalsoasaprotectionfortheircolonialproperties,especiallyIndia.Ladysmith,forexample,isintheNatalregion,whichhadlongservedasagatewaytotheIndianOcean.DG

The preparation ofmantlets,movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up threewholemonths;

Itisnotquiteclearwhatmantletswere.Ts’aoKungsimplydefinesthemas“largeshields,”butwegetabetter ideaof them fromLiCh’üan,who says theywere to protect theheadsof thosewhowereassaultingthecitywallsatclosequarters.ThisseemstosuggestasortofRomantestudo,readymade.TuMusaystheywere . . . (wheeledvehiclesusedinrepellingattacks,accordingtoK’angHsi). . . .Thenameisalsoappliedtoturretsoncitywalls.Of movable shelters, we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were

woodenmissile-proofstructuresonfourwheels,propelledfromwithin,coveredoverwithrawhides,andusedinsiegestoconveypartiesofmentoandfromthewalls,forthepurposeoffillinguptheencirclingmoatwithearth.TuMuaddsthattheyarenowcalled“woodendonkeys.”

andthepilingupofmoundsoveragainstthewallswilltakethreemonthsmore.

Theseweregreatmoundsorrampartsofearthheapeduptotheleveloftheenemy’swallsinordertodiscover theweak points in the defence, and also to destroy the fortified turretsmentioned in theprecedingnote.

5.Thegeneral,unabletocontrolhisirritation,willlaunchhismentotheassaultlikeswarmingants,

Thisvividsimile...istakenfromthespectacleofanarmyofantsclimbingawall.Themeaningisthatthegeneral,losingpatienceatthelongdelay,maymakeaprematureattempttostormtheplace

beforehisenginesofwarareready.

withtheresultthatone-thirdofhismenareslain,whilethetownstillremainsuntaken.Sucharethedisastrouseffectsofasiege.6.Therefore theskilful leadersubdues theenemy’s troopswithoutanyfighting;hecaptures their

citieswithout layingsiege to them;heoverthrows theirkingdomwithout lengthyoperations in thefield.

ChiaLinnotes that heonlyoverthrows the . . .Government, but doesnoharm to individuals.TheclassicalinstanceisWuWang,whoafterhavingputanendtotheYindynastywasacclaimed“Fatherandmotherofthepeople.”

7.WithhisforcesintacthewilldisputethemasteryoftheEmpire,andthus,withoutlosingaman,histriumphwillbecomplete.

Owingto . . .doublemeanings . . . , thelatterpartof thesentenceissusceptibleofquiteadifferentmeaning:“Andthus,theweapon,notbeingbluntedbyuse,itskeennessremainsperfect.”

The101sthasnohistory,butithasarendezvouswithdestiny.Maj.Gen.WilliamC.Lee,rallyingthemenofthenascent101stAirborneDivision(1942)

Thisisthemethodofattackingbystratagem.8.Itistheruleinwar,ifourforcesaretentotheenemy’sone,tosurroundhim;iffivetoone,to

attackhim;

Straightaway,withoutwaitingforanyfurtheradvantage.

iftwiceasnumerous,todivideourarmyintotwo.The saying . . . at first sight . . . appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung,however,givesacluetoSunTzu’smeaning:“Beingtwototheenemy’sone,wemayuseonepartofour army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” Chang Yü thus furtherelucidatesthepoint:“Ifourforceistwiceasnumerousasthatoftheenemy,itshouldbesplitupinto

twodivisions,onetomeettheenemyinfront,andonetofalluponhisrear;ifherepliestothefrontalattack,hemaybecrushedfrombehind;iftotherearwardattack,hemaybecrushedinfront.”

9.Ifequallymatched,wecanofferbattle;

Li Ch’üan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: “If attackers and attacked areequallymatchedinstrength,onlytheablegeneralwillfight.”

Whentheenemyisequalinthenumberofitsforces,thereshouldbeanimmediateretreat,andthentheenemyshouldbeambushedoreliminatedbymeansofsharp-shooters.U.S.Dept.oftheArmy,HandbookonAggressorInsurgentWarfare(1962edition)

ifslightlyinferiorinnumbers,wecanavoidtheenemy;

ChangYüremindsusthatthesayingonlyappliesiftheotherfactorsareequal;asmalldifferenceinnumbersisoftenmorethancounterbalancedbysuperiorenergyanddiscipline.

ifquiteunequalineveryway,wecanfleefromhim.10.Hence,thoughanobstinatefightmaybemadebyasmallforce,intheenditmustbecapturedby

thelargerforce.11.NowthegeneralisthebulwarkoftheState:ifthebulwarkiscompleteatallpoints,theStatewill

bestrong;ifthebulwarkisdefective,theStatewillbeweak.

AsLiCh’üan terselyputs it:“. . . If thegeneral’sability isnotperfect (i.e., ifhe isnot thoroughlyversedinhisprofession),hisarmywilllackstrength.”

12.Therearethreewaysinwhicharulercanbringmisfortuneuponhisarmy:—13.(1)Bycommandingthearmytoadvanceortoretreat,beingignorantofthefactthatitcannot

obey.Thisiscalledhobblingthearmy.

“Hobblingthearmy”isoneofthosegraphicmetaphorswhichfromtimetotimeilluminateSunTzu’swork....LiCh’üan...addsthecomment,“Itisliketyingtogetherthelegsofathoroughbred,sothat

itisunabletogallop.”Onewouldnaturallythinkof“theruler”inthispassageasbeingathome,andtryingtodirectthemovementsofhisarmyfromadistance.Butthecommentatorsunderstandjustthereverse,andquote thesayingofT’aiKung:“Akingdomshouldnotbegoverned fromwithout,anarmyshouldnotbedirectedfromwithin.”Ofcourseitistruethat,duringanengagement,orwheninclose touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a littledistance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrongorders.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, beingignorantoftheconditionswhichobtaininanarmy.Thiscausesrestlessnessinthesoldiers’minds.

Ts’aoKung’snote is . . . : “Themilitary sphere and the civil sphere arewhollydistinct; youcan’thandleanarmyinkidgloves.”AndChangYüsays:“Humanityandjusticearetheprinciplesonwhichtogovernastate,butnotanarmy;opportunismandflexibility,ontheotherhand,aremilitaryratherthancivicvirtues.”

15. (3)By employing the officers of his armywithout discrimination, through ignorance of themilitaryprincipleofadaptationtocircumstances.Thisshakestheconfidenceofthesoldiers.

TuMu[quotesanothercommentator]:“Theskilfulemployerofmenwillemploythewiseman,thebraveman,thecovetousman,andthestupidman.Forthewisemandelightsinestablishinghismerit,thebravemanlikestoshowhiscourageinaction,thecovetousmanisquickatseizingadvantages,andthestupidmanhasnofearofdeath.”

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudalprinces.Thisissimplybringinganarchyintothearmy,andflingingvictoryaway.17.Thuswemayknowthattherearefiveessentialsforvictory:(1)Hewillwinwhoknowswhentofightandwhennottofight.

ChangYüsays:“Ifhecanfight,headvancesandtakestheoffensive;ifhecannotfight,heretreatsandremains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take theoffensiveorthedefensive.”

(2)Hewillwinwhoknowshowtohandlebothsuperiorandinferiorforces.This is notmerely thegeneral’s ability to estimatenumbers correctly. . . .ChangYüexpounds thesayingmoresatisfactorily:“Byapplyingtheartofwar,it ispossiblewithalesserforcetodefeata

greater,andviceversa.Thesecretliesinaneyeforlocality,andinnotlettingtherightmomentslip.ThusWuTzu says: ‘Witha superior force,make for easyground;with an inferiorone,make fordifficultground.’”

AfterTheArtofWar,thetreatisereferredtoasWuTzu(writtenbyWuCh’i,whodiedin381B.C.)isprobablytheoldestmilitaryworkinChinesehistoryandtheonecitedmostoften.DG

(3)Hewillwinwhosearmyisanimatedbythesamespiritthroughoutallitsranks.(4)Hewillwinwho,preparedhimself,waitstotaketheenemyunprepared.(5)Hewillwinwhohasmilitarycapacityandisnotinterferedwithbythesovereign.

Tu Yu quotes [another commentator] as saying: “It is the sovereign’s function to give broadinstructions, but to decide on battle is the function of the general.” It is needless to dilate on themilitarydisasterswhichhavebeencausedbyundue interferencewithoperations in the fieldon thepartofthehomegovernment.Napoleonundoubtedlyowedmuchofhisextraordinarysuccesstothefactthathewasnothamperedbyanycentralauthority.

Victoryliesintheknowledgeofthesefivepoints.

Literally,“Thesefivethingsareknowledgeoftheprincipleofvictory.”

18.Hencethesaying:Ifyouknowtheenemyandknowyourself,youneednotfeartheresultofahundredbattles.Ifyouknowyourselfbutnottheenemy,foreveryvictorygainedyouwillalsosufferadefeat.

LiCh’üan cites the case ofFuChien, prince ofCh’in,who in 383A.D.marchedwith a vast armyagainsttheChinEmperor.Whenwarnednottodespiseanenemywhocouldcommandtheservicesofsuch men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: “I have the population of eightprovincesatmyback,infantryandhorsementothenumberofonemillion;why,theycoulddamuptheYangtszeRiveritselfbymerelythrowingtheirwhipsintothestream.WhatdangerhaveItofear?”Nevertheless,hisforcesweresoonafterdisastrouslyroutedat theFeiRiver,andhewasobligedtobeatahastyretreat.

Ifyouknowneithertheenemynoryourself,youwillsuccumbineverybattle.

ChangYü offers the best commentary. . . .He says that thesewords “have reference to attack anddefence:knowingtheenemyenablesyoutotaketheoffensive,knowingyourselfenablesyoutostandonthedefensive.”Headds,“Attackisthesecretofdefence;defenceistheplanningofanattack.”Itwouldbehardtofindabetterepitomeoftheroot-principleofwar.

Thisman,Isay,ismostperfectwhoshallhaveunderstoodeverythingforhimself,afterhavingdevisedwhatmaybebestafterwardanduntotheend.Hesiod,WorksandDays(c.800B.C.)

IV.TACTICALDISPOSITIONS

Where force isnecessary, there itmustbeappliedboldly,decisively,andcompletely.Butonemustknowthelimitationsofforce;onemustknowwhentoblendforcewithamaneuver,ablowwithanargument.LeonTrotsky(1932)

TheChinesegivenastheheadinghereisaverycomprehensiveandsomewhatvagueterm.. . .It isbesttakenassomethingbetween,orperhapscombining,“tactics”and“dispositionoftroops.”Ts’aoKung explains it as “marching and countermarching on the part of the two armieswith a view todiscoveringeachother ’scondition.”TuMusays:“It is through thedispositionsofanarmy that itscondition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain secret,whichleadstovictory;showyourdispositions,andyourconditionwillbecomepatent,whichleadstodefeat.”WangHsiremarksthatthegoodgeneralcan“securesuccessbymodifyinghistacticstomeetthoseoftheenemy.”

1.SunTzusaid:Thegoodfightersofoldfirstputthemselvesbeyondthepossibilityofdefeat,andthenwaitedforanopportunityofdefeatingtheenemy.2.To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our ownhands, but the opportunity of defeating the

enemyisprovidedbytheenemyhimself.

Thatis,ofcourse,byamistakeonhispart.

3.Thusthegoodfighterisabletosecurehimselfagainstdefeat,

Chang Yü says: “By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks, and takingunremittingprecautions.”

butcannotmakecertainofdefeatingtheenemy.4.Hencethesaying:Onemayknowhowtoconquerwithoutbeingabletodoit.5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemymeans taking the

offensive.

The commentators are all againstme. Themeaning they give, “Hewho cannot conquer takes thedefensive,”isplausibleenough,but...highlyimprobable.

6.Standingonthedefensiveindicatesinsufficientstrength;attacking,asuperabundanceofstrength.7.Thegeneralwhoisskilledindefencehidesinthemostsecretrecessesoftheearth;

Literally, “hides under the ninth earth,” which is a metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy andconcealment,sothattheenemymaynotknowhiswhereabouts.

Batistahas3,000meninthefieldagainstus.Itisabattleagainsttime,andtimeisonourside.Theyneverknowwhereweare,butwealwaysknowwheretheyare.FidelCastro(February24,1957)

hewhoisskilledinattackflashesforthfromthetopmostheightsofheaven.

Anothermetaphor,implyingthathefallsonhisadversarylikeathunderbolt,againstwhichthereisnotimetoprepare.Thisistheopinionofmostofthecommentators,thoughTs’aoKung,followedbyTuYu,explains“secretrecesses”asthehills,rivers,andothernaturalfeatureswhichwillaffordshelter

orprotectiontotheattacked,and“topmostheightsofheaven”asthephasesofweatherwhichmaybeturnedtoaccountbytheattackingparty.

Thusontheonehandwehaveabilitytoprotectourselves;ontheother,avictorythatiscomplete.8.Toseevictoryonlywhenitiswithinthekenofthecommonherdisnottheacmeofexcellence.

AsTs’aoKungremarks,“Thethingistoseetheplantbeforeithasgerminated,”toforeseetheeventbeforetheactionhasbegun.LiCh’üanalludestothestoryofHanHsinwho,whenabouttoattackthevastly superior armyofChao,whichwas strongly entrenched in the cityofCh’êng-an, said tohisofficers, “Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner.” Theofficershardlytookhiswordsseriously,andgaveaverydubiousassent.ButHanHsinhadalreadyworked out in hismind the details of a clever stratagem,whereby, as he foresaw, hewas able tocapturethecityandinflictacrushingdefeatonhisadversary.

9.Neitherisit theacmeofexcellenceifyoufightandconquerandthewholeEmpiresays,“Welldone!”Trueexcellencebeing,asTuMusays:“Toplansecretly,tomovesurreptitiously,tofoiltheenemy’sintentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the daymay be won without shedding a drop ofblood.”SunTzureserveshisapprobationforthingsthat

“theworld’scoarsethumbAndfingerfailtoplumb.”

10.Toliftanautumnhairisnosignofgreatstrength;toseesunandmoonisnosignofsharpsight;tohearthenoiseofthunderisnosignofaquickear.11.Whattheancientscalledacleverfighterisonewhonotonlywins,butexcelsinwinningwith

ease.MeiYao-ch’ên says: “Hewhoonly sees theobvious,winshisbattleswithdifficulty;hewho looksbelowthesurfaceofthings,winswithease.”

12.Hencehisvictoriesbringhimneitherreputationforwisdomnorcreditforcourage.TuMuexplainsthisverywell,“Inasmuchashisvictoriesaregainedovercircumstancesthathavenotcome to light, theworld at large knows nothing of them, and hewins no reputation forwisdom;inasmuchasthehostilestatesubmitsbeforetherehasbeenanybloodshed,hereceivesnocreditforcourage.”

13.Hewinshisbattlesbymakingnomistakes.

Ch’ênHaosays:“Heplansnosuperfluousmarches,hedevisesnofutileattacks.”TheconnectionofideasisthusexplainedbyChangYü:“Onewhoseekstoconquerbysheerstrength,cleverthoughhemaybeatwinningpitchedbattles, isalsoliableonoccasiontobevanquished;whereashewhocanlookintothefutureanddiscernconditionsthatarenotyetmanifest,willnevermakeablunderandthereforeinvariablywin.”

Makingnomistakesiswhatestablishesthecertaintyofvictory,foritmeansconqueringanenemythatisalreadydefeated.14.Hencetheskilfulfighterputshimselfintoapositionwhichmakesdefeatimpossible,anddoes

notmissthemomentfordefeatingtheenemy.

Positionneednotbeconfinedstrictlytotheactualgroundoccupiedbythetroops.Itincludesallthearrangementsandpreparationswhichawisegeneralwillmaketoincreasethesafetyofhisarmy.

15.Thusit is that inwarthevictoriousstrategistonlyseeksbattleafter thevictoryhasbeenwon,whereashewhoisdestinedtodefeatfirstfightsandafterwardslooksforvictory.

HoShih thusexpoundstheparadox:“Inwarfare, first layplanswhichwillensurevictory,andthenleadyourarmytobattle;ifyouwillnotbeginwithstratagembutrelyonbrutestrengthalone,victorywillnolongerbeassured.”

WemakethiswideencirclingmovementintheMediterranean,havingforitsprimaryobjecttherecovery of the commandof that vital sea, but also having for its object the exposure of theunderbellyoftheAxis,especiallyItaly,toeveryattack.WinstonChurchill,debateinHouseofCommons(1942)

16.Theconsummateleadercultivatesthemorallaw,andstrictlyadherestomethodanddiscipline;thusitisinhispowertocontrolsuccess.

Thereisaverystrongtemptation...forgovernmentforcestoactoutsidethelaw,theexcusesbeingthattheprocessesoflawaretoocumbersome,thatthenormalsafeguardsinthelawfortheindividualarenotdesignedforaninsurgencyandthataterroristdeservestobetreatedasanoutlawanyway.Notonlyisthismorallywrong,but,overaperiod,itwillcreatemorepracticaldifficultiesforagovernmentthanitsolves.Agovernmentwhichdoesnotactinaccordancewiththelawforfeitstherighttobecalledagovernmentandcannotexpectitspeopletoobeythelaw.

Functioninginaccordancewiththelawisaverysmallpricetopayinreturnfortheadvantageofbeingthegovernment.Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences fromMalayaandVietnam(1966)

17.Inrespectofmilitarymethod,wehave,firstly,Measurement;secondly,Estimationofquantity;thirdly,Calculation;fourthly,Balancingofchances;fifthly,Victory.18.MeasurementowesitsexistencetoEarth;EstimationofquantitytoMeasurement;Calculationto

Estimationofquantity;BalancingofchancestoCalculation;andVictorytoBalancingofchances.

It is not easy to distinguish [these] four terms very clearly. The first seems to be surveying andmeasurementoftheground,whichenableustoformanestimateoftheenemy’sstrength,andtomakecalculationsbasedonthedatathusobtained;wearethusledtoageneralweighing-up,orcomparisonoftheenemy’schanceswithourown;ifthelatterturnthescale,thenvictoryensues.

19.Avictoriousarmyopposedtoaroutedone,isasapound’sweightplacedinthescaleagainstasinglegrain.

Literally,“avictoriousarmyislikeani(20oz.)weighedagainstashu(1/24oz.);aroutedarmyasashuweightedagainstan i.”Thepoint is simply theenormousadvantagewhichadisciplined force,flushedwithvictory,hasoveronedemoralisedbydefeat.

20.Theonrushofaconqueringforceisliketheburstingofpent-upwatersintoachasmathousandfathomsdeep.Somuchfortacticaldispositions.

V.ENERGY

Thebattleswayed./Half-nakedmenhackedslowlyateachother/AstheGreekseasedbacktheTrojans./Theystoodclose;/Closer;thighinthigh;masktwistedoverironmask/Likekissing.

ChristopherLogue,WarMusic(1987)

WangHsi expands [“energy”] into “the application, in variousways, of accumulated power”; andChangYüsays:“Whenthesoldiers’energyhasreacheditsheight,itmaybeusedtosecurevictory.”

1.SunTzusaid:Thecontrolofalargeforceisthesameinprincipleasthecontrolofafewmen:itismerelyaquestionofdividinguptheirnumbers.

Thatis,cuttingupthearmyintoregiments,companies,etc.,withsubordinateofficersincommandofeach.TuMuremindsusofHanHsin’sfamousreplytothefirstHanEmperor,whosaidtohim,“HowlargeanarmydoyouthinkIcouldlead?”“Notmorethan100,000men,yourMajesty.”“Andyou?”askedtheEmperor.“Oh!”heanswered,“themorethebetter.”

2.Fightingwithalargearmyunderyourcommandisnowisedifferentfromfightingwithasmallone:itismerelyaquestionofinstitutingsignsandsignals.3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain

unshaken—thisiseffectedbymanœuvresdirectandindirect.

WenowcometooneofthemostinterestingpartsofSunTzu’streatise,thediscussionofchêngandch’i.Asitisbynomeanseasytograspthefullsignificanceofthesetwoterms,ortorenderthematallconsistentlybygoodEnglishequivalents,itmaybeaswelltotabulatesomeofthecommentators’remarksbeforeproceedingfurther. . . .ChiaLin:“Inpresenceoftheenemy,yourtroopsshouldbearrayedinnormalfashion,butinordertosecurevictoryabnormalmanœuvresmustbeemployed.”MeiYao-ch’ên:“Ch’iisactive,chêngispassive;passivitymeanswaitingforanopportunity,activitybringsthevictoryitself.”Ho Shih: “Wemust cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly

designed,andviceversa;thuschêngmayalsobech’i,andch’imayalsobechêng.”HeinstancesthefamousexploitofHanHsin,whowhenmarchingostensiblyagainstLin-chin,suddenlythrewalargeforceacrosstheYellowRiverinwoodentubs,utterlydisconcertinghisopponent.Here,wearetold,themarchonLin-chinwaschêngandthesurprisemanœuvrewasch’i....AcommentoftheT’angEmperorT’aiTsunggoestotherootofthematter:“...Thewholesecret

liesinconfusingtheenemy,sothathecannotfathomourrealintent.”Toputitperhapsalittlemoreclearly: any attack or other operation is chêng on which the enemy has had his attention fixed;whereasthatisch’i,whichtakeshimbysurpriseorcomesfromanunexpectedquarter.Iftheenemyperceivesamovementwhichismeanttobech’i,itimmediatelybecomeschêng.

4.Thattheimpactofyourarmymaybelikeagrindstonedashedagainstanegg—thisiseffectedbythescienceofweakpointsandstrong.5. In all fighting, the directmethodmay be used for joining battle, but indirectmethodswill be

neededinordertosecurevictory.

ChangYüsays:“Steadilydevelopindirecttactics,eitherbypoundingtheenemy’sflanksorfallingonhisrear.”Abrilliantexampleof“indirecttactics”whichdecidedthefortunesofacampaignwasLordRoberts’nightmarchroundthePeiwarKotalinthesecondAfghanwar.

6.Indirecttactics,efficientlyapplied,areinexhaustibleasHeavenandEarth,unendingastheflowofriversandstreams;likethesunandmoon,theyendbuttobeginanew;likethefourseasons,theypassawaybuttoreturnoncemore.Herewesimplyhaveanexpression,infigurativelanguage,ofthealmostinfiniteresourceofagreatleader.

7.Therearenotmorethanfivemusicalnotes,yetthecombinationsofthesefivegiverisetomoremelodiesthancaneverbeheard.8.Therearenotmorethanfiveprimarycolours,yetincombinationtheyproducemorehuesthan

caneverbeseen.9.Therearenotmorethanfivecardinaltastes,yetcombinationsofthemyieldmoreflavoursthan

caneverbetasted.10. Inbattle, therearenotmore than twomethodsofattack—thedirectand the indirect;yet these

twoincombinationgiverisetoanendlessseriesofmanœuvers.11.Thedirectandtheindirectleadontoeachotherinturn.Itislikemovinginacircle—younever

cometoanend.Whocanexhaustthepossibilitiesoftheircombination?12.Theonsetoftroopsisliketherushofatorrentwhichwillevenrollstonesalonginitscourse.13.Thequalityofdecisionislikethewell-timedswoopofafalconwhichenablesit tostrikeand

destroyitsvictim.Asappliedtothefalcon,[thisquality]seemstometodenotethatinstinctofself-restraintwhichkeepsthe bird from swooping on its quarry until the rightmoment, togetherwith the power of judgingwhentherightmomenthasarrived.Theanalogousqualityinsoldiersisthehighlyimportantoneofbeing able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will bemost effective.When the“Victory”wentintoactionatTrafalgarathardlymorethandriftingpace,shewasforseveralminutesexposedtoastormofshotandshellbeforereplyingwithasinglegun.Nelsoncoollywaiteduntilhewaswithincloserange,whenthebroadsidehebroughttobearworkedfearfulhavocontheenemy’snearestships.

14.Thereforethegoodfighterwillbeterribleinhisonset,andpromptinhisdecision.WangHsi’snote...:“Thisisjusthowthe‘psychologicalmoment’oughttobeseizedinwar.”

15.Energymaybelikenedtothebendingofacrossbow;decision,tothereleasingofthetrigger.16.Amidtheturmoilandtumultofbattle,theremaybeseemingdisorderandyetnorealdisorderat

all;amidconfusionandchaos,yourarraymaybewithoutheador tail,yet itwillbeproofagainstdefeat.

MeiYao-ch’ên says: “The subdivisions of the armyhaving been previously fixed, and the varioussignalsagreedupon,theseparatingandjoining,thedispersingandcollectingwhichwilltakeplaceinthecourseofabattle,maygivetheappearanceofdisorderwhennorealdisorderispossible.Yourformationmaybewithoutheadortail,yourdispositionsalltopsy-turvy,andyetaroutofyourforcesquiteoutofthequestion.”

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulatedweaknesspostulatesstrength.

TuMu...putitquiteplainly:“Ifyouwishtofeignconfusioninordertoluretheenemyon,youmustfirsthaveperfectdiscipline; ifyouwish todisplay timidity inorder toentrap theenemy,youmusthave extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident,youmusthaveexceedingstrength.”

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealingcourage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength withweaknessistobeeffectedbytacticaldispositions.

ChangYürelatesthefollowinganecdoteofKaoTsu,thefirstHanEmperor:“WishingtocrushtheHsiung-nu,he sentout spies to reporton their condition.But theHsiung-nu, forewarned, carefullyconcealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers andemaciatedcattle tobe seen.The resultwas that the spiesoneandall recommended theEmperor todeliverhisattack.LouChingaloneopposedthem,saying:‘Whentwocountriesgotowar, theyarenaturally inclinedtomakeanostentatiousdisplayof theirstrength.Yetourspieshaveseennothingbutoldageandinfirmity.Thisissurelysomeruseonthepartoftheenemy,anditwouldbeunwiseforustoattack.’TheEmperor,however,disregardingthisadvice,fellintothetrapandfoundhimselfsurroundedatPo-têng.”

19. Thus onewho is skilful at keeping the enemy on themovemaintains deceitful appearances,accordingtowhichtheenemywillact.

TuMu . . . points out . . . : “If our forcehappens tobe superior to the enemy’s,weaknessmaybesimulatedinordertolurehimon;butifinferior,hemustbeledtobelievethatwearestrong,inorderthathemaykeepoff.Infact,all theenemy’smovementsshouldbedeterminedbythesignsthatwechoosetogivehim.”[Notethis]anecdoteofSunPin,adescendantofSunWu. . . :In341B.C.,theCh’iStatebeingatwarwithWei,sentT’ienChiandSunPinagainst thegeneralP’angChüan,whohappenedtobeadeadlypersonalenemyofthelatter.SunPinsaid:“TheCh’iStatehasareputationfor cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.”Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chüanpursuedthemhotly,sayingtohimself:“IknewthesemenofCh’iwerecowards:theirnumbershavealreadyfallenawaybymorethanhalf.”Inhisretreat,SunPincametoanarrowdefile,whichhecalculatedthathispursuerswouldreach

afterdark.Herehehadatreestrippedofitsbark,andinscribeduponit thewords:“UnderthistreeshallP’angChüandie.”Then,asnightbegantofall,heplacedastrongbodyofarchersinambushnearby,withorderstoshootdirectlytheysawalight.Lateron,P’angChüanarrivedatthespot,andnoticing the tree, strucka light inorder to readwhatwaswrittenon it.Hisbodywas immediatelyriddledbyavolleyofarrows,andhiswholearmythrownintoconfusion.

Hesacrificessomething,thattheenemymaysnatchatit.20.Byholdingoutbaits,hekeepshimonthemarch;thenwithabodyofpickedmenheliesinwait

forhim.21.Theclevercombatant looks to theeffectofcombinedenergy,anddoesnot require toomuch

fromindividuals.

Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takesindividual talent intoaccount,anduseseachmanaccordingtohiscapabilities.Hedoesnotdemandperfectionfromtheuntalented.”

Hencehisabilitytopickouttherightmenandtoutilisecombinedenergy.22.Whenheutilisescombinedenergy,hisfightingmenbecomeasitwerelikeuntorollinglogsor

stones.Foritisthenatureofalogorstonetoremainmotionlessonlevelground,andtomovewhen

onaslope;iffour-cornered,tocometoastandstill,butifround-shaped,togorollingdown.23.Thustheenergydevelopedbygoodfightingmenisasthemomentumofaroundstonerolled

downamountainthousandsoffeetinheight.Somuchonthesubjectofenergy.

Thechief lessonof this chapter, inTuMu’sopinion, is theparamount importance inwarof rapidevolutionsandsuddenrushes.“Greatresults,”headds,“canthusbeachievedwithsmallforces.”

VI.WEAKPOINTSANDSTRONG

Troopsare(orshouldbe)trainedtoexploittheirdominantweapon’sstrongpoints....Warisachessgame inwhichboth thevalueof thepiecesand thenatureof theirpossiblemovesvarybothwiththetrainingofthepiecesandtheskilloftheindividualplayer.TheodoreRopp,paraphrasingVonClausewitz,inWarintheModernWorld(1959)

Chang Yü attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: “Chapter IV, on TacticalDispositions, treatedof theoffensiveand thedefensive;chapterV,onEnergy,dealtwithdirectandindirectmethods.Thegoodgeneralacquaintshimselffirstwiththetheoryofattackanddefence,andthen turnshisattention todirectand indirectmethods.Hestudies theartofvaryingandcombiningthesetwomethodsbeforeproceedingtothesubjectofweakandstrongpoints.Fortheuseofdirectorindirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and strong pointsdependsagainontheabovemethods.HencethepresentchaptercomesimmediatelyafterthechapteronEnergy.”

1.SunTzusaid:Whoeverisfirstinthefieldandawaitsthecomingoftheenemy,willbefreshforthefight;whoeverissecondinthefieldandhastohastentobattle,willarriveexhausted.2.Therefore theclevercombatant imposeshiswillontheenemy,butdoesnotallowtheenemy’s

willtobeimposeduponhim.

Onemarkofagreatsoldieristhathefightsonhisowntermsorfightsnotatall.

3.Byholdingoutadvantagestohim,hecancausetheenemytoapproachofhisownaccord;or,byinflictingdamage,hecanmakeitimpossiblefortheenemytodrawnear.

Inthefirstcase,hewillenticehimwithabait;inthesecond,hewillstrikeatsomeimportantpointwhichtheenemywillhavetodefend.

4.Iftheenemyistakinghisease,hecanharasshim;ifwellsuppliedwithfood,hecanstarvehimout;ifquietlyencamped,hecanforcehimtomove.

Thekingwhoisendowedwithpersonalityandthematerialconstituentsofsovereigntyandon

whomallrightpolicyrests iscalledtheconqueror.Thatwhichencircleshimonallsidesandprevailsintheterritoryimmediatelyadjacenttohisis...knownastheenemy....Aneighboringprincehavingthefullestmeasureofantagonismisanenemy.Whenheisindifficulty,heshouldbe attacked; when he is without support or has weak support, he should be exterminated. Incontrary circumstances [when he is strong or has strong support], he should be harassed orweakened.Kautilya,ArthaSastra(fourthorthirdcenturyB.C.)

5.Appearatpointswhichtheenemymusthastentodefend;marchswiftlytoplaceswhereyouarenotexpected.6.An armymaymarch great distanceswithout distress, if itmarches through countrywhere the

enemyisnot.

Ts’aoKungsumsupverywell:“Emergefromthevoid,strikeatvulnerablepoints,shunplacesthataredefended,attackinunexpectedquarters.”

7.Youcanbesureofsucceedinginyourattacksifyouonlyattackplaceswhichareundefended.

WangHsirightlyexplains[“undefended”]as“weakpoints;thatistosay,wherethegeneralislackingincapacity,or the soldiers in spirit;where thewallsarenot strongenough,or theprecautionsnotstrict enough;where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are [at]varianceamongstthemselves.”

Youcanensurethesafetyofyourdefenceifyouonlyholdpositionsthatcannotbeattacked.

I.e., where there are none of theweak pointsmentioned above. . . . ChangYü [says]: “Hewho isskilledinattackflashesforthfromthetopmostheightsofheaven,makingitimpossiblefortheenemytoguardagainsthim.Thisbeingso, theplaces thatIshallattackareprecisely those that theenemycannotdefend...Hewhoisskilledindefencehidesinthemostsecretrecessesoftheearth,makingitimpossiblefortheenemytoestimatehiswhereabouts.Thisbeingso,theplacesthatIshallholdarepreciselythosethattheenemycannotattack.”

ViewersoffilmssuchasAngLee’sCrouchingTiger,HiddenDragon(2000)orthekung-fufilmsofJackie Chan will recognize the imagery. It is also strongly present, of course, in martial artsdisciplinessuchastaichi.DG

8.Hencethatgeneralisskilfulinattackwhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattodefend;andheisskilfulindefencewhoseopponentdoesnotknowwhattoattack.

Anaphorismwhichputsthewholeartofwarintoanutshell.

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through youinaudible;andhencewecanholdtheenemy’sfateinourhands.

Itwasanextraordinaryachievementofmodernwarfare:between12and25October,1950,theintelligence staffs of MacArthur ’s armies failed to discern the slightest evidence of themovementof130,000soldiersandporters.Acombinationofsuperbfieldcraftandcamouflageby theChinese,with their lack of use of any of the conventionalmeans of detectingmodernmilitarymovement—wirelesstraffic,mechanisedactivity,supplydumps—blindedtheU.N.HighCommandtowhatwastakingplaceonitsfront.MaxHastings,TheKoreanWar,1987

10.Youmayadvanceandbeabsolutelyirresistible,ifyoumakefortheenemy’sweakpoints;youmayretireandbesafefrompursuitifyourmovementsaremorerapidthanthoseoftheenemy.

Mao is the surgeon, exploring the wound, insisting above everything else on the delicateprobing,thediscoveryoftheenemy’sweakenednerve,thedangerouspointwhereweaknessisbalancedbystrength:atthispoint,hewillorderattack.RobertPayne,MaoTse-tung(1969)

11. Ifwewish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be shelteredbehindahighrampartandadeepditch.Allweneeddoistoattacksomeotherplacethathewillbeobligedtorelieve.

TuMusays:“Iftheenemyistheinvadingparty,wecancuthislineofcommunicationsandoccupytheroadsbywhichhewillhave to return; ifweare the invaders,wemaydirectourattackagainst thesovereign himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was nobelieverinfrontalattacks.

12.Ifwedonotwishtofight,wecanpreventtheenemyfromengaginguseventhoughthelinesofourencampmentbemerelytracedoutontheground.Allweneeddoistothrowsomethingoddand

unaccountableinhisway.

TuMu[illustratesthiswithananecdote]ofChu-koLiang,whowhenoccupyingYang-p’ingandabouttobeattackedbySsu-maI,suddenlystruckhiscolours,stoppedthebeatingofthedrums,andflungopen thecitygates, showingonlya fewmenengaged insweepingandsprinkling theground.Thisunexpectedproceedinghadtheintendedeffect;forSsu-maI,suspectinganambush,actuallydrewoffhisarmyandretreated.WhatSunTzuisadvocatinghere,therefore,isnothingmorenorlessthanthetimelyuseof“bluff.”

13.Bydiscovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves,we cankeepourforcesconcentrated,whiletheenemy’smustbedivided.

Theconclusion isperhapsnotveryobvious,butChangYü(afterMeiYao-ch’ên)rightlyexplains itthus:“If theenemy’sdispositionsarevisible,wecanmakeforhiminonebody;whereas,ourowndispositionsbeingkeptsecret,theenemywillbeobligedtodividehisforcesinordertoguardagainstattackfromeveryquarter.”

14.Wecanformasingleunitedbody,whiletheenemymustsplitupintofractions.Hencetherewillbeawholepittedagainstseparatepartsofawhole,whichmeansthatweshallbemanytotheenemy’sfew.15.Andifweareablethustoattackaninferiorforcewithasuperiorone,ouropponentswillbein

direstraits.16.The spotwherewe intend to fightmustnotbemadeknown; for then the enemywill have to

prepareagainstapossibleattackatseveraldifferentpoints;

SheridanonceexplainedthereasonofGeneralGrant’svictoriesbysayingthat“whilehisopponentswerekeptfullyemployedwonderingwhathewasgoingtodo,hewasthinkingmostofwhathewasgoingtodohimself.”

andhis forces being thus distributed inmanydirections, the numberswe shall have to face at anygivenpointwillbeproportionatelyfew.17.Forshouldtheenemystrengthenhisvan,hewillweakenhisrear;shouldhestrengthenhisrear,

hewillweakenhisvan;shouldhestrengthenhisleft,hewillweakenhisright;shouldhestrengthenhisright,hewillweakenhisleft.Ifhesendsreinforcementseverywhere,hewilleverywherebeweak.

InFredericktheGreat’sInstructionstohisGeneralsweread:“Adefensivewarisapttobetrayusintotoofrequentdetachment.Thosegeneralswhohavehadbutlittleexperienceattempttoprotecteverypoint,while thosewhoarebetteracquaintedwith theirprofession,havingonly thecapitalobject inview,guardagainstadecisiveblow,andacquiesceinsmallermisfortunestoavoidgreater.”

18.Numericalweaknesscomesfromhavingtoprepareagainstpossibleattacks;numericalstrength,fromcompellingouradversarytomakethesepreparationsagainstus.

Thehighestgeneralship, inCol.Henderson’swords, is“tocompel theenemytodispersehisarmy,andthentoconcentratesuperiorforceagainsteachfractioninturn.”

19.Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, wemay concentrate from the greatestdistancesinordertofight.

WhatSunTzuevidentlyhasinmindisthatnicecalculationofdistancesandthatmasterlyemploymentofstrategywhichenableageneraltodividehisarmyforthepurposeofalongandrapidmarch,andafterwardstoeffectajunctionatpreciselytherightspotandtherighthourinordertoconfronttheenemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions which military historyrecords, one of themost dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blücher just at the criticalmomentonthefieldofWaterloo.

Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819) was a daring, highly decorated, and famously hard-living, hard-fighting Prussian cavalry officer. He beat Napoleon I on several occasions and wascommander-in-chiefofthearmieswhentheymarchedonParisandbroughtdowntheFirstEmpire.WhenNapoleonregainedpower,vonBlücher,nowaprinceandanoldman,wasputincommandoftheArmyoftheRhine.BadlywoundedinbattleatLigny,vonBlücherneverthelessledhistroopsonalongandbrutalmarchtojoinWellingtonatWaterloo.Hisarmy’scrushinginterventionwasdecisive.DG

20.Butifneithertimenorplacebeknown,thentheleftwingwillbeimpotenttosuccourtheright,therightequallyimpotenttosuccourtheleft,thevanunabletorelievetherear,orthereartosupportthevan.Howmuchmoresoifthefurthestportionsofthearmyareanythingunderahundredliapart,andeventhenearestareseparatedbyseveralli!

TheChineseofthislastsentenceisalittlelackinginprecision,butthementalpicturewearerequired

todrawisprobablythatofanarmyadvancingtowardsagivenrendez-vousinseparatecolumns,eachof which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various detachments toproceedathaphazard,withoutpreciseinstructionsastothetimeandplaceofmeeting,theenemywillbeable toannihilate thearmyindetail.ChangYü’snotemaybeworthquotinghere:“Ifwedonotknowtheplacewhereouropponentsmeantoconcentrateor thedayonwhichtheywill joinbattle,ourunitywillbe forfeited throughourpreparations fordefence,and thepositionsweholdwillbeinsecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurriedcondition,andnomutualsupportwillbepossiblebetweenwings,vanguardorrear,especiallyifthereisanygreatdistancebetweentheforemostandhindmostdivisionsofthearmy.”

Letnoactbedoneathaphazard,norotherwisethanaccordingtothefinishedrulesthatgovernitskind.MarcusAurelius,Meditations(A.D.167)

21.Thoughaccording tomyestimate the soldiersofYüehexceedourown innumber, that shalladvantagethemnothinginthematterofvictory.Isaythenthatvictorycanbeachieved.

Alasforthesebravewords!Thelongfeudbetweenthetwostates[WuandYüeh]endedin473B.C.withthetotaldefeatofWubyKouChienanditsincorporationinYüeh.ThiswasdoubtlesslongafterSunTzu’sdeath....ChangYüistheonlyonetopointouttheseemingdiscrepancy[betweenchapterIV,paragraph4,andthis],whichhethusgoesontoexplain:“InthechapteronTacticalDispositionsitis said: ‘One may know how to conquer without being able to do it,’ whereas here we have thestatement that ‘victory can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in the former chapter, where theoffensiveanddefensiveareunderdiscussion,itissaidthatiftheenemyisfullyprepared,onecannotmakecertainofbeatinghim.ButthepresentpassagerefersparticularlytothesoldiersofYüehwho,accordingtoSunTzu’scalculations,willbekeptinignoranceofthetimeandplaceoftheimpendingstruggle.Thatiswhyhesaysherethatvictorycanbeachieved.”

22.Thoughtheenemybestrongerinnumbers,wemaypreventhimfromfighting.Schemesoastodiscoverhisplansandthelikelihoodoftheirsuccess.23.Rousehim,andlearntheprincipleofhisactivityorinactivity.Forcehimtorevealhimself,soas

tofindouthisvulnerablespots.24.Carefullycomparetheopposingarmywithyourown,sothatyoumayknowwherestrengthis

superabundantandwhereitisdeficient.25.Inmakingtacticaldispositions,thehighestpitchyoucanattainistoconcealthem;concealyour

dispositions,andyouwillbesafefromthepryingofthesubtlestspies,fromthemachinationsofthewisestbrains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what themultitudecannotcomprehend.27.AllmencanseethetacticswherebyIconquer,butwhatnonecanseeisthestrategyoutofwhich

victoryisevolved.

I.e.,everybodycanseesuperficiallyhowabattle iswon;what theycannotsee is the longseriesofplansandcombinationswhichhasprecededthebattle.

28.Donotrepeatthetacticswhichhavegainedyouonevictory,butletyourmethodsberegulatedbytheinfinitevarietyofcircumstances.

AsWang Hsi sagely remarks: “There is but one root-principle underlying victory, but the tacticswhich lead up to it are infinite in number.” With this compare Col. Henderson [writing aboutStonewallJackson]:“Therulesofstrategyarefewandsimple.Theymaybelearnedinaweek.Theymaybetaughtbyfamiliarillustrationsoradozendiagrams.Butsuchknowledgewillnomoreteachaman to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write likeGibbon.”

29.Militarytacticsarelikeuntowater;forwaterinitsnaturalcourserunsawayfromhighplacesandhastensdownwards.30.Soinwar,thewayistoavoidwhatisstrongandtostrikeatwhatisweak.

Likewater,takingthelineofleastresistance.

31.Watershapesitscourseaccordingtothenatureofthegroundoverwhichitflows;thesoldierworksouthisvictoryinrelationtothefoewhomheisfacing.32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant

conditions.33.Hewhocanmodifyhistacticsinrelationtohisopponentandtherebysucceedinwinning,may

becalledaheaven-borncaptain.34.Thefiveelements

Water,fire,wood,metal,earth.

arenotalwaysequallypredominant;

Thatis,asWangHsisays:“Theypredominatealternately.”

thefourseasonsmakewayforeachother in turn.Thereareshortdaysand long; themoonhas itsperiodsofwaningandwaxing.

Thepurportofthepassageissimplytoillustratethewantoffixityinwarbythechangesconstantlytaking place inNature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of thephenomenawhichSunTzumentionsisbynomeansparalleledinwar.

VII.MANOEUVRING

Inwar, three-quarters turnsonpersonalcharacterandrelations; thebalanceofmanpowerandmaterialscountsonlyfortheremainingquarter.NapoleonI,“Observationssurlesaffairesd’Espagne”(1808)

1.SunTzusaid:Inwar,thegeneralreceiveshiscommandsfromthesovereign.2.Havingcollectedanarmyandconcentratedhisforces,hemustblendandharmonisethedifferent

elementsthereofbeforepitchinghiscamp.3.Afterthat,comestacticalmanœuvring,thanwhichthereisnothingmoredifficult.

IhavedepartedslightlyfromthetraditionalinterpretationofTs’aoKung,whosays:“Fromthetimeofreceivingthesovereign’sinstructionsuntilourencampmentoveragainsttheenemy,thetacticstobe pursued aremost difficult.” It seems tome that the tactics ormanœuvres can hardly be said tobeginuntilthearmyhassalliedforthandencamped,andch’ênHao’snotegivescolourtothisview:“For levying, concentrating, harmonising and intrenching an army, there are plenty of old ruleswhich will serve. The real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations.” Tu Yu also

observesthat“thegreatdifficultyistobebeforehandwiththeenemyinseizingfavourablepositions.”

Thedifficultyoftacticalmanœuvringconsistsinturningthedeviousintothedirect,andmisfortuneintogain.

ThisisoneofthosehighlycondensedandsomewhatenigmaticalexpressionsofwhichSunTzuissofond.This ishowit isexplainedbyTs’aoKung:“Makeitappear thatyouarea longwayoff, thencoverthedistancerapidlyandarriveonthescenebeforeyouropponent.”TuMusays:“Hoodwinktheenemy,sothathemayberemissandleisurelywhileyouaredashingalongwiththeutmostspeed.”HoShih gives a slightly different turn to the sentence: “Although you may have difficult ground totraverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a drawback which can be turned into actualadvantagebycelerityofmovement.”SignalexamplesofthissayingareaffordedbythetwofamouspassagesacrosstheAlps—thatofHannibal,whichlaidItalyathismercy,andthatofNapoleontwothousandyearslater,whichresultedinthegreatvictoryofMarengo.

4.Thus, to take a longandcircuitous route, after enticing the enemyoutof theway, and thoughstarting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice ofdeviation.

ChiaLin [says]:“Ifouradversary’scourse is reallyashortone,andwecanmanage todiverthimfromit,eitherbysimulatingweaknessorbyholdingoutsomesmalladvantage,weshallbeabletobeathimintheraceforgoodpositions.”Thisisquiteadefensibleview,thoughnotadoptedbyanyothercommentator....TuMu cites the famousmarch ofChaoShê in 270B.C. to relieve the townofO-yü,whichwas

[under siege] by a Ch’in army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability ofattempting a relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening country tooruggedanddifficult.HismajestythenturnedtoChaoshê,whofullyadmittedthehazardousnatureofthemarch,butfinallysaid:“Weshallbe like tworatsfightinginahole—andthepluckieronewillwin!”Soheleftthecapitalwithhisarmy,buthadonlygoneadistanceof30liwhenhestoppedandbeganthrowingupintrenchments.For28dayshecontinuedstrengtheninghisfortifications,andtookcarethatspiesshouldcarrytheintelligencetotheenemy.The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the

beleagueredcitywasintheHanState,andthusnotactuallypartofChaoterritory.ButthespieshadnosoonerdepartedthanChaoShêbeganaforcedmarchlastingfortwodaysandonenight,andarrivedon the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commandingposition on the “North hill” before the enemy had gotwind of hismovements.A crushing defeatfollowedfor theCh’in forces,whowereobliged to raise thesiegeofO-yü inallhasteand retreatacrosstheborder.

5.Manœuvringwithanarmyisadvantageous;withanundisciplinedmultitude,mostdangerous.6.Ifyousetafullyequippedarmyinmarchinorder tosnatchanadvantage, thechancesare that

you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves thesacrificeofitsbaggageandstores.

Isubmitmyownrendering[ofthispassage]withoutmuchenthusiasm,beingconvincedthatthereissomedeep-seatedcorruptioninthetext.Onthewhole,itisclearthatSunTzudoesnotapproveofalengthymarchbeingundertakenwithoutsupplies.

7.Thus,ifyouorderyourmentorolluptheirbuff-coats,

ChangYüsays:“Thismeans,infullpanoply.”

andmakeforcedmarcheswithouthaltingdayornight,coveringdoubletheusualdistanceatastretch,

Theordinaryday’smarch,accordingtoTuMu,was30li;butononeoccasion,whenpursuingLiuPei,Ts’aoTs’aoissaidtohavecoveredtheincredibledistanceof300liwithintwenty-fourhours.

doingahundredliinordertowrestanadvantage,theleadersofallyourthreedivisionswillfallintothehandsoftheenemy.8.Thestrongermenwillbeinfront,thejadedoneswillfallbehind,andonthisplanonlyone-tenth

ofyourarmywillreachitsdestination.

The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred li to gain a tacticaladvantage,eitherwithorwithoutimpedimenta.Manœuvresofthisdescriptionshouldbeconfinedtoshort distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forcedmarches are oftenmore painfulthanthedangersofbattle.”Hedidnotoftencalluponhistroopsforextraordinaryexertions.Itwasonly when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificedeverythingtospeed.

9.Ifyoumarchfiftyli inordertooutmanœuvretheenemy,youwill losetheleaderofyourfirstdivision,andonlyhalfyourforcewillreachthegoal.

Literally,“theleaderofthefirstdivisionwillbetornaway.”[FromtheTsoChuan,19thyear:]“Thisisacaseof[thefallingtree]tearingupitsroots.”

LikesomanytextsinaliteratureasvastandancientasChina’s,thereferencetotheTsochuancomeswithastep-ladderprovenanceandmysteriesofitsown.TheTsochuan—theTsoCommentaryontheSpringandAutumnAnnals—existedbytheearlyHanDynasty.Whenpreciselyisopentoquestion,butitsimportisunquestionable.Chinese intellectual activity, from poetry to military tracts, builds upon references to a long

intellectualpast,especiallytowhatareknownastheFiveClassics.Consequently, idiomsandpointsofreferencecantransmitencyclopediclayersofmeaninginastonishinglybrieflines.AlongwiththeKung-yung and theKu-liang commentaries, the Tso chuan sets out to explain the background andsignificanceoftheeventsrelatedinthefifthofthegreatFiveClassics,theCh’un-Ch’iu,ortheSpringandAutumnAnnals.Employing extremely laconic language, it chronicles events in the state ofLufrom 722 to 481 B.C. The Annals were essential study for China’s educated classes across themillennia.AsianscholarWilliamTheodoredeBarynotes that theywere regarded“notonlyas thefinalauthorityuponquestionsofancienthistory...butastheembodimentofmorallaw...andthesource of all wisdom and right knowledge.” Therefore, any reference to the Classics or to thecommentariesonthemisthesameascitingthefinalauthorityonasubject.DG

10.Ifyoumarchthirtyliwiththesameobject,two-thirdsofyourarmywillarrive.

In theT’ungTien [TuYu’s encyclopedic treatise on theConstitution] is added: “From thiswemayknowthedifficultyofmanœuvring.”

11.Wemaytakeitthenthatanarmywithoutitsbaggage-trainislost;withoutprovisionsitislost;withoutbasesofsupplyitislost.

ThisisexplainedbyTuYuas“fodderandthelike”;byTuMuandChangYüas“goodsingeneral”;and byWangHsi as “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I thinkwhat Sun Tzumeant was “stores andaccumulatedindépôts,”asdistinguishedfrom...thevariousimpedimentaaccompanyinganarmyonitsmarch.

12.Wecannotenterintoalliancesuntilweareacquaintedwiththedesignsofourneighbours.13.Wearenotfittoleadanarmyonthemarchunlesswearefamiliarwiththefaceofthecountry—

itsmountainsandforests,itspitfallsandprecipices,itsmarshesandswamps.14.Weshallbeunabletoturnnaturaladvantagestoaccountunlesswemakeuseoflocalguides.15.Inwar,practisedissimulation,andyouwillsucceed.Moveonlyifthereisarealadvantagetobe

gained.16.Whethertoconcentrateortodivideyourtroops,mustbedecidedbycircumstances.17.Letyourrapiditybethatofthewind,

Thesimileisdoublyappropriate,becausethewindisnotonlyswiftbut,asMeiYao-ch’ênpointsout,“invisibleandleavesnotracks.”

yourcompactnessthatoftheforest.

MêngShih [notes]: “When slowlymarching, order and ranksmust be preserved”—so as to guardagainstsurpriseattacks.Butnaturalforestsdonotgrowinrows,whereastheydogenerallypossessthequalityofdensityorcompactness.

18.Inraidingandplunderingbelikefire,inimmovabilitylikeamountain.

That is [with reference to the latter], when holding a position fromwhich the enemy is trying todislodgeyou,orperhaps,asTuYusays,whenheistryingtoenticeyouintoatrap.

19.Letyourplansbedarkandimpenetrableasnight,andwhenyoumove,falllikeathunderbolt.

TuYuquotesasayingofT’aiKungwhichhaspassedintoaproverb:“Youcannotshutyourearstothethunderoryoureyestothelightning—sorapidarethey.”Likewise,anattackshouldbemadesoquicklythatitcannotbeparried.

20.Whenyouplunderacountryside,letthespoilbedividedamongstyourmen;

SunTzuwishestolessentheabusesofindiscriminateplunderingbyinsistingthatallbootyshallbethrownintoacommonstock,whichmayafterwardsbefairlydividedamongstall.

whenyoucapturenewterritory,cutitupintoallotmentsforthebenefitofthesoldiery.

Ch’ênHaoalsosays:“Quarteryoursoldiersontheland,andletthemsowandplantit.”Itisbyactingonthisprinciple,andharvestingthelandstheyinvaded,thattheChinesehavesucceededincarryingout some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao, whopenetratedtotheCaspianSea.

21.Ponderanddeliberate

Notethatboththesewords[inEnglishandinChinese]arereallymetaphorsderivedfromtheuseofscales.

beforeyoumakeamove.

ChangYüquotes[anothercommentator]assayingthatwemustnotbreakcampuntilwehavegaugedtheresistingpoweroftheenemyandtheclevernessoftheopposinggeneral.

22.Hewillconquerwhohaslearnttheartificeofdeviation.Suchistheartofmanœuvring.

Withthesewords,thechapterwouldnaturallycometoanend.Buttherenowfollowsalongappendixin the shapeofanextract fromanearlierbookonWar,now lost,but apparentlyextant at the timewhen Sun Tzuwrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzuhimself,butnocommentatorraisesadoubtastoitsgenu-ineness.

23.TheBookofArmyManagementsays:

It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any information about thiswork.MeiYao-Ch’ên calls it “an ancientmilitary classic,” andWangHsi, “an old book onwar.”ConsideringtheenormousamountoffightingthathadgoneonforcenturiesbeforeSunTzu’stimebetween the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that acollectionofmilitarymaximsshouldhavebeenmadeandwrittendownatsomeearlierperiod.

Onthefieldofbattle,thespokenworddoesnotcarryfarenough:hencetheinstitutionofgongsanddrums.Norcanordinaryobjectsbeseenclearlyenough:hencetheinstitutionofbannersandflags.24.Gongsanddrums,bannersandflags,aremeanswherebytheearsandeyesofthehostmaybe

focussedononeparticularpoint.

ChangYüsays:“Ifsightandhearingconvergesimultaneouslyonthesameobject,theevolutionsofasmanyasamillionsoldierswillbelikethoseofasingleman!”

25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advancealone,orforthecowardlytoretreatalone.

Chang Yü quotes a saying: “Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those whoretreat against orders.” TuMu tells a story in this connection ofWu Ch’i, when he was fightingagainsttheCh’inState.Beforethebattlehadbegun,oneofhissoldiers,amanofmatchlessdaring,salliedforthbyhimself,capturedtwoheadsfromtheenemy,andreturnedtocamp.WuCh’ihadthemaninstantlyexecuted,whereuponanofficerventuredtoremonstrate,saying;“Thismanwasagoodsoldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.”Wu Ch’i replied, “I fully believe he was a goodsoldier,butIhadhimbeheadedbecauseheactedwithoutorders.”

Thisistheartofhandlinglargemassesofmen.26. In night-fighting, then,makemuch use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of

flagsandbanners,asameansofinfluencingtheearsandeyesofyourarmy.

Ch’ênHao alludes toLiKuang-pi’s night ride toHo-yang at the headof 500mountedmen [c.760A.D.];theymadesuchanimposingdisplaywithtorches,thatthoughtherebelleaderShihSsü-minghadalargearmy,hedidnotdaretodisputetheirpassage.

27.Awholearmymayberobbedofitsspirit;

“Inwar,”saysChangYü,“ifaspiritofangercanbemadetopervadeallranksofanarmyatoneandthe same time, its onsetwill be irresistible.Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldierswill be keenestwhentheyhavenewlyarrivedonthescene,anditisthereforeourcuenottofightatonce,buttowaituntil their ardour and enthusiasmhavewornoff, and then strike. It is in thisway that theymaybe

robbedoftheirkeenspirit.”LiCh’üanandotherstellananecdote[intheTsoChuan]ofTs’aoKuei,aprotégéofDukeChuang

ofLu.ThelatterStatewasattackedbyCh’i,andtheDukewasabouttojoinbattleatCh’ang-cho,afterthefirstrolloftheenemy’sdrums,whenTs’aosaid,“Notjustyet.”Onlyaftertheirdrumshadbeatenforthethirdtime,didhegivethewordforattack.Thentheyfought,andthemenofCh’iwereutterlydefeated.QuestionedafterwardsbytheDukeastothemeaningofhisdelay,Ts’aoKueireplied,“Inbattle,acourageousspiritiseverything.Nowthefirstrollofthedrumtendstocreatethisspirit,butwiththeseconditisalreadyonthewane,andafterthethirditisgonealtogether.Iattackedwhentheirspiritwasgoneandourswasatitsheight.Henceourvictory.”[ThewriterWuTzu]puts“spirit”firstamongthe“fourimportantinfluences”inwar,andcontinues:“Thevalueofawholearmy—amightyhostofamillionmen—isdependentononemanalone:Suchistheinfluenceofspirit!”

acommander-in-chiefmayberobbedofhispresenceofmind.ChangYüsays:“Presenceofmindisthegeneral’smost importantasset. It is thequalitywhichenableshim todisciplinedisorderand toinspire courage into thepanic-stricken.”Thegreat generalLiChing (A.D.571-649)has a saying:“Attackingdoesnotmerelyconsistinassaultingwalledcitiesorstrikingatanarmyinbattlearray;itmustincludetheartofassailingtheenemy’smentalequilibrium.”

Intellectandeducationplayamoreprominentpartinwarthanstaminaandcourage.GeorgeFrancisRobertHenderson andSirThomasBarclay, “War,”Encyclopedia Britannica,eleventhedition(1910)

28.Nowasoldier ’sspiritiskeenestinthemorning;Alwaysprovided,Isuppose, thathehashadbreakfast.At thebattleof theTrebia, theRomanswerefoolishlyallowedtofightfasting,whereasHannibal’smenhadbreakfastedattheirleisure.

bynoondayithasbeguntoflag;andintheevening,hismindisbentonlyonreturningtocamp.29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an armywhen its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is

sluggishandinclinedtoreturn.Thisistheartofstudyingmoods.30.Disciplinedandcalm,toawaittheappearanceofdisorderandhubbubamongsttheenemy:—this

istheartofretainingself-possession.31.Tobenearthegoalwhiletheenemyisstillfarfromit,towaitateasewhiletheenemyistoiling

and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’sstrength.32. To refrain from intercepting an enemywhose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from

attackinganarmydrawnupincalmandconfidentarray:—thisistheartofstudyingcircumstances.

33.Itisamilitaryaxiomnottoadvanceuphillagainsttheenemy,nortoopposehimwhenhecomesdownhill.34.Donotpursueanenemywhosimulatesflight;donotattacksoldierswhosetemperiskeen.35.Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.Do not interferewith an army that is returning

home.Thecommentatorsexplain [the latter]pieceofadvicebysaying thatamanwhoseheart is seton

returning home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore toodangerous an opponent to be tackled. ChangYü quotes thewords of HanHsin: “Invincible is thesoldierwho hath his desire and returneth homewards.”Amarvellous tale is told of Ts’aoTs’ao’scourageand resource . . . : In198A.D.,hewasbesiegingChangHsiu in Jang,whenLiuPiaosentreinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off histroops,only to findhimselfhemmed inbetween twoenemies,whowereguardingeachoutletofanarrowpassinwhichhehadengagedhimself.Inthisdesperateplight,Ts’aowaiteduntilnightfall,whenheboredatunnelintothemountainside

andlaidanambushinit.Thenhemarchedonwithhisbaggage-train,andwhenitgrewlight,ChangHsiu,findingthatthebirdhadflown,pressedafterhiminhotpursuit.Assoonasthewholearmyhadpassedby,thehiddentroopsfellonitsrear,whileTs’aohimselfturnedandmethispursuersinfront,sothattheywerethrownintoconfusionandannihilated.Ts’aoTs’aosaidafterwards,“Thebrigandstriedtocheckmyarmyinitsretreatandbroughtmetobattleinadesperateposition;henceIknewhowtoovercomethem.”

36.Whenyousurroundanarmy,leaveanoutletfree.

Thisdoesnotmeanthattheenemyistobeallowedtoescape.Theobject,asTuMuputsit,is“tomakehimbelievethatthereisaroadtosafety,andthuspreventhisfightingwiththecourageofdespair.”TuMuaddspleasantly:“Afterthat,youmaycrushhim.”

Donotpressadesperatefoetoohard.

Ch’ênHaoquotesthesaying,“Birdsandbeastswhenbroughttobaywillusetheirclawsandteeth.”ChangYüsays:“Ifyouradversaryhasburnedhisboatsanddestroyedhiscooking-pots,andisreadytostakeallontheissueofabattle,hemustnotbepushedtoextremities.”...HoShihillustratesthemeaningbyastorytakenfromthelifeofFuYen-Ch’ing....Thatgeneral,

togetherwithhiscolleagueTuChung-wei,wassurroundedbyavastlysuperiorarmyofKhitansintheyear945A.D.Thecountrywasbareanddesert-like,andthelittleChineseforcewassoonindirestraitsforwantofwater.Thewellstheyboredrandry,andthemenwerereducedtosqueezinglumpsof mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-Ch’ingexclaimed,“Wearedesperatemen.Farbetter todie forourcountry than togowith fetteredhands

intocaptivity!”Astronggalehappenedtobeblowingfromthenortheastanddarkeningtheairwithdensecloudsof

sandydust.TuChung-weiwasforwaitinguntilthishadabatedbeforedecidingonafinalattack;butluckilyanotherofficer,LiShou-chêngbyname,wasquickertoseeanopportunity,andsaid:“Theyaremany andwe are few, but in themidst of this sandstormour numberswill not be discernible;victorywill go to the strenuous fighter, and thewindwill be our best ally.”Accordingly, FuYen-Ch’ingmadeasuddenandwhollyunexpectedonslaughtwithhiscavalry,routedthebarbariansandsucceededinbreakingthroughtosafety.

37.Suchistheartofwarfare.

Itakeit thatthesewordsconcludetheextractfromtheBookofArmyManagement,whichbeganatparagraph23.

VIII.VARIATIONOFTACTICS

Thereisrequiredforthecompositionofagreatcommandernotonlymassivecommonsenseandreasoningpower,notonlyimagination,butalsoanelementoflegerdemain,anoriginalandsinistertouch,whichleavestheenemypuzzledaswellasbeaten.WinstonChurchill,TheWorldCrisis(1923)

The headingmeans literally “TheNineVariations,” but, asSunTzudoes not appear to enumeratethese,andas,indeed,hehasalreadytoldus(chapterV,paragraphs6-11)thatsuchdeflectionsfromtheordinarycoursearepracticallyinnumerable,wehavelittleoptionbut tofollowWangHsi,whosaysthat“Nine”standsforanindefinitelylargenumber:“Allitmeansisthatinwarfareweoughttovaryourtacticstotheutmostdegree.”...Theonlyotheralternativeistosupposethatsomethinghasbeenlost—asuppositiontowhichtheunusualshortnessofthechapterlendssomeweight.

1.SunTzusaid:Inwar,thegeneralreceiveshiscommandsfromthesovereign,collectshisarmy

andconcentrateshisforces.

Repeated from chapter VII, paragraph 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have beeninterpolatedheremerelyinordertosupplyabeginningtothechapter.

2.Whenindifficultcountry,donotencamp.Incountrywherehighroadsintersect,joinhandswithyourallies.Donotlingerindangerouslyisolatedpositions.

ChangYü[definesthelast-namedsituationasbeing]situatedacrossthefrontier,inhostileterritory.LiCh’üansaysit is“countryinwhichtherearenospringsorwells,flocksorherds,vegetablesorfirewood”;ChiaLin,“oneofgorges,chasmsandprecipices,withoutaroadbywhichtoadvance.”

Inhemmed-insituations,youmustresorttostratagem.Inadesperateposition,youmustfight.

ChangYühasan importantnotehere. . . . : “The reasonwhyonly five [of theninevariations]aregiven is that the subject is treated en précis... All kinds of ground have corresponding militarypositions,andalsoavariationoftacticssuitabletoeach....[But]hewishesheretospeakoftheFiveAdvantages, so he begins by setting forth theNineVariations. These are inseparably connected inpractice, and therefore they are dealt with together.” The weak point of this argument is thesuggestionthat“fivethings”canstandas. . .anabstractorabridgmentofnine,whenthosethatareomitted are not less important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not includedamongstthenineatall.

3.Thereareroadswhichmustnotbefollowed,

“Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch’üan, “where an ambush is to befeared.”

armieswhichmustnotbeattacked,

More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be attacked.” Ch’ên Hao says:“When you see your way to obtain a trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat,refrainfromattacking,forfearofovertaxingyourmen’sstrength.”

townswhichmustnotbebesieged,

Ts’aoKunggivesaninterestingillustrationfromhisownexperience.WheninvadingtheterritoryofHsü-chou,heignoredthecityofHua-pi,whichlaydirectlyinhispath,andpressedonintotheheartof the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer thanfourteenimportantdistrictcities.ChangYüsays:“Notownshouldbeattackedwhich,iftaken,cannotbeheld,orifleftalone,willnotcauseanytrouble.”HsünYing,whenurgedtoattackPi-yang,replied:“Thecityissmallandwell-fortified;evenifIsucceedintakingit, itwillbenogreatfeatofarms;whereasifIfail,Ishallmakemyselfalaughing-stock.”Intheseventeenthcentury,siegesstillformedalargeproportionofwar.Itwas[Marshal]Turenne

whodirectedattentiontotheimportanceofmarches,countermarchesandmanœuvres.Hesaid:“Itisagreat mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain aprovince.”

positionswhichmustnotbecontested,commandsofthesovereignwhichmustnotbeobeyed.ThisisahardsayingfortheChinese,withtheirreverenceforauthority,andWeiLiaoTzu(quotedbyTuMu) is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, amilitarycommanderisthenegationofcivilorder!”Theunpalatablefactremains,however,thatevenImperialwishesmustbesubordinatedtomilitarynecessity.

I’vealwaystakenitforgrantedthattheFührerleftthecommandofthearmytome.Thiscrazyorderhascomelikeabombshell.Hecan’tjustblindlyapplyexperiencehegainedinRussiatothewar inAfrica.He should have left the decision here tome. . . .Until thismoment,we inAfricahadalwayshadcompletefreedomofaction.Nowthatwasover. . . .Anoverwhelmingbitternesswelledupinuswhenwesawthesuperlativespiritofthearmy,inwhicheveryman,from thehighest to the lowest, knew that even thegreatest effort couldno longer change thecourseofbattle.FieldMarshal Rommel, onAdolfHitler ’s interference and theGerman defeat at ElAlamein(1942)

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tacticsknowshowtohandlehistroops.5.Thegeneralwhodoesnotunderstandthese,maybewellacquaintedwiththeconfigurationofthe

country,yethewillnotbeabletoturnhisknowledgetopracticalaccount.Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only securing good positions, butavailingoneselfofnaturaladvantagesineverypossibleway.ChangYüsays:“Everykindofground

ischaracterisedbycertainnaturalfeatures,andalsogivesscopeforacertainvariabilityofplan.Howisitpossibletoturnthesenaturalfeaturestoaccountunlesstopographicalknowledgeissupplementedbyversatilityofmind?”

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he beacquaintedwiththeFiveAdvantages,willfailtomakethebestuseofhismen.

ChiaLin...tellsusthattheseimplyfiveobviousandgenerallyadvantageouslinesofaction,namely:“Ifacertainroadisshort,itmustbefollowed;ifanarmyisisolated,itmustbeattacked;ifatownisinaparlouscondition,itmustbebesieged;ifapositioncanbestormed,itmustbeattempted;andifconsistent with military operations, the ruler ’s commands must be obeyed.” But there arecircumstanceswhichsometimesforbidageneraltousetheseadvantages.For instance,“acertain roadmaybe theshortestway forhim,but ifheknows that it abounds in

naturalobstacles,orthattheenemyhaslaidanambushonit,hewillnotfollowthatroad.Ahostileforce may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight withdesperation,hewillrefrainfromstriking,”andsoon....Henceweseetheuselessnessofknowingthe onewithout the other—of having an eye forweaknesses in the enemy’s armourwithout beingcleverenoughtorecastone’splansonthespurofthemoment.

7.Henceinthewiseleader ’splans,considerationsofadvantageandofdisadvantagewillbeblendedtogether.

“Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says Ts’aoKung, “the oppositestateshouldbealwayspresenttoyourmind.”

Ourstrategyis“pitoneagainstten,”andourtacticsare“pittenagainstone.”Thesecontraryandyetcomplementarypropositionsconstituteoneofourprinciplesforgainingmasteryover theenemy.MaoTse-tung,ProblemsofStrategyinChina’sRevolutionaryWar(1936)

8. Ifourexpectationofadvantagebe tempered in thisway,wemaysucceed inaccomplishing theessentialpartofourschemes.

TuMu[says]:“Ifwewishtowrestanadvantagefromtheenemy,wemustnotfixourmindsonthat

alone,butallowforthepossibilityoftheenemyalsodoingsomeharmtous,andletthisenterasafactorintoourcalculations.”

9.If,ontheotherhand,inthemidstofdifficultieswearealwaysreadytoseizeanadvantage,wemayextricateourselvesfrommisfortune.

Atranslatorcannotemulatetheconcisenessof[theoriginalChinese,whichreads,wordforword]“toblend[thoughtsofadvantage]withdisadvantage,”butthemeaningisasgiven.TuMusays:“IfIwishtoextricatemyselffromadangerousposition,Imustconsidernotonlytheenemy’sabilitytoinjureme, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these twoconsiderations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberatingmyself . . . For instance, if I amsurroundedbytheenemyandonlythinkofeffectinganescape,thenervelessnessofmypolicywillincitemyadversarytopursueandcrushme;itwouldbefarbettertoencouragemymentodeliveraboldcounter-attack,andusetheadvantagethusgainedtofreemyselffromtheenemy’stoils.”

Fortunefavorsthebrave.Terence,Phormio(c.161B.C.)

Deathisnothing.Buttolivedefeatedandwithoutglory,thatistodieeveryday.NapoleonI(1804)

10.Reducethehostilechiefsbyinflictingdamageonthem;

ChiaLinenumeratesseveralwaysofinflictingthisinjury. . .:—“Enticeawaytheenemy’sbestandwisestmen, so that hemay be leftwithout counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that thegovernment policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissensionbetween the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deteriorationamongsthismenandwasteofhis treasure.Corrupthismoralsby insidiousgifts leadinghim intoexcess.Disturbandunsettlehismindbypresentinghimwithlovelywomen.”ChangYü(afterWangHsi)[says]:“Gettheenemy...intoapositionwherehemustsufferinjury,andhewillsubmitofhisownaccord.”

maketroubleforthem,andkeepthemconstantlyengaged;

Literally [with reference to the latter phrase], “make servants of them.”TuYu says: “Prevent themfromhavinganyrest.”

holdoutspeciousallurements,andmakethemrushtoanygivenpoint.

MêngShih’snote...:“Causethemtoforgetpien(thereasonsforactingotherwisethanontheirfirstimpulse),andhasteninourdirection.”

11.Theartofwarteachesustorelynotonthelikelihoodoftheenemy’snotcoming,butonourownreadiness to receivehim;noton thechanceofhisnotattacking,but ratheron the fact thatwehavemadeourpositionunassailable.12.Thereare fivedangerous faultswhichmayaffect ageneral: (1)Recklessness,which leads to

destruction;

“Braverywithout forethought,”asTs’aoKunganalyses it,whichcausesaman to fightblindlyanddesperatelylikeamadbull.Suchanopponent,saysChangYü,“mustnotbeencounteredwithbruteforce,butmaybeluredintoanambushandslain.”[WuTzusays:]“Inestimatingthecharacterofageneral,menarewonttopayexclusiveattentiontohiscourage,forgettingthatcourageisonlyoneout of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fightrecklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must becondemned.”Ssu-maFa,too,makestheincisiveremark,“Simplygoingtoone’sdeathdoesnotbringaboutvictory.”

(2)cowardice,whichleadstocapture;

Ts’aoKung[describesthecowardas]theman“whomtimiditypreventsfromadvancingtoseizeanadvantage,”andWangHsiadds,“who isquick to fleeat thesightofdanger.”MêngShihgives thecloserparaphrase“hewhoisbentonreturningalive,”thatis,themanwhowillnevertakearisk.But,asSunTzuknew,nothingistobeachievedinwarunlessyouarewillingtotakerisks.T’aiKungsaid:“Hewholetsanadvantageslipwillsubsequentlybringuponhimselfrealdisaster.”In404A.D.,LiuYüpursued therebelHuanHsüanup theYangtszeandfoughtanavalbattlewith

him at the island of Ch’êng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while theiropponentswereingreatforce.ButHuanHsüan,fearingthefatewhichwasinstoreforhimshouldhebe overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, ifnecessary, at amoment’s notice. The natural resultwas that the fighting spirit of his soldierswasutterly quenched, andwhen the loyalistsmade an attack fromwindwardwith fireships, all striving

withtheutmostardourtobefirstinthefray,HuanHsüan’sforceswererouted,hadtoburnalltheirbaggageandfledfortwodaysandnightswithoutstopping.ChangYütellsasomewhatsimilarstoryofChaoYing-Ch’i,ageneraloftheChinStatewhoduring

abattlewiththearmyofCh’uin597B.C.hadaboatkeptinreadinessforhimontheriver,wishingincaseofdefeattobethefirsttogetacross.

Cowardsdonotcountinbattle;theyaretherebutnotinit.Euripides,Meleager(fifthcenturyB.C.)

(3)ahastytemper,whichcanbeprovokedbyinsults;

TuMutellsusthatYaoHsiang,whenopposedin357A.D.byHuangMei,TêngCh’iangandothers,shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Têng Ch’iang said: “Our adversary is of acholerictemperandeasilyprovoked;letusmakeconstantsalliesandbreakdownhiswalls,thenhewillgrowangryandcomeout.Oncewecanbringhisforcetobattle,itisdoomedtobeourprey.”This planwas acted upon,YaoHsiang came out to fight, was lured on as far as San-yüan by theenemy’spretendedflight,andfinallyattackedandslain.

(4)adelicacyofhonourwhichissensitivetoshame;

Thisneednotbetakentomeanthatasenseofhonourisreallyadefectinageneral.WhatSunTzucondemnsisratheranexaggeratedsensitivenesstoslanderousreports, thethin-skinnedmanwhoisstung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’ên truly observes, though somewhatparadoxically:“Theseekeraftergloryshouldbecarelessofpublicopinion.”

(5)over-solicitudeforhismen,whichexposeshimtoworryandtrouble.Hereagain,SunTzudoesnotmeanthatthegeneralistobecarelessofthewelfareofhistroops.Allhewishestoemphasiseisthedangerofsacrificinganyimportantmilitaryadvantagetotheimmediatecomfortofhismen.Thisisashortsightedpolicy,becauseinthelongrunthetroopswillsuffermorefromthedefeat,or,atbest, theprolongationofthewar,whichwillbetheconsequence.Amistakenfeelingofpitywillofteninduceageneraltorelieveabeleagueredcity,ortoreinforceahard-presseddetachment,contrarytohismilitaryinstincts.It is now generally admitted that [Britain’s] repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South

AfricanWarwere somany strategicalblunderswhichdefeated their ownpurpose.And in the end,reliefcamethroughtheverymanwhostartedoutwiththedistinctresolvenolongertosubordinate

theinterestsofthewholetosentimentinfavourofapart.Anoldsoldierofoneof[the]generalswhofailedmostconspicuouslyinthiswar,triedonce,Iremember,todefendhimtomeonthegroundthathewasalways“sogoodtohismen.”Bythisplea,hadhebutknownit,hewasonlycondemninghimoutofSunTzu’smouth.

Aprincewho gets a reputation for good nature in the first year of his reign, is laughed at in thesecond.NapoleonI,lettertotheKingofHolland(1807)

13.Thesearethefivebesettingsinsofageneral,ruinoustotheconductofwar.14.Whenanarmyisoverthrownandits leaderslain, thecausewillsurelybefoundamongthese

fivedangerousfaults.Letthembeasubjectofmeditation.

IX.THEARMYONTHEMARCH

Theconductofwar...consistsintheplanningandconductoffighting....[Fighting]consistsof a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which . . . are called“engagements.”...Thisgivesrisetothecompletelydifferentactivityofplanningandexecutingthese engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of themwith the others in order tofurthertheobjectofthewar.Onehasbeencalledtactics,andtheother,stra-tegy.”CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar(1832)

1.SunTzusaid:Wecomenowtothequestionofencampingthearmy,andobservingsignsoftheenemy.Passquicklyovermountains,andkeepintheneighbourhoodofvalleys.Theideais,nottolingeramongbarrenuplands,buttokeepclosetosuppliesofwaterandgrass....[Compare this to Wu Tzu, who says:] “Abide not in natural ovens”; i.e., “the openings of largevalleys.”ChangYütellsthefollowinganecdote:“Wu-tuCh’iangwasarobbercaptaininthetimeoftheLaterHan,andMaYüanwassenttoexterminatehisgang.Ch’ianghavingfoundarefugeinthe

hills,MaYüanmadenoattempttoforceabattle,butseizedallthefavourablepositionscommandingsuppliesofwaterandforage.Ch’iangwassooninsuchadesperateplightforwantofprovisionsthathe was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in theneighbourhoodofvalleys.”

2.Campinhighplaces,

Notonhighhills,butonknollsorhillockselevatedabovethesurroundingcountry.

facingthesun.

TuMutakesthistomean“facingsouth,”andCh’ênHao“facingeast.”

Donotclimbheightsinordertofight.Somuchformountainwarfare.3.Aftercrossingariver,youshouldgetfarawayfromit.

“Inordertotempttheenemytocrossafteryou,”accordingtoTs’aoKung,andalso,saysChangYü,“inordernottobeimpededinyourevolutions.”

4.Whenaninvadingforcecrossesariverinitsonwardmarch,donotadvancetomeetitinmid-stream.Itwillbebesttolethalfthearmygetacross,andthendeliveryourattack.

LiCh’üanalludestothegreatvictorywonbyHanHsinoverLungChüattheWeiRiver...:“Thetwoarmiesweredrawnuponoppositesidesoftheriver.Inthenight,HanHsinorderedhismentotakesometenthousandsacksfilledwithsandandconstructadamalittlehigherup.Then,leadinghalfhisarmy across, he attacked Lung Chü; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, hehastilywithdrew to the other bank. “LungChüwasmuch elated by this unlooked-for success, andexclaiming,“IfeltsurethatHanHsinwasreallyacoward!”hepursuedhimandbegancrossingtheriverinhisturn.HanHsinnowsentapartytocutopenthesandbags,thusreleasingagreatvolumeofwater,whichsweptdownandpreventedthegreaterportionofLungChü’sarmyfromgettingacross.He then turnedupon the forcewhich had been cut off, and annihilated it,LungChühimself beingamongsttheslain.Therestofthearmy,onthefurtherbank,alsoscatteredandfledinalldirections.”5.Ifyouareanxioustofight,youshouldnotgotomeettheinvadernearariverwhichhehasto

cross.

6.Mooryourcrafthigherupthantheenemy,andfacingthesun.

ChangYühasthenote:“Saideitheroftroopsmarshalledontheriver-bank,orofboatsanchoredinthestreamitself;ineithercaseitisessentialtobehigherthantheenemyandfacingthesun.”

Donotmoveup-streamtomeettheenemy.

TuMusays:“Aswaterflowsdownwards,wemustnotpitchourcamponthelowerreachesofariver,for fear theenemyshouldopen the sluicesand sweepusaway ina flood. . . .Chu-koWu-houhasremarkedthat‘inriverwarfare,wemustnotadvanceagainstthestream,’whichisasmuchastosaythat our fleetmust not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then theywould be able to takeadvantage of the current and make short work of us.” There is also the danger, noted by othercommentators,thattheenemymaythrowpoisononthewatertobecarrieddowntous.

Somuchforriverwarfare.7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any

delay.

Becauseofthelackoffreshwater,thepoorqualityoftheherbage,andlastbutnotleast,becausetheyarelow,flat,andexposedtoattack.

8.Ifforcedtofightinasalt-marsh,youshouldhavewaterandgrassnearyou,andgetyourbacktoaclumpoftrees.

LiCh’üanremarksthatthegroundislesslikelytobetreacherouswheretherearetrees,whileTuYusaysthattheywillservetoprotecttherear.

Somuchforoperationsinsalt-marshes.9.Indry,levelcountry,takeupaneasilyaccessibleposition

TuMuexplainsitas“groundthatissmoothandfirm,”andthereforeadaptedforcavalry;ChangYüas “level ground, free from depressions and hollows.”He adds later on that although Sun Tzu isdiscussingflatcountry,therewillneverthelessbeslightelevationsandhillocks.

withrisinggroundtoyourrightandonyourrear,

TuMuquotesT’aiKungassaying:“Anarmyshouldhaveastreamoramarshonitsleft,andahillortumulusonitsright.”

sothatthedangermaybeinfront,andsafetyliebehind.Somuchforcampaigninginflatcountry.10.Thesearethefourusefulbranchesofmilitaryknowledge

Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains. CompareNapoleon’s“MilitaryMaxims,”no.1.

whichenabledtheYellowEmperortovanquishfourseveralsovereigns.

Ts’aoKung’sexplanation is, that theYellowEmperorwas the first to institute the feudalsystemofvassalprinces,eachofwhom(tothenumberoffour)originallyborethetitleofEmperor.LiCh’üantellsusthattheartofwaroriginatedunderHuangTi,whoreceiveditfromhisMinisterFêngHou.

11.Allarmiespreferhighgroundtolow,

“High ground,” says Mei Yao-ch’ên, “is not only more agreeable and salubrious, but moreconvenient from a military point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but alsodisadvantageousforfighting.”

andsunnyplacestodark.12.Ifyouarecarefulofyourmen,

Ts’aoKungsays:“Makeforfreshwaterandpasture,whereyoucanturnoutyouranimalstograze.”Andtheothercommentatorsfollowhim....[Myreading]hasreferencetothehealthofthetroops.ItisthetitleforChuangTzu’sthirdchapter,whereitdenotesmoralratherthanphysicalwell-being.

andcamponhardground,

Dryandsolid,asopposedtodampandmarshy,ground.Thisistobefoundasaruleinhighplaces.

thearmywillbefreefromdiseaseofeverykind,

ChangYüsays:“Thedrynessoftheclimatewillpreventtheoutbreakofillness.”

andthiswillspellvictory.13.Whenyoucometoahillorabank,occupythesunnyside,with theslopeonyourright rear.

Thusyouwill at once act for thebenefit of your soldiers andutilise thenatural advantagesof theground.14.When,inconsequenceofheavyrainsup-country,ariverwhichyouwishtofordisswollenand

fleckedwithfoam,youmustwaituntilitsubsides.15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural

hollows,

Explained[byMeiYao-ch’ênas“placesenclosedoneverysidebysteepbanks,withpoolsofwateratthebottom.”

confinedplaces,

“Naturalpensorprisons,”explainedas“placessurroundedbyprecipicesonthreesides—easytogetinto,buthardtogetoutof.”

tangledthickets,

“Placescoveredwithsuchdenseundergrowththatspearscannotbeused.”

quagmires

“Low-lyingplaces,soheavywithmudastobeimpassableforchariotsandhorsemen.”

andcrevasses,

[According to Mei Yao-Ch’ên] “a narrow difficult way between beetling cliffs,” but Ts’ao Kung[denotes]somethingonamuchsmallerscale.TuMu’snoteis“groundcoveredwithtreesandrocks,andintersectedbynumerousravinesandpitfalls.”Thisisveryvague,butChiaLinexplainsitclearlyenoughasadefileornarrowpass,andChangYütakesmuchthesameview.

shouldbeleftwithallpossiblespeedandnotapproached.16.Whilewekeepaway fromsuchplaces,weshouldget theenemy toapproach them;whilewe

facethem,weshouldlettheenemyhavethemonhisrear.17.Ifintheneighbourhoodofyourcampthereshouldbeanyhillycountry,pondssurroundedby

aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must becarefullyroutedoutandsearched;fortheseareplaceswheremeninambushorinsidiousspiesarelikelytobelurking.

ChangYühasthenote:“Wemustalsobeonourguardagainsttraitorswhomaylieinclosecovert,secretlyspyingoutourweaknessesandoverhearingourinstructions.”

18.Whentheenemyiscloseathandandremainsquiet,heisrelyingonthenaturalstrengthofhisposition.

HerebeginSunTzu’sremarksonthereadingofsigns,muchofwhichissogoodthatitcouldalmostbe included in amodernmanual likeGen.Baden-Powell’s “Aids to Scouting” [the reference is toGen.R.S.S.Baden-Powell’smilitarymanualAidstoScoutingforNCOsandMen(1899)].

19.Whenhekeepsaloofandtriestoprovokeabattle,heisanxiousfortheothersidetoadvance.

Probablybecauseweareinastrongpositionfromwhichhewishestodislodgeus.“Ifhecamecloseuptous,”saysTuMu,“andtriedtoforceabattle,hewouldseemtodespiseus,andtherewouldbelessprobabilityofourrespondingtothechallenge.”

20.Ifhisplaceofencampmentiseasyofaccess,heistenderingabait.21.Movementamongstthetreesofaforestshowsthattheenemyisadvancing.

Ts’aoKungexplainsthisas“fellingtreestoclearapassage,”andChangYüsays:“Everyarmysendsoutscouts toclimbhighplacesandobserve theenemy. Ifascoutsees that the treesofa forestaremovingandshaking,hemayknowthat theyarebeingcutdowntoclearapassagefor theenemy’smarch.”

The appearanceof a number of screens in themidst of thickgrassmeans that the enemywants tomakeussuspicious.

Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung, is as follows: “The presence of a number ofscreensorshedsin themidstof thickvegetationisasuresignthat theenemyhasfledand,fearingpursuit,hasconstructed thesehiding-places inorder tomakeussuspectanambush.”Itappears thatthese “screens” were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating armyhappenedtocomeacross.

22.Therisingofbirdsintheirflightisthesignofanambuscade.

Chang Yü’s explanation is doubtless right: “When birds that are flying along in a straight linesuddenlyshootupwards,itmeansthatsoldiersareinambushatthespotbeneath.”

Startledbeastsindicatethatasuddenattackiscoming.23.Whenthereisdustrisinginahighcolumn,itisthesignofchariotsadvancing;whenthedustis

low,butspreadoverawidearea,itbetokenstheapproachofinfantry.

The commentators explain the phenomenonby saying that horses and chariots, being heavier thanmen, raisemore dust, and also followone another in the samewheel-track,whereas foot-soldierswouldbemarchinginranks,manyabreast.AccordingtoChangYü,“everyarmyonthemarchmusthave scouts someway inadvance,whoonsightingdust raisedby theenemy,willgallopbackandreportittothecommander-in-chief.”[As]Gen.Baden-Powell[writes]:“Asyoumovealong,say,inahostilecountry,youreyesshouldbe lookingafar for theenemyoranysignsofhim: figures,dustrising,birdsgettingup,glitterofarms,etc.”[AidstoScouting].

Whenitbranchesoutindifferentdirections,itshowsthatpartieshavebeensenttocollectfirewood.Afewcloudsofdustmovingtoandfrosignifythatthearmyisencamping.

ChangYüsays:“Inapportioningthedefencesforacantonment,lighthorsewillbesentouttosurveythe position and ascertain theweak and strong points all along its circumference.Hence the smallquantityofdustanditsmotion.”

24.Humblewordsandincreasedpreparationsaresignsthattheenemyisabouttoadvance.

“Asthoughtheystoodingreatfearofus,”saysTuMu.“Theirobjectistomakeuscontemptuousandcareless,afterwhichtheywillattackus.”ChangYüalludestothestoryofT’ienTanoftheCh’iState,who,in279B.C.washard-pressedin

hisdefenceofChi-moagainsttheYenforces,ledbyCh’iChieh.In...theShihChiweread:“T’ienTanopenlysaid,‘MyonlyfearisthattheYenarmymaycutoffthenosesoftheirCh’iprisonersandplacetheminthefrontranktofightagainstus;thatwouldbetheundoingofourcity.’Theothersidebeinginformedofthisspeech,atonceactedonthesuggestion;butthosewithinthecitywereenragedat seeing their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should fall into theenemy’shands,werenervedtodefendthemselvesmoreobstinatelythanever.“OnceagainT’ienTansentbackconvertedspieswhoreportedthesewordstotheenemy:‘WhatI

dreadmostisthatthemenofYenmaydiguptheancestraltombsoutsidethetown,andbyinflictingthisindignityonourforefatherscauseustobecomefaint-hearted.’Forthwiththebesiegersdugupallthe graves and burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing theoutragefromthecitywalls,weptpassionatelyandwereall impatienttogooutandfight, theirfurybeing increased tenfold. T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise. Butinstead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributedamongsthisbestwarriors,while the rankswere filledupwith theirwivesandconcubines.He thenservedoutalltheremainingrationsandbadehismeneattheirfill.Theregularsoldiersweretoldtokeepoutofsight,andthewallsweremannedwiththeoldandweakermenandwithwomen.“This done, envoys were despatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange the terms of surrender,

whereupon theYenarmybegan shouting for joy.T’ienTanalsocollected20,000ouncesof silverfromthepeople,andgotthewealthycitizensofChi-motosendittotheYengeneralwiththeprayerthat,whenthetowncapitulated,hewouldnotallowtheirhomestobeplunderedortheirwomentobemaltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humour, granted their prayer; but his army now becameincreasinglyslackandcareless.“Meanwhile,T’ienTangottogetherathousandoxen,deckedthemwithpiecesofredsilk,painted

theirbodies,dragon-like,withcolouredstripes,and fastenedsharpbladeson theirhornsandwell-greasedrushesontheirtails.Whenthenightcameon,helightedtheendsoftherushes,anddrovetheoxenthroughanumberofholeswhichhehadpiercedinthewalls,backingthemupwithaforceof

5000 pickedwarriors. The animals, maddenedwith pain, dashed furiously into the enemy’s campwheretheycausedtheutmostconfusionanddismay;fortheirtailsactedastorches,showingupthehideouspatternon theirbodies,and theweaponson theirhornskilledorwoundedanywithwhomtheycameintocontact.“In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now threw

themselveson the enemy.At the samemoment a frightfuldin arose in the city itself, all those thatremained behindmaking asmuch noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on bronzevessels,untilheavenandearthwereconvulsedby theuproar.Terror-stricken, theYenarmyfled indisorder,hotlypursuedbythemenofCh’i,whosucceededinslayingtheirgeneralCh’iChieh...TheresultofthebattlewastheultimaterecoveryofsomeseventycitieswhichhadbelongedtotheCh’iState.”

Violentlanguageanddrivingforwardasiftotheattackaresignsthathewillretreat.25.Whenthelightchariotscomeoutfirstandtakeupapositiononthewings,itisasignthatthe

enemyisformingforbattle.26.Peaceproposalsunaccompaniedbyasworncovenantindicateaplot.27.Whenthereismuchrunningabout

Everymanhasteningtohisproperplaceunderhisownregimentalbanner.

andthesoldiersfallintorank,itmeansthatthecriticalmomenthascome.28.Whensomeareseenadvancingandsomeretreating,itisalure.29.Whenthesoldiersstandleaningontheirspears,theyarefaintfromwantoffood.30.If thosewhoaresent todrawwaterbeginbydrinkingthemselves, thearmyissufferingfrom

thirst.

AsTuMuremarks:“Onemayknowtheconditionofawholearmyfromthebehaviourofasingleman.”

31.If theenemyseesanadvantage tobegainedandmakesnoeffort tosecure it, thesoldiersareexhausted.32.Ifbirdsgatheronanyspot,itisunoccupied.

Ausefulfacttobearinmindwhen,forinstance,asCh’ênHaosays,theenemyhassecretlyabandonedhiscamp.

Clamourbynightbetokensnervousness.

Owingtofalsealarms;or,asTuMuexplainsit:“Fearmakesmenrestless;sotheyfalltoshoutingatnightinordertokeepuptheircourage.”

33.Ifthereisdisturbanceinthecamp,thegeneral’sauthorityisweak.Ifthebannersandflagsareshiftedabout,seditionisafoot.Iftheofficersareangry,itmeansthatthemenareweary.

Andtherefore,asCapt.Calthropsays,slowtoobey.TuMuunderstandsthesentencedifferently:“Ifall theofficersofanarmyareangrywiththeirgeneral, itmeansthattheyarebrokenwithfatigue”[owingtotheexertionswhichhehasdemandedfromthem].

34.Whenanarmyfeedsitshorseswithgrainandkillsitscattleforfood,Intheordinarycourseofthings,themenwouldbefedongrainandthehorseschieflyongrass.

andwhen themen do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that theywill notreturntotheirtents,youmayknowthattheyaredeterminedtofighttothedeath.

ImayquoteheretheillustrativepassagefromtheHouHanShu, . . . inabbreviatedform. . . :“Therebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’ên-ts’ang. Huang-fu Sung, who was insupremecommand,andTungChoweresentoutagainsthim.Thelatterpressedforhastymeasures,butSungturnedadeafeartohiscounsel.Atlasttherebelswereutterlywornout,andbegantothrowdowntheirweaponsoftheirownaccord.Sungwasnowforadvancingtotheattack,butChosaid:‘Itisaprincipleofwarnottopursuedesperatemenandnottopressaretreatinghost.’Sunganswered:‘That does not apply here.What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; withdisciplinedtroopsIamfallingonadisorganisedmultitude,notabandofdesperatemen.’Thereuponheadvancedtotheattackunsupportedbyhiscolleague,androutedtheenemy,WangKuobeingslain.”

35.The sight ofmenwhispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points todisaffectionamongsttherankandfile.

Themusketmadetheinfantryman,andtheinfantrymanmadethedemocrat.Gen.J.F.C.Fuller,TheConductofWar(1961)

36.Toofrequentrewardssignifythattheenemyisattheendofhisresources;

Because,whenanarmyishardpressed,asTuMusays,thereisalwaysafearofmutiny,andlavishrewardsaregiventokeepthemeningoodtemper.

toomanypunishmentsbetrayaconditionofdiredistress.

Becauseinsuchcasedisciplinebecomesrelaxed,andunwontedseverityisnecessarytokeepthementotheirduty.

37.Tobeginbybluster,butafterwardstotakefrightattheenemy’snumbers,showsasupremelackofintelligence.

Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch’ên andWang Hsi, is: “Thegeneralwhoisfirsttyrannicaltowardshismen,andtheninterrorlesttheyshouldmutiny,etc.”Thiswouldconnectthesentencewithwhatwentbeforeaboutrewardsandpunishments.

38.Whenenvoysaresentwithcomplimentsintheirmouths,itisasignthattheenemywishesforatruce.

TuMu says: “If the enemy opens friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that they areanxiousforanarmistice,eitherbecausetheirstrengthisexhaustedorforsomeotherreason.”

39.If theenemy’stroopsmarchupangrilyandremainfacingoursforalongtimewithouteitherjoiningbattleor taking themselvesoff again, the situation is one that demandsgreat vigilance andcircumspection.

AsTs’aoKungpointsout,amanœuvreofthissortmaybeonlyarusetogaintimeforanunexpectedflankattackorthelayingofanambush.

40.Ifourtroopsarenomoreinnumberthantheenemy,thatisamplysufficient;itonlymeansthat

nodirectattackcanbemade.

Literally[withreferencetothelatterphrase],“nomartialadvance.”Thatistosay,chéngtacticsandfrontalattacksmustbeeschewed,andstratagemresortedtoinstead.

Whatwecandoissimplytoconcentrateallouravailablestrength,keepaclosewatchontheenemy,andobtainreinforcements.

Thisisanobscuresentence,andnoneofthecommentatorssucceedinsqueezingverygoodsenseoutofit. . . .IfollowLiCh’üan,whoappearstoofferthesimplestexplanation:“Onlythesidethatgetsmoremenwillwin.”...ChangYü[expoundsthe]meaningtousinlanguagewhichislucidityitself:“When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, althoughwemay not bestrongenoughtodeliverasustainedattack,wecanfindadditionalrecruitsamongstoursutlersandcamp-followers,andthen,concentratingourforcesandkeepingaclosewatchontheenemy,contrivetosnatchthevictory.Butwemustavoidborrowingforeignsoldierstohelpus.”He then quotes fromWei Liao Tzu . . . : “The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be

100,000,buttheirrealvaluewillbenotmorethanhalfthatfigure.”[ChangYü’s]interpretationmeans“togetrecruits,”notfromtheoutside,butfromthetag-ragandbobtailwhichfollowsinthewakeofalargearmy.Thisdoesnotsoundaverysoldierlysuggestion,andIfeelconvincedthatitisnotwhatSunTzumeant.

41.Hewho exercises no forethought butmakes light of his opponents is sure to be captured bythem.

Ch’ênHao[says,quotingfromtheTsoChuan]:“Ifbeesandscorpionscarrypoison,howmuchmorewillahostilestate!Evenapunyopponent,then,shouldnotbetreatedwithcontempt.”

42.Ifsoldiersarepunishedbeforetheyhavegrownattachedtoyou,theywillnotprovesubmissive;and,unlesssubmissive,theywillbepracticallyuseless.If,whenthesoldiershavebecomeattachedtoyou,punishmentsarenotenforced,theywillstillbeuseless.43.Thereforesoldiersmustbetreatedinthefirstinstancewithhumanity,butkeptundercontrolby

meansofirondiscipline.

YenTzu(B.C.493)saidofSsu-maJang-chü“Hiscivilvirtuesendearedhimtothepeople;hismartialprowess kept his enemies in awe.” [Wu Tzu says]: “The ideal commander unites culture with a

warliketemper;theprofessionofarmsrequiresacombinationofhardnessandtenderness.”

Isitbettertobelovedthanfeared,orthereverse?Theansweristhatitisdesirabletobeboth,butbecause it isdifficult to join themtogether, it ismuchsaferforaprince tobefearedthanloved,ifheistofallinoneofthetwo.NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince(1532)

Thisisacertainroadtovictory.44.If intrainingsoldierscommandsarehabituallyenforced,thearmywillbewell-disciplined;if

not,itsdisciplinewillbebad.45.Ifageneralshowsconfidenceinhismenbutalwaysinsistsonhisordersbeingobeyed,

TuMu . . . says:“Ageneralought in timeofpeace toshowkindlyconfidence inhismenandalsomakehisauthorityrespected,sothatwhentheycometofacetheenemy,ordersmaybeexecutedanddisciplinemaintained,becausetheyalltrustandlookuptohim.”

thegainwillbemutual.

ChangYüsays:“Thegeneralhasconfidenceinthemenunderhiscommand,andthemenaredocile,havingconfidence inhim.Thus thegain ismutual.”Hequotesapregnant sentence fromWeiLiaoTzu. . . :“Theartofgivingorders isnot to try torectifyminorblundersandnot tobeswayedbypettydoubts.”Vacillationandfussinessarethesurestmeansofsappingtheconfidenceofanarmy.

X.TERRAIN

Livinghighuponacliffmonastery,surroundedbyhostilearmiesincommandofalltheroads,Maowascompelledtoreviseallhisthinkingonrevolutionarytacticsandstrategy....[H]ehad

commanded small guerrilla battles where his own troops possessed swiftmobility . . . [and]suffereddreadfullosses.Hisnextstepwastoacquirethegoodwillofthevillagersontheplains,thesecondwastoemploythemashisintelligencestaff,andthethirdwastoinvitetheprovincialarmiestoattack,sothathecouldreplenishhisdiminishingsupplyofammunition.Hesaidlaterthat therewas not a singlemachine gun among his troops at the beginning. . . . [They]weresuccessful because they knew their terrain better, because they were trained for guerrillawarfare, and because they observed all the classic tenets of guerrilla warfare without everforgettingtheirmainobjective:loot,elbowroom,securefootholds.RobertPayne,MaoTse-tung(1969)

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising paragraphs 1-13, deals with ground. . . . The “sixcalamities”arediscussed inparagraphs14-20,and therestof thechapter isagainamerestringofdesultoryremarks,thoughnotlessinteresting,perhaps,onthataccount.

1.SunTzusaid:Wemaydistinguishsixkindsofterrain,towit:(1)Accessibleground;MeiYao-ch’ênsays:“Plentifullyprovidedwithroadsandmeansofcommunication.”

(2)entanglingground;

MeiYao-ch’ênsays:“Net-likecountry,venturingintowhichyoubecomeentangled.”

(3)temporisingground;(4)narrowpasses;(5)precipitousheights;

Theroot[ideasare]narrowness[and]steepness

(6)positionsatagreatdistancefromtheenemy.

Itishardlynecessarytopointoutthefaultinessofthisclassification.

2.Groundwhichcanbefreelytraversedbybothsidesiscalledaccessible.

Generallyspeaking,“levelcountry”ismeant.

3.With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunnyspots,andcarefullyguardyourlineofsupplies.

The general meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, “not to allow the enemy to cut yourcommunications.”TuMu,whowasnotasoldierandcanhardlyhavehadanypracticalexperienceoffighting, goesmore into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications by awall, orenclosingitbyembankmentsoneitherside!InviewofNapoleon’sdictum,“thesecretofwarliesinthecommunications”[PenséesdeNapoléonIer,no.47],wecouldwishthatSunTzuhaddonemorethan skirt the edge of this important subject here and in chapter I, paragraph 10, and chapterVII,paragraph11.Col.Hendersonsays:“Thelineofsupplymaybesaidtobeasvitaltotheexistenceofanarmyas

thehearttothelifeofahumanbeing.Justastheduelistwhofindshisadversary’spointmenacinghimwithcertaindeath,andhisownguardastray,iscompelledtoconformtohisadversary’smovements,and to content himselfwithwardingoff his thrusts, so the commanderwhose communications aresuddenlythreatenedfindshimselfinafalseposition,andhewillbefortunateifhehasnottochangeallhisplans, tosplituphis force intomoreor less isolateddetachments,and tofightwith inferiornumbersongroundwhichhehasnothadtimetoprepare,andwheredefeatwillnotbeanordinaryfailure,butwillentailtheruinorsurrenderofhiswholearmy”[TheScienceofWar,chapter2].

Thenyouwillbeabletofightwithadvantage.4.Groundwhichcanbeabandonedbutishardtore-occupyiscalledentangling.5.Fromapositionofthissort,iftheenemyisunprepared,youmaysallyforthanddefeathim.But

iftheenemyispreparedforyourcoming,andyoufailtodefeathim,then,returnbeingimpossible,disasterwillensue.6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called

temporisingground.

TuYuwrites:“Eachsidefindsitinconvenienttomove,andthesituationremainsatadeadlock.”

7.Inapositionofthissort,eventhoughtheenemyshouldofferusanattractivebait,

TuYusays:“turningtheirbacksonusandpretendingtoflee.”Butthisisonlyoneofthelureswhichmightinduceustoquitourposition.

itwillbeadvisablenot to stir forth,but rather to retreat, thusenticing theenemy inhis turn; then,whenpartofhisarmyhascomeout,wemaydeliverourattackwithadvantage.8.Withregardtonarrowpasses,ifyoucanoccupythemfirst,letthembestronglygarrisonedand

awaittheadventoftheenemy.

Becausethen,asTuYuobserves,“theinitiativewillliewithus,andbymakingsuddenandunexpectedattacksweshallhavetheenemyatourmercy.”

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fullygarrisoned,butonlyifitisweaklygarrisoned.10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should

occupytheraisedandsunnyspots,andtherewaitforhimtocomeup.

Ts’aoKungsays:“Theparticularadvantageofsecuringheightsanddefilesisthatyouractionscannotthenbedictatedbytheenemy.”ChangYütellsthefollowinganecdoteofP’eiHsing-chien(A.D.619-682),whowas sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes: “At nightfall he pitched hiscampasusual,andithadalreadybeencompletelyfortifiedbywallandditch,whensuddenlyhegaveorders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. Thiswas highly displeasing to hisofficers,whoprotestedloudlyagainsttheextrafatiguewhichitwouldentailonthemen.“P’ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as

quicklyaspossible.Thesamenight,a terrificstormcameon,whichfloodedtheirformerplaceofencampmenttothedepthofovertwelvefeet.Therecalcitrantofficerswereamazedatthesight,andownedthattheyhadbeeninthewrong.‘Howdidyouknowwhatwasgoingtohappen?’theyasked.P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without askingunnecessaryquestions.’Fromthisitmaybeseen...thathighandsunnyplacesareadvantageousnotonlyforfighting,butalsobecausetheyareimmunefromdisastrousfloods.”

11.Iftheenemyhasoccupiedthembeforeyou,donotfollowhim,butretreatandtrytoenticehimaway.

Theturning-pointofLiShih-min’scampaignin621A.D.againstthetworebels,TouChien-tê,KingofHsia,andWangShih-ch’ung,PrinceofChêng,washisseizureoftheheightsofWu-lao,inspiteofwhichTouChien-tê persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally inLo-yang, [and]was defeated andtakenprisoner.

12.Ifyouaresituatedatagreatdistancefromtheenemy,andthestrengthofthetwoarmiesisequal,itisnoteasytoprovokeabattle,Thepointofcourseis,thatwemustnotthinkofundertakingalongandwearisomemarch,attheendofwhich“weshouldbeexhaustedandouradversaryfreshandkeen.”

andfightingwillbetoyourdisadvantage.13.ThesesixaretheprinciplesconnectedwithEarth.

Orperhaps,“theprinciplesrelatingtoground.”

Thegeneralwhohasattainedaresponsiblepostmustbecarefultostudythem.

Out of the foregoing six, it will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to theconfigurationofthecountry,andthatonly4and5canbesaidtoconveyanydefinitegeographicalidea.

14.Nowan army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising fromnatural causes, but fromfaultsforwhichthegeneralisresponsible.Theseare:(1)Flight;(2)insubordination;(3)collapse;(4)ruin;(5)disorganisation;(6)rout.15.Otherconditionsbeingequal,ifoneforceishurledagainstanothertentimesitssize,theresult

willbetheflightoftheformer.

See chapter III, paragraph 10. The general’s fault here is that of “not calculating the enemy’sstrength.”...AsLiCh’üanveryjustlyremarks,“Givenadecidedadvantageinposition,orthehelpofsomestratagemsuchasaflankattackoranambuscade,itwouldbequitepossible[tofightintheratioofonetoten].”

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result isinsubordination.

TuMucites theunhappycaseofT’ienPu,whowassent toWei in821A.D.withorders to leadanarmyagainstWangT’ing-ts’ou.Butthewholetimehewasincommand,hissoldierstreatedhimwiththeutmostcontempt,andopenlyfloutedhisauthoritybyridingaboutthecampondonkeys,several

thousandsatatime.T’ienPuwaspowerlesstoputastoptothisconduct,andwhen,aftersomemonthshadpassed,hemadean attempt to engage the enemy,his troops turned tail anddispersed in everydirection.Afterthat,theunfortunatemancommittedsuicidebycuttinghisthroat.

Whentheofficersaretoostrongandthecommonsoldierstooweak,theresultiscollapse.

Ts’aoKungsays:“Theofficersareenergeticandwanttopresson,thecommonsoldiersarefeebleandsuddenlycollapse.”...TuMuexplainsitas“stumblingintoadeath-trap.”

17.Whenthehigherofficersareangryandinsubordinate,andonmeetingtheenemygivebattleontheirownaccountfromafeelingofresentment,beforethecommander-in-chiefcantellwhetherornoheisinapositiontofight,theresultisruin.

WangHsi’snoteis:“Thismeans,thegeneralisangrywithoutjustcause,andatthesametimedoesnotappreciatetheabilityofhissubordinateofficers;thushearousesfierceresentmentandbringsanavalancheofruinuponhishead.”...MyinterpretationofthewholepassageisthatofMeiYao-ch’ênandChangYü.TuMugivesa longextractfromtheTsoChuan, showinghowthegreatbattleofPi[597B.C.]waslostfortheChinStatethroughthecontumacyofHsienHuandtheresentfulspiteofWeiIandChaoChan.

18.Whenthegeneralisweakandwithoutauthority;whenhisordersarenotclearanddistinct;

WeiLiaoTzusays:“If thecommandergiveshisorderswithdecision, thesoldierswillnotwait tohear them twice; if hismoves aremadewithout vacillation, the soldierswill not be in twomindsabout doing their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words, “The secret of gettingsuccessfulworkoutofyourtrainedmenliesinonenutshell—intheclearnessoftheinstructionstheyreceive.” . . . Wu Tzu [says]: “The most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worstcalamitiesthatbefallanarmyarisefromhesitation”[AidstoScouting].

whentherearenofixeddutiesassignedtoofficersandmen,

[TuMuputsitthus]:“Neitherofficersnormenhaveanyregularroutine.”

andtheranksareformedinaslovenlyhaphazardmanner,theresultisutterdisorganisation.19.Whenageneral,unabletoestimatetheenemy’sstrength,allowsaninferiorforcetoengagea

largerone,orhurlsaweakdetachmentagainstapowerfulone,andneglectstoplacepickedsoldiersinthefrontrank,theresultmustbearout.

[From Julius Caesar ’s first rules in “De Bello Gallico” (the Gallic Wars)]: “Whenever there isfightingtobedone,thekeenestspiritsshouldbeappointedtoserveinthefrontranks,bothinordertostrengthentheresolutionofourownmenandtodemoralisetheenemy.”

20.Thesearesixwaysofcourtingdefeat,

Ch’ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) “neglect to estimate the enemy’s strength”; (2) “want ofauthority”;(3)“defectivetraining”;(4)“unjustifiableanger”;(5)“non-observanceofdiscipline”;(6)“failuretousepickedmen.”

whichmustbecarefullynotedbythegeneralwhohasattainedaresponsiblepost.21.Thenaturalformationofthecountryisthesoldier ’sbestally;

Ch’ên Hao says: “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected withground.”

butapowerofestimatingtheadversary,

Ageneralshouldalwaysutilise,butneverrelywhollyonnaturaladvantagesofterrain.

ofcontrollingtheforcesofvictory,This is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in Chinese, and so little in anEnglishtranslation.Whatitseemstoimplyiscompletemasteryofthesituationfromthebeginning.

andofshrewdlycalculatingdifficulties,dangersanddistances,constitutesthetestofagreatgeneral.

AsChangYüremarks,theseare“theessentialsofsoldiering,”groundbeingonlyahelpfulaccessory.

22.Hewhoknowsthesethings,andinfightingputshisknowledgeintopractice,willwinhisbattles.Hewhoknowsthemnot,norpractisesthem,willsurelybedefeated.23. If fighting is sure to result invictory, thenyoumust fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if

fightingwillnotresultinvictory,thenyoumustnotfightevenattheruler ’sbidding.

HuangShih-kungoftheCh’indynasty[says]:“Theresponsibilityofsettinganarmyinmotionmustdevolveonthegeneralalone;ifadvanceandretreatarecontrolledfromthePalace,brilliantresultswillhardlybeachieved.Hencethegod-likerulerandtheenlightenedmonarcharecontenttoplayahumblepart in furthering their country’s cause [literally , kneel down to push the chariotwheel].”Thismeansthat“inmatterslyingoutsidethezenana,thedecisionofthemilitarycommandermustbeabsolute.”ChangYüalsoquotesthesaying:“DecreesoftheSonofHeavendonotpenetratethewallsofacamp.”

24.Thegeneralwhoadvanceswithoutcovetingfameandretreatswithoutfearingdisgrace,

ItwasWellington,Ithink,whosaidthatthehardestthingofallforasoldieristoretreat.

whoseonlythoughtistoprotecthiscountryanddogoodserviceforhissovereign,isthejewelofthekingdom.

Anoblepresentment,infewwords,oftheChinese“happywarrior.”Suchaman,saysHoShih,“evenifhehadtosufferpunishment,wouldnotregrethisconduct.”

25.Regardyoursoldiersasyourchildren,andtheywillfollowyouintothedeepestvalleys;lookonthemasyourownbelovedsons,andtheywillstandbyyouevenuntodeath.

In this connection,TuMudraws forus anengagingpictureof the famousgeneralWuCh’i, fromwhosetreatiseonwarIhavefrequentlyhadoccasiontoquote:“Heworethesameclothesandatethesamefoodasthemeanestofhissoldiers,refusedtohaveeitherahorsetorideoramattosleepon,carriedhisownsurplusrationswrappedinaparcel,andsharedeveryhardshipwithhismen.“Oneofhissoldierswassufferingfromanabscess,andWuCh’ihimselfsuckedoutthevirus.The

soldier ’smother,hearingthis,beganwailingandlamenting.Somebodyaskedher,‘Whydoyoucry?

Yoursonisonlyacommonsoldier,andyetthecommander-in-chiefhimselfhassuckedthepoisonfromhissore.’Thewomanreplied,‘Manyyearsago,LordWuperformedasimilarserviceformyhusband,whoneverlefthimafterwards,andfinallymethisdeathatthehandsoftheenemy.Andnowthathehasdonethesameformyson,hetoowillfallfightingIknownotwhere.’”LiCh’üanmentionstheViscountofCh’u,whoinvadedthesmallstateofHsiaoduringthewinter.

TheDukeofShênsaid tohim,“Manyof thesoldiersaresufferingseverely fromthecold.”Sohemadearoundofthewholearmy,comfortingandencouragingthemen;andstraight-waytheyfeltasiftheywereclothedingarmentslinedwithflosssilk.

26.If,however,youareindulgent,butunabletomakeyourauthorityfelt;kind-hearted,butunabletoenforceyourcommands;andincapable,moreover,ofquellingdisorder:thenyoursoldiersmustbelikenedtospoiltchildren;theyareuselessforanypracticalpurpose.

An adage states: “Injury comes out of kindness.” LiChing once said that if you couldmake yoursoldiers afraid of you, theywould not be afraid of the enemy. TuMu recalls an instance of sternmilitarydisciplinewhichoccurredin219A.D.,whenLüMêngwasoccupyingthe townofChiang-ling.Hehadgivenstringentorderstohisarmynottomolesttheinhabitantsnortakeanythingfromthembyforce.Nevertheless,acertainofficerservingunderhisbanner,whohappened tobea fellow-townsman,

ventured toappropriateabamboohatbelonging tooneof thepeople, inorder towear itoverhisregulationhelmetasaprotectionagainsttherain.LüMêngconsideredthatthefactofhisbeingalsoanativeof Ju-nan shouldnot be allowed topalliate a clear breachofdiscipline, and accordinglyheorderedhissummaryexecution, the tears rollingdownhis face,however,ashedidso.Thisactofseverityfilled thearmywithwholesomeawe,andfromthat timeforthevenarticlesdropped in thehighwaywerenotpickedup.

27.Ifweknowthatourownmenareinaconditiontoattack,butareunawarethattheenemyisnotopentoattack,wehavegoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.

Thatis,asTs’aoKungsays,“theissueinthiscaseisuncertain.”

28. Ifwe know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our ownmen are not in aconditiontoattack,wehavegoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.29.Ifweknowthattheenemyisopentoattack,andalsoknowthatourmenareinaconditionto

attack,butareunawarethatthenatureofthegroundmakesfightingimpracticable,wehavestillgoneonlyhalfwaytowardsvictory.

30.Hencetheexperiencedsoldier,onceinmotion,isneverbewildered;oncehehasbrokencamp,heisneverataloss.

The reasonbeing, according toTuMu, that he has takenhismeasures so thoroughly as to ensurevictorybeforehand.“Hedoesnotmoverecklessly,”saysChangYü,“sothatwhenhedoesmove,hemakesnomistakes.”

31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victorywill not stand indoubt;ifyouknowHeavenandknowEarth,youmaymakeyourvictorycomplete.

LiCh’üansumsupasfollows:“Givenaknowledgeofthreethings—theaffairsofman,theseasonsofheavenandthenaturaladvantagesofearth—victorywillinvariablycrownyourbattles.”

That the four seasons have regularities is the principle of Heaven and Earth. . . . That threeseasons are for coming to completion and achievement and one season [winter] is forpunishmentandkillingistheDaoofHeavenandEarth.

GeoffreyMacCormack, “Mythology and theOrigin of Law in EarlyChinese Thought”(2001)

XI.THENINESITUATIONS

ThesecanincludeelementsofthesixgeographicalfeaturesnotedinChapterX,aswellasconditionsofthearmyitself—thatis,situationsasopposedtogrounds.DG

TheoverwhelminglessonthePLAlearnedfromitsbrusheswiththeAmericanswastheneedforspeed: “In the Liberation War (in China), we might take days to surround a Kuomintang

division,thenslowlyclosethecirclearoundit.WiththeAmericans,ifwetookmorethanafewhours,theywouldbringupreinforcements,aircraft,artillery.”YuXiu,regimentaldeputypoliticalcommissar,onthestormingofthe8thCavalry’spositions(1950)

WangHsi...says:“Thereareninemilitarysituations,goodandbad.”

1. SunTzu said: The art ofwar recognises nine varieties of ground: (1)Dispersive ground; (2)facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6)seriousground;(7)difficultground;(8)hemmed-inground;(9)desperateground.2.Whenachieftainisfightinginhisownterritory,itisdispersiveground.

Socalledbecausethesoldiers,beingneartotheirhomesandanxioustoseetheirwivesandchildren,are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. “In theiradvance,”observesTuMu,“theywilllackthevalourofdesperation,andwhentheyretreat,theywillfindharboursofrefuge.”

3.Whenhehaspenetratedintohostileterritory,buttonogreatdistance,itisfacileground.

TuMuremarks,“Whenyourarmyhascrossedtheborder,youshouldburnyourboatsandbridges,inordertomakeitcleartoeverybodythatyouhavenohankeringafterhome.”

4.Groundthepossessionofwhichimportsgreatadvantagetoeitherside,iscontentiousground.

I must apologise for using [“contentious”] in a sense not known to the dictionary, i.e., “to becontendedfor.”...Ts’aoKungsays:“groundonwhichthefewandtheweakcandefeatthemanyandthe strong,” such as “the neck of a pass,” instanced by Li Ch’üan. Thus, Thermopylae was[contentiousground],becausethepossessionofit,evenforafewdaysonly,meantholdingtheentireinvadingarmyincheckandthusgaininginvaluabletime.[WuTzuwrites]:“Forthosewhohavetofightintheratioofonetoten,thereisnothingbetterthananarrowpass.”WhenLüKuangwas returningfromhis triumphantexpedition toTurkestan in385A.D.,andhad

gotasfarasI-ho,ladenwithspoils,LiangHsi,administratorofLiang-chou,takingadvantageofthedeathofFuChien,KingofCh’in,plottedagainsthimandwasforbarringhiswayintotheprovince.YangHan,governorofKao-ch’ang,counselledhim,saying,“LüKuangisfreshfromhisvictoriesin

thewest,andhissoldiersarevigorousandmettlesome.Ifweopposehimintheshiftingsandsofthedesert,we shall be nomatch for him, andwemust therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten tooccupythedefileatthemouthoftheKao-wupass,thuscuttinghimofffromsuppliesofwater,andwhenhistroopsareprostratedwiththirst,wecandictateourowntermswithoutmoving.OrifyouthinkthatthepassImentionistoofaroffwecouldmakeastandagainsthimattheI-wupass,whichisnearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in vain against theenormous strength of these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, wasoverwhelmedandsweptawaybytheinvader.

5.Groundonwhicheachsidehaslibertyofmovementisopenground.

Ts’aoKung[explainsthisas]“groundcoveredwithanetworkofroads,”likeachess-board.Anotherinterpretation, suggested by Ho Shih, is “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In eithercase,itmustevidentlybe“flatcountry,”andtherefore[it]“cannotbeblocked.”

6.Groundwhichformsthekeytothreecontiguousstates,

[Ts’ao Kung writes:] “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous withboth.”

sothathewhooccupiesitfirsthasmostoftheEmpireathiscommand,

Chinawasdivided[intoalooseconfederacyofstates]undertheChoudynasty.Thebelligerentwhoholdsthisdominatingpositioncanconstrainmostofthemtobecomehisallies.

isgroundofintersectinghighways.7.Whenanarmyhaspenetrated into theheartofahostilecountry, leavinganumberof fortified

citiesinitsrear,itisseriousground.

WangHsiexplainsthenamebysayingthat“whenanarmyhasreachedsuchapoint, itssituationisserious.”LiCh’üaninstances(1)thevictoriousmarchofYoIintothecapitalofCh’iin284B.C.,and(2)theattackonCh’u,sixyearslater,bytheCh’ingeneralPoCh’i.

8.Mountain forests, rugged steeps,marshes and fens—all country that ishard to traverse: this isdifficultground.

ChiaLinexplains[steeps,marshesandfens]asground“thathasbeenruinedbywaterpassingoverit,” and Tu Yu simply as “swampy ground.” But Ch’ên Hao says [it refers particularly] to deephollows—whatChu-koLiang[designated]“earth-hells.”

9.Groundwhichisreachedthroughnarrowgorges,andfromwhichwecanonlyretirebytortuouspaths,so thatasmallnumberof theenemywouldsuffice tocrusha largebodyofourmen: this ishemmed-inground.10.Groundonwhichwecanonlybesavedfromdestructionbyfightingwithoutdelay,isdesperate

ground.

AspicturedbyTs’aoKung,...hereescapeisnolongerpossible:“Aloftymountaininfront,alargeriverbehind,advanceimpossible,retreatblocked.”Ch’ênHaosays:“Tobeon‘desperateground’islikesittinginaleakingboatorcrouchinginaburninghouse.”TuMuquotesfromLiChingavividdescriptionoftheplightofanarmythusentrapped:“Suppose

anarmyisinvadinghostileterritorywithouttheaidoflocalguides:—itfallsintoafatalsnareandisat the enemy’smercy.A ravineon the left, amountainon the right, a pathway soperilous that thehorseshavetoberopedtogetherandthechariotscarriedinslings,nopassageopeninfront,retreatcutoffbehind,nochoicebuttoproceedinsinglefile.Then,beforethereistimetorangeoursoldiersinorderofbattle,theenemyinoverwhelmingstrengthsuddenlyappearsonthescene.Advancing,wecannowheretakeabreathing-space;retreating,wehavenohavenofrefuge.Weseekapitchedbattle,butinvain;yetstandingonthedefensive,noneofushasamoment’srespite.“Ifwesimplymaintainourground,wholedaysandmonthswillcrawlby;themomentwemakea

move,wehavetosustaintheenemy’sattacksonfrontandrear.Thecountryiswild,destituteofwaterandplants;thearmyislackinginthenecessariesoflife,thehorsesarejadedandthemenworn-out;all theresourcesofstrengthandskillunavailing, thepasssonarrowthatasinglemandefendingitcan check the onset of ten thousand; allmeans of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points ofvantagealreadyforfeitedbyourselves:—inthisterribleplight,eventhoughwehadthemostvaliantsoldiersandthekeenestofweapons,howcouldtheybeemployedwiththeslightesteffect?”StudentsofGreekhistorymaybe remindedof theawfulclose to theSicilianexpedition, and the

agonyoftheAtheniansunderNiciasandDemosthenes.

11.Ondispersiveground,therefore,fightnot.Onfacileground,haltnot.Oncontentiousground,attacknot.

But [according toTs’aoKung] rather let all your energiesbebentonoccupying theadvantageouspositionfirst.LiCh’üanandothers,however,supposethemeaningtobethattheenemyhasalreadyforestalledus,sothatitwouldbesheermadnesstoattack....WhentheKingofWuinquireswhatshouldbedone in thiscase,SunTzureplies:“Therulewith

regardtocontentiousgroundisthatthoseinpossessionhavetheadvantageovertheotherside.Ifaposition of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away bypretendingtoflee—showyourbannersandsoundyourdrums—makeadashforotherplacesthathecannotaffordtolose—trailbrushwoodandraiseadust—confoundhisearsandeyes—detachabodyofyourbest troops, andplace it secretly inambuscade.Thenyouropponentwill sally forth to therescue.”

12.Onopenground,donottrytoblocktheenemy’sway.

Becausetheattemptwouldbefutile,andwouldexposetheblockingforceitselftoseriousrisks[thisinterpretationfollows]thatofChangYü.[Anotherinterpretation]isindicatedinTs’aoKung’sbriefnote: “Draw closer together”—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.WangHsipointsoutthat“openground”isonlyanothernameforthe“accessibleground”describedinchapterX,paragraph2,andsaysthattheadviceheregivenissimplyavariationof“keepasharpeyeonthelineofsupplies,”becarefulthatyourcommunicationsarenotcut.

Ongroundofintersectinghighways,joinhandswithyourallies.

Orperhaps,“formallianceswithneighbouringstates.”

No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares thecommonhungerforpeaceandfellowshipandjustice.Nonation’ssecurityandwell-beingcanbelastinglyachievedinisolationbutonlyineffectivecooperationwithfellow-nations.PresidentDwightDavidEisenhower,“TheChanceforPeace”(1953)

13.Onseriousground,gatherinplunder.

Onthis,LiCh’üanhasthefollowingdeliciousnote:“Whenanarmypenetratesfarintotheenemy’scountry,caremustbetakennottoalienatethepeoplebyunjusttreatment.FollowtheexampleoftheHanEmperorKaoTsu,whosemarchintoCh’interritory[in207B.C.]wasmarkedbynoviolationofwomenorlootingofvaluables.Thushewontheheartsofall.Inthepresentpassage,then,Ithinkthat

the true readingmust be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘donot plunder.’ ”Alas, I fear that in this instance theworthycommentator ’sfeelingsoutranhisjudgment.TuMu,atleast,hasnosuchillusions.Hesays:“Whenencampedon‘seriousground,’therebeing

noinducementasyettoadvancefurther,andnopossibilityofretreat,oneoughttotakemeasuresfora protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on theenemy.”

Indifficultground,keepsteadilyonthemarch.

Or,inthewordsofchapterVIII,paragraph2,“donotencamp.”

14.Onhemmed-inground,resorttostratagem.

Ts’aoKungsays:“Trytheeffectofsomeunusualartifice”;andTuYuamplifiesthisbysaying:“Insuch a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we cansucceed in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on thefamousoccasionwhenHannibalwashemmedinamongthemountainsontheroadtoCasilinum,andtoallappearancesentrappedbytheDictatorFabius.ThestratagemwhichHannibaldevisedtobafflehisfoeswasremarkablylikethatwhichT’ienTan

hadalsoemployedwithsuccessexactly62yearsbefore.[SeethenoteforchapterIX,paragraph24.]Whennightcameon,bundlesoftwigswerefastenedtothehornsofsome2000oxenandsetonfire,theterrifiedanimalsbeingthenquicklydrivenalongthemountainsidetowardsthepasseswhichwerebesetbytheenemy.ThestrangespectacleoftheserapidlymovinglightssoalarmedanddiscomfitedtheRomans that theywithdrew from theirposition, andHannibal’s armypassed safely through thedefile.

Ondesperateground,fight.

For,asChiaLinremarks,“ifyoufightwithallyourmight,thereisachanceoflife;whereasdeathiscertainifyouclingtoyourcorner.”

15.Thosewhowerecalledskilfulleadersofoldknewhowtodriveawedgebetweentheenemy’sfront and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the goodtroopsfromrescuingthebad,theofficersfromrallyingtheirmen.

16.Whentheenemy’smenwerescattered,theypreventedthemfromconcentrating;evenwhentheirforceswereunited,theymanagedtokeepthemindisorder.17.Whenitwastotheiradvantage,theymadeaforwardmove;whenotherwise,theystoppedstill.

MeiYao-ch’ên connects thiswith the foregoing: “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy,theywouldpushforwardinordertosecureanyadvantagetobegained;iftherewasnoadvantagetobegained,theywouldremainwheretheywere.”

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point ofmarchingtotheattack,Ishouldsay:“Beginbyseizingsomethingwhichyouropponentholdsdear;thenhewillbeamenabletoyourwill.”

OpinionsdifferastowhatSunTzuhadinmind.Ts’aoKungthinksitis“somestrategicaladvantageonwhichtheenemyisdepending.”TuMusays:“Thethreethingswhichanenemyisanxioustodo,andontheaccomplishmentofwhichhissuccessdepends,are:(1)tocaptureourfavourablepositions;(2)toravageourcultivatedland;(3)toguardhisowncommunications.”Ourobjectthenmustbetothwarthisplansinthesethreedirectionsandthusrenderhimhelpless.But...IagreewithCh’ênHao,whosays[thetext]doesnotreferonlytostrategicaladvantages,but

is any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy. By boldly seizing theinitiativeinthisway,youatoncethrowtheothersideonthedefensive.

19.Rapidityistheessenceofwar:

AccordingtoTuMu,“thisisasummaryofleadingprinciplesinwarfare,”andheadds:“Thesearetheprofoundesttruthsofmilitaryscience,andthechiefbusinessofthegeneral.”Thefollowinganecdotes,toldbyHoShih,showtheimportanceattachedtospeedbytwoofChina’s

greatestgenerals. In227A.D.,MêngTa,governorofHsin-ch’êngunder theWeiEmperorWênTi,was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-koLiang,PrimeMinisterof thatState.TheWeigeneralSsu-maIwas thenmilitarygovernorofWan,and gettingwind ofMêngTa’s treachery, he at once set offwith an army to anticipate his revolt,havingpreviouslycajoledhimbyaspeciousmessageoffriendlyimport.Ssu-ma’sofficerscametohimand said: “IfMêngTahas leaguedhimselfwithWuandShu, thematter shouldbe thoroughlyinvestigatedbeforewemakeamove.”Ssu-maI replied:“MêngTa isanunprincipledman,andweoughttogoandpunishhimatonce,whileheisstillwaveringandbeforehehasthrownoffthemask.”Then,byaseriesofforcedmarches,hebroughthisarmyunderthewallsofHsin-ch’êngwithinthe

spaceofeightdays.NowMêngTahadpreviouslysaidinalettertoChu-koLiang:“Wanis1200lifromhere.WhenthenewsofmyrevoltreachesSsu-maI,hewillatonceinformhisImperialMaster,

but itwill be awholemonth before any steps can be taken, and by that timemy citywill bewellfortified.Besides,Ssu-maIissurenottocomehimself,andthegeneralsthatwillbesentagainstusarenotworthtroublingabout.”Thenextletter,however,wasfilledwithconsternation:“Thoughonlyeight days have passed since I threwoffmy allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.Whatmiraculousrapidityisthis!”Afortnightlater,Hsin-ch’ênghadfallenandMêngTahadlosthishead.In621A.D.,LiChingwassentfromK’uei-chouinSsu-ch’uantoreducethesuccessfulrebelHsiao

Hsien,whohad set up asEmperor at themodernChing-chouFu inHupeh. Itwas autumn, and theYangtszebeing then in flood,HsiaoHsienneverdreamt that his adversarywouldventure to comedownthroughthegorges,andconsequentlymadenopreparations.ButLiChingembarkedhisarmywithoutlossoftime,andwasjustabouttostartwhentheothergeneralsimploredhimtopostponehisdepartureuntiltheriverwasinalessdangerousstatefornavigation.LiChing replied:“To the soldier,overwhelmingspeed isofparamount importance,andhemust

nevermissopportunities.Nowisthetimetostrike,beforeHsiaoHsienevenknowsthatwehavegotanarmytogether.Ifweseizethepresentmomentwhentheriverisinflood,weshallappearbeforehis capitalwith startling suddenness, like the thunderwhich is heard before you have time to stopyourearsagainstit.[SeenoteforchapterVII,paragraph19.]Thisisthegreatprincipleinwar.Evenifhegetstoknowofourapproach,hewillhavetolevyhissoldiersinsuchahurrythattheywillnotbefittoopposeus.Thusthefullfruitsofvictorywillbeours.”Allcameaboutashehadpredicted,andHsiaoHsienwasobligedtosurrender,noblystipulatingthathispeopleshouldbesparedandhealonesufferthepenaltyofdeath.

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attackunguardedspots.20.Thefollowingaretheprinciplestobeobservedbyaninvadingforce:Thefurtheryoupenetrate

intoacountry,thegreaterwillbethesolidarityofyourtroops,andthusthedefenderswillnotprevailagainstyou.21.Makeforaysinfertilecountryinordertosupplyyourarmywithfood.22.Carefullystudythewell-beingofyourmen,

[WangHsisays:]“Petthem,humourthem,givethemplentyoffoodanddrink,andlookafterthemgenerally.”

As you know that theCredit of the Service depends not only on dealing fairlywith themenEmployedinit,butontheirbeliefthattheyareandwillbefairlydealtwith.JohnPaulJones,establishingrulesfornavalconduct(1777)

anddonotovertaxthem.Concentrateyourenergyandhoardyourstrength.

Ch’ênrecallsthelineofactiontakenin224B.C.bythefamousgeneralWangChien,whosemilitarygeniuslargelycontributedtothesuccessoftheFirstEmperor.HehadinvadedtheCh’uState,whereauniversallevywasmadetoopposehim.But,beingdoubtfulofthetemperofhistroops,hedeclinedallinvitationstofightandremainedstrictlyonthedefensive.InvaindidtheCh’ugeneraltrytoforcea battle: day after dayWangChien kept inside hiswalls andwould not come out, but devoted hiswhole timeandenergy towinning the affection and confidenceofhismen.He tookcare that theyshouldbewellfed,sharinghisownmealswiththem,providedfacilitiesforbathing,andemployedeverymethodofjudiciousindulgencetoweldthemintoaloyalandhomogeneousbody.After some timehad elapsed, he told off certain persons to findout how themenwere amusing

themselves.The answerwas, that theywere contendingwith one another in putting theweight andlong-jumping.WhenWangChienheardthattheywereengagedintheseathleticpursuits,heknewthattheirspiritshadbeenstrunguptotherequiredpitchandthattheywerenowreadyforfighting.BythistimetheCh’uarmy,afterrepeatingtheirchallengeagainandagain,hadmarchedawayeastwardsindisgust.TheCh’ingeneralimmediatelybrokeuphiscampandfollowedthem,andinthebattlethatensuedtheywereroutedwithgreatslaughter.Shortlyafterwards,thewholeofCh’uwasconqueredbyCh’in,andthekingFu-ch’uledintocaptivity.

Keepyourarmycontinuallyonthemove,

Inorderthattheenemymayneverknowexactlywhereyouare.

anddeviseunfathomableplans.23. Throw your soldiers into positionswhence there is no escape, and theywill prefer death to

flight.Iftheywillfacedeath,thereisnothingtheymaynotachieve.

ChangYü. . .quotes. . .WeiLiaoTzu:“Ifonemanweretorunamokwithaswordinthemarket-place, and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that thisman alone hadcourageandthatalltherestwerecontemptiblecowards.Thetruthis,thatadesperadoandamanwhosetssomevalueonhislifedonotmeetoneventerms.”

Officersandmenalikewillputforththeiruttermoststrength.

ChangYüsays:“Iftheyareinanawkwardplacetogether,theywillsurelyexerttheirunitedstrengthtogetoutofit.”

24.Soldierswhenindesperatestraitslosethesenseoffear.Ifthereisnoplaceofrefuge,theywillstandfirm.Iftheyareintheheartofahostilecountry,theywillshowastubbornfront.Ifthereisnohelpforit,theywillfighthard.25.Thus,withoutwaitingtobemarshalled,thesoldierswillbeconstantlyonthequivive;without

waitingtobeasked,theywilldoyourwill;

Literally,“withoutasking,youwillget.”

withoutrestrictions,theywillbefaithful;withoutgivingorders,theycanbetrusted.

Thewholeofthisparagraph,ofcourse,hasreferenceto“desperateground.”

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do awaywith superstitious doubts. Then, until death itselfcomes,nocalamityneedbefeared.

Thesuperstitious,“boundintosaucydoubtsandfears,”degenerateintocowardsand“diemanytimesbefore their deaths.” TuMu quotes Huang Shih-kung: “‘Spells and incantations should be strictlyforbidden,andnoofficerallowedtoinquirebydivinationintothefortunesofanarmy,forfearthesoldiers’mindsshouldbeseriouslyperturbed.’Themeaningis,”hecontinues,“thatifalldoubtsandscruplesarediscarded,yourmenwillneverfalterintheirresolutionuntiltheydie.”

27.Ifoursoldiersarenotoverburdenedwithmoney,itisnotbecausetheyhaveadistasteforriches;iftheirlivesarenotundulylong,itisnotbecausetheyaredisinclinedtolongevity.

ChangYühasthebestnoteonthispassage,“Wealthandlonglifearethingsforwhichallmenhaveanaturalinclination.Hence,iftheyburnorflingawayvaluables,andsacrificetheirownlives,itisnotthat they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.” Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating that, assoldiersarebuthuman,itisforthegeneraltoseethattemptationstoshirkfightingandgrowricharenotthrownintheirway.

28.Onthedaytheyareorderedouttobattle,yoursoldiersmayweep,

TheverbinChineseis“snivel.”Thisistakentoindicatemoregenuinegriefthantearsalone.

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down theircheeks.

Notbecausetheyareafraid,butbecause,asTs’aoKungsays,“allhaveembracedthefirmresolutiontodoordie.”WemayrememberthattheheroesoftheIliadwereequallychildlikeinshowingtheiremotion.ChangYüalludestothemournfulpartingattheIRiverbetweenChingK’oandhisfriends,whentheformerwassenttoattemptthelifeoftheKingofCh’in(afterwardsFirstEmperor)in227B.C.Thetearsofallfloweddownlikerainashebadethemfarewellandutteredthefollowinglines:“Theshrillblastisblowing,Chillytheburn;Yourchampionisgoing—Nottoreturn.”

Butletthemoncebebroughttobay,andtheywilldisplaythecourageofaChuoraKuei.

[Chu]wasthepersonal[thatis,given]nameofChuanChu,anativeoftheWuStateandcontemporarywithSunTzuhimself,whowasemployedby...HoLüWangtoassassinatehissovereignWangLiaowithadaggerwhichhehadsecretedinthebellyofafishservedupatabanquet.Hesucceededinhisattempt,butwasimmediatelyhackedtopiecesbytheking’sbodyguard.Thiswasin515B.C.Theotherheroreferredto,Ts’aoKuei,performedtheexploitwhich...madehisnamefamous166

yearsearlier,in681B.C.LuhadbeenthricedefeatedbyCh’i,andwasjustabouttoconcludeatreatysurrendering a large slice of territory,whenTs’aoKuei suddenly seizedHuanKung, theDuke ofCh’i,ashestoodonthealtarstepsandheldadaggeragainsthischest.NoneoftheDuke’sretainersdaredtomoveamuscle,andTs’aoKueiproceededtodemandfullrestitution,declaringthatLuwasbeingunjustlytreatedbecauseshewasasmallerandweakerstate.HuanKung,inperilofhislife,wasobligedtoconsent,whereuponTs’aoKueiflungawayhisdaggerandquietlyresumedhisplaceamidtheterrifiedassemblagewithouthavingsomuchaschangedcolour.Aswastobeexpected,theDukewantedafterwards to repudiate thebargain,buthiswiseoldcounsellorKuanChungpointedout tohimtheimpolicyofbreakinghisword,andtheupshotwasthatthisboldstrokeregainedforLuthewholeofwhatshehadlostinthreepitchedbattles.

29.Theskilfultacticianmaybelikenedtotheshuai-jan.Nowtheshuai-janisasnakethatisfoundintheCh’angmountains.Strikeat itshead,andyouwillbeattackedbyits tail;strikeat its tail,andyouwillbeattackedbyitshead;strikeatitsmiddle,andyouwillbeattackedbyheadandtailboth.30.Asked if anarmycanbemade to imitate theshuai-jan,That is, asMeiYao-ch’ên says, “Is it

possibletomakethefrontandrearofanarmyeachswiftlyresponsivetoattackontheother,justasthoughtheywerepartsofasinglelivingbody?”

Ishouldanswer,Yes.ForthemenofWuandthemenofYüehareenemies;yetiftheyarecrossingariverinthesameboatandarecaughtbyastorm,theywillcometoeachother ’sassistancejustasthelefthandhelpstheright.Themeaning is: If two enemieswill help each other in a time of commonperil, howmuchmoreshould twopartsof the samearmy,bound togetheras theyarebyevery tieof interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of co-operation,especiallyinthecaseofalliedarmies.

31.Henceit isnotenoughtoputone’strust inthetetheringofhorses,andtheburyingofchariotwheelsintheground.

Thesequaintdevices topreventone’sarmyfromrunningawayrecall theAthenianheroSôphanes,whocarriedananchorwithhimatthebattleofPlataea,bymeansofwhichhefastenedhimselffirmlytoonespot. It isnotenough, saysSunTzu, to render flight impossiblebysuchmechanicalmeans.Youwillnotsucceedunlessyourmenhavetenacityandunityofpurpose,and,aboveall,aspiritofsympatheticco-operation.Thisisthelessonwhichcanbelearnedfromtheshuai-jan.

32.Theprincipleonwhichtomanageanarmyistosetuponestandardofcouragewhichallmustreach.Literally,“level thecourage[ofall]as though[itwere thatof]one.” If the idealarmyis to formasingleorganicwhole,thenitfollowsthattheresolutionandspiritofitscomponentpartsmustbeofthe same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seeminglyungrateful description of his army at Waterloo [where he won] as “the worst he had evercommanded”meantnomorethanthatitwasdeficientinthisimportantparticular—unityofspiritandcourage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in thebackground,hewouldmostcertainlyhavelosttheday.

33.Howtomakethebestofbothstrongandweak—thatisaquestioninvolvingtheproperuseofground.MeiYao-ch’ên’sparaphraseis:“Thewaytoeliminatethedifferencesofstrongandweakandtomakeboth serviceable is to utilise accidental features of the ground.” Less reliable troops, if posted instrongpositions,willholdoutas longasbetter troopsonmoreexposed terrain.Theadvantageofpositionneutralisestheinferiorityinstaminaandcourage.Col.Henderson says: “With all respect to the text books, and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am

inclined to think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficientimportanceisattachedtotheselectionofpositions...andtotheimmenseadvantagesthataretobederived,whetheryouaredefendingorattacking,fromtheproperutilisationofnaturalfeatures”[The

ScienceofWar].

34.Thustheskilfulgeneralconductshisarmyjustasthoughhewereleadingasingleman,willy-nilly,bythehand.

TuMusays:“Thesimilehasreferencetotheeasewithwhichhedoesit.”[TheChinese]meansthathemakesitimpossibleforhistroopstodootherwisethanobey.

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thusmaintainorder.

[The Chinese] seems to combine the meanings “noiseless” and “imperturbable,” both of whichattributeswouldofcourseconducetosecrecy.

36.Hemustbeabletomystifyhisofficersandmenbyfalsereportsandappearances,andthuskeepthemintotalignorance.

Ts’aoKunggives us oneof his excellent apophthegms: “The troopsmust not be allowed to shareyourschemesinthebeginning;theymayonlyrejoicewithyouoverthehappyoutcome.”“Tomystify,mislead, and surprise the enemy,” is one of the first principles inwar, as has been

frequentlypointedout.Buthowabouttheotherprocess—themystificationofone’sownmen?ThosewhomaythinkthatSunTzuisover-emphaticonthispointwoulddowelltoreadCol.Henderson’sremarksonStonewallJackson’sValleycampaign:“Theinfinitepains,”hesays,“withwhichJacksonsought toconceal,even fromhismost trustedstaffofficers,hismovements,his intentions,andhisthoughts,acommanderlessthoroughwouldhavepronounceduseless”—etc.,etc.[StonewallJackson,Vol.1].Intheyear88A.D.,...,“PanCh’aotookthefieldwith25,000menfromKhotanandotherCentral

AsianstateswiththeobjectofcrushingYarkand.TheKingofKutcharepliedbydispatchinghischiefcommandertosuccourtheplacewithanarmydrawnfromthekingdomsofWên-su,Ku-moandWei-t’ou,totalling50,000men.PanCh’aosummonedhisofficersandalsotheKingofKhotantoacouncilofwar,andsaid:“Ourforcesarenowoutnumberedandunabletomakeheadagainsttheenemy.Thebestplan,then,isforustoseparateanddisperse,eachinadifferentdirection.TheKingofKhotanwillmarchawaybytheeasterlyroute,andIwillthenreturnmyselftowardsthewest.Letuswaituntiltheeveningdrumhassoundedandthenstart.”PanCh’aonowsecretlyreleasedtheprisonerswhomhehadtakenalive,andtheKingofKutchawas

thus informedofhisplans.Muchelatedbythenews, the lattersetoffatonceat theheadof10,000

horsementobarPanCh’ao’sretreatinthewest,whiletheKingofWên-surodeeastwardswith8000horseinordertointercepttheKingofKhotan.AssoonasPanCh’aoknewthatthetwochieftainshadgone,hecalledhisdivisionstogether,gotthemwellinhand,andatcock-crowhurledthemagainstthearmyofYarkand,asitlayencamped.The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, andwere closely pursued by PanCh’ao.Over

5000headswerebroughtbackastrophies,besidesimmensespoilsintheshapeofhorsesandcattleandvaluablesofeverydescription.Yarkand thencapitulating,Kutchaand theotherkingdomsdrewoff their respective forces.From that time forward,PanCh’ao’sprestige completelyoverawed thecountriesofthewest.”Inthiscase,weseethattheChinesegeneralnotonlykepthisownofficersinignoranceofhisrealplans,butactuallytooktheboldstepofdividinghisarmyinordertodeceivetheenemy.

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definiteknowledge.

ChangYüquotes[anothercommentator]assaying:“Theaxiom,thatwarisbasedondeception,doesnot apply only to deception of the enemy. Youmust deceive even your own soldiers.Make themfollowyou,butwithoutlettingthemknowwhy.”

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating hispurpose.38.Atthecriticalmoment,theleaderofanarmyactslikeonewhohasclimbedupaheightandthen

kicksawaytheladderbehindhim.Hecarrieshismendeepintohostileterritorybeforeheshowshishand.39.Heburnshisboats andbreakshis cooking-pots; likea shepherddrivinga flockof sheep,he

driveshismenthiswayandthat,andnoneknowswhitherheisgoing.

TuMusays:“Thearmyisonlycognisantoforderstoadvanceorretreat;itisignorantoftheulteriorendsofattackingandconquering.”

40.Tomusterhishostandbringitintodanger:—thismaybetermedthebusinessofthegeneral.

SunTzumeansthataftermobilisationthereshouldbenodelayinaimingablowattheenemy’sheart.Notehowhereturnsagainandagaintothispoint[seeparagraph23above].AmongthewarringstatesofancientChina,desertionwasnodoubtamuchmorepresentfearandseriousevilthanitisinthe

armiesofto-day.

41.Thedifferentmeasuressuitedtotheninevarietiesofground;

Chang Yü says: “One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties ofground.”

theexpediencyofaggressiveordefensive tactics;and thefundamental lawsofhumannature: thesearethingsthatmustmostcertainlybestudied.42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings

cohesion;penetratingbutashortwaymeansdispersion.43.Whenyouleaveyourowncountrybehind,andtakeyourarmyacrossneighbouringterritory,

youfindyourselfoncriticalground.

This“ground”iscursorilymentionedinchapterVIII,paragraph2,butitdoesnotfigureamongtheninesituationsofthischapterorthesixkindsofterraininchapterX.One’sfirstimpulsewouldbetotranslateit[as]“distantground”(...inthesenseof“distantlands”),butthis...ispreciselywhatisnotmeanthere.MeiYao-ch’ênsaysitis“apositionnotfarenoughadvancedtobecalled‘facile,’andnotnearenoughtohometobecalled‘dispersive,’butsomethingbetweenthetwo.”That,ofcourse,doesnotexplainthename,whichseemstoimplythatthegeneralhasseveredhis

communicationsandtemporarilycuthimselfofffromhisbase.Thus,WangHsisays:“It isgroundseparatedfromhomebyaninterjacentstate,whoseterritorywehavehadtocrossinordertoreachit.Henceitisincumbentonustosettleourbusinesstherequickly.”Headdsthatthispositionisofrareoccurrence,whichisthereasonwhyitisnotincludedamongthesixkindsofterrain.

When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersectinghighways.44.Whenyoupenetratedeeplyintoacountry,itisseriousground.Whenyoupenetratebutalittle

way,itisfacileground.45.Whenyouhavetheenemy’sstrongholdsonyourrear,andnarrowpassesinfront,itishemmed-

inground.Whenthereisnoplaceofrefugeatall,itisdesperateground.46.Therefore,ondispersiveground,Iwouldinspiremymenwithunityofpurpose.

Thisend,accordingtoTuMu,isbestattainedbyremainingonthedefensive,andavoidingbattle.

Onfacileground,Iwouldseethatthereiscloseconnectionbetweenallpartsofmyarmy.

AsTuMusays, theobject is toguardagainst twopossiblecontingencies:“(1) thedesertionofourowntroops; (2)asuddenattackon thepartof theenemy.”MeiYao-ch’ênsays:“Onthemarch, theregiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between thefortifications.”

47.Oncontentiousground,Iwouldhurryupmyrear.

ThisisTs’aoKung’sinterpretation.ChangYüadoptsit,saying:“Wemustquicklybringupourrear,sothatheadandtailmaybothreachthegoal.”Thatis,theymustnotbeallowedtostraggleupalongwayapart.MeiYao-ch’ênoffersanotherequallyplausibleexplanation:“Supposingtheenemyhasnotyetreachedthecovetedposition,andwearebehindhim,weshouldadvancewithallspeedinordertodisputeitspossession.”...Ch’ênHao,on theotherhand, assuming that the enemyhashad time [to] selecthisownground,

quotes[SunTzu’sadmonition]againstcomingexhaustedtotheattack.Hisownideaofthesituationisrather vaguely expressed: “If there is a favourable position lying in front of you, detach a pickedbodyoftroopstooccupyit;theniftheenemy,relyingontheirnumbers,comeuptomakeafightforit,youmayfallquicklyontheirrearwithyourmainbody,andvictorywillbeassured.”Itwasthus,headds,thatChaoShêbeatthearmyofCh’in.

48.Onopenground,Iwouldkeepavigilanteyeonmydefences.

AsWangHsisays,“fearingasurpriseattack.”

Ongroundofintersectinghighways,Iwouldconsolidatemyalliances.49.Onseriousground,Iwouldtrytoensureacontinuousstreamofsupplies.

The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as one might expect, to anunbrokencommunicationwithahomebase.

Ondifficultground,Iwouldkeeppushingonalongtheroad.

[Ts’aoKungputsitthus:]“Passawayfromitinallhaste.”

50.Onhemmed-inground,Iwouldblockanywayofretreat.

[MêngShihsays:]“TomakeitseemthatImeantodefendtheposition,whereasmyrealintentionistoburstsuddenlythroughtheenemy’slines.”[MeiYao-ch’ênsays:]“Inordertomakemysoldiersfightwithdesperation.”[WangHsisays:]“Fearinglestmymenbetemptedtorunaway.”TuMupointsoutthat this [injunction] is the converse of chapter VII, paragraph 36, where it is the enemy who issurrounded.In532A.D.,KaoHuan,afterwardsEmperorandcanonisedasShên-wu,wassurroundedbyagreat

army underÊrh-chuChao and others.His own forcewas comparatively small, consisting only of2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn verycloselytogether,gapsbeingleftatcertainpoints.ButKaoHuan,insteadoftryingtoescape,actuallymadeashift toblockall the remainingoutletshimselfbydriving into themanumberofoxenanddonkeys roped together.As soon as his officers andmen saw that therewas nothing for it but toconquerordie,theirspiritsrosetoanextraordinarypitchofexaltation,andtheychargedwithsuchdesperateferocitythattheopposingranksbrokeandcrumbledundertheironslaught.

Ondesperateground,Iwouldproclaimtomysoldiersthehopelessnessofsavingtheirlives.TuYusays:“Burnyourbaggageandimpedimenta,throwawayyourstoresandprovisions,chokeupthewells,destroyyourcooking-stoves,andmakeitplain toyourmenthat theycannotsurvive,butmustfighttothedeath.”MeiYao-ch’ênsaysepigrammatically:“Theonlychanceoflifeliesingivingup all hope of it.” This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about “grounds” and the “variations”respondingtothem.Reviewing the passageswhich bear on this important subject,we cannot fail to be struck by the

desultory andunmethodical fashion inwhich it is treated.SunTzubegins abruptly in chapterVIII,paragraph2,toenumerate“variations”beforetouchingon“grounds”atall,butonlymentionsfive,namelynos.5,7,8and9ofthesubsequentlist,andonethatisnotincludedinit.Afewvarietiesofground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chapter IX, and then chapter X sets forth six newgrounds, with six variations of plan tomatch. None of these ismentioned again [until] at last, inchapterXI,wecometotheNineGroundsparexcellence,immediatelyfollowedbythevariations....Though it is impossible toaccount for thepresent stateofSunTzu’s text, a fewsuggestive facts

may be brought into prominence: (1) chapter VIII, according to the title, should deal with ninevariations,whereasonlyfiveappear.(2)Itisanabnormallyshortchapter.(3)ChapterXIisentitledTheNineGrounds.Severalofthesearedefinedtwiceover,besideswhichtherearetwodistinctlistsofthecorrespondingvariations.(4)Thelengthofthechapterisdisproportionate,beingdoublethatofanyotherexceptIX.Idonotproposetodrawanyinferencesfromthesefacts,beyondthegeneral

conclusionthatSunTzu’sworkcannothavecomedowntousintheshapeinwhichitlefthishands:chapterVIIIisobviouslydefectiveandprobablyoutofplace,whileXIseemstocontainmatterthathaseitherbeenaddedbyalaterhandoroughttoappearelsewhere.

51.Foritisthesoldier ’sdispositiontoofferanobstinateresistancewhensurrounded,tofighthardwhenhecannothelphimself,andtoobeypromptlywhenhehasfallenintodanger.

[ChangYü]alludes to theconductofPanCh’ao’sdevoted followers in73A.D.:“WhenPanCh’aoarrivedatShan-shan,Kuang,theKingofthecountry,receivedhimatfirstwithgreatpolitenessandrespect;butshortlyafterwardshisbehaviourunderwentasuddenchange,andhebecameremissandnegligent.PanCh’aospokeaboutthistotheofficersofhissuite:‘Haveyounotnoticed,’hesaid,‘thatKuang’s polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have come from theNorthernbarbarians,andthatconsequentlyheisinastateofindecision,notknowingwithwhichsideto throw inhis lot.That surely is the reason.The trulywiseman,weare told, canperceive thingsbeforetheyhavecometopass;howmuchmore,then,thosethatarealreadymanifest!’Thereuponhecalledoneofthenativeswhohadbeenassignedtohisservice,andsetatrapforhim,saying:‘WherearethoseenvoysfromtheHsiung-nuwhoarrivedsomedaysago?’“Themanwassotakenabackthatbetweensurpriseandfearhepresentlyblurtedoutthewholetruth.

PanCh’ao,keepinghisinformantcarefullyunderlockandkey,thensummonedageneralgatheringofhisofficers,thirty-sixinall,andbegandrinkingwiththem.Whenthewinehadmountedintotheirheadsalittle,hetriedtorousetheirspiritstillfurtherbyaddressingthemthus:‘Gentlemen,hereweare in theheartofan isolated region,anxious toachieve richesandhonourbysomegreatexploit.NowithappensthatanambassadorfromtheHsiung-nuarrivedinthiskingdomonlyafewdaysago,andtheresult is that therespectfulcourtesyextendedtowardsusbyourroyalhosthasdisappeared.ShouldthisenvoyprevailuponhimtoseizeourpartyandhandusovertotheHsiung-nu,ourboneswill become food for thewolvesof thedesert.What arewe to do?’Withone accord, theofficersreplied, ‘Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life anddeath.’”Forthesequelofthisadventure,seechapterXII,paragraph1,note.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with theirdesigns.We are not fit to lead an army on themarch unless we are familiar with the face of thecountry—itsmountainsandforests, itspitfallsandprecipices, itsmarshesandswamps.Weshallbeunabletoturnnaturaladvantagestoaccountunlesswemakeuseoflocalguides.

These sentences are repeated from chapter VII, paragraphs 12-14—in order to emphasise theirimportance,thecommentatorsseemtothink.Iprefertoregardthemasinterpolatedhereinordertoformanantecedenttothefollowingwords.Withregardtolocalguides,SunTzumighthaveaddedthatthereisalwaystheriskofgoingwrong,eitherthroughtheirtreacheryorsomemisunderstanding...:Hannibal,wearetold,orderedaguidetoleadhimintotheneighbourhoodofCasinum,wherethere was an important pass to be occupied; but his Car- thaginian accent, unsuited to the

pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, andturningfromhisproperroute,he tookthearmyin thatdirection, themistakenotbeingdiscovereduntiltheyhadalmostarrived.

ThismistakealmostcostHannibalhisarmy:ThetroopswerehemmedinbythemountainsoneithersideoftheroutetoCasilinum.TheRomancommander,Fabius,figuredhehadHannibaltrapped.Butinoneofmilitaryhistory’sgreatestruses,Hannibal,inatacticsimilartowhatT’ienTanhadusedinChina some sixty years earlier, took advantage of the cover of night, disguised cattlewith fire tosurpriseandterrifyhisenemy,andescaped.SeethenoteforchapterIX,paragraph24.DG

53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit awarlikeprince.

“One who rules by force,” was a term specially used for those princes who established theirhegemonyoverother feudal states.The famous “warlikeprinces”of the7th centuryB.C.were (1)DukeHuanofCh’i,(2)DukeWênofChin,(3)DukeHsiangofSung,(4)PrinceChuangofCh’u,and(5)DukeMuofCh’in.Theirreignscoveredtheperiod685-591B.C.

54.Whenawarlikeprinceattacksapowerfulstate,hisgeneralshipshows itself inpreventing theconcentrationoftheenemy’sforces.Heoveraweshisopponents,andtheiralliesarepreventedfromjoiningagainsthim.

MeiYao-ch’ênconstructsoneofthechainsofreasoningthataresomuchaffectedbytheChinese:“Inattackingapowerfulstate,ifyoucandivideherforces,youwillhaveasuperiorityinstrength;ifyouhave a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, theneighbouring states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’sallieswillbepreventedfromjoiningher.”...Ch’ên Hao and Chang Yü take the sentence in quite another way. The former says: “Powerful

thoughaprincemaybe,ifheattacksalargestate,hewillbeunabletoraiseenoughtroops,andmustrelytosomeextentonexternalaid;ifhedispenseswiththis,andwithoverweeningconfidenceinhisown strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, hewill surely be defeated.”ChangYüputs hisviewthus:“Ifwerecklesslyattackalargestate,ourownpeoplewillbediscontentedandhangback.Butif(aswillthenbethecase)ourdisplayofmilitaryforceisinferiorbyhalftothatoftheenemy,theotherchieftainswilltakefrightandrefusetojoinus.”

In seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is

necessaryforhimtoinflict,andtodothemallatonestroke,soasnottohavetorepeatthemdaily.Thus,bynotunsettlingmen,hewillbeabletoreassurethem,andwinthemtohimselfbybenefits.Hewho does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled tokeeptheknifeinhishand.NoccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince(1532)

55.Hencehedoesnot strive toallyhimselfwithallandsundry,nordoeshe foster thepowerofotherstates.Hecarriesouthisownsecretdesigns,keepinghisantagonistsinawe.

Thetrainofthought[accordingtoLiCh’üan]appearstobethis:Secureagainstacombinationofhisenemies,“hecanaffordtorejectentanglingalliancesandsimplypursuehisownsecretdesigns,hisprestigeenablinghimtodispensewithexternalfriendships.”

Thusheisabletocapturetheircitiesandoverthrowtheirkingdoms.

Thisparagraph,thoughwrittenmanyyearsbeforetheCh’inStatebecameaseriousmenace,isnotabad summaryof thepolicybywhich the famousSixChancellorsgraduallypaved theway forherfinaltriumphunderShihHuangTi.ChangYü,followinguphispreviousnote,thinksthatSunTzuiscondemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.He again refers to thewarlikeprinceoncemore,thusmakingitappearthatintheendheisboundtosuccumb.

56.Bestowrewardswithoutregardtorule,

WuTzulesswiselysays:“Letadvanceberichlyrewardedandretreatbeheavilypunished.”

issueorderswithoutregardtopreviousarrangements;

“Inordertopreventtreachery,”saysWangHsi.ThegeneralmeaningismadeclearbyTs’aoKung’squotations from theSsu-maFa [amilitary treatise thought to be from the 6th centuryB.C.]: “Giveinstructionsonlyonsightingtheenemy;giverewardsonlywhenyouseedeservingdeeds.”...Ts’aoKung’s paraphrase I take to mean: “The final instructions you give to your army should notcorrespond with those that have been previously posted up.” Chang Yü simplifies this into “yourarrangementsshouldnotbedivulgedbeforehand.”AndChiaLinsays:“Thereshouldbenofixityinyourrulesandarrangements.”Notonlyistheredangerinlettingyourplansbeknown,butwaroften

necessitatestheentirereversalofthematthelastmoment.

andyouwillbeabletohandleawholearmyasthoughyouhadtodowithbutasingleman.57.Confrontyoursoldierswiththedeeditself;neverletthemknowyourdesign.

Literally,“donottellthemwords”;i.e.,donotgiveyourreasonsforanyorder.LordMansfieldoncetoldajuniorcolleagueto“givenoreasons”forhisdecisions,andthemaximisevenmoreapplicabletoageneralthantoajudge.Capt.Calthroptranslatesthissentencewithbeautifulsimplicity:“Ordersshoulddirectthesoldiers.”Thatisall.

William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield (1705-1793) was a British chief justice known for hisunpopularprosecutionsof rebel Irish lordsandcertain libelcases,which led to theburningofhishomeduringtheGordonRiots.DG

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothingwhen the situation isgloomy.

58.Placeyourarmyindeadlyperil,anditwillsurvive;plungeitintodesperatestraits,anditwillcomeoffinsafety.

ThesewordsofSunTzuwereoncequotedbyHanHsininexplanationofthetacticsheemployedinoneofhismostbrilliantbattles....In204B.C.,hewassentagainstthearmyofChao,andhaltedtenmilesfromthemouthoftheChing-hsingpass,wheretheenemyhadmusteredinfullforce.Here,atmidnight,hedetachedabodyof2000lightcavalry,everymanofwhichwasfurnishedwitharedflag.Their instructionswere tomake theirway through narrow defiles and keep a secretwatch on theenemy. “When the men of Chao see me in full flight,” Han Hsin said, “they will abandon theirfortificationsandgivechase.Thismustbethesignforyoutorushin,pluckdowntheChaostandardsandsetuptheredbannersofHanintheirstead.”Turningthentohisotherofficers,heremarked:“Ouradversaryholdsastrongposition,andisnot

likelytocomeoutandattackusuntilheseesthestandardanddrumsofthecommander-in-chief,forfear I should turn back and escape through the mountains.” So saying, he first of all sent out adivisionconsistingof10,000men,andorderedthemtoforminlineofbattlewiththeirbackstotheRiverTi.Seeingthismanœuvre,thewholearmyofChaobrokeintoloudlaughter.Bythistimeitwasbroaddaylight,andHanHsin,displayingthegeneralissimo’sflag,marchedout

ofthepasswithdrumsbeating,andwasimmediatelyengagedbytheenemy.Agreatbattlefollowed,lastingforsometime;untilatlengthHanHsinandhiscolleagueChangNi,leavingdrumsandbanneronthefield,fledtothedivisionontheriverbank,whereanotherfiercebattlewasraging.Theenemyrushedouttopursuethemandtosecurethetrophies,thusdenudingtheirrampartsofmen;butthetwogenerals succeeded in joining theotherarmy,whichwas fightingwith theutmostdesperation.Thetimehadnowcomeforthe2000horsementoplaytheirpart.As soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the

desertedwalls, toreup theenemy’s flagsandreplaced themby thoseofHan.When theChaoarmyturnedbackfromthepursuit,thesightoftheseredflagsstruckthemwithterror.ConvincedthattheHanshadgot in andoverpowered their king, theybrokeup inwild disorder, every effort of theirleadertostaythepanicbeinginvain.ThentheHanarmyfellonthemfrombothsidesandcompletedtherout,killingagreatnumberandcapturingtherest,amongstwhomwasKingYahimself....Afterthebattle,someofHanHsin’sofficerscametohimandsaid:“InTheArtofWar,wearetold

tohaveahillortumulusontherightrear,andariverormarshontheleftfront.[Thisappearstobeablend of Sun Tzu and T’ai Kung. See chapter IX, paragraph 9, and note.] You, on the contrary,orderedus todrawupour troopswith the river at ourback.Under these conditions, howdidyoumanagetogainthevictory?”Thegeneralreplied,“IfearyougentlemenhavenotstudiedTheArtofWarwithsufficientcare.Isit

notwrittenthere:‘Plungeyourarmyintodesperatestraitsanditwillcomeoff insafety;placeit indeadlyperilanditwillsurvive’?HadItakentheusualcourse,Ishouldneverhavebeenabletobringmycolleaguesround.WhatsaystheMilitaryClassic?—‘Swoopdownonthemarket-placeanddrivethemenofftofight’[ThispassagedoesnotappearinthepresenttextofTheArtofWar].IfIhadnotplacedmytroopsinapositionwheretheywereobligedtofightfortheirlives,buthadallowedeachmantofollowhisowndiscretion,therewouldhavebeenageneraldébandade,anditwouldhavebeen

impossible to do anythingwith them.” The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said,“Thesearehighertacticsthanweshouldhavebeencapableof.”

59.Foritispreciselywhenaforcehasfallenintoharm’swaythatitiscapableofstrikingablowforvictory.

Dangerhasabracingeffect.

60.Successinwarfareisgainedbycarefullyaccommodatingourselvestotheenemy’spurpose.

Ts’aoKung says: “Feign stupidity”—byan appearanceof yielding and falling inwith the enemy’swishes.ChangYü’snotemakesthemeaningclear:“Iftheenemyshowsaninclinationtoadvance,lurehimontodoso;ifheisanxioustoretreat,delayonpurposethathemaycarryouthisintention.”Theobjectistomakehimremissandcontemptuousbeforewedeliverourattack.

61.Bypersistentlyhangingon the enemy’s flank,we shall succeed in the long run inkilling thecommander-in-chief.

[Thelastis]alwaysagreatpointwiththeChinese.

62.Thisiscalledabilitytoaccomplishathingbysheercunning.63.Onthedaythatyoutakeupyourcommand,blockthefrontierpasses,destroytheofficialtallies,

[The official tallies were] used at city-gates and on the frontier. Theywere tablets of bamboo orwood,onehalfofwhichwasissuedasapermitorpassportbytheofficialinchargeofagate.Whenthishalfwas returned tohim,withina fixedperiod,hewasauthorised toopen thegateand let thetravellerthrough.

Notunlikeourpassportsandvisasforvisitingothercountriestoday.DG

andstopthepassageofallemissaries.

Eithertoorfromtheenemy’scountry.

64.Besterninthecouncil-chamber,

Shownoweakness,andinsistonyourplansbeingratifiedbythesovereign.

sothatyoumaycontrolthesituation.

MeiYao-ch’ên . . .understands thewholesentence tomean:Take thestrictestprecautions toensuresecrecyinyourdeliberations.

65.Iftheenemyleavesadooropen,youmustrushin.66.Forestallyouropponentbyseizingwhatheholdsdear,andsubtlycontrivetotimehisarrivalon

theground.

Ch’ênHao’s explanation . . . is clear enough: “If Imanage to seize a favourable position, but theenemydoesnot appearon the scene, the advantage thusobtainedcannotbe turned to anypracticalaccount.Hewhointends,therefore,tooccupyapositionofimportancetotheenemy,mustbeginbymaking an artful appointment, so to speak,withhis antagonist, and cajole him intogoing there aswell.”Mei Yao-ch’ên explains that this “artful appointment” is to bemade through themedium of the

enemy’sownspies,whowillcarrybackjusttheamountofinformationthatwechoosetogivethem.Then,havingcunninglydisclosedourintentions,“wemustmanage,thoughstartingaftertheenemy,to arrive before him” (chapter VII, paragraph 4).We must start after him in order to ensure hismarchingthither;wemustarrivebeforehiminordertocapturetheplacewithouttrouble.

67.Walkinthepathdefinedbyrule,

[TheChinesecharacter]standsfor“amarking-line,”hencearuleofconduct[followingtherulesofthephilosopherMencius].Ts’aoKungexplainsitbythesimilarmetaphor“squareandcompasses.”ThebaldnessofthesentimentratherinclinesmetofavourthereadingadoptedbyChiaLin,...which

yieldsanexactlyoppositesense,namely:“Discardhardandfastrules.”ChiaLinsays:“Victory is theonly thing thatmatters,and thiscannotbeachievedbyadhering to

conventional canons.” It is unfortunate that this variant rests onvery slight authority, for the senseyieldediscertainlymuchmoresatisfactory.Napoleon,asweknow,accordingtotheveteransoftheoldschoolwhomhedefeated,wonhisbattlesbyviolatingeveryacceptedcanonofwarfare.

andaccommodateyourselftotheenemyuntilyoucanfightadecisivebattle.

TuMusays:“Conformtotheenemy’stacticsuntilafavourableopportunityoffers;thencomeforthandengageinabattlethatshallprovedecisive.”

68.Atfirst,then,exhibitthecoynessofamaiden,untiltheenemygivesyouanopening;afterwardsemulatetherapidityofarunninghare,anditwillbetoolatefortheenemytoopposeyou.

Asthehareisnotedforitsextremetimidity,thecomparisonhardlyappearsfelicitous.ButofcourseSunTzuwasthinkingonlyofitsspeed.Thewordshavebeentakentomean:Youmustfleefromtheenemyasquicklyasanescapinghare;butthisisrightlyrejectedbyTuMu.

XII.THEATTACKBYFIRE

Ilovethesmellofnapalminthemorning.Lt.Col.BillKilgoreinApocalypseNow,screenplaybyJohnMilius(1976)

Rathermorethanhalfthechapter(paragraphs1-13)isdevotedtothesubjectoffire,afterwhichtheauthorbranchesoffintoothertopics.

1.SunTzu said:There are fivewaysof attackingwith fire.The first is to burn soldiers in theircamp;

LiCh’üansays:“Setfiretothecamp,andkillthesoldiers”(whentheytrytoescapefromtheflames).PanCh’ao, sent on a diplomaticmission to theKing of Shan-shan [see chapterXI, paragraph 51,note],foundhimselfplacedinextremeperilbytheunexpectedarrivalofanenvoyfromtheHsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: “Neverventure,neverwin![Otherwisetranslated:Unlessyouenterthetiger ’slair,youcannotgetholdofthetiger ’scubs.]Theonlycourseopentousnowistomakeanassaultbyfireonthebarbariansundercoverofnight,whentheywillnotbeabletodiscernournumbers.Profitingbytheirpanic,weshallexterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with glory, besidesensuringthesuccessofourmission.”“TheofficersallrepliedthatitwouldbenecessarytodiscussthematterfirstwiththeIntendant.Pan

Ch’aothenfellintoapassion:‘Itisto-day,’hecried,‘thatourfortunesmustbedecided!TheIntendantisonlyahumdrumcivilian,whoonhearingofourprojectwillcertainlybeafraid,andeverythingwillbebroughttolight.Aningloriousdeathisnoworthyfateforvaliantwarriors!’Allthenagreedtodoashewished.“Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the

barbariancamp.Astronggalewasblowingat the time.PanCh’aoordered tenof theparty to takedrumsandhidebehindtheenemy’sbarracks,itbeingarrangedthatwhentheysawflamesshootup,theyshouldbegindrummingandyellingwithalltheirmight.Therestofhismen,armedwithbowsandcrossbows,hepostedinambuscadeatthegateofthecamp.Hethensetfiretotheplacefromthewindwardside,whereuponadeafeningnoiseofdrumsandshoutingaroseonthefrontandrearoftheHsiung-nu,whorushedoutpell-mellinfranticdisorder.PanCh’aoslewthreeofthemwithhisownhand,whilehiscompanionscutofftheheadsoftheenvoyandthirtyofhissuite.Theremainder,morethanahundredinall,perishedintheflames.“Onthefollowingday,PanCh’aowentbackandinformedKuoHsün[theIntendant]ofwhathehad

done.Thelatterwasgreatlyalarmedandturnedpale.ButPanCh’ao,divininghisthoughts,saidwithupliftedhand:‘Althoughyoudidnotgowithuslastnight,Ishouldnotthink,Sir,oftakingsolecreditforourexploit.’ThissatisfiedKuoHsün,andPanCh’ao,havingsentforKuang,KingofShan-shan,showedhimtheheadofthebarbarianenvoy.Thewholekingdomwasseizedwithfearandtrembling,whichPanCh’aotookstepstoallaybyissuingapublicproclamation.Then,takingtheking’ssonashostage,hereturnedtomakehisreporttoTouKu.”

thesecondistoburnstores;

TuMusays:“Provisions,fuelandfodder.”InordertosubduetherebelliouspopulationofKiangnan,KaoKêngrecommendedWênTioftheSuidynastytomakeperiodicalraidsandburntheirstoresofgrain,apolicywhichinthelongrunprovedentirelysuccessful.

thethirdistoburnbaggage-trains;

AnexamplegivenisthedestructionofYüanShao’swaggonsandimpedimentsbyTs’aoTs’aoin200A.D.

thefourthistoburnarsenalsandmagazines;thefifthistohurldroppingfireamongsttheenemy.Nofewerthanfourtotallydiverseexplanationsofthissentencearegivenbythecommentators,notoneofwhichisquitesatisfactory....TheinterpretationwhichIhaveadoptedisthatgivenbyTuYu... :“Todropfireintotheenemy’scamp.Themethodbywhichthismaybedoneistosetthetipsofarrowsalightbydippingthemintoabrazier,andthenshootthemfrompowerfulcrossbowsintotheenemy’slines.”

2.Inordertocarryoutanattackwithfire,wemusthavemeansavailable.

Ts’aoKungthinksthat[“means”indicates]“traitorsintheenemy’scamp.”...ButCh’ênHaoismorelikelytoberightinsaying:“Wemusthavefavourablecircumstancesingeneral,notmerelytraitorstohelpus.”ChiaLinsays:“Wemustavailourselvesofwindanddryweather.”

Thematerialforraisingfireshouldalwaysbekeptinreadiness.

[TheChinesecharacter]isexplainedbyTs’aoKungas“appliancesformakingfire.”TuMusuggests“dry vegetablematter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.” . . . ChangYü says: “vessels forhoardingfire,stuffforlightingfires.”

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting aconflagration.

Afiremustnotbebegun“recklessly”or“athaphazard.”

4.Theproperseasoniswhentheweatherisverydry;thespecialdaysarethosewhenthemoonisinthe constellation of the Sieve, theWall, theWing or theCross-bar; for these four are all days of

risingwind.

These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions,correspondingroughlytoSagittarius,Pegasus,CraterandCorvus.

5.Inattackingwithfire,oneshouldbepreparedtomeetfivepossibledevelopments:6.(1)Whenfirebreaksoutinsidetheenemy’scamp,respondatoncewithanattackfromwithout.7.(2)Ifthereisanoutbreakoffire,buttheenemy’ssoldiersremainquiet,bideyourtimeanddo

notattack.The prime object of attackingwith fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is notproduced,itmeansthattheenemyisreadytoreceiveus.Hencethenecessityforcaution.

8. (3)When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it upwith an attack, if that ispracticable;ifnot,staywhereyouare.

Ts’aoKungsays:“Ifyouseeapossibleway,advance;butifyoufindthedifficultiestoogreat,retire.”

9. (4) If it is possible tomake an assaultwith fire fromwithout, do notwait for it to break outwithin,butdeliveryourattackatafavourablemoment.

TuMusaysthatthepreviousparagraphshadreferencetothefirebreakingout(eitheraccidentally,wemaysuppose,orbytheagencyofincen-diaries)insidetheenemy’scamp.“But,”hecontinues,“iftheenemyissettledinawasteplacelitteredwithquantitiesofgrass,orifhehaspitchedhiscampinapositionwhichcanbeburntout,wemustcarryour fireagainsthimatanyseasonableopportunity,andnotwaitoninhopesofanoutbreakoccurringwithin,forfearouropponentsshouldthemselvesburnupthesurroundingvegetation,andthusrenderourownattemptsfruitless.”The famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking

advantageofafavourablewind,triedtosetfiretotheChinesegeneral’scamp,butfoundthateveryscrapofcombustiblevegetationintheneighbourhoodhadalreadybeenburntdown.Ontheotherhand,Po-ts’ai,ageneraloftheYellowTurbanrebels,wasbadlydefeatedin184A.D.

throughhisneglectofthissimpleprecaution.AttheheadofalargearmyhewasbesiegingCh’ang-shê, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling ofnervousness pervaded the ranks; soHuang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: “Inwar,there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not account for everything. [Thecommentator here quotes fromSunTzu, chapterV, paragraphs 5, 6 and 10.]Now the rebels have

pitchedtheircampinthemidstofthickgrasswhichwilleasilyburnwhenthewindblows.Ifwesetfiretoitatnight, theywillbethrownintoapanic,andwecanmakeasortieandattackthemonallsidesatonce,thusemulatingtheachievementofT’ienTan[whousedconvertedspiestodevastatingeffect].”That same evening, a strongbreeze sprangup; soHuang-fuSung instructedhis soldiers to bind

reedstogetherintotorchesandmountguardonthecitywalls,afterwhichhesentoutabandofdaringmen,whostealthilymadetheirwaythroughthelinesandstartedthefirewithloudshoutsandyells.Simultaneously,aglareoflightshotupfromthecity-walls,andHuang-fuSung,soundinghisdrums,ledarapidcharge,whichthrewtherebelsintoconfusionandputthemintoheadlongflight.

10.(5)Whenyoustartafire,betowindwardofit.Donotattackfromtheleeward.

ChangYü,followingTuYu,says:“Whenyoumakeafire,theenemywillretreatawayfromit;ifyouoppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to yoursuccess.”A rathermore obvious explanation is given byTuMu: “If thewind is in the east, beginburningtotheeastoftheenemy,andfollowuptheattackyourselffromthatside.Ifyoustartthefireontheeastside,andthenattackfromthewest,youwillsufferinthesamewayasyourenemy.”

11.Awindthatrisesinthedaytimelastslong,butanightbreezesoonfalls.

[Comparethis]toLaoTzu’ssaying:“Aviolentwinddoesnotlast thespaceofamorning”(TaoTéChing, chapter 23).MeiYao-ch’ên andWangHsi say: “Aday breeze dies down at nightfall, and anightbreezeatdaybreak.Thisiswhathappensasageneralrule.”Thephenomenonobservedmaybecorrectenough,buthowthissenseistobeobtainedisnotapparent.

12.Ineveryarmy,thefivedevelopmentsconnectedwithfiremustbeknown,themovementsofthestarscalculated,andawatchkeptfortheproperdays.

TuMu’scommentary...:“Wemustmakecalculationsastothepathsofthestars,andwatchforthedaysonwhichwindwill rise,beforemakingourattackwith fire.”ChangYü[says]:“Wemustnotonlyknowhow to assail ouropponentswith fire, but alsobeonourguard against similar attacksfromthem.”

13.Hencethosewhousefireasanaidtotheattackshowintelligence;thosewhousewaterasanaidtotheattackgainanaccessionofstrength.

14.Bymeansofwater,anenemymaybeintercepted,butnotrobbedofallhisbelongings.

Ts’aoKung’snote is:“Wecanmerelyobstruct theenemy’sroadordividehisarmy,butnotsweepaway all his accumulated stores.”Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructivepoweroffire.This is thereason,ChangYüconcludes,whytheformerisdismissedinacoupleofsentences,whereastheattackbyfireisdiscussedindetail.WuTzuspeaksthusofthetwoelements:“Ifanarmyisencampedonlow-lyingmarshyground,fromwhichthewatercannotrunoff,andwherethe rainfall isheavy, itmaybesubmergedbya flood. Ifanarmy isencamped inwildmarsh landsthicklyovergrownwithweedsandbrambles,andvisitedbyfrequentgales,itmaybeexterminatedbyfire.”

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks withoutcultivatingthespiritofenterprise;fortheresultiswasteoftimeandgeneralstagnation.

Thisisoneofthemostperplexingpassagesin[TheArtofWar]....Ts’aoKungsays:“Rewardsforgoodservice shouldnotbedeferreda singleday.”AndTuMu:“Ifyoudonot takeopportunity toadvanceandrewardthedeserving,yoursubordinateswillnotcarryoutyourcommands,anddisasterwillensue.”...Forseveralreasons,however,andinspiteoftheformidablearrayofscholarsontheotherside,I

prefertheinterpretationsuggestedbyMeiYao-ch’ên,whosewordsIwillquote:“Thosewhowanttomakesureofsucceeding in theirbattlesandassaultsmustseize thefavourablemomentswhen theycomeandnotshrinkonoccasionfromheroicmeasures:thatistosay,theymustresorttosuchmeansofattackasfire,waterandthelike.Whattheymustnotdo,andwhatwillprovefatal,istositstillandsimplyholdontotheadvantagestheyhavegot.”

16.Hencethesaying:Theenlightenedrulerlayshisplanswellahead;thegoodgeneralcultivateshisresources.Themeaningseems tobe that the ruler laysplanswhich thegeneralmust showresourcefulness incarrying out. . . . Tu Mu [offers this quotation from another commentator]: “The warlike princecontrolshissoldiersbyhisauthority,knitsthemtogetherbygoodfaith,andbyrewardsmakesthemserviceable.Iffaithdecays,therewillbedisruption;ifrewardsaredeficient,commandswillnotberespected.”

17.Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to begained;fightnotunlessthepositioniscritical.

SunTzumayat timesappear tobeover-cautious,buthenevergoes so far in thatdirectionas theremarkablepassageintheTaoTéChing,chapter69:“Idarenottaketheinitiative,butprefertoactonthedefensive;Idarenotadvanceaninch,butprefertoretreatafoot.”

18.Norulershouldput troops into thefieldmerely togratifyhisownspleen;nogeneralshouldfightabattlesimplyoutofpique.19.Ifitistoyouradvantage,makeaforwardmove;ifnot,staywhereyouare.

ThisisrepeatedfromchapterXI,paragraph17.HereIfeelconvincedthatitisaninterpolation.

20.Angermayintimechangetogladness;vexationmaybesucceededbycontent.21.Butakingdomthathasoncebeendestroyedcannevercomeagainintobeing;

TheWuStatewasdestinedtobeamelancholyexampleofthissaying.

norcanthedeadeverbebroughtbacktolife.22.Hencetheenlightenedrulerisheedful,andthegoodgeneralfullofcaution.Thisisthewayto

keepacountryatpeaceandanarmyintact.

XIII.THEUSEOFSPIES

Whenyouconcealyourwillfromothers,thatisThick.Whenyouimposeyourwillonothers,thatisBlack.LeeZhongWu,ThickFace,BlackHeart(1911)

Theevolutionof themeaning“spy” isworthconsideringforamoment,provided itbeunderstoodthat this is very doubtful ground. . . . [It is defined elsewhere] as “a crack” or “chink,” andon the

wholewemayacceptHsüCh’ieh’sanalysisasnotundulyfanciful:“Atnight,adoorisshut;if,whenitisshut,thelightofthemoonisvisible,itmustcomethroughachink.”Fromthisitisaneasysteptothemeaning“spacebetween,”orsimply“between,”asforexampleinthephrase“toactasasecretspybetweenenemies.”...Anotherpossibletheoryisthatthewordmayfirsthavecometomean“topeep,” which would naturally be suggested by “crack” or “crevice,” and afterwards themanwhopeeps,orspy.

1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousandmen andmarching them great distancesentailsheavylossonthepeopleandadrainontheresourcesoftheState.Thedailyexpenditurewillamounttoathousandouncesofsilver.Therewillbecommotionathomeandabroad,andmenwilldropdownexhaustedonthehighways.

ChangYühasthenote:“Wemayberemindedofthesaying:‘Onseriousground,gatherinplunder ’[chapter XI, paragraph 13].Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on thehighways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to beconveyedtothearmy.Besides,theinjunctionto‘forageontheenemy’onlymeansthatwhenanarmyisdeeplyengagedinhostileterritory,scarcityoffoodmustbeprovidedagainst.Hence,withoutbeingsolelydependentontheenemyforcorn,wemustforageinorderthattheremaybeanuninterruptedflowofsupplies.Then,again,thereareplaceslikesaltdeserts,whereprovisionsbeingunobtainable,suppliesfromhomecannotbedispensedwith.”

Asmanyassevenhundredthousandfamilieswillbeimpededintheirlabour.

MeiYao-ch’ênsays:“Menwillbelackingattheplough-tail.”Theallusionistothesystemofdividinglandintonineparts, . . .eachconsistingofabout15acres,theplotinthecenterbeingcultivatedonbehalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. Itwas here also, as TuMu tells us, that theircottageswere built and awell sunk, to be used by all in common. . . . In time ofwar, one of thefamilieshadtoserveinthearmy,whiletheothersevencontributedtoitssupport.Thus,byalevyof100,000men(reckoningoneable-bodiedsoldiertoeachfamily),thehusbandryof700,000familieswouldbeaffected.

2.Hostilearmiesmayfaceeachotherforyears,strivingforthevictorywhichisdecidedinasingleday.Thisbeingso,toremaininignoranceoftheenemy’sconditionsimplybecauseonegrudgestheoutlayofahundredouncesofsilverinhonoursandemoluments

“For spies” is of course themeaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborateexordiumifspieswereactuallymentionedatthispoint.

istheheightofinhumanity.

SunTzu’sargument iscertainly ingenious.Hebeginsbyadverting to the frightfulmiseryandvastexpenditure of blood and treasurewhichwar always brings in its train.Now, unless you are keptinformedoftheenemy’scondition,andarereadytostrikeattherightmoment,awarmaydragonfor years. The onlyway to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtaintrustworthyspiesunless theyareproperlypaid for their services.But it is surely falseeconomy togrudgeacomparativelytriflingamountforthispurpose,wheneverydaythatthewarlastseatsupanincalculablygreatersum.Thisgrievousburdenfallsontheshouldersofthepoor,andhenceSunTzuconcludesthattoneglecttheuseofspiesisnothinglessthanacrimeagainsthumanity.

3.Onewhoactsthusisnoleaderofmen,nopresenthelptohissovereign,nomasterofvictory.

Thisidea,thatthetrueobjectofwarispeace,hasitsrootinthenationaltemperamentoftheChinese.Even so far back as 597B.C., thesememorablewordswere utteredbyPrinceChuangof theCh’uState: “The character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the ideographs for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear ’(cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in ofweapons,thepreservationoftheappointmentofHeaven,thefirmestablishmentofmerit,thebestowalofhappinessonthepeople,puttingharmonybetweentheprinces,thediffusionofwealth.”

4.Thus,whatenablesthewisesovereignandthegoodgeneral tostrikeandconquer,andachievethingsbeyondthereachofordinarymen,isforeknowledge.

Thatis,knowledgeoftheenemy’sdispositions,andwhathemeanstodo.

5.Nowthisforeknowledgecannotbeelicitedfromspirits;

“byprayersorsacrifices,”saysChangYü.

itcannotbeobtainedinductivelyfromexperience,

TuMu’snotemakesthemeaningclear....“[knowledgeoftheenemy]cannotbegainedbyreasoningfromotheranalogouscases.”

norbyanydeductivecalculation.

Li Ch’üan says: “Quantities like length, breadth, distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exactmathematicaldetermination;humanactionscannotbesocalculated.”

6.Knowledgeoftheenemy’sdispositionscanonlybeobtainedfromothermen.

MeiYao-ch’ên has rather an interesting note: “Knowledge of the spirit-world is to be obtained bydivination; information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of theuniverse can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy areascertainablethroughspiesandspiesalone.”

7.Hence the use of spies, ofwhom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3)convertedspies;(4)doomedspies;(5)survivingspies.8.Whenthesefivekindsofspyareallatwork,nonecandiscoverthesecretsystem.

[The Chinese] is explained by Tu Mu as “the way in which facts leak out and dispositions arerevealed.”

Thisiscalled“divinemanipulationofthethreads.”

MeiYao-ch’ên’sparaphraseshowsthatwhatismeantisthecontrolofanumberofthreads.

Itisthesovereign’smostpreciousfaculty.

[General Baden-Powell writes:] “Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalryleaders,hadofficersstyled‘scoutmasters,’whosebusinessitwastocollectallpossibleinformationregardingtheenemy,throughscoutsandspies,etc.,andmuchofhissuccessinwarwastraceableto

thepreviousknowledgeoftheenemy’smovesthusgained”[AidstoScouting].

9.Havinglocalspiesmeansemployingtheservicesoftheinhabitantsofadistrict.TuMusays:“Intheenemy’scountry,winpeopleoverbykindtreatment,andusethemasspies.”

[GeneralGeorge]CrookrealizedthatnoAmericansoldierwouldbeabletocompetewiththeApachewarriorsonaman-to-manbasisinthefieldofendurance....Recognizingtheproblem,Crookrecruitedscoutsonascaleneverbeforeemployedinorderthathewouldhavefightingtroopswith thenecessary individualenduranceand“knowhow”tofight Indianson theirownterms.Navahos,Pimas,andfriendlyApacheswerehired.Lt.Col.DonaldV.Rattan,“AntiguerrillaOperations:ACaseStudyfromHistory”(1960)

10.Havinginwardspies,makinguseofofficialsoftheenemy.

[TheChineseterm]includesbothcivilandmilitaryofficials.TuMuenumeratesthefollowingclassesas likely to do good service in this respect: “Worthy men who have been degraded from office,criminalswhohaveundergonepunishment;also,favouriteconcubineswhoaregreedyforgold,menwhoareaggrievedatbeinginsubordinatepositions,orwhohavebeenpassedoverinthedistributionof posts, otherswho are anxious that their side should be defeated in order that theymay have achanceofdisplayingtheirabilityandtalents,fickleturncoatswhoalwayswanttohaveafootineachboat.“Officialsoftheseseveralkinds,”hecontinues,“shouldbesecretlyapproachedandboundtoone’s

interestsbymeansofrichpresents.Inthiswayyouwillbeabletofindoutthestateofaffairsintheenemy’s country, ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, andmoreover disturb theharmonyandcreateabreachbetweenthesovereignandhisministers.”The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with “inward spies,” appears from an

historical incident relatedbyHoShih: “LoShang,Governorof I-chou, senthisgeneralWeiPo toattacktherebelLiHsiungofShuinhisstrongholdatP’i.Aftereachsidehadexperiencedanumberofvictoriesanddefeats,LiHsiunghadrecoursetotheservicesofacertainP’o-t’ai,anativeofWu-tu.Hebeganbyhavinghimwhippeduntilthebloodcame,andthensenthimofftoLoShang,whomhewastodeludebyofferingtoco-operatewithhimfrominsidethecity,andtogiveafiresignalattherightmomentformakingageneralassault.LoShang,confidinginthesepromises,marchedoutall his best troops, and placedWei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’sbidding.“Meanwhile,LiHsiung’sgeneral,LiHsiang,hadpreparedanambuscadeon their lineofmarch;

andP’o-t’ai,havingreared longscaling-laddersagainst thecitywalls,nowlighted thebeaconfire.

WeiPo’smen racedupon seeing the signal andbegan climbing the ladders as fast as they could,while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang’ssoldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whomwas forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung thenchargedwithallhisforces,bothinsideandoutsidethecity,androutedtheenemycompletely.”[Thishappenedin303A.D.]

11.Havingconvertedspies,gettingholdoftheenemy’sspiesandusingthemforourownpurposes.

By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the enemy’s service, andinducingthemtocarrybackfalseinformation,aswellastospyinturnontheirowncountrymen....HoShihnotesthreeoccasionsonwhichconvertedspieswereusedwithconspicuoussuccess:(1)by

T’ienTaninhisdefenceofChi-mo[chapterIX,paragraph24,note];(2)byChaoShêonhismarchtoO-yü[chapterVII,paragraph4,note];and(3)bythewilyFanChüin260B.C.,whenLienP’owasconducting a defensive campaign against Ch’in: The King of Chao strongly disapproved of LienP’o’scautiousanddilatorymethods,whichhadbeenunabletoavertaseriesofminordisasters,andtherefore lenta readyear to thereportsofhisspies,whohadsecretlygoneover to theenemyandwerealready inFanChü’spay.Theysaid:“Theonly thingwhichcausesCh’inanxiety is lestChaoKuashouldbemadegeneral.LienP’otheyconsideraneasyopponent,whoissuretobevanquishedinthelongrun.”Now thisChaoKuawas a son of the famousChao Shê From his boyhood, he had beenwholly

engrossedinthestudyofwarandmilitarymatters,untilatlasthecametobelievethattherewasnocommanderinthewholeEmpirewhocouldstandagainsthim.Hisfatherwasmuchdisquietedbythisoverweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, andsolemnly declared that if everKuawere appointed general, hewould bring ruin on the armies ofChao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteranstatesmanLinHsiang-ju,wasnowsenttosucceedLienP’o.Needless tosay,heprovednomatchfor theredoubtablePoCh’iand thegreatmilitarypowerof

Ch’in.Hefell intoa trapbywhichhisarmywasdividedinto twoandhiscommunicationscut;andafteradesperateresistancelasting46days,duringwhichthefamishedsoldiersdevouredoneanother,he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, amounting it is said, to 400,000 men,ruthlesslyputtothesword.

12.Havingdoomedspies,doingcertainthingsopenlyforpurposesofdeception,andallowingourownspiestoknowofthemandreportthemtotheenemy.

TuYugivesthebestexpositionofthemeaning:“Weostentatiouslydothingscalculatedtodeceiveourown spies,whomustbe led tobelieve that theyhavebeenunwittinglydisclosed.Then,when these

spiesarecaptured in theenemy’s lines, theywillmakeanentirely false report,and theenemywilltakemeasuresaccordingly,onlytofindthatwedosomethingquitedifferent.Thespieswillthereuponbeputtodeath.”...As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shihmentions the prisoners released by Pan Ch’ao in his

campaignagainstYarkand [chapterXI,paragraph36,note].Healso refers toT’angChien,who in630A.D.wassentbyT’aiTsungtolulltheTurkishKhanChieh-liintofanciedsecurity,untilLiChingwasabletodeliveracrushingblowagainsthim....LiI-chiplayedasomewhatsimilarpartin203B.C.,whensentbytheKingofHantoopenpeaceful

negotiationswithCh’i.Hehascertainlymoreclaimtobedescribedasa[doomedspy];fortheKingof Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated by what heconsideredthetreacheryofLiI-chi,orderedtheunfortunateenvoytobeboiledalive.

13.Survivingspies,finally,arethosewhobringbacknewsfromtheenemy’scamp.

This is theordinaryclassof spies,properly socalled, forminga regularpartof the army.TuMusays:“Yoursurvivingspymustbeamanofkeenintellect,thoughinoutwardappearanceafool;ofshabbyexterior,butwithawillofiron.Hemustbeactive,robust,endowedwithphysicalstrengthandcourage;thoroughlyaccustomedtoallsortsofdirtywork,abletoendurehungerandcold,andtoputupwithshameandignominy.”Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta-hsiWu of the Sui dynasty: “When he was governor of

EasternCh’in,Shên-wuofCh’imadeahostilemovementuponSha-yüan.TheEmperorT’aiTsusentTa-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were onhorseback andwore the enemy’s uniform.When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feetaway from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching thepasswordsusedbythearmy.Thentheygotontheirhorsesagainandboldlypassedthroughthecampundertheguiseofnight-watchmen;andmorethanonce,happeningtocomeacrossasoldierwhowascommittingsomebreachofdiscipline,theyactuallystoppedtogivetheculpritasoundcudgelling!“Thustheymanagedtoreturnwiththefullestpossibleinformationabouttheenemy’sdispositions,

andreceivedwarmcommendationfromtheEmperor,whoinconsequenceoftheirreportwasabletoinflictaseveredefeatonhisadversary.”

14.Henceitisthatwithnoneinthewholearmyaremoreintimaterelationstobemaintainedthanwithspies.

TuMu andMei Yao-ch’ên point out that the spy is privileged to enter even the general’s privatesleeping-tent.

Noneshouldbemoreliberallyrewarded.Innootherbusinessshouldgreatersecrecybepreserved.

Tu Mu [says that] all communications with spies should be carried on “mouth-to-ear.” . . . Thefollowingremarksonspiesmaybequotedfrom[Marshal]Turenne,whomadeperhapslargeruseofthemthananypreviouscommander:“Spiesareattachedtothosewhogivethemmost;hewhopaysthemillisneverserved.Theyshouldneverbeknowntoanybody;norshouldtheyknowoneanother.When they propose anything verymaterial, secure their persons, or have in your possession theirwives and children as hostages for their fidelity.Never communicate anything to thembutwhat isabsolutelynecessarythattheyshouldknow.”

15.Spiescannotbeusefullyemployedwithoutacertainintuitivesagacity.Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “In order to use them, one must know fact from falsehood, and be able todiscriminatebetweenhonestyanddouble-dealing.”...TuMustrangelyreferstheseattributestothespiesthemselves:“Beforeusingspieswemustassureourselvesastotheirintegrityofcharacterandtheextentoftheirexperienceandskill.”Buthecontinues:“Abrazenfaceandacraftydispositionaremoredangerousthanmountainsorrivers;ittakesamanofgeniustopenetratesuch.”Sothatweareleftinsomedoubtastohisrealopiniononthepassage.

Andif,tobesure,sometimesyouneedtoconcealafactwithwords,doitinsuchawaythatitdoesnotbecomeknown,or,ifitdoesbecomeknown,thatyouhaveareadyandquickdefence.Niccolò Machiavelli, “Advice to Raffaello Girolami When He Went as Ambassador to theEmperor”(1522)

16.Theycannotbeproperlymanagedwithoutbenevolenceandstraightforwardness.

ChangYü[interpretstheChineseas]“notgrudgingthemhonoursandpay”;“showingnodistrustoftheirhonesty.”[Sothatthepassagewouldread:]“Whenyouhaveattractedthembysubstantialoffers,youmusttreatthemwithabsolutesincerity;thentheywillworkforyouwithalltheirmight.”

17.Withoutsubtleingenuityofmind,onecannotmakecertainofthetruthoftheirreports.

MeiYao-ch’ênsays:“Beonyourguardagainstthepossibilityofspiesgoingovertotheserviceoftheenemy.”

18.Besubtle!Besubtle!anduseyourspiesforeverykindofbusiness.19. Ifasecretpieceofnews isdivulgedbyaspybefore the time is ripe,hemustbeput todeath

togetherwiththemantowhomthesecretwastold.

The Chinese here is so concise and elliptical that some expansion is necessary for the properunderstandingof it. . . .Word forword [it reads]: “If spymatters areheardbefore [ourplans] arecarriedout,”etc....ThemainpointofSunTzu’sinjunction[mustsurelybethat]whereasyoukillthespyhimself“asapunishmentforlettingoutthesecret,”theobjectofkillingtheothermanisonly,asCh’ênHaoputsit,“tostophismouth”andpreventthenewsleakinganyfurther.Ifithadalreadybeenrepeatedtoothers,thisobjectwouldnotbegained.Eitherway,SunTzulayshimselfopentothechargeofinhumanity,thoughTuMutriestodefend

himbysayingthatthemandeservestobeputtodeath,forthespywouldcertainlynothavetoldthesecretunlesstheotherhadbeenatpainstowormitoutofhim.

Men should either be treated generously or destroyed, because they take revenge for slightinjuries—forheavyones,theycannot.NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince(1532)

20.Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it isalwaysnecessarytobeginbyfindingoutthenamesoftheattendants,

thosewhowaitonothers,servantsandretainersgenerally.

theaides-de-camp,

[TuYu describes them as] “thosewhose duty it is to keep the general suppliedwith information,”whichnaturallynecessitatesfrequentinterviewswithhim.

the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned toascertainthese.

As the first step,nodoubt, towards findingout if anyof these important functionaries canbewonoverbybribery.

21.Theenemy’s spieswhohavecome to spyonusmustbe soughtout, temptedwithbribes, ledawayandcomfortablyhoused.Thustheywillbecomeconvertedspiesandavailableforourservice.22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and

employlocalandinwardspies.

TuYuexpandsthisinto“throughconversionoftheenemy’sspieswelearntheenemy’scondition.”AndChangYüsays:“Wemusttempttheconvertedspyintoourservice,becauseitishethatknowswhichofthelocalinhabitantsaregreedyofgain,andwhichoftheofficialsareopentocorruption.”

23.Itisowingtohisinformation,again,thatwecancausethedoomedspytocarryfalsetidingstotheenemy.

[ChangYüputsitthus:]“Becausetheconvertedspyknowshowtheenemycanbestbedeceived.”

24.Lastly,itisbyhisinformationthatthesurvivingspycanbeusedonappointedoccasions.25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this

knowledgecanonlybederived,inthefirstinstance,fromtheconvertedspy.

He not only brings information himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy toadvantage.

Henceitisessentialthattheconvertedspybetreatedwiththeutmostliberality.26.Ofold,theriseoftheYindynasty

SunTzumeanstheShangdynasty,foundedin1766B.C.ItsnamewaschangedtoYinbyP’anKêngin1401.

wasduetoIChih,

BetterknownasIYin,thefamousgeneralandstatesmanwhotookpartinCh’êngT’ang’scampaignagainstChiehKuei.

whohadservedundertheHsia.Likewise,theriseoftheChoudynastywasduetoLüYa,[LüYawasalsoknownas]LüShang.[He]rosetohighofficeunderthetyrantChouHsin,whomheafterwardshelpedtooverthrow....Heissaidtohavecomposedatreatiseonwar.

whohadservedundertheYin.

ThereislessprecisionintheChinesethanIhavethoughtitwelltointroduceintomytranslation,andthecommentariesonthispassagearebynomeansexplicit.But,havingregardtothecontext,wecanhardlydoubtthatSunTzuisholdingupIChihandLüYaasillustriousexamplesoftheconvertedspy,orsomethingcloselyanalogous.Hissuggestionis,thattheHsiaandYindynastieswereupsetowingtotheintimateknowledgeoftheirweaknessesandshortcomingswhichtheseformerministerswereabletoimparttotheotherside.MeiYao-ch’ênappearstoresentanysuchaspersiononthesehistoricnames:“IYinandLüYa,”hesays,“werenotrebelsagainsttheGovernment.Hsiacouldnotemploythe former, henceYin employed him.Yin could not employ the latter, henceChou employed him.Theirgreatachievementswereallforthegoodofthepeople.”HoShihisalsoindignant:“HowshouldtwodivinelyinspiredmensuchasIandLühaveactedas

commonspies?SunTzu’smentionof themsimplymeans that theproperuseof thefiveclassesofspiesisamatterwhichrequiresmenofthehighestmentalcalibre,likeIandLü,whosewisdomandcapacityqualified themfor the task. [His]wordsonlyemphasize thispoint.”HoShihbelieves thenthatthetwoheroesarementionedonaccountoftheirsupposedskillintheuseofspies.Butthisis[a]veryweak[interpretation].

27.Henceitisonlytheenlightenedrulerandthewisegeneralwhowillusethehighestintelligenceofthearmyforpurposesofspying,

Ch’ênHao . . . points out that “the god-likewisdom of Ch’êng T’ang andWuWang led them toemployIYinandLüShang.”

andtherebytheyachievegreatresults.

TuMucloseswithanoteofwarning:“Justaswater,whichcarriesaboatfrombanktobank,mayalsobe themeans of sinking it, so reliance on spies,while productive of great results, is oft-times thecauseofutterdestruction.”

Spiesareamostimportantelementinwar,becauseonthemdependsanarmy’sabilitytomove.

ChiaLinsaysthatanarmywithoutspiesislikeamanwithoutearsoreyes.

APPENDIX:THECOMMENTATORS

byLionelGileseditedbyDallasGalvinSUNTZUCANBOASTanexceptionallylonganddistinguishedrollofcommentators,whichwoulddohonourtoanyclassic....

1.TS’AOTS’AO,ALSOKNOWNASTS’AOKUNGANDLATERWEIWUTI,A.D.155-220

ThereishardlyanyroomfordoubtthattheearliestcommentaryonSunTzuactuallycamefromthepenofthisextraordinaryman,whosebiographyintheSanKuoChihreadslikearomance.Oneofthegreatestmilitarygeniusesthattheworldhasseen,andNapoleonicinthescaleofhisoperations,hewasespeciallyfamedforthemarvellousrapidityofhismarches,whichhasfoundexpressionintheline, “TalkofTs’aoTs’ao, andTs’aoTs’aowill appear.”Ou-yangHsiu saysofhim thathewasagreatcaptainwho

measured his strength against Tung Cho, Lü Pu and the two Yüan, father and son, andvanquished them all; whereupon he divided the Empire of HanwithWu and Shu, andmadehimselfking.ItisrecordedthatwheneveracouncilofwarwasheldbyWeiontheeveofafar-reachingcampaign,hehadallhiscalculationsready;thosegeneralswhomadeuseofthemdidnot lose one battle in ten; thosewho ran counter to them in any particular saw their armiesincontinentlybeatenandputtoflight.

Ts’aoKung’snotesonSunTzu,modelsof austerebrevity, are so thoroughly characteristicof thesterncommanderknowntohistory,thatitishardindeedtoconceiveofthemastheworkofamerelittérateur.Sometimes,indeed,owingtoextremecompression,theyarescarcelyintelligibleandstandnolessinneedofacommentarythanthetextitself....Ts’aoKungisthereputedauthorofabookonwarin100,000oddwords,nowlost....

2.MÊNGSHIH,C.A.D.502-557?ORPOSSIBLYASEARLYASTHETHIRDCENTURY

Thecommentarywhichhascomedowntousunderthisnameiscomparativelymeagre,andnothingabouttheauthorisknown.Evenhispersonalnamehasnotbeenrecorded....[H]eisnamed[asthe]lastofthe“FiveCommentators,”theothersbeingWeiWuTi[Ts’aoTs’ao],TuMu,Ch’ênHaoandChiaLin.

3.LICH’ÜAN,EIGHTHCENTURYA.D.[He]wasawell-knownwriteronmilitarytactics.[Oneofhistreatises]hasbeeninconstantusedownto thepresentday. [Oneofhisworks recounts the] livesof famousgenerals from theChou to theT’angDynasties....Heisalsogenerallysupposedtobetherealauthorof[a]popularTaoisttract....His notes aremostly short and to the point, andhe frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes

fromChinesehistory. [However,hiscommentariesarebasedonaversionof theSunTzu text thatdiffersconsiderablyfromthosenowextant.]

4.TUYU,DIED812A.D.[He]didnotpublishaseparatecommentaryonSunTzu,hisnotesbeingtakenfromtheT’ungTien,theencyclopædictreatiseontheConstitutionwhichwashislife-work.TheyarelargelyrepetitionsofTs’aoKungandMêngShih,besideswhichitisbelievedthathedrewontheancientcommentariesofWangLingandothers....[ThepoetandcommentatorTuMuwashisgrandson.]

5.TUMU,803-852A.D.[He]isperhapsbestknownasapoet—abrightstareveninthegloriousgalaxyoftheT’angperiod.WelearnfromCh’aoKung-wuthatalthoughhehadnopracticalexperienceofwar,hewasextremelyfondofdiscussingthesubject,andwasmoreoverwellreadinthemilitaryhistoryoftheCh’unCh’iuandChanKuoeras.Hisnotes,therefore,arewellworthattention.Theyareverycopious,andrepletewith historical parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu’s work is thus summarised by him: “Practisebenevolenceandjustice,butontheotherhandmakefulluseofartificeandmeasuresofexpediency.”He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters of the thousand years which hadelapsedsinceSunWu’sdeathwould,uponexamination,befoundtoupholdandcorroborate,ineveryparticular,themaximscontainedinhisbook....

6.CH’ËNHAO,T’ANGDYNASTY(618-907A.D.)[He]appears tohavebeenacontemporaryofTuMu.Ch’aoKung-wusays thathewas impelled towrite a new commentary onSunTzubecauseTs’aoKung’s on the one handwas too obscure andsubtle, and that of TuMu on the other too long-winded and diffuse.Ou-yangHsiu,writing in themiddleofthe11thcentury,callsTs’aoKung,TuMuandCh’ênHaothethreechiefcommentatorsonSun Tzu. . . . [Ch’ên’s] commentary, though not lacking in merit, must rank below those of hispredecessors.

7.CHIALIN,NODATES,BUTHELIVEDDURINGTHET’ANGDYNASTY(618-907A.D.)

[HiscommentaryonSunTzu]isofsomewhatscantytexture,andinpointofquality,too,perhapstheleastvaluableoftheeleven.

8.MEIYAO-CH’ËN,1002-1060[C]ommonlyknownbyhis“style”asMeiShêng-yü,[he]was, likeTuMu,apoetofdistinction.HiscommentarywaspublishedwithalaudatoryprefacebythegreatOu-yangHsiu,fromwhichwemaycullthefollowing:

LaterscholarshavemisreadSunTzu,distortinghiswordsandtryingtomakethemsquarewith

theirownone-sidedviews.Thus,thoughcommentatorshavenotbeenlacking,onlyafewhaveprovedequal to the task.MyfriendShêng-yühasnot fallen into thismistake. Inattempting toprovideacriticalcommentaryforSunTzu’swork,hedoesnotlosesightofthefactthatthesesayingswereintendedforstatesengagedininternecinewarfare;thattheauthorisnotconcernedwiththemilitaryconditionsprevailingunderthesovereignsofthethreeancientdynasties(theHsia,theShang,andtheChou),norwiththeninepunitivemeasuresprescribedtotheMinisterofWar. Again, SunWu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is always deep.Whether thesubjectbemarchinganarmy,orhandlingsoldiers,orestimatingtheenemy,orcontrollingtheforces of victory, it is always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strictlogicalsequence,thoughthishasbeenobscuredbycommentatorswhohaveprobablyfailedtograsptheirmeaning.Inhisowncommentary,MeiShêng-yühasbrushedasidealltheobstinateprejudicesofthesecritics,andhastriedtobringoutthetruemeaningofSunTzuhimself.Inthisway, thecloudsofconfusionhavebeendispersedand thesayingsmadeclear. Iamconvincedthat the present work deserves to be handed down side by side with the three greatcommentaries;andforagreatdealthattheyfindinthesayings,cominggenerationswillhaveconstantreasontothankmyfriendShêng-yü

Makingsomeallowancefortheexuberanceoffriendship,Iaminclinedtoendorsethisfavourablejudgment,andwouldcertainlyplacehimaboveCh’ênHaoinorderofmerit.

9.WANGHSI,SUNGDYNASTY(960-1279A.D.)[He]isdecidedlyoriginalinsomeofhisinterpretations,butmuchlessjudiciousthanMeiYao-ch’ênandonthewholenotaverytrustworthyguide.HeisfondofcomparinghisowncommentarywiththatofTs’aoKung,butthecomparisonisnotalwaysflatteringtohim.WelearnfromCh’aoKung-wuthatWangHsirevisedtheancienttextofSunTzu,fillinguplacunæandcorrectingmistakes.

10.HOYEN-HSI,SUNGDYNASTY(960-1279A.D.)[Thereissomecontroversyoverhispersonalnameandbiography.]...heappearssimplyasHoShihin theYüHai, and [ithasbeen said] thathispersonalname isunknown. . . . [His] commentary . . .“containshelpfuladditions”hereandthere,butischieflyremarkableforthecopiousextractstaken,inadaptedform,fromthedynastichistoriesandothersources.

11.CHANGYü,LATESUNGDYNASTY?Thelistcloseswithacommentatorofnogreatoriginalityperhaps,butgiftedwithadmirablepowersof lucid exposition. His commentary is based on that of Ts’ao Kung, whose terse sentences hecontrivestoexpandanddevelopinmasterlyfashion.WithoutChangYü,itissafetosaythatmuchofTs’ao Kung’s commentary would have remained cloaked in its pristine obscurity and thereforevalueless.Hiswork...findsanicheintheT’ungChih,[aliteraryhistory]whichalsonameshimastheauthorofthe“LivesofFamousGenerals.”Itisratherremarkablethatthelast-namedfourshouldallhaveflourishedwithinsoshortaspaceof

time.Ch’aoKung-wuaccountsforitbysaying,

DuringtheearlyyearsoftheSungdynastytheEmpireenjoyedalongspellofpeace,andmenceasedtopractisetheartofwar.Butwhen[Chao]Yüan-hao’srebellioncame(1038-42)andthefrontier generals were defeated time after time, the Court made strenuous enquiry for menskilledinwar,andmilitarytopicsbecamethevogueamongstallthehighofficials.HenceitisthatthecommentatorsofSunTzuinourdynastybelongmainlytothatperiod.

FORFURTHERREADING

The first thing to knowaboutSunTzu, author ofTheArtofWar, is that hewould be amazed andhorrifiedtolearnthatyouarereadinghisbook!AsBurtonWatson,thegreattranslatorofclassicalChineseandJapaneseliterature,pointsout,itwasassumedinancientChina“thatanyonetowhomthetextwastransmittedwouldreceiveinstructioninitsmeaningwhenhereceivedthetext.”Writingstillcarried the charge of the supernatural, of sacred knowledge. Only a warrior scholar could havecomposed this text,andonly thosewhowere initiatedcouldhave received it.The following listofbooksandsourcesisofferedfortoday’sreaderswhowouldliketogainadeepercomprehensionofTheArtofWarinthefullnessofhowitshouldbeunderstood.When SunTzu composed his treatise,warswere dictated by kings and run by elites. Theworld

over, theywere fought for territory or other gain. Educationwas predicated on knowledge of the“classics” that, West or East, focused in large part on a literature bound up in tales of war.Thoroughgoingtraininginstrategywaspartofapropereducation,anddabblinginmilitaryhistorywasacommonhobbyofmembersoftheupperclassesandinformedtheirrhetoricaloratory.The education of the upper classes continued to emphasize the classics andwar through the late

nineteenthcentury,whenourtranslator,LionelGiles,beganhissingularworkinEngland.Whilehelaboredtobridgethevastdifferencesinhistory,language,andcustomsbetweenhisreadersandSunTzu, Giles was in important respects working from a similar mind-set: He was well-read in theclassics of Greece and Rome, deeply trained in military history, and aware of the foibles ofcontemporarypoliticsandpolicies—nottomentionbeingagreatsinologistinhisownrightandthesonofanother.Buttoday,asarmchairwarriors,wemustsearchWesternandEasternsourcesforthereferencesthat

will bring Sun Tzu’s text tomeaningful life. This list of suggested sources, which ranges over anumberofdisciplines,includesworkswrittenbythefoundersofWesterncivilizedthoughtatthetimeSunTzuwascomposingTheArtofWarandworkswithinsightsintothelivesofthosewhofight.Thesection concludes with a list of Internet sources that lead through hyperlinks to a suite of relateddisciplines,andfilmsthatoffergraphicdepictionsof thecomplexitiesof theancientAsianwarriorethic.

Books

AsianStudiesdeBary,WilliamTheodore,Wing-tsitChan,andBurtonWatson,eds.SourcesofChineseTradition.Vol. 1 in the series Introduction to Oriental Civilizations. New York: Columbia University Press,1964.OneofthegreatresearchtoolsforstudentsofAsianaffairs.Hawkes, David. Ch’u Tz’u: The Songs of the South. Oxford: Clar-endon Press, 1959. BeautifultranslationsofsongsfromoneofthefiveConfucianclassics,TheBookofSongs.Kitagawa,JosephM.,ed.TheReligiousTraditionsofAsia.NewYork:Macmillan,1989.Payne,Robert.MaoTse-Tung.1950.NewYork:WeybrightandTalley,1969.Asuperlativebiography

andfountofunusual insights,historicalcomparisons,personalencounters,poetry,andresearchonthemilitarystrategiesofoneoftheseminalfiguresofthetwentiethcentury.MaousedhisknowledgeofTheArtofWar to fendoff the invading Japanese inWorldWar II and tobeatChiangKai-chek,another aficionado of Sun Tzu, in China’s civil war. Payne provides extraordinary sociologicalinsightintolifeinChinaandtheworkingsofmilitarystrategy.———.ARageforChina.NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1977.Reminiscencesofawitnesstosomeofthemostimportanteventsoftwentieth-centuryChinesehistory.———.TheWhitePony.NewYork:JohnDay,1947.SongsandpoetrythatwouldhavebeenheardbySunTzu.CalledCh’u songsandYüeh fuballads, theyare translatedbyPayneandsomeofChina’sbestmid-twentieth-centurypoetsandscholars.Waley,Arthur.TheBookofSongs.Boston,NewYork:HoughtonMifflin,1937.AlsoknownasTheBookofOdes.OneofthefiveClassicsofConfucius,translatedforthegeneralreader,andoneofthefirst—andperhaps themost accessible, afterPayne’sTheWhitePony—of all earlyChinese poetryworks in English. Like Lionel Giles, Waley was a great pioneer of translation from Chinese toEnglish.Watson,Burton.EarlyChineseLiterature. NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1962.A seminalworkofhistoryandcriticism;anessentialresearchtool.———,trans.CourtierandCommoner inAncientChina:Selections fromtheHistoryof theFormerHan by PanKu. NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1977. Pan Ku’s celebrated and influentialworkhasbeenamodelfordynastichistorysinceitsappearanceinthefirstcenturyA.D.Translatedbyalegendaryauthorwhosescholarshipisbreathtaking.———, trans.Records of the Grand Historian of China: Translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-maChi’en.2vols.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1961.ThegreathistoryofearlyChina;setsthestandardforallsubsequenthistoricalwritingintheEast.Filledwithfascinating,sometimesamusing,often horrifying, anecdotes of life, war, and mini-biographies, this book has been compared toPlutarch’sLives.

OtherTranslationsofTheArtofWarOfthescoresofversionsofTheArtofWar thathavebeenpublished in theUnitedStates since the1960s,aconsiderablenumberusethebookasajumping-offpointfortheirownpurposes—mainly,howtowin:inbusiness,film-making,martialarts,litigation.Herearesomeofthebettereditions.

Ames,RogerT.SunTzu:TheArtofWarfare.NewYork:Bal-lantineBooks,1993.ContainsboththeoriginalChinesetextandtheEnglishtranslation.AmeswasthefirsttopublishaversionbasedontheYinChüehShantext—ancientbamboostripsfoundinLinyi,China,in1972;providesafairamountofculturalandphilosophicalbackground.Clavell, James.The Art of War, by Sun Tzu. New York: Dela-corte Press, 1983. The Lionel GilesversionasemendedandrewrittenbyClavell.Cleary, Thomas. The Art of War. Boston: Shambhala, 1988. Cleary is a good translator, and hisintroductionsaresuperlative.

———.TheLostArtofWar.SanFrancisco:HarperSan-Francisco,1996.AlsoknownasTheArtofWarIIandSunTzuII—writtenbySunPin,saidtobeadescendantofSunTzu.DenmaTranslationGroup.SunTzu,TheArtofWar:ANewTranslation.Boston: Shambhala, 2001.The most recent and authoritative translation; includes valuable explanatory essays and acommentary. The translators used a version of the text known as the Yin Chüeh Shan, the oldestversioneverfound,datingfromc.140-118B.C.;itwascopiedontothinbamboostrips,preservedforcenturies,anddiscoveredin1972.Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War.With a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. NewYork:Oxford University Press, 1963. Griffith is an expert in the analysis of military matters who alsoprovidesananalysisofSunTzu’sinfluenceonMaoTse-tungandtheJapanesemilitary.LiddellHartisalsoabrilliantwriteronmilitaryaffairs.Sawyer,RalphD.,andMei-chünLeeSawyer.SunTzu:TheArtofWar.NewYork:BarnesandNoble,1994.ForreadersinterestedinChinesehistoryandmilitaryweaponry.Wing,R.L.TheArtofStrategy.NewYork:Doubleday,1988.TheArtofWarwithcommentary thatfocusesonthestrategicrealm;suggeststhatwarnotbewagedsavetopreserveone’sterritory.

WarandStrategyAmbrose, Stephen E. American Heritage New History of World War II. Revised and updated byStephenAmbrosebasedontheoriginaltextbyC.L.Sulzberger.NewYork:VikingPress,1997.Cairnes,WilliamE.,andDavidG.Chandler.TheMilitaryMaximsofNapoleon.NewYork:DaCapoPress, 1995.Chandler updates the editionofNapoleon’smaximsproduced in1901byCairnes andprovidesfurthercommentary.Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. 6 vols. London: Cassell, 1948-1954. An invaluableaccountbyBritain’swartimeprimeministerandanarchitectoftheAlliedvictory.Clough,A.H.,ed.Plutarch:LivesofNobleGreciansandRomans.TranslatedbyJohnDryden.NewYork:ModernLibrary,1992.Cook,HarukoTaya,andTheodoreF.Cook.JapanatWar:AnOralHistory.NewYork:NewPress,1992.Freedman,Lawrence,ed.War.OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1994.Aformidablecollectionofessaysbyrenownedscholars.Handel,MichaelI.MastersofWar:SunTzu,Clausewitz,andJomini.Portland,OR:FrankCass,1992.ComparesSunTzu’s approachwith that of two great nineteenth-centurymilitary thinkers.GeneralBaronAntoine-Henri de Jominiwas a French-Swiss commanderwho served underNapoleon andlater the czar; his approach to strategy focused on speed, agility, and an aggressive offense. VonClausewitz,thegreatPrussiantheorist,wasstrongondefense;hebelievedwarsarewonbyattrition,inducingtheenemyintomassiveaffairsinwhichthelastmanstandingwins.HandelsuggestsneitherstandsthetestoftimeasSunTzuhas.Hastings,Max.TheKoreanWar.NewYork:SimonandSchus-ter,1987.Machiavelli,Niccolò.TheArtofWar.1521.ArevisededitionoftheEllisFarneworthtranslation;withanintroductionbyNealWood.NewYork:DaCapoPress,1990.

———.ThePrince.1532.Translated,edited,andwithanintroductionbyDanielDonno.NewYork:BantamClassics,1984.Manyothergoodeditionsarealsoavailable.McClintock, Michael. Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, andCounter-terrorism,1940-1990.NewYork:PantheonBooks,1992.ExploresprinciplesofTheArtofWarthathaveintriguedU.S.guerrilla-warfarestrategistsforahalfcentury.Musashi,Miyamoto.ABookofFiveRings.Translated byVictorHarris.Woodstock,NY:OverlookPress,1992.Writtenin1645byarenownedswordsmanandwanderingsamurai(ronin),Japan’sgreatcontributiontostrategictheoryisrecommendedfor thosewhoseekmobilityinatightlystructuredhierarchy.Roberts,J.M.AShortHistoryoftheWorld.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993.Ropp,Theodore.WarintheModernWorld.Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,1959.Sawyer,Ralph, andMei-chunLee Sawyer.The SevenMilitaryClassics of AncientChina. Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1993.Tuchman,Barbara.TheGunsofAugust.1962.NewYork:Bal-lantineBooks,1994.OnWorldWarIanditsinception.Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. 1833. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976.

WebSitesTherearescoresofrelevantmilitarywebsitesontheInternet,andmanydedicatedsolelytoTheArtofWarandAsiastudies.

www.belisarius.com:Thissite’sprimaryfocusisbusiness,butittakesadecidedlymilitarystance.

www.d-n-i.net:ThisishometoDefenseandtheNationalInterest,abusinessandmilitaryinformationsite. It devotes considerable space to theworkof legendarypilot anddesignerColonel JohnBoyd(U.S.AirForce),whodevelopedthreeinfluential,mathematicallycoherentcombat theories:agility,maneuver warfare strategy, and the system referred to by the acronym OODA (observe, orient,decide,act)—allbasedonhisexperiencesasafighterpilotandhis intensestudyofTheArtofWarandotherclassicworksonmilitarystrategy.

www.dmoz.org/Arts/Literature/World_Literature/Chinese/Sun_Tzu : This is the locale for SunTzu at theOpenDirectory Project (ODP). It provides scores of hyperlinks towonderful websitesdedicatedtomilitaryhistory,Asianstudies,andliterature—allsuggestedbySunTzuandTheArtofWar.Avaluablesiteforothersubjectsaswell.

www.Sonshi.com:Thebestsitefornewlymintedaficionados.Withbookreviews,newsbulletins,and

a conversational tone, it is themost accessible and provides hyperlinks to someof the better sitesdedicatedtoSunTzuandEasternphilosophicalsystems.

www.VictoryOverWar.com: Formed by the Denma Translation Group—led by scholars KidderSmith,anauthorandprofessoratBowdoinCollege,andJamesGimian,publisherofShambhalaSun—thisbeautiful,thought-provokingsitebringstogetherimportantliterary,philosophical,andculturalcomponentstocreateasenseofSunTzu’slargerproject.Thesiteisfrequentlyupdated.

www.vikingphoenix.com/SunTzu:Dedicatedtomilitarybooksandsourcematerialsineverymode.

FilmsFilm,granteditsromanticismandlackofscholarlycachet,offersentrée,at least insimulacrum,totheworldSunTzuwantsustounderstand.Asworksofart,filmscanevokethetension,thefear,andthepractical factors thatplaguecombatants, suchas incomplete informationor supply lines, rottenweather,andgeneralchaos.Moreover,whenweareimmersedinthecleartonesofSunTzu’sprose,itisdifficulttorememberthepsychologicalatmosphere—theintrigues,thepride,andtheurgency—that press the decision to fight. Movies readily deliver this atmosphere and also offer valuableinsightsintootherculturesandothertimes.With the exception of the kung-fu genre, the studios of China and Taiwan have not produced

significantfilmsforinternationalaudiencesthatdepictthesagecommanderinbattleorinotherwaysinterpretthehistoryorpresenttheculturalbackdropofTheArtofWar.ButgiventheChinesenationalloveaffairwithhistory,art,andphilosophy,thiswilldoubtlesschange.Meanwhile,CrouchingTiger,HiddenDragon(2000),anAmericanproductiondirectedbyAngLeeandbasedonthenovelbyWangDuLu,isabrilliantexplorationbyaChinesedirectorofmanyoftheTaoistthemesinSunTzu.Atthetimeofthefilm’srelease,AngLeesaid,“MyteamandIchosethemostpopulistgenre, themartialartsfilmofHongKong,asaninstrument,awaytoinvestigatetheculturalinheritanceofChina. . .andthepassingonofthatTaoisttraditionfromgenerationtogeneration.”Hesucceeded.CrouchingTigeralsoillustratestheimplicitconceptsofhonoranddutyassetforthinTheArtofWar.JackieChan,directorandstarofcountlessrollickingkung-fuactionmovies,isanotherdevoteeof

SunTzuandTheArtofWar.Thoughhehasnotyetfixedthetitle,ChanisproducingafilmbasedonSunTzutodebutin2004.Japanesecinemaisespeciallyrich inhistoricaldramaswithmilitary themes.Thesefilmsexplore

not just the weaponry and the approach to battle, but also the human sensibility that doubtlessprompted Sun Tzu to compose his treatise. This is no surprise:WhenChinese culture traveled toJapan,TheArt ofWar quickly became a treasured text—somuch so that the aristocracy trained inkendo(thewayofthesword)andChineseclassicsrightuptoWorldWarII.AndSunTzuremainedeverygeneral’sbible.Moreover,theJapanesesufferedthroughtheirown“warringstates”era,a400-yearperiodof interminablecivilwarsandunimaginablebrutalityamongprovincial lords,warriormonks,andbrigands,allfightingforlandandpower.Thiseraendedwiththefoundingoftheformofgovernment known as Tokugawa Shogunate in the early seventeenth century, but it has providedauthors and filmmakers with endless fodder for historical dramas and penetrating psychological

explorations.AkiraKurosawa,thegreatgeniusoftwentieth-centuryJapanesecinema,lovedtoexplorehistorico-

literary subjects, but his greatestworks are popular tales of a commonman caught in the jaws ofhistory.TheyreflectTaoistprinciplesandthecodesofchivalryunderlyingthedecisiontofightandare imbued with the ancient Japanese understanding of Sun Tzu a millennium after Sun Tzucomposedhis treatise. InSevenSamurai (1954), itinerantwarriors (samurai) are hired to rescue atownbesetbybanditwarlords.Thefightscenes,theissuesofclass,andthefinalfutilityofviolencemake this a startling andmovingwork.The samurai,who in this instance personify theweak andsmallpittedagainstthewell-equippedandstrong,usebattletechniquesasexplicatedbySunTzu.Kurosawa’sKagemusha(1980)issetduringaperiodofterribleinterstatewarsandconsolidation,

whenakingdiesandisreplacedbyacommonthiefwhocouldbehistwin.ThoughtheactiontakesplacelongafterthetimeofTheArtofWar,thefilmgivesthesenseofhierarchiesandthelayingoutofplansbeforebattlemuchasSunTzudescribedthem.InSanshiroSugata (1945),anundisciplinedyoungman becomes amartial arts expert and falls in love, providing viewers with a look at theprinciplesofSunTzuonthepersonallevel.Finally,Yojimbo(1961)tellsthestoryofahighlyskilledsamuraiwhofindshimselfinatowndividedbetweenrivalgangstersandwhosucceedsinbringingpeacebyadheringtotheprinciplesofSunTzu.

1EditedfromtheoriginalPrefacetothe1910Luzac&Co.edition.