Spotlight South Asia

Paper Nr. 4/ 2012:

The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives

Author: Djan Sauerborn (Heidelberg)

ISSN 2195-2787

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SSA ist eine regelmäßig erscheinende Analyse-Reihe mit einem Fokus auf aktuelle politische Ereignisse und Situationen Südasien betreffend. Die Reihe soll Einblicke schaffen, Situationen erklären und Politikempfehlungen geben.

SSA is a frequently published analysis series with a focus on current political events and situations concerning South Asia. The series should present insights, explain situations and give policy recommendations.

APSA (Angewandte Politikwissenschaft Südasiens) ist ein auf Forschungsförderung und wissenschaftliche Beratung ausgelegter Stiftungsfonds im Bereich der Politikwissenschaft Südasiens.

APSA (Applied Political Science of South Asia) is a foundation aiming at promoting science and scientific consultancy in the realm of political science of South Asia.

Die Meinungen in dieser Ausgabe sind einzig die der Autoren und werden sich nicht von APSA zu eigen gemacht.

The views expressed in this paper are solely the views of the authors and are not in any way owned by APSA.

Impressum:APSA

Im Neuehnheimer Feld 330D-69120 Heidelbergcontact@apsa.info

www.apsa.info

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Acknowledgment:The author is grateful to the South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels

for the extended support on this report.

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The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives

The Republic of Maldives, located in the Indian Ocean southwest of Sri Lanka consists of

about 1200 coral islets (only 200 are populated) and is spread across an area of 90,000 sq

km. With about 394,500 inhabitants, the Maldives have the smallest population in Asia of

which more than a quarter live in the capital Malé. The first settlers who were

predominantly Buddhist seafarers from southern India and Sri Lanka populated the

Maldives in the 5th century B.C. In addition cultural infusion from the Arab Peninsula and

East Africa influenced the highly dispersed group of Islands. In 1200 AD the last Buddhist

king converted to Islam. Sunni Islam is the state law of the Maldives and only Muslims can

obtain citizenship, the practice of other forms of faith is punishable by law. Dhivehi, which is

a derivate of Sinhala, is the main language of the Maldives; due to its open market

economy and tourism English is also commonly spoken and referred to as the second

main language.

In October 2009 the relatively unknown archipelago made the headlines worldwide for

being the first country to hold a cabinet meeting under water. The purpose for this unusual

endeavor was to create awareness for the Maldives’ struggle with climate change. The

cabinet met sub aqua to sign a declaration which was to be forwarded to the U.N. climate

change summit in Copenhagen, demanding large cuts in carbon emissions. A reporter

approaching the then President Nasheed asking him what consequences the disapproval

of the declaration would have, received a grim answer: “if that happens, we are all going to

die”. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sea levels will

rise between 18-59 cm until 2100. Nasheed promised his fellow Maldivians that they

would not “end up in refugee camps if the worst happens”. The Maldivian government has

made it one of its core tasks to seek for lands the country could acquire if forced to

evacuate their country. Sri Lanka and India are high on the list due to similar culture and

climate.

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Sociopolitical Turmoil & Radicalization

Sadly sea levels are not the only thing on the rise. Sociopolitical conflict and turmoil have

also reached the shores of the country many describe as the paradise on earth. Two main

events have influenced the Maldives negatively this year: The rise of Islamic

fundamentalism and the “coup d’état”. The former reached its pivotal point when in January

of 2012 the government ordered the shutdown of all spas and health centers operated by

resorts on the islands. The conservative Adhaalath Party justified its “call for closure” by

accusing these recreational retreats of promoting prostitution. Many protesters went a step

further and demanded a complete ban on selling alcohol as well as direct flights to Israel. If

the government had not nullified the proposals put forward the negative impact on tourism,

the strongest pillar of the Maldivian economy, would have surely been insurmountable. This

is nevertheless a troubling warning signal for this young republic which has traditionally

been known for its liberal, open and tolerant interpretation of Islam. Some officials state

that this initiative by conservative forces was only the tip of a much larger iceberg, pointing

to the increasing support within the archipelago state for the Taliban in Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Many liberals in the Maldives discount this notion as a severe form of hysteria.

But there have been incidents in the past that shine light on the hull of this alleged iceberg.

In 2002, Ibrahim Fauzee, a Maldivian citizen was deported to Guantanamo Bay by the US

for having ties to the Al Qaeda. One year later posters praising Osama bin Laden popped

up on the walls of a school. In 2007 tourists were injured in an explosion in the Sultan’s

Park in Male. On February 7th, the same day former President Nasheed was allegedly

ousted, half a dozen of men stormed the National Museum of the Maldives and destroyed

several Buddhist statues, some were so damaged beyond repair. According to the men

who attacked this cultural heritage these works of art were idols and therefore illegal under

Islamic and National Law. In an interview Ali Waheed, the director of the museum, which

was built by the Chinese confirmed that the entire collection on pre-Islamic history was

gone. The question if these occurrences are enough to justify speaking of a radical Islamic

threat to the Maldives is hard to answer, but authorities should stay alert and not belittle

these events. In a country in which approximately 5% of the population are addicted to

narcotics (Mohammed Shoaib, member of Journey, an NGO aimed at helping addicts said

it was “easier to buy heroin than pizza in Malé) and with gang violence on the rise, the

lack of perspective is creating a dangerous void which has to be filled with job

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opportunities, anti-drug programs and further education so that radical fundamentalism

does not gain the upper hand.

A Quasi-Coup?

The murder of Afrashim Ali, a lawmaker for the Progressive Party of the Maldives and

supporter of former President Nasheed on October the 2nd marked another low point in

the power struggle of the Maldives. On February 7th 2012, President Nasheed was (in his

words) forced to step down from office. Analysts, politicians and the media differ on the

question of legitimacy of this power transition. Some view it as the act of an aggressive

junta that removed a democratically elected President in a military coup others such as

India and the US have called the new government “legitimate”, since Nasheed, by coercion

or not, resigned and a successor Mohammed Waheed Hassan was sworn in. The arrest of

chief Justice Abdulla Mohamed on the orders of Nasheed for acting biased towards certain

criminals triggered protests amongst the population and can be seen as the tipping point of

Nasheed’s reign.

A national inquiry commissioned by the Commonwealth of Nations came to the conclusion

that the power transition was “legal and constitutional” and Nasheed’s resignation was

“voluntary”. The rationale behind the swift endorsement of this inquiry by several nations

indicates a strong sense of realpolitik. Nasheed skipped his trial on October the 1st and

continues on campaigning for the elections in 2013. Voices however are being raised that

the three judges presiding over the case have been hand-picked in violation of the legal

framework. In addition it seems questionably how the Inquiry can state that power

transition was “legal” but at the same time recognize a police mutiny that occurred

simultaneously as well as “serious problems” with the rule of law. Naushad Waheed, the

brother of President Waheed is amongst the skeptics. In a BBC interview he distanced

himself from his brother pointing to” human rights abuses against the opposition” as well as

an “immoral and illegal seizure of power”. Many fear that with Waheed the Island state will

experience a democratic downward spiral; some go even further and say Waheed is a just

the extended arm of Gayoom, who ruled the country for 30 years with an authoritarian iron

fist. Adding ex-Gayoom loyalists to his cabinet such as Dhunya Maumoon the daughter of

Gayoom as a state minister for foreign affairs, will not help Waheed silence his critics.

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The question remains if the legal nature of this case also leads to legitimacy. It comes as

no surprise that many analysts speak of a “quasi-coup d’état”. Concluding one can state

that although the Maldives have been successful in reaching almost all Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) as well as being removed from the list of Least Developed

Countries (LDCs) internal as well as external actors need to put this young democracy on

the right track again before it regresses back to autocratic patterns or in the words of the

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, “without

a consensus on how to proceed the country will be unable to deal with the political,

economic and environmental challenges which will determine its future.” There is an old

Maldivian proverb, Furifá huri badiyale(r) gudu gude(r) nagáre (roughly translated from

Divehi: “The water pot that is full will not shake”) which describes the stability and

confidence of a person or society which is in control of her life. One can only hope that the

implications of this proverb, especially the aspect of stability regarding institutions, elites,

the rule of law and civil society are endorsed in the future by this young and troubled

democracy.

The shift in power as well as the subsequent turmoil did not pass unnoticed in Beijing and

New Delhi. Both import dependent nations rely on good relations with Malé and thus have

a geo-strategic interest in influencing the smallest South Asian State, which Hasan A.

Hilmy has named the “Diamond of the Indian Ocean”.

China-Maldives Relations: Building a dragon's den in India's backyard?

India is wary of growing Chinese Influence. Some naval officers and intelligence analysts

even go so far as to accuse China of schmoozing the Maldives with soft power tools in

order to add another pearl to the so often mentioned “Sino encirclement”, better known as

the “string of pearls”. Former President Nasheed did not exclude China from his foreign

policy agenda but nevertheless maintained closer relations with New Delhi which he often

called a “natural ally” in the Indian Ocean. He went even further in stating that there was no

room for “nontraditional friends” in the proximity of the Maldives. Furthermore Nasheed

was never shy to point out that India was a far more reliable partner than China. This

rhetoric also fell in line with Nasheed's pro-Western stance. The reality on the ground

however, has changed after the coup in February. In contrast to Nasheed, Waheed's

speech at the opening ceremony of the 2nd China-Eurasia Expo, and the second China-

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Eurasia Economic Development and Cooperation Forum on September the 5th sounded

more like an endorsement of China than a rejection. He described China as “our example

of a good international leader and citizen” and labeled China as an “invaluable friend” to

which the Maldives has a “traditional bond”. Increasing Chinese activities in the past

months have shown that this shift is not merely rhetorical in nature. “Island hoppers” from

China are the number 1 foreign tourists in the Maldives today. In addition on August 31st

China agreed to lend $500 million dollars to the Archipelago State. The Maldivian

government plans on investing $150 million dollars into infrastructural programs. The

current President Mohamed Waheed did not comment on plans for the rest of the $350

million dollars. But change is not only occurring on an economic level. In September 2012

China was granted land to construct a 3,920 square feet fully fledged embassy in the heart

of Malé and only a stone's throw away from the Indian High Commission. This made China

the only non-South Asian Country to establish an embassy on the Maldives. Maldives

Foreign Minister Abdul Samad Abdullah was quick in his attempt to silence alarms bells in

New Delhi, reassuring India's political elite, that a growing Chinese presence should not be

equated with deteriorating Indian influence. He added that the Maldives were “too small” to

play a role in the power game between the two most populated countries in the world. It

would not however be the first time that a pawn had a major impact in a game of geo-

political chess. In 1977 for example, The Soviet Union attempted to rent the Maldivian

Island of Gan for 1$ million annually and use it as a refueling and maintenance station, but

was eventually turned down. Most analysts believe that Moscow wanted to gain a foothold

in the Indian Ocean in order to be able to counter activities from the US base Diego Garcia.

Even though the first comprehensive security agreement between India and the Maldives

was signed in 1974 and joint military exercises between both nations have been

undertaken over the course of the past 20 years, many Indian security analysts and policy

makers are afraid that the Chinese might add the Maldives as yet another token to their

string of pearls. In 2000 rumors surfaced, that the Chinese were in the midst of establishing

a naval base on the Island of Maroa which was supposed to be operational by 2010. In

2002 the project allegedly was temporarily put on ice and reanimated in 2004. Chinese as

well as Maldivian officials have been reluctant to provide the public with further relevant

information. Both sides have stated that the purpose of the deep sea surveys conducted

was merely for gathering data relevant for environmental protection. The information

regarding Maroa is sketchy and most sources providing the so-called “truth” are rather

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dubious. The analytical increment value is not very high and until credible sources

generate reliable intelligence, conclusions should be left to conspiracy theorists.

It is not quite clear what to make of the rigorously mentioned but insufficiently analyzed

string of pearls concept which was coined by the American consultancy firm Booz Allen in

2004 to describe China’s energy supply strategy. Some see the establishment of Chinese

bases and naval ports in the Indian Ocean and beyond (Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives,

Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia and Pakistan) as nothing really worth raising

eyebrows, since it is deemed as a normal step by a resourceful and powerful nation, which

will not really change the power dynamics within the region. China obviously seconds this

notion and adds that these bases are necessary to secure the livelihood of energy imports

through critical sea lanes, straits and choke points and if anything rather support India,

which also relies heavily on energy imports; both countries export and import huge trade

volumes through the Maldivian territory. It should not come as a surprise that New Delhi

has a quite difference stance. It interprets this nautical encirclement as a key element of

Chinese ambitions to reduce Indian influence in the region. This perspective is also shared

by the United States, which is well aware that its pivot to Asia relies heavily on India's

commitment to upgrade its Navy. It is neither in the interest of the Indian Navy, which is

keen on finally receiving the attention and financial assets usually reserved for the Army

and Air force nor is it in the interest of the Obama administration to abandon the idea of

hostile, Chinese encirclement. Although several naval security analysts and observers

have stated over and over again, that it would be neither feasible nor sustainable for China

to establish a nuclear submarine base in Maroa, the hawks in New Delhi remain

unconvinced.

India's “hard power” reaction: Buffing up security cooperation & security dependency

It seems that India's answer to China's open soft power strategy towards the Maldives is to

invest in more hard power capabilities. Instead of engaging in a battle of nutrition regarding

direct investment and trade with China, India has chosen to bet on the horse it already

knows: The security sector. The Indian government might even go further and terminate

the 25$ million foreign aid all together. Tensions between the Maldivian government and

the Indian minister for foreign affairs Salman Khurshid have risen during November due to

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the decision of the former to cancel a 511$ million contract issued to GMR, a Bangalore-

based infrastructural company, in 2010 to upgrade and operate Ibrahim Nasir International

Airport. New Delhi is quite aware that contesting China economically, a competitor which

has the backing of President Waheed, at a time where a comeback of pro-Indian Nasheed

is very unlikely is not a promising or viable option. Increasing capabilities in a sector which

it has influenced and shaped over the past decades seems to be New Delhi's answer to its

fear of losing its grip on the Maldives. Over the past years India has shaped the agenda of

the Maldivian Armed Forces, provided them with military equipment and has helped train

their troops, thus initiating integration into India's security grid. 24 of the 26 Maldivian atolls

have coastal radars set up by the Indian Navy. Furthermore the radar chains of the entire

coastal line have been integrated into a central control room within India's Coastal

Command. In 2006 the Indian Navy donated a Trinkat Class Fast Attack Craft to the

Maldives National Defense Force's Coast Guard. Memories of Indian paratroopers landing

on the archipelago state in 1988 in an successful attempt (Operation Cactus) to liberate

Malé from armed mercenaries of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Ealam who

were paid by a Maldivian named Abdullah Luthufi are still well alive amongst the Maldivian

military brass.

Following this strategic rationale it should not come as a complete surprise that the first

high profile Indian official to visit the Maldives after power transition was defence Minister A

K Antony. The three day visit in September turned out to be more than the usual

handshaking and saluting. Antony was accompanied by a high profile delegation which

included defence secretary Shashi Kant Sharma, Chief of Western Naval Command, Vice

Admiral Shekhar Sinha, Lt. Gen SP Tanwar and Director General Armed Forces Medical

Services Air Marshal DP Joshi. At the invitation of Maldivian defence minister Col

Mohamed Nazim Anthony inaugurated a military hospital and attended the stone laying

ceremony of the training academy of the Maldivial National Defence Forces. More

importantly, the Indian government has decided to deploy a permanent defence attaché in

Malé and has extended the stationing of its Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv, which

has recently been upgraded with night flying capabilities. In addition New Delhi will be

sending a team of flight instructors to train the Maldives Air Force. Furthermore, the Indian

Navy has decided to continue with its monthly surveillance activities of the Maldives’

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which intends to contain piracy and illegal activities close

to Maldivian territory.

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Treading uncertain waters:

The fragile Maldivian government seems to playing a risky balancing act. On the one hand

inviting China to invest heavily in its infrastructure and economic development and on the

other hand strengthening security ties with India. For now both Asian giants seem to be

eager to deepen their influence through their current modus operandi. The question

remains if this strategy of gaining “the best of both worlds” will be accepted by China and

India in the long run and if this strategy will have time develop. The current government

seems prepared to take the gamble. Just two months after Antony visited the Maldives in

September to boost defence cooperation, the Maldivian Minister of Defence and National

Security, Colonel (Retired) Mohamed Nazim met with the Chinese Minister of National

Defence, General Liang Guanglie and members of the Chinese central military commission

on December 10, 2012 to discuss strengthening Sino-Maldivian security ties. This

unsurprisingly created an uproar amongst Indian policy makers and military personnel.

As in almost all cases domestic politics determines foreign policy and if the future of

domestic politics is highly volatile and uncertainty rather than clarity is the starting point of

analysis, identifying foreign policy shifts seems rather difficult and should always be

interpreted as a possible model and not as something which is “written in stone”.

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Kumar, A. 2012. Chinese Engagement with the Maldives: Impact on Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region, Strategic Analysis (IDSA), vol. 36, no. 2.

Mitra, S.K; Wolf, S.O; Schöttli, J. 2006. A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia: An Essential Guide to the Politics and Economics of South Asia, Routledge,London.

Samaranayake,N. 2012. Maldives: Why the US and India should remain calm, Pacific Forum CSIS (PacNet), no.13.

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