The Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption

Review

Law Business Research

Fifth Edition

Editor

Mark F Mendelsohn

The Anti-Bribery and

Anti-Corruption

Review

Fifth Edition

EditorMark F Mendelsohn

Law Business Research Ltd

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The publisher acknowledges and thanks the following law firms for their learned assistance throughout the preparation of this book:

ALLEN & OVERY LLP

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DECHERT

FERRERE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

Editor’s Preface ..................................................................................................viiMark F Mendelsohn

Chapter 1 AUSTRALIA .............................................................................. 1Robert R Wyld and Jasmine Forde

Chapter 2 BRAZIL ................................................................................... 29Ricardo Pagliari Levy and Sofia Preto Villa Real

Chapter 3 CHINA .................................................................................... 41Kareena Teh, Fabian Roday and Lear Liu

Chapter 4 ECUADOR ............................................................................. 53Ernesto Velasco

Chapter 5 ENGLAND & WALES ........................................................... 67Shaul Brazil and John Binns

Chapter 6 FRANCE ................................................................................. 79Antonin Lévy

Chapter 7 GERMANY ............................................................................. 91Sabine Stetter

Chapter 8 GREECE ............................................................................... 101Ilias G Anagnostopoulos and Jerina (Gerasimoula) Zapanti

Chapter 9 HONG KONG ..................................................................... 110Kareena Teh and Fabian Roday

CONTENTS

iv

Contents

Chapter 10 INDIA ................................................................................... 123Aditya Vikram Bhat and Shwetank Ginodia

Chapter 11 ITALY .................................................................................... 136Roberto Pisano

Chapter 12 JAPAN ................................................................................... 149Kana Manabe, Hideaki Roy Umetsu and Shiho Ono

Chapter 13 LUXEMBOURG ................................................................... 160Anne Morel

Chapter 14 MALAYSIA ............................................................................ 169Rosli Dahlan and Muhammad Faizal Faiz Mohd Hasani

Chapter 15 MEXICO ............................................................................... 183Oliver J Armas, Luis Enrique Graham and Thomas N Pieper

Chapter 16 NETHERLANDS ................................................................. 196Neyah van der Aa and Jaantje Kramer

Chapter 17 POLAND .............................................................................. 209Tomasz Konopka

Chapter 18 PORTUGAL .......................................................................... 221Sofia Ribeiro Branco and Joana Bernardo

Chapter 19 RUSSIA .................................................................................. 231Vladimir Melnikov and Sergei Eremin

Chapter 20 SWITZERLAND .................................................................. 243Yves Klein

Chapter 21 TURKEY ............................................................................... 258Pınar Bülent, Begüm Biçer İlikay and Gözde Kabadayı

v

Contents

Chapter 22 UNITED STATES ................................................................ 268Mark F Mendelsohn

Appendix 1 ABOUT THE AUTHORS .................................................... 295

Appendix 2 CONTRIBUTING LAW FIRMS’ CONTACT DETAILS .. 309

vii

EDITOR’S PREFACE

This fifth edition of The Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Review presents the views and observations of leading anti-corruption practitioners in jurisdictions spanning every region of the globe. The worldwide scope of this volume reflects the reality that anti-corruption enforcement has become an increasingly global endeavour.

Over the past year, the foreign bribery landscape has continued to grow increasingly complicated for multinational companies, particularly in light of the sweeping fallout from multiple high-profile corruption scandals. In Brazil, Operation Car Wash, the investigation that uncovered a sprawling embezzlement ring at state-owned oil company Petróleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras), has ensnared politicians at the highest levels of the Brazilian government as well as numerous companies that engaged with Petrobras around the world. In March 2016, Brazilian authorities raided the home of former President Lula de Silva and detained him for questioning. Lula and his wife were subsequently indicted by Brazilian prosecutors on money laundering charges in September 2016. The Brazilian crackdown on corruption shows no signs of abating, and has expanded to include investigations related to Eletrobras, Brazil’s state-owned utility.

In Malaysia, the misappropriation of more than US$3.5 billion in funds by senior government officials from state-owned strategic development company 1Malyasia Development Berhad (1MBD) has sparked worldwide investigations and asset tracing and recovery exercises. Authorities in several countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia have all launched probes into lenders and banks with ties to 1MDB. In July 2016, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) filed civil forfeiture complaints seeking the forfeiture and recovery of more than US$1 billion in assets associated with the laundering of misappropriated funds from 1MBD, the largest forfeiture action ever brought under the DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative.

Global efforts to combat corruption were further impacted by the massive leak in April 2016 of more than 11 million documents connected to Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca, dubbed the Panama Papers. Dating back over four decades, the Panama Papers revealed that, among other things, the law firm appears to have helped establish at least 214,000 secret shell companies and offshore accounts in known tax havens to shelter and hide the wealth of clients that included approximately 300,000 corporate entities, 12 current

Editor’s Preface

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and former world leaders, and at least 128 other public officials. While international law enforcement agencies have only begun to assess the contents and significance of the leaked documents, it is clear that prosecutors are looking to the Panama Papers as a  road map for uncovering foreign bribery, among other offences, and furthering international corruption investigations.

In the United States, enforcement authorities continue to vigorously enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), with the past year’s cases showing a  significant increase in the number of enforcement actions from 2015. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alone brought more FCPA enforcement actions within the first six months of 2016 than in any year since 2011. The investigation and enforcement focus has cut across a range of industries, including pharmaceutical and medical device companies, airlines, financial services and the telecommunications sector. While these cases continue to cover many regions, business activity in China has remained a major FCPA enforcement priority. As this edition of The Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Review goes to print, 15 corporate enforcement actions have implicated multinationals’ China operations, representing over half of all FCPA actions brought in 2016 to date.

Importantly, the past year’s FCPA cases have demonstrated that the DOJ and SEC will continue to actively and aggressively pursue large-scale corporate bribery cases. In February 2016, the DOJ and SEC, together with the Public Prosecution Service of the Netherlands, entered into a US$795 million global settlement with the world’s sixth-largest telecommunications company, Amsterdam-based VimpelCom Limited, a  foreign issuer of publicly traded securities in the United States, and its wholly owned Uzbek subsidiary, Unitel LLC. The settlement, which resolved allegations that VimpelCom and Unitel violated the FCPA and certain Dutch laws by funnelling over US$114 million in bribe payments to a shell company beneficially owned by a  government official in Uzbekistan, represents the second-largest global FCPA resolution to date and the sixth-largest in terms of penalty payments made to US regulators. The VimpelCom settlement was the culmination of significant collaboration between US regulators and international law enforcement agencies, with the DOJ proclaiming it ‘one of the most significant coordinated international and multi-agency resolutions in the history of the FCPA’. In September 2016, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group agreed to pay the DOJ and SEC US$412 million for FCPA violations stemming from the hedge fund’s use of third-party intermediaries, agents and business partners to pay bribes to senior government officials in Africa. The settlement represents the fourth-largest FCPA enforcement action to date.

Though not uncontroversial, self-reporting and cooperation by companies has continued to be a theme in the United States. In April 2016, the DOJ launched a one-year pilot programme to provide greater transparency on how business organisations can obtain full mitigation credit in connection with FCPA prosecutions through voluntary self-disclosures, cooperation with DOJ investigations and remediation of internal controls and compliance programmes. The DOJ memorandum announcing the initiative makes clear that any mitigation credit offered through the Pilot Program is separate from, and in addition to, any mitigation credit already available under the US Sentencing Guidelines. The DOJ further emphasised that voluntary self-reporting is the central aim of the Pilot Program, and is therefore an essential requirement for receiving maximum mitigation credit. Whether companies participating in the programme truly benefit, and whether the promise of greater transparency is realised, remains to be seen.

Editor’s Preface

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I wish to thank all of the contributors for their support in producing this volume. I appreciate that they have taken time from their practices to prepare chapters that will assist practitioners and their clients in navigating the corruption minefield that exists when conducting foreign and transnational business.

Mark F MendelsohnPaul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLPWashington, DCNovember 2016

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Chapter 13

LUXEMBOURG

Anne Morel 1

I INTRODUCTION

According to the latest Corruption Perceptions Index (of the NGO Transparency International),2 Luxembourg ranks among the 10 least corrupt countries in the world, out of a total of 175 countries and territories. Despite the low level of corruption perceived in the public sector, it is by no means insignificant, and appears especially in conflicts of interests between the private and the public sector and in the real estate sector.

To prevent and combat corruption, soft law instruments were developed to supply the judges and members of the government with an ethical framework. Moreover, codes of conduct and whistle-blower systems have been established in several sectors by private companies. However, a code of ethics is still lacking for elected officials.3

The legal framework on anti-bribery and anti-corruption has notably improved since 2001 and is strongly implemented.4 On 15 January 2001, Luxembourg approved the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention of 21 November 1997 on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, introducing a  number of important articles into the Luxembourg Penal Code. In 2007, an inter-ministerial committee, the Corruption Prevention Committee, was established to coordinate the fight against corruption, highlight future challenges and raise awareness with regard to the sectors that are most targeted through publications and seminars. The Law of 13 February 2011 strengthened the efforts to combat corruption as it implemented the recommendations put forward in the evaluation by the OECD and

1 Anne Morel is a partner at Bonn Steichen & Partners.2 Available at www.transparency.org.3 European Commission, ‘Annex Luxembourg to the EU Anti-Corruption Report,

Brussels 3.2.2014: COM(2014) 38 final, Annex 16’, p. 2.4 GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, ‘Luxembourg Corruption Report’, available at

www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/luxembourg.

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the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption. This was also a turning point because the same Law introduced legal provisions on whistle-blowing in the Labour Code and in the law on public service. The new legal provisions prohibit bribery of a person in the public sector and of law enforcement officials, and grant protection to employees or public agents who alert their superiors or competent authorities to the existence of corruption or abuse of influence.

II DOMESTIC BRIBERY: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In domestic law, the distinction has to be made between active and passive bribery. It is considered active when a party instigates the bribe and passive when the bribe is received by a party.

The offence includes not only (1) the corruption of persons holding public authority or public officials or agents entrusted with an elective public mandate (i.e., politically exposed persons (PEPs))5 or with a public service mission, including from another state, EU officials and in general the staff of the institutions of the EU and international organisations6 and magistrates, but also (2) the corruption of individuals who manage or work for a private sector entity.

A bribe is defined as an offer, promise, donation, gift or advantage given or received, directly or indirectly, for the person offering or receiving the bribe or for a third party.

Active bribery is foreseen by Article  247 of the Penal Code. Under this article, imprisonment for five to 10 years and a fine of €500 to €187,500 shall apply to any person unlawfully proposing or giving a bribe to a person holding public authority, or carrying out a public service mission, or to a person holding a public electoral mandate.

The objective of active bribery is to force a person to:a carry out or abstain from carrying out an act relating to his or her office, duty, or

mandate, or facilitated by his or her office, duty or mandate; andb abuse his or her real or alleged influence with a view to obtaining from any public

body or administration any distinction, employment, contract or any other favourable decision.

A person is considered to have committed passive bribery if it can be proved that he or she carried out the above.

Article 310-1 of the Penal Code also provides that active bribery is committed if the target of the bribe is a director or manager of a legal entity, or who is acting as a proxyholder or agent for a  legal entity or natural person, whose actions are carried out without the

5 PEPs are defined as natural persons who occupy or hold prominent public positions, and direct family members or persons closely associated with them. PEPs must in principle be subject to enhanced due diligence, notably because they may, where appropriate, be targets for acts of corruption, such as an infringement consisting of behaviour by which offers, promises, gifts or presents are requested, received, proposed or given for the purpose of performing or refraining from performing an act, obtaining particular favours or benefits or exercising undue influence to get jobs, contracts or other favourable decisions.

6 See Section IV, infra, on foreign bribery.

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knowledge and the authorisation of the board of directors or managers, the shareholders, the principal or the employer. The same applies under Article 310 for passive bribery, when the director or manager, etc., solicits or accepts the bribe.

Passive bribery is foreseen by Article 246 of the Penal Code. Under this article, the unlawful solicitation or receiving of a bribe when made by a person holding public authority or carrying out a public service mission, or by a person holding a public electoral mandate, is punishable by imprisonment for five to 10 years and a fine of €500 to €187,500.

The offence of bribery applies whenever the following persons are involved:a any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office, whether appointed

or elected;b any person, agent or representative of public authority in charge of a public service

mission or holding a public elective mandate for Luxembourg;c any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public

agency or public enterprise;d community officials and members of the European Commission, the European

Parliament, the Court of Justice of the EU and the Court of Auditors of the EU;e any official, agent or member of a public international organisation; andf a company or organisation’s managing bodies.

Related offences, such as trading in influence, are punishable if the aim is to persuade a person to use his or her influence to obtain a favour from a public authority or an administration, without any distinction as to the occupation or the title of the person to be influenced, or if this intended result was achieved and if an intermediary was used.

The duties of a government official or a  foreign public official are classified as any functions or powers that are conferred on the official, or that the official considers himself or herself to have.

Under Article 248 of the Penal Code, any person who unlawfully solicits or receives a  bribe, to abuse his or her real or alleged influence with a  view to obtaining from any public body or administration any distinction, employment, contract or any other favourable decision, shall be punished by imprisonment for six months to five years and a fine of €500 to €125,000. The same provisions shall apply to persons proposing or giving a bribe.

Under Article 249 of the Penal Code, any person holding public authority or carrying out a public service mission, or any person holding a public electoral mandate, who unlawfully solicits or receives a bribe from a person who benefits from the improper act, will be punished by imprisonment for five to 10 years and a fine of €500 to €187,500. The same provisions shall apply to persons proposing or giving the bribe.

Under Article 250 of the Penal Code, any judge, arbitrator or expert, or any other person sitting in judicial matters appointed either by a court or by the parties, who unlawfully requests or receives the bribe and accepts the offer or promise to carry out or to abstain from carrying out an act related to his or her duty, will be punished by imprisonment for 10 to 15 years and a fine of €2,500 to €250,000. The same provisions apply to persons proposing or granting the bribe.

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III ENFORCEMENT: DOMESTIC BRIBERY

i Conditions for enforcement and additional penalties

The constitutive elements for offences related to corruption are:a active or passive behaviour aimed at influencing an official;b the intention of the person committing the act to misuse his or her influence;c the role of the person (any agent or representative of public authority, in charge of

a  public service mission, or holding a public elective mandate, any foreign public official, as well as any person (including a legal person) who proposes or grants the promises, gifts or presents) as an element of the infringement; and

d an improper advantage to be obtained for oneself or another party, whether or not the intended result is achieved and whether or not an intermediary is used.

The willingness to corrupt or to be corrupted is the pyschological element of the offence. It shall be demonstrated that there was a link between the advantage required or offered and the action expected from the receiver of the bribe.

The solicitation, or acceptance, of an advantage (passive bribery) or the offering of an advantage (active bribery) and the aim of the solicitation or offering (i.e., to carry out or abstain from carrying out an action or the abuse of influence) are the material elements of the offence. Whether the advantage has been effectively obtained is irrelevant.

Bribery implies the existence of an illegal agreement between two persons. Such an agreement shall be concluded prior to the action or abstention from action.

Under Article  253 of the Penal Code, various additional penalties, particularly ineligibility, can be applied in corruption cases even with regard to lesser offences and circumstances in which recategorisation of the offence occurred.

ii Legal entities

Legal entities are criminally liable for the offences committed on their account by their corporate bodies (managers, directors, shareholders, statutory auditors or the de facto managers acting in the name and in the interest of the legal entity). The criminal liability of legal persons extends to any natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices to the same act.

Legal persons that have committed a  misdemeanour or an offence, including extortion, bribery, trading influence and corruption offences, may be subject to one or more of the following penalties, in addition to the compensation of damages to the person who has suffered because of the fraudulent act:a a fine, in the conditions and modalities provided for in Article 36 of the Penal Code;b specific confiscation;c disqualification from public tenders; ord dissolution, in the conditions and modalities provided for by Article  38 of the

Luxembourg Penal Code.

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In addition to these penalties, the judge may order the following measures, if there are sufficient elements evidencing the criminal liability of a legal entity:a the suspension of proceedings entailing the liquidation or the dissolution of the legal

entity (including a merger);b the prohibition of any specific asset transaction that could lead to its insolvency; orc a request for the deposit of a warrant.

The maximum amount of the fine applicable to legal persons having committed extortion, bribery (active or passive), trading influence and corruption (in the public and private sectors) offences is €750,000.

iii Case law

In a decision dated 2 February 2011, the Court of Appeal considered that misappropriation of funds and bribery cannot be qualified with the same facts at the same time. The Court also considered in the same decision that the benefit that is derived from the illegal action is not a condition of the offence but only a description of the interest that drives a person to offer a bribe, or the consideration a public officer may think he or she can obtain from a person. The case concerned a public servant, assigned to the tax administration, who was accused of having unduly granted tax advantages and a favourable advance ruling to a company. The civil servant received a four-year suspended jail sentence and a fine of €10,000.

IV FOREIGN BRIBERY: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Article 252 of the Penal Code refers to foreign public officials. This article also provides that the provisions applicable to active and passive bribery at a domestic level also apply to foreign public officials who are defined as:a persons entrusted with, or agents of, public authority or law enforcement, officers or

persons holding elected office or charged with a public service mission in another state;b persons sitting in a foreign jurisdiction, even non-professional members of a collegiate

entity in charge of deciding a  case, or practising as arbitrators under foreign state regulations or a public international organisation regulation concerning arbitration;

c community officials and members of the Commission of the European Communities, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court of the Auditors of the European Communities, in full respect of the relevant provisions of the treaties instituting the European Communities, the Statute of the Court of Justice, and the implementing regulations thereof, with regard to the withdrawal of immunities; and

d officials or agents of another public international organisation, members of a parliamentary assembly of a public international organisation and persons practising judicial functions or who record office functions in another international court whose competence is accepted by Luxembourg in full respect of the relevant provisions of those public international organisations, public international parliamentary assemblies, or international courts and the implementing regulations thereof, with regard to the withdrawal of immunities.

According to Article 252, the definition of ‘community officials’ includes ‘any person who is an official or other contracted employee within the meaning of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities or the conditions of employment of other servants

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of the European Communities’ and ‘any person seconded to the European Communities by Member States or by any public or private body who carries out functions equivalent to those performed by European Community officials or other servants’.

Members of bodies set up in accordance with the treaties establishing the European Communities and the staff of such bodies shall be treated in the same way as Community officials, insofar as the staff regulations of officials of the European Communities or the conditions of employment of other servants of the European Communities do not apply to them.

V ASSOCIATED OFFENCES: FINANCIAL RECORD-KEEPING AND MONEY LAUNDERING

i Financial record-keeping

According to the Law of 19 December 2002, as amended, regarding the trade and companies registry and the accounting and annual accounts of companies, companies and legal entities shall keep up-to-date accounts covering all their activities, assets and liabilities. There are no specific provisions in this Law regarding anti-bribery or anti-corruption, but criminal sanctions apply to persons who have committed forgery in the annual accounts of a company either by false signature, by forgery or alteration of records, or by fabrication of agreements, provisions, obligations or discharges or by alteration of clauses, declarations or facts.

ii Money laundering

The predicate offence that may give rise to a money laundering offence is limited in principle only to the public or private passive corruption of the persons committing forgery (referred to above), including PEPs, given that it is the concealment by the corrupt party of the source of the corruption’s proceeds that constitutes money laundering.

Money laundering is foreseen by Article 506-1 of the Penal Code and is punishable by one to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of €1,250 to €1.25 million.

VI ENFORCEMENT: FOREIGN BRIBERY AND ASSOCIATED OFFENCES

Corruption offences and related offences may also be prosecuted in Luxembourg if the offence, or an act that constitutes one of the elements of the offence, is deemed to have been committed in Luxembourg territory. The courts in Luxembourg have jurisdiction to hear cases involving offences committed abroad without the dual criminality requirement.

In a decision dated 3 July 2013, the Court of Appeal considered that knowing the anticipated benefit of the bribe may help to resolve any issues concerning the performance undertaken as part of the agreement. The aim of the briber does not necessarily rely on one specific action to be taken by the official on one occasion, but it can be limited to obtaining and maintaining good relations with the official to ensure their cooperation in all occasions. The Court also considered that the offence is complete even though the offer has not been accepted. The case concerned a personal adviser of the Ministry of Transport of a  foreign state, who handed an envelope containing €10,000 in cash to an official of the European

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Investment Bank. The superior of the official returned the envelope to the personal adviser on the same day that it was handed to the official. The adviser was sentenced on the basis of Article 247 of the Penal Code.

VII INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

Luxembourg has signed and ratified the following international conventions or treaties:a the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in

International Business Transactions dated 21 November 1997 (approved by the Law of 15 January 2001);

b the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto dated 15 November 2000 (approved by the  Law of 18 December 2007); and

c the United Nations Convention against Corruption dated 31 October 2003 (approved by the Law of 1 August 2007).

VIII LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

We are not aware of any government or parliamentary initiatives to amend the existing legal provisions or to introduce new legal provisions.

IX OTHER LAWS AFFECTING THE RESPONSE TO CORRUPTION

As mentioned in our introduction, the Law of 13 February 2011 has introduced specific provisions in the Labour Code to protect employees or public agents who alert their superiors or competent authorities to the existence of corruption or the abuse of influence. According to Article L 271-1 of the Labour Code, an employee who in good faith has alerted his or her superiors, colleagues or any third party, cannot be subject to reprisals and his or her agreement cannot be terminated because of this alert.

X COMPLIANCE

The Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector, as amended, which is applicable to credit institutions and to other professionals in the financial sector, imposes that credit institutions and investment firms ‘shall have robust internal governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks they are or might be exposed to, and adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures as well as control and security arrangements for information processing systems’. Adequate internal control mechanisms include ‘remuneration policies and practices allowing and promoting a sound and effective risk management’.

A professional financial service (PFS), with the exception of an investment firm, must provide evidence that it ‘has a sound administrative and accounting organisation and adequate internal control procedures. “The administrative and accounting organisation and internal control procedures shall be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of a PFS other than an investment firm.”’

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Such robust internal governance arrangements or sound administrative and accounting organisation and adequate internal control procedures imply that there is a compliance system.

The internal governance arrangement shall include, in particular, the implementation of a  management information system, incorporating risk factors, as well as internal communication arrangements, including a whistle-blower procedure that enables the staff of the institution to inform those responsible of their legitimate concerns regarding the internal governance of the institution. Such a system shall respect the confidentiality of the persons who raise a concern outside the established reporting lines as well as with the board of directors. The warnings, given in good faith, shall not result in any liability of any sort for the persons who issued them.7

There is no legal obligation for commercial companies or other legal entities to have a compliance system but it is common to find that companies have corporate governance rules in place.

XI OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS

A notable innovation is the hotline set up by Transparency International Luxembourg for private and legal persons to denounce instances of corruption and support whistle-blowers.8

Although the OECD recognised Luxembourg’s efforts to raise awareness of anti-corruption in its report of 2013,9 it concluded that the provisions on liability of legal persons need to be amended and that measures have to be taken to rectify the omissions identified by the OECD in what constitutes a  foreign bribery offence and the corporate liability regime. The report also highlighted that further measures are also necessary when it comes to investigations and prosecutions of the offence of bribery of public officials.

Corruption is not considered as a threat or serious issue for businesses in Luxembourg and the levels of corruption are quite low (and at least lower than in most EU countries). However, case law reveals that corruption cases do occur and there is still room for improvement. In the Luxembourg annex to the EU Anti-Corruption Report,10 the authors of the report highlighted that three areas require attention, namely:a political parties’ accounting duties: this area would require clarification of the

applicable accounting obligations. The introduction of a  supervisory mechanism specifically applicable to campaign accounts and to the financing of individual candidates is also among the points that require attention;

b conflicts of interest of elected officials and civil servants at national and local levels. Verification by an independent mechanism would be required and legislation on access to public information should also be considered; and

7 Circular CSSF 12/552 as amended by Circulars CSSF 13/563 and CSSF 14/597.8 See transparency.lu/hotline/whistleblowing.9 OECD, ‘Luxembourg: follow-up to the Phase 3 Report and recommendations, August 2013’.10 European Commission, ‘Annex Luxembourg to the EU Anti-Corruption Report,

Brussels 3.2.2014: COM(2014) 38 final, Annex 16’, p. 8.

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c resources used to combat financial and economic crime. Increasing such resources should be considered to ‘ensure a proportional response to the risks, in line with the importance of Luxembourg as a financial centre’.

The lack of legislation regarding lobbying and access to information of public interest is also an area that will require future attention.

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Appendix 1

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ANNE MORELBonn Steichen & PartnersAnne is a  partner at Bonn Steichen & Partners where she heads the employment, compensations and benefits practice.

Anne assists clients in individual as well as collective employment relationships such as the drafting of employment contracts, staff handbooks, internal policies, individual termination procedure, negotiating compromise agreements, assisting clients in information and consultation procedures, negotiations with employees’ representatives and trade unions and entering into collective bargaining agreements, collective redundancies, but also setting up whistle-blowing systems and assisting clients on non-discrimination issues.

She has extensive experience in structuring schemes or alternative forms of remuneration for large international companies, such as share option plans, employee participation schemes and supplementary pension plans.

In addition, Anne has a proven track record in providing specialist advice on data protection law and data privacy matters, and brings a wealth of experience in dealing with Luxembourg and EU data protection regulators.

Anne is vice-president of the Luxembourg Employment Law Specialists Association and a  member of the European Employment Lawyers Association, the International Bar Association and the Industrial Relations and Social Affairs Committee of the Luxembourg Bankers’ Association.

BONN STEICHEN & PARTNERS2 rue Peternelchen, Immeuble C2L-2370 HowaldLuxembourgTel: +352 26 025 1Fax: +352 26 025 999amorel@bsp.luwww.bsp.lu