This article was downloaded by: [Nipissing University]On: 17 October 2014, At: 10:26Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Australian Journal of Political SciencePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cajp20

The Ambivalent Moderation of HinduNationalism in IndiaSubrata K. Mitraa

a University of HeidelbergPublished online: 14 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Subrata K. Mitra (2013) The Ambivalent Moderation of Hindu Nationalism inIndia, Australian Journal of Political Science, 48:3, 269-285, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2013.822466

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2013.822466

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

The Ambivalent Moderation of HinduNationalism in India

SUBRATA K. MITRA

University of Heidelberg

Despite regular participation in national and regional elections and occupation ofoffice both at the centre and in the regional governments, the Hindu nationalistBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has not acquired the aura of moderation. It has notachieved acceptance into the party system of India in a manner that wouldmake it comparable to Christian Democratic parties in Europe. This appearspuzzling in the light of Downs’ moderation thesis, which suggests that regularparticipation in free, fair and competitive elections transforms extremist partiesto moderates as they converge towards the median voter. The articleapproaches this puzzling counterfactual in intra-system comparison by drawingon the case of Sikh nationalism. With a focus on BJP, the article presents ananalysis of party competition, party programs, policies and public opinion dataon issue positions and the social base of the party. In conclusion, three generalenabling conditions are identified that help explain the deviant case of theambivalent moderation of the BJP.

Keywords: Bharatiya Janata Party; extremism; Hindu nationalism; India; moderation;secularism

Introduction

‘To Modi or not’ is a dilemma that deeply divides India’s Hindu nationalist BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) as it prepares for the next general election, due in 2014.1 NarendraModi, who has delivered three successive legislative victories to the BJP in the

Subrata K. Mitra is Professor of Political Science at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University. Theauthor would like to thank Hans Löfgren, K.C. Suri, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Mirjam Kuenkler, SylvieGuichard, Radu Carciumaru and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and technicalhelp.1India’s hyperactive electronic media and newspapers are full of reports about the dilemma facing theBJP with regard to the possible nomination of Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, as itsprime ministerial candidate and the internal strife that the issue has unleashed (see Reddy 2013 andSpecial Correspondent 2013). Guha (2012, 6) proposed that the term ‘Hindu nationalism’ be rejected:‘How can they be called “nationalists” when they would withold full citizenship from those Indianswho are Muslims or Christians or Parsis or atheists?’ I will, however, in this article retain this termbecause of its common use as designation for the BJP and the Hindutva movement. The concept of hin-dutva was shaped by the writings of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar to suggest that virtually everyone who

Australian Journal of Political Science, 2013Vol. 48, No. 3, 269–285, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2013.822466

© 2013 Australian Political Studies Association

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

prosperous western State of Gujarat, combines muscular Hinduism with suraj – a mixof what is widely perceived as good governance and tough law and order manage-ment. The combination of these two dimensions that works for him and manyparty activists – many consider Modi to be one of the most popular candidates forthe prime ministership – is anathema to some senior members of the BJP. Theseinclude L.K. Advani, one of the founders of the party and its prime ministerial can-didate in the 2009 election. Advani, along with some members of the NDA – theNational Democratic Alliance, the main opposition coalition – and all those whoare advocates of an inclusive ‘secular’ ethos, consider Modi’s brand of politics antag-onistic to India’s tradition of tolerant pluralism. Modi’s prominence in the BJP (he isalready a member of its national committee) and the internal party opposition to thisvery prominence, demonstrate the ambivalent moderation of Hindu nationalism.Despite its moderate policies when in power at the national level (1999–2004), theBJP is seen by many as a façade for Hindu extremists, who consider its formally mod-erate position on the nature of the Indian state and political community as obfuscationfor electoral purposes.This article seeks to ‘bring structure back in again’ through an analysis of the

cluster of factors that explains the persistence of the ambivalent image of the BJP.As a corollary to this objective, I ask why Hindu nationalism, in contrast withother forms of cultural, religious or ethnic chauvinism, such as Tamil or Sikh nation-alism, is singled out for the particular opprobrium of ‘anti-secularism’. In Indian par-lance, this amounts to being seen as a party of exclusive cultural nationalism, locatedoutside the constitutional norms of secularism.

The Puzzle, Main Argument and Design of Empirical Analysis

Based on the logic of spatial models of voting behaviour (Downs 1957; Riker andOrdeshook 1973), the moderation hypothesis suggests that the imperative of votemaximisation drives leaders of extremist parties to the ideological middle ground(Figure 1). The conjecture has received strong empirical support from Kalyvas(1996), who has shown how extremist fringes within Christian movements inEurope eventually faded away, making possible the rise of moderate Christian Demo-cratic parties. Religious movements in Europe, which have also had an extremist past,have gradually moderated their ideologies and found their own niche within the space

Figure 1. Convergence to the Median in a Competitive Party System.

270 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

of the liberal democratic political process. Outside of the arena of European liberaldemocracy, however, the expectation of moderation as an outcome of electoral par-ticipation appears less well founded.Such is the case of India’s Hindu nationalist BJP, which, despite regular partici-

pation in elections and holding office both at the central and regional levels,remains at the threshold of acceptability as a legitimate member of the partyfamily. Its opponents, who see themselves as secularists, consider the BJP to be acommunalist2 party representing a form of militant Hinduism that negates thebasic values underpinning the modern state and the constitution, an allegationdenied strenuously by the party’s parliamentary wing. The evidence is, at best,mixed. Llewellyn (2011) argued that regular electoral participation has turned theBJP moderate, but this has been contested by Jaffrelot (2010). Despite vigorousdenial by its leadership, a sense of ambiguity prevails with regard to the positionof the BJP on secularism, its policies towards the separate status of Kashmir andits long-term intent towards the vast array of administrative and legislative protec-tions for minorities. Based on this ambivalent moderation of the BJP as a counterfac-tual with regard to the moderation hypothesis, I argue that the prediction ofmoderation (that is, convergence to the median) is contingent on three boundary con-ditions. These are: first, the existence of a principal dimension along which parties areranged which forces vote-maximising competing parties to converge towards themedian voter; second, an institutional arrangement that combines the federal divisionof power, separation of powers at the centre and a redrawing of geographic bound-aries to enable a secure territorial niche to extremist parties, which provides an incen-tive for these parties to become moderate in their policies; and third, a bureaucraticecclesiastic order that is capable of ‘confining the storm troopers to the barracks’,that is, restraining the fanatic fringe from upsetting the electoral chances of ‘their’political party.This argument builds on the example of the Catholic Church, which as Kalyvas

(1996, 2000) showed, restrained the extremists amongst the clergy in order toallow conservative Christian parties of Europe to appeal to the median voter.Three conjectures, specific to the Indian case, follow from these general arguments.First, the simultaneous existence of a radical, anti-system dimension along with aconventional policy dimension underpinning India’s party competition providesthe radical elements within parties of the Left and the Right with a rationale fortheir existence, and consequently reasons for obstructing the moderating tendencieswithin their respective parties. Second, India’s expanding federal structure enablescultural nationalist parties to establish a strong regional niche, once they establishthemselves electorally in a state. But regional homelands do not help cultural nation-alist parties with pan-Indian ambitions such as the BJP. Third, the fragmented char-acter of Hinduism, which does not have a central bureaucratic coordinating

has ancestral roots in India and accepts the sacredness of India as part of his/her cultural and politicalidentity is a Hindu and that collectively they constitute a nation.2In Indian usage, communalism refers to ideas and political forces that are opposed to secularism, under-stood as a form of tolerant pluralism. Communalism in this sense stands for an ideology that would bethe equivalent of nineteenth-century notions of nationalism, linked to a specific language, religion,culture, territory and a shared, collective vision of its identity. The Indian variants of cultural nationalism– Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Tamil, Naga and so on, each with its attendant movements and parties – havefought for their own homelands.

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 271

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

mechanism, makes it difficult for the political leadership of Hindu nationalism torestrain the more extreme religious elements. In contrast, parties like the ShiromaniAkali Dal (SAD, henceforth Akali Dal) are better placed to restrain the fanaticfringe because of the existence of a supreme body for Sikh religion and the practiceof party functionaries doubling as ecclesiastical leaders or working jointly with them.The article draws supportive evidence for these structural factors that make it dif-

ficult for the BJP to be recognised as India’s main conservative moderate party frompublic opinion data which show deep polarisation among supporters on key issuesand a cross-cutting social base that renders clear policy positions difficult. Besides,clinging on to the perception of ambivalent moderation gives a tactical advantagethat the adversaries of the BJP are loath to give up; hence the incessant harking-back to the association of the BJP with the anti-Muslim riots of Ayodhya (1992)and Godhra (2002).3 This political capital helps some anti-BJP parties to emphasisea ‘pro-secular’ profile and avoid pressures to take clear positions on some of the mainpolitical, social and economic issues that face India today.Based on these factors, I explain below why the BJP continues to be ambivalent

and be profiled as such by its adversaries whereas other extremist movements havebecome moderate and are seen in that light (the case of Sikh extremism comes infor detailed empirical analysis). The article first briefly specifies the Downsian mod-eration conjecture in terms of a spatial model of party competition on a Left–Rightdimension. This is followed by narratives that sketch the development of the BJPand the Sikh movement. On this basis, the article asks why electoral participation,in intra-systemic comparison, does not remove the soupçon of illegitimacy that theparty carries for a section of India’s political class, while not preventing otherforms of religious or ethnic nationalism from becoming more moderate. In con-clusion, based on the analysis of the case of the BJP, the article restates the structuralconditions that hinder the BJP’s moderation and identifies general implications of thisambivalent moderation for the political system and the policy process in India.

BJP’s Ambivalent Moderation: Evidence Pro and Contra

Following Downs (1957), in a competitive political arena, regardless of the distri-bution of political forces across the whole spectrum of the ideological space, theprocess of majority coalition building will cause competing parties to convergetowards the median voter (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Meguid 2005).When a general Left–Right dimension underpins the electorate and the ideal pointsof voters are distributed along this dimension, competing parties keen to maximisetheir share of votes converge towards the median voter (Figure 1). The consequenceis the emergence of two large, moderate parties or coalitions on either side of themedian voter, generating some indifference in voters equidistant from both partiesand some alienation and disaffection in the two extreme flanks where voters seetheir parties moving away from their preferred positions to a more moderate stance.Independent India was born out of the bloody Partition, that carved Pakistan out of

British India as a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Following

3The BJP has not accepted full responsibility for these anti-Muslim riots. In contrast, the leadership ofthe Congress has been able to distance itself successfully from the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, which fol-lowed the assasination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, in which some important Congressleaders are known to have been involved.

272 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Independence in 1947, as Pakistan went on to establish an Islamic state, India, underthe leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, resolved to constitute a secular state based onliberal principles and competitive elections. In terms of the Downsian logic, onecould see the effects of the moderation hypothesis. The catch-all Indian NationalCongress, located right in the middle of the political spectrum, achieved overwhelm-ing majorities in parliament (Mitra 1980). Left and Right tendencies emerged withinthe Congress Party, which was effectively a coalition of factions and regional parties,with the central leadership playing a mediating role. Outside, there were the Commu-nists to the Left and the Swatantra and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Jan Sangh tothe Right.The BJP is the most important voice of Hindu nationalism in India today. Literally,

the Indian Peoples’ Party, the successor to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which was set upon 21 October 1951, shortly after Independence, with the mission to promote an exclu-sive, Hindu view of nation, state and collective identity (Table 1). In view of its empha-sis on Hindutva as the core of its political program and its strong links with extremistHindu cultural and social organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh(RSS), the party is seen by many as the leading electoral voice of Hindu nationalism,drawing on an exclusivist political clientele. The BJP held office at the level of India’scentral government between 1998 and 2004, and is in office currently in severalregional governments, and vociferously denies the charges of being anti-system.Nevertheless, it retains firm links with a group of extremist Hindu organisations collec-tively referred to as the parivar – Hindi for family – which gives the BJP, both in termsof its policies and its perception by experts and laymen alike, an ambivalent character.Contesting the allegations of ambivalence, the BJP points to its actual record in

government, which, the party manifesto argues, was accommodative of Muslim

Table 1. Chronology – Hindu Nationalism

Date Historical event

10 April 1875 The Hindu reform movement Arya Samaj is founded by Swami Dayananda.1923 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar publishes Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? outlining the

vision of ‘Hindu Rashtra’ (Hindu Nation) as ‘Akhand Bharat’ (UndividedIndia).

1925 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is founded by Dr K.B. Hedgewar to opposeboth British colonialism in India and Muslim separatism.

1980 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is founded by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Lal KrishnaAdvani and Bhairon Singh Shekhawat.

1984 The Ram Janmabhoomi movement is launched by VHP and BJP, under theleadership of L.K. Advani.

6 December 1992 Babri Mosque is demolished by kar sevaks (volunteers) prompting nationwideclashes between Hindus and Muslims in which more than 2000 people die.

February–March2002

Over 1000 people, mostly Muslims, die in riots in Gujarat following the Godhratrain attack by a Muslim mob, which resulted in 58 Hindu pilgrims beingburned alive.

1998–2004 The BJP, as the biggest constituent of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA),the opposition coalition at the Centre, forms the national government, with AtalBihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister and Lal Krishna Advani as his deputy.

2011–2012 BJP in power in five regional governments (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka,Chhattisgarh and Himachal Pradesh). In five other states (Punjab, Jharkhand,Nagaland, Uttarakhand and Bihar) it shares power with other political parties.The BJP constitutes the main component of the NDA.

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 273

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

interests. During its watch, the funding for the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca by IndianMuslim pilgrims continued to grow. Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook the ‘busdiplomacy’ with arch enemy Pakistan. The bus trip to Lahore, the first of its kindby an Indian Prime Minister, was intended to give an institutional shape to thenew cooperative relationship with Pakistan. The data presented in Table 2 showhow in recent years the BJP and the Congress have become the two major contendersfor power in India, representing, as the defenders of the moderation hypothesis mightargue, Centre Right and Centre Left positions on the ideological spectrum.Despite some similarities to European conservative parties, there are major Hindu

political and social organisations linked to the BJP that do not share the moderationofficially espoused by the BJP. The moderate image assiduously cultivated by theBJP’s parliamentary wing was negated by the Godhra riots (2002) in the BJP-ruledState of Gujarat, under the watch of the NDA government in Delhi. The tainted con-nection with anti-Muslim violence has stymied the efforts of the BJP to distance itspublic profile from the extremist fringe. The defenders of the moderation of the BJPpoint to a number of major changes that have come to play a significant role in thepolicies espoused by the party. Underpinning the conciliatory undertone of its2004 manifesto was the assertion that three salient erstwhile party positions wereabandoned. These were the demand to build a temple for Ram in Ayodhya on thespot where a mosque, allegedly built by the Moghul Emperor Babar, stood; abolitionof the separate personal law for Indian Muslims that permits polygamy; and an end toarticle 370 of the Indian constitution, which gives a separate status to Muslimmajority Jammu and Kashmir. Juxtaposed to this record, however, there is evidenceof anti-systemic behaviour such as anti-Muslim violence and ethnic exclusivity thatcontradict the norms and core values of the Indian constitution. Llewellyn (2011, 51)described this on-again, off-again relationship as a ‘tug of war between the party andother Hindu nationalist groups’.

Why Sikh Nationalism Became Moderate in Contrast to Hindu Nationalism

Sikh nationalism, which has waged war against the Indian state and whose sacredshrine was attacked by the Indian army in 1984, has become ensconced as a legiti-mate party and coalition partner in power in the state of Punjab. This remarkableprocess of political change is in stark contrast to the vicissitudes of Hindu national-ism. The moderation of Sikh extremism, associated with its acquisition of electedpower, supports the moderation hypothesis (Table 3). Why does moderationappear to work for Sikh nationalism and not for Hindu nationalism?Of older vintage than Hindu nationalism, and more militant in organisation and more

strident in the articulation of its demands, Akali Dal, the Sikh nationalist party, is nowvery much integrated within the mainstream of the regional politics of Punjab. Havingshed formal links to Sikh separatism more than a decade ago, the party is fully inte-grated also into the mainstream of politics at the national level, as a member of theNational Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition. In Punjab, it has held office in coalitionwith the BJP. The Akali Dal can today as a legitimate political party openly sympathisewith demands for Sikh identity and the martyrdom of those who fell fighting the Indianarmy in the 1984 action against Sikh terrorism without drawing opprobrium fromIndia’s ‘secular’ parties or sanctions from the Indian state.In terms of the evolution of extremist ethnic and religious political movements to

moderation, Sikh nationalism is not alone. The steady integration of the Akali Dal as

274 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Table 2. Parliamentary Elections 1999, 2004 and 2009

1999 2004 2009

NATIONAL PARTIES Seats Percentage of total votes Seats Percentage of total votes Seats Percentage of total votesIndian National Congress (INC) 114 28.30 145 26.53 206 28.55Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 182 23.75 138 22.16 116 18.80Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 14 4.16 19 5.33 21 6.17Communist Party of India (Marxist)

(CPM)33 5.40 43 5.66 16 5.33

Communist Party of India (CPI) 4 1.48 10 1.41 4 1.43

REGIONAL PARTIES Seats Percentage of total votes in theState (national average)

Seats Percentage of total votes in theState (national average)

Seats Percentage of total votes in theState (national average)

AIADMK – All India Anna DravidaMunnetra Kazhagam (Tamil Nadu)

10 25.68 (1.93) 0 29.77 (2.19) 9 22.91(1.66)

DMK – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam(Tamil Nadu)

12 23.13 (1.73) 16 24.6 (1.81) 18 25.12(1.82)

AGP – Asom Gana Parishad (Assam) 0 11.92 (0.32) 2 19.95(0.53) 1 14.61(0.43)JKNC – Jammu & Kashmir National

Conference (Jammu & Kashmir)4 28.94 (0.12) 2 22.02 (0.13) 3 19.13(0.12)

JMM – Jharkhand Mukti Morcha(Jharkhand)

0 3,80 (0.27) 5 16.28 (0.47) 2 11.69(0.25)

NPF – Nagaland People’s Front (est. 2004)(Nagaland)

– 1 73.12 (0.18) 1 69.97(0.19)

RSP – Revolutionary Socialist Party (WestBengal)

3 4.25 (0.41) 3 4.48 (0.43) 2 3.56(0.36)

SAD – Shiromani Akali Dal (Punjab) 2 28.59 (0.69) 8 34.28 (0.90) 4 33.85(0.96)Shivsena (Maharashtra) 15 16.86 (1.56) 12 20.11 (1.81) 11 17.01(1.50)TD – Telugu Desam (Andhra Pradesh) 29 39.85 (3.65) 5 33.12 (3.04) 6 25.02(2.51)TRS – Telangana Rashtra Samithi (est.

2001) (Andhra Pradesh)– 5 6.83 (0.63) 2 6.16(0.61)

Source: Election Commission of India. URL: <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/index.asp>.

THEAMBIV

ALENTMODERATIO

NOFHIN

DU

NATIO

NALISM

275

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

a legitimate part of the political system finds resonance in the case of other regionalparties that have found political homes in their respective regions. This can be seen inTable 2, which shows how other extremist movements have found a regional niche,such that they now constitute a substantial force in their region though their nationalprowess remains miniscule. As the section below will show, the same does not applyin the case of the BJP, where the dilemma between moderation and extremist flankspersists.

Challenging the Left–Right Dimension: Emergence of Anti-System Politics

Following Independence, the leaders of the Indian National Congress, particularlyJawaharlal Nehru, made vigorous efforts to balance the interests of the minoritiesagainst the power of the majority. This was underpinned by a consensus on valuesthat would seem to confirm the modernisation thesis that dominated the approachto the politics of developing countries in the West at that time. Through a combi-nation of constitutional norms, legislation, and strategic social and economicreform, the regime attempted to move India’s traditional, hierarchical societytowards an egalitarian democracy. One of the consequences of the effective holdthat the ‘Congress System’

4 had on the electoral space and the process of moderationwas that the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the BJP’s predecessor, which identified its missionas that of defending the interest of Hindus, made no headway at all, winning just ahandful of seats, whereas the Congress routinely gained an absolute parliamentarymajority. The extremists, tucked away at the left and right fringes of the electoralarena, started coming into their own as the Congress declined in the face of risingdiscontent in the 1960s. The strategy of ‘anti-Congressism’, popularised by RamManohar Lohia, challenged the uni-dimensional character of the issue space andsaw the formation of broad coalitions of the Left and the Right against the Centrealong an anti-system dimension (Figures 2 and 3). The issue space describes the

Table 3. Punjab Legislative Assembly Election Results (Seats) 1962–2012

Party 1962 1967 1969 1972 1977 1980 1985 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012

IndianNationalCongress

90 48 38 66 17 63 32 87 14 62 44 46

ShiromaniAkali Dal

19 26 43 24 58 37 73 3 75 41 48 56

BharatiyaJanataParty

8 9 8 – 25 1 6 6 18 3 19 12

BahujanSamajParty

– – – – – – – 9 1 – – –

CommunistParty ofIndia

9 5 4 10 7 9 1 4 2 2 – –

Source: Election Commission of India. URL: <http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx>.

4A term coined by Rajni Kothari (1970) which explained how the Congress Party occupied the centre ofa multi-dimensional issue space and managed to hold office for the first two decades after Independence.

276 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

political space (akin to the market in which different brands compete for their marketshare). In the analysis presented here, the issue space can be seen as a matrix wherethe columns are the issues salient to the electorate, the rows are the parties and cellentries are the positions they take on specific issues. A principal component analysiscan reveal to what extent a meta-dimension underpins the issue space. Using acontent analysis of party manifestos, I have generated the issue spaces of earlyIndian elections and shown that during the period of Congress hegemony (the Con-gress system), a general Left–Right dimension underpinned the issue space (Mitra1978, 81). This was transformed into a two-dimensional space with the rise ofanti-Congressism in the early 1960s, eventually leading to the emergence of broadanti-Congress coalitions opposed to one another in terms of the main policy dimen-sion of Indian politics (Mitra 1980).The first opportunity at power sharing came to Hindu nationalism, as well as to the

Socialists, in the 1960s, at the level of regional governments. Indira Gandhi, whobroke away from the Congress Party to create a new, more radical party called theCongress (R, for Requisitionist), brought about a new realignment by ostensiblyembracing ideas falling within the anti-system dimension under her iconic sloganof ‘Quit Poverty’.Congress (R) came again, however, to occupy the Centre, with the Left and Right

as the two fringes of the system, as Indira Gandhi harvested a huge electoral reward inthe election of 1971. The realignment of forces at the macro level of the system thinlydisguised the discontent that lay just under the surface. The anti-system dimensionpersisted just under the surface and, as subsequent developments show, would berekindled again and again, giving extremist factions inside conventional parties asense of their validity.Political protest started once again after the euphoria of India’s victory against

Pakistan in the 1971 war, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, wore off. TheLeft and Right joined together as forces of resistance in the mid-1970s to opposeIndira Gandhi, who by then had imposed authoritarian rule through the emergencyprovision of the constitution. Once elections were announced in 1977, those

Figure 2. Flight of the Disaffected, Emergence of an Anti-System Dimension and Emergenceof Anti-System Movements on the Left and Right.

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 277

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

opposed to her regime came together through the Janata party coalition and won theparliamentary elections, forming the first non-Congress government at the Centre.This was the first time that Hindu nationalist leaders held ministerial responsibilityin the central government of India. But bickering soon started between the socialistsand the Hindu nationalists. Isolated within the Janata Party, the Jan Sangh leaderswalked out under the new name of Bharatiya Janata Party and fought the 1980 elec-tion under their own name.The core ideology of the newly formed BJP was summed up under ‘Five Prin-

ciples’: nationalism and national integration; democracy; positive secularism; Gand-hian socialism; and value-based politics. Right from the outset, the party representedone of the two major manifestations of Hindu nationalism, which were createdthrough a division of labour between the political wing espousing a hybrid liberalHindu nationalism, and the broader organisational wing, supported by the RSS,which supplied the dedication, energy and staff to make the new party work. Itsnetwork of several thousand pracharaks – full-time, educated, unmarried, male acti-vists – was made available for service to the BJP, giving the party overnight an effec-tive group of campaigners. The political strength of Hindu nationalism soon becameclear as the Ramajanmabhoomi issue galvanised Hindu sentiments and eventuallypropelled the BJP to power in 1998 (Juergensmeyer 1994).By the early 1990s, the BJP had consolidated its position as the main challenger to

the Indian National Congress. Its strength was in the Hindi heartland of northern Indiabut its influence extended also to other areas. The steady growth of the party in thenational parliament was impressive. From the low point of two seats in the LokSabha in 1984, the party gained 85 seats in 1989 and 182 in the parliamentary elec-tions held in 1999. The dividends of moderation appear to have encouraged the liberalwing of the BJP to take control of the manifesto and come with the ‘India Shining’slogan, which sought to give the party a moderate, modernist and economic

Figure 3. Two-Dimensional Distribution of Pro- and Anti-Regime Groups: Emergenceof Broad-Based Multi-Party Coalitions of the 1960s.

Source: Mitra (1980).

278 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

growth-oriented allure. The consequence appears to have been disastrous as, in the2004 election, the number of seats won by the BJP came down to 138, and sankeven further to 116 in 2009 (Table 2). In the course of its rapid rise to power, theparty had drawn on the desire of many Hindus for a more prominent role forHindu culture within the institutions of the secular state and to deny special treatmentsto minorities, such as a special status for the Muslim-majority state of Jammu andKashmir. Ambivalence persisted, however, as the NDA manifesto included the divi-sive Ayodhya temple issue, albeit in a muted fashion. It said, ‘[w]e continue to holdthat the judiciary’s verdict in this matter should be accepted by all. At the same time,efforts should be intensified for dialogue and a negotiated settlement in an atmosphereof mutual trust and goodwill’ (National Democratic Alliance 2004).

Hiatus between Extremists and Moderates: Electoral Basis of the BJPDilemma

TheHindu nationalist movement is constantly caught in the dilemma between politicalmobilisation versus electoral representation, integration versus accommodation, ideol-ogy versus populism, and shakha (cadre-based party) versus janata (mass-party).Many suspect the BJP of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, believingthat the extremist elements will go alongwith electoral democracy and the party’s gen-erally moderate stance as long as it brings in the power. But when it does not gainpower, or control slips, the political leadership tends to mobilise the sleeping giantof amajority Hindu community. The same critics point towardsModi’s refusal to apol-ogise toMuslims for the failings of the state in the Godhra riots as evidence of how theparty would jettison its moderate stance once its power is securely established.The BJP dilemma – whether to become moderate with little to distinguish it from

the centrist Congress on key policies, or to continue as extremists and embrace pol-itical oblivion – derives from the existence of two competing tendencies within itselectoral base whose relative strength is more evenly balanced than similar tusslesamong its competitor parties.5 The results of a survey in 1996 of a representativesample of the Indian electorate show that supporters of the BJP on the whole tendto lean in the direction of Hindu religious extremism (for a detailed discussion seeMitra and Singh 1999). But on each of four core issues, there is also a significantmoderate section within the BJP electorate, which the party leadership can ignoreonly at its peril. The existence of supporters of and opponents to the ‘secular’ and‘communal’ options in each of the four salient issues of Indian politics is notunique to the BJP, but can be found all parties in the 1996 general election. Butonly in the BJP does one find evidence of the existence of a substantial extremistwing as well as an important moderate wing. The gap between the two tendencies– those who agree with the extremist position and those advocating a more moderatesolution – is the lowest in the BJP, compared to the other parties (Tables 4–7).The gap between the moderate and extremist supporters (i.e., those saying ‘justified’

and ‘unjustified’, respectively, in Table 4) of the Congress, the BJP and the Left Frontwas, respectively, 26, 15 and 46 per cent, which shows that, compared to its mainrivals, the gap between the competing tendencies among BJP voters was less pronounced.

5The tension between moderation and extreme sentiments within the BJP has parallels with that facingthe Republican Party in presidential election campaigns in the United States (see Tanenhaus 2012).

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 279

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Once again, like the previous case, the gap between the extremist and moderatevoters within the BJP, at 17 per cent, is less pronounced than in either the Congress(23 per cent) or the Left Front (30 per cent) (see Table 5).

Table 4. Partisan Opinion on the Demolition of the Babri Mosque

Congress BJP NF Left Front BSP Total

Unjustified 42.6 25.4 47.9 54.8 27.3 37.9Cannot Say/Don’t Know 8.1 11.4 7.7 8.8 20.1 10.1Justified 16.4 40.5 24.5 8.9 27.6 22.8Inapplicable 33 22.7 20 27.5 25.1 29.1

Question: Some people say that the demolition (of the Babri Mosque) was justified, while others say itwas not justified. What would you say, was it justified or not justified?Source: Mitra (1999, 277).

Table 5. Partisan Opinion on Resolution of the Kashmir Problem

Congress BJP NF Left Front BSP Total

Negotiation 33.1 34.9 31.9 32.8 25.4 33.3Cannot Say/Don’t Know 35.6 27.9 34.3 30 30.1 34.1Should be Suppressed 9.9 17.5 11.6 4.9 14.4 11.2Not Heard of Kashmir 21.4 19.7 23.2 32.3 30.1 21.4

Question: People’s opinions are divided on the issue of the Kashmir problem – some people say thatgovernment should suppress the agitation by any means, while others say that this problem should beresolved by negotiations. What would you say, should the agitation be suppressed, or resolved bynegotiation? Responses to this question are quite revealing.Source: Mitra (1999, 278).

Table 6. Partisan Opinion on Developing Friendly Relations with Pakistan

Congress BJP NF Left Front BSP Total

Disagree 17.1 23.3 11.7 17.8 12.5 17.5Don’t Know/No Opinion 37.2 34.7 37.1 37.2 37.3 38Agree 45.6 41.9 51.2 44.9 50.2 44.4

Question: India should make more efforts to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. Do you agree ordisagree?Source: Mitra (1999, 279).

Table 7. Partisan Opinion on Separate Civil Code for Religious Communities

Congress BJP NF Left Front BSP Total

Disagree 29.6 36.3 28.6 22 30 30.1Don’t Know/No Opinion 24.3 23.3 29.1 18.3 25.1 25.4Agree 46.1 40.4 42.2 59.7 44.8 44.5

Question: Every community should be allowed to have its own laws to govern marriage and propertyrights. Do you agree or disagree?Source: Mitra (1999, 280).

280 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Table 8. Social Base of Political Parties 1996–2004 (per cent)

Background Characteristics 1996 2004

INC+ BJP+ NF LF BSP UPA NDA LF BSP SP+All-India Average 27.5 24.9 10.1 7.5 3.4 39.5 37.9 6.4 5.0 5.4GenderFemale 27.6 23.0 9.4 7.6 3.1 40.4 37.1 7.0 5.0 5.1Male 27.4 26.8 10.8 7.4 3.6 38.8 38.5 5.9 5.0 5.7LocalityRural 28.1 22.6 10.6 8.8 3.8 39.2 37.3 6.2 5.5 5.8Urban 25.6 32.2 8.7 3.4 2.0 40.7 40.2 7.1 3.1 3.9AgeUp to 25 years 25.7 27.0 10.2 6.9 3.8 38.3 38.3 5.9 5.5 6.026–35 years 27.1 25.5 9.9 7.7 3.5 40.5 37.7 6.4 4.3 5.636-45 years 28.8 25.1 9.7 8.1 2.9 39.5 38.6 6.0 5.1 5.046–55 years 27.0 23.6 10.2 8.4 3.5 37.8 38.2 7.2 4.6 6.356 years and Above 30.0 21.3 10.9 6.4 2.9 40.6 36.3 6.9 5.8 4.2EducationIlliterate 28.6 21.1 12.3 6.6 5.0 40.6 34.3 5.1 7.8 6.5Up to Middle 28.4 23.8 9.2 8.9 2.8 42.9 35.6 8.6 3.5 4.3College, without Degree 25.8 31.3 8.0 7.7 1.6 37.8 38.6 6.9 4.1 5.9Graduate and Above 21.1 36.7 6.1 6.0 0.9 34.9 46.7 5.0 2.8 4.4OccupationUnskilled Worker 30.6 17.0 9.9 10.8 5.2 42.6 27.4 8.0 9.8 6.0Agricultural and Allied Worker 28.4 17.8 11.5 8.9 5.2 43.4 36.6 6.8 4.8 3.8Artisan and Skilled Worker 27.3 24.1 9.3 7.7 3.0 43.9 34.8 6.8 3.9 5.3Cultivator (Less than 5 acres) 26.1 26.2 14.0 6.4 4.9 35.4 37.3 4.0 7.6 8.9Cultivator 5 acres and more) 29.7 34.6 8.2 1.6 2.5 35.8 44.5 3.0 3.0 8.0Business 23.3 33.0 10.1 7.6 0.7 37.0 42.7 7.1 3.0 4.5White Collar and Professional 26.2 30.8 5.6 8.0 0.3 37.4 42.3 9.0 2.5 2.2CasteScheduled Caste 31.6 14.4 5.6 11.0 12.1 39.7 25.9 8.8 18.4 2.9Scheduled Tribe 39.2 19.0 6.2 6.5 1.0 46.2 34.3 7.0 0.6 0.6Other Backward Caste 21.7 23.6 16.3 5.9 2.3 40.7 38.7 4.4 2.8 7.6

(Continued)

THEAMBIV

ALENTMODERATIO

NOFHIN

DU

NATIO

NALISM

281

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Table 8. Continued.

Background Characteristics 1996 2004

Upper Caste 28.4 33.6 7.1 7.3 0.4 36.0 44.6 7.3 1.5 5.5ReligionHindu 26.2 28.9 8.4 7.4 3.7 36.8 42.3 5.9 5.3 4.4Muslim 35.3 3.1 25.3 10.1 1.2 54.8 11.8 6.9 2.9 16.4Christian 39.9 3.0 2.0 5.6 - 60.5 21.1 8.6 0.9 0.4Sikh 18.3 14.3 16.7 2.4 5.6 30.4 48.2 6.9 4.9 2.7Other 26.5 6.0 12.0 2.4 4.8 41.7 21.3 15.9 10.4 2.4Economic ClassVery Poor 29.6 16.0 10.7 11.3 4.4 42.9 32.8 7.5 7.0 4.3Poor 28.3 23.1 10.5 6.7 4.7 39.6 37.3 5.8 5.7 5.8Middle 26.1 31.1 10.9 5.6 2.2 37.6 40.9 5.8 2.8 6.9Upper 22.4 40.1 7.9 3.4 0.4 32.8 49.3 3.7 2.4 5.6

Source: Mitra and Singh (2009, 98).

282S.K.M

ITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

On the Pakistan issue, those who voted for the Congress and the Left Front weremore likely to favour friendly relations than the opposite (respectively 28 and 27 percent) compared to the BJP, where this figure was 18 per cent (see Table 6).Finally, when it comes to the iconic issue of the personal law, the gap between

those favouring a uniform civil law, and those against, comes down to 4 per centamong the BJP supporters as opposed to 14 per cent for the Congress and 38 percent for the Left Front. These data add credibility to Llewellyn’s argument that itis difficult to be categorical about the tendency of the BJP voters ‘as a whole’ tobecome more moderate. The attitudes of BJP voters displayed in this surveyexplain the ambivalence of the BJP, which remains characterised by contradictoryattitudes rather than support for coherent policy (see Table 7).The social base of party support (Table 8) points to yet another reason for the

ambivalence of the BJP. Despite its Hindu nationalist rhetoric the BJP has developeda tendency to be a catch-all party, rather like the Congress Party, cutting into eachsocial group. Remarkably, 3 per cent of Muslim respondents admit to have votedfor the BJP and its allies in 1996 and 11 per cent in 2004. Its support among educated,upper-caste males is substantially higher than that of other parties, but the imperativeof building large coalitions under the pressure of the first-past-the-post system ofelectoral rules operates such that all Indian parties feel obliged to cut into eachother’s social bases. In that respect, the BJP, as a consequence of its Hindu upper-caste profile, is at a disadvantage compared with the arch enemy, the Indian NationalCongress, which can mobilise minority groups such as Muslims and Dalits (formeruntouchables) against the Hindu nationalists. As such, the BJP has to moderate itsstance to enhance its vote share, and to seek allies, as its own social base cannotallow further advance on its own. On the other hand, moderation and coalition build-ing dilutes ideology, which alienates the activists.

Conclusion

The structural difficulties in the moderation of the BJP identified in this article ques-tion the optimistic expectations that underpin democracy transition strategies throughelections in countries emerging from western colonial rule or those like Iraq andAfghanistan, emerging out of western military occupation. The availability of asecond, anti-system dimension provides a basis from which to mobilise the resent-ment of losers on the extreme flanks of the Left–Right dimension. As the declineof the Congress Party commenced in the 1960s, precipitated by the death of its stal-wart leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1964, the alienated and excluded flank voters(Figure 3) started moving towards a new, radical, anti-system dimension. The avail-ability of anti-Congress coalitions helped mobilise the discontented extremists intoanti-regime blocs, which in some instances produced chronic instability. Thememory of past successes based on a grand coalition of the extremists remainsfresh in the strategic calculations of Indian parties and serves to keep alive thehopes of extremists to gain power without having to become moderate.The ambivalence of the BJP in contrast to Sikh nationalists suggests that moder-

ation of extremist parties is possible when three enabling conditions are in operation.The first of these is the dimensionality of the issue space in which parties compete. Ifparties are ranged along a single dimension, then party competition will drive thevote-maximising competitors towards the median, and will force extremists eitherto keep a low-key position or to leave the party altogether. The potential availability

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 283

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

of an anti-system dimension keeps the hopes of extremists within the BJP alive. Themoderate wing can ignore the existence of these activists – sorely needed at the timeof elections – only at its peril. A second condition is the availability of a secure ter-ritorial niche which makes it possible for the extremist party, now turned into govern-ment, to accommodate the core values of extremists symbolically and then get onwith the normal business of governance. The induction of Sikh values and leadersinto high governmental office in the state of Punjab (e.g., the 1999 recognition bythe Punjab government of Sikh religious values and leaders) took the sting out of reli-gious extremism. Such is also the case of the other extremist movements that havefound secure regional niches and become both moderate in policy and integratedwithin the political community (Table 2, lower section).The third condition puts the onus on the inner organisational and power structure of

the religion linked to the extremist party. The capacity of a political party to self-police, and rein in the extreme elements into politically brokered moderation, orexpel them, is a crucial part of the bargain. Such is the case of the Sikh religion,which is equipped with its one and only holy book (the Guru Granth Saheb), a reli-gious order (the Khalsa), religious properties (Gurdwaras), and governed by a highadministrative institution, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee. Suchinstitutional capacity is conspicuously absent in the case of the BJP. To solve thecredibility dilemma, the religious extremist party requires a firm backing fromtheir ecclesiastical authority to put the weight of authority behind moderation. Splitamong many different sects, competing orders and belief systems and an ontologythat conspicuously denies the existence of one ultimate and supreme truth, unlikethe Catholic Church (Kalyvas 1996, 2000), Hinduism lacks the necessary organis-ational body that could authoritatively coordinate all the various strands and workjointly with the Hindu Nationalist Party to reach a common goal of winningenough moderate power which would be acceptable to the system at large, and yetpromote an optimal part of the cultural and religious agenda of the popular base ofthe movement.The significance of the problem of ambivalent moderation – equivalent to ‘encap-

sulation without integration’ – goes beyond the politics of India. The contrastbetween the BJP’s ambivalence in contrast with the gradual moderation of other cul-tural nationalist movements shows how – given the appropriate mix of institutions,self-policing and strategic reform policies – a move towards moderation might bepossible. The task for the analyst in India is to continue the search for those enablingconditions that might make durable moderation of extremist parties feasible.

References

Adams, J., Merrill, S. and Grofman, B. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-NationalAnalysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioural Factors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Guha, R. 2012. Patriots and Partisans. New Delhi: Allen Lane.Jaffrelot, C. 2010. Refining the ‘Moderation Thesis’ Regarding Radical Parties: The Jana Sangha and theBJP between Hindu Nationalism and Coalition Politics in India. Questions de Recherche/Research inQuestion, No. 34 – December 2010. Paris: Centre d’études et de recherches internationales.

Juergensmeyer, M. 1994. Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress.

Kalyvas, S.N. 1996. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Cornell: Cornell University Press.Kalyvas, S. 2010. Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties.Comparative Politics 32: 379–98.

284 S.K. MITRA

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014

Kothari, R. 1970. Politics in India. Boston: Little, Brown.Llewellyn, J.E. 2011. A Victory for Secular India? Hindu Nationalism in the 2004 Election. Politics andReligion 4: 49–70.

Meguid, B. 2005. Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in NicheParty Success. American Political Science Review 99: 347–59.

Mitra, S.K. 1978. Governmental Instability in Indian States: West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, andPunjab. New Delhi: Ajanta.

Mitra, S.K. 1980. Theory of Governmental Instability in Parliamentary Systems. Comparative PoliticalStudies 13: 235–63.

Mitra, S.K. 1999. Culture and Rationality: The Politics of Social Change in Post-Colonial India. Delhi:Sage.

Mitra, S.K. and Singh, V.B. 1999. Democracy and Social Change in India. Delhi: Sage.Mitra, S.K. and Singh, V.B. 2009. When Rebels Become Stakeholders: Democracy, Agency and SocialChange in India. New Delhi: Sage.

National Democratic Alliance. 2004. An Agenda for Development, Good Governance, Peace, andHarmony. Elections to the 14th Lok Sabha April–May 2004. URL: <http://www.indian-elections.com/partymanifestoes/nda.html>. Consulted 24 June 2013.

Reddy, B.M. 2013. Gadkari Plays it Safe, Advani’s Move Comes a Cropper. The Hindu 5 June. URL:<http://www.thehindu.com/news/gadkari-plays-it-safe-advanis-move-comes-a-cropper/article4782198.ece>. Consulted 18 June 2013.

Riker, W. and Ordeshook, P. 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice Hall.

Special Correspondent. 2013. Modi Most Popular Leader in Country, Says Rajnath. The Hindu 3 June.URL: <xhttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-most-popular-leader-in-country-says-rajnath/article4778233.ece>. Consulted 18 June 2013.

Tanenhaus, S. 2012. How the Republicans Got that Way. New York Review of Books 59 (9): 17–9.

THE AMBIVALENT MODERATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM 285

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Nip

issi

ng U

nive

rsity

] at

10:

26 1

7 O

ctob

er 2

014