European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 8, 275-278 (1978)

The allocation of monetary gain and loss following dyadic performance: the weight given to effort and

ability under conditions of low and high intra-dyadic attraction*

HELMUT LAMM Padagogische Hochschule Koln

EGON KAYSER Universitat Mannheim

INTRODUCTION

Ability and effort are the two internal factors which are used in Heider’s attribution- theoretical analysis of interpersonal relations (Heider, 1958). It is on these two factors, along with task difficulty and chance as external factors, that ‘naive’ explanations of own and other’s performance are based (cf: Rotter, 1966; Weiner et al., 1971).

The factors producing (causing) an outcome also play a role in ‘equity theory’ (Adams, 1965), where they are called inputs (or contributions). Inputs that are considered (causally) relevant determine whether payment is considered fair (adequate) or not.

Now, ability and effort can be considered two principal inputs (or contributions) by persons to a product. Thus, it seems reasonable to examine the relative weight given to these two factors in decisions concerning the allocation of performance payment. Available research evidence suggests that ability and effort are given different weight in evaluation of performance. For instance, a highly motivated but comparatively unable person receives a higher evaluation than a highly motivated and able stimulus person (Weiner and Kukla, 1970).

This weight can be assessed via the allocation of a performance outcome (e.g., monetary payment) obtained by the members of a dyadic team who differ in effort and ability. In our study, the allocation will be made by a third person (the experimental subject) who is presented with the story of the performance dyad as the stimulus situation.

It is likely that (a) the type of task, (b) the mutual relationship of the stimulus persons and (c) the type of outcome (negative or positive) are important as possible

*This study was conducted at the Sonderforschungsbereich 24, Sozial- und wirtschaftspsychologische Entscheidungsforschung, Universitlt Mannheim (West Germany), and financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Land Baden-Wdrttemberg.

0046-2772/78/0208-0275$01.00 0 1978 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received I2 December 1976 Revised 3 March 1977

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‘moderators’ of the weight given by observers to the team members’ ability and effort. Specifically, we intend to answer the following questions.

(a) When team member A puts in twice the task-relevant ability as B, but B puts in twice-the effort as A, will they receive the same allocation from an observer, or will one of them (which one?) receive preferential treatment?

(b) What influence do different degrees of attractiveness within the team have on the weight of ability and effort? For instance: how do observers pay the ‘lazy talented person’ of pairs who are friends and of pairs who are not friends?

(c) How is the weight given to effort versus ability determined by the type of outcome (gain or loss)?

Helmut Lamm and Egon Kayser

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 40 male senior students from Mannheim high schools. They participated voluntarily in the experiment and were paid 5 DM per hour.

Procedure and stimulus material

The subject is presented with a story in which two male persons, described as friends or as non-friends, together produce a pamphlet on educational problems. The sale of the pamphlet is presented as a success (gain of 300 DM) or a failure (loss of 300 DM). Stimulus person A’s ability is presented as twice as great as B s (allegedly based on tests that had been taken). On the other hand, person B s effort is presented as having been twice that of A: B worked twice as long on the task as A. (Work was qualified as ‘intense, fully concentrated, and with complete application of one’s abilities’.)

Independent variables

Attraction

Within the stimulus teams, attraction is experimentally varied on two levels: persons who ‘know each other superficially’ versus persons who are ‘close friends’ and rate themselves positively on a given scale of attractiveness. In each case the stimulus persons remain anonymous for the allocator (the subject).

Outcome

Gain was operationalized as + 300 DM and loss as -300 DM. This monetary gain or loss was presented as a result of the pamphlet’s sale having been a success or a failure (where, in the latter case, the team has expenses to pay).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable consists in the allocation decision made by the subject regarding the 300 DM lost/won by the team (i.e. how much each team member should receive/ pay).

The allocation of monetary gain 277

Table 1. Allocation (portion of 300 DM) to partner A under success and failure

Success Failure x SD x SD

Low attraction 150.91 18.14 150.00 0.00 High attraction 141.00 17.29 170.00 15.82

A is the team partner with higher ability but lower effort. N = ten subjects per cell.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows the mean values and standard deviations of allocations to stimulus person A (the more able but less diligent participant). A would receive 150 DM if the subject divided the 300 DM equally. (The allocation to B as well as the difference between the distributions to A and to B merely represent linear transformations of the allocation to A.)

Allocation of gain

Under low attraction (non-friends) the payoff was divided almost equally. On the other hand, in the case of high attraction (friends), there was a near-significant tendency for allocations to favour the relatively unable but more diligent partner (B) (t = 1.64 < .08, one-tailed; tested against the 5050 split). This last result is consistent with the results of Weiner and Kukla (1970), mentioned above.

Allocation of loss

In the loss condition, equal distributions resulted throughout if the stimulus persons were not friends. By contrast, in the case of friends the more able but less diligent partner was given a significantly higher share of the loss to pay than his counterpart ( t = 2.58, p < .025, one-tailed).

DISCUSSION

As the results indicate, effort and ability as inputs only carry equal weight when performance participants have no friendly interpersonal relationship among each other. The experimental subjects punish the relatively lazy but talented team partner only if he is on friendly terms with his diligent but less talented partner, and if the team- work has proven unsuccessful. If the team-work has proven successful - if profits are to be allocated - the above tendency (disfavouring the able but lazy partner in the case of friends) appears only as a trend.

In interpreting these results it may be suggested that a norm (expectation) of mutual obligation - to contribute one’s share to a common goal - is more salient with friends than with non-friends. Friendship presumably involves the principle of mutual - and not one-sided - support. Since relative lack of ability, not being under one’s

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control, cannot fairly be held against him, evaluative judgment can centre only on the relative lack of effort in pinpointing blame. Now, if the goal is successfully attained (gain), person A's lack of effort, not having led to the effect of a negative result, may be discarded by a (pragmatically oriented) evaluator. By contrast, when the goa1 is not attained - when a negative outcome results - an evaluator will presumably attribute responsibility to the stimulus person whom he considers as causally involved in a detrimental way by own choice (lack of effort). We suggest that the 'letdown' of a friend is considered as particularly grave since it constitutes a violation of one of the normative principles on which a friendship is built.

Overall, in our view the question of the weight given to various causal (product- relevant) factors in the allocation of product-generated profits and costs under various social and psychological conditions constitutes a theoretically fruitful and socially relevant research topic. We are currently working along these lines.

Helmut Lamm and Egon Kayser

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Weiner, B., and Kukla, A. (1970). An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. Journal

Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., and Rosenbaum, R. M. (1971). Perceiving

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