the admissible contents of experience intro post - glasgowheart

Forthcoming(2011)inK.HawleyandF.Macpherson(eds.)TheAdmissibleContentsofExperience,Wiley‐Blackwell.

TheAdmissibleContentsofExperience

FionaMacpherson

Thisessayprovidesanoverviewofthedebateconcerningtheadmissible

contentsofexperience,togetherwithanintroductiontothepapersinthis

volume.Thedebateisonethattakesplaceamongadvocatesofacertainwayof

thinkingofperceptualexperiences:thattheyarestatesthatrepresenttheworld.

Fortosaythatastatehascontentistosaythatitrepresents;anditscontentis

usuallytakentobethatwhichisrepresented.Oneshouldnotbetemptedto

thinkthatthedebateisthereforemarginaloresoteric,forthisviewofperceptual

experiencehasbeenbyfarthedominantviewofperceptualexperienceinrecent

yearsinphilosophy(andinpsychologyandneuroscience).Thedebateisabout

whatanswertogivetoafundamentalquestionaboutthenatureofperceptual

experience,namely:whatobjectsandpropertiescanitrepresent?

Onecanaskthisquestionabouttheadmissiblecontentsofperceptual

experienceaboutperceptualexperienceintotobutonecanalsoaskitaboutthe

perceptualexperiencesassociatedwitheachsensorymodality.Thus,onecanask

whatobjectsandpropertiesvisualorauditoryortactileexperiencescan

represent,andsoon.Onecanalsoaskitofexperiencesthatarenotinanyone

modality(ifindeedtherearesuchexperiences,foritiscontroversialwhether

thereare).Suchexperiencesaresometimescalled“cross‐modal”experiencesor

“amodal”experiences.1Agoodexampleofsuchanallegedexperiencewouldbea

perceptualexperiencethatrepresentedthattheflashoflightthatonesawwas

1Theterm“cross‐modal”experienceisinfactusedtorefertomanydifferentsortsofexperiencebuttheusageinthemaintextisonestandardtype.


thecauseofthesoundthatoneheard.Infact,thequestionaboutwhatthe

admissiblecontentsofexperienceareismostfrequentlyaskedaboutthe

experiencesinonemodalityatatime.Somewhatpredictablyamongthese,itis

visionthathasreceivedthemostattention.Inthisintroduction,Iwillfocuson

outliningthedebateconcerningvisualexperience,andonecanextrapolateasto

howthedebatewouldgoinothercases.

1.PerceptualExperienceasaRepresentationalState

Asmentionedabove,manypeopleholdthatperceptualexperiencesare

representationalstates.Whatdoesthismeanandwhydopeopleholdittobe

true?Tosaythatonestaterepresentsanotheristosay,atleastinpart,thatone

stateisaboutanother.Considerexamplesofthingsotherthanexperiencethat

aresaidtorepresent.Someareman‐made.Forexample,photographstypically

representthatwhichwasinfrontofthelenswhentheyweretaken.A

photographofatree,wemightsay,representsatree.Apaintingofaflower

representsaflower.Certainnatural,non‐man‐madestatesoftheworldare

sometimessaidtorepresenttoo.Theangleofacolumnofsmokerepresentsthe

speedofthewind.Thenumberofringsinthetrunkofatreerepresentsitsage.

Anothercase,quitedifferentfromtheothertwo,islanguage.Sentences

representorareaboutthings.Thesentence,‘Thewindblewthroughthe

branchesofthetree’representsthatthewindblewthroughthebranchesofthe

tree.Theparadigmcaseofmentalstatesthatrepresentarethepropositional

attitudes,suchasbeliefanddesire.Propositionalattitudesaresocalledbecause

onetakesanattitude(holdingtrueinthecaseofbelief;wantingtobetrueinthe

caseofdesire)towardsaproposition.Forexample,ifIbelievethatbasking


sharksswimintheFirthofClydethenItaketheattitudeofholdingittobetrue

towardsthepropositionthatbaskingsharksswimintheFirthofClyde.IfIdesire

itthenIwantittobetruethatbaskingsharksswimintheFirthofClyde.IfI

believeordesirethatbaskingsharksswimintheFirthofClydethenmymental

stateisaboutorrepresentsthatbaskingsharksswimintheFirthofClyde.

Whydopeoplethinkthatbeliefsarerepresentationalstates?Onereason

isthatbeliefshaveaccuracyorcorrectnessconditions.Thatistosaythatthereis

awaytheworldcouldbethatwouldmakethebelieftrueandawaythatthe

worldcouldbethatwouldmakethebelieffalse.Inthecaseofmybeliefthat

baskingsharksswimintheFirthofClyde,thewaytheworldwouldhavetobein

ordertomakethebelieftrueisifbaskingsharksswimintheFirthofClyde,and

itwouldbefalseotherwise.

Thisfeatureofbeliefs,whichatleastinpartmakesthemrepresentational

states,explainswhysomepeoplethinkthatinorderforastatetobea

representationalstateithastohavethepossibilityofmisrepresentingtheworld.

However,thisclaimisnotobviouslytrue.Thereasonisthatbeliefsabout

necessarystatesofaffairs,particularlylogicallyorconceptuallynecessarystates

ofaffairs,donot,atleastinonesense,havethepossibilityofmisrepresenting.

Forexample,mybeliefsthattwoplustwoequalsfour,thatvixensarefemale

foxesandthatDavidHumeisDavidHumecouldn’tmisrepresentthewaythe

worldisasthesestatesofaffairsnecessarilyobtain.

Dodeclarativesentencesalsohaveaccuracy‐conditions?Considerthe

sentence,“TherearebaskingsharksintheFirthofClyde”.Justasmybeliefwhich

Iwouldexpressbyutteringthissentencehasaccuracy‐conditions,sotoo,it


mightseem,doesthesentence.Onecomplicationhere,however,isthatsome

philosophersthinkthatsomeorallsentencesarecontextsensitive.Thatistosay

thatwhattheymeanchangesaccordingtotheircontext.Forexample,the

sentenceItoldyoutoconsidermightmean(andprobablytypicallymeans)that

therearecetorhinusmaximusintheFirthofClyde.ButinthecontextwhereI

wastellingyouaboutGlasgowgangstersandtheirpenchantforsunbathingon

theWaverley,aboatthatfrequentlysailsdowntheFirthofClyde,thenthe

sentencemightmeanthatthereareloansharksonsunloungersintheFirthof

Clyde.Ifsomesentencesarecontextsensitive,thenitwouldbeaccuratenotto

saythatsentenceshavecorrectnessconditions,full‐stop,butthatsentencesina

particularcontexthavecorrectnessconditions.

Whatofnatural,non‐man‐madestatesoftheworld,suchastheangleof

thecolumnofsmokeortheringsinthetrunkinthetree?Thereisatraditionin

philosophywhichholdsthatthesenaturalindicatorscannotmisrepresent,for

theyareconceivedofasstatesthatcovarywithoutexceptionwiththatwhich

theyrepresent.Thisisbecauseitisclaimedthatitisinvirtueoftheirstrictly

covaryingthattheyarerepresentationalstates.Inotherwords,ifanexceptionto

strictcovariancewasfoundthentheallegednaturalindicatorwouldnotbeheld

torepresentthatwhichitfailedtostrictlycovarywith.2However,onecouldhold

insteadthatnaturalindicatorsrepresentsomethingonlysolongastheyreliably

covarywiththatthing,notperfectlycovary.Forexampleonemightthinkthatas

longasthenumberofringsinthetrunkofatreefrequentlyornormallycovaries

withtheagesofatreethentheyrepresenttheageevenifintheoddyearofbad

2Seeforexample,F.DretskeKnowledgeandtheFlowofInformation(MITPress,1981)


growthsometreesdonotlaydownanextraring–inwhichcasethenumberof

ringswouldbemisleadingwithrespectto,orwouldmisrepresent,theageofthe

tree.

Whatofphotographsandpictures?Onemightthinkthattheydon’thave

accuracy‐conditionsforonemightthinkthattheydon’trepresentthattheworld

isacertainway.3Apaintingofachair,forexample,mightrepresentachair,butit

maynotrepresentthatthereissuchachair.Itmightbeapaintingofachairthe

artistmerelyimaginedwhichdoesn’texistorapaintingofachairwhichonce

existedbutdoesnolongerandtheartistmaynotintendtorepresentthatthat

chairexistsbypaintingsuchanimage.Similarly,onemightthinkthata

photographofachairmightrepresentachairbutitdoesnotrepresentthatit

existsnow.Onemightretortherethatphotographsatleastrepresentthata

certainstateofaffairsonceexisted.Forexample,aphotographmightrepresent

thatachairwithacertainlookonceexistedandwasinGeorgeSquare.Andthe

photographmightrepresentthatwhetherornotthatstateofaffairseverexisted,

forthephotographmightbemisleadingincertainrespects.Althoughpeoplesay

thatphotographsdon’tlie,itistruethatiftheyhavebeendigitallyalteredorif

theyaretakenfromamisleadingangletheymightleadyoutobelievetheworld

wasonewaybutitwasreallyanother.Similarly,onemightretortthatpaintings

representthatastateofaffairscouldexist.Andonemightthinkthatwhilemost

pictureswillaccuratelyrepresentthingsthatcouldexist,somemight

misrepresentstatesofaffairsthatcouldn’texist.Forexampleapictureofaflying

3NotethatCrane(inthisvolume)holdsthatpicturescanbeaccurateorinaccuratebutnottrueorfalse.Hethereforeclaimsthatthecontentofpicturesinnotpropositional.


pigwouldmisrepresentthatapigcanflywhenthisisnomologicallyimpossible.

M.C.Escherpaintedwhatlooktobespatiallyimpossibleobjects,suchasthe

Penrosetriangle,inthefullknowledgethatsuchanobjectisageometrical

impossibility.Furthermovescouldbemadeinthisdebate.Whatiscertainlytrue

isthatifpicturesorphotographscanmisrepresentonehastogiveadifferent

accountofthisfromthatwhichonegivesofbeliefmisrepresentation.

Anotherreasonthatbeliefsareheldtoberepresentationalstatesisthat

ascribingsuchstatesthatrepresentcertainthingstosubjectshelpsexplainand

predictsubjects’behaviour.Forexample,ifIbelievethatbaskingsharksswimin

theFirthofClydethen,giventhatIhavecertaindesires,suchasthedesireto

spotthem,thismayexplainwhyIfrequentlylookoutforthemintheFirthof

ClydeandmaypredictthatIwillgototheFirth.

Thesetworeasonsforthinkingthatbeliefsarerepresentationalstates–

thattheyhaveaccuracy‐conditionsandthatattributingthemtosubjectshelpsto

explainandpredicttheirbehaviour–havebeencitedasreasonsthatalso

explainwhyweshouldthinkthatperceptualexperiencesarerepresentational

states.Letusconsidereachinturn.Whythinkthatperceptualexperienceshave

accuracy‐conditions?SupposeIhaveavisualexperienceIwoulddescribeas

beingavisualexperienceasofabaskingsharkontheshore.Onemightthinkthat

thistypeofexperiencecouldbeaccurateorinaccurate.Thisisbecausethere

mayreallybeabaskingsharkontheshoreortheremaynot.Theremaybeaseal

ontheshore,whichImistakeforabaskingshark,ortheremaybenosharkand

noobjectmistakenforashark,forImaybehallucinating.(Notethat

hallucinationsaresuchthatalthough,asamatterofcontingentfact,theytendto


beinaccurate,theyneednotbeandcouldbeaccurate–thesearecalledveridical

hallucinations.)IfthisiscorrectthenthetypeofexperiencethatIundergohas

accuracy‐conditionsandcanrepresentaccuratelyorinaccurately(thatis

misrepresent)dependingonwhetherthoseaccuracy‐conditionsobtain.(Note

thatphilosophersusethis“asof”locutionin“asofabaskingshark”asopposed

tojustsaying“ofabaskingshark”simplytosignalthatthereneedbenobasking

sharkintheworldwhichtheexperienceisof–itmaymerelyappeartobeofa

particularbaskingsharkthatexistsintheworld.)

Therearesomedissentingvoices,however.Somephilosophers–

disjunctivists–thinkthatifoneseesabaskingsharkandifonehallucinatesa

baskingsharkthenonehasperceptualexperiencesthatdifferinimportant

mentalrespectstotheextentthatweshouldthinkofthemasbeingdifferent

fundamentaltypesofstate‐thatisasdifferingintheirmostimportantnature.4

Suchphilosophersholddifferentviewsofwhatthementaldifferencesare

betweenthestates.Forexample,somethinkthattheydifferbecauseoneis

involvedinperceptuallyexperiencingabaskingsharkandtheothersimply

cannotbedistinguishedfromthatstatejustbyreflectiononthenatureofthe

experienceitselfbythesubjectoftheexperience;somethinkthattheydifferin

theirphenomenalcharacter;somethinkthattheydifferintheirepistemological

status.Someofthesephilosophersthinkthatyoucanonlyhavethesame

fundamentaltypeofperceptualexperiencethatyouhavewhenyouseeabasking

sharkaccurately,whenyouseeitaccurately.Youcannothavethistypeof

4DisjunctivistsincludeM.G.F.Martin,JohnMcDowell,BillBrewerandWilliamFish.ThevarioustypesofdisjunctivismarediscussedinA.HaddockandF.Macpherson"Introduction:VarietiesofDisjunctivism"inourDisjunctivism:Perception,Action,Knowledge(OxfordUP,2008).


experiencewhenyoueithermisperceivethesealasbeingabaskingsharkorif

youjusthaveahallucinationasofabaskingshark.Ibelievethattheyholdthis

becausetheyreasonasfollows:perceptualexperiencesofthefundamentaltype

hadwhenseeingabaskingsharkonthebeachaccuratelyarepartlycomposedof

thebaskingsharkonthebeach.Ifthereisnobaskingsharkonthebeachthenit

cannotpartlycomposewhicheverexperiencethepersonishaving,suchasa

hallucinationofabaskingsharkoranillusoryexperienceasofasharkcasedbya

seal.Thusthepersoncan’tbehavingthesamefundamentaltypeofexperience.

Becausethereisnopossibilityofhavingthatfundamentaltypeofexperiencein

thosecircumstancesthenthereisnopossibilityoftheexperience

misrepresentingonthisview.Andifonethinksthatforastatetobe

representationaltherehastobethepossibilityofitmisrepresentingthenthis

lineofthoughtwouldentailthatthattypeofexperienceisnotrepresentational.

Thejargonsometimesusedtoexpressthisisthattheseexperiences“present“

theworldasbeingacertainway,theydon’trepresentitasbeingthatway.5

However,thisargumenthasrecentlybeenrepliedtobySusannaSiegel.6

Shearguesthatevenifthetypeofperceptualexperienceasofabaskingshark

hadwhenaccuratelyseeingabaskingsharkcouldn’tbehadinaccurately,this

doesn’tmeanthatthattypeofexperiencedoesn’trepresent.Sheclaimsthatthat

typeofexperiencecanstillhaveaccuracy‐conditionsand,invirtueofthatfact

alone,itisrepresentational.Onecanacceptthatoneisunabletohavethissame

5VersionsofviewaredefendedinC.Travis“TheSilenceoftheSenses”,Mind113(2004),pp.57‐94andB.Brewer“PerceptionandContent”,EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy14(2006),pp.165‐81.6S.Siegel“DoVisualExperiencesHaveContents?”,inB.Nanay(ed.),PerceivingtheWorld(OxfordUP,2010),pp.333‐68.


fundamentaltypeofmentalstateinaccurately,butnonethelessaccuracy‐

conditionscanbespecifiedbycomparingtheconditionsinwhichonecanhave

theperceptualexperiencewiththeconditionsthatmightexistinotherpossible

worlds.Theexperienceisclearlyaccuratewithrespecttothisworldbutitis

inaccuratewhenwecompareittootherpossibleworldsinwhichtheconditions

requiredinorderforustohavetheexperienceintheactualworlddonotobtain.

Inthisway,sheargues,wecanclaimthattheexperiencehasaccuracy‐conditions

andinthisminimalsense,atleast,isrepresentationaleventhoughthe

experiencecannotbehadinaccuratelyandsocannotmisrepresent.Philosophers

arecurrentlydebatingwhetherthisminimalsenseofrepresentationisthesense

ofrepresentationthatpeoplecareaboutwhentheyclaimthatexperiences

representandifitisnot,whatexactlythatsenseis.Butrecalltheexample

discussedabove–thatofnecessarilytruebeliefs.Itseemsthatthesebeliefscan’t

befalse,butnonethelesstheyeachrepresentcertainthings(thattwoplustwo

equalsfour,thatvixensarefemalefoxesorthatDavidHumeisDavidHume).If

thatisrightthenitseemsthatthefactthatcertaintypesofexperiencecan’tbe

hadinaccuratelyshouldnottellinfavourofthemnotbeingrepresentational.

Letusturnnowtothesecondreasonforthinkingthatexperiencesare

representational–thatattributingperceptualstateswithrepresentational

contentstosubjectshelpstoexplainandpredicttheirbehaviour.Isthistrue?It

canseemso.IfIhaveavisualexperiencethatrepresentsabaskingshark,itmay

explainwhyIkeeplookinginthedirectionthatIdo(perhapsatitswimmingup

anddownthecoast).ItmayexplainwhyIutter,“Iseeabaskingshark”orwhyI

jumpupanddownwithexcitement.Accordingtothosewhorejectdisjunctivism,


andholdthatonecanhavethesamefundamentaltypeofexperiencewhen

accuratelyperceivingtheworldorwheninaccuratelyperceivingtheworldor

whenhallucinating,itisbecausemyexperiencesrepresentsthatthereisa

baskingsharkthatIbehaveasIdoanddosowhetherornotthereisabasking

sharkthere.Youmayalsobeabletoaccuratelypredictmybehaviourbasedon

myhavinganexperiencewiththatrepresentationalcontenttogetherwithother

thingsyouknowaboutme–perhapsmydesiretoswimclosetothesecond

largestlivingsharkinthenorthernhemisphere’smostsoutherlyfjord.

However,thatthisexplanationisavailabletonondisjunctivsitsdoesnot

meanthatasimilarsortofexplanationisnotavailabletoadisjunctivistwho

thinksthatexperiencesdonotrepresenttheworldbutratherpresentit.Heor

shewillexplainandpredictthebehaviourofsubjectsbasedonwhatthe

subject’sexperiencepresentswhentheyareaccuratelyperceiving,andbasedon

whatthesubjectthinksthattheirexperiencespresentswhentheyarenot

accuratelyperceiving.

Itliesbeyondthescopeofthisintroductiontoargueastowhichview–

representationalismorformsofdisjunctivismthatrejectrepresentationalism‐is

therightone.Forourpurposesweneedonlynotethatthedebateaboutthe

admissiblecontentsofexperiencetakesplaceamongthosewhothinkthat

experiencesdorepresenttheworld.However,itseemstomethatasimilar

debatecouldtakeplaceamongthosewhothinkexperiencespresenttheworld

ratherthanrepresentit.Theycoulddebateaboutwhichfeaturesoftheworldare

presentedbyexperience.However,inpracticetherehasbeennosuchdebate,

primarilyIbelieve,becausethosewhoendorsethisviewareveryliberalabout


whatexperiencecanpresent,whereasthosewhothinkexperiencesare

representationalhavetendedtofallintotwocamps:thosewhoareliberalwho

believeexperiencescanrepresentlow‐levelandhigh‐levelproperties,andthose

areconservativeandwhobelievethatexperiencescanonlyrepresentlow‐level

properties.Withtheassumptioninplacefortherestofthisintroductionthat

perceptualexperiencesdorepresent,Iwillnowexplainthedebateaboutthe

admissiblecontentsofexperience.

2.IntroducingtheDebate

Letussupposethatvisualexperiencesrepresentobjectsandrepresentthemas

havingcertainproperties.Therangeofpropertiesthatobjectscanhaveisvast.

Thereisthepropertyofbeingacertaincolour,shape,size,temperature,havinga

certainsmellortaste,havingcertaincausalproperties,emittingcertainsounds,

havingacertaintexture.Anobjectmightalsohavethepropertyofbeinga

certainindividualsuchasyourbrother,orthefirstmanonthemoon.Anobject

mightbeoneofacertainman‐madekind,suchasbeingaknifeorachair,orit

mightbeanaturalkindsuchabeingatreeorasycamoretree,orbeingan

amphibianoranatterjacktoad.

Itseemsobviousthatvisualexperiencesrepresentsomeofthese

propertiesandnotothers.Mostpeoplewouldagreethatvisualexperiences

representtheshape,size,colourandpositionofobjects–propertiestodowith

thevisualappearanceofthings(low‐levelproperties).Andmostpeopleare


agreedthatvisiondoesnotandcouldnotrepresenteveryproperty.Thereare

tworeasonsforthinkingthis.

Thefirstisthattherearesomepropertiesthatthevisualsystemsimply

isn’tandcouldn’tbesensitiveto.Whichpropertiesthoseareiscontroversialbut

Ispeculate,althoughitisonlyspeculation,thatmostpeoplewouldagreethat

visualexperiencescannotrepresentthefollowing:thepropersensiblesofsenses

otherthanvision–soundsinthecaseofhearing,temperatureinthecaseof

touchandsoon–andpropertiessuchasbeingradioactive,emittinganelectric

field,beingsixhundredyearsold.

Thesecondreasonisthatthereisoftenadistinctionbetweenwhatour

visualexperiencesrepresentandthebeliefsthatweformonthebasisofthose

experiences.Thisdistinctionisoftenmaskedbythefactthatweoftenclaimto

seewhatwestrictlyspeaking,onreflection,wouldholdthatweonlybelieveor

know.(PerhapsthisoccursinpartbecauseinEnglishweoftenusetheword‘see’

tomean‘know’.)Hereisanexample.Mymothercomesintothekitcheninthe

morning.Therearemuddyfootprintsonthefloor.Shemightsay‘IseeFiona

camehomelatelastnight.’NowshecertainlybelievesthatIdid.Butdoesshe

strictlyspeakingseethatIcamehomelastnight?Doesshehaveavisual

experiencethatrepresentsmycominghomelate?Iamstronglyinclinedtosay

thatshedoesnot.Sheseesthemuddyfootprints.Whatexactlyshehasavisual

experienceasofisdebatable.Onemightthinkthatitisasofmuddyfootprintsor

thatitisasofdarkobjectsonalightersurfacebackground.Whichever,itseems

obviousthatshedoesnothaveanexperienceasofmecominghomelate.She

merelybelievesthisonthebasisofinferringfromwhatshedoesstrictly


speakingdoessee–themuddyfootprints.Onreflectiononsuchcaseswemight

cometothinkthatthepropertiesthatourexperiencesdorepresentissomewhat

restricted.

Therearealargeclassofpropertiesoverwhichthereisalargedispute

concerningwhethervisualexperiencedoorcanrepresentthem.Theseinclude:

beinganartificialkind,beinganaturalkind,beingaspecificindividual,

causation,thenatureofthebacksidesofobjects,thenatureoftheoccludedparts

ofobjects,directionality(high‐levelproperties).

Itwouldbegoodifwecouldclearlydelineatethosepropertiesthat

everyoneagreesvisualexperiencescanrepresentandthosethataresubjectto

debate,andthosethateveryoneisagreedthattheycannot.Unfortunately,thisis

difficulttodoandthereisnoagreedwaytodoit.Listingproperties,asIhave

donethusfar,isthetypicalway.

Weshouldnotethatwhatpeople’sexperiencesrepresentmaydiffer.

Extremeexamplesincludethecolourblindwhoseexperiencesmayrepresent

fewercolourscomparedtothenormallysightedandpeoplewithperfectpitch

whomayrepresentmorespecificinformationaboutpitchthanpeoplewith

relativepitch.Sowhenpeopleaskwhattheadmissiblecontentsofexperience

aretheyaretypicallyeitheraskingaboutwhatthenormalperson’sexperience

representsortheyareaskingwhatitispossibleforanyone’sexperienceto

represent.

Itmightseemodd,onreflection,thatthereisadebateaboutwhatthe

admissiblecontentsofexperienceare,atleastamongpeoplewhohavenormal


perceptualexperiences.Onemightthinkthatallweneedtodoistointrospect

andseewhatourexperienceisliketodeterminetheanswer.Ourexperiences

purporttoinformusaboutthewaytheworldis,sowhycan’twejustreporthow

theysoinformusandtherebyreportwhattheyrepresent,andwhydon’twefind

agreement?

Thereareacoupleofreasonswhythismaybethecase.Oneisthatwe

mayourselvesfindithardtotellapartperceptualexperiencefrombelief.So

perhapssomepeoplemistakenlyreportbeliefcontentasbeingthecontentof

experienceorviceversa.Anotherreasonisthatperhapswhatourexperiences

representisnotalwaysavailabletousassubjectsofthoseexperiences.For

example,therearesometheoriesofrepresentationthatclaimthatwhatan

experiencerepresentsdependsonwhatitiscausedbyandcovarieswithinthe

world.Butwhatitcovarieswithmaynotbeamatteravailabletothesubjectof

thatexperience–atleastjustbyintrospection.Anotherexampleisthatsome

philosophersholdthatwhatourexperiencesrepresentisnotwhatwetypically

thinkthattheyrepresent.Forexample,somephilosophersthinkthatour

experiencesdonotrepresentcolours–whicharesurfacepropertiesofobjects,

aswetypicallythink–butcloselyrelatedpropertiessuchascoloursinspecific

illuminationsormentalpropertiesthatourexperienceshavewhenwelookat

objects.

3.ReasonstobeaLowLevelTheorist


Low‐leveltheoristsaremotivatedbythethoughtthatiftwoexperiencesare

differentinwhattheyrepresentthentheymusthavedifferentphenomenal

characters.Thatistosaythat“whatitislike”tohavetheexperiencesforthe

subjectmustbedifferent.7Thisseemsplausibleforitisacommonassumption

(althoughnotamongcertaindisjunctivists)thattwoexperiencesaredifferentif

andonlyiftheyhavedifferentphenomenalcharacters.Asecondreasontohold

thisarisesifoneacceptsoneofthemostpopulartheoriesofphenomenal

characterinphilosophyofmindtoday,namelyrepresentationalism.Accordingto

thisview,phenomenalcharactersupervenesonrepresentationalcontentor,

accordingtoastrongerformoftheview,thetwoareidentical.8Infact,aswewill

induecoursesee,manytheoristswhoargueforhigh‐levelcontentalsoaccept

theideathatiftwoexperiencesaredifferentinwhattheyrepresenttheymust

havedifferentphenomenalcharactersandviceversa.Whether

representationalismistrueornotisatopicthatliesoutwiththescopeofthis

introduction.However,itisplausibletothinkthatatleastinaverylargenumber

ofcases,perhapswithinasubjectoversomespecifiedperiodoftime,differences

inphenomenalcharactersuperveneondifferencesinrepresentationalcontent

andviceversa.9

7ThisphrasewasintroducedintothephilosophicallexiconinT.Nagel,“WhatisitLiketoBeaBat?”,PhilosophicalReview,83(1974),pp.435‐50.8ProminentrepresentationalistworksincludeM.Tye,TenProblemsofConsciousness:ARepresentationalTheoryofthePhenomenalMind(MITPress,1995);F.I.DretskeNaturalisingtheMind(MITPress,1995);W.G.Lycan,ConsciousnessandExperience,(MITPress,1996).9SeeF.Macpherson,F.RepresentationalTheoriesofPhenomenalCharacter,Ph.D.Thesis,UniversityofStirling(2000),availableonlineinSTORRE,TheUniversityofStirling’sdigitalRepository:http://hdl.handle.net/1893/25.


So,startingwiththethoughtthattwoexperienceshavedifferentcontents

onlyiftheyhavedifferentphenomenalcharacters,low‐leveltheoristsmounta

seriesofargumentsonacase‐by‐casebasis.Theytrytoarguethattwo

experiences,whichahigh‐leveltheoristmightclaimhavedifferentcontents,

havethesamephenomenalcharacter,andthereforerepresentthesamething.

Andtheyarguethatthecontentthatbothshareisalow‐levelcontent.For

example,ColinMcGinnarguesthatweshouldrestrictthecontentofvisual

experiencestopropositionswhosecontentcanbespecifiedingeneraltermsand

notparticulars.10Heasksyoutoimagineseeingyourbible.Heclaimsthatthe

experiencethatyouhavecannotrepresentthatyourbibleisinfrontofyou

becauseyouwouldbehavinganexperiencewiththeverysamephenomenal

characterifyouwerenotseeingyourbiblebutabiblethatlookedexactlysimilar

inallrespects.Forexample,ifyourbiblehadadog‐ear,theotherbiblewould

haveonetoo.McGinnisthinkingthatdifferentobjectscanhavethesame

appearanceandthuscancausethesameexperienceinme.ThereforeIcan’t

representthataparticularobjectispresent–Icanonlyrepresentthatthere

existsacertainsortofobjectinfrontofme–onewithacertainlook.Ofcourse,if

Ihaveavisualexperiencethatrepresentsanobjectwithacertainlook–alook

thatmybibleshares–andifIbelievethatmybiblehasthatlookandistheonly

onearoundwiththatlookthennodoubtIwillcometobelievethatmybibleis

presentonaccountoftheexperiencethatIhave.Butaccordingtothelow‐level

theoristthiscontentissolelythecontentofbelief.Itisnotthecontentofthe

experience.

10C.McGinn,TheCharacterofMind,(OxfordUP,1982)pp.38‐39.


Onecouldextendthistypeofreasoningtonaturalandartificialkinds.For

example,supposeyouhaveavisualexperiencethatyoumightnaturallydescribe

asbeingoneasofatoadonarock.Perhapsyourexperience,onreflection,

doesn’treallyrepresentatoadonarockforwouldn’tonehaveanexperience

withthesamephenomenalcharacterifonewerenotlookingatatoadonarock

butmerelyatoadskinenclosingasupportivewireframework,orifonewere

lookingatawax‐workofafrogthatwassorealisticonecouldn’ttellitapartby

sightfromarealtoad?Likewise,onemightnaivelythinkthatone’sexperience

couldrepresentthataGeiger‐counterwaspresent.Butcouldn’tonehavethe

verysamevisualexperienceifanobjectwiththemerelookofaGeiger‐counter

waspresentwithoutthatobjecthavingthepropertyofbeingabletodetect

radiation?

Ifoneacceptedthiskindofreasoningthenitwouldbereasonabletohold

thatthecontentsofvisualexperienceshouldberestrictedtogeneralcontents

andobservableproperties–thatispropertiesthatonecantellanobjecthasjust

bylookingsuchasshape,size,colourandposition.

4.ReasonstobeaHighLevelTheorist

Priortothepapersinthisvolumebeingpublished,themainargumentsagainst

thelow‐levelviewweremadebySusannaSiegel.11Sheclaimsthatsomenatural

kindproperties,suchasbeingapinetree,canfeatureinthecontentof

perception.Sheasksustoimaginethatwearenovicesatidentifyingtrees.While

11S.Siegel“WhichPropertiesareRepresentedinPerception?”,inT.S.GendlerandJ.Hawthorne(eds.)PerceptualExperience(OxfordUP,2006),pp.481‐503.


anovice,welookataparticulartreethatisinfactapinetreeandhaveavisual

experience.Wethenbecometreeexperts.Wecantellwhatkindoftreeeachtree

isbylooking.Sheclaimsthattheoverallphenomenalcharacterofone’smental

lifewillbedifferentwhenonelooksatapinetreewhenoneisanexpert,andcan

identifythepinetreeassuch,comparedtowhenonelooksatapinetreewhen

oneisanovice,andcan’tidentifythetree.Sheclaimsthatthisdifferenceinthe

overallphenomenologyisduetoadifferenceinthephenomenologyofthevisual

experienceshadineachcase.Shealsoclaimsthatiftwoexperiencesdifferin

phenomenalcharacterthentheydifferinrepresentationalcontent.Finally,she

claimsthatifthereisadifferenceincontentherethenitisbestexplainedbythe

naturalkindpropertybeingapinetreebeingrepresentedinthesecondbutnot

thefirstvisualexperience.Theexampleisofatypenowknownas‘contrast

cases’.

Therearetwomainrepliesthatonecangivetothisargument.Thefirstis

toquestionwhetherthedifferenceinthephenomenologyofyourconscious

mentallifeisadifferenceinthephenomenologyofexperience.Onecouldclaim

thatthedifferenceliesinotherphenomenalstates.Aplausibleclaimwouldbe

thatwhenyouareanoviceyouconsciouslybelievethatatreeisinfrontofyou.

Whenyouareanexpertyouconsciouslybelievethatapinetreeisinfrontofyou.

Andonecouldclaimthatwhatitisliketohavethesetwodifferentbeliefsisnot

thesame.Thusthedifferenceinphenomenalcharacterisattributabletothe

differentbeliefsyouhave.Thusthephenomenaldifferenceinexperiencerequired

inorderfortheretobeadifferenceinvisualcontentisnotthere.


Asecondreplyacceptsthatthereisadifferenceinthephenomenologyof

yourexperiencewhenyouareanoviceandwhenyouareanexpert,butitdoes

notacceptthatsuchadifferenceshowsthatanaturalkindlike‘pinetree’is

representedinyourexperience.Rather,itisargued,acertainoutlineshape

(perhapsoftheleavesorofthewholetree)orpatternonthebarkorcolourof

theleavesorbarkbecomessalienttoyouwhenyouareanexpert,andthisisto

saythatthisfeatureisrepresentedonlywhenyouareanexpertorrepresented

inmoredetailinyourexperiencewhenyouareanexpert.Perhapsthisis

becauseyoupayattentiontothefeaturewhenyouareanexpertorperhapsitis

becauseyoureyesfoveateonthisfeaturewhenyouareanexpertmorethanthey

didwhenyouwereanovice.

Anotherargumentthatonemightgiveforcertainexperienceshaving

high‐levelcontentquestionswhy,whenwethinkthatwehaveidentifiedtwo

visualexperienceswiththesamephenomenalcharacter,weshouldalwaysthink

thatwhattheyrepresentisthatwhichisincommontotheworldinfrontofthe

observeronbothoccasionsthattheyhavetheexperiences.Forexample,take

yourexperienceofatoadandyourexperiencesofthetoadhuskthatlookslikea

toad.Letusagreethatthesetwoobjectscausevisualexperienceswiththesame

phenomenalcharacterinasubject.Thelow‐leveltheoristwillsaythatboth

representanobjectwithcertainshape,sizeandpositionpropertiesandthatthe

propertyofbeingatoadisnotrepresented.Butthehigh‐leveltheoristcould

questionwhythelow‐leveltheoristissoconfidentthattheaccuracy‐conditions

forthisexperiencearesimplythatatoad‐lookingobjectispresentandhence

thatbothexperiencesareaccurate.Rather,theymightclaimthatboth


experiencesrepresentthatatoadispresentandthisistheaccuracycondition.

Onthisviewthevisualexperienceofthetoadwouldbeaccuratebutthevisual

experienceofthetoadhuskwouldbeinaccurate.Itwouldmisrepresentthata

toadwastherewhentherewasmerelyatoadhusk.But,theargumentwould

continue,thisreflectsthewayourexperiencestrikesus.Onewouldbesurprised

wereonetofindoutthatthereweremerelyatoadhuskinfrontofone,

Thissecondargumentshowsthatitwilloftenbeverydifficultto

determinewhattheaccuracy‐conditionsofatypeofexperienceis.Andthe

formerargumentshowsthatdeterminingwhetherachangeinthephenomenal

characterofone’smentallifeisachangeinthephenomenalcharacterofan

experienceorofsomeotheraspectofmentallifemaybeverydifficult.In

addition,knowingwhatthechangesinphenomenalcharacterofanexperience

signalaboutthedifferenceinrepresentationistricky.Inshort,determiningwhat

theadmissiblecontentsofexperienceareisahardtask.

5.WhyIstheDebateImportant?

Thedebateastowhattheadmissiblecontentsofexperienceareisimportantfor

manyreasons.Onereasonisthattherearemanydifferenttheoriesofhowan

experiencegetstohavethecontentthatitdoes.Forexampletherearefunctional

roleaccountsthatsaythattheroleoftheexperienceinthesubject’smentallife

determinesitcontentandtherearecausalcovariationaccountswherewhatan

experiencerepresentsisdeterminedbywhatitiscausedbyandcovarieswith

andmanymoreaccounts.Whetheranyofthesetheoriesareplausiblewill


dependontheirabilitytoaccountfortheformsofrepresentationthatwethink

canandcannotoccur.Thushavinganindependentgrasponthisissuewillbe

crucial.

Thedebateisalsoimportantforassessingwhetherrepresentationalismis

true.Recallthatthistheoryclaimsthattherecanbenodifferencesin

phenomenalcharacterwithoutdifferencesincontentandviceversa.Whether

thisisplausibleornotmaydependontherepresentationalresourcestowhich

onehasaccess,inordertoexplaindifferencesinphenomenalcharacter.12

Anyissueinphilosophyofmindwherewhatisatstakeiswhethera

personhasabelieforanexperienceofacertainsortwillbeinfluencedbythis

debate.Thisisbecauseitmayhelpdeterminethatabeliefispresentratherthan

anexperienceifthecontentofthestateinquestionisnotonethatanexperience

couldhave.Thus,forexample,itmayhelpindeterminingwhethercognitive

penetrationhasoccurredforitmaydeterminethatcertaincontentscouldnotbe

contentsofexperience.13

Thedebatealsohaslinkstovariousepistemologicalquestions.Thisis

becausewhatthecontentofperceptualexperiencescanbewillaffectwhatwe

shouldthinkconcerningwhetherandhowexperiencesjustifybeliefs–andthus

one’sepistemologicaltheory.

12Seeforexample,Macpherson,"AmbiguousFiguresandtheContentofExperience",Noûs,40(2006),pp.82‐117.13SeeMacpherson,"CognitivePenetrationofColourExperience:RethinkingtheIssueinLightofanIndirectMechanism",PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch(forthcoming).


6.Thepapersinthisvolume

Eachofthepapersinthisvolumeaddressoneormoreoftheissuesdiscussed

above.

TimBaynearguesthathigh‐levelcontentscanfeatureinperceptual

experience.Hefocusesonassociativeagnosia,adeficitinwhichsubjects’form

perceptionisintactbuttheydonnotrecogniseobjectsasbelongingtokindsthat

theyarefamiliarwith.Heclaimsthatthebestexplanationofsuchsubjectsisthat

theyaremissinghigh‐levelphenomenology.

StephenButterfill,relyingonMichotte’spsychologicalexperiments,which

provideinterestingcasesofcontrastcases,arguesthatwecanperceive

causation.Heclaimsthatperceptionofcausationisoneinstanceofcategorical

perception.Atthesametime,heholdsthatcausationisnotrepresentedin

perceptualexperience.

AlexByrnespendssometimeinhispaperarguingthatperception

involvesrepresentationalcontent.Buthedoesnotthinkthatitinvolveshaving

perceptualexperienceswithrepresentationalcontentforheeschewsthevery

ideaofexperienceasphilosophersconceiveofit.Hethusopposestheviewthat

perceptiondoesnotinvolverepresentation,butendorsestheviewthatitdoes

notinvolveexperience.Hethenclaimsthatthecontentofperceptionisnotvery

richandthatthisfactvindicatesoneclaimofthosewhobelievethatnocontent

atallisinvolvedinperception.Theclaimisthatperceptualerrorsaredueto

falsebeliefsnotfalseexperience.


Inhiscontribution,TimCranearguesthatperceptualexperienceshave

contentbutthatthiscontentisofaspecifickind.Itisnotpropositionalandthus

notlikethecontentofbelief,eventhoughithasaccuracy‐conditions.Herelates

theseclaimstohislong‐standingviewthatthecontentofperceptualexperience

isnonconceptual.

Theideathatthereareelementsofexperiencebeyondthefacingsurfaces

ofun‐occludedpartsofobjects,suchasthebacksidesandoccludedpartsof

objectsisexploredbyAlvaNoë.Thesephenomenally“presentasabsent”

elements,heclaims,arerepresentedinexperienceinvirtueofdeploymentof

knowledgeofthewaysinwhichmymovementsproducesensorychange.Noë

goesontocompareandcontrastperceptualexperienceandbelief.Theyareboth

methodsofaccesstoobjectsandpropertiesbutonesthatinvolvethe

employmentofdifferentaccessskills.

AdamPautz’schapteridentifiesthreeconceptionsofexperientialcontent.

Adebateaboutwhetherexperienceshavecontentmustconcerntheidentity

conception,heargues,foronlythismakesthedebatenon‐trivial.Accordingto

thisconception,anexperiencehascontentwhenitssubjectstandsinaspecial

relation,'sensorilyentertaining',toaproposition.Hearguesexperiencesdohave

thiskindofcontentasitbestexplainscertainexperientialfeatures.Heclaims

thesecontentsaregeneral,notsingular,mainlyongroundsofsimplicity.Finally,

hediscusseswhichpropertiesfeatureinthecontentsofexperience,usingwhich

beliefsourexperiencescangroundasaguide.

RichardPricearguesinfavourofalow‐levelview.Heclaimsthatseveral

contrastcaseswhicharecitedintheliteratureasbeingonethatshowthathigh‐


levelpropertiesmustberepresentedareunconvincingand,attheveryleast,

naturalkindpropertiesneednotbepositedaspartofthecontentofexperience.

LikeButterfill,SusannaSiegelalsofocusesonwhethercausationcan

featureinthecontentofvisualexperience.ShearguesthattheMichotte

experimentsaresuggestivebutnotconclusive.Shethendevelopsinteresting

contrastcasestosupportherclaimthatcausationcanberepresentedin

experience.Finally,Siegeldefendstheideathatexperiencemaynonetheless

remainsilentabout,thatisnotrepresent,certainpropertiesofcausation.

Intheconcludingpaperinthisvolume,MichaelTyediscusseswhether

experienceshaveexistentialcontents,singularcontents,gappycontentsor

multiplecontents.AccordingtoTye,contenthasastructurewithaplaceforan

objecttofill.Inveridicalperceptionitisfilledandwegetasingularcontent.In

hallucinationitisunfilledandwegetagappycontent.

Thesepapersformanexcitingbodyofwork.Diverseopinionsare

forcefullyarguedfor.Thepaperssuggestnewandexcitingdirectionsfor

researchandfromwhichIbelievefutureworkontheadmissiblecontentsof

experiencewillflow.14

14ThankstoMichaelBradyforhishelpfulcomments.

the admissible contents of experience intro post - glasgowheart

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