the access to justice journal
TRANSCRIPT
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The Access To Justice Journal
Charlotte School of Law
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The Access to Justice Journal is a student-run organization whose mission is to publish scholarly practice-oriented works covering myriad legal issues focused on serving the underserved. The Access to Justice Journal strives to serve as a forum to the legal community for discussing issues impeding access to justice, and as a
tool for law students to further refine their skill in legal writing, editing, and researching.
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Table of Contents
Understanding Crime Under Capitalism: A Critique of American Criminal Justice and Introduction to Marxist Jurisprudence By Steven E. Gilmore – St. Mary’s School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . page 4 Involuntary Commitment: How Living with a Mental Illness Can Lead to a Massive Curtailment of Liberty By LaQunya L. Baker – Charlotte School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . page 57
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UNDERSTANDING CRIME UNDER CAPITALISM: A CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST JURISPRUDENCE
STEVEN E. GILMORE
“Your Honor, years ago I recognized my kinship with all living beings, and I made up my mind that I was not one bit better than the meanest on earth. I said then, and I say now, that while there is a lower class, I am in it, and
while there is a criminal element I am of it, and while there is a soul in prison, I am not free.”1 — Eugene Victor Debs
INTRODUCTION
Americans have a pronounced tendency to boast that our system of justice is superior in
form and in fairness to virtually all other international legal structures.2 Prudent observers have
noticed the casuistry with which media outlets discuss the relative inequities of those juridical
models foreign to the American method.3 As a result of this and other related causes, we
Americans have come to understand crime, why crime occurs, and our sense of justice in
narrowly, if not exclusively, American terms.4 These assertions are not unique, and they appear
with regularity in scholarship on the subjects of ethnocentrism and American exceptionalism.5 1 Marshall Van Winkle, Radical Labor: United States vs. Debs et al., 7 Sixty Famous Cases 221, 2 Nancy K. Humphreys, Is Our Legal System the Best in the World?, Huffington Post (Sept. 16,
2013, 9:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-k-humphreys/is-our-legal-system-the-
b_b_3612565.html.
3 See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets
Boundaries, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 737, 738-44 (1999) (detailing the concept of ethnocentrism to
explain how Americans have been culturally conditioned to believe in our justice system’s
superiority).
4 Demleitner, supra, 738-44.
5 E.g., William R. Catton, Jr., The Functions And Dysfunctions Of Ethnocentrism: A Theory, 8
Soc. Probs. 201 (1960-1961); Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism:
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Traditional criminologists generally understand crime and why it occurs based on either
behavioral theories or definitional theories of crime.6 Behavioral theories of crime tend to focus
on crime as a product of learned characteristics developed as a result of upbringing, interpersonal
relationships, or even inherited traits that make a given person more or less likely to commit
crime.7 By contrast, definitional theorists consider the social and political processes that go into
deciding whether and why one act or another is to be labeled criminal.8 In the context of the
American and capitalist models, the more broadly accepted of the two theories is the behavioral
theory.9 In many ways this is to be expected when one considers the American emphasis on
individualism.10 As a result, the American justice system has developed in response to this
understanding of crime.11 The American law enforcement arm polices based on the behavior of
Comparative Law Sets Boundaries, 31 Ariz St. L.J. 737 (1999); Rosemary Foot, Exceptionalism
Again: The Bush Administration, the "Global War on Terror" and Human Rights, 26 Law &
Hist. Rev. 707 (2008); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81
Or. L. Rev. 97 (2002).
6 Michael J. Lynch et al., The New Primer in Radical Criminology: Critical Perspectives on
Crime, Power & Identity, 1–3 (3d ed. 2000).
7 Id. at 3.
8 Id. at 1-3.
9 Id. at 23.
10 See id. at 29-31 (analyzing the American concept of individualism as a mechanism for
understanding behavior; therefore crime as well).
11 See generally id. at 104-06, 192–96 (3d ed. 2000) (describing in detail the manner in which the
justice system has developed alongside and as a byproduct of capitalism).
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individuals as they have been observed, the courts and prosecuting apparatuses of the state seek
to convict people whose behavior violates the law as it is written, and the prisons warehouse
offenders whose behaviors deviate from our legally and culturally accepted edicts.12
For Marxists, crime is conceptualized altogether differently. All crime can be understood
as the expression of a set of power relations, either occurring in affirmance or in attempt to
subvert that relationship.13 Every deviant act from petty thievery to sexual assault can be
explained in this manner.14 This is not to say that crime is an inevitable byproduct of capitalism,
though it may be, but crime is necessary inasmuch and to the degree that wage and influence
disparities are represented within the sphere of those power relations.15 Marxists also utilize the
12 See generally Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology 190–205 (David F.
Greenberg ed., 1st ed. 1981) (discussing the role of the three branches of the criminal justice
system as they have evolved in conjunction with American capitalism).
13 Id. at 8-9. “[I]ncarceration is political since it is the end-product of decisions to treat some
social harms as deserving of penal sanctions and others as not—with little regard to the actual
extent of social damage.” See generally Michael J. Lynch et al., The New Primer in Radical
Criminology: Critical Perspectives on Crime, Power & Identity 25, 8–11 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing the emergence of Marxist criminology).
14 See Whose Law? What Order? A Conflict Approach to Criminology 215–53 (William J.
Chambliss & Milton Mankoff eds., 1976) (introducing a three-part discussion of crime analyzed
as the product of class conflict).
15 See Mark Cowling, Can Marxism Make Sense of Crime?, 2 Global Discourse: An Interdisc. J.
of Current Aff. & Applied Contemp. Thought 59, 64–66 (2011) (illustrating that incarceration,
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definitional analysis to critique the manner in which acts come to be labeled criminal, along with
the degree to which those acts are punished based on the “distribution of political and economic
power.”16
This discussion has become increasingly relevant as we struggle to articulate more
equitable measures of criminal justice in the face of mounting civil unrest. Following the highly
publicized deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown at the hands of white local law enforcement
officers, along with the subsequent failure of the justice system to address this repugnant state of
affairs,17 it has become essential for left-legal activists and advocates of social justice to begin
crafting a model of criminal justice that is capable of withstanding the bias of perceived class,
gender, and racial supremacy. Further, it seems necessary to express these ideas in a manner that
is amenable to implementation, rather than conveyed in the abstract terms of bourgeois
ideology.18 Such a design of legal structures and procedures can be deduced from the concepts
provided by Karl Marx and the various leftist practitioners and theoreticians that have followed
while necessary under capitalism, is actually less prevalent in countries with an adequate welfare
state functioning to lessen the degree of wage and income disparity).
16 Michael J. Lynch et al., The New Primer in Radical Criminology: Critical Perspectives on
Crime, Power & Identity 25, 4 (3d ed. 2000).
17 Sally Kohn, First Mike Brown, Then Eric Garner: Prosecutors Can’t Be Trusted to Try Cops,
The Daily Beast (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/03/the-eric-
garner-case-should-have-gone-to-trial.html?via=mobile&source=twitter.
18 Bertell Ollman, Introduction to Essays in Critical Theory: Toward a Marxist Criticism of
Liberal Ideology, NYU.edu (Mar. 16, 2005),
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/critique_ideology_content.php.
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in Marx’s footsteps.19 Nevertheless, it is beyond our ability to fully or accurately construct a
Marxist model of criminal law in abstract, just as it would have been impossible for slaves in
pharaonic Egypt or feudal serfs to outline a model of modern capitalist criminal law.20 Socialism
represents the transcendence of humanity from the barbarism of capitalism to a new and more
equitable society; therefore, the construction of society and its institutions lie in the execution of
that new society, as opposed to the development of any ideological concepts.21 With this
statement, we arrive at the crux of Marxism, distinguished from mere philosophy, in that
Marxism represents the marriage of theory and practice understood more broadly as “praxis”.22
Praxis is embodied in Marx’s statement that philosophers have merely interpreted the world up
to now, but the point should be to change it.23 This is, in part, the component of Marxism that
19 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 77 (Haymarket
Books ed. 2006).
20 See Seth Ackerman, The Red and the Black, Jacobin (Dec. 31, 2012),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2012/12/the-red-and-the-black/ (discussing the inherent difficulties
in attempting to predict or construct an abstract model of socialist society).
21 Peter Frase, Four Futures, Jacobin (Sept. 10, 2012),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2011/12/four-futures/. See also Crime and Capitalism: Readings in
Marxist Criminology 8–9 (David F. Greenberg ed., 1st ed. 1981) (explaining that resolving
capitalism’s inherent contradictions necessitates arriving at a new social form).
22 Todd Chretien, Praxis Makes Perfect, SocialistWorker.org (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://socialistworker.org/2013/03/26/praxis-makes-perfect.
23 Id.
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stresses human agency above all else.24 As concepts emphasizing human agency, such as praxis
and the necessity of self-determination and self-emancipation, are so core to the Marxist
framework,25 it follows that these elements are to be considered inexorable components of the
Marxist model of criminal justice.
In order to fully understand what envisioning a Marxist model would entail, it is
necessary to lay the foundation of the Marxist legal tradition in its historical context, and then in
explicitly Marxist terminology as such terms may relate to crime and criminal justice. Some of
this information may seem overly introductory for those who have studied Marx in any detail.
Nonetheless, it is intended for this piece to be digestible for a wide array of readers, many of
whom are less likely to have delved into the depths of Marx’s work—let alone the niche subject
of legal critiques and applications of Marx to law and criminal justice. We will journey first
through a brief history of Marxism as it relates to law and the legal systems purported to have
existed in the name of Marx, particularly the Soviet legal system. Following this historical
analysis, we will consider the specific tenets of Marxism and how those concepts may guide us
in constructing an authentic Marxist model of criminal justice. Next we will implement these
tenets in laying out a critique of each of the three phases of the American criminal justice
system: 1) the police, 2) the courts, and 3) the prisons. Finally, we will conclude with an attempt
at providing brief recommendations for constructing a Marxist criminal justice system. What
24 Id.
25 See Paul D’Amato, The Real Marxist Tradition, SocialistWorker.org (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://socialistworker.org/2003-2/479/479_10_MarxTradition.shtml (explaining the essentiality
of these and other components to the production of authentic Marxism, while using the presence
of such elements to distinguish it from inauthentic Marxism, such as Stalinism or Maoism).
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follows is intended to be an introductory overview of these concepts and systems. As a result,
the complexity of insight devoted to each section may appear somewhat limited. I encourage the
reader to follow the works cited herein and wade out further into the depths of the ideas and
methodologies of the Marxist tradition.
THE MARXIST LEGAL TRADITION
“Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the
economical conditions of existence of your class.”26 — Karl Marx
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were nineteenth century writers and political activists
who put forth the general theory of revolutionary communism and its transition period, more
commonly referred to as socialism.27 The understanding of these ideas and practices is nestled
more broadly under the banner of Marxism.28 A rudimentary explanation of the basic
methodology of Marxism could be expressed as follows: Capitalist society is divided into two
distinct classes—the working class and ruling class—whose attributes are defined by their
relation to the means of production.29 The means of production are the tools utilized to produce
the goods upon which society depends.30 The ruling class dominates ownership of the means of
production, while the working class is made to compete against one another at the individual
level, in effort to sell the greatest amount of their individual labor possible to the ruling class in
26 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, a Road Map to History’s Most
Important Political Document, 64 (Phil Gasper ed., Haymarket Books ed. 2005).
27 Id. at 9-14.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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exchange for a wage that represents the least possible amount of cost to the ruling class.31 This
struggle in labor represents an irresolvable conflict or contradiction in capitalism, as the value of
an individual laborer, a commodity to be exchanged for a wage, is alienated from the laborer’s
value as a human being.32 In order to effectuate meaningful and lasting change, the workers
must develop a sense of their own class-consciousness, organize collectively against the ruling
class to seize the means of production, and control the means of production democratically so
that the workers may enjoy the full fruit of their own labor.33
Marx and Engels were prodigious in their intellectual output, writing on virtually every
aspect of politics and economics—from critiques of governing authorities and the tedium of
inessential bureaucracy, to the labor and economic impetuses for determining how societies are
organized and the ineradicable conflicts that arise as a result of that organization.34 So it is with
no end of confusion and consternation that leftist jurists have been forced to bear with the
relative dearth of material from Marx and Engels on the subject of law and jurisprudence.35
Much of the information provided by Marx and Engels actually touching on the subject tends to
apply only tertiarily to the topic of law as it related at the time to private property, labor, finance
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law 11–12 (1st ed. 1980) (stating
that the task of writing on the subject of Marxist jurisprudence is made more complicated due to
the lack of material provided by Marx and Engels); see also Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law v
(1984) (articulating the author’s surprise at the lack of study dedicated to the subject).
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or economic crimes against the proletariat—most often mentioned only with regard to some
other aspect of the political economy and class oppression.36 This created some sense of doubt
among legal theorists and academics as to whether a substantive Marxist theory of law is even
discernable based on such scant source material.37 In fact, the subject of law and Marxism is so
36 See Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liberal Ideas and Marxist Critiques 5 (2d ed.
1986) (noting that Marx’s attention to the analysis of jurisprudence was vastly outweighed by his
critique of political economy); see also R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal
Law 12–14 (1st ed. 1980) (providing that Marx and Engels wrote very little explicitly about law,
and much of the analysis must necessarily be deduced from their theories on the economic
structures of the state); Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology 11 (David F.
Greenberg ed., 1st ed. 1981) (explaining that Marx and Engels did not provide a systematic
analysis of law and criminal justice); Csaba Varga, Marxian Legal Theory xiv–xv (Csaba Varga
ed., 1993) (detailing Marx and Engels’ lack of interest in the law, despite their educational
background in legal studies).
37 See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 9 (1984) (suggesting that a decidedly Marxist
legal theory may not even exist); Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical
Necessity and Radical Contingency, 4 CAN. J. L. & Jurisprudence 145 (1991) (positing that there
is not much of Marxist theory of law); Janet Campbell, An Analysis of Law in the Marxist
Tradition 3–4 (Studies in Political Science ed. 2003) (quoting Boaventura de Sousa Santos to
note that it is commonly stated that there is no Marxist theory of law); Hans Kelsen, The
Communist Theory of Law 12–13 (1955) (pointing out that Marx was largely dismissive of law
as bourgeois ideology); China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of
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rarely touched upon in academia that some scholars have investigated the field of Marxist
jurisprudence while laboring under the belief that they were quite alone in the undertaking.38
In spite of Marx’s enduring relevance and applicability in the fields of sociology,
economics, and politics, the state of Marxist jurisprudence appears upon cursory inspection to be
a case of arrested underdevelopment.39 This condition is rendered all the more intimidating and
incomprehensible when one considers the efforts made by Soviet era jurists who tried to square
the circle in establishing a legal system that sought to make quasi-Marxist analyses conform to
the restrictions of a debased, debauched, gerontocratic, and dictatorial form of Soviet-style
communism.40 A few Soviet jurists protrude from this ideological wreckage, Evgeny Pashukanis
International Law 79 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006) (noting that the absence of an articulable
Marxist theory law is a barrier to establishing a systematic legal structure based on Marxism).
38 Marxism and Law 2 (Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney eds., 1982) (stating the editors’ belief
that their assemblage of writings was the only contemporary collection on the subject Marxist
jurisprudence).
39 See generally China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law
62 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006) (discussing the resurging Marxist critique in the wake of
expanding global capitalism and previous scarcity of Marxist legal scholarship).
40 See Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 2, 144 (1984) (noting the general failure by Communist
states to offer any meaningful contributions to Marxist jurisprudence, and of the inherent
contradictions between Marxism and the nature of Soviet-style communism); see also R.W.
Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law 12–14 (1st ed. 1980) (decrying the
theoretical perversions and discordant attempts by Soviets theorists who sought to force isolated
fragments of Marxism into their distorted system of communism). See generally Christopher
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and Petr Ivanovich Stuchka among them, but the vast majority of their writings and research
dealt with aspects of jurisprudence that were largely unrelated to criminal law, nor were their
efforts directed significantly toward the actual establishment of a structurally sound justice
system in the new society.41 Pashukanis was a Russian attorney in the early decades of the
twentieth century following the Bolshevik Revolution.42 His primary contribution to Marxist
jurisprudence is represented in the development of his voluminous work, The General Theory of
Law and Marxism.43 Pashukanis’ theory attempted to draw from already existing legal forms
while incorporating explicitly Marxist principles to create a kind of socialist law of the transition
period, which was to be further developed and implemented during the time in which Soviet
society progressed toward full communism.44 Stuchka, who was a colleague and critic of
Hitchens, Hitch-22: A Memoir 98 (1st ed. 2010) (remarking on the gerontocratic, and therefore
patently un-Marxist, state of the Soviet Union).
41 See generally China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law
60–64, 77, 82–83 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006) (discussing the valuable contributions and, by
implication, the relative worth of Soviet jurists like Pashukanis and Stuchka compared with the
shameful and devastatingly suppressive legal enactments perpetrated by Andrey Vyshinsky);
HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 10, 13 (1984) (noting that Pashukanis’ contributions were
toward establishing a generalized theory of law and Marxism).
42 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 60–75–77
(Haymarket Books ed. 2006).
43 Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law 89 (1955).
44 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 79
(Haymarket Books ed. 2006); see also Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early
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Pashukanis,45 believed the law was solely a function of state oppression, and the law, in its
existing bourgeois form, did not provide a model from which the Soviet form could be
constructed.46 Stuchka also rejected the need for any distinction between a law of the transition
period and the regulatory functions required for society under full communism.47 The
complexity of Pashukanis’ and Stuchka’s arguments exceed our purpose here, but it is useful to
recognize there was an authentic attempt at constructing a viable Marxist theory of law in the
early years of the Soviet Union. It is possible that Pashukanis might have eventually constructed
a working theoretical model justice system that conformed or expanded logically from Marxist
methodology, but Josef Stalin saw an end to his work and life in 1937, during the great purges,
and branded Pashukanis an “enemy of the people” in the process.48 Stuchka was spared this fate
by having the fortune and good timing to pass away from natural causes before the purges
Years of the Russian Revolution, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 26 (2001) (describing
Pashukanis’ theory as the law of the transition period).
45 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 75 n.4
(Haymarket Books ed. 2006).
46 China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law 83 (Haymarket
Books ed. 2006).
47 Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian Revolution, 14
CAN. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 26 (2001).
48 Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet, Introduction to Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on
Marxism and Law, Marxists.org 273–301 (1980) available at
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/biog/biogintro.
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began.49 Such was the state of affairs under Stalin,50 and that alone should serve reason enough
to merit dismissing the criminal justice model under Stalin and his successors, from
consideration here.
It is important to note that the veritable famine of work committed to the subject of
Marxist jurisprudence is, in many ways, a byproduct of design.51 Law, particularly criminal law,
was considered an intrinsic component of state sanctioned tyranny—a tool created by the ruling
49 See Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian
Revolution, 14 CAN. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 26 (2001) (believing it all but certain that Stuchka
would have been executed along with Pashukanis had he lived that long); see also P.I. STUCHKA,
Selected Writings on Soviet Law and Marxism vii, xx (Piers Beirne et al. eds., 1988) (noting the
year of death as 1932, then implying that Stuchka might not have survived the Stalinst purges
had he lived any longer).
50 See generally Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian
Revolution, 14 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 25–26 (2001) (discussing instances in which Stalin
pressured, threatened, even executed the leftist jurists who failed to fall in line with Stalin’s
capricious concept of the Party and its renunciation of the universally Marxist concept that the
state should wither away).
51 See Janet Campbell, An Analysis of Law in the Marxist Tradition 1–7 (Studies in Political
Science ed. 2003) (pointing out that the concept of law was not necessarily intended to be an
element of Marxism, due to its theoretically limited shelf life upon the establishment of the
proletarian dictatorship).
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class and wielded by the state for the purpose of further disenfranchising the proletariat.52 As per
Marx, the entirety of the state and its legal apparatuses were eventually to wither away upon the
successful self-emancipation of the working class, more or less phasing itself out, as the
outmoded artifice of a reliquary construction.53 Contributing to the evident aversion of Marxists
to legal analysis is the fear of giving way to legal fetishism.54 Legal fetishism refers to any
conviction that the rule of law is necessary, autonomous, or even desirable in any fashion.55 For
52 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 27 (1984). See also Michael Head, The Passionate Legal
Debates of the Early Years of the Russian Revolution, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 21
(2001) (paraphrasing a Soviet jurist, Podvolotskii, in stating that law functions as a coercive
enforcement of the normative values established by the ruling class).
53 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 15 (1984). The concept of the withering away of law is
potentially Marx’s most notorious pronouncement. Id. See also Michael Head, The Passionate
Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian Revolution, 14 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 26
(2001) (stating that the Soviets initially attempted to create the conditions by which the state
could begin to wither away until Stalin came into power and forcibly reversed Soviet consensus
on the necessity of this basic tenet of Marxism).
54 See Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 10–14 (1984) (explaining the concept of legal fetishism
and general disdain among Marxists toward the natural “Rule of Law” and those who regard law
as a necessary institutional framework). See generally Andrew Vincent, Marx and Law, 20 J.L.
& SOC'Y 371, 380, 385 (1993) (highlighting in brief the general concern of being accused of
legal fetishism).
55 Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical Necessity and Radical Contingency,
4 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 145, 152 (1991).
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Marxists, the general purpose of law is to sanction the existing material relations between the
working class and the state, where law is considered the codified will of the bourgeoisie.56 This
very accusation was stated in no uncertain terms by Marx in the Communist Manifesto.57 A
belief in the necessity of law, to maintain social order and harmony, presupposes a rather nasty
and unscientific conception of the nature of man.58 Nevertheless, the notion that law may simply
cease, as if it were the victim of a massive coronary, seems plainly utopian on its face.59 It
follows that it would be likewise utopian, to believe the political economy could change
immediately upon the breach in some revolutionary watershed.60 The obvious truth of the matter
is in the concept’s nomenclature—the state does not vanish but merely withers as if from
atrophy, redundancy, or both.61 This, of course, was one of the great failings of the early Soviet
56 R.W. MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 18 (1st ed. 1980)
(paraphrasing Engels in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy).
57 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, a Road Map to History’s Most
Important Political Document 9–14 (Phil Gasper ed., Haymarket Books ed. 2005).
58 See Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 120 (1984) (writing that such a belief relies on the
supposition that man is naturally inclined to greed and selfishness).
59 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 15–16 (1984).
60 See R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law 25 (1st ed. 1980) (stating
that common sense gives the lie to this impossibility).
61 See id. (paraphrasing Engels in Anti-Duhring to explain that the state is not simply abolished,
but gradually erodes as post-revolutionary society moves towards an eventual state of
classlessness); see also Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the
Russian Revolution, 14 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 9 (2001) (quoting Lenin from The State and
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Union, wherein the Bolsheviks attempted to hasten the necessary structural and industrial
preconditions, in order to sooner arrive at the final stateless, and classless destination.62 Given
the general hellishness of Russia in the years succeeding the Revolutions, it seems the
Bolsheviks were yoked to the chain of unrelenting circumstance and terminally bad luck.63 Had
conditions allowed for the organic growth of communism in Russia, and had the Bolshevik
revolution been emulated internationally, as they believed it would, the Soviet Union might have
gone through the protracted period of transition from capitalism to full communism, known in
Marxist parlance as socialism or vulgar communism.64 The laws and legal forms that developed
in response to these unique circumstances represented new contributions to Marxism, as
Revolution to show that the state is an impossible and unnecessary institution in a society that
lacks the usual class antagonisms).
62 See Id. at 7-9 (discussing the manner in which the Bolsheviks modified Marxism in order to
adapt the methodology to their circumstances, and later the perversions spearheaded by Stalin’s
doctrine of socialism in one state).
63 See generally Paul D’Amato, What happened to the Russian Revolution?, SocialistWorker.org
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://socialistworker.org/2012/02/10/what-happened-to-the-russian-revolution
(laying out the various external and internal calamities during in the early years of the Soviet
Union).
64 See generally Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian
Revolution, 14 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 3, 7–9 (2001) (explaining that Lenin and Trotsky had
not intended for an immediate transition to full communism, but that they had fully expected
international revolution and a protracted temporary proletarian state).
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revolutionaries sought to incorporate Marxism into their legal analysis.65 To fully understand
these contributions, it is necessary to first examine some of the more classically Marxist concepts
and the manner in which those ideas naturally bear relation to law.
Historical Materialism & the Dialectic
Marx’s critique of capitalist society, from economics to its jurisprudence, revolves
around the concept of historical materialism.66 Materialism is the element of Marxism that sets it
apart from crude philosophy in its rejection of any measure of idealism.67 In terms of a legal
analysis, the materialist jurist should concern oneself with the social and economic imperatives
that drive and “direct the course of legal development,” as opposed to the letter of the law, which
is a socially produced construct in the idealist sense.68 The law as it is written is only a matter of
words, but to study the machinations that gave rise to the law, the manner in which the law is
carried out, and how that law affects our objective reality, is to examine law as a materialist.69
65 CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60
(Haymarket Books ed. 2006).
66 HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 17 (1984); MICHAEL J. LYNCH ET AL., THE NEW PRIMER IN
RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME, POWER & IDENTITY 25 (3d ed.
2000).
67 See HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 17 (1984) (explaining the distinction between
materialism and idealism).
68 See ANTHONY CHASE, LAW AND HISTORY 20, 28 (New Press ed. 1997) (discussing the
meaning of materialism as it relates to jurisprudence).
69 See generally, OLUFEMI TAIWO, LEGAL NATURALISM: A MARXIST THEORY OF LAW 30–32 (1st
ed. 1996) (providing an account of historical materialism); CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL
21
This emphasis on historical materialism has given rise to assertions that Marx was a historical
determinist.70 The truth of that matter is that Marx, while acknowledging history, has in some
part, actually emphasized human agency above all else.71 This is the heart of materialism, the
production and reproduction of the events by human self-action.72 The particular form of human
action Marx analyzed is that of the interaction between the bourgeois and the proletariat—the
ruling and working classes, respectively—and relationship of the proletariat, to the means of
production.73 Instead of analyzing these groups as sociological abstractions, Marx held that the
relation of these classes, to the means of production must be considered in light of the present
RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–8 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006)
(discussing historical materialism and its relation to law and legal structures); ANTHONY CHASE,
LAW AND HISTORY 20, 28 (New Press ed. 1997) (examining the meaning of materialism as it
pertains to jurisprudence).
70 MIÉVILLE, Supra, at 4–8 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006); But see CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS,
HITCH–22: A MEMOIR 111 (1st ed. 2010) (refuting the charge of determinism). Contra Eric
Engle, Human Rights According to Marxism, 65 GUILD PRAC. 249 (2008) (claiming that
Marxism is deterministic due to its overreliance on economic forces of production that serve as
the guiding historical motivator).
71 CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HITCH-22: A MEMOIR 111 (1st ed. 2010).
72 See CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
5 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006) (paraphrasing John Rees in The Algebra of Revolution).
73 MICHAEL J. LYNCH ET AL., THE NEW PRIMER IN RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME, POWER & IDENTITY 20–23 (3d ed. 2000).
22
mode of production—capitalism.74 The implications of this argument extend beyond the
common tools of industry and factory labor, and into the realm of jurisprudence.75 Legislators
and the judiciary, comprised of the bourgeoisie, use the law as an instrument to maintain class
antagonism, by preserving the economic order and relations of the people to the means of
production.76 Crime control and law enforcement, often capricious and arbitrary, are methods
used to preserve class divisions and regularly emphasize the protection of private property at the
expense of the welfare of the people.77 Further, crime can be expressed in material terms as a
function of supply and demand.78 Society has a demand for crime, to which supply corresponds,
and gaps in society are filled by new criminals, new inmates, and new executees.79
The next aspect of Marx’s materialism is the dialectic. If historical materialism is the
foundation of Marxism, then the dialectic is the means by which we can come to understand the
way social change occurs.80 The bulk of Marx’s work centers on the dialectic, so it is
74 Id.
75 See Id. at 21 (discussing the law as a means of maintaining class divisions).
76 See Id. at 20-23 (explaining the relationship of Marx’s class analysis to law).
77 See generally KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE POWER IN AMERICA (South
End Press ed. 2007) (expounding upon the role of law enforcement as anathema to the working
class).
78 R.W. MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1st ed. 1980).
79 Id.
80 See V.G. AFANASYEV, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 13 (1987) (quoting Marx to explain
dialectical materialism as a method for changing, rather than merely interpreting the world).
23
exceedingly difficult to give full justice to the concept in such short space.81 Nevertheless, a
simple, if overly simple, definition of the dialectic is as follows: the dialectic is the
understanding of “contradictions and their resolution through a transcendence or overcoming.”82
The dialectic, then, is the organizing principle for Marxists.83 When internal contradictions
cannot be resolved from within the confines of the existing social order, we consider that
circumstance to be dialectical.84 This is an intrinsic contradiction because the conflict is specific
to the present societal configuration; therefore, the only way to resolve these contradictions is
through the creation of a new social form.85 For Marxists, the new form represents the
revolutionary shift from capitalism to communism.86 This, it seems, supports the Marxist
aversion to law because the dialectic analysis posits that law, in its present bourgeois form,
cannot facilitate the ushering in of a new social form, since the purpose of law is to preserve the
81 Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical Necessity and Radical Contingency,
4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 145, 151–52 (1991).
82 CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 498 (David F. Greenberg ed.,
1st ed. 1981).
83 V.G. AFANASYEV, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 13 (1987).
84 CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 317 (David F. Greenberg ed.,
1st ed. 1981).
85 Id.
86 See Richard Wolff, A Socialism for the 21st Century, RDWOLFF.COM (June 11, 2013),
http://rdwolff.com/content/socialism-21st-century (discussing this issue in the subsection entitled
“What to Do Now”).
24
current configuration.87 We can begin to grasp the dialectical method as an understanding of the
history of conflicts between opposing views and classes, as well as the struggle to synthesize
these views into an ascertainable truth.88 This understanding is called dialectical materialism.89
To gain full comprehension, it may be necessary to illustrate this method in strictly legal
terms. Let us consider the offense of prostitution. Prostitution is a form of labor in the Marxist
sense, more broadly known as “sex work” in the parlance of modern Marxist-feminism.90
Prostitution is also outlawed in the United States.91 This is an example of criminalizing labor,
simply because it does not fit within the culturally accepted strata, but the Marxist analysis
doesn’t end by merely pointing out this contradiction.92 The Marxist critique considers the
conflict between women laboring in sex work, marginalized, and disenfranchised, as a result of
87 CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 317 (David F. Greenberg ed.,
1st ed. 1981).
88 Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical Necessity and Radical Contingency,
4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 145, 151–52 (1991).
89 V.G. AFANASYEV, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM 14 (1987).
90 See Melissa Gira Grant, Let’s Call Sex Work What It Is: Work, THE NATION (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/178683/lets-call-sex-work-what-it-work (providing an analysis
of sex work at the intersection of Marxist labor politics and feminism).
91 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2014).
92 See Cara Beusman, Demonizing Sex Work Harms Sex Workers, JEZEBEL.COM (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://jezebel.com/demonizing-sex-work-harms-sex-workers-1537828241 (emphasizing further
the need to recognize sex work in all its forms as a legitimate form of labor).
25
the laws prohibiting the conduct, against the ruling class that legislates against their interests.93
Further, laws implemented with the professed intent of protecting women in the sex industry,
such as broad laws against human trafficking, actually have the effect of further alienating
women and their lived experiences in the sex industry.94 To consider this issue dialectically is to
consider the intent of the legislators, expressed or otherwise, the law as it is written, and the
effects the law and its implementation have on the people.95 Where the law creates
contradictions, or where law creates conflict between class interests, that conflict is said to be
dialectical because such conflicts cannot be remedied by creating new laws or lessening the
restrictions of preexisting laws—it requires fundamental change in the law and all laws.96
Alienation, Exploitation, & False Consciousness
A predominant explanation for the occurrence of crime is believed to come from the
school of thought stemming from Emile Durkheim known as anomie theory, which may be more
93 Charlotte Shane, Invisible Sex Workers, JACOBIN (May 14, 2014),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/05/invisible-sex-workers/.
94 Alana Massey, Keeping Sex Workers Quiet, JACOBIN (Nov. 2, 2014),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/11/keeping-workers-quiet/.
95 See generally ANTHONY CHASE, LAW AND HISTORY 20, 28 (New Press ed. 1997) (offering an
explanation of dialectic contradictions inherent within the law and legal structures).
96 CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 8–9 (David F. Greenberg ed.,
1st ed. 1981). (“A process is dialectical when it is based on an inner contradiction that cannot be
reconciled within an existing set of relationships. Because the contradiction is inherent . . . it can
only be resolved by creating a new social form.”).
26
clearly understood as the theory of alienation, articulated by Marx.97 The concept of alienation,
as stated earlier, concerns the working class’ alienation from the product of its labor.98 Workers
produce products for consumption, but those workers have no connection to the product once it’s
produced, or to the value for which it is sold.99 As a result, the worker is unable to identify his
labor from any other indistinct portion of the physical machinery itself—owned by the capitalists
and employed to serve their ends.100 Marx believed that humans are naturally inclined toward
socialization and creativity, but the alienation of labor, under capitalism, separates the workers
from their natural state and orients them instead around their economic life, which becomes the
dominant focus.101 The worker does not experience anything relatively close to the full financial
benefit his product, which results in profit for the capitalist, and this profit is the representation
of exploited labor.102 Exploitation is what the worker experiences when his labor has been sold
97 See Id. at 8–9; see also CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HITCH-22: A MEMOIR 98 (1st ed. 2010)
(remarking on the origin of anomie in Durkheim, then briefly comparing the concept to the
Marxist understanding of alienation and class relations).
98 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, A ROAD MAP TO HISTORY’S
MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL DOCUMENT 9–14 (Phil Gasper ed., Haymarket Books 2005) (1848).
99 PETER OSBORNE, HOW TO READ MARX 51–52 (First American ed. 2006).
100 PAUL D’AMATO, THE MEANING OF MARXISM 70 (2006).
101 Mark Cowling, Can Marxism Make Sense of Crime? 2 GLOBAL DISCOURSE: AN INTERDISC. J.
OF CURRENT AFF. & APPLIED CONTEMP. THOUGHT 59, 62 (2011).
102 Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical Necessity and Radical Contingency,
4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 145–46 (1991).
27
for less than the use value of his labor.103 As workers lack the ability to bargain for their wages,
on equal ground with their employers, the workers are essentially forced to do labor for the
offered wage, with minimal room for adjustment.104 If the worker is unable to meet his
subsistence requirements, based on that wage or sum total income from multiple lawful forms of
labor, the worker seems left with only unlawful remedies, in order to supplement his lawful
income.105 But there are those workers who, rather than appearing alienated or attempting to
push back against the system that exploits their labor, affirmatively endorse the interests of the
ruling class.106 This condition can be understood as a form of “false consciousness,” wherein
workers embrace ethics that are counter to their class interests—from the more common labor
competition and individualism, to the more extreme forms of racism and sexism.107 These
sentiments are contradictory to the class interests of the laborers, because they serve to fragment
and decollectivize the workforce, which, but for these conflicts, might organize against the
103 See Id. at 146. (“[E]xploitation’ occurs when someone uses another person as merely an
object for her own benefit without regard for the humanity of that person.”).
104 Id. at 147.
105 Id. But see Mark Cowling, Can Marxism Make Sense of Crime?, 2 GLOBAL DISCOURSE: AN
INTERDISC. J. OF CURRENT AFF. & APPLIED CONTEMP. THOUGHT 59, 62 (2011) (noting that the
explanation of alienation and exploitation as a source of crime was not put forward by Marx
himself, but is an extrapolation of Marx by others who have adapted Marxism to the problem of
crime, and perhaps an inaccurate extrapolation at that).
106 Id. at 150.
107 Id. at 147.
28
bosses.108 For Marxists, these concepts may provide an explanation for why the poor commit
crime.109 Two causes of criminality have been identified in relation to alienation and
exploitation: (1) the working class is exploited and deprived access to much of society’s surplus
goods and services; and (2) competitive capitalism encourages and reinforces normative values
of greed and selfishness, which drives commodity fetishism and other covetous sentiments.110 In
essence, the working class cannot attain the things they’re culturally instructed to value, or
achieve the legitimate stations that would allow them to acquire those goods or services, so a
natural outcome of this conflict may be theft, for instance, or other offenses to varying degrees of
severity.111 The criminal is alienated, in a sense, because the egoism and greed of the ruling class
is essentially legalized or normative, while the exact or similar behavior performed by the
working class is prohibited and punished harshly.112
The Lumpenproletariat
The lumpenproletariat is a contentious subject, in the realm of Marxist legal scholarship,
but it remains one of the few concepts Marx addressed that spoke directly to issue of crime and
criminals.113 Therefore, aspects of the lumpen category, whether one even recognizes it as a
108 Id. at 147-148.
109 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 231–43 (Spring 1973),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264911.
110 Id. at 234–35.
111 Id. at 231–43.
112 Id. at 236.
113 Mark Cowling, Marx’s Lumpenproletariat and Murray’s Underclass: Concepts Best
Abandoned? 9, originally in MARX’S EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE: (POST)MODERN INTERPRETATIONS
29
distinct category, present requisite matters for discussion.114 In 1972, socialist Hal Draper
authored the premier account of the lumpenproletariat, as various misleading and mistranslated
renditions of the phrase began occurring amidst revolutionary discussions and publications.115
Draper wrote, speaking for Marx, that the lumpenproletariat was an ill-defined constituent of
parasitic elements—social scum, counterrevolutionaries, and vagabonds “capable of the basest
banditry and foulest corruption.”116 This sedimentary class excrement, according to Marx, was
not to be recruited by leftists into the ranks of the revolutionary working class.117 In an instance,
where they had been mistakenly brought on as part of the revolutionary contingent, the
lumpenproletarians resorted to looting the jewelry shops and committing acts of senseless
property damage.118 Draper offers that the lumpenproletariat, is the product of developed
capitalism and the existing social order, as opposed to a prerequisite for its construction.119
Further, Draper recognizes in Marx’s writing that the lumpenproletariat character is not bound
(Mark Cowling & James Martin eds., 2002)
http://icspt.uchicago.edu/papers/2002/cowling02.pdf.
114Id. at 9; see Hal Draper, The Concept of the “Lumpenproletariat” in Marx and Engels, 6
ECONOMIES ET SOCIÉTÉS 2285 (1972) (noting that the lumpenproletariat may not refer to any
particular class of workers at all).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2294–95.
117 Id. at 2298–301.
118 Id. at 2301.
119 Id. at 2303–04.
30
solely to the confines of the working class, but also found in the ranks of the bourgeoisie.120
Marx considered these lumpen-bourgeois to be likewise parasitic and socially functionless, but
found in the finance aristocracy of beneficiaries, inheritors, and “hangers on of the rich and
powerful.”121 This is a significant analysis, because it seems to identify the criminal class
responsible for the various Wall Street and banking catastrophes that have befallen the United
States, over the last century. In addition, the phrase “hangers on of the rich and powerful,” seems
to implicate the low-to-mid-level bureaucrats, and other agents of the state, who do not
personally belong to the ranks of the ruling elite.122 Later, we will consider the position of the
police in relation to the lumpenproletariat, and determine whether such a classification may be
more apt, when describing the manner in which officers are employed to act against their class
interests.
Base & Superstructure
Briefly, it may be somewhat necessary to explain Marx’s concept of base and
superstructure, and identify where the legal structures reside within those two categories.123 The
base and superstructure analysis has been criticized, perhaps rightly, as being too vague and
underdeveloped to be an empirical contribution to the Marxist critique of capitalism.124 The base
120 Id. at 2305.
121 Id. at 2306–07.
122 Id. at 2306–07.
123 See HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 78–81 (1984) (covering an in-depth analysis of
Marx’s concept of base and superstructure).
124 Lee Goldstein, High Theory And Low Practice: A Dream And Five Theses On Being A Left
Lawyer And Legal Worker, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 133, 146-50 (2012-2013).
31
and superstructure configuration, is used to signify the relationship between the mode of
production. and political and ideological function of the state in a capitalist society.125 In
essence, Marx believed that the mode of production, capitalism, represents the economic base,
while politics and ideology represents the superstructure.126 The superstructure is molded by the
economic base, which then provides context to our thoughts and experiences.127 The question
for Marxists is where the law is situated in this analysis.128 The face-value answer suggests that
law is necessarily part of the superstructure, as it is a part of political schema, acting in
preservation of the capitalism.129 Marx even wrote that society’s economic structure is what
drives the legal and political superstructure.130 Notwithstanding, scholars and proponents of
natural law have suggested that law is actually part of the economic base, as the mode of
production itself adheres to certain laws of ownership.131 The debate itself is somewhat
unremarkable, as it relates to criminal law, but readers would be well served to be aware of the
concept and its origin in Marxism. For our purposes, let us assume that the realm of criminal law
125 Raymond A. Belliotti, Marxist Jurisprudence: Historical Necessity and Radical Contingency,
4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 145, 147–48 (1991).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Mark Cowling, Can Marxism Make Sense of Crime? 2 GLOBAL DISCOURSE: AN INTERDISC. J.
OF CURRENT AFF. & APPLIED CONTEMP. THOUGHT 59, 66 (2011).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See G. A. Cohen, Base and Superstructure: A Reply to Hugh Collins, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 95 (1989) (providing a broader discussion of this issue).
32
is set in the superstructure, and the economic base informs the shape of the superstructural legal
system in America.132 This may be more helpful for the sake of clarity, because it allows us to
observe the manner in which criminal law is used as a tool that has been shaped in the
superstructure, and wielded for the preservation and advancement of the capitalist mode of
production.133
MARXISM AND THE THREE STAGES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The Marxist critique of criminal justice under capitalism offers a sharp analysis of each
stage in the tripartite justice system: 1) policing; 2) the courts; and 3) the penal system.134 It is
important, in constructing the appraisal of capitalist justice that Marxists remain critical of the
132 Julius Stone, L'etat, C'est Moi L'etat Est Mort! A Retrospect On Soviet Marxist Theorizing On
State And Law, 10 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1962-1963). “[L]aw is merely part of the cultural, ethical,
political and legal superstructure, wholly determined by the economic arrangements of a class-
dominated society.” Id.
133 See generally LYNCH, supra note 6, at 20–23 (explaining the relationship of Marx’s class
analysis to law).
134 See Id. at 8–17. (offering a brief summary of the Marxist critique from the perspective of
radical criminology).
33
legal systems that have operated, however fraudulently, under the banner of Marxism.135 To that
end, each section will be accompanied by a brief assessment and comparison to the Soviet
model. By no means could it be suggested that the Soviet model is at all viable or preferable, but
it is worthwhile to draw comparisons, if only, to distinguish the system employed in the Soviet
Union, from any of the ideas and methodology actually attributable to Marx.136 It is important to
note, much of the information regarding the legal structures, in early years, following the
October revolution is fragmented, due to the lack of statistics gathered on the topic of crime, and
general disinterest with the law and court system.137 As a result, the analysis of the Soviet model
may seem limited, or even perfunctory in some sections.
The Police
“I have no particular love for the idealized ‘worker’ as he appears in the bourgeois Communist’s mind, but when I see an actual flesh-and-blood worker in conflict with his natural enemy, the policeman, I do not have to ask myself which side I am on.”138 — George Orwell
It is commonly asserted that the police, particularly an armed police force, are necessary,
and even desirable, in a civilized society.139 According to Gallup polls, performed yearly since
135 CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60–
64 (Haymarket Books ed. 2006).
136 See generally Id. (providing a summary dismissal of the Soviet legal system, while pointing
out the wholesale disconnect between that system and Marxism).
137 MAKEPEACE, supra note 35, at 49–55, 79.
138 GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA 124 (Harcourt ed. 1980).
34
139 LYNCH, supra note 6, at 145; see also Michael Medved, Slow down, police are the good guys,
USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2014, 6:03 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/21/police-militarization-ferguson-crime-
violence-justice-bureau-column/14307505/ (arguing that police are a force for good in the U.S.,
and necessary agents in the continued survival of “African-Americans”). See generally Steve
Adubato, By Any Means Necessary: Do We Need Police In Schools?, N.J. MONTHLY (Feb. 11,
2013), http://njmonthly.com/articles/towns_and_schools/steve-adubato-only-in-nj/by-any-
means-necessary.html (intimating that an armed police presence in schools may be necessary to
preserve the safety of the children); Heather MacDonald, New York’s Indispensable Institution,
CITY JOURNAL (July 11, 2009) http://www.city-journal.org/2009/nytom_nypd.html (describing
the correlation between economics and law enforcement in New York City, and concluding that
the police are an indispensable element for continued economic growth); Timothy Roufa, Does
Society Still Need Law Enforcement? If So, What Is It Worth?,
CRIMINOLOGYCAREERS.ABOUT.COM (Nov. 18, 2012)
http://criminologycareers.about.com/b/2012/07/12/does-society-need-law-enforcement-if-so-
what-is-it-worth.htm (discussing the historical necessity of the police in relation to their salary);
Jazz Shaw, The “militarization” of police was not only inevitable, but necessary, HOTAIR.COM
(Aug. 16, 2014) http://hotair.com/archives/2014/08/16/the-militarization-of-police-was-not-only-
inevitable-but-necessary/ (concluding that the militarization of the police is necessary to combat
the armed criminals who outnumber them).
35
1993, a majority of Americans polled have expressed confidence in the police every year.140
Even during periods of turmoil and conflict between the police and the citizenry, such as the year
following the Los Angeles riots of 1992,141 or the years featuring clashes between police and
Occupy Wall Street protestors,142 Americans have routinely polled positively in favor of the
police.143 Critiques of law enforcement have become commonplace, following the events of
police violence in Ferguson, MO and elsewhere,144 and perhaps 2015 might finally be year to
when this unbroken chain of police confidence finally begins to show its rust.145 Nevertheless,
staunch confidence in law enforcement is to be understood, as Americans are more or less
140 Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 5–8, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
141 Scott Martelle, Rodney King and the L.A. riots: When 20 years can seem like yesterday, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2012/04/rodney-
king-and-the-la-riots-when-20-years-can-seem-like-yesterday.html.
142 Rebecca Solint, The truth about violence at Occupy, SALON (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:04 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/02/21/the_truth_about_violence_at_occupy/.
143 See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 5–8, 2014), (directing the reader’s attention
particularly to the polls performed on March 22–24, 1993, and June 1–4, 2013).
144 E.g., Harold Meyerson, Ferguson’s lawlessness is not a big surprise, WASH. POST (Nov. 26,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-in-ferguson-lawlessness-
bred-lawlessness/2014/11/26/2d1f0c0c-7595-11e4-a755-
e32227229e7b_story.html?postshare=1881417091657708.
145 See Id.
36
conditioned to view police violence as a something that happens in isolation,146 while other
police supporters tend to chalk criticism of law enforcement up to an overemphasis on just a few
bad apples on the force.147 In light of mounting civil unrest, some commentators have felt
obliged to speak out in favor of reforms and other remedies aimed at issues, including concerns
of racism.148 There remains a possibility that issues are at last coming to a head, and even
President Obama has been compelled to speak and act on the racial biases, so prevalent amongst
police officers.149 President Obama found it necessary to intervene when, on December 18,
2014, an Executive Order was issued establishing the “President's Task Force on 21st Century
146 WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 8–9.
147 Joel Hughes, There are no "bad apple" police officers, THE DENVER POST (Feb. 14, 2015,
5:00 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/voices/ci_27521364/there-are-no-bad-apple-police-
officers. (“Yet, nearly every time someone criticizes the police, someone else counters with the
argument that we are unjustifiably fixing our attention on ‘a few bad apples.’”). Id.
148 Timothy Lynch, 2015 can be the year of criminal justice reform, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 9,
2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/2015-can-be-the-year-of-criminal-
justice-reform/article/2559732; see, e.g., José Martín, Policing is a Dirty Job, But Nobody's
Gotta Do It: 6 Ideas for a Cop-Free World, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/policing-is-a-dirty-job-but-nobodys-gotta-do-it-6-
ideas-for-a-cop-free-world-20141216 (presenting ideas aimed at reforming).
149 Dave Boyer, Obama says police training needed to reduce their racial ‘bias’, THE WASH.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/22/obama-says-police-
training-needed-reduce-their-rac/.
37
Policing.”150 Nevertheless, the task force’s interim findings, and reform recommendations, fail
to address the functional and substantive deficiencies of the American model of policing.151
Despite the reforms recommended by the task force, up to now, the recommendations would still
leave the role of community mediator largely, if not exclusively, in the hands of the police.152
But it is not enough to state simply that law enforcement officers have exhibited a
marked tendency toward practices that are racist,153 sexist,154 homophobic, transphobic,155 and
150 Interim Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, PRESIDENT’S TASK
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 83 (Mar. 2015),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Interim_TF_Report.pdf.
151 Alex S. Vitale, Obama’s Police Reforms Ignore the Most Important Cause of Police
Misconduct, THE NATION (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/200409/obamas-
police-reforms-ignore-most-important-cause-police-misconduct.
152 Id..
153 Reddit Hudson, Being a cop showed me just how racist and violent the police are. There’s
only one fix., THE WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/06/i-was-a-st-louis-cop-my-peers-
were-racist-and-violent-and-theres-only-one-fix/; see also Charlene Carruthers, Black Future
Month: End the Anti-Black Police State, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:27 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlene-carruthers/end-the-antiblack-police-
_b_6604488.html?ncid=fcbklnkushpmg00000047 (pointing out the persistent and pervasive
mistreatment of blacks by law enforcement).
38
Islamophobic,156 all while developing a growing penchant for thuggish violence.157The Marxist
critique must analyze law enforcement in its totality, as an institution, and its relation to the
capitalist mode of production.158 A Marxist must ask how the police contribute to the
154 Joy Diaz, Sexist Comment by Austin Police Officer: Isolated Incident or Part of Broader
Culture?, KUT.ORG (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://kut.org/post/sexist-comment-austin-police-
officer-isolated-incident-or-part-broader-culture.
155 Walter Armstrong, Brutality in Blue, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 27, 2007),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/node/87367; see also Amnesty International, STONEWALLED:
POLICE ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 2–4 (2005), http://www.streetwiseandsafe.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/StonewalledAI.pdf (analyzing the extent of police violence and
misconduct directed toward LGBTQ people); accord George Gillett, We need to talk about
homophobia in the police, THE INDEPENDENT (July 23, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/we-need-to-talk-about-homophobia-in-the-
police-9614725.html (examining the same issue as it relates to the United Kingdom and drawing
similar conclusions).
156 Tom McKay, Meet the Women Suing a Michigan Police Department and Standing Up
Against Islamophobia, POLICYMIC (Jan. 25, 2015), http://mic.com/articles/109116/meet-the-
women-suing-a-michigan-police-department-and-standing-up-against-islamophobia.
157 Noah Berlatsky, When Chicago Tortured, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014, 11:59 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/chicago-police-torture-jon-burge/383839/.
158 David Whitehouse, Law and the Rise of Capitalism, WORKS IN THEORY (July 16, 2014),
http://worxintheory.wordpress.com/2014/07/16/law-and-the-rise-of-capitalism/.
39
preservation of the existing capitalist mode of production.159 In essence, the question to be posed
is, whether law enforcement is inherently classist, and not merely anti-poor, as a matter of
unintended consequence.160 Law enforcement and policing has long functioned as a method
employed to control the working class.161 The police have been implemented as a tool of state-
sanctioned violence, used to protect the interests of the ruling class and the preservation of
capitalism.162 While many Americans believe the police to be the standing guard between the
public and criminals, the reality is that the purpose of the police is to serve as the gatekeepers of
social peace for capitalists.163 In fact, the modern police developed largely in response to
capitalism, as industrialization and the shifting mode of production rendered obsolete the prior
methods of social control.164 The police emerged as a centralized unit post-1829, as officers
became divorced from their previous working class consciousness, and began to identify their
duty with the interests of private property and preserving order.165 The police became part of the
evolving capitalist infrastructure, and their social and financial interests grew ever entwined with
159 Id.
160 See generally Kristian Williams, The Demand for Order and the Birth of Modern Policing,
MONTHLYREVIEW.ORG (Dec. 2003), http://monthlyreview.org/2003/12/01/the-demand-for-order-
and-the-birth-of-modern-policing/ (providing an analysis of the caustic relationship between the
poor and the police).
161 WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 105.
162 LYNCH, supra note 6, 145.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 145–46
40
ensuring that the system of capitalism would not fail.166 When workers tried to rebel against
their bosses, the police proved virulently anti-labor, aligned themselves with the interests of the
bosses, and engaged in countless acts of strike-breaking and arrests of labor demonstrators for
spurious “public-order offenses.”167 As organized labor and strikes have become virtually
nonexistent, police began to favor policies that are anti-black, and consequently anti-poor.168 On
March 1, 2015, police in Los Angeles shot and killed a homeless man, Charley Robinet, for
reasons that remain in dispute.169 Officers claim Robinet was going for a gun, but eyewitnesses
and video evidence plainly suggest otherwise.170 The reality is that Robinet is merely the most
recent, in a long line of police attacks upon the poor and homeless throughout the country, all in
effort to protect the interests of private property in Los Angeles and other cities where the poor
and homeless have been forced to congregate in greater numbers.171 And that is ultimately
where the Marxist critique establishes itself apart from other analyses of law enforcement. The
clearest illustration of law enforcement serving the interests of class lies in its utter inability, or
166 WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 25.
167 Id. at 147–48.
168 See Jason Farbman, Breaking Broken Windows, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://socialistworker.org/2015/01/07/breaking-broken-windows (addressing the “broken
windows” theory and its effect on modern policing and black communities).
169Michael Brown, Enemies in Blue, JACOBIN (Mar 4, 2015),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/police-killing-homeless-los-angeles-capitalism/.
170Id.
171Id.
41
disinterest, in policing the behavior of anyone save the poor and socially immobile.172
Corporations are expected to police themselves, despite overwhelming evidence of the horrors
and atrocities attributable to unregulated corporate misconduct—from wide scale instances of
toxic pollution and contaminations, withholding the information related to the lethal effects and
byproducts of such pollutants and contaminants, to coordinating attacks on union members and
striking workers, and orchestrating the establishment of sweatshops and the displacement of
indigenous populations.173 The police simply do not hold the finance class to account, either
because they do not want to, or because they are directed away from these larger issues by the
people whose class interests are likewise antithetical to those of the working poor.174 The police
are also willfully obfuscatory and incapable of policing themselves, or turning over honest data
and statistics for review.175 Whatever the rationale, it is plain that the needs of the poor are
secondary, at best, to the needs of the ruling class.176
Just prior to the October revolution in Russia, the provisional government established the
Special Committee for Fighting Pogroms in September 1917, which was essentially the first
form of law enforcement in post-Tsarist Russia.177 They were short lived, as the “Extraordinary
172 LYNCH, supra note 6, at 159.
173 Id. at 155–59.
174 Id.
175 Tom McCarthy, Police killed more than twice as many people as reported by US government,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/mar/04/police-killed-people-fbi-data-justifiable-homicides?CMP=share_btn_fb.
176 WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 116–19.
177 MAKEPEACE supra note 35, at 67.
42
Commission for the Struggle with Counterrevolution, Sabotage and Speculation,” known as the
Cheka, succeeded this agency in December 1917.178 The early duties of the Cheka was to
confront counterrevolutionary subterfuge; however, the Cheka was criticized severely for the
frequency and degree of its actions in response to counterrevolutionary infractions.179 The Cheka
was formally abolished in February, 1922, in an effort to curtail the adjudicative power granted
to law enforcement, which was then replaced by the State Political Police—the GPU—who were
tasked with the investigatory functions previously vested in the Cheka.180 In practice, very little
had changed, as the GPU had largely preserved the old attitudes and methodology that had so
marred the Cheka.181 There is little instructive to say on the subject of Soviet policing as it relates
to Marxism, save to emphasize that there was never any significant period of time following the
October revolution when policing did not exist in Russia, the police were armed and comprised
of members of the working class, and all of the incarnations of post-Tsarist police often proved
to be a violent and repressive force.182 It may be possible to rationalize much of this, as Lenin
and Trotsky attempted,183 but such a discussion is beyond our scope.
178 Id. at 10, 74.
179 Id. at 74.
180 Id. at 75.
181 Id.
182 Id.at 74–81, 88.
183 Id. at 75.
43
In analyzing the police from a Marxist perspective, it may be useful to consider Draper’s
analysis of the lumpenproletariat, discussed supra.184 Draper drew comparisons between the
lumpenproletariat and the Naples lazzaroni—groups that sold themselves to the bourgeoisie for
the purpose of combatting and destabilizing the working class.185 This sounds exceedingly
similar to the role of police in modern society. The police are a group of hired actors from
predominantly working class backgrounds with little formal education.186 They are employed by
the state to protect the interests of property, above the interests of the working people, and to
preserve the codified bounds normative behavior established by governing bodies, comprised of
members of the finance class.187 Marx provided little on the subject of policing as an exclusive
area of consideration; instead, all of Marx’s critiques of the state necessarily implicated the
police as a tool of state action.188 This supports the possibility that the police could serve a
184 See generally Draper, supra note 116, at 2285 (noting that the lumpenproletariat may not
refer to any particular class of workers at all).
185 Id. at 2285, 2292–94.
186 Willa Frej, U.S. Police: Education levels and the use of force, MSNBC (Dec. 19, 2014, 9:45
AM), http://www.msnbc.com/ronan-farrow-daily/us-police-education-levels-and-the-use-force.
187 LYNCH, supra note 77, at 145.
188 KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE 50 (Progress Publishers ed. 1979). (“The centralized
state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and
judicature – organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labor –
originates from the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle class society as a mighty
weapon in its struggle against feudalism.”)
44
legitimate purpose once divorced from its “political attributes” in the hierarchical structure of the
state, and then made accountable to and revocable by the working class.189
The Courts
“I had seen enough of the miseries of war, to wish it might never more have existence in the world, and that some other mode might be found out to settle the differences that should occasionally arise in the neighbourhood of nations. This certainly might be done if Courts were disposed to set honestly about it, or if countries were enlightened enough not to be made the dupes of Courts.”190 — Thomas Paine
The judicial system is a legitimizing agent that reaffirms existing social inequalities and
perpetuates class contradictions by applying laws that are purported to be neutral, but are
actually quite unequal and biased in their origin and application.191 The American criminal courts
routinely (and disproportionately) punish the wrongdoing of the society’s most disenfranchised
people, all while mildly punishable administrative laws, or often no laws at all, are applied to the
crimes committed by the wealthy elite.192 In essence, the judicial system seeks to ensure that
prosecution and adjudication for some is maximized exponentially, while prosecution for a select
few is drastically minimized.193 The playing field is unequal with respect to the poor, as the
quality of legal representation for the poor is markedly deficient compared to those who are able 189 Id. at 53–4, 64. (“Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police
was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible, and at all times
revocable, agent of the Commune . . . . [I]n fact, for the first time since the days of February
1848, the streets of Paris were safe, and that without any police of any kind.”)
190 PAUL PHILIPS, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW AND LAWS 165 (C.M. Campbell & Paul Wiles,
eds., 1980).
191 LYNCH, supra note 77, at 170.
192Id. at 165.
193Id.
45
to afford private defense counsel.194 The system’s interest is not in justice, but in ensuring that
the poor are dealt with in a manner that is fundamentally contrary to the way in which the courts
handle the rich.195 Consider in the abstract the disparity in punishment, prosecution, and quality
of representation between a common drug dealer charged with possession with intent to
distribute and a rich pharmaceutical executive charged with illegally prescribing medication to
people without the requisite medical infirmity.196 We could also observe distinctions in the
substantive law applied in either situation, as well as the inequitable ramifications for the related
offense in either scenario.197 This point illustrates the flaw in the American judicial system, in
that procedural adherence to the laws proscribing these offenses would result in an equitable
apportion of justice, but that is simply not the case.198 Radical criminologists have termed this
the procedural model of justice.199 The procedural model focuses on the individual offender as a
rational actor, and crime as a matter of decision-making undertaken by the individual, which
creates the impression that harsh sentencing would result in less crime, either by way of specific
or general deterrence, or incapacitation.200 If this were the case, then crime in U.S. should be
amongst one of the lowest rated comparatively, as opposed to one of the highest in the world.201
194 Id. at 168.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 169.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 170.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 171.
46
The critique of criminal courts from a radical Marxist perspective is incomplete without
examining the class bias in civil courts as well, where the members of the working class are
exceedingly less likely to appear.202 There is an element of design to this that is beyond our
scope to analyze, but it suffices to say that the civil courts, where punishment is expressed almost
exclusively in currency, tend to be reserved for the finance class, while the criminal courts exist
functionally for the purpose of punishing the poor.203
The Bolsheviks sought to radically reconfigure the judicial system in post-Tsarist
Russia.204 The most common crimes discussed in the annals of Marxist jurisprudence are crimes
against the revolution, or counterrevolutionary crimes.205 Such offenses bear a natural and
obvious significance to Marxists, though official response to counterrevolution has often been
deplorable.206 Lenin believed the judicial function of the courts would soon dissipate after the
October revolution, becoming largely administrative, and that formal judges would come to be
replaced by members of the working class.207 Though Lenin had little personal interest in laws or
the judiciary, he was keen to see that bribery and other offenses, typically associated with the
means of the bourgeoisie—something akin to white-collar crimes—would be outlawed and
punishable.208 Nevertheless, infractions that had been considered criminal conduct prior to the
202 Id. at 174-75, 184-85.
203 Id.
204 R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law 66–75 (1st ed. 1980).
205 Id. at 12.
206 Id. at 13.
207 Id. at 58.
208 Id. at 50.
47
revolution would be reconsidered in light of the new social order.209 It was intended that criminal
matters be stripped of their class bases and for rules and regulations to replace previous laws to
allow for the managerial organization of society.210 Public participation in the gradual withering
of the state in the period of transition would guide the new society in redefining the rule of law,
or the rule of regulation as it were.211 On November 24, 1917, all preexisting courts were
abolished and replaced by revolutionary tribunals comprised of working class citizens, for the
purpose of addressing offenses committed during the period of transition.212 This proved more
complicated in practice, as the party leaders did not codify any new laws or regulations
governing criminal or civil conduct, so the tribunals lacked any semblance of uniformity or
guidance beyond community where the tribunal was situated.213 The revolutionary tribunals were
to have jurisdiction over cases involving organized uprisings against the revolution, disturbances
of social institutions, and misuse of position or employment in the administration of
government—crimes generally committed by the bourgeoisie.214 Special revolutionary tribunals
were established whose jurisdiction was solely over infractions committed by the press.215 Later,
local courts were established to hear cases of “pogroms, bribery, forgery, illegal use of Soviet
209 Id. at 29.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 45, 58.
212 Harold J. Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 Yale L.J. 803, 804–06 (1946–47).
213 Id.
214 R.W. Makepeace, supra note 204, at 68–69.
215 Id. at 69.
48
documents, hooliganism and espionage.”216 Tribunals could consider “fines, deprivation of
liberty, exile, public censure, being declared a public enemy, total or partial deprivation or
political rights or property, and compulsory public work.”217 The position of investigator and
prosecutor, known as the procuracy, had also been abolished, so the duty of investigation was
assigned to the judiciary, and any working class citizen of good character could be appointed
prosecutor or defense counsel.218 The courts and tribunals were forbidden from employing
prerevolutionary law, and were instructed to fill in the gaps in revolutionary legislative
authorities with the dictates of one’s “socialist legal consciousness.”219 As one might expect, this
fractured arrangement was not at all successful given the material conditions of Soviet life at that
time.220 It wasn’t until after Lenin’s death that the business of codifying procedural and
substantive Soviet law was finally undertaken.221
Corrections
“[P]unishment is nothing but a means of society to defend itself against the infraction of its vital conditions, whatever may be their character. Now, what state of society is that, which knows of no better instrument for its own defense than the hangman, and which proclaims through the ‘leading journal of the world’ its own brutality as eternal law?”222 — Karl Marx
216 Id. at 70.
217 Id. at 69.
218 Id. at 68.
219 Id. at 71.
220 Id. at 68.
221 See Harold J. Berman, supra note 212, at 804–06 (noting that uniformity of law was not
provided by the party until the 1936 constitution).
222 Karl Marx, Dispatches for the New York Tribune Selected Journalism of Karl Marx 121–22
(Penguin ed. 2007).
49
America bears the distinction of housing more prisoners per citizen than virtually any
other nation in the world.223 It should come as no surprise, then, that housing prisoners is part of
a monstrously extensive for-profit industry, known pejoratively among critics as the prison-
industrial complex.224 The corrections industry reaps the financial benefit of the rigorous
policing and draconian sentencing policies discussed above. One private prison operator,
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), actually sought to purchase forty-eight prisons from
state governments.225 Governors were induced to sell by CCA’s promise of 90% guaranteed
occupancy, irrespective of fluctuations in the crime rate.226 This appears to be an all too common
practice in the industry.227 Further, those private prison corporations have actually helped write
laws designed to ensure a consistent stream of inmates are available to help meet those
occupancy requirements.228 In states that accepted contracts with occupancy requirements, the 223 Nick Wing, Here Are All Of The Nations That Incarcerate More Of Their Population Than
The U.S., Huffington Post (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:21 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/incarceration-rate-per-capita_n_3745291.html.
224 Michael Shammas, End the Prison-Industrial Complex, Huffington Post (Mar. 12, 2014, 5:59
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-shammas/end-the-prison-industrial-
complex_b_4561459.html.
225 Andy Kroll, This is How Private Prison Companies Make Millions Even When Crime Rate
Fall, Mother Jones (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/09/private-prisons-
occupancy-quota-cca-crime.
226 Id.
227 Id,
228 Id..
50
taxpayers are obligated to pay the cost of empty beds when occupancy dips below the
requirement.229 This taxpayer indemnification practice has become known as a “low-crime
tax.”230 In Colorado, for instance, taxpayers were forced to make up the difference of $2 million
in empty prison beds when the state’s crime rate declined significantly.231 The conclusion to be
drawn from this is that it is in the taxpayer’s best interest for crime rates to be high, for prisons to
be full, and for prison operators to be rich. Moreover, private prisons have become notorious for
forcing prisoners to live in environments that are exceedingly unsafe and dangerously
unsanitary.232 This is the case, in spite of the incredibly immense profits corporations derive from
this industry.233 This is to say nothing of the tremendous taxpayer expense in covering the
appellate measures undertaken by inmates, the per inmate cost of incarceration, and the massive
229 April M. Short, 6 Shocking Revelations About How Private Prisons Make Money, Salon (Sept.
23, 2013, 7:22 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/09/23/6_shocking_revelations_about_how_private_prisons_make_
money_partner/.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Margaret Winter & Gabriel Eber, Private Prisons Are the Problem, Not the Solution, ACLU
(Apr 30, 2012, 4:38 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights-criminal-law-
reform/private-prisons-are-problem-not-solution.
233 Liliana Segura, With 2.3 Million People Incarcerated in the US, Prisons Are Big Business,
The Nation (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/prison-profiteers.
51
expense of administering executions in states that allow the death penalty.234 Death penalty cases
alone cost taxpayers somewhere between $470,000–$1,000,000 more per case, when compared
cases where the death penalty is not considered.235 And that figure fails to take into account the
sum of suffering and dehumanization involved in carrying out this manner of punishment,
assuming even then that administering the execution itself goes according to plan.236 Nor can it
be quantified the fact that, in administering the execution, the state has made a presumably
innocent paid employee a complicit participant in a homicide. Studies report that at least 4% of
those set to be executed, around 120 inmates, are going to be executed based on wrongful
convictions.237 Given the profitability of housing inmates, one can see how ensuring the veracity
of a given conviction, might be less important to the correctional industry than the profit to be
gained, as a result of continued incarceration. In fact, as demonstrated above, releasing inmates is
positively contrary to their interests.
The profit critique of the private prison industry is low hanging fruit for Marxists, as the
narrative of wild profits and willful disregard of human decency, fits neatly within our class
234 Ken Armstrong, Another Death Penalty Moratorium, The Marshall Project (Feb. 13, 2015,
5:51 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/13/another-death-penalty-moratorium.
235 Kelly Philips Erb, Considering The Death Penalty: Your Tax Dollars At Work, Forbes (May
1,2014, 12:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/05/01/considering-the-
death-penalty-your-tax-dollars-at-work/.
236 Id.
237 David Von Drehle, More Innocent People on Death Row Than Estimated: Study, Time (Apr.
28, 2014), http://time.com/79572/more-innocent-people-on-death-row-than-estimated-study/.
52
based analysis.238 Nevertheless, this appraisal of the prison-industrial complex must go beyond
simply shaming the prison industry for being profitable, however rightful shaming may be, and
cut further to the greater issue of assessing the function of punishment as a fundamental aspect of
modern society.239 The Marxist analysis views imprisonment and punishment as a reflection and
reproduction of the ruling class’ will—a class that has been able to construct punishments that
are most amenable to their own interests.240 Marxist criminologist Dr. Michael J. Lynch, cited
herein and throughout, posits that the rate of imprisonment is directly correlative to the rate of
surplus value.241 Surplus value is expressed as “an empirical measure of labor’s exploitation and
alienation.”242 This concept of surplus value is derived from Marx.243 Lynch studied the
statistical relationship between rates of incarceration and the rate of surplus value, and
determined that people became more marginalized economically as the rate of surplus value
increased.244 As people become more marginalized, the state recognizes a need for greater social
238 See generally Scott McLemee, Our Incarceration Nation, SocialistWorker.org (July 14,
2014), http://socialistworker.org/2014/07/14/our-incarceration-nation (providing a lyrically
leftist critique of the for-profit prison industry).
239 See generally Michael J. Lynch et al., supra note 191, at 187–209 (critiquing the modern
prison industry as a necessary and desirable component of capitalism).
240 Id. at 194.
241 Id.
242Id. at 206.
243 David Schweickart, After Capitalism 39–40 (2d ed. 2011).
244 Michael J. Lynch et al., supra note 191, at 206.
53
control.245 These new admissions into in the prisons represent the surplus population, or surplus
labor.246 Capitalism cannot function at full employment, as some unemployment is necessary and
desirable in order for capitalism to remain a profitable system.247 In essence, capitalism requires
a reserve army of the unemployed poor who functioned, at least initially, as a looming threat of
replacement to discourage workers from striking.248 These unemployed workers represent the
sum of surplus labor, increasingly deprived and marginalized, and have become increasingly
imprisoned as a result.249
The early years of post-Tsarist Russia saw the Soviets attempt to rectify the inequalities
of punishment experienced under the Tsar.250 The Soviets sought to consider offenses committed
in proportion to the offender’s prior class identity.251 If the offender was a member of the
propertied class, the revolutionary tribunals were to consider whether such an offender could be
adopted into the developing classless society, or whether to isolate the offender for the purpose
of ensuring social defense.252 The concept of retributive justice was abandoned in abstract, but
seizure of land and claims to property was a common outcome of criminal infractions.253
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 David Schweickart, supra, at 97–104.
248 Id.
249 Michael J. Lynch et al., supra note 191, at 206.
250 Harold J. Berman, supra note 212, at 803, 822–25.
251 R.W. Makepeace, supra note 204, at 65.
252 Id.
253 Id..
54
Whether that punishment was retributive in actuality, however rightfully under the
circumstances, appears to be of little consequence.254 Chief among the penalties for deviant
behavior was the concept and practice of labor re-education.255 This form of punishment was
designed to reintegrate the offender into productive society, and to help the offender to realize
the societal effects of the infraction—to awaken his consciousness to his own suffering and the
suffering of others.256 This practice, honest in its foundation, nevertheless devolved into the
creation of harrowing forced labor camps and eventually the return of capital punishment.257
CONCLUSION
For all intents and purposes, this has been an introductory overview of Marxism and
criminal justice. The essay is limited in depth, owing to the wide breadth of subject matter
covered, in order to introduce the concepts and critiques to an audience that may yet be
unfamiliar with Marxism, let alone the very narrow area of study within Marxism that is
dedicated to legal study and criminology. In conceiving ideas and remedies moving forward, it
will be immensely useful for Marxists and other leftists to keep these concepts alive in the mind.
Also, it is important to identify the ideological and practical deficiencies of the early Soviet
model, while acknowledging their honest efforts and ultimate failure to develop a more just and
equitable system.
254 See generally R.W. Makepeace, supra note 204, at 65–66 (noting the general degradation of
retributive approaches to punishment, but commenting that such principles appear to have been
at odds with the material reality of their application).
255 Harold J. Berman, supra note 212, at 822–25.
256 Id.
257 R.W. Makepeace, supra note 204, at 79.
55
Marx identified human agency and the collective action of the working class, as the
driving force required in achieving the new socialist society. Therefore, a Marxist criminal
justice model must incorporate collective human activity, rather than relegate citizens to the role
of passive observer in the criminal justice process, included only for the purpose of securing
indictments and providing verdicts. This is instructive in the present, and ought to be a guiding
precept for leftists, and may help direct us toward establishing meaningful programs that may
lessen the suffering of the working class on the road to a more achieving equitable society.
Applying this concept, to a policing one can envision how a tribunal, distinct and apart from the
existing legal apparatuses, made of ordinary citizens with actual adjudicative authority,
established for the purpose of reviewing officer conduct, could help curb the onslaught of police
brutality and other transgressions. If the police serve the people, then they should be likewise
answerable to and revocable by the people. The political component of the courts should also be
divorced from judicial procedures—ending private campaign finance, and eliminating racial and
class biases in the adjudicative process. The prisons should not be able to profit from
confinement, and the history of contracting private organizations to build inmate warehouses to
the detriment of the prisoners and society in general must end. Police violence and misconduct
will continue to be disregarded, so long as their actions preserve the stability of the capitalist
infrastructure. The courts will continue to adjudicate along class lines, so long as their social and
financial interests are inexorably dependent on the existing system. The prison-industrial
complex will balloon and possibly burst, perhaps morphing into something even more sinister, so
long as it is profitable to continue warehousing the poor. Such issues can be ameliorated to some
degree, but cannot be satisfactorily eradicated by merely enacting institutional reforms.
Collective action and movement building toward a fundamental change in the present social
56
order must confront these issues. That change can be identified in the works and methodology of
Marx. The organizing principles of Marxism are apparent: workers must become cognizant of
the full value of their life and labor when confronted with those agents seeking to exploit their
labor and alienate them from their sense of humanity, for change awaits the awakening
consciousness of the working class. It is up to the workers—from the factories and the kitchens,
to the classrooms and the courtrooms—for they remain the ones enchained.
57
“Except for sickness, litigation is one of the worst things that can befall a person.” – Justice
Learned Hand
I. Introduction
Personal autonomy. It is a phrase that lives in the shadows of our Constitution. It is a
theme that drives the articles and clauses that our framers constructed to outline the morals of our
societies. The idea of self governance gives birth to many inalienable rights such as the right to
privacy, the right to marry, the right to raise children, and the right to accept or reject
recommended medical care. In an open letter to the President of the United States, the National
Council on Disability published a report that explored the curtailment of the rights of a highly
marginalized group of people living in the U.S. with psychiatric disabilities.
People with psychiatric disabilities are the only Americans who can have their freedom
swept from under them by being institutionalized without a conviction.258 Once committed,
individuals do not enjoy the right to accept or reject medical care at their own will.259 When
individuals who are subject to involuntary commitment die in institutions, their deaths are rarely
investigated.260 While vast strides have been made throughout the twenty-first century in making
the treatment of Americans with mental disabilities more in line with the ideals of the
Constitution, these individuals are still discriminated against within the court system. This
judicial discrimination is no less than a reflection of the societal woes faced by Americans with
psychiatric disabilities.
258National Council on Disability, From Privileges to Rights: People Labeled with Psychiatric Disabilities Speak for Themselves (January 20, 2000), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan202000. 259 Id. 260 Id.
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II. Limited Protection for All
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution says that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”261 This section of the amendment
is known as the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, which throughout history,
has been a rallying point for the underrepresented and has been the foundation for numerous civil
rights battles. This amendment was created to ensure that all citizens enjoy access to justice;
however, since its culmination, society has managed to poke holes in the blanket protection that
should be provided by these two clauses. Individuals coping with mental disabilities are one of
the groups slipping through those holes.
III. A Lackluster Standard of Proof
From the Due Process Clause stems the concept of the standard of proof.262 The standard
of proof instructs the factfinder concerning the “degree of confidence society thinks she should
have in the accurate depiction of factual conclusions.”263 The applicable standard helps establish
the level of importance attached to the decision in each case.264 In criminal cases, defendants
have traditionally been protected by high standards of review designed to alleviate the possibility
of erroneous judgment.265 Under the Due Process Clause, the state must prove guilt in a criminal
proceeding using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.266
261 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 262 Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970). 263 Id. 264 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). 265 Id. 266 Id. at 421.
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The Court has discussed that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is reserved for
criminal proceedings only. Using a lower standard of proof in involuntary commitment
proceedings, such as a “preponderance of the evidence,” would lead to an increased number of
individuals erroneously committed against their will.267 The landmark case, Addington v. Texas,
which seemingly established the standard of proof to determine the need to involuntarily commit
a defendant in a civil case, did little more than reaffirm that are no constitutionally protected
safeguards to ensure that the mentally ill are afforded there due process and equal protection
rights.268
In Addington, the plaintiff was committed indefinitely against his will by a family
member269 The Court applied a “clear and convincing evidence” analysis, the median level
standard of proof, to support the involuntary commitment, despite the plaintiff’s argument that
“the evidence against him should have been required to reach the highest standard of proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt.”270 The Court reasoned an individual’s liberty interest in a civil
commitment proceeding is of greater weight compared to the State’s interest in protecting
citizens faced with mental illness. The Court still came to the conclusion that the Due Process
Clause does not require the same beyond a reasonable doubt standard in civil proceedings that
are afforded in criminal prosecutions that similarly result in a deprivation of liberty.271 The
justices stated, “because psychiatry was a field dealing with the inexact science of predicting
future risk, the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt was so burdensome that it would serve as
267 267 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 425. 268 Id. at 418-33. 269 Id. at 418. 270 Id. at 433. 271 Id. at 418.
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a barrier to the hospitalization of many patients who were in clear need of care.”272 In
considering the spirit of our Constitution and the value society should place on personal
autonomy, a barrier erected before the hospitalization of an individual would be proper.
Anything less would curtail individual freedoms.
V. A Massive Curtailment of Liberty
A state may try to justify the curtailment of an individual’s liberty interest under two
legal concepts: (1) a state’s inherent police powers; and (2) the doctrine of parens patriae.273 The
term parens patriae is Latin for parent of the country and refers to the common law doctrine that
assigns to the government the responsibility to intervene on behalf of citizens who seemingly
cannot make healthy life decisions for themselves.274 The other controlling legal principal, a
state’s police power, requires the state to protect the interest and welfare of not only the citizen
suffering from mental illness, but also all citizens within its borders.275 When the state has the
duty to protect society as a whole, it often does so at the expense of an individual’s liberties.
When it comes to people living with mental disabilities, the class as a whole is marginalized and
stifled to promote the societal goal of security.
It is this idea of protecting society and keeping potentially “harmful” mentally ill
individuals off the streets that leads to prolonged stents in psychiatric facilities. Individuals who
receive acquittals through the justice system supported by the rational, “not guilty by reason of
272National Council on Disability, From Privileges to Rights: People Labeled with Psychiatric Disabilities Speak for Themselves (January 20, 2000), available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan202000. This holding contradicts the rational that “in cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, the standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.” Addington, at 1805. 273 Megan Testa, MD & Sara G. West, MD, Civil Commitment in the United States, (October 2010) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392176/. 274 Id. 275 Id.
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insanity” (NGRI), are subsequently civilly committed.276 These individuals are hospitalized until
they can show that they no longer pose a threat to society.277 Often, the process to regain
freedom from hospitalization is so complicated and lengthy, individuals spend more time in
psychiatric facilities than they would have been incarcerated for the crime originally
committed.278
In Jones v. United States, the plaintiff was arrested for attempted petty larceny (a
misdemeanor) and entered an insanity plea.279 The plaintiff was found NGRI and was
subsequently civilly committed.280 After being hospitalized for more than 12 months, exceeding
the maximum time of incarceration for misdemeanors, the plaintiff asked to be released.281 The
plaintiff argued that he should not be involuntarily committed for a period of time longer than he
would have spent incarcerated for the crime in question.282 Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the
Court ruled that, “persons committed after findings of NGRI could be hospitalized against their
will for an indefinite period of time, regardless of the maximum length of time that could be
served if they were convicted.”283 This ruling shows that the value of individual freedom and
personal autonomy held by individuals living with mental disabilities is held in less regard in
society, even less than those who are convicted of the same crimes that the mentally ill are
acquitted of.
276 Id. at 35. 277 Id. 278 Testa, supra at 35. 279 Id. 280 Id. 281 Id. 282 Id. 283 Id. “The justices ruled that, because a finding of NGRI was technically an acquittal, the length of the ’hypothetical criminal sentence’” was irrelevant to the determination of the length of involuntary hospitalization.”
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IV. What Exactly Are We Proving?
During the Civil Rights Movement, minor restrictions were put in place to reduce the
number of individuals erroneously committed against their will. The courts established that a
state cannot constitutionally confine an individual unless the state can prove that the individual in
question actually has a (1) mental illness and (2) that he or she poses an imminent threat to his or
her safety or the safety of others.284 The idea behind this standard is that the individual is not
capable of surviving safely, on his own, in society.285 This standard was articulated in the
landmark case, O’Connor v. Donaldson. In O’Conner, the plaintiff, who was diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia, was held in a psychiatric hospital against his will for fifteen years.286
The plaintiff showed no signs of attempted suicide or an ability to harm others; however, his
request to be released was denied repeatedly.287 It took an audience with the Supreme Court to
finally restore the plaintiff’s freedom. The Justices stated that the individual in question must
present a “known risk of harm to him- or herself or others, be in such a state that he or she would
be ‘hopeless to avoid the hazards of freedom,’ or in need of psychiatric treatment.”288 While this
standard has made waves in a pool of injustice, there has been push back from members of the
medical community who see this ruling as hindering the access to medical treatment needed by
the mentally ill.289
284 Testa, supra at 35. 285 O’Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2494, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975). 286 Testa, supra, at 33. 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 Id.
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VI. Alternative Measures
Despite push back for the review of involuntary commitment, a modern trend for
alternative measures is slowly gaining momentum in the justice system. Several courts in the U.S.
now hold, a court must show that involuntary commitment is the least restrictive means imposed
on an individual and that alternative treatments would not be adequate.290 With findings such as
this, alternative measures to involuntary commitment are on the rise. Outpatient civil
commitments, an alternative to separating individuals from society, allow the mentally disabled
to remain in their own communities.291 In order to qualify for outpatient civil commitment: (1)
the individual must be diagnosed with a mental disorder; (2) the individual needs to clearly be in
need of treatment and have a history of poor insight regarding his need for care leading to
periods of treatment non-adherence; and (3) there must be evidence indicating that the individual
is likely to become dangerous to himself or others if treatment non-adherence were to occur.292
Outpatient commitment can be easier for the families responsible for mentally ill relatives. This
alternative has resulted in fewer arrests of people with mental illness, has increased the
participation of psychiatric treatment by the mentally ill, and has decreased the rates of
hospitalization.293
VII. Conclusion
Courts have addressed the concerns of involuntary commitment by implementing
measures such as limiting the time a patient can be held before being afforded a lawyer and
implementing alternatives such as outpatient civil commitment. However, there are still many
controversies surrounding involuntary commitment in civil proceedings that have yet to be
290 In re D.P., 2001 ND 203, 636 N.W.2d 921 (N.D. 2001). 291 Testa, supra, at 38. 292 Id. 293 Id.
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resolved. More than one-third of the states in this country still do not have involuntary outpatient
commitment (IOC) statutes and are still relying on involuntary inpatient commitment.294 Of the
two-thirds of the states who have enacted IOC laws, residents with psychiatric disabilities are
forced to take medications and endure painful treatments, and are coerced into commitment and
medical treatments.295 Because these inconsistent and discriminatory procedures are still in place,
individuals with mental disabilities continue to suffer at the hands of discriminatory laws.296
Throughout our nation’s history, various groups have been the target of marginalization
and discrimination. The root of the issue can often be remedied through the treatment of these
individuals in the justice system. How individuals are treated in everyday society is a reflection
of how they are treated within the court system. The rights of the mentally ill are currently not
viewed equally, in the eyes of the law, compared to the fallacy portrayed in our Constitution as
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Involuntary commitment and forced
medical treatment are being used as a means of social control, and greater steps need to be taken
to strike a balance between access to psychiatric care and the access to adequate justice.
294 Id. 295 Id. 296 In a case currently being heard in the Eastern District of New York where a man was held for ten days against his will, attorney William Brooks stated that there is a “deprivation of liberty that people with mental illness suffer when private hospitals invoke the power of the state to involuntary commit them, and that people with mental illness should be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment even though the amendment applies generally to government officials only.” Mark Hamblett, Suit Over Involuntary Mental Health Commitment Proceeds, New York Law Journal (March 27, 2015), available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202721775743/Suit-Over-Involuntary-Mental-Health-Commitment-Proceeds#ixzz3VbznBP00.