ARTICLE IN PRESS

0265-9646/$ - se

doi:10.1016/j.sp

E-mail addr

Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219

www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

The 2002 Space Cooperation Protocol between China and Brazil:An excellent example of South–South cooperation

Yun Zhao

School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Available online 14 July 2005

Abstract

China and Brazil have been cooperating in space since 1986 and, after 15 years of successful joint creative work, the two sides

agreed a 2002 Protocol, providing a more concrete framework for further cooperation in space projects. This bilateral agreement

was heralded as an authentic bilateral effort amplifying the so-called South–South relationship. A close examination of the Protocol

has revealed that the document, while responding to the UN Declaration on International Cooperation, has made a significant

contribution and set a good example for space cooperation among developing countries. Placed against the background of ongoing

space commercialization, the success of this model can test the viability of existing space commercial rules and help introduce further

improvements.

r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

International space cooperation is a key factor forfuture exploration and utilization of outer space. Itssupporters believe it should permeate all space endea-vors and is a significant duty that will affect privateindustry [1]. The International Geophysical Year (IGY)of 1957–1958 marked the start of a cooperative andtruly international effort in space activities. More than60 states participated in the IGY, which resulted in arapid increase in geographical studies and an invigora-tion of the whole field of solar–terrestrial physics [2].Recent developments in international space cooperationsignal the introduction of a new era in the rapidlydeveloping field of space law [3]. The importance ofinternational cooperation in outer space has beenrecognized by spacefaring countries. The InternationalSpace Year (ISY) in 1992, bringing about a global effortto establish a long-term comprehensive observationcapability, was indeed an ambitious cooperative spaceendeavor undertaken by the world scientific commu-

e front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

acepol.2005.05.003

ess: lwzhao@cityu.edu.hk.

nity.1 The adoption of the UN Declaration on Interna-tional Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the UNDeclaration’) in 1996 has further pushed the develop-ment of space cooperation.In fact, international space cooperation emerged far

earlier than the adoption of the UN Declaration. Chinahas undertaken extensive cooperation arrangementswith other countries, e.g. the sharing of satellitetechnology [4]. The history of space cooperationbetween China and Brazil is symbolized by theChina–Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS) set upin 1986, followed by the signature of the Protocol onResearch and Production of the Earth Resource Satellitein 1988. This was China’s first international cooperativespace technology venture with another developingcountry [5]. In 2002, after 15 years’ of successful jointcreative work, the two sides were able to reach a newProtocol (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2002 Protocol’),providing a more concrete framework for furthercooperation in space projects [6].The 2002 Protocol, based on and in the spirit of the

Protocols reached before, continues space cooperation

1See Ref. [2], at 36.

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219214

between the two states. Besides developing a secondgeneration of CBERS satellites, the Protocol alsoestablishes that the two sides will examine the viabilityof jointly developing a geostationary, meteorologicaland telecommunications satellite. It contains 19 articlesof great innovation on the commercialization of outerspace. This bilateral agreement has been heralded as anauthentic bilateral effort amplifying the so-calledSouth–South relationship.This paper will evaluate the Protocol, highlighting its

significance in promoting space cooperation. Part 2provides a brief overview of the history of spacecooperation between China and Brazil. Part 3 examinesthe 2002 Protocol and provides an evaluation of itsprinciples. This part demonstrates how the 2002Protocol promotes space cooperation and commerciali-zation in outer space. Finally, Part 4 provides someobservations that will pave the way to the infiniterewards which may be reaped from the commercializa-tion of outer space.

2. History of space cooperation between China and Brazil

One of the major space powers, China stronglysupports activities involving the peaceful use of outerspace and maintains that international space coopera-tion be promoted and strengthened on the basis ofequality and mutual benefit, mutual complementarityand common development [7]. China’s participation ininternational space cooperation started in the mid-1970s. Since 1985 the country has signed manyintergovernmental or interagency cooperative agree-ments, protocols and memorandums, and establishedlong-term cooperative relations with a dozen countries,including the USA, Italy, Germany, the UK, France,Japan, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine andChile [7].Brazil was among the earliest countries to undertake

cooperative projects with China. The CBERS project,set up in 1986, was jointly financed by China and Brazil.And the Protocol on Research and Production of theEarth Resource Satellite was signed by both govern-ments in 1988. However, the first consequence of theProtocol only occurred 11 years later, when the CBERS-1 was launched in 1999 from the Chinese base inTaiyuan. It is China’s first generation transmissionEarth resources satellite. The satellite was officiallydelivered for service in 2002.2 More than 230 000satellite data pictures have been received fromCBERS-1 and these have been widely applied in variousareas of social and economic development for bothcountries.

2CBERS-2 was launched in 2003, as CBERS-1 has exceeded its

2-year life expectancy.

The successful launch of CBERS-1 showed thatChina and Brazil were beginning to use their indigen-ously developed satellite to obtain real-time remotedata, ending China’s long lack of a home-made resourcesatellite. It was the first time that China had developedan Earth resource satellite with remote sensors. Itwas also the first time it had obtained remotesensing imagery of remote areas of the western part ofChina. This made a certain contribution to thedevelopment of that part of the country. Expertsworld-wide believed that the successful develop-ment and launch of the CBERS-1 indicated thatChina’s satellite development capability had reached anew stage [8].Another two cooperative protocols were concluded in

1994 and 2000, respectively. Both protocols deal withcooperation in space technology, or more specifically, inthe development of Earth resources satellites. Thanks totheir creative joint research and development, bothparties were able to agree a further cooperative protocolin 2002. Soon after this, CBERS-2 was launched fromTaiyuan in October 2003. With this satellite, Brazilbecame independent in remote sensing radar imaging.This means that the country no longer needs to purchaseUS Landsat imagery, or to rely on other satellites,which it had been doing for at least seven years [9].CBERS-2 will monitor deforestation and forest fires inBrazil, as well as providing data to be used for harvestestimates.Plans included in the 2002 Protocol to launch two

more satellites in the future—the CBERS-3 (launchforecast for 2006) and CBERS-4 (launch sometime in2007)—have been confirmed. These satellites will havemore advanced cameras than the previous two.

3. Understandings of the 2002 Protocol

The 2002 Protocol is a complementary Protocolto the 1994 Framework Agreement between theGovernment of the Federative Republic of Braziland the Government of the People’s Republic ofChina on Cooperation in the Peaceful Applicationsof Outer Space Science and Technology on theContinuity of the Joint Development of Earth Re-sources Satellites. It begins by recognizing severalprior agreements. The basic purpose is to continue thecooperation between the two sides to develop a secondgeneration of CBERS satellites (CBERS-3 and 4).3

With 15 years of successful cooperation, the two sideswere able to reach a higher level of cooperation. The2002 Protocol, 19 articles in total, contains veryimportant new dispositions.

3Article 1 (1) of the 2002 Protocol.

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219 215

3.1. Dispute resolution

It is important to note that the Protocol contains clearrules on dispute resolution. Indeed, an appropriatedispute resolution mechanism is critical to the success ofsuch cooperation, since various rules and principles willonly protect commercial ventures to the extent that theyare enforceable [10]. Thus the Protocol creates aCoordination Committee to solve problems during itsimplementation. The Protocol further establishes a JointProject Committee as an executive body with widecompetence.4 Misunderstandings or disputes concerningthe interpretation or application of the Protocol can besettled by mutual consultations between the partieswithin the framework of the Joint Project Committee.The second and final instance, at the request of eitherparty, will be the Coordination Committee.5 ThisCommittee is different from a formal dispute resolutionbody. Because of their years of cooperation, the twoparties have a trusting relationship. This informaldispute resolution mechanism can function well andmaintain good relationships between the two parties.

3.2. Areas for cooperation

Rules are provided for facilitating the entry and exitof equipment and materials required for the implemen-tation of the project in both countries, as well as for theprovision of the appropriate documentation for citizensfrom each country to enter, exit and reside within theterritory of the other country in order to carry outactivities relating to the Project.6 This is essential to itssmooth operation. Free movement of facilities, informa-tion and personnel necessary for the project is the basisof cooperation.Further facilitation is provided later on: both parties

give priority to companies or institutions of the otherparty to provide the services, parts and components orequipment each party needs to complete its duties infulfillment of the project.7 This preference provided tothe other party could promote both a friendly relation-ship and economic development. The arrangement isalso in line with the global trend of economic develop-ment, thus meaning more than merely providing amodel for space cooperation—it provides a prelude andmodel for future trade liberalization between the twoparties.8

4According to Article 4 of the 2002 Protocol, within 60 days of the

entry into force of this Protocol, Brazilian Space Agency and the

Chinese National Space Administration, designated to coordinate and

manage the Project, shall establish the Joint Project Committee.5Article 17 of the 2002 Protocol.6Article 7 and 8 of the 2002 Protocol.7Article 10 of the 2002 Protocol.8Trade in goods and services can be largely facilitated by the

arrangements for free movement of materials and personnel. Future

3.3. Model of cooperation

It is vital to note that the parties have agreed on anequal sharing of the total investment in the project.9

This is different from the previous investment model,where China took up 70 percent of the cost. This meansthat activities concerning the launch of the CBERS-3and 4 will be shared on an equal basis, with each sharing50 percent of the costs.10 It follows from this arrange-ment that both parties will have equal rights to utilizethe products of CBERS-3 and 4 and that these productsmay be used by a third party only with the mutualconsent of both parties.11 This equal arrangement is aconsiderable improvement on the previous 70–30 model.Moreover, there are plans to launch the CBERS-3 fromChina and the CBERS-4 from the Alcantara LaunchCenter in Maranhao, Brazil.There have clearly been great achievements from the

previous cooperation, where Brazil provided scientists,engineers and a smaller percentage of investment capitalin exchange for a smaller percentage of the profits. Thisrightly reflects the principle that space cooperationshould be based on mutual benefits and commondevelopment [11]. But, after 15 years of cooperation,Brazil is now capable of taking greater control over thisspace project and is thus able to take on moreresponsibilities. This rightly accords with both theguiding principles of China’s international cooperationand the UN Resolution.

3.4. Commercial benefits from cooperation

Commercialization is the final goal of the spaceproject. Accordingly, several articles are devoted to thisquestion. Since Brazil is in charge of the CBERS-4launch, it will develop its Alcantara Launch Center as acompetitive international center for commerciallaunches. The launch of the CBERS-4 will be a test ofthe viability of the center as a future commercial launchsite. This will have far-reaching effects on satellitelaunches among developing countries. Currently, launchactivities have largely been monopolized by a fewdeveloped countries; the work of the center will nodoubt add to the competition in launch services.Developing countries can be expected to enjoy favorableconditions from their ‘pal’.According to the 2002 Protocol, both parties will

enjoy equal benefits from the satellites. For eachlaunch, each country will sign a contract with off-set

(footnote continued)

liberalization in trade can follow this example by removing trade

barriers and advocating trade facilitation.9Article 9 of the 2002 Protocol.10Article 11 of the 2002 Protocol. China is in charge of the CBERS-3

launching and Brazil is in charge of the CBERS-4 launching.11Article 12 of the 2002 Protocol.

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219216

and re-flight insurance clauses, according to the rules ofinternational commercial launch services.12 Meanwhile,the model of a joint venture is to be studied for thepurpose of marketing and/or distributing CBERSimages to third parties.13 Furthermore, we should notethat the issue of intellectual property rights is included inthe Protocol for the first time.14 These two provisionstouch on the most sensitive issue in space commercia-lization.As a result of increasing international space coopera-

tion and the future commercialization of prospectivetechnical innovations in outer space, the protection ofproperty rights in space activities, including issuesregarding technology transfer is essential [12]. Theongoing multinational project on the InternationalSpace Station (ISS) provides one example of how toundertake space commercialization. The Inter-Govern-mental Agreement (IGA) of 1998, together with bilateralMemoranda of Understanding, defines the overallcooperative model for the partners. However, thesituation is different when it comes to commercializationof the ISS. The IGA does not cover commercializationand, with 16 partners involved in the project, eachhaving its own national commercialization plan, thecommercial operation of the ISS therefore has tointegrate a number of complicated factors. It is takinga long time to reach a consensus on the operationalframework for commercialization of the ISS. However,the special relationship between China and Brazil hasjustified a different approach. We can expect that moreand more space cooperation will be carried out in thefuture on a model like that of China and Brazil,especially when developed countries continue to main-tain restrictions on technology transfer.

4. Evaluation and recommendations

4.1. Establishing a cooperation mechanism

The principle of international cooperation is laiddown in Article I (1) of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.Two different standpoints existed during its formula-tion. The developed countries agreed that this principleset forth limitations and obligations on the use of outerspace, but that it did not diminish their inherent rightsto determine how they shared the benefits derived fromtheir space activities. The developing countries, on theother hand, believed that this principle was not only an

12Article 11 of the 2002 Protocol.13Article 13 of the 2002 Protocol.14According to Article 16 of the 2002 Protocol, aspects concerning

intellectual property rights of the Cooperation Project, where they

could be applied, shall be object of particular arrangements taking into

account the national laws of each country and the international rules

accepted by both countries.

appeal to all states to conduct their space activities on acooperative international basis, but it actually impliesthat they have an obligation to do so [13]. As aconsequence of their standpoints, most developedcountries are of the opinion that there is no formalmechanism to enforce the principle, while developingcountries insist that there should be a requirement for astricter and fully codified international legal instrumentto ensure cooperation and access for all countries [7].The question of the need to establish a cooperation

mechanism to carry out this principle has been a seriousconcern for the UNCOPUOS. After years of discussion,the UN Declaration was adopted, offering basicguidance in international cooperation, namely: (1) statesare free to determine all aspects of their participation ininternational cooperation on an equitable and mutuallyacceptable basis; (2) international cooperation should beconducted in the modes that are considered mosteffective and appropriate by the countries concerned,including, inter alia, governmental and non-governmen-tal, commercial and non-commercial, global, multi-lateral, regional or bilateral; and internationalcooperation among countries at all levels of develop-ment.15

The international climate is conducive to laying thegroundwork for international cooperation. The greatestimpact the major space powers could have on space lawis the formulation of bilateral or multilateral agreementsgoverning cooperative space activities. Current andpotential future commercial applications of outer spaceusage include remote sensing, direct television broad-casting, space tourism, mining mineral deposits anderecting solar panels for energy generation; furtherapplications extends to the ISS, whose constitutivedocument has been viewed as a model for multilateralcooperation [14]. However, multilateral space coopera-tion requires long periods of negotiation and is morecomplicated when it comes to further implementation.Bilateral cooperation, largely based on mutual trust andmore readily representing mutual interests, can be aprelude to further extension. Normally bilateral coop-eration can provide a testbed for a deeper level ofcooperation and can entail outcomes beyond the purelyeconomic. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation can bewell formulated to suit the specific requirements of bothparties. This is obvious from the China–Brazil activity,whose achievements can have a positive, reinforcingeffect on political stability and states’ political rela-tions.16 Bilateral cooperation is thus often adopted by

15UN Declaration, paragraph 2 and 4.16The US policy for meteorological and remote sensing data from

space for Earth observations is (as a matter of policy and law) a public

good—the cost to the developed world either is very small (e.g.,

COFUR with Landsat) or free (e.g., EOS data). It is in fact cheaper for

the developing world to make use of this public good data rather than

develop an indigenous national satellite system. However, political and

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219 217

many nations, avoiding tedious multi-sided negotia-tions.

4.2. Dual-use issue and cooperation among developing

countries

In the past few years we have witnessed a tremendousgrowth of space applications to serve a wide range ofactivities. Moreover, many satellite systems are inher-ently of a dual-use nature, with both civilian andmilitary applications. Remote-sensing, Earth observa-tion and surveillance satellites are the most importantexamples of such dual-use systems [15]. China andBrazil’s cooperative development of Earth resourcesatellites clearly falls within the above examples [16].17

While the intelligence provided by such satellites can beused to strengthen an early warning and crisis preven-tion system, it can also be used for military purposes.CBERS-2 has been described as a military version of asatellite jointly developed for remote sensing—evidenceof how development of a civil program can have clearmilitary benefit [17]. Nevertheless, China has in itspublic pronouncements on space activities always urgedthe peaceful use of outer space. Concern over thepossibility of dual use has been resolved by using theterm ‘peaceful applications’ in the title of the 2002Protocol. The two nations have cooperated and willcontinue their cooperation in space activities followingthis principle.One of the most important ways of promoting the

utilization of space science and technology for thebenefit of all mankind is through space science andtechnology transfer to more countries. The establish-ment of an effective cooperation mechanism at global,regional, multilateral or bilateral level will play a pivotalrole in guaranteeing access to space science andtechnology. Only through this mechanism can develop-ing countries possess genuine capabilities in spacescience and technology for the purpose of fulfilling theirspecific needs.While following the UN Declaration on International

Cooperation, China has further specified the importanceof simultaneously increasing the space developmentcapability of all countries, especially developing coun-tries, and enabling all countries to enjoy the benefits ofspace technology. With developed countries still settinglimits in transferring relevant technologies, it is all themore meaningful that China is committed to supporting

(footnote continued)

longer-term technological and commercial benefits justify such

indigenous development as CBERS represents—this is especially the

case for Brazil.17The CBERS is aimed at the development of a complete remote

sensing system by developing countries, which would be both

compatible to and competitive with other systems produced and

operational during the present decade.

the use of its more developed space technology andspace application technology to undertake cooperationwith other developing countries and to provide servicesto these countries.18 The China–Brazil cooperation, onlyone among various bilateral cooperative agreementswhich have been signed between China and othercountries, is thus rightly considered an excellent exampleof ‘South–South Cooperation’ in the high-tech field fordeveloping countries [18].

4.3. Prospects for further improvement

Unfortunately, the 2002 Protocol only offers simpleprinciples without going further into detailed arrange-ments. For example, when we come to the issue ofintellectual property rights, the protocol contains onlysimple wording, requiring specific arrangements infuture. Protection of intellectual property is critical tothe success of the project, especially for those involved inresearch and development efforts through collaborativerelationships. Both parties should agree to respectproprietary rights in, and the confidentiality of, identi-fied property and appropriately marked data andgoods.19

Furthermore, the creation, use, transfer, ownershipand protection of intellectual property are of utmostimportance to both parties. A detailed set of rulesconcerning intellectual property rights should thus be inplace, pulling together the different national laws ofboth parties. The efforts of the two parties should not beisolated from international society. It is important tonote the attempts by the International Institute for theUnification of Private Law (Unidroit) to harmonizenational space law in relation to space commercialactivities [19]. In 2001 the Convention on InternationalInterests in Mobile Equipment was opened for signa-ture. Three different protocols were linked to theConvention, with one protocol on space assets. How-ever, the question of incompatibilities between theProtocol on Space Assets and the current legal frame-work in existing space law was raised in the UNCO-PUOS discussion [20]. The efforts of the Unidriotshould generally be welcomed in view of the vacuumin space law; however, the organization should workclosely with the UNCOPUOS, which remains the mainbody for harmonizing national space law. It is expectedthat issues concerning protection of intellectual propertyrights in relation to space commercial activities will bediscussed in the near future. China and Brazil should

18See further Ref. [7].19See for example, M.B. Broadwell, Intellectual Property and the

Economic Development of the International Space Station, presenta-

tion at Space Technology and Applications International Forum

(STAIF-2000), Albuquerque, NM, February 2000.

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219218

actively participate in the process and concretize the2002 Protocol in this aspect for better cooperation.No provisions in the Protocol touch on the issue of

liability. Reference might be made to the disputeresolution arrangement, through which disputes con-cerning the liability of each party can be resolved.However, this arrangement does not affect the situationwhen a third party is involved. It is thus helpful to referto the 1972 Liability Convention for possible resolution.The simple formulation of the Protocol—although

understandable—could also be a problem for furtherimplementation. At the time of the negotiations, spacecommercialization was still at the testing and developingstage. This is also true where development of a legalregime for space commercialization is concerned.Various discussions are still going on concerning theappropriate legal rules for space commercialization.Thus, while Chinese–Brazilian cooperation provides agood example for bilateral space commercialization, infuture implementation, it will be necessary to studyother existing commercial space projects and make theprotocol a more concrete document.It is to be noted that the Protocol will remain in force

for 5 years and will be automatically renewed for equaland successive periods of 5 years, unless either partynotifies the other party of the intention to terminate theprotocol with at least six months’ prior notice. Based onsuch an arrangement, we can reasonably expect thatmore detailed rules will be further negotiated and addedto the existing Protocol for better coordination andperformance.Finally, for the purpose of coordination and the

prevention of possible conflicts among the parties tovarious agreements, it is suggested that such agreementsshould be under the aegis of a space organization. Asprovided in the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, treaties shall, after their entry into force, betransmitted to the Secretariat of the UN for registrationor filing and recording, as the case may be, and forpublication.20 In the present case, the UNCOPUOS maybe one possible body to undertake this task, given itsposition within the UN system. Unfortunately, theUNCOPUOS may be unwilling to take on this tasksince it basically deals with multilateral aspects of spacelaw and not bilateral ones. Nevertheless the UN iswidely considered to be well-suited to the regulatory andcoordinating function as evidenced by its proven recordof formalizing treaties regarding space activities [21] aswell as resolving other international issues [22]. More-over, once an agreement has proven itself to be ofsignificance to future space activities, the UNCOPUOSwould be the appropriate body to push forward suchpractices and deepen future space cooperation.

20Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 80 (1).

5. Conclusion

Efforts towards international space cooperation arenothing new to the space countries [23]. Space explora-tion is a tremendous undertaking requiring the re-sources, expertise, and efforts of many individuals fromdifferent nations throughout the world. Differentnations need to work together for common goals.Examples of multilateral space cooperation include

Intelsat, Inmarsat, Eutelsat and ESA, which have laid asolid foundation for future endeavors. Bilateral co-operation has also developed rapidly, but mostlybetween developed countries. From the examples above,we can see that rules and principles can be accumulatedand improved while better balancing various competinginterests [24]. Space cooperation between China andBrazil amplifies the so-called ‘South–South’ relation-ship, especially in view of the present situation wheredeveloping countries are seen as potential clients forcommercial remote sensing programs.While developed countries are the main providers of

satellite images, they tend to impose high charges,though assuring the required public services throughsubsidized prices. With the success of the CBERSprogram, this situation should largely change: suchcooperation has the added benefit of ensuring that noone state monopolizes too many space resources.Additionally, the model of space cooperation canfurther extend to other developing countries, encoura-ging them to participate in ventures on a modest scaleand contributing to common benefits for these nations[25].A close examination of the 2002 Protocol has thus

revealed that this document, while responding to theUN Declaration, has made a specific contribution andset a good example for space cooperation amongdeveloping countries. Witnessing the unstable legalenvironment created by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,the China–Brazil cooperation model can mean more tointernational society. Placed against the background ofthe trend towards space commercialization, the successof this model can test the viability of existing spacecommercial rules and help create further improvements.No doubt the achievements from such a model ofcooperation will provide an excellent opportunity toexceed the ‘‘one small step for man, one giant leap formankind’’.21

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Mr. Jose MonserratFilho, Vice-President of the Brazilian Society of

21Statement made by Neil Armstrong on 20 July 1969 when he

became the first man to walk on the Moon.

ARTICLE IN PRESSY. Zhao / Space Policy 21 (2005) 213–219 219

Aerospace Law (SBDA) for his kindness in providingvaluable comments on the draft of the paper. The workdescribed in this paper was fully supported by a Grantfrom the Research Grants Council of the Hong KongSpecial Administrative Region, China [Project No.9040943 (CityU 1195/04H)].

References

[1] Freeman, Inadomi. Who’s the Captain Kirk of this enterprise?:

Regulating outer space industry through corporate structures.

U.C. Davis Law Review 1985;8:805–6;

Trimble. The international law of outer space and its effect on

commercial space activity. Pepperdine Law Review 1984;11:

545–6.

[2] Zaman S. Building international cooperation through ISY. IEEE

Technology and Society Magazine 1992:32–3.

[3] For further discussion, see Twibell TS. Space law: legal restraints

on commercialization and development of outer space. University

of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review 1997;65:603–6.

[4] Milhollin G, White G. A new China syndrome: Beijing’s atomic

bazzar. Washington Post, C1; May 12, 1991.

[5] China, Brazil to jointly launch a 2nd satellite. China Daily, March

5, 2002, available at, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Mar/

28110.htm (viewed on December 21, 2004).

[6] See further Brazil expects to further space technology cooperation

with China, Xinhua News Agency, October 22, 2003, available at,

http://www.china.org.cn (viewed on January 11, 2004).

[7] See white paper on China’s space activities, available at, http://

english.people.com.cn/features/spacepaper/spacepaper5.html

(viewed on January 11, 2004).

[8] Chen Y. CBERS and its applications, available at, http://www.

cnsa.gov.cn/espacechina/v3n7.htm (viewed on June 15, 2004).

[9] But in reality, Brazil still makes use of free EOS data from the US.

Launch of the Sino-Brazilian satellite makes Brazil self-sufficient in

remote sensing radar, Agencia Brasil, Arab Brazilian Chamber of

Commerce, available at, http://www.anba.com.br/ingles/noticia.

php?id=470 (viewed on December 21, 2004).

[10] Bockstiegel. Proposed draft convention on the settlement of space

law disputes. Journal of Space Law 1984;12:136–8.

[11] See the UN Declaration on international cooperation, G.A. Res.

51/122, U.N. Document, A/AC.105/572/Rev. 1, 1996.

[12] Moenter R. The international space station: legal framework

and current status. Journal of Air Law and Commerce 1999;64:

1052.

[13] Jasentuliyana N. Ensuring access to the benefits of space

technologies for all countries. Space Policy 1994:8–9.

[14] Manzione LL. Multinational investment in the space station: an

outer space model for international cooperation? American

University International Law Review 2002;18:515.

[15] Steinberg GM. Satellite capabilities of emerging space-competent

states, available at, http://faculty.biu.ac.il/�steing/military/

sat.htm (viewed on December 21, 2004).

[16] See Alves PG. Access to outer space technologies: implications

for international security, vol. 16. New York: United Nations;

1992.

[17] Johnson-Freese J. China’s manned space program: sun tzu or

apollo redux? Naval War College Review 2003;56(3).

[18] See further China–Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS),

available at, http://www.cast.ac.cn (viewed on January 11, 2004).

[19] See, http://www.unidroit.org.

[20] For further discussion, see dos Santos AF. Financing of space

assets. Space Policy 2003;19:128–9.

[21] Jasentuliyana N. Treaty law and outer space: can the united

nations play an effective role? Annals of Air & Space Law

1986;11:226.

[22] Ashe III JB. Space station alpha: international shining star or

legal black hole? Temple International & Comparative Law

Journal 1995;9:353.

[23] See for example Kosmo F. The commercialization of space: a

regulatory scheme that promotes commercial ventures and

international responsibility. University of Southern California

Law Review 1988;61:1086.

[24] Malagar LB, Magdoza-Malagar MA. International law of outer

space and the protection of intellectual property rights. Boston

University International Law Journal 1999;17:364.

[25] Fountain LM. Creating momentum in space: ending the paralysis

produced by the common heritage of mankind doctrine.

Connecticut Law Review 2003;35:1778.