the 10th european development fund national indicative ... · the 10th european development fund...

The 10th European Development Fund National IndicativeProgramme

Evaluation of the World Bank administered contracts:197 311 Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP)

197 313 Liberia Community Empowerment Project (LCEP)

EDF contract no.: 2013 / 319 585 of the Framework Contract

Beneficiary Country: LIBERIA

Final Report Volume 1 – Main Report

April 2014

This project is funded by the A project implemented by European Union

Evaluation of the World Bank administered contracts: 197 311 Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP) and197 313 Liberia Community Empowerment Project (LCEP); EDF contract no.: 2013 / 319585 of the Framework Contract

Page iFramework Contractor: Parsons Brinckerhoff Consortium Final Report, Volume 1 – Main Report

Contents Final Report Volume 1 – Main ReportTable of Contents ........................................................................................................... i

Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................ iii

Executive Summary .................................................................................................... I A. AIDP Feeder Roads Component .......................................................... I B. AIDP Water Supply Component ..........................................................III C. LCEP-II project .................................................................................... V

Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................1

Chapter 2. Evaluation of the AIDP Project - Feeder Roads component ...........4 2.1 Relevance (problems and needs) and quality of the project ................5 2.2 Effectiveness (achievement of purposes) ..........................................10 2.3 Efficiency (sound management and value for money) .......................16 2.4 Sustainability (likely continuation of achieved results) .......................28 2.5 Impact (achievement of wider effects) ...............................................30 2.6 Coherence/complementarity (mutual reinforcement) .........................31 2.7 Community value added ...................................................................33 2.8 Visibility .............................................................................................34

Chapter 3. Evaluation of the AIDP Project – Water Supply component .........35 3.1 Relevance (problems and needs) and quality of the project ..............36 3.2 Effectiveness (achievement of purposes) ..........................................48 3.3 Efficiency (sound management and value for money) .......................58 3.4 Sustainability (likely continuation of achieved results) .......................65 3.5 Impact (achievement of wider effects) ...............................................68 3.6 Coherence/complementarity (mutual reinforcement) .........................70 3.7 Community value added ...................................................................73 3.8 Visibility .............................................................................................74

Chapter 4. Evaluation of the LCEP-II project ....................................................75 4.1 Relevance (problems and needs) and quality of the project ...............79 4.2 Effectiveness (achievement of purposes) ...........................................84 4.3 Efficiency (sound management and value for money) ........................91 4.4 Sustainability (likely continuation of achieved results) ........................97 4.5 Impact (achievement of wider effects) .............................................. 101 4.6 Coherence/complementarity (mutual reinforcement) ........................ 102 4.7 Community value added .................................................................. 103 4.8 Visibility ............................................................................................ 104


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Chapter 5. Main Conclusions and Recommendations AIDP Project – Feeder Roads component ............................................................. 106 5.1 Form of co-financing by the EU of the AIDP project ......................... 106 5.2 Delays in signing Administration and Grant Agreements .................. 106 5.3 Absence of economic evaluation and Logframe ............................... 106 5.4 Absorption capacity and de-commitment of funds ............................ 107 5.5 Quality of reporting ........................................................................... 107 5.6 Single source contracting of ILO ...................................................... 108 5.7 Role of the IIU .................................................................................. 108 5.8 Accounting in PFMU ........................................................................ 108 5.9 Remarks on WB performance .......................................................... 109 5.10 Sustainability .................................................................................... 110

Chapter 6. Main Conclusions and Recommendations AIDP Project – Water Supply component .............................................................. 111 6.1 Financing arrangements .................................................................. 111 6.2 Absorption capacity and de-commitment of funds ............................ 111 6.3 Procurement of the high-lift pumps................................................... 111 6.4 Involvement of the private sector...................................................... 112 6.5 Affordability of drinking water ........................................................... 112

Chapter 7. Main Conclusions and Recommendations LCEP-II project ......... 113 7.1 Appropriateness of the CDD approach ............................................. 113 7.2 Administration of co-financed projects .............................................. 113 7.3 Selection process of sub-projects..................................................... 113 7.4 Improve presentation of financial results .......................................... 113 7.5 Future of LACE ................................................................................ 113 7.6 Outstanding supplies........................................................................ 114

Volume 1 – Appendix 1: List of persons contacted .................................................... 115Volume 1 – Appendix 2: List of documents consulted ................................................ 118Volume 1 – Appendix 3: Terms of Reference ............................................................ 121Volume 1 – Appendix 4: Details of field inspections ................................................... 131Volume 1 – Appendix 5: Provisional conversion of PFMU-IIU disbursements Based on historical IMF exchange rates .............................. 141Volume 1 – Appendix 6: Inventory of contract works executed – Lot 1B .................... 141Volume 1 – Appendix 7: List of LCEP-II projects visited by the Evaluators ................ 155

List of tables

Table 2.01 – The proposed total AIDP program ...................................................................4Table 2.02 – Approved breakdown EU contribution to AIDP project ........................................5Table 2.03 – Key Data of the AIDP Feeder Roads component ...............................................5Table 2.04 – The 18 culvert contracts of Phase 1(source ILO Final Report) ...........................11Table 2.05 – Tendered Phase 2 contracts for shaping and graveling ....................................12Table 2.06 – Training program local contracting industry .....................................................13Table 2.07 – Training in Labour Based Methods of MPW staff ............................................14Table 2.08 – Re-posted periodic maintenance contracts of national roads .............................15Table 2.09 – Cost Feeder Roads component .....................................................................20


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Table 2.10 – Submissions PFMU Financial Costs AIDP project (EU-funded portion only) .......24Table 2.11 – Foreign Currency Transactions WB-US$ versus EU-Euros ...............................26Table 2.12 – Reconciliation of the AIDP – EU Component based on the figures of PFM dd. 6 March 2014 .......................................................................................26Table 2.13 – Differences in exchange rate conversions based on Evaluator’s conversion ......27Table 3.01 – Approved breakdown EU contribution to AIDP project ......................................35Table 3.02 – Key Data of the AIDP Water Supply component ..............................................35Table 3.03 – Water Projects 2006 – 2008 .........................................................................42Table 3.04 – Contract details civil works contract Lot 1B (EU-funded portion of AIDP) ............50Table 3.05 – Implementation details Lot 1B (EU-funded portion of AIDP project) ...................51Table 3.06 – Goods scope of Works .................................................................................59Table 3.07 – Variation Orders approved for supply contract Jual Group ................................60Table 3.08 – Contract data Colan for Design and Supervision Lots 1A, 1B, 2 and 3 ...............62Table 3.09 – Approved Variation Orders Lot 1B .................................................................63Table 4.01 – Basic WB Information – (updated the 10th of September 2013) .........................76Table 4.02 – WB Key Dates ............................................................................................76Table 4.03 – Administration Agreement Budget of Operations amended Sept. 17, 2010 .......... 77Table 4.03 – Administration Agreement Budget of Operations amended June 10, 2011 ..........77Table 4.05 – Grant Agreement Eligible Expenditures ..........................................................78Table 4.06 – Achievements Main Outcome Indicators.........................................................84Table 4.07 – Completed projects as per 31 July 2013 .........................................................85Table 4.08 – Financial breakdown of sub-projects (in US$) .................................................85Table 4.09 – Actual value Achieved at completion 31 July 2013 ...........................................86Table 4.10 – Culverts with serious backfilling problems .......................................................87Table 4.11 – Bridges with serious backfilling problems........................................................87Table 4.12 – Achieved results Intermediate Output Indicators ..............................................89Table 4.13 – Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) ...................................92Table 4.14 – Budget versus Actual Expenditure in Euros ....................................................92Table 4.15 – Status of Activities under the Communication and Visibility Plan ..................... 104

List of figures

Figure 2.01 – Current interventions in the road sector (March 2012) .....................................32

Final Report Volume 2 – End User Surveys


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Abbreviations

AA Administration AgreementAIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development ProjectCDD Community-Driven DevelopmentCEPI First Community Empowerment ProjectCEPII Second Community Empowerment ProjectCfWTEP Cash-for-Work Temporary Employment ProjectDEU Delegation of the European Union in LiberiaESMF Environmental and Social Management FrameworkEU European UnionFPCRTF Food Price Crisis Response Trust FundGIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale ZusammenarbeitGoL Government of LiberiaICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportIDA International Development AssociationIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsIFR Interim Financial ReportILO International Labour OrganizationIPRS Interim Poverty Reduction StrategyISR Implementation Supervision ReportLACE Liberia Agency for Community EmpowermentLCEP-II Second Liberia Community Empowerment ProjectLGA Local Government AuthoritiesLWSC Liberia Water and Sewer CorporationM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMPW Ministry of Public Works, LiberiaMTR Mid-Term ReviewPAD Project Appraisal DocumentPDO Project Development ObjectivePMC Project Management CommitteeRFTF Results Focused Transitional FrameworkROM Results Oriented MonitoringRPF Resettlement Policy FrameworkToR Terms of ReferenceUNDP United Nations Development ProgramWASH Water, Sanitation and HealthWB WORLD BANK

Evaluation of the World Bank administered contracts: 197 311 Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Program (AIDP) and197 313 Second Liberia Community Empowerment Project (LCEP-II); EDF contract No.: 2013/319585 of the Framework Contract

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Executive SummaryIn accordance with the Project CycleManagement, the Government of Liberiaand the European Union decided toundertake a Final Evaluation of theimplementation of the World Bankadministered contracts:

§ 197 311 Agriculture and InfrastructureDevelopment Program (AIDP) and

§ 197 313 Second Liberia CommunityEmpowerment Project (LCEP-II);

This report presents the findings andrecommendations of the Evaluators. Thereport consists of 2 volumes: Volume 1 –Main Report and Volume 2 – End UserSurvey.

A. Evaluation AIDP FeederRoads Component

The Administration Agreement betweenthe WB and the EU was signed on the 27th

of February 2009 by the Delegation of theEuropean Union (DEU) in Liberia and theWB. It was activated on the 4th of August2009 but became effective only after thesigning of the Grant Agreement betweenthe WB and the Government of Liberia onthe 20th of July 2010.

For the implementation of the project,Trust Fund TF070904 was created.

A.1 RelevanceThe objective of the Trust Fund was toCo-finance the AIDP by supporting theRepublic of Liberia’s efforts and prioritiesin rural areas as stated in Liberia’s(interim) Poverty Reduction SupportProgram by rehabilitating and constructingrural roads as well as contributing toincrease production capacity of potablewater in Monrovia and rehabilitating thedistribution network of secondary andtertiary pipelines.

The intervention is in line with the (interim)Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), inwhich the Government of Liberia gave ahigh priority to rehabilitation of rural

infrastructure as a means to reducepoverty in the near-term.

The rehabilitation of feeder roads fallsunder the Infrastructure pillar of thePoverty Reduction Strategy and isfocused largely on the use of (LabourBased Method (LBM) for the rehabilitationand maintenance of rural roads in order tomaximise job creation.

The AIDP Program was also completely inline with the development and cooperationstrategies of EC for Africa, and theCSP/NIP.

The intervention of EU corresponds onlyto some activities to be implementedunder an overall program appraised byWB. The intervention was highly relevantto correspond to the most urgent needs ofthe target groups. Road infrastructure andespecially rural roads have not beenmaintained for many years, were in poorconditions and extremely difficult to useduring the rainy season.

The intervention is in line with the ParisDeclaration as it is used a multilateraldonor pool of funds to support thepriorities as expressed by the GoL in theirPRS. The project did not contribute to thepolicy dialogue with EU, as the fund of theproject was a support to a trust fundoperated by the WB.

In the end the GoL has, in consultationwith and after approval of the WB and EU,substituted shaping and graveling worksthat were foreseen on selected feederroads with periodic maintenance activitieson main gravel roads in the samecounties; this in order to utilize theavailable funds as far as possible withinthe given time frame and in accordancewith the objectives.

Selection of the specific rural roads tookplace during implementation via aparticipatory process involving the DistrictCommittees (DC) and CountyAdministrations (CA) in prioritization andplanning. The criteria included socio-economic indicators (such as population,access to basic services, etc.), linkages toother EU and IDA- funded projects, as


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well as taking account of food security andagricultural activities under AIDP.The project was prepared as anemergency operation under OP/BP8.0World Bank guidelines in the pre-arrearsclearance era of post conflict Liberia. Thedesign of the project picked up pendingelements identified through an earlierTechnical Assistance Project financed byTrust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB).

A detailed economic evaluation ofinvestments was not performed due to theemergency nature of the project. Therewas no log frame (LF) in the originalprogramme document of theAdministration Agreement (AA). Under therural road component, the supervisingconsultants (ILO) have established a LFwith indicators. The quality of the LF waspoverty oriented and with road indicators.In the completion document the outputswere reported against the LF.

The financial resources were in principlesufficient to carry out the proposedintervention, but only if sufficient timewould have been available. This isdemonstrated by the fact that of theproposed € 6,466,000 for works andtraining only € 3,612,095.55 could beused.

The risks and assumptions were identifiedin the project appraisal document.

The design of the project did not foreseesufficient flexibility for adaption to achanging context. Although the EUgranted one extension of 12 months to theproject, this showed to be fully insufficientand resulted in the de-commitment of €2,853,904.45 on the feeder roadscomponent. A further extension wasimpossible due to the closure of the 10th

EDF program. A certain degree offlexibility was demonstrated by the factthat an amount of € 1,047,982.59 wasabsorbed by the URIRP (IDA H478)periodic road maintenance program in thesame Counties. This improved the accessto markets, schools and health centers forthe beneficiaries.

Of all the factors that have influenced theoutcome of this intervention, the latesigning of the Administration Agreementbetween the EU and the WB and theFinancial Agreement between the WB andthe GoL is the most important one. Boththe EU and the WB could have known atthe signing of the Grant Agreement that itwould be impossible to achieve theplanned results within the remainingtimeframe. Now the civil works contractsfor the first phase could start only in April2011 and had to stop in July 2012.

Besides imposing unrealistic timelines forimplementation, the legal agreements didnot include any cross conditions ofeffectiveness or default. The delay inmaking the grant effective resulted insome challenges with the propercoordination of parallel investments fromdifferent sources of investment under theprevailing emergency conditions.

The stakeholders (e.g. the agriculturalproducers) were not actively involved inthe design of the project.

The attention given by the WB staff to theEU-funded activities under Component Bof the overall AIDP project, in particularthe feeder roads is considered by theEvaluators and the EU Delegation inLiberia as proportionally too low.The overall programme design touched ongender aspects. Under the roadcomponent a minimum of 15 % of the LBworkforce was women. Environmentalaspects have been included as is the casewhen undertaking infrastructure work.Donor coordination was not really visible.

A.2 Effectiveness (achievement ofpurposes)

As far as the total AIDP project isconcerned, the following outcomes wereenvisaged:

- The project will support Government’sefforts in re-establishing basicinfrastructure and in reviving theagriculture economy for rural growthand poverty alleviation.

- The expected outcome of the project is


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functioning service provision on thetargeted basic infrastructure, whichfacilitates, inter alia, improvedmarketing opportunities for targetedfarmers.

- Infrastructure related outcomes are:(i) targeted roads are successfully

maintained and remainaccessible during the rainyseason;

(ii) increased access to an allseason road by targeted ruralpopulation.

(iii) Intermediate outcomeindicators for the infrastructureactivities will be constructionprogress.

As for the Feeder Roads component ofthe AIDP project, also another outcomewas important: creation of employment inthe shortest possible way. Especially forthis requirement, the IIU of the MPWentered into a contract with the ILO, giventheir broad experience with Labor Basedconstruction and maintenance techniquesin the region.

The ILO started their assignment on the13th of July 2010 and had to stopprematurely on the 31st of July 2012, dueto the closure of the project related to thedeadline for disbursement. The work ofthe ILO comprised:

Component A: Design and supervision of200 km of feeder roads in Bong, Nimbaand Lofa CountiesComponent B: Building the capacity oflocal contractors and MPW staff in the useof Labor Based Methods in theconstruction and maintenance of roadsComponent C: Others:- Preparation of the Logframe- Carrying out a Baseline survey- Preparation of standard Tenderdocuments for Labor Based works for theMPW

Due to the unavailability of Labor Basedequipment for the small contractors, it wasagreed that the civil works of ComponentA would be implemented in two phaseswhiles awaiting the equipment, to beprocured by MPW under the Labor Based

Public Works Program. The decision wasalso based on the low capacity of the localcontractors and the experiences on otherprojects. The two phases were: Phase 1: Construction of culverts Phase 2: Road formation and gravelling

Under Component A tender documentswere prepared to construct in total 595culverts and road formation and gravelingof 198 km of feeder roads.

The final total amount of certified works ofPhase 1 was US$ 2,641,809,09equivalent to approximately € 1,98 million.

The evaluators have visited 9 out of the 18contracts, e.g. 50% of all contracts

The selection of the roads eligible for thisintervention has not been verytransparent. It was found that certainroads, even one year after completion, didnot carry a reasonable amount of traffic,but this might also be due to the fact thatthe proposed road formation and gravelingworks never took place.

The quality of the works varies from goodto poor, with an average of rating of justsufficient. The main shortcoming is thebackfilling of the culverts, leaving the roadin a number of cases even more difficult topass than before.

Under Component B the following resultswere achieved:

- Training of local contractors trained:target 20, achieved: 20.

- Training of MPW staff trained: target20, achieved 24.

The completed activities mentioned underComponent C were:

- Logframe: the ILO prepared theLogframe for project monitoring but itwas hardly used.

- Baseline survey: the baseline surveywas carried out to establish indicatorsfor measuring the impact of theproject.

- Tender documents for Labor Basedworks: Unfortunately WB requirements


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did not allow the project to try thetender document.

Due to the problems with the tendering ofPhase 2 of the civil works contracts,budget constraints and the abrupt closureof the project caused by the non-extendable deadline for disbursement ofEDF X funds, the EU and the WB agreedin November 2012 to re-post costs madeby the WB that had been spent onperiodic maintenance of national roads inthe same Counties. The total length of there-posted works was 329.0 km at a cost ofUS$ 1,338,483.37, equivalent to €1,047,982.59 (in average € 3,185/km).The evaluation team disagrees with theconclusion in the WB’s ICR Report that asa result of this re-posting the target for thefeeder roads of 200 km has beenexceeded by 220%. One cannot comparethe 329 of periodic maintenance activitieswith the 200 km planned road formationand graveling activities. Only because ofthe fact that the EU allowed the re-postingof costs incurred by the WB for themaintenance works on the national roads,the financial figures became a little bit lessdisastrous. Without this re-posting thedisbursement would have been €2,564,112.96 out of the available budgetof € 6,446,000 or 40% only.

The project created 143,301 person daysof employment and the total wages paidwere US$ 429,903 (US$ 3.00/day). Thefemale participation was 15%.

A.3 Efficiency (sound managementand value for money)

In the appraisal document of July 2007 anumber of implementation arrangementswere envisaged but in practice thisarrangements did not work out asplanned:

a) The existing Steering Group would beexpanded to include a representative ofthe Ministry of Agriculture and arepresentative of the EU. This hasnever been done.

b) The Ministry of Public Works wouldimplement the Project through theexisting Special Implementation Unit(now IIU). Unfortunately the capacities

of the IIU to manage the project wereover-estimated. Especially in the fieldof Labour-based rehabilitation of feederroads there was a lack of experiencewithin the MPW. The initial start-up ofthe feeder roads component hadsignificant delays emanating primarilyfrom a scarcity of motivated and skilledhuman resource at the MPW. Thisculminated in contracting theInternational Labour Organization(ILO), on a sole source basis, to act asan Implementation Agent on behalf ofthe MPW.

c) The roles of the IIU and PFMU werenot clearly defined and could lead toconflicts.

Role of EU DelegationThe most important factor that affected theefficiency of the implementation of theproject was not the implementationcapacity of the IIU, ILO or localcontractors but the delay in signing theAdministration Agreement between theWorld Bank and the European Union andthe Grant Agreement between the WorldBank and the Government of Liberia.

It took the WB and the EU fromSeptember 2007 till 28 February 2009 toagree on the Administration Agreement.The main reason was a difference in theinterpretation of the existing EC-WB TrustFunds and Co-financing FrameworkAgreement (TFCFA), as amended on 17March 2003, on issues like procurementrules, eligibility to bid, accountancy rulesand reporting. It is quite obvious that littleor no experience was available in the EUDelegation in Abidjan that handled thismatter.

Also discussions between the EU and theWB on the renewal of the EC-WB TrustFunds and Co-financing FrameworkAgreement (TFCFA) delayed the process.The Administration Agreement betweenthe EU and the WB for the AIDP projectwas signed 28 February 2009 whilst thenew TFCFA was signed 29 March 2009.

The delay till February 2009, causedmainly by the EU, was followed by anotherdelay due to the late signing of the Grant


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Agreement between the WB and the GoL.This Grant Agreement was signed only onthe 20th of June 2010 and led to thesituation that it was already clear from themoment of signing the Grant Agreementthat the project could never be completedwithin the given time.

The supervision of the project by theEuropean Union Delegation was verysuperficial. In the AdministrationAgreement clear tasks related to thesupervision and financial control weredelegated to the World Bank and the IIU.

The EU Delegation was not able to checkespecially the financial administration ofthe project. The reporting from the WB tothe EU was insufficient to carry out thattask. The EU in the end showed areasonable flexibility when re-posting roadmaintenance activities on national gravelroads. With this action an amount of US$1,338,483.37 (€ 1,047,982.59) was savedfrom de-commitment. Up to now a finalreconciliation of the accounts between theWB and the EU has not been effectuated.

Role of ILOThe MPW-IIU hired the ILO to implementthe Feeder Roads component. Thecontract between the MPW-IIU and theILO was signed on the 13th of July 2010for a period of 24 month at an agreedcontract sum of US$ 1,616,340.00.

Due to unavailability of LB equipment forthe small contractors, it was agreed thatthe project would be implemented in twophases whiles awaiting the equipment tobe procured by MPW under the LBPWP.This decision was also triggered by thelow capacity of the local contractors andthe experiences on other projects. Thetwo Phases were:

(i) Construction of culverts(ii) Road formation and graveling

Phase (i) was partially executed butPhase (ii) had to be cancelled due toprocurement issues and budget and timeconstraints.

The cost of the culverts constructed under

Phase (i) is in line with similar projects inand around Liberia (US$ 5,884 perculvert).

Phase (ii) has been deleted completelydue to problems in the procurement stage,supposed budget constraints andespecially time constraints.

The ILO spent an amount of US$727,029.66 on the design, supervision,training, fees and administrative/logisticcosts. This amount seems reasonable.However, the ILO received US$934,621.70 and has to refund thereforeUS$ 207,592.04. This is still a matter ofdebate between the WB/IIU and the ILOand has not been solved yet.

The cooperation of the ILO in thisevaluation was not appreciated.

Role of Local Contracting Industry

The efficiency of the Local ContractingIndustry was quite poor, but has to bejudged primarily in the light of themitigating circumstances of working in apost conflict fragile environment. The localconstruction industry was significantlyimpacted by the brain drain, disinvestmentad destruction of equipment due to thecivil war. Most of them lack basicequipment and experience in the roadconstruction. The ILO strategy was toengage and train local contractors inlabour based methodology forimplementation of the works. This traininghas been carried out satisfactory.

Role of IIU in the MPWAlready in an early state of the project itbecame clear that the then SIU wasunderstaffed and lacking experience in thedesign, procurement and supervision ofworks to be carried out under LB methods.For that reason, the road inventory,selection of roads for rehabilitation,design, works supervision and training oflocal contractors and MPW staff wasoutsourced to the ILO. This left the IIUwith general management tasks/financialcontrol and the ILO with the micromanagement of the project.


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The activities of the ILO and the localcontractors have been monitored by theMPW on a regular basis. Also the ResidentEngineers and their staff from the Countiesof Bong, Lofa and Nimba participated in thesupervision activities and site meetings.The monitoring data has been madeavailable in quarterly reports to the WB andthe PFMU. It is not clear why theDepartment of Rural Roads was notinvolved.

Already in 2008 the EU adopted the policycalled “Reforming Technical Cooperationand Project Implementation Units forExternal Aid provided by the EuropeanCommission – A Backbone Strategy”. Inline with this policy, the EU shouldpreferably continue to support the transferof the IIU from a Project ImplementationUnit into a Roads Authority, or otherwisethe integration of the IIU in the lineorganization of the MPW.

Role of the PFMUThe PFMU is responsible for financialmanagement, disbursement and relatedreporting, including interim un-auditedfinancial reports (IFRs) and timely conductof annual audits. Through their office theEvaluator received 5 different submissionson the amounts charged to the EU on thisAIDP project. Although in the end therewas consensus on the amounts chargedto the EU, the Evaluator is of the opinionthat, based on the differences shown inthe respective submissions, the internalcontrol of the PFMU on the externalreporting should be improved.

Role of the WBDespite the existence of a standardAdministration Agreement there havebeen different expectations at the start ofthe project on the role to be played by theWB. The WB has explained in writingclearly that the project implementation isthe responsibility of the client. The projectimplementation is not micro managed bythe task team nor is it warranted. The EUDelegation had expected a more pro-active role. The impression is that theFeeder Roads component did not receivethe attention it needed. The WBmonitoring missions rarely visited one of

the 18 Lots for culverts construction. Mostof the attention went to the othercomponents of the AIDP project.

The delays in the implementation of theproject can be blamed to both the EU andthe WB. It is unbelievable that 16 monthshave been lost in signing a GrantAgreement (not a Loan Agreement!)between the WB and the Government ofLiberia (MoF).

The EU Delegation could not check thefinancial information given in theImplementation Completion Memorandumand the unaudited financial reports sincethey do not have access through theClient Connection to the WB’s Trust FundDonor Centre. Also the conversion ofDollar expenditures to Euros is a blackbox.

The Final Reconciliation has not beencarried out yet, 16 months after the officialclosing of the project. There is a differenceof approximately 350 thousand Eurosbetween the figures mentioned in the ICMreport and the figures of the Evaluator.

The total unspent amount of the FeederRoads component is € 2,853,904.45.

Considering the balance between the timespent in signing the AdministrationAgreement and Grant Agreement, theundisbursed amounts, the delays inimplementation, and the mitigatingcircumstances of working in a post conflictfragile environment, the overall efficiencyof the Feeder Roads component is ratedas unsatisfactory.

A.4 Sustainability (likelycontinuation of achievedresults)

The final outcome of the project has notbeen achieved yet. Only the culverts havebeen constructed but the shaping andgraveling works were never executed andtherefore the project is incomplete and notready for normal use. Economic benefitshave therefore not accrued yet

There is reasonable policy support fromthe national and sector policies. Needs


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touched by the intervention are soessential for the population of Liberia thatno changes in policy support can beexpected.

There is a budget allocation in the GoLbudget for maintenance of rural roads. It isclear that this budget allocation isinsufficient to cover the maintenance ofthe feeder roads. Apart from the fact ifthere is an allocation or not, the fact is thatin the financial year July 2013 till June2014 nothing has been released for themaintenance of the feeder roads. It ismost likely that donor support will benecessary in the medium term in order toensure that the results of the interventionare not lost completely due to the lack ofmaintenance.

The project was to set up CommunityBased Organizations (CBO) along theselected roads to undertake basic routinemaintenance. These groups have notbeen set up under the AIDP project as thesecond phase never started. Capacitybuilding of the local contractors needs tobe maintained by the provision ofresources for routine maintenancecoupled with adequate planning andbudgeting.

A.5 Impact (achievement of widereffects)

The impact of the project is difficult tomeasure in real terms because there wereno Output Verifiable Indicators (OVI’s)defined. Although only 350 culverts wereconstructed at this stage, the roadimprovements have generated a limitedpositive impact. The project providedaccess to the main road, market, healthcentres and schools. The contribution ofthe project to these changes is markedfrom the discussions with beneficiariesand given in Volume 2, End UserSurveys - Chapter 1 End User SurveyAIDP Project - Feeder Roadscomponent. The roads were largelyimpassable at certain times of the year.Weather conditions can jeopardize theimpact of the work on the culverts if theroads become impassable due to the lackof maintenance budget of the MPW. Theproject contributed to the pillar 4 in the

iPRS with respect to rehabilitatinginfrastructure.

No unplanned positive impact has beenfound and no spill-over effects have beenidentified.

Significant collaboration has beenachieved between the EC, World Bankand AfDB in the continuing policy dialoguewith donors in the transport and watersectors in Liberia. There is definitely thepotential for donor complementarity butthe coordination on project level was poorand can be further improved.

Recommendations Feeder Roadscomponent

Recommendations have been given onthe following subjects:

1. Form of co-financing by the EU of the AIDP project2. Delays in signing Administration and Grant Agreements3. Absence of economic evaluation and Logframe4. Absorption capacity and de- commitment of funds5. Quality of reporting6. Single source contracting of ILO7. Role of the IIU8. Accounting in PFMU9. Remarks on WB performance10. Sustainability

B. Evaluation AIDP WaterSupply Component

The Water Supply component was thesecond component of the AIDP projectthat was funded by the EU. The envisagedcontribution of the EU for this componentwas € 3,334,000 (includingcontingencies). The following outputswere envisaged:

a) Rehabilitation of Ducor and CityReservoirs at Mamba Point

b) Rehabilitation of Booster Stations atNewport, Bushrod Island and WhitePlains Water Treatment Plant

c) Supply Installation Testing andcommissioning of High lift pumps


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d) Monrovia Water Distribution System(Lot 1B) to provide potable water tocommunities in Monrovia.

B.1 Relevance (problems andneeds) and quality of theproject)

Rehabilitation and infrastructureconstruction were at the heart of policiesthat have been put in place since 2006 bythe GOL. The Interim Poverty ReductionStrategy (iPRS) recognized poor accessto safe drinking water and sanitationservices as major causes of illness andpoverty, with the greatest impact on thepoor, who in most cases, were notconnected to the existing system.

Rebuilding the basic infrastructure toincrease access to clean water and safesanitation services was therefore a toppriority in GOL’s strategy to improvehealth conditions, economic growth, andthus reduce poverty as projected in itsiPRS.

In 2008, at the time of projectcommencement, the initial projects forreconstruction and infrastructurerehabilitation were still far from beingachieved. This was the case especially forthe rehabilitation of the drinking watersupply and sanitation system in the city ofMonrovia. More than 1 million inhabitantsof Monrovia used completely dilapidatedwater and sanitation facilities designed fora city a quarter that size, creating greatsusceptibility to water-borne diseases.

Since 1999 several urgent rehabilitationactions have been launched by theGovernment to rehabilitate components ofthe water system to a certain extent (theWater Treatment Plant in White Plains,the re-commissioning of the large (36 in.dia.) water transmission pipeline, etc.),financed by the Republic of China onTaiwan and by European Commission. In2006/2008, production was estimatedabout 1.2 million gallons per day (4,542m3/day) - about 7.5% -10% of its originalcapacity - for the Monrovian population ofmore than a million people. Only a smallpart of Monrovia had piped water, a largesection of the city extracts water fromhand-dug public and private shallow wells,

and trucked water delivered at variouspoints throughout the city, further re-soldby retail distributors. Manyneighbourhoods of the city relied mostlyon water sellers.

The proposed interventions funded by theEU were in line with solving (part of) theimmediate needs. They were also in linewith existing policies. A national-levelpolicy for the management of waterresources (Integrated Water ResourcesManagement Policy) was developed in2007. Towards the end of 2009, thegovernment defined the “Water Supplyand Sanitation Policy” for Liberia. But itwas not until 2011 that the GOL undertookserious commitments for the improvementof access to water supply and sanitationby signing the WASH Compact “SanitationPolicy and Water for All”, and it was onlyin 2012 that it started graduallymaterializing.

The Administration Agreement of the TrustFund was incomplete and did not includea Logical Framework. The ProjectDevelopment Objective was described as:Improved drinking water supply to thepopulation of Monrovia and the expectedOutcomes were: 1) increased productioncapacity of potable water in Monrovia: 2)rehabilitation of the distributive network ofsecondary pipelines and tertiary pipelines:3) Policy reform, Studies and TechnicalAssistance; 4) InfrastructuresInvestments: Works for the Rehabilitationand construction of (…) water treatmentplant and secondary and tertiary networkin selected neighbourhoods Monrovia foran improved distribution of water; 5)Operating cost for project managementand coordination.

No indicators for the monitoring of theexpected outcomes were provided in theAdministration Agreement.

The implementation arrangements werethe same as for the Feeder Roadscomponent: the MPW-IIU was responsiblefor the technical aspects, among them theprocurement process (works, goods andservices) and the PFMU was responsiblefor the financial aspect of the project(control, disbursements). For the technicalaspects the MPW-IIU worked together


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with specialists from the LWSC. AlsoColan Consult from Ghana was hired todesign and supervise the works.

It needs to be noted that for its part theAfDB has selected the LWSC as theimplementation agency for its waterprojects. The LWSC uses the AfDBprocedures for all contracts and servicesfinanced by it. There are therefore twoimplementing agencies (SIU/IIU) andLWSC) that are responsible for carryingout rehabilitation works on the drinkingwater network for Monrovia, with eachusing specific procedures of theirrespective lessor.

The EC delegation in Liberia mentioned intheir Annual Report 2008 about the recentco-financing agreements with UNinstitutions for some EDF 8th projects:“The experience has been mixed. On theone hand these instruments enhance theharmonization of contributions and workprogram and help to bridge internalcapacity constraints of the EC. On theother hand, however, many of thesearrangements suffer from severeshortcomings in transparency regardingprogress and results, lack of detailedreporting on the use of funds and frominsufficient EC visibility”.

It is regrettable that the lessons learnedfrom previous co-financing experienceswith UN agencies have not been used toimprove the design of the co-financingproject with the World Bank.

Donor coordination was part of the designand included in the AdministrationAgreement. However, the only realcoordination between projects appears tohave been the one brought by theConsultant Colan.

B.2 Effectiveness (achievement ofpurposes)

The following activities, to be fundedunder the project, were foreseen:

(i) The rehabilitation/extension of thedrinking water distribution network incertain neighbourhoods of GreaterMonrovia;

(ii) The rehabilitation of the Caldwell andNewport Street Booster Stations,Mamba Point Reservoir and Ducorreservoir and

(iii) Supply, installation and testing ofequipment (high lift pumps andgenerators) to the Booster Stations inNewport Street, Caldwell and WhitePlains Water Treatment Plant

Re (i): rehabilitation/extension of thedistribution network

This activity started within the frameworkof the MWSSRP project with LWSC as theonly implementing agency until 2010 andthen in coordination with MPW/IIU after2010. As part of the AIDB fundedMWSSRP project, the LWSC contractedin October 2008 Colan Consult (CC) tocarry out the engineering design andconstruction supervision of variouscomponents of the programme, amongstothers Lot 1B for the rehabilitation of partof the distribution network.

The contract “Rehabilitation of DistributionNetwork – Lot 1B” was awarded to TopInternational Engineering (GH) Limited,“Rehabilitation of Distribution Network.Works started on 22th February 2010 forLot1B (EC/WB) and finished 20th February2011; the Defect Liability Periodcommenced on 1st March 2011 andfinished 1st March, 2012. Lot 1B declared"completed works" consisted of:

§ Pipe laying (total length 48.0 km)§ Installation of valves and pipes

special (170)§ Construction of valve chambers (120)§ Construction of Public standpipes

(35), each with 6 faucets§ Rehabilitation of existing mains (5km)

The network rehabilitation works haveproceeded without problems. The qualityof the works was generally good althoughthe LWSC complained that in certainsections the pipes were not laid on theprescribed depth. This does not showfrom the Interim Payment Certificates andFinal Handing-over Certificate that were


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signed also by a representative from theLWSC.

Unfortunately the capacity of thedistribution network can today not be fullyutilized as rehabilitation of boosterstations, reservoirs and supply andinstallation of high lift pumps and enginesis still on-going (in WTP). This will notaffect the integrity of the distribution butthe distribution network will not be fullyfunctional until these complementaryprojects are completed.

Furthermore, the rehabilitated network hasnot been fully operational because of thelack of flow (example in part of centralMonrovia). It has therefore not beenpossible to monitor and ascertain theintegrity of some of the existing pipelinesthat have been rehabilitated for use in thenetwork. Given that the defect liabilityperiod has ended LWSC has to prepareitself for any eventuality when the systembecomes fully operational.

Also the rehabilitation intervention did notinclude the transfer of existingconnections unto the new lines laid.LWSC will have to do this and get newconnections to enjoy the benefit of theintervention.

The works were completed in time andaccording to budget. The Original andFinal Contract Sum were identical: US$3,142,746.41.

Re (ii): The rehabilitation of the Caldwelland Newport Street BoosterStations, Mamba Point Reservoirand Ducor reservoir.

The civil works contract “Rehabilitation ofthe Caldwell and Newport Street BoosterStations, Rehabilitation of Mamba PointReservoir and Ducor reservoir” wasawarded to China Henan Engineeringafter a normal WB tender procedure.

Construction works commence on 18th

April 2011. With the exception of theworks at the Ducor reservoir, the works forthe Booster stations8 and the Mamba

reservoir were practically completed on18th October 2011.

The following works were executed:

§ Construction of new suction tank (350m3), new generator house, new pumphouse, new operator house and ancillarycivil works at Caldwell Booster Station;§ Rehabilitation of existing suction tank

and pump house and construction ofnew generator house and ancillary civilworks at Newport Street Booster Station;§ Clearing of site, replacement of pipe

work, cleaning, structural repair anddisinfection of Mamba Point Reservoir.

The works at the Ducor reservoir have notbeen executed due to “accessibility” andownership challenges. Funds for thoseworks were diverted for providinginterconnection of service pipeline fromthe Ducor reservoir on to the Mamba Pointreservoir service line.

The contractor China Henan Engineeringcompleted the project within the availablebudget and a good quality of the works.

Re (iii): Supply, installation and testing ofequipment (high lift pumps andgenerators) to the Booster Stationsin Newport Street, Caldwell andWhite Plains Water TreatmentPlant.

The Contract “Supply, Installation, Testingand Commissioning of Pumps andGenerators at the Booster Stations andWhite Plains Water Treatment Plant” wasoriginally awarded after a formal tenderprocedure to the contractor: A&N ExportInc. on the 29th of April 2011 for anamount of US$ 1,516,975.00.

The start date was 30 June 2011 and theestimated end date was 30 November2011. The contractor received anextension of time till the 21st of February2012, but that proved to be insufficient.

The scope of work was the following:

§ Supply, installation, testing andcommissioning of 2 No. Pumps, 1 No.generator and ancillary electrical and


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pipe work at each of Newport StreetBooster Station, Caldwell BoosterStation and White Plains WTP;

§ Supply and installation of electricalwiring for all buildings at Caldwell andNewport Street Booster Stations;

§ Construction of generator house atWhite Plains;

Since the contractor was not able tosupply all pumps within the agreed timeschedule (even not within the extension oftime of 12 weeks granted to him), thecontract was terminated on the 23rd ofApril 2012, by which date, threegenerators and four pumps out of six weredelivered but nothing was installed ortested.

The EU paid in total US$ 929,311.35(equivalent to approx. € 707,570.40) tothe contractor A & N for the materialsdelivered.

Due to the failure of A&N Export Inc. todeliver all the goods in time, the contractwas terminated and re-tendered. The re-tendered contract was funded solely bythe WB from other sources (Contract:RFQ No.: IIU-MPW / SI-HLP&GEN /LWSC/001/12, Grant: IDA H5040) and istherefore no longer part of this evaluation.

The new contractor was the Jual GroupGhana Ltd. for a total tender sum of US$855,370.00. The contract had a Start dateof 31 August 2012 and an End date of 28October 2013 (including extensions oftime).

Also the new contract did not go smoothly.All pumps were finally installed but the 2high-lift pumps in the White Plains WaterTreatment Plant still have to be tested andare not running yet, 20 month after thestart of the new contract.

The overall effectiveness of the project isconsidered low due to the fact that thehigh-lift pumps in White Plains are still notrunning and the piped water distributionnetwork constructed under Lot 1B is still to

be optimized by means of connecting thevarious existing systems in a better way.

The End User Survey has shown a lowdegree of satisfaction with the results sofar.

B.3 Efficiency (sound managementand value for money)

A first consultancy contract forsupervision, administration andmanagement of the works and goodscontracts was awarded to Colan Consulton the 6th of April, 2011 to be completedby the 7th of December, 2011. It wasextended to December 2012 to continuewith the supervision services and facilitateprocurement of a new goods contractor,following the cancellation of the originalgoods contract. The extended period,however, could not cover the period of thenew goods contract, so a new consultancycontract was entered into from March2013 to elapse June 2013. Due to delaysin the delivery of the goods a furtherextension was required. Testing still has tobe carried out at White Plains.

The tasks carried out by Colan Consultincluded:

(i) To supervise rehabilitation worksat the Newport Street and CaldwellBooster Stations

(ii) To supervise rehabilitation worksfor the Reservoirs at Mamba Point.

(iii) To supervise the installation,testing and commissioning of Pumpsand Generators at the Newport Streetand Caldwell Booster Stations andthe delivery, installation, testing andcommissioning of the High Lift Pumpsat the White Plains Water TreatmentPlant.

The Consultant has carried out his tasksin a professional way. According to therecords received from the PFMU on 6March 2014 the EU paid US$ 261,670.06to Colan Consult for their servicesbetween 8 September 2011 and 30 July2012 under this component.

A second consultancy contract for


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Consultancy Services for Design andConstruction Supervision was signed withColan Consult but this contract wasfunded by the AfDB/DfID. Therefore noopinion is given on the financialperformance of this consultancy contract.

The second contract was originallyscheduled to be completed within 22months. The schedule could not howeverbe adhered to for a number of reasons,including the following:· Delays in review of reports by

stakeholders· Delay in deciding the way forward

after discovering budgetary shortfalls· Delays in construction of facilities· Addition of some work components

The whole assignment covering Lots 1A,1B, 2 and 3 was eventually carried outover a period of 40 months, with 3addendums, ending in July 2012.

The quality of the design and supervisionis judged as professional and up tostandard.

(iv) The rehabilitation/extension of thedrinking water distribution network incertain neighbourhoods of GreaterMonrovia

The contract for the rehabilitation of theDistribution Network, (civil works contractLot 1B), was signed on the 22nd ofFebruary 2010 with Top InternationalEngineering (GH) Limited for an amount ofUS$ 3,142,746.41.

The execution of the works went smoothwithout major hick-ups or delays. Only 7Variation Orders were given.

The Final Contract Sum was US$3,142,746.41 but, according to the PFMUfigures of 6 March 2014, the EU has beencharged only US$ 1,612,321.71 (€1,135,280.82) for the IPC’s 8 to 12 in theperiod 12/04/2011 till 15/07/2011. Thedifference of US$ 1,530,424.70 betweenthese figures was charged to the WBfunded water component of the AIDP.

The Final Contract Amount of US$3,142,746.41 appears to be on the high

side, but this is mainly due to the workingconditions in a fragile state.

(v) The rehabilitation of the Caldwell andNewport Street Booster Stations,Mamba Point Reservoir and Ducorreservoir

The civil works contract for these activitieswas won by China Henan EngineeringCompany Ltd.

Start date: 18th of April 2011End date: 18th of October 2011Contract Sum: US$ 841,461.11

The following works were executed:

§ Construction of new suction tank (350m3), new generator house, new pumphouse, new operator house andancillary civil works at Caldwell BoosterStation;

§ Rehabilitation of existing suction tankand pump house and construction ofnew generator house and ancillary civilworks at Newport Street BoosterStation;

§ Clearing of site, replacement of pipework, cleaning, structural repair anddisinfection of Mamba Point Reservoir.

The project was completed, within thebudget and with a good quality of theworks. The Contract Sum appeared to beon the high side. The project wassupervised well by Colan Consult.

The Contract Sum was US$ 841,461.11but, according to the PFMU figures of 6March 2014, the EU has been chargedonly US$ 768,644.88 for the IPC’s 1 to 5 inthe period 20/07/2011 till 18/07/2012. Thedifference of US$ 72,816.23 between thesefigures is unknown but may be related topayments effected after the deadline fordisbursement that were not charged to theEU.(iii) Supply, installation and testing of

equipment (high lift pumps andgenerators) to the Booster Stations inNewport Street, Caldwell and WhitePlains Water Treatment Plant

The supply contract was surprisinglyawarded to A & N Export Inc., a company


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without experiences with this kind ofpumps. Due to non-compliance with theconditions of the contract (failure to deliverthe goods in time), the contract wasterminated on the 23rd of April 2012, bywhich date, three generators and fourpumps out of six were delivered but notinstalled.

According to the PFMU records of 6March 2014 a total amount of US$929,311.35 (approx. € 685,140.14) fromthe AIDP-EU funds has been paid to thecontractor for the goods delivered but notinstalled. This amount is considered high,especially taking into considerationVariation Order no. 2 of US$ 112,584.00given to the second supplier for theprocurement of goods that appeared onthe packing list of A & N but were missing.

The contract was re-tendered andawarded to the Jual Group Ghana Ltd.This re-tendered contract was not fundedby the EU but solely by the WB from othersources (Contract: RFQ No.: IIU-MPW/SI-HLP&GEN/LWSC/001/12, Grant: IDAH5040).

Although not important for this evaluation,the new tender amount of US$ 855,370.00plus a variation order of US$ 112,584.00is considered extremely high in the lightfact that 4 out of the 6 pumps and all 3generators were already delivered by A &N. Outstanding for the Jual Group wereonly 2 high-lift pumps for White Plains andthe installation and testing of the goods.

The Jual Group installed all pumps andgenerators, only the testing of the 2pumps in White Plains is still outstanding.Furthermore, the pumping station inCaldwell is still not operational due to amissing part.

The technical performance of the JualGroup and the supervisor Colan Consultcan be rated as moderately satisfactory.

The LWSC was not enough involved inthe day-to-day implementation of theproject.

The IIU was not very visible in theimplementation phase of the project; that

was left to Colan Consult who was hiredespecially for this. The IIU was activelyinvolved in the design and procurementphases of the project. During theimplementation stage they followed up onthe verification of the Payment Certificatesthat were then sent to the PFMU forfurther handling.

The WB was more actively involved in theWater Supply component than in theFeeder Roads component. Questionmarks have already been put at theapproval of the first supply contract to alocal supplier in Monrovia withoutexperience with large pumps. The failureof the first supply contract could possiblyhave been avoided by means of a morerigid screening of the potential bidder.

According to the figures received from thePFMU on the 6th of March 2014thefollowing payments were charged to theEU:

Supply Testing & Commissioning High LiftPumps: US$ 929,311.35Supervision & Rehab of Booster Stations:US$ 1,030,314.94Water Distribution Networks: Ducor,Mamba Point: US$ 1,660,365.96Total: US$ 3,619,992.25

This amount is equal to € 2,737,287.43,based on the exchange rate conversioncarried out by the WB itself.

The total budget for the Water Supplycomponent as given in the AA was:€ 3,334,000.00The amount charged to the EU,based on the WB-IMC figures was:€ 2,737,287.43The under-utilization of available fundsfor the Water component is therefore:€ 596,712.57

Considering the balance between theconstruction costs, the delays inimplementation (caused mainly by the EU,WB and the MoF themselves), the under-spending of the available budget and themitigating circumstances of working in apost conflict fragile environment, theoverall, the efficiency of the Water Supplycomponent is rated as unsatisfactory.


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B.4 Sustainability (likelycontinuation of achievedresults)

The sustainability of the intervention isthreatened by a number of factors:

§ The supply and distribution system ofdrinking water in Monrovia is astructurally expensive system causedby the lack of storage capacity thatmakes the system dependent ofpumping mechanisms which must runcontinuously;

§ The system is dependent on veryexpensive electicity;

§ The actual production is limited by thelack of adequate operational funds

§ There is insufficient allocation of fundsfor maintenance;

§ Severe vandalism has been noted,especially at the stand pipes.

The objectives of the MilleniumDevelopement Goal (MDG) for WaterSupply and Sanitation is very ambitious:the Water Sanitation and Hygiene SectorStrategic Plan, 2012-17 and the WASHStrategic Investment Plan for the sameperiode 2012 2017 have defined thetargets as follows:

§ The target is that by 2017, 93% of theurban population in Liberia should haveaccess to potable water sources andsanitation for 61% of the urbanpopulation by 2017.”

§ For Monrovia, this indicates: the “fullrehabilitation of the existing distributionsystem and extension of the system tocover 77% of Greater Monrovia as wellas a comprehensive leakage reductionprogram and the installation of newconsumer connections”

§ The investment program provides forthe development of more than 100,000new connections to the network.

§ The LWSC has, with great difficulty,managed to increase its subscriberbase of approximately 6,000 customersto 9,000 connections over 3 years, orabout 1,000 per year. It is nowexpected to increase this total to20,000 per year.

All while implementing a policy of full costrecovery; the steps will require significantnew efforts:

§ The cost recovery for urban waterservices is a goal in the water policyand the analysis shows that this can beachieved, provided: i) substantial tariffincreases are effected and ii) theoperating efficiencies of the LWSC/water utilities improve compared to thepresent : annual tariff increases of 10%and annual improvement in operatingefficiencies of 7% initially until 2017and reduced increases thereafter willenable the urban water utilities toachieve full cost recovery includinginvestments in the period from 2022 to2030.

§ The suggested substantial tariffincreases to reach full cost recoverywould naturally have to beaccompanied with social safeguards inorder to i) make water servicesaffordable for the poorer segments ofthe population and ii) related toaffordability make the tariff increasespolitically acceptable.

The real constraint, to improve the supplyof drinking water to the inhabitants ofMonrovia, is no longer (if it ever was) aninfrastructure but an institutional andorganizational problem.

The participation of the private sectorneeds to be strongly encouraged for themanagement of the LWSC, not like LECunder a "management contract" but in thecontext of a real "affermage”. Manyrelevant lessons can be learned fromsuccessful experiences of affermage inthe context of water utilities in Africa.


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The Evaluating team stronglyrecommends EC Liberia to support thisapproach to ensure the sustainability of allpast and future investments in the watersector. This is the only way to reallyensure that the inhabitants of Monroviahave a better and more dignified access todrinking water in the coming days.

B.5 Impact (achievement of widereffects)

The impact of the project is difficult tomeasure in real terms because there wereno Output Verifiable Indicators (OVI’s)defined.

However, for all those dependent on theprivate sector, the constraints for watersupply are numerous, the price to buywater on an average is very high:residents surveyed are obliged thereforeto strongly constrain their waterconsumption.

This is why the surveyed householdsoverwhelmingly expressed theirwillingness to subscribe within the LWSCnetwork. Data on household affordabilityindicated that smaller households-those inthe first quintile- could pay around USD 8per month for drinking water consumptionthrough the LWSC network. This is inprinciple sufficient to cover the moderateconsumption (approximately 45 l/p/d) indrinking water for a family of 5 persons(average household size of Monrovia).

The costs pertaining to networkconnection are therefore a major barrierfor household access to safe drinkingwater.

Recommendations Feeder RoadscomponentRecommendations have been given onthe following subjects:

1. Financing arrangements2. Absorption capacity and de- commitment of funds3. Procurement of the high-lift pumps4. Involvement of the private sector5. Affordability of drinking water

C. LCEP-II projectAfter years of civil war that devastated thecountry's economy and destroyed itsphysical, social, and human infrastructure,the Government’s iPRS and the WorldBank’s corresponding Interim StrategyNote (ISN) identified community-drivendevelopment (CDD) as an appropriatevehicle for delivering emergency socialand economic recovery activities.

This approach was deemed particularlyrelevant in the rural areas, which hadsuffered most from the war and isolation,as well as historic lack of Governmentsupport. The CDD approach would aim toempower communities by providing themopportunities to identify their needs,support the design and implementation oftheir sub-projects, manage sub-projectresources, and be responsible for theirappropriate and efficient utilization.

Based on these assumptions the firstLiberia Community Empowerment Projectwas launched in 2003. This project wassatisfactory implemented by the LiberiaAgency for Community Empowerment(LACE), which had been created byGovernment specifically for the purpose ofsupporting CDD projects. LCEP-Igenerated significant attention and hopefrom poor rural communities and was dueto close in August 2007. Given the goodexperiences with the implementation ofLCEP-I the WB decided to opt for acontinuation of this approach for thefollowing reasons:

(i) continue support initiated underLCEP-I to avoid disruption of essentialand timely support to community-based recovery activities; communitydevelopment fostering peace andsecurity;

(ii) catalyse donor support around asingle community development modeland delivery mechanism and provideopportunity for seamless co-financingby other donors;

(iii) create an environment that wouldfoster development of localgovernment structures; and


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(iv) provide a context for collaborationbetween community-based activitiesand government sector policies,particularly in health and education.

The Administration Agreement for the Co-Financing of the Liberia CommunityEmpowerment Project II between theEuropean Union and the World Bank wassigned on December 11, 2008. Itprovided Euro 8,500,000 to beadministered by IDA for theimplementation of the LCEP-II as outlinedin the project appraisal document (PAD).The original completion date of theAdministrative Agreement was December31, 2011.

On the 24th of April 2009 a LetterAgreement was signed that provided theEU co-financing to LCEP-II for thefollowing three components to which thisfunding contributed:

Part A: Community Driven ProgramPart B: Capacity Building ProgramPart C: Project Management

C.1 Relevance (problems and needs)and quality of the project

The WB/EU intervention in the LCEP-IIproject is in line with the PovertyReduction Strategy (PRS), in which theGovernment of Liberia gave a high priorityto quickly embark upon the rehabilitationof infrastructure and the rebuilding ofsystems to deliver basic services as ameans to reduce poverty in the near-term.

The Project’s relevance is substantialgiven that its objectives, design, andimplementation arrangements remainedrelevant to the country context, Liberiandevelopment priorities, and WB/EU’sassistance policies and programsthroughout implementation.

The LCEP-II project was fully in line withthe development and cooperationstrategies of EC for Africa, and theCSP/NIP. The project is also in line withthe 9th Country Strategy Paper (CSP), theNational Indicative Programme (NIP)

2005-2007 and with the Paris Declarationas it is used a multilateral donor pool offunds to support the priorities asexpressed by the GoL in their PRS. Theproject did not contribute to the policydialogue with EU, as the fund of theproject was a support to a trust fundoperated by the WB.

There have been no changes in thecontext and relevance of the project forthe target groups. The project remainedimportant for the beneficiaries of the sub-projects. The project was responding tothe request from GoL for emergency fundsto reinstate critical infrastructure destroyedduring the war.

No activities by Government or donorshave changed the needs and priorities ofthe beneficiaries.

The LCEP-II had three ProjectComponents. In the AdministrationAgreement between the World Bank andthe EU dated 11 December, 2008 theoriginal components were defined asfollows:

Part A: Community Driven Program(US$13.0 million with EU Co-financing)Part B: Capacity Building Program(US$1.3 million with EU Co-financing)Part C: Project Management (US$1.95million with EU Co-financing)

Project preparation benefitted from theimplementation structures of and lessonslearned from the LCEP-I. LACE wasidentified to remain as the implementingpartner. Improving on the LCEP-I design,however, LCEP-II placed greateremphasis on the participation of lineministries and local authorities toencourage the longer-term maintenanceand sustainability of the sub-projects.

The project in its design was veryambitious, given:

- The geographical scope (countrywide);- The poor quality of the roads network;- The number of infrastructures sub- projects to complete (265), and;


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- The application of the time-expensive community demand driven approach.

The planned timescale was short andproved to be too short for a fully effectiveproject.

The project did not use any logicalframework (LF) neither for the wholeproject, nor for the EU funding. The onlyplanning tool was a board of indicators,mainly regarding process indicatorsrelated to activities implementation andefficiency.No targeted Output Verifiable Indicators(OVI), especially regarding impacts forSO and OO were proposed, jeopardizingthe monitoring of outcomes and impacts.Moreover no baseline was initiallydesigned in order to allow the progressassessment.

No risk and assumptions analysis wasdesigned for the whole project.

The EU funds became only available in2009, two years after the CountyDevelopment Project FinancingAgreement. The project was extendedonce for a period of one year (up to31/12/2012), challenging theimplementation of all expectedinfrastructures.

Given the delays in EU funds disposal (in2009 instead of 2007), the projecttimeframe was one-year extendedregarding EU funding in a secondamendment (October 2011).

Due to time constraints and financialchallenges - related to losses in theexchange rate between Euro and USD(estimated around 0,5 million Euros) -,the total number of the infrastructureswas reduced from 265 to 260.

The Project design responded to thecountry’s on-going and evolving needs.The expansion of the LCEP-II design toinclude CfWTEP provided a mechanismfor rapid relief from the food crisis andcontributed to the continued relevance ofthe Project design. The Project design,however, may be considered overly

ambitious in the scaling up from LCEP-I toLCEP-II, especially so in light of theaddition of the CfWTEP activities andinfusion of EU funding. The temporaryemployment activities were modeled onLACE’s CDD approach developed underLCEP-I and LCEP-II, helping to ensurethat the public works could be rolled outquickly. The revision of the Project’sdesign led to the expansion of publicworks activities through the developmentof the WB-funded YES Project. It alsoprovided important lessons forimplementation of the Government-fundedLYEP, launched in 2013, demonstratingthe continuing relevance of its designapproach. The EU was not involved in thefunding or implementation of these Projectexpansions.

C.2 Effectiveness (achievement ofpurposes)

The Project had two overarchingoutcomes:

(i) improved infrastructure in targetedcommunities and

(ii) improved capacity to respond tocommunity infrastructure developmentneeds.

The first outcome, improved infrastructurein targeted communities was realized bythe construction of sub-projects. In total,244 subprojects were completed underLCEP-II. The intermediate indicatorrelated to sub-project completion originallyset a target of 80 sub-projects. Thisincreased to 260 with the initial infusion ofEU funding, then to 265 with the additionalEUR285,000. In the end 244 sub-projectswere completed before 30/06/2013: 89culverts, 49 bridges, 69 water & sanitationprojects, 30 schools, 6 markets and 1health facility.

In total 114 projects were visited: 98 out ofthe 244 completed projects were visited(40%). Besides that also the 16 projectsthat are still under construction, but to befunded from GoL resources, have beenvisited. The detailed list of all projectsvisited is given in Volume 1 – Appendix 8.


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Box culverts:

In total 89 box culverts were constructed,compared with a target of 88. Three morebox culverts are under construction withGoL funding. The quality of theconstructed culverts varied from very goodto poor, with an average of fair. Thefinishing of the works is rather raw andmost sites have not been cleaned fromdebris. At almost all culvert sites it wasnoticed that the backfilling was not carriedout sufficiently and sometimes not at all,leaving the new structures impassable. Nomaintenance whatsoever has been carriedout since construction of the culverts wascompleted, leading now already toclogged-up streams and channels.

Bridges:

In total 49 bridges were constructed,compared with a target of 52. Two morebridges are still under construction withGoL funding. The project used standardbridge designs from the MPW. Like for theculverts the quality of the constructedbridges varies from very good to poor,with an average of fair to good. Thefinishing of the works is rather raw andmost sites have not been cleaned fromdebris. At almost all bridge sites it wasnoticed that the backfilling was not carriedout sufficiently.

Water and Sanitation (WatSan) projects:

In total 69 WatSan projects wereimplemented, compared with a target of85. Ten more WatSan projects are stillunder construction with GoL funding. The69 WatSan projects completed consistedof 184 latrines and 164 water wells andthe 10 WatSan projects underconstruction with GoL funding consist of31 latrines and 27 water wells. During thefield visit it was noted that it appears thatmost of these 10 projects underconstruction have been abandonedcompletely (due to lack of funds withinLACE?). The construction of the latrineswas based on a standard design. Thequality and workmanship was generallygood, sometimes even excellent. In morethan 80% of the projects visited, the

latrines were never used. Even nearschools, markets and the only health postthe use of this facility is very limited. A bigtask in terms of sensitization still liesahead.

The quality of the concrete work of thewells is in several cases poor. Also thedepth to which the wells have beenexcavated is in various instancesinsufficient. The selection of the locationsof the wells could be improved. Now theyare located sometimes far out of thevillage centres. It was disappointing to seethat almost 25% of the wells visited did notproduce water. Most commonshortcomings were defect pump headsand the well being too shallow.Maintenance of the pumps is not carriedout anywhere.

Schools:

In total 30 schools were constructed,compared with a target of 33. One moreschool is still under construction with GoLfunding. For the schools also an approvedstandard design of the MPW was used.The construction was in most cases of avery good quality. A number of schoolswere not yet in use because the furnituredelivery to the schools is delayed. Thegap between completion and operationaluse seems generally relatively long. Thefuture design of the schools shouldinclude additional quarters for teachers inorder to ensure impacts and sustainability.

Markets:

All 6 markets that were planned havebeen built. A standard design withstandard dimensions was used. Some arenot yet in-use and all are judged too smallregarding the needs, requiring extension.The construction was generally of anacceptable quality. Given the investment,daily markets are more relevant thanweekly markets. One reason for the non-utilization of the markets was that themarket sellers were not pleased by thefact that they had to pay now highermarket fees to the Liberia MarketAssociation (LMA) than before to theowners of the private market places. This


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raises the issue of ownership of theproject: did LACE, under this communitydriven approach, built these markets forthe sellers out of the community or for theLMA?

Health Post:

One mismatch of the Project appears tobe in the delivery of health services.Ninety percent of the sampledcommunities listed a clinic, hospital orhealth centre among their needs. Yetthere was built only one health post underthe LCEP-II project in Togbahville, SinoeCounty. This resulted from staffingconstraints within the MOH. The qualitywas not impressive and leakages of theroof were visible. The quality of the doorsand windows was below standard. Only 2out of the 4 latrines were used. Nofurniture was delivered yet by LACE yet.The health post received in December2013 (their first full month of operation)551 patients. This dropped to 405 inJanuary 2014 due to lack of medicines.

Further outputs:

LACE engaged 17,000 Liberians intemporary employment and created680,000 workdays through these activities.The Government and the Bank agreed toraise the daily wage rate for the programfrom US$2.50 (as originally outlined in theEPP) to US$3.00 per day to align withother on-going temporary employmentprograms. The EU did not fund this part ofthe project.

Targets for training (2,650 PMC membersand 360 local officials) were fullyachieved. As reported by LACE, 2,650PMC members and 530 local officialswere trained during CEPII.

The target to keep project managementexpenses as part of total budgeted annualexpenditures below 13 percent was set tomeasure management capacity andefficiency of the Project. Percentagesvaried slightly over the years, but alwaysfell below the target. At Project closing,the management expenses, as measured

by the final Project allocation of all threefunding sources, were at 12.95 percent.

C.3 Efficiency (sound managementand value for money)

The project was built on the experiencesgained and lessons learned during the firstLCEP-I project, carried out between 2003and 2007. The organization responsible forthe management and implementation thenand now was the Liberia Agency forCommunity Empowerment (LACE) thathad been created by Governmentspecifically for the purpose of supportingCDD projects.

The LCEP-II project was managed well byLACE, given the difficult circumstances.Not everything went well of course, but theoverall rating is satisfactory. The projectfaced three major challenges that led todelays in the implementation of theproject:

1. Although the World Bank’s Board ofDirectors approved CEPII in June 2007,EU co-financing did not becomeeffective until August 2009, largelybecause of delays in signing theAdministration Agreement between IDAand the EU.

2. The weaknesses in LACE’sprocurement capacity identified duringthe 2009 Mid-Term Review (MTR)necessitated development of all newprocurement templates. The MTRcoincided with effectiveness of the EUco-financing, and the need to finalizerevisions to the templates prior tocommencement of EU-financedactivities was another contributingfactor.

3. Weak capacity of local contractors --hardly surprising in a post-conflict andfragile context like Liberia -- led todelays in completing sub-projects ontime

The overall project was initially managedlike two separated projects: the WB partand the EU part. That improved in the lastyear, and the project was finally managedlike a unique one. The WB very strictlycontrolled financial issues and externalaudits were conducted annually.


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The EU contribution through TF 094016 atproject closure was:

Category Amount (€)Goods 50,820.57Sub-grants for sub-projects(incl. transfer of US$ 2,111,827.83) 6,569,484.23

Consultants’ services(incl. audits) and training 927,519.60

Incremental operating costs 850,955.77Designated Account -69,207.19Sub-total 8,329.572.98Refund balance to EU 2,631.59Sub-total 8,332,204.57Cost for setting-up trust fund 27,795.43WB Handling fees 440,000.00Grand total 8,800,000.00

Remarks:On May 15, 2012, acting on a requestfrom LACE and with approval of the EU,the World Bank reposted expensesoriginally incurred under the World Bank’sIDA financing of the CEPII to the EU’sTrust Fund financing of this Project. Thetotal amount of the reposting fromTF094016 to IDA H3050 was USD2,111,827.83 (or approximately €1,564,317 at the estimated exchangedrate of 1.35). It allowed LACE to fullyutilize the EU funding before its closingdate of August 31, 2012 (eleven monthsprior to the closing of the IDA Grant).Without this reposting an amount of €5,005,167.32 or 76.19% would have beenused.

According to the CESP II EU Report – finalof 12 September 2013, between 500,000and 700,000 Euros were officially “lost” onthe sub-grants for sub-projects budget linedue to the high exchange rate fluctuation,affecting directly the infrastructuresimplementation. The Evaluator could notcheck this figure.

The Evaluator does not understand it whythere was such a big increase in theIncremental operating costs in the lastmonths between the IFR ending on30/06/2012 and the closure statement ofthe WB of 13/11/2012. It went up from +/- €661,240.07 to € 850,955.77. LACE and theWB should explain this.

No LF was used as a planning andmonitoring tool for the project, jeopardizing

the outcomes monitoring. Nevertheless,work plans have been inserted in the semi-annual reports. An updated databaseinventorying all the completed and on-going sub-projects, funded by EU and WB,was available at the end of the project.

Coordination with other projects wasrelatively weak. LCEP-II and YES project -both implemented by LACE but with twoseparated teams - did not meetcomplementarities even if implemented inthe same areas. Only a few Communityfacilitators were common to both projects.

Given the delays, most of the outputswere delivered in the last months of theproject). Nevertheless according to thesemi-annual report, they were almost allcompleted. The strong improvement inproject implementation between the lastmonitoring report in 2011 and the EUfunding closure in December 2012 mustbe highlighted. Visited sub-projectsgenerally appeared of good quality andare judged so by beneficiaries.

In terms of value for money the output isreasonable priced:

The average price for a box culvert wasUS$ 29,112.39 and is somewhat belowthe prices offered on similar projectscarried out by the MPW in the country.

The average price for a bridge was US$82,919.63 and is in line with similarprojects carried out by the MPW in thecountry.

The average WatSan project consisted ofthe construction of 2.67 latrines and 2.38water wells. The average price was US$18,348.43 and looks at the low side.

The average price for a school, inclusiveof WatSan facilities was US$ 94,403.23.This is approximately US$15,000 perclassroom -- less if WASH constructioncosts are excluded. By comparison, datafrom recent education sector ICRs in otherlow capacity and fragile contexts (Benin,Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Northern Uganda,and Tanzania) show per classroomconstruction costs between US$20,000and US$25,000 when using nationalcompetitive bidding procurement methods.


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The average price for a market, inclusiveof WatSan facilities was US$ 57,108.75.This price seems correct.

The only health post was constructed for aprice of US$ 85,212.23. This price is,given the quality of the construction, onthe high side. Also the furniture still has tobe delivered. Apart from the poor quality ofthe works, the health post is in need of asolar power supply system. There is noelectricity grid to which the health post canbe connected and therefore all medicalactivities (deliveries, etc.) that occur duringnight time have to be carried out with thehelp of a kerosene lamp.

It is questionable if 59.52% of the totalbudget should have been spent on boxculverts and bridges only.The Overall efficiency of the Project israted as substantial based on the costeffectiveness of the CDD approach andLACE’s ability to deliver both community-based, small-scale construction sub-projects, albeit with some delays inimplementation, and the temporaryemployment program in a cost-effectivemanner.

Although there have been no economicrate of return (ERR) calculations for CEPII-- either at project inception or closure --the project appears to have representedthe least-cost solution to obtaining usefuland measurable benefits for poor ruraland urban communities, especially giventhe post-conflict context.

LACE’s operating ratio for LCEP-II was12.95 per cent, below the project target of13 per cent. This operating cost wasachieved despite two additional years ofoperating costs resulting from the Project’sextensions. It is also well below operatingcosts of social funds in other low capacitycontexts which can be significantly higher(between 15 – 20 per cent) However,delays in the implementation of the sub-projects negatively affected the Project’sefficiency.

C.4 Sustainability (likelycontinuation of achievedresults)

The financial/economic viability of theproject was not established in ameasurable way at the beginning of theproject, nor at the end of the construction ofthe sub-projects. No cost/benefits ratio orEconomic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR)was computed.

No concrete maintenance plans weredeveloped in any community visited by theEvaluation Team. Communitysensitization and training should havebeen strengthened to include more focuson community responsibility formaintenance. Had LACE designed simplemaintenance manuals for each type ofsub-project and conducted specifictraining for communities in thedevelopment of a practical, costedmaintenance plan at sub-projectcompletion, the result might have beenbetter.

Generally support to communities stoppedafter the sub-projects completion.Mechanisms for sustainability(infrastructure maintenance managementcommittees) were not planned as part of anexit strategy (there was no exit strategy atall).

New schools should be operated andmaintained as the existing ones, andinserted in the pool of schools managed bythe Ministry of Education. New schoolsshould be operated and maintained as theexisting ones, and inserted in the pool ofschools managed by the Ministry ofEducation. The Ministry of Educationthrough the CEO should take up majorrepairs and renovation that are beyond thecommunities’ capacities, but funds in theMinistry of Education are not sufficient forall the needs. This system is unsustainable,especially given the number of newschools built and transferred by the variousto donors (e.g. UNICEF currentlyrenovating schools). The MOU betweenthe MOE and LACE regarding staffing theeducation facilities constructed underCEPII helps to mitigate this risk.


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However, MOE struggles with theseprovisions nationally and therefore maynot be able to staff these schools fully.

For the culverts and bridges nomaintenance organization and funds areplanned. The commitment for voluntarywork is not the same everywhere. In somecommunities, a financial contribution isexpected from all inhabitants in case ofrepairs. Like for schools, major repairs willbe at the charge of the ministry of Publicworks but they too are under-staffed andunder-funded.

Sustainability for wells pump is also underthreat. Within 1.5 years already more than25% was not functioning anymore.Mechanics are available in the privatesector to repair broken pumps, but this isnot for free and therefore not usedregularly. Slight maintenance could beensured by the PMCs. Some PMC haveset up additional adjustments in order toprotect the pump (e.g. barriers againstanimals and children). The cleaning up hasto be improved. Mechanisms for voluntaryfinancial contribution in case of repairs andcommunity organization are set up in somecommunities, and will be a positive factorfor sustainability.

Regarding the latrines, they will last longand will not require maintenance since theyare hardly used by the communities. Out ofthe 16 WatSan projects visited by theEvaluators, more than 80% was neverused. The relevance of collective latrinesby communities has to be analysed.

The LCEP-II project acted in a ratherisolated manner. But it is not desirable todesign bottom up approach forcommunities as small non-replicableisolated interventions. LCEP-II promotedan approach of injecting strictly “bottom-up” community-led project identification,implementation and monitoring; it was itsmandate. It has lacked an incentive for“top-down” planning, coordination and inparticular in monitoring orchestrated bycapacitated public institutions at locallevel. It was not in the conception of theproject. But it was not realistic as theprocess of decentralization is now strongly

supported by the Government. Findingthe ways to better involve local authoritiesand regional engineers would have beenin the long run very effective: it wouldhave contributed to a smoother transitionfrom one exclusively “bottom upmovement” to a more balanced bottomand top down one that will be essentialtoday in the relations between localauthorities and communities. LCEP-IIcould have been able to contributesubstantially to the scaling up of theexperience of Community drivenDevelopment Approach by steadilyempowering and reinforcing capacities ofmembers of rural communities. Duringthese last 10 years this commitment couldhave led to the emergence of a civilsociety in rural areas working togetherwith the tiny but developing producers’organizations movement. It would havegreatly facilitated their involvement in thefuture local fora for planning decisions.This would have been the best way tohelp ensure community access toresources available from localgovernments, help build accountability oflocal governments toward poorcommunities, and ensure long-termsustainability. It is a lost opportunity.

C.5 Impact (achievement of widereffects)

The impact of the project is difficult tomeasure in real terms because there wereno Output Verifiable Indicators (OVI’s)defined. The 244 sub-projects constructedhave generated a positive impact. Thecontribution of the project to thesechanges is marked from the discussionswith beneficiaries and given in Chapter 3of Volume 2 - End User Surveys.

The Project appears to have had apositive impact on poverty, genderdynamics, and social development.Project benefits, in terms of increasedaccess to better basic services andimproved economic infrastructure, as wellas employment opportunities, reached theintended target groups. The targeting ofthe program was effective with anestimated 80 percent of the target groupbeing either poor or extremely poor.


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Full impacts will be dependent of themechanisms set up by communities andlocal authorities to ensure sustainability.Specifically for schools, improved schoolenrolment will be directly linked to thedisposal of on time paid and adequatelytrained teachers and actual materialsupply. Some of them are indeed stillmissing and most of them are volunteers.

A coordination of donors seems to existbut without apparently relevant implicationin this project.

Recommendations LCEP-II projectRecommendations have been given onthe following subjects:

1. Appropriateness of the CDD approach2. Administration of co-financed projects3. Selection process of sub-projects4. Improve presentation of financial results5. Future of LACE6. Outstanding supplies

D. Coherence/complementarity(mutual reinforcement)

For all three projects, the Feeder Roads,the Water Supply and LCEP-II it can besaid that the activities and outputs wouldhave logically allowed the objectives to beachieved if the project had not beenterminated prematurely. There were nocontradictions between the different levelsof objectives.

As for the AIDP Feeder Roadscomponent:There are a number of complementaryactions underway in the road sector:

a) There is evidence of integration of roadinvestments with agriculturaldevelopment like for example the ILOfeeder road rehabilitation project inMargibi County;

b) There are several road maintenanceinitiatives within the sector. The ILOand SIDA have been training labour-intensive routine maintenancecontractors, whereas LCIP are usingmobile maintenance crews;

c) The MPW has launched two Design,Build and Transfer (DBT) hybridOPRCs, financed by the IDA under theUrban and Rural InfrastructureRehabilitation Program (URIRP);

d) Plans are in a final stage to transformthe IIU into a Roads Authority and toset up a dedicated Road Fund, this toguarantee a professionalimplementation of projects and asteady and sufficient flow of funds formaintenance of the infrastructure.

There is no convergence between theobjectives of the intervention and those ofthe other Community policies.

There is some overlap with other on-goingactivities. SIDA has completed already in2013 the shaping and graveling of the Lot9 Kolahun – Populahun road in Lofa andstarted in November 2013 with theshaping and graveling of Lot 18 Shello –Sorlumba road in Lofa County, twoprojects that were foreseen under the ILOproject Phase 2. Overlap was also notedon Lot 5 Gbanquoi–Fleedin in NimbaCounty. Here LACE has constructed abridge, funded by the EU under the LiberiaCommunity Empowerment Project (LCEP-II Project 57).

As for the AIDP Water Supply component:In the Project Completion Report 2010 ofthe AfDB re the Monrovia Water andSanitation Rehabilitation Program it wasstated “Coordination and interfacing ofactivities appears to have suffered fromthe adopted parallelfinancing/implementation arrangements.The project was managed by two PMTs(one based in the LWSC for the DFIDfunded activities and another in the IIU ofthe MPW for the WB/EC activities).Engineering design and reporting on theproject however benefitted from the use ofone engineering consultant (ColanConsult) for all aspects of the project”.

In the same report under “Harmonization”they mention that: “Project design was forparallel financing, each donor managingits funds in line with their respectiveoperational policies, guidelines, andprocedures. There were no jointsupervision missions nor formal project


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coordination/management fora for donors.World Bank, as the administrator for theco-financing, did not appear to have adedicated task manager. AnchoringWB/EC- financed componentimplementation responsibility in anotherunit -Special Implementation Unit (SIU),now Infrastructure Implementation Unit(IIU) - other than LWSC also causedproblems. The IIU appears to have beenoverwhelmed due to its multi-sectoralnature; and liaison with LWSC was noteffective. Supervising consultants assistedin enabling coordination between LWSCand IIU but as a service provider couldonly go so far”.

There is coherence with the AfDB’s firstwater project, launched in 2008, called the“Monrovia Water Supply and SanitationRehabilitation Program” (MWSSRP 2008-2010) which was to be financed through aDFID fund, managed by the AfDB.

The project was the result of numerousconsultations carried out in Liberia by theAfDB with the WB, the EC, the UK (viaDFID) and the GOL: the financing and theprogram of activities actually included thevarious financial commitments from thedonors and the distribution of tasks towhich they subscribed during themeetings of the GOL/Donors in 2006 and2007.As for the LCEP-II project:There were no contradictions between thedifferent levels of sub-objectives. Theactivities designed and implementedmutually reinforced each other.

In a number of instances, overlap wasnoticed, especially with the EU itself thatfunded other projects in the same region:

- The AIDP Feeder Roads project, co-financed by the WB/EU had overlapwith the LCEP-II project. For exampleon the road from Gbanquoi-Fleedin inNimba County, at a certain point intime both LACE and a contractor forthe AIDP project were working.

- Also the LCEP-II project had overlapwith the ECHO program. InBarnersville a water well wasconstructed by ACF/CWEI with

financial support from ECHO at 500 mfrom a LCEP-II WatSan project.

- In Sinoe County LACE constructed theHealth Post, whilst the EU had fundedanother health post along the sameroad between ITT village andGreenville.

There was no convergence between theobjectives of the intervention and those ofthe other Community policies.

E. Community value added

The WB designed the Feeder Roads andWater Supply component of the AIDP andthe LCEP-II project. The EU accepted theobjectives, targeted beneficiaries and thetiming, etc. as expressed in the AppraisalDocuments of July 2007 completelywithout modifications.

Since the WB prepared the AppraisalDocuments, they did not coordinate theintervention specifically with the possibleintervention of EU Member States in thecountry.

Interventions in the same type of activitiesof the LCEP-II project are on-going but notat the level of bi-lateral aid from EUMember states. It is mainly NGO’s andchurches that are actively involved, inparticular in WatSan projects.

In the project preparation phase the WBdid not look explicitly to the possibility ofcreating actual synergy (or duplication)with the intervention of EU MemberStates. This especially frustrated the AfDBand the main donor of the Monrovia Waterand Sanitation Rehabilitation Program, theDfID from the United Kingdom.

During the implementation of the threedifferent project components, bi-annualcoordination meetings were organised,chaired by the EU Delegation in Liberiawith all donors active in the same field tooptimise synergies and avoid duplication.

F. Visibility

The visibility of the AIDP Feeder Roadscomponent was not good. The only placeout of the 10 Lots visited where a


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signboard was available was at the start ofLot 5 Gbanquoi-Fleedin in Nimba County.All other sections did not have anyvisibility at all. The signboard was o.k. andmentioned the GoL, WB and EU correctlyas being the donors.

During the end-user survey questionswere raised concerning the source offunding. Almost all people thought thatWorld Bank funded the project, with someco-financing of the Government of Liberia.The EU was never mentioned as a sourceof funding, although they were the onlyfinanciers of this component of the AIDPproject.

The visibility of the AIDP Water Supplycomponent was good. The supervisionconsultant Colan from Ghana, incollaboration with the EU and World Bankrepresentatives and other stakeholders,held a public awareness activity inaccordance with the EU project visibilityrequirements to disseminate projectinformation and inform the public on thestatus of the works being executed in Lot1B.

The activities mainly entailed:- Inspection of completed and on-going

works with all stakeholders and publicentities.

- Media briefing on the projectimplementation and plannedinvolvement of beneficiaries in theoperation of some components of theworks.

- Stakeholder discussion on the statusof works.

The following stakeholders participated inthe activity:- The European Union Office- The World Bank- Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation- The Infrastructure Implementation

Unit- Colan Consult- Top International Engineering Limited

( Contractor )- Beneficiary Communities- Public and Media Agencies.

Signboards have been erected at variouslocations, in conformity with the EUguidelines.

The experiences with the visibility of theLCEP-II project were mixed. LACE hadprepared a Communication and VisibilityPlan, including all the steps to be taken tocomply with the EU requirements onvisibility like branding on vehicles,signposts, and at its offices to include theEU logo, as well as raise awareness of EUsupport among stakeholders withinGovernment, donor community, andbeneficiary communities by conductingoutreach through the media (i.e.newspaper articles and a weekly radioprogram) and sensitization programswithin the communities themselves.

A number of signboards posted nearfacilities constructed mentioned only theWorld Bank, GoL and LACE.

In the Counties of River Gee, Maryland,Grand Kru and Sinoe no signboards wereavailable at all. It is understood that thesesignboards are placed after completion ofthe construction at the official handing-over of the projects, and that in thoseCounties this ceremony has not been heldyet. Currently a number of projects havebeen completed and are in use for morethan a year and still no handing-overceremony is held, due to financialconstraints within LACE. Therefore thereare no signboards at all, although somewere already prepared but storedelsewhere.

While the EU support was mentioned onthe LACE website, the information had notbeen updated since 2010.

The EU evaluation team also noted thatbeneficiaries were generally not aware ofthe EU contribution, even not when it wasmentioned on signboards (if available).They all new the WB and GoL were thedonors.

G. End User SurveysThe results of the End User Surveys arepresented in Volume 2 of this report.