1

Introduction

The 2006 military coup of September 19 in Thailand has once again raised questions about the

process of democratization in Thailand and the nature of the country’s political system in general.1

From the reactions towards the coup it is clear that democracy in Thailand is interpreted quite

differently by both local and foreign observers. While some have argued the coup was ‘a necessary

step to restore democracy’, others claim it was ‘a set-back for Thai democracy’.2 The arrival of

Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai, TRT henceforth) Party onto the political

stage was applauded by observers as a new turning point in Thai political history, with

unprecedented voter turn-out and successive electoral victories. According to one analyst

democracy was ‘consolidating’ in Thailand, despite some ‘minor set-backs’ (Albritton 2005).

However, while the TRT government turned increasingly authoritarian and corrupt toward 2005

and a people’s movement (the People’s Alliance for Democracy, PAD henceforth) was formed

demanding Thaksin’s resignation, the military coup which finally ousted Thaksin in 2006 was

condemned because of the inability to solve the political crisis by democratic and constitutional

means. Such opposing and conflicting interpretations of the coup and of Thai politics more

generally, naturally begs for a detailed analysis of the events, but also questions the usability of

the term ‘democracy’ as an analytical category.

The aim of this essay is to show how the ‘conventional’ political science approach as a

method to analyse democracy, fails to adequately address the complexities of the 2006 coup in

Thailand and describe the nature of Thailand’s political system more generally.3 Many academics

consider the coup to be the outcome of growing tension between not only the Thai people and

the TRT government, but more significantly between the TRT and other elites, notably former TRT

supporters, the military, and the monarchy.4 This inter-elitist tension and struggle of power was

reflected in two opposing discourses about democracy; Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy.5

By analysing these discourses and showing that the term ‘democracy’ is a contested concept with

multiple meanings, it is clear that the ‘conventional approach’ fails to accurately describe Thai

1 The notion of democratization is, as this present paper attempts to show, a highly contested and debated issue.

2 For background on the contradictory reactions to the coup, see Crispin (2006), Tasker (2006), and Handley (2006a).

3 The term ‘conventional approach’ here is the author’s own and it will be explained in the following section.

4 Further details about these authors, their arguments and references will be provided below.

5 The term ‘Thaksinocracy’ is taken from Thirayuth Bunmi (2006:9-11). The term ‘Royalist Democracy’ is borrowed

from Thongchai (2008:12).

2

political culture, and thus to provide a comprehensive understanding of the recent coup. Rather

than analysing democracy strictly in terms of processes and behaviour of citizens and institutions,

and how these comply with what I will call ‘international consensus democracy’, an alternative

approach which focuses on circulating discourses of democracy and how these discourses relate to

struggles of power, and examines these within a local cultural and historical context, can prove

more insightful.6 The important political role of the Thai monarch makes Thailand a special case

study as democracy and kingship under the formula ‘democracy with the King as Head of State’ go

together in a manner perhaps unique in comparison to other political systems around the world.

By breaking away from the ‘conventional approach’ this essay finally proposes some ideas and

guidelines for rethinking an alternative framework for identifying the existence of ‘alternative’

democratic political systems. 7

Toward a Redefinition of a Framework for Analysing Democracy8

The primary objective of this essay to show that the ‘conventional approach’ inadequately

describes the coup and the political system of Thailand in general, suggests that the term

‘democracy’ referring to both a form of government and a political philosophy, by no means has a

universally accepted standard definition and thus is a poor analytical tool, especially when used to

describe political systems in non-Western cultures. The ideology or philosophy of democracy

refers to both a set of principles and processes. In principle, ideally, governments must provide for

the physical and mental well-being of the majority of people in a society without jeopardising the

general good (Kobkua 2004:4). Theoretically, members of a democratic society have individual

(often considered to be universal) rights which the ideal government should try to nurture, rather

than limit. The principle in turn is fulfilled by the democratic process (elections, political parties,

parliament, and constitutions) through which all individuals of society participate and by means of

which everyone has equal access to power (ibid:5). From this vantage point, the principle and

process of democracy become the primary focal points when analysing political systems and their

‘democratic nature’, although the principle and processes may vary considerably from one political

6 The term ‘international consensus democracy’ is the author’s own. It will be outlined in the following section. 7 The term ‘alternative’ here is of course unfortunate as it hints at a deviation from a ‘standard’ democracy, but in lack of a better term, it has been chosen for the time being. 8 Due to constraints on the length of this essay a comprehensive theoretical outline of democracy has deliberately been omitted.

3

system to the other. This is basically why the theoretical framework and the ‘conventional

approach’ as an approach to analyse democracy is problematic.

Attempts to analyse the concept of democracy by an anthropological/ethnographic

approach have recently been undertaken by a number of scholars compiled in Paley (2002). These

contributions taken together can be considered an alternative to the ‘conventional approach’ of

the political sciences. According to Paley (ibid:469-72), rather than focusing on the democratic

processes and principles of political systems outside the Western cultural hemisphere, and

analysing how these comply with democratic political systems in the West, studying the local

meaning and circulating discourses of democracy within the socio-cultural and historical context,

and their relationship to changing forms and struggles of power, proves more insightful. The

‘conventional approach’ is problematic because it is highly ‘Euro-centric’ or ‘Western-centric’ as it

presupposes an idealized prototype of democracy which in turn is considered universally

applicable and the destined outcome or final stage of development of all political systems

worldwide. This prototype may be termed ‘international consensus democracy’ and will be used

henceforth in the present paper. As Paley (ibid:470) points out this sort of ‘international

consensus’ about democracy is imagined as one only have to compare a few democratic political

systems in the West to realize that in terms of process and principle these vary considerably. The

implications are that these countries tend to be seen as ‘undemocratic’, ‘underdeveloped’, and

‘uncivilized’. By extension, the principle of democracy becomes a universal right or privilege.

One particular problem about the ‘conventional approach’ and its tendency to focus

entirely on the processes of democracy, constitutions in particular, is the failure to see the

underlying struggles of power hidden beneath these documents. As Surin (1999a:358) points out,

constitutions tend to be sites of political struggle, and do not necessarily represent endpoints in

these struggles. Thus it is important to note to what extent constitutions serve as ‘ideological

tools’, and how they are sites of contests, but also to look beyond them and put them into a wider

historical context.

Paley’s alternative approach does not offer an alternative theoretical framework within

which to explore the political system of Thailand. This naturally begs the question whether it is

possible to identify distinct democratic political systems as being neither subsystems of, or

subordinate to ‘international consensus democracy’. The case of Thailand where the monarchy

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has a significant political role and the notion of a Royalist Democracy claimed to be rooted in

Buddhist concepts of kingship, and fundamentally different from ‘international consensus

democracy’, is particular interesting. Attempts to address this question can be found in existing

literature on the topic of Asian Values and the debate about Asian-style or, in the case of Thailand,

Thai-style democracy (Hood 1998, Nehrer 1999, Surin 1999b, Hewison 1999, and Thompson 2004).

While particular socio-cultural characteristics and values of Thai society have been identified, the

claim that these characteristics justify the country’s political culture as being distinct from its

Western counterparts, is considered to be a rejection of liberal democracy, and a discourse of

power and an excuse for elitist rule by most scholars (Hood ibid:866, Nehrer ibid:958, Surin

ibid:412, Hewison ibid:231, and Thompson ibid:1068).

Attempts to identify a religious dimension of democratization in Asia have recently been

undertaken by a research team conducted by the Danish scholar Bubandt (2006), but to the

present author’s knowledge, no such study on Thailand’s political system and its religious context

has been undertaken so far. Thus, while the present author is still in the process of exploring a

framework for defining such ‘alternative’ democratic political systems, due to constraints on the

length of this essay, only some ideas and guidelines as to how one would go about framing an

alternative approach will be presented here, and will be open to further discussion elsewhere.

Methodology

Before any discussion on the meaning of democracy in Thai society can begin, a historical outline

of the local meanings and circulating discourses of democracy in Siam and Thailand is necessary.9

Next, moving on to discuss the political ideology of democracy in a contemporary setting, an

outline of the two circulating discourses in the context of the coup, referred to as Thaksinocracy

and Royalist Democracy, will be presented. This section is followed by an outline of the inter-elitist

power struggle, highlighting the fault lines along which this power struggle unfolded in the 2006

coup.

Turning to the main discussion of this paper the analytical problems of the ‘conventional

approach’ will be examined by analysing Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy by using Paley’s

alternative approach. In turn, it will be examined how these discourses relate to the inter-elitist

9 Siam was renamed Thailand in 1939 under Phibun Songkhram’s first term (1939-44).

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power struggle. This analysis will focus on two sites of contestation between them: (1) attitudes

toward elections, the electoral mandate, and the behaviour of the electorate, and (2) the

constitutional framework. Based on this analysis and how Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy

differ according to these two sites of contestation, it will be discussed how the ‘conventional

approach’ fails to fully address not only the complexities of the coup, and its inadequacy as a tool

to analyse political systems more generally. Finally, using Thailand and the coup as a point of

departure, some ideas and guidelines how to rethink and reframe a theoretical approach to

identify the existence of ‘alternative’ democratic political systems will be presented.

I have chosen to use Royal Powers (2006) by Pramuan Ruchanaseri as a primary source in

Thai as this book reflects the political crisis of 2006. Pramuan was a former associate of Thaksin,

but he decided to break with TRT and became a pro-royalist. His text is supportive of Royalist

Democracy and sceptic of Western democracy and became the inspiration for the Royal Power

discourse (see below). Thus this text perfectly illustrates how democracy was being redefined in

the context of the coup.

Meaning and Circulating Discourses of Democracy in the Political History

of Siam and Thailand

Ever since democracy or ‘prachathipatay’ (meaning ‘people’s sovereignty’) as the political ideology

came to be known in Siam and Thailand, was introduced as a result of interaction with British and

French colonial presence in the region at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was rejected first

by the Chakri kings who considered it an alien ideology which could not be implemented in its

pure form. As nationalistic revolutions swept across the globe and monarchies fell, and despite the

Chakri Kings’ attempts of constitutional reform, democracy eventually became the principal

ideology and the inspiration for the People’s Party to overthrow the absolute monarchy in 1932.

Despite the People’s Party’s intention to surrender power to the people, their fear of being ousted

by their political opponents never made this happen. Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1932

competition over power between Siam and Thailand’s elites (the bureaucracy, the military and the

monarchists in various constellations), has been a recurrent theme throughout the country’s

twentieth century political history. The many coups and counter-coups and constitutions (the

2007 constitution is the country’s 29th

constitution) is the outcome of this on-going power struggle.

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From 1932 until 1973, from 1976-77, and again from 1991-92, the political system was in the

hands of the military and bureaucrats. From 1977 to 1997 it was dominated by politicians and

businessmen with military support. Thus only in the brief interval 1973-76 is Thailand considered

to have had a ‘true’ political system of representative democracy (Kobkua 2004:8). Once in power

every new faction or coalition of factions quickly scrapped the old constitution and wrote a new

one. In addition, while the formation of political parties and parliament and elections would be

allowed at times, it did not necessarily guarantee that public participation in decision-making and

public interests would be embedded. For these reasons, democracy is considered to have been

practiced predominantly in process rather than principle, and the ideology is considered mainly to

have supported the agenda of the ruling elites, rather than the people whose interests the

ideology essentially, according to its Western ideal, was designed to serve (ibid:7).

After 1932 the attempt to change Siam’s political system into a democratic system along

Western lines failed miserably and in 1939 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram ousted the People’s

Party, and turned Thailand into a Fascist regime and led the country into wartime collaboration

with the Japanese under military rule. From the late 1950s and onwards the factions in power

would legitimise their rule by redefining democracy according to local socio-cultural traits and

their opposition to the regimes they replaced. Kobkua (ibid:9) argues three principal types of

democracy can be identified: (1) the Phor Khun-style (meaning ‘paternal’) Democracy or Thai

Buddhist-style democracy, (2) the Limited/Guided Democracy, and (3) the Traditionalist-style

Democracy. These will be outlined below.

The Phor Khun-style Democracy was introduced by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat after he

had ousted Phibun in a coup in 1957. Sarit’s political philosophy termed ‘despotic paternalism’

claimed to have roots in traditional Thai social and cultural values and Buddhism, and his intention

was to install ‘democracy from above’. Sarit’s chief ideologue, Luang Wichit Wathakan, created

the myth about the glory of the kingdom of Sukhothai as a model for Thailand to strive to become

again. In turn, Sarit’s leadership was compared to the patriarchal administration of the former

kingdom, which combined both elements of the benevolent and affectionate paternal love and

care of a father to his children, but also of a cruel and capable leader who would sacrifice himself

for the benefit of the common good or patthana (development or progress). In return, he

expected every Thai citizen to do the same and play their role according to the social hierarchy.

7

Opposition in government was deemed counter-productive to the common good, and the military

were assigned a political role as protectors of the nation’s stability and security. Sarit, in contrast

to his predecessor Phibun, revived the monarchy and used it primarily as a source of legitimacy.

Despite the Sarit regime’s inherent authoritarianism and military rule, referred to as the ‘Dark Age’

of Thai political history, Sarit’s development agenda combined with Buddhism, is still remembered

by many Thais as a time of progress and change. 10

After Sarit’s death in 1963 his successors Thanom and Praphat carried on Sarit’s political

project, however, with less success.11

The population became increasingly critical of military rule

and demanded more democratic space. Following violent clashes between protestors and the

military in 1973, the king intervened to stop the conflict. The king’s sympathy for the protestors

and criticism of the violence subsequently sent Thanom and Praphat into exile, and military rule

ceased. From 1973 to 1976, Thailand experienced what is often referred to as a ‘brief experiment

in democracy’ (ibid:8). Amidst growing Communist activity in the region, however, the political

space granted and domestic sympathy for the movement soon became an increasing concern for

the monarchy which feared that ‘too much liberalism’ would bring about its overthrow like its

counterparts in the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. The military’s massacre of

protesting students on 6 October 1976 which killed an unknown number of students and sent

hundreds to join the Communist insurgents in the jungle was supported by the palace.

From the tragedy of 1976 emerged the Limited/Guided Democracy which once again

restored power to the military and bureaucratic elite, the former assuming a primary political role

while parliament only had a secondary function. Their power was, however, challenged by local

chao phor (‘strongmen’ or ‘godfathers’) who were able to buy their way into parliament.

From 1980-88 Prem Tinsulanond served as unelected Prime Minister (PM, henceforth),

but with popular support. While Prem allowed parliament to function during this time, it was kept

in check by the military. 12

The governments, however, were often too corrupt to survive even a

single term. With the socio-economic transformations of the 1980s and the emergence of a

10 For more background on the Sarit regime and the ideology of Phor Khun-style Democracy or ‘Despotic

Paternalism’, see Thak Chaloemtiarana (2007). 11 After Sarit’s death the corruption of his regime was fully exposed. As a result, Sarit’s political ideology in

the hands of his successors lost its legitimacy. 12 Premocracy has been used as a term to define this political system, referring to Prem’s charisma and

popular appeal despite the fact that he was never elected. When Prem resigned he was subsequently elevated to member of the king’s Privy Council and is head of the council today. For more background on the Privy Council, see McCargo (2005).

8

political aware middle class, the demand for more political space and public participation led to

Prem’s resignation.

Like many of its predecessors, the Chatichai government which replaced Premocracy was

so heavily engaged in corruption that it earned its nickname: ‘the Buffet Cabinet’, and was ousted

in a military coup in 1991 supported by the middle class and the palace.13

The king appointed

Anand Panyarachun as caretaker PM, but following Suchinda’s refusal to resign and surrender

power in the hands of a PM, violent clashes between the military and protestors ensued on May

17 1992. Once again the king intervened directly and summoned the leaders of the two factions,

Suchinda and Chamlong Srimuang. After the incident Anand was reappointed interim PM by the

king, and parliamentary politics resumed.

While parliamentary politics resumed in the 1990s the problem of Money Politics and

corruption still made Thai politics function ineffectively and governments lasted only briefly.14

The

governments of Chuan Leekpai, Banharn and Chavalit were brought down in 1995, 1996 and 1997,

respectively with palace approval.15

Toward the late 1990s a broad reform movement took shape to rewrite the constitution

and provide a system of check and balances to prevent corrupt governments from abusing power

for profitable gains. The new constitution coincided with the economic crisis of 1997. Although

considered a ‘people’s constitution’ based on the fact that a broad segment of the population was

invited to participate in drafting the document, and the new constitution was regarded as a

safeguard for the people against future corrupt governments, it was also considered a ‘palace

constitution’ owing to the Royal Prerogative of Article 7. This article enabled the king to dissolve

parliament and appoint an interim PM whenever the provision of the constitution did not apply.16

Amidst the drafting process of the new constitution, the 1997 economic crisis dealt a blow to the

Thai economy and the ruling Democrat Party led by Chuan Leekpai. As will be explained more

thoroughly below, these events and Thaksin’s clever manipulation of them knocked the

13 The term ‘political schizophrenia’ has been used to refer to the middle class’ support of the military, while

they had previously been resisting military rule (Surin 1999:362). During the 1990s, however, the saying ‘rural people elect governments, the urban people overthrow them’ referring to the vicious circle of election and corruption, coups came to be considered normal and legitimate. For background see Anek Laothamatas’ ‘Tale of Two Democracies’ (Anon. 2006). 14 Money Politics is a term used to refer to Thai political culture in the 1990s when many businessmen

bought their way into parliament. 15 McCargo (2005:517, note 17) argues the palace was involved in the ousting of the latter two premiers.

16 For more background on the 1997 Constitution, see Klein (1998) and Kobkua (2004), and Connors

(2008:148) for details on the origin of Article 7.

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Democrats off the political arena, and paved the way for TRT’s rise to power. With the passing of

the 1997 constitution, a new area of parliamentary politics seemed to have begun, but as will be

discussed more thoroughly below, the constitution did not put an end to Money Politics and

corruption.

The third and final Traditionalist-style Democracy has emerged alongside the other

ideologies outlined above, and according to most scholarship is linked to the restoration of the

power of the throne. It emerged under the Sarit era as the ‘Democratic Government with the King

as Head of State’ and evolved under Prem in the 1980s. The political system of Thailand today is

still officially recognised under this formula. Traditionalist Democracy will be outlined in the

Royalist Democracy section below.17

In summary, the outline above shows that the political apparatus in Thailand has

remained in the hands of competing elites throughout most of the twentieth century, and only in

brief intervals have the government been representative of the people. Democracy has been

rejected as a foreign ideology by successive regimes which in turn have opted for a local approach

for democracy based on Thai socio-cultural values and Buddhism.

Thaksinocracy

Thaksin Shinawatra, a former policeofficer turned businessman in the telecommunications

business and his Shin Corp. was one of the few companies to survive the 1997 economic crisis and

avoid bankruptcy. Entering politics with the ambition to form a party which could respond to the

needs of businesses in the aftermath of the economic crisis, TRT designed a political programme

which by many commentators was labelled ‘populist’ referring to its appeal to mainly poor urban

and rural Thais, providing 30 Baht healthcare, cheap loans for farmers and village funds

programme. On an ideological level TRT presented a significant contrast to the Democrat led

government of Chuan Leekpai at the time which, to the displeasure of many owners of Small and

Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) followed the advice of the International Monetary Fund blindly,

allowing foreign investors to buy up companies left bankrupt by the crisis. Thaksin criticised this

approach for leading to ‘neo-colonisation’ of Thailand and wanted to support local

17 Traditionalist-style Democracy and Royalist Democracy refer to the same concept, but the latter term is

used in the present paper.

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entrepreneurship instead, to build a strong nationalist economy. This pro-nationalist rhetoric

found a strong appeal among many affected by the economic crisis, and the TRT Party gained

support from different segments of Thai society, including intellectuals and former political

activists and ex-communists. Thus Thaksin’s political programme was designed to craft a new

social contract between the people and the state (Pasuk and Baker 2004:135-39). Whether

intentionally or not Thaksin’s rising popularity challenged the traditional existing social contract

between the monarchy and the people. Thaksin’s promises of a way out of poverty, seriously

contrasted the ‘sufficiency economy’ philosophy proscribed by the king, urging people to make the

most of what they have.

As Police Lieutenant Colonel, Thaksin had influential contacts and an important network

within the police force which he used to strengthen his power-base. He also began to build

alliances with the military by interfering with military appointments which constitutionally is a

privilege reserved for the king.18

As will be discussed below, this led to growing tension between

the TRT government and the palace.

The TRT Party’s popularity translated into two electoral victories which marked a

watershed in Thai political history. The TRT government was the first to serve a full term, and

twice elected in 2001 and 2005 with strong mandates. Owing to the restructuring of the

democratic process of the new 1997 constitution, the TRT’s overwhelming majority in parliament

was able to ease out opposition. Soon, however, Thaksin seemed to be hated by his opponents as

much as he was loved by his supporters. The corruption scandal which nearly barred Thaksin’s rise

to power was soon replaced by other controversial incidents.19

Among these include Thaksin’s

‘War on Drugs’ and his mishandling of the Muslim separatism in the Southern provinces

(highlighted in the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents) with extra-judicial killings numbering in

thousands of deaths. In turn, critical media and respected intellectuals who pointed out the

human rights abuse were effectively silenced (Pasuk and Baker 2004:144-57).

18 According to Article 70 of the 1997 constitution the king is the superior commander of the armed forces.

They must obey the king only, and their duty is to secure the stability and independence of the nation and protect the ‘democratic system with the King as Head of State’ (cited in Pramuan 2006:20). Hewison (2007:938) argues Thaksin had learned from Chatichai’s experience that a military support base was important. 19 The 1997 constitution and its anti-corruption charter compelled all newly elected PMs to declare their

assets upon taking office. Thaksin was the first PM to face charges of corruption, but he was found non-guilty. For more background on this case and Thaksin in general, see Pasuk and Baker (2004).

11

In summary, Thaksin’s political project despite its popular appeal seemed to put the

democratic process above principles of individual rights and freedom as his political legacy shows.

While Thaksinocracy resembled ‘international consensus democracy’, he openly declared that

“democracy was simply a tool and not a goal” (Thai Nation 11 December 2003). Despite its broad

popular appeal the TRT Party was first and foremost a party by the rich and for the rich.

Royalist Democracy

Royalist Democracy can be considered an alternative political philosophy or para-political

institution to elected parliament. The Thai monarch is unique because he maintains a highly

influential political role compared to other constitutional monarchies around the world. Royalist

Democracy is first and foremost supported by the king and members of the palace, but also by a

large segment of the Thai population and by various elitist groups in Thai society. While the

monarch’s political influence seems to have little to do with ‘international consensus democracy’

or somewhat anachronistic in the eyes of a Westerner, there are several cultural and historical

reasons why a Royalist Democracy has evolved in the Thai context. The Thai monarch’s political

role is partly based on ancient notions of kingship and by asserting the monarch’s necessity in the

contemporary setting amidst a dysfunctional political system haunted by corruption. This will be

explained more in detail below.

The Thai monarch, King Rama IX Bhumipol Adulyadet, unquestionably enjoys more

popularity and support than any other monarch in the world. The current political role of the

monarch, however, is the outcome of decades of alliance-building with different sections of the

Thai elite, most notably the military.20

While the survival of the monarchy looked bleak after its

overthrow in 1932 and Prajadhipok’s abdication in 1935, the monarchists tried to regain political

influence by joining the anti-Fascist/anti-Japanese resistance against Phibun. After the war, the

monarchy regained foothold under Phibun, but was only allowed a very marginal symbolic role.

However, after Phibun’s expansionist project of annexing ‘lost territories’ in the neighbouring

countries had failed, he turned to the monarchy as an alternative source of political legitimacy

20 The term ‘network monarchy’ has been coined by McCargo (2005) as a model to describe how the

monarch by means of the Privy Council, most notably through Prem, has been able to control the political apparatus and the military. While the ‘network monarchy’ according to McCargo has had significant influence on Thai politics since 1973, it has never achieved full dominance. This term will be used henceforth to refer to the monarchical-military alliance.

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during his second term (1948-57). The young king Bhumipol, however, distanced himself from

Phibun and joined forced with Sarit who ousted Phibun. Whereas Phibun had failed to gain

legitimacy from the monarchy, Sarit promoted the young royal couple and made the king a source

of legitimacy for his military dictatorship of ‘despotic paternalism’. The young royal couple began

to appear in public, blessing Sarit’s many development projects.

After Sarit’s death in 1963 and the corruption of his regime had been exposed, the young

monarch gradually distanced himself from the Praphat-Thanom military regime. He began to

express sympathy for parliamentary rule and visited universities to discuss politics with students

(Gray 1999). He also embarked on Royal Tours around the kingdom which became the inspiration

for the many royally initiated development projects, which to this day make up the official

narrative about the king’s meritorious deeds and support for his country.21

Many of the royal

rituals and ceremonial performances and the use of rachasap (‘royal vocabulary’) revived under

Sarit, enhanced the image of the young king as being a righteous and morally just God-king, or

Dhammaraja, and the Royal Projects in turn were considered meritorious deeds and proof of his

barami – possession of the 10 virtues. These notions linked the present monarch to ancient

notions of Buddhist kingship and have served as crucial elements in creating an image of the

monarch as being a moral authority. As Thongchai (2008:21) notes because every Thai citizen aged

sixty or younger grew up “under the pervasive aura of an unprecedented royal cult”, his image as

being truly divine has gained substantial foothold.

King Bhumipol has gradually risen to become the moral authority of Thai society, the icon

of the nation, the protector of its stability and unity, and the vehicle of democratic reform. This is

the outcome of two main factors: royalist historiography glorifying the deeds of the present king

and his interventions in times of political crisis, his efforts to eradicate the corruption of various

governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and the king’s strong criticism of them, as evident

in the discourse of Clean Politics.22

According to Thongchai (ibid:34, note 9) the king’s democratic

image in official narrative is based on royalist historiography’s commemoration of the present

monarch’s interventions in 1973 and 1992, and omission of palace involvement in the tragic event

of 1976. Palace historiography presents a uni-linear process of democratization attributed to the

21 One such account is the book Royal Powers by Pramuan (2006:45-46) cited in this paper. For more

background on the Royal Projects, in particular their ideological function; see Chanida Chitbundid (2004). 22 Clean Politics is another term borrowed from Thongchai (ibid:24). The main features of this discourse will

be outlined below.

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kings of the Chakri dynasty who are honoured for initiating democratic reform before the 1932

revolution. However, as the Siamese people were not yet ready for democracy, they were

enslaved under military dictatorship by Pridi and later Phibun (Pramuan 2006:7-9). In turn, the

monarchy became a vehicle for democratic reform saving the people from the clutches of military

rule, epitomized in the aforementioned interventions in 1973 uprising and overthrow of the

Praphat-Thanom regime, and again in 1992 when the present monarch intervened to stop

Suchinda. Despite the massacre on October 6 1976, the three years prior to the event is

considered an important era in Thailand’s democratic history bestowed by the king. As Thongchai

(2008:13) points out because few Thais have a living memory of the 1932 revolution, Royalist

historiography has become official narrative.

With the socio-economic changes of the 1980s and the demand for parliamentary politic,

and as anti-Communism lost its relevance as a source of legitimacy for limiting political space, the

discourse of Clean Politics emerged. Clean Politics can be considered a response to the rise of

Money Politics and retired generals and businessmen buying their way into parliament. The Clean

Politics discourse portrayed all politicians as corrupt and as lacking moral. In turn, by showing his

contempt for elected politicians, using the annual Birthday speech as an opportunity to criticise

politicians for their selfishness, the monarch gradually rose to become a moral authority ‘above’ or

‘beyond’ the dirty business of politics. The combination of heavy corruption and successive

dysfunctional governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s supported this belief. The Royal

Prerogative as of Article 7 of the 1997 constitution was an important outcome of this tendency

and the power granted to the king can therefore be considered as both a safeguard against

corruption as well as a manifest of the monarch’s powerful ideological and political role. However,

besides the written words of the constitutions, the king’s ‘extra-constitutional’ powers are

recognized among members of Thai society as being natural, and the palace has long promoted

the idea of an ‘unwritten constitution’ or social contract between ‘him and his people’ being more

important than the written ones. The many coups and counter-coups throughout the twentieth

century and the large turn-over in the number of constitutions can be considered to have

supported this belief (Pramuan 2006:13).

Royalist Democracy is essentially a political ideology or philosophy based on traditional

notions of Buddhist kingship, and the monarchy functions as a political institution parallel to or

14

above the parliamentary system. In official discourse the king is regarded as a vehicle of

democratic reform against military rule of the past, and against the corrupt politicians of the

present. These developments and the king’s popularity have secured the ideological position of

the monarch as a moral authority in Thai society. While officially the monarchy is a constitutional

monarchy, the king is considered to have ‘extra-constitutional’ powers according to his rule by the

teachings of Buddha, the dharma, which among supporters of the palace and traditionalists are

considered above the rule of law of the written constitutions (Pramuan 2006:11,14). This political

arrangement with the king playing a central role is officially named a ‘democracy with King as

Head of State’, and is considered by Royalists to be fundamentally different from Western

democracies (ibid:introduction). As this system has deep historical roots and predates the arrival

of democracy in the region, it is often claimed to be better suited to the Thai context, and that

Thais are better accustomed to it (ibid). Based on the Dhammaraja myth about the morally

righteous and just leader, the king has a responsibility to nurture the well-being of his people and

relieve their sorrows with ‘the compassion and affection as a father to his children’ (ibid:7,21). In

turn the people must respect and revere the king. This intimate relationship between the king and

his people are among supporters of Royalist Democracy superior to electoral mandates, especially

since governments historically have proven unresponsive to people’s need (ibid:31,57).

Despite the Thai monarch’s far-reaching political influence, his role has until recently

been overlooked in academic work on Thai politics.23

Many academics, Thai in particular, have

exercised considerable self-censorship due to the strict lèse-majesté law (Streckfuss 1995).

Outline of the 2006 Political Crisis and Coup and the Inter-elitist Power

Struggle

The political crisis prior to the 2006 coup was first and foremost a clash between the TRT

government and those disaffected by it. However, it is also now generally accepted among

academics that the coup was the outcome of an on-going inter-elitist power struggle between the

‘network monarchy’ and Thaksin’s own network. As Pye and Schaffar (2008:54) note the historical

anti-Thaksin movement which emerged prior to the coup is not to be confused with the elitist

effort to remove Thaksin. They argue Thaksin’s opponents seized the momentum of the political

23 One such effort is the controversial book by Paul Handley (2006b) The King Never Smiles.

15

crisis as an opportunity to get rid of Thaksin for the sake of their own interests. Among these

count succession and Thaksin’s increasing politicization of the military, and interference with royal

business interests.24

Many social groups, labour unions, and pro-democracy NGOs had long been criticising

Thaksin for his human rights abuse and suppression and silencing of critical media (Pye and

Schaffar 2008:39). Many farmers protested against the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which the

TRT Government was about to sign with Japan (ibid). Despite the TRT’s ‘populist agenda’, their

policies seemed to do downright harm to those they were designed to help, and departed from

Thaksin’s own anti-globalist and pro-nationalist rhetoric. Although the anti-Thaksin protestors

were significant in numbers, they were largely overlooked until media mogul and former Thaksin

aide, Sondhi Limthongkul, who had himself launched his own protests against Thaksin, joined

them and helped reorganise the anti-Thaksin campaign into the PAD, and most importantly

provided it with enough funds to make it visible and heard. While Thaksin and Sondhi had been

business partners in the past, and Sondhi owed the survival and success of his Manager Group to

Thaksin in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, Sondhi’s public criticism of Thaksin after the fall-out

between the two was considered more than anything to be driven by desire for personal revenge

and thus did not gain much currency in the population. However, when Thaksin announced the

sale of his Shin Corp. to the Singaporean investment arm Temasek Holdings, avoiding taxation in

Thailand, Sondhi’s criticism of the TRT government’s corruption found resonance within a broad

segment of the population.

The issue was particularly sensitive to many Thais as Shin Corp. had been built on

generous state concession and thus was considered national property. The sale seemed to

contradict Thaksin’s own nationalist agenda, namely the policy to support Thai enterprises and

keep them on Thai hands. Also, the Thaksin administration had changed the law on foreign

ownership from 25% to 49% just a few weeks prior to announcement of the sale. These factors

combined made Thaksin appear no less corrupt than previous governments and caused

considerably public outrage against his administration.

24 According to Ockey (2005) the palace wanted to get rid of Thaksin to prepare for royal succession and the

transition of power from the present monarch to his son, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. For background on Thaksin’s politicisation of military appointment see Ukrist (2008). For Thaksin’s conflict with the Royal family’s investment arm, the Crown Property Bureau, see Handley (2006c).

16

The PAD initially demanded Thaksin’s resignation, but Thaksin refused to do so. Instead

he called for new elections to be held in April 2006, and the opposition responded with a boycott.

As a result, the TRT candidates in the majority of the constituencies ran against no other

candidates, and the TRT won a majority of seats in parliament. However, the election was widely

believed to be ‘unfair’ and thus the political crisis continued. This led the PAD to change strategy

and support Sondhi’s idea of asking for royal intervention (ibid:54). Based on the book Royal

Powers (Pramuan 2006), Sondhi had since his fall-out with Thaksin adopted a pro-royalist rhetoric

and argued for the return of ‘royal powers’ to the king and for him to use the Royal Prerogative of

Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution and ask Thaksin to resign. The king, however, rejected these

demands as ‘irrational’ and ‘undemocratic’, and asked the judges to ‘solve the mess’ (The Nation

26 April 2006). The judges subsequently annulled the election. At first, the Royal Power discourse

did not seem to have any impact on the palace. Later, however, it became clear that the palace

was supporting the discourse. Prem, on behalf of the king, met with high-ranking military officers

and reminded the soldiers of their duty and sworn allegiance to the king (Bangkok Post 15 July

2006). As the TRT government prepared for new elections to be held in October 2006, the coup

circumvented this on September 19 while Thaksin was overseas attending a UN meeting in New

York. He subsequently went into self-imposed exile in London, but has returned to Thailand

recently.

The coup group first appeared as the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional

Monarchy. However, as the name sent the wrong message to foreign media and the international

community, the coup group soon renamed itself, dropping ‘Constitutional Monarchy’ to avoid any

confusion that the king should be behind or involved in the coup (Hewison 2007:994, note 65 ).

The king, however, did in fact appear in public shortly after the take-over, and approved the coup

(CNN 20 September 2006), and despite the name change, the coup group’s name in Thai remained

the same. Thus the coup was considered to be a ‘royalist coup’.

Evidence of an inter-elitist struggle is also reflected in several passages mentioned in

Royal Powers (Pramuan 2006) which contains indirect criticism of Thaksin and his government, in

particular politicians’ disrespect of the monarchy (ibid:56), the controversy over the appointment

of Khunying Jaruwan Maintaka as auditor-general, considered to be unconstitutional by critics

despite palace support (ibid:52,59), the lack of morality and corruption of the TRT government

17

(ibid:51,54), and Thaksin’s politicization of military appointments which is a Royal Privilege

(ibid:20,30).

‘Democracy’ as a Problematic Analytical Term

According to the official statement of the coup group the purpose was ‘to restore democracy’ and

remove an authoritarian and morally corrupt PM, who had abused power in office for his own

benefit. Thaksin faced charges of corruption, lèse-majesté for disrespecting the monarch, and for

being a threat to stability and causing national disunity (BBC News 20 September 2006). As

outlined above, the coup basically transferred power from Thaksin to the ‘network monarchy’.

Gradually, Royalist Democracy replaced Thaksinocracy and thus the meaning of democracy was

significantly redefined over a short period of time. This change of power and of the meaning of

democracy is important to keep in mind, and presents a range of analytical problems when

discussing the coup and its ‘democratic nature’. This is the subject of discussion below.

There were two main sites of contestation which showed the friction between Thaksin

and the ‘network monarchy’ and the difference between the meaning of democracy in

Thaksinocracy and Royal Democracy. These were: (1) the attitude toward elections, the electoral

mandate, and the democratic behaviour of the electorate, and (2) the constitutional framework.

Elections, Electoral Mandates and Democratic Behaviour of the Electorate

Thaksin’s strong electoral mandate served as his main source of political legitimacy. As elections

are a basic process of ‘international consensus democracy’, a strong electoral mandate could

silence critics in Thailand and mobilize support from the international community if needed.

Thaksin firmly insisted on his electoral mandate throughout his time in office and after being

ousted.25

Under Thaksinocracy it was only the voice of the majority that mattered which became

increasingly evident as Thaksin sought to silence all criticism by reference to his electoral mandate.

To Thaksin appropriate ‘democratic behaviour’ was kaanmueang ning (‘quiet politics’) which

meant keeping your mouth shut, if you had an opinion different from that of the majority (Pasuk

and Baker 2004:139).

25 In a letter published in several international and Thai newspapers 1 year after the coup, Thaksin

maintained his electoral mandate had been taken from him in an illegal military coup. He also bemoaned Thailand’s undemocratic political culture and urged Thais to resist the military dictatorship (Thaksin 2007:11).

18

In Royalist Democracy elections, electoral mandates and the attitude toward ‘proper

democratic behaviour’ of citizens, governments and institutions are fundamentally different from

‘international consensus democracy’ and Thaksinocracy. While parliamentary politics and a PM

can operate under Royalist Democracy, the king is considered the ultimate authority. This is based

on the traditionalists’ belief in a political system founded on Buddhist notions of kingship

according to which the king has a direct mandate from the people, as outlined above. By extension,

the king does not need an electoral mandate to be king. What matters the most is the king’s

observance of the dharma.

The emergence of the Royal Power discourse gradually shifted attention from Thaksin’s

legal wrong-doings toward his moral conduct. While in the beginning Sondhi’s criticism of Thaksin,

revolving around Thaksin’s alleged disrespect of the monarch had not gained significant support

from the people’s sector, the announcement of the Shin Corp sale and Sondhi’s subsequent

criticism of the TRT government did. Although Royal Powers and Sondhi’s criticism of Thaksin

emerged independently of palace interests, it supported its cause. The image of Thaksin as being

morally corrupt was suddenly taken to a new level. Thaksin’s mishandling of the problems in the

South made him a threat to national security and stability. The protest against the Thaksin

government and its policies divided people to such an extent that Thaksin was blamed for causing

national disunity. By highlighting Thaksin’s immoral conduct Thaksin’s electoral mandate was

gradually undermined, and Royalist Democracy replaced Thaksinocracy as the most legitimate

political system in the eyes of many Thais. Against Thaksin’s strong electoral mandate this turn of

events was most desirable to his political opponents. The Royal Power discourse finally gave the

‘network monarchy’ incentive to step in and act on ‘legitimate grounds’.

Parallel to the Royal Power discourse, but an important element of it, was the discourse

of Clean Politics which re-emerged and intensified during the political crisis. It was voiced by

Sondhi, the king, and not surprisingly was also used by the coup group’s leader, Sonthi

Boonyaratklin, as justification for the coup subsequently (Kate 2007). According to the Clean

Politics discourse the predominantly rural and urban poor segment of the electorate were

criticised for their ‘lack of understanding of democracy’. They were blamed for brining Thaksin to

power, because of their selfishness tempted by Thaksin’s ‘populist’ agenda. Implicitly, the

elections which had brought Thaksin to power were considered illegitimate. In this context, the

19

Clean Politics discourse can also be considered to serve as an important strategy to undermine

Thaksin’s mandate.

Finally, the Royal Power discourse also had strong nationalistic connotations. According

to Pramuan (2006:31), Royalist Democracy is a unique political system which falls out of any

analytical category of Western political sciences. By emphasising this local approach to democracy

in times of political crisis, especially after Thaksin had exposed his neo-liberal agenda highlighted

in the Shin Corp sale which contradicted his own nationalist rhetoric, it turned popular sentiment

in favour of Royalist Democracy and away from Thaksin’s ‘global approach’ of ‘international

consensus democracy’.

In summary, Thaksinocracy was replaced by Royalist Democracy helped by the Royal

Power and Clean Politics discourses which argued for the return of moral politics based on

traditionalist notions of Buddhist kingship which put less emphasis on elections, mandates and

‘democratic behaviour’ as opposed to moral leadership.

Constitutional Framework

The change from Thaksinocracy to Royalist Democracy and its relation to the inter-elitist struggle

was also evident in how both parties related to the constitutional framework. As noted above

Article 7 of the 1997 constitution gave the monarch special powers and could therefore be

regarded as a ‘palace constitution’. While the constitution was intended to prevent corrupt

governments from abusing power and provide a system of check and balances, there were some

holes in it which unintentionally made the executive strong and independent. Ironically, while the

1997 charter was designed to prevent Money Politics and the rise of corrupt politicians, the

constitution paved the way for Thaksin’s rise to power (Pasuk and Baker 2004:62).

Once in power it became clear that Thaksin did not want to play according to the rules of

the 1997 constitution, and regarded it as a highly undemocratic document. He openly criticised

that members of the so-called independent bodies (the Constitutional Court) were handpicked

rather than elected when he faced charges in the Assets Declaration case (Pasuk and Baker

2004:5) and he became increasingly antagonistic towards additional 1997 bodies afterwards

(ibid:173-6). In this sense, ‘international consensus democracy’ served as an ‘extra-constitutional’

source of legitimacy for Thaksinocracy, by pointing out some principal democratic failures in the

20

1997 constitution. It is in this context that Thaksin’s challenge to Royalist Democracy was most

clear.

While the 1997 constitution provided significant legitimacy for a Royalist Democracy as

highlighted in the Royal Prerogative of Article 7, the king was reluctant to exercise the use of

Article 7. Possibly, the monarch already considered the 1997 constitution dead or feared the

reaction from Thaksin’s many supporters if he demanded Thaksin’s resignation, and its potential

impact on his own ‘democratic image’. This explains why the monarch referred to the PAD’s

demands for a royal intervention as ‘irrational’ and ‘undemocratic’, and reflects that Thaksin’s

threat to Royalist Democracy’ was taken serious by the palace (Connors 2008:160). While the

monarch technically is confined by the legal framework he is also considered to have ‘extra-

constitutional’ powers, and as mentioned above, he must obey the dharma rather than the rule of

law of the written constitutions. In this sense, Royalist Democracy does not need a written

constitution for the king to exercise his powers. According to Pramuan (2006:33) the 1997

constitution clearly had some inherent failures which were the root of the political crisis. That the

legal mechanisms of check and balances according to Pramuan (2006:26) had also failed was clear

from his remark that the king is the people’s last refuge in their pursuit of justice. The Thai people

would eventually have to turn to the king to ask for help to solve the political crisis (ibid:57).

In summary, Royalist Democracy gradually replaced Thaksinocracy and as a result the

meaning of democracy was significantly redefined. Democracy in the sense of Royalist Democracy

is one where the king’s moral authority is above a dysfunctional and corrupt political system.

While the constitutions function primarily as sources of legitimacy, the ‘unwritten constitution’

and social contract between the king and his people is always superior to them. As both

Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy were seeking legitimacy outside the 1997 constitution,

using the 1997 constitution as a reference point when discussing the ‘democratic nature’ of the

coup is problematic. Finally, the arrival of Pramuan’s book inspiring Sondhi to openly criticise

Thaksin, the Royal Power discourse promoted Royalist Democracy to such an extent that the coup

could be carried out with sufficient legitimacy.

Reactions and Interpretations of the Coup

21

Having outlined how Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy differed in terms of their use of the

notion ‘democracy’ based on the two sites of contestation mentioned above, it is clear that using

these sites as points of departure, presents some problems analytically when discussing

democracy in the context of the coup, and the nature of the Thai political system more generally.

The contradictory nature of the interpretations by the observers referred to below reflects how

these analyses are based on the two sites of contestation outlined above. The implications of

focusing on these sites according to the ‘conventional approach’ will be discussed below.

Thaksin’s removal from power was considered a catastrophe and a ‘breakdown’ for Thai

democracy by some observers (Case 2007). The urban middle class earned the nickname ‘Tank

Liberals’ for their support for the military intervention to solve the political crisis (Ungpakorn

2007:11). To some observers it was a disappointment to see Thailand’s recent consolidated

democracy being wound up in such a short time (Ockey 2006). Much to the dismay of some

observers the PAD demonstrations were considered a return to ‘street politics’ and ‘mob rule’ and

the protestors were criticised for their ‘undemocratic behaviour’, unsuitable for a ‘proper’

democracy (Nelson 2007:18). Rather, many argued, the crisis should have been solved by

democratic means. If people disliked Thaksin, he should have been defeated in an election and if

his conduct was illegal, he should have been judged by the legal mechanisms of check and

balances.

As discussed briefly above, however, it is questionable whether the constitutional bodies

of the 1997 constitution were able to serve the purpose of check and balances against Thaksin, as

he openly defied them. By criticising their inherent ‘undemocratic nature’, they lost their

legitimacy. Despite public pressure on Thaksin to resign, there seemed to be no means within the

constitutional framework to stop him. This highlighted the need for an alternative, ‘extra-

constitutional’ approach. When Thaksin refused to resign, those opposed to his regime were faced

with no other choice than to support the Royal Power discourse. Thus the support of the military

intervention by the middle class and people of the lower strata of society may be regarded as last

resort. In this context, however, it is also important to note that the majority of the PAD actually

opposed support for a royal intervention, suggesting that attempts were made to solve the

political crisis by other means, bypassing the Royal Prerogative and the use of Article 7 (Pye and

Schaffar 2008:54).

22

On the other hand, those observers who welcomed the military coup because it brought

down Thaksinocracy, mindful of the saying that ‘Thai democracy sometimes needs to take two

steps back, to move one forward’ probably had too high expectations to the military junta’s

‘democratic intentions’.26

While elections were held in December 2007 and parliamentary politics

have resumed, according to Ukrist (2008) the ‘network monarchy’ is now in a ‘more desirable’

position with its political opponents out of the way and its agenda fulfilled. Stability prior to Royal

succession has been secured and the military has received a 50-60% budget increase. Bodies like

the International Security Operation Command and Council of National Security have been

strengthened and are likely to maintain influence on the course of politics in the future (ibid:139).

27 These bodies can take pre-emptive measures against anything which can be labelled a threat to

the stability of the nation, most notably the survival of the monarchy (ibid). With Thaksin and

former TRT members abolished from politics, and although the newly elected People’s Power

Party (PPP) continues the Thaksin legacy of ‘populist’ policy programmes, its leader, Samak

Sundaravej, is a staunch royalist and likely to be more compliant with the will of the palace and

the ‘network monarchy’.

From the contradictory nature of the reactions from the observers listed above, it is clear

that focusing too much on the processes of democracy; elections, electoral mandates and on

democratic behaviour is problematic as the approach tends to see democracy as a single entity,

and not as multiple contesting discourses. By comparison to ‘international consensus democracy’

it is possible to see both Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy as falling short of democratic

ideals. And yet while Thaksinocracy was somewhat reminiscent of ‘international consensus

democracy’ – at least in appearance, the Thaksin administration seriously violated human rights

and limited individual freedom and its policies adversary effects which caused considerable

outrage among many Thais and led to demands for his resignation. Despite Thaksinocracy’s

inherent authoritarianism, its resemblance with ‘international consensus democracy’, however,

helped it gain support from the international community and thus the coup was widely perceived

to move Thailand in an ‘anti-democratic’ direction.

26 Surachat Bamrungsuk (2007:36) for instance argued how democracy could still function in a ‘controlled

form’ by the military. 27 The Council for Democratic Reform (under Constitutional Monarchy) renamed itself The Council of

National Security after the coup.

23

As neither Thaksinocracy nor Royalist Democracy seemed to adhere to the constitutional

framework and both were based on ‘extra-constitutional’ sources of legitimacy, it is clear that the

1997 constitution is also problematic as a point of departure for any discussion about democracy

in the context of the 2006 coup. Thus another shortcoming of the ‘conventional approach’ when

analysing democracy is the tendency to see constitutions as the legal framework within which all

actors must play, which is not necessarily the case. In this context, an important feature of Royalist

Democracy is the emphasis of moral politics and the king’s extra-constitutional rights. This

presents an analytical problem when using the ‘conventional approach’ according to which these

‘extra-constitutional’ powers may simply be regarded as an excuse by the ruling elite to bypass the

rule of law.

Toward an Approach of Recognising Political Systems as ‘Alternative’

Democracies

Having examined the inadequacy of the ‘conventional approach’ as a method to fully address and

understand the context of the coup and the Thai political system, some ideas and guidelines as to

how one would go about constructing an alternative theoretical approach for studying political

systems with the possibility of recognising alternative democratic political systems in non-Western

cultures based on the present case study will be presented below.

To formulate an alternative approach to the study of political systems and alternative

democracies, one would have to ask the following two questions; (1) can an existing system of

democratic processes and principles already be identified within the local socio-cultural context

which is fundamentally different from the standard definitions of ‘international consensus

democracy’, and (2) what is the basic source of legitimacy upon which the political system under

study is built?

For political systems to function they must be based on a social contract between

members of that particular society in which a compromise about the distribution of power and

protection of individual rights (although these might differ from one culture to another) has to be

settled with popular acceptance. According to ‘international consensus democracy’ the

democratic processes of election, parliament and constitution ensures that the rights of people

are maintained and thus that the social contract is followed by all parties. The democratic process

24

in turn provides the legitimacy of this system. If the system breaks down (if a government

collapses due to scandals, corruption, vote of censure etc.), the social contract functions as the

nexus of renegotiation.

In the case of Thailand, the democratic processes of ‘international consensus democracy’

do not necessarily guarantee that people’s rights are protected, as the case study of the present

essay has made clear. In a historical context, the large turn-over in the number of constitutions is

probably one reason why these documents have never acquired the status of being more than

temporary social contracts. In the event the political system breaks down (as it often has due to

corruption), the present monarch functions as an ‘unofficially elected’ Head of State who can

check the abuse of power and appoint an interim PM. This ‘extra-constitutional’ power and role of

the monarch is based on the belief and consensus about his moral authority. In this sense, the king

must act in the best service of his people as he is morally obliged to do, according to the rules

proscribed for the Dhammaraja. Thus the social contract is basically one between the king and his

people, and the source of legitimacy of the political system is ultimately religion, and not the

democratic processes of a political ideology. While this traditionalist political arrangement in

contemporary scholarship is analysed as a hegemonic ideology which maintains the rule of the

‘network monarchy’, an examination of its role as a distinct political system alongside the

established ‘international consensus democracy’ according to the guidelines above, could perhaps

acknowledge the existence of distinct democratic political systems.

Conclusion

The intention of this essay was to show how the term ‘democracy’ as an analytical category proves

problematic when used ‘conventionally’ to examine political events such as the 2006 coup in

Thailand and assess its ‘democratic nature’ and as an approach to understand the political system

of Thailand more generally. Focusing on elections, electoral mandates, the democratic behaviour

of citizens, institutions and governments, and the constitutional framework, ignores the fact that

the principles and processes of ‘international consensus democracy’ may be interpreted

differently locally, and identify the existence of several contesting discourses of democracy. These

differences can be attributed to local socio-cultural and historical characteristics. Taking these

factors into account as well as analysing how these circulating discourses of democracy are linked

25

to political struggles of power between contesting elites, proves a better way to understand not

only why democracies may be substantially different in specific cultures, but also how they came

to be that way.

Democracy should not be seen as a specific entity which is globally homogeneous. There

is a tendency in much contemporary scholarship to analyse and understand democracy according

to an imagined ‘international consensus democracy’. Rather, democracy can be a contested

concept among competing elites, and social groups, and can be considered to serve as the

principal ideology of those who are in power, as well as those who struggle to attain it.

Finally, as an alternative approach to the study of democracies in other cultures, this

paper presented some ideas and guidelines how one would go about such a task. One such

approach may begin by identifying democratic processes and social contracts embedded in

existing socio-cultural traits of political systems, and by examining what the sources of legitimacy

are on which these political systems are built.

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