th - constitution.orgthe honorable ken anderson, the honorable suzanne brooks, the honorable tim...
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05-973-C395
CHARLES EDWARD LINCOLN III, § IN THE DISTRICT COURTIndividually and as Next Friend of §CHARLES EDWARD ANDREW §LINCOLN IV, §
Plaintiff, § 395TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT§
v. §§
WILLIAMSON COUNTY et. al, §Defendants § OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC IMPOSING SANCTIONS
On January 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25 and 26, 2006, a hearing was held on Defendants' Motion
for Sanctions in the above-styled and numbered cause. After considering the Defendants' Motion
for Sanctions, the response, the evidence and arguments of counsel, this Court finds as follows:
This Honorable Court finds that there is good cause to issue the sanctions imposed under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections 9-10, and
in support thereof would make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. All findings
of fact that would be more properly made as conclusions of law are so designated and vice versa :
Findings of Fact:
1. Charles Edward Lincoln III brought suit and has filed pleadings1 against Defendants,
Williamson County, the Honorable Michael Jergins, Mike Davis, Laurie Nowlin, and
J. Randall Grimes, the Honorable Burt Carnes, the Honorable Billy Ray Stubbleficld,
the Honorable Ken Anderson, the Honorable Suzanne Brooks, the Honorable Tim
Wright and the Honorable Don Higginbotham, alleging civil rights violations under
the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the State of Texas.
2. Charles Edward Lincoln III has admitted in open court to drafting the pleadings in this
case.
1 Unless otherwise noted, the pleadings at issue here are Plaintiffs Motion to Modify, theresulting Petition, Plaintiffs Original Petition and all amendments and supplements to same thatPlaintiff has filed and/or were incorporated into cause number 05-973-C395
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS , JAN 30 2006
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3. Attorney Valorie Davenport has provided her signature to the pleadings in this matter
drafted by Mr. Lincoln. She claims to have read the pleadings and has in open court
and on the record adopted and ratified the pleadings.
4. Attorney Francis Wayne Williams Montenegro has provided his signature to the
pleadings in this matter drafted by Mr. Lincoln. He has signed on behalf of Davenport
with her permission and authority.
5. Charles Edward Lincoln III also has appeared pro sc in this litigation by signing and
filing pro se pleadings with the District Clerk's office in this case.
6. OnoraboutOctober23, 2003, after several failed mandamus actions, the Austin Third
Court of Appeals ordered Charles Edward Lincoln II and his attorney, Francis
Montenegro, to "refrain from filing subsequent groundless, frivolous motions, briefs,
and pleadings in connection with the underlying child custody litigation either in this
court, or in the district courts below". Charles Edward Lincoln III and attorney
Francis Montenegro were also ordered to pay Laurie Nowlin and J. Randall Grimes
attorneys fees as sanctions by the Third Court of Appeals. They have failed to pay the
sanctions and they have failed to submit written proof to the Third Court of Appeals
as ordered.
7. The Third Court of Appeals has stated that Charles Edward Lincoln III and Francis
Montenegro's claims brought before them were frivolous, brought in bad faith and
vexatious . The claims brought by Plaintiff in the writs of mandamus filed in the
Third Court of Appeals involve the same claims and nucleus of operative facts as
those raised in the federal lawsuits, federal appeals, and in this lawsuit. Lincoln and
his lawyers have filed a new lawsuit in the district court in Travis County challenging
the decision of the Third Court of Appeals. Lincoln and his attorneys did not appeal
the decision of the Third Court of Appeals.
8. Charles Edward Lincoln III and attorneys Davenport and Montenegro have continued
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 2 LINCOLN
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to file frivolous pleadings on Lincoln's behalf in connection with the civil rights
litigation in this District Court. Charles Edward Lincoln III and attorneys Davenport
and Montenegro have harassed Judge Jergins by having him served at night at his
home and hi front of his children. They have harassed J. Randall Grimes by serving
him federal pleadings as he left the hearing before the Third Court of Appeals the day
Lincoln and Montenegro were sanctioned by that Court. They have harassed J. Randal
Grimes by serving him at home and in front of his children. Charles Edward Lincoln
III has failed to attend proceedings before this court as requested, and on January 12,
2006, failed to appear despite having been served with a subpoena to appear. He was
attached and forced to appear before the Court.
9. Charles Edward Lincoln HI and attorney Montenegro filed two lawsuits in The United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas raising these same issues
without success. Davenport attempted to represent Lincoln in that lawsuit but was
denied admission pro hac vice by the Court. Charles Edward Lincoln III and attorneys
unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal of those lawsuits to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit without success and sought a rehearing en banc for that
Court and an extension of time to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the United
Slates Supreme Court after filing this lawsuit. Undeterred by prior losses and orders
on January 17, 2006, Lincoln and his attorneys then filed a new lawsuit in Cause
Number D-J-GN-06-0163, Charles Edward Lincoln and Francis Williams
Montenegro v. Laurie Nowlin and Elena Lincoln, 98th Judicial District Court, Travis
County, Texas, allegedly attacking the judgment of the Third Court of Appeals.
10. This case numbered 05-973-;C395 is litigation that is in connection with the
underlying action being brought by Charles Edward Lincoln III involving his son,
Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV in cause number 02-1490-F3 95. This lawsuit was
filed while the cases were still pending in the federal courts. Lincoln and his lawyers
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 3
FEB-10-2006(FRI) U:S5 office (FflX)Sie 2dd 9771 P 005/018
I
failed to verify the petition and follow the other mandates of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code when thej/filed the lawsuit against Judge Jergins in the family law
case.
11. Charles Edward Lincoln HI on, August 4,2005, filed an application for an ex parte
order in Travis County while this litigation was pending in Williamson County in an
attempt to circumvent the Williamson County courts. Lincoln and Davenport failed
to notify the ad litem and the attorney representing the mother they were filing the
application for ex parte order.
12. Charles Edward Lincoln El claims representation by attorneys Davenport and
Montenegro while at the same time filing pro se pleadings if, and when, it suits his
strategy.j"=-
13. There is no reasonable probability of Charles Edward Lincoln EL s&d^ttoax&ys-jp*-
Pavenp^rt-aadJ^'fonteaeggo- succeeding at trial in this litigation. Plaintiff Charles
i Edward Lincoln HI and attorneys Davenport and Montenegro have filed allegations
of alleged civil rights violations by the Judge presiding over the custody case, the
lawyer representing bis ex-wife, the ad litem appointed by the court, the lawyer
representing the lawyer for Plaintiffs ex-wife, and all the other judges in Williamson / 4 ,-y^'ivv^/j£ Sfeji^
County, Texas, as well as the County itself. /The allegations and writings of Plaintiff^ p-tv~r^
were clearly in the first person, scurrilous, defamatory and without any basis in law
or fact. By way of illustration and without limiting the vile nature of other scurrilous
allegations the Court find the pleadings contained references to the firm or Grimes and
Copenhavcr as "Grimes and Gropengrabher". These pleadings and allegations were
filed in bad faith without reasonable inquiry into the validity of the allegations or the
law.
14. Plaintiff and his'counsel have testified that they are aware that an attorney cannot be
liable for simply representing a client. Plaintiff and his counsel admitted that Mike
I
ORDER. IMPOSING SANCTIONS 4 UNCOCSjJLiJX
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Davis was not involved in the family law litigation and first appeared when he simply
represented J. Randall Grimes in the Federal Court matter.
15. Plaintiff and his counsel have failed to properly investigate the law or the facts
supporting the alleged claims. Lincoln's petition asserts claims against Defendants
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Texas law based solely on rulings by Judge Jergins in this
cause. The Austin Court of Appeals expressly referred Lincoln and Montenegro to
TEX. CW.PMC. & &EMCOD£ §30.017(a)(2), which it paraphrased as requiringthat
"claims against [a] judge filed in [the] underlying lawsuit may not be based on rulings
[the] judge made in [the] pending cause." In re Lincoln, 114 S.W.Sd at 727 n.2. As
pointed out in separately filed special exceptions, Lincoln failed to comply with any
of the requirements of §30.017 -the petition was based solely on rulings in the family
law pending case, it was not under oath, and Lincoln did not pay the filing fees or
obtain a separate cause number
16. District Judges do not make policies for the county in which they serve. Specifically,
the Honorable Michael Jergins does not make policy for Williamson County. Any
actions taken, or not taken, by the Honorable Michael Jergins are not attributable to
Williamson County. County's do not have solicitor generals as alleged by Plaintiff
and his attorneys. Mike Davis is not an employee of Williamson County, Texas but
merely serves as outside counsel in litigation for the county.
17. Lincoln had a caller id in his home that said "kill judge jergins". Lincoln is a
disbarred attorney. Lincoln has admitted to sending emails flaunting his service of
lawsuits on Judge Jergins and J. Randall Grimes at their homes. Plaintiff sent
Defendants and this court a 168 page fax at approximately 10:00 p.m. at night, the day
before the deadline, to respond to matters for the November 10, 2005, hearing.
t& T~t<wWn-tinH 1-iic gttftcn^y<LJa3gf his frl'volpl!,*1 fi1i^^^Ti4^^4^nf-Jyiir.rnpfr>i^nto4^HW-a4.wJ— .
^Tmsappiuations^DJlJaw. Lincoln, Davenport, andj^ojateuegi 0' btlii've—feat-fo*.
j^d'T^fa
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 5 PpJ& -{^
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\<tistiiptins4egrttfflate-pwcc6ae9r4^^
<H>mfeittpteyrlhty«m Mnn.illegally what-tfaoy afO-nnabl&4o achiovc lawfiulyrTlrcy
_g^v fjjgmpt the^teg&mate family lawjwtctium Of lliu 395Jj^k<TTtt^OTift4ja-fek---?
^aat^bfCC^fivfttC-;partie§^ruj_ rnimqf*l tn pnrgnnaUy^nnn- hipkJitLrntirm an<+*~-aful
«akc-uvcryund; so weary-o£having to deal wiGr-feetBrtfaai. limy will uccedg-tahis
nnjiigtrfltid demands. IBmBg-ao-tegaJ-uiabilitTrr, tho vedtte-uf [Lincoln's] cauSc-of
ftetion rsGta-sglciy upon'ilS puwci-lu intmudatc and coerce.
19. Lincoln asserts that Laurie Nowlin is not entitled to derived judicial immunity based
upon her status as court-appointed guardian ad litem for Charlie Lincoln IV. He has
asserted this claim not only as to the "civil rights" claims, but also as to the legal
malpractice/breach of fiduciary duty claims specifically against Ms. Nowlin. Under
the doctrine of "derived judicial immunity", settled law in the Slate of Texas, a court
appointed of tier of the court receives the same immunity as a judge acting in his or her
official capacity - absolute immunity from liablity for judicial acts performed within
the scope of his or her jurisdiction. As such, Lincoln's claims against Ms. Nowlin are,
in their entirety, groundless in that they have no basis in law(TRCP Rule 13) and are
unwarranted by existing law (CPRC 10.001(2)).
20. In numerous pleadings in this litigation, Mr. Lincoln has asserted claims onbehalf of
his minor son against Ms. Nowlin for, inter alia., legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty. However, the Final Decree in Lincoln's divorce from his former wife
Elena Lincoln, provides that Elena Lincoln has the exclusive right to represent the
child in legal action, hi sum, Lincoln lacked authority, at all relevant times, to assert
claims against Ms. Nowlin (among others) on behalf of his minor son. As such,
Lincoln's claims against Ms. Nowlin asserted on behalf of his minor son are
groundless in that they have no basis in law (TRCP Rule 13) and are unwarranted by
existing law (CPRC § 10.001(2)).
ORDER IMTOSING SANCTION'S 6 /yWj?^oi-N'4
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21. Lincoln alleges that Nowlin "agreed to represent the best interests of both Plaintiffs
father and son and generally alleges that he had attorney-client relationship with Ms.
Nowlin. These allegations are factually groundless and they form the basis for an
alleged breach of a promise that, if made, was illegal and unenforceable as against
public policy; i.e. an alleged promise to act as Lincoln's attorney while simultaneously
serving as ad litem for Lincoln's son. Moreover, these allegations of an attorney-
client relationship between Mr. Lincoln and Ms. Nowlin form the basis for the legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims Lincoln asserted on his own behalf.
These claims arc groundless both legally and factually.
22. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims
against Judge Michael Jergins thai were precluded by judicial immunity, without a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
23. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims for
prospective relief against Judge Michael Jergins even after it became moot when he
no longer presided over Lincoln's family law case.
24. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current laxv, including claims for
prospective injunctivc relief against all the other Judges of Williamson County
without a reasonable basis to believe that any had inflicted, or was likely to inflict a
legally cognizable injury.
25. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 1 ^~---^ LINCOLN*yt^TJj,*
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would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims
against Judge Jergins asserted in the family law case over which all the allegations
pertain to or were inextricably bound up with his rulings in that case.
26. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them, were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims of
prior restraint of First Amendment-protected speech in an order Lincoln agreed to on
the record in open court, imposing restrictions similar to those sought by Lincoln
himself in the divorce action, after acquiescing hi the Court of Appeals' refusal to
mandamus Judge Jergins on the same allegations of free speech deprivation.
27. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims
against Defendants Grimes and Davis for conduct which Lincoln admitted all occurred
in the course of, and was indistinguishable from, their representation of their
respective clients against Lincoln.
28. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims
wherein Lincoln purports to represent an assert claims on behalf of Charles Edward
Andrew Lincoln fV, and althoughElenaLincolnhas the exclusive right under the final
divorce decree, which has not been superseded, to represent and act as next friend for
the child in litigation.
29. Plaintiff and his counsel have asserted groundless claims that reasonable inquiry
would have shown them were without merit, precluded by settled law, and without a
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 8 UNCOIW
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good faith argument for the revision or extension of current law, including claims
brought against Williamson County for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
30. Plaintiffs pleadings were not filed in good faith.
31. Counsel for Defendants have expended extensive financial resources and time in
defending the litigation brought by Charles Edward Lincoln JH and attorneys
Davenport and Montenegro.
32. Plaintiff and his attorneys have made arguments and/or pleadings that were intended
to harass Defendants. Counsel for Defendants have proven inconvenience,
harassment, and expenses associated with defending the claims brought by Charles
Edward Lincoln HI and attorneys Davenport and Montenegro.
33. This Court has the .inherent power to assess sanctions. The Court also has the power
to assess sanction under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Texas of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
Conclusions of Law:
1. A pleading is sanctionable under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, or Chapters 9
and/or 10 of the Civil Practice andRemedies Code if it is groundless and was brought
in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.
2. A groundless pleading is one that has no basis in law or fact and is not warranted by
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
3. Charles Edward Lincoln HI did not make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and
factual basis of the claims he presented in his pleadings drafted for Ms. Davenport
and/or Mr. Montenegro's signature.
4. Attorney Valorie Davenport did not make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and
factual basis of the claims that were presented in Plaintiffs pleadings to which Ms.
Davenport certified by her signature upon same under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 13, and Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
ORDER IMTOSING SANCTIONS . 9 . /^^^- LffiCOUW
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5. Attorney Francis Wayne Williams Montenegro did not make a reasonable inquiry into
the legal and factual basis of the claims that were presented in Plaintiffs pleadings to
which Mr. Montenegro certified by his signature upon same under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 13, or Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
6. Plaintiffs pleadings were signed in violation of Rule 13, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure and Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, by
attorney Valorie Davenport because they contain groundless claims brought in bad
faith and for the purposes of harassment.
1. Plaintiffs pleadings were signed in violation of Rule 13, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure and Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, by
attorney Francis Wayne Williams Montenegro because they contain groundless claims
brought in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment.
8. Charles Edward Lincoln HI did not make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and
factual basis of the claims he presented in his pleadings he drafted as a pro se litigant.
9. Plaintiffs pro se pleadings were signed in violation of Rule 13, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure and Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, by pro
se litigant Charles Edward Lincoln HI because it contains groundless claims brought
in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment.
10. Charles Edward Lincoln HE, Valorie Davenport and Francis Montenegro were aware
that there existed no good faith cause of action against Wi lliamson County, Texas,
Milce Davis, or Randall Grimes.
11. Plaintiff has no cause of action under 42 USC 1983 against Mike Davis for
representing J. Randall Grimes nor against J. Randall Grimes for representing Ms.
Lincoln.
12. The litigation in the above-referenced cause number, 05-973-C395, was brought
against Williamson County, Texas, Mike Davis and Randall Grimes in bad faith by
ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS 10 X^O^NLE-ICOLNJ
^%T '
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Plaintiff Charles Edward Lincoln HI, Valerie Davenport and Francis Montenegro.
Such actions by Charles Edward Lincoln HI, Valoric Davenport and Francis
Montenegro are sanctionable conduct.
13. Plaintiffs pleadings that were signed by attorneys Davenport and Montenegro and
filed with the District Clerk were filed to needlessly prolong litigation and create
unnecessary expense.
14. Plaintiffs pro se pleading that was signed by Charles Edward Lincoln HI and filed
with the District Clerk was filed to needlessly prolong litigation and create
unnecessary expense.
15. There is no reasonable probability of Plaintiff succeeding at trial.
16. Plaintiff spleadings in this cause ofaction (specificallyPlaintiff sMotion to Modify,
Petition and amendments or supplements thereto) were signed and filed in violation
of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13, and Chapters 9 and/or 10 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. Apart from chapters 9-10 and Rule 13, under Tex.
Const. Art. 2 §1 and Art. 5, §8. the court has the inherent authority to sanction parries
for bad-faith abuses if it finds that to do so will aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and
integrity. Sanctions maybe imposed against the party, his attorney, or both. Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); King'v. First Nat. Bank ofBaird, 161
S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex.App. - Eastland 2005, no pet his.). Liability for sanctions is
joint and several. Kitgle v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 88 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex.App. -
San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (en bane).
17. Plaintiffs pleadings in this numbered action 05-973-C395 are frivolous, groundless,
without merit and brought in bad faith for the purposes of harassment of Defendants.
18. Charles Edward Lincoln III and his counsel Valoric Davenport andFrancis Williams
Montenegro have violated Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 9 and/or
10 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 13 by signing pleadings and motions that
were groundless, in bad faith, arid submitted for the purposes of harassrn.aitand delay.
OPXICRIMFOSUJQ SANCTIONS 11 \ \ ^~y^-;ijNcoL}«
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19. Plaintiff and his counsel, Davenport and Montenegro, have asserted groundless claims
that reasonable inquiry would have shown them were without merit, precluded by
settled law, and without a good faith argument for the revision or extension of current
law.
20. Plaintiff and his counsel, Davenport and Montenegro, have made allegations or other
factual contentions in a pleading or motion that lacked evidentiary support or, are not
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.
21. The imposition of sanctions in this case is made appropriate and is justified by the
circumstances and evidence presented before this Honorable Court. The Court finds
that the sanctions imposed herein are the minimum sanction sufficient to deter the
conduct by Charles Edward Lincoln HI, Valorie Davenport and Francis Montenegro,
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.
22. The Court further finds that it is within this Honorable Court's inherent power as
provided by Texas Government Code, § 21.001, to sanction Plaintiff and his attorneys
Valorie Davenport and Francis Wayne Williams Montenegro.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREEDiatDefendants' Motion
for Sanctions is hereby GRANTED. The Court imposes the following monetary sanctions against
Charles Edward Lincoln d, and against Valorie Davenport, and Francis Williams Montenegro,
attorneys for Charles Edward Lincoln HI:
This Court hereby FURTHER ORDERS that Charles Edward Lincoln ffl pay monetary
sanctions in the amount of S50,000.00 to MichaelP. Davis, The Texas Attorney General and Michael
Johnson, counsel for Defendants Williamson County, The Honorable Judge Jergins, the Honorable
Burt Games, the Honorable Billy Ray Sfubblefield, the Honorable Ken Anderson, the Honorable
Suzanne Brooks, the Honorable Tim Wright and the Honorable Don Higginbotham, Mike Davis, J.
Randall Grimes, and Laurie Nowlin for the filing of this frivolous lawsuit, and to deter him from
further filings.jj^TTT^v
OHDEU IMPOSING SANCTIONS 12 ^"T^^ LINCOLN4
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This Court hereby FURTHER ORDERS that Valorie Davenport pay monetary sanctions in
the amount of 525,000.00 to Michael P. Davis, The Texas Attorney General and Michael Johnson,
counsel for Defendants Williamson. County, The Honorable Judge Jcrgins, J. Randall Grimes, the
Honorable Hurt Carncs, the Honorable Billy Ray Stubblcfield, the Honorable Ken Anderson, the
Honorable Suzanne Brooks, the Honorable Tim Wright and the HonorableDonHigginbotham, Mike
Davis, and Laurie Nowlin for the filing of this frivolous lawsuit, and to deter her from further filings.
This Court hereby FURTHER ORDERS that Francis Williams Montenegro pay monetary
sanctions in the amount of $25,000.00 to Michael P. Davis, The Texas Attorney General and Michael
Johnson, counsel for Defendants Williamson County, The Honorable Judge Jergins, the Honorable
Burt Games, the Honorable Billy Ray Stubblefield, the Honorable Ken Anderson, the Honorable
Suzanne Brooks, the Honorable Tim Wright and the Honorable Don Higginbotham, Milcc Davis, J.
Randall Grimes, and Laurie Nowlin for the filing of this frivolous lawsuit, and to deter him from
further filings.
This Court FURTHER ORDERS that Charles Edward Lincoln m is specifically prohibited
from filing lawsuits, or other legal actions, in courts of the State of Texas without first obtaining\Cr~t. -Ai-n cL&^cgpi***--\
permission from the Presiding Judge of the regior/in which he proposes to bring the action. This
requirement would be in effect until Charles Edward Lincoln HI has satisfied the following
obligations in full:
1. Payment of the foregoing monetary sanctions against Charles Edward Lincoln JH;
2. Payment of the sanctions awarded by the Texas Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in In Re Charles Edward Lincoln III; Cause No. 03-03-00459-CV. Sanctions were
awarded in the amount of 52,000.00 to J. Randall Grimes and 51,000.00 to Laurie J.
Nowlin.
3. Payment of the $7,500.00 awarded to Laurie J. Noxvlin in the family law case styled
and numbered 02-1490-F395; In the Interest of Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln, Ar
Child entered by the Court in that case on October 21, 2003.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the sanctions imposed as to Valorie Davenport and/or
Francis Williams Montenegro in Defendants' Motion for Sanctions shall be suspdBuCjd^aspong as$OT}&N&V?—^$xoiiDBRiMi'OSiNG SANCTONS u ^^-^NCOLN*
F E B - I O - a O O b ( F P I i U:?6 office (FflX)Sl? ?dd 9771 P 015/018
' -f*- , I 11
' ,-rUe ^M^o-'«s!^a o^JiX7 eS U<* UwSk f^ T»* s«M&V\,
Valorie Davenport and/or Francis Williams Montenegro do not aid, abet, or otherwise participate in |/ -riST ^l^O^S.
new litigation as counsel for Charles Edward Lincoln IH,-O£-allow him to utilizotboir law licenses in -
jurflieiaaoo of his-ewB-clajmns. / The terms of this order do not prohibit Valorie Davenport and/or
Francis Wi lliams Montenegro from assisting Charles Edward Lincoln in the appeal of this case styled
Charles Edward Lincoln III, Individually and as Next Friend of Charles Edward Andre\v Lincoln IV
v. Williamson County et al, and numbered 05-973-C395, to the Third Court of Appeals for the State
of Texas, or any other proper appellate court'.
FT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District Clerk of Williamson County shall provide a
copy of this Order to the District and County Clerks of the Region so that said clerks maybe made
aware of this Order so that they may enforce same.
The terms of this Order shall have no effect upon Plaintiffs right to appeal this case styled
Charles Edward Lincoln III, Individually and as Next Fri end of Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln TV
v. Williamson County et al. and numbered 05-973-C395, to the Third Court of Appeals for the State
of Texas, or any other proper appellate court. Further, the terms of this Order shall have no effect
upon Plaintiff s right to maintain litigation in the fami ly law cause of action styled and numbered 02-
1490-F395, or the appeal of same to the Third Court of Appeals for the State of Texas, or any other
proper appellate court.j^l r I i
FHS tS«2IER-OJ®€R£©-Hiz!c ^
i x-es-Jj
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the litigation in this cause of action numbered 05-973-
C395 and styled Charles Edward Lincoln III, Individually and as Next Friend of Charles Edward
Andre\v Lincoln IV v. Williamson County et al. is hereby concluded with this Order. This Order of
the Court is a final and appealable judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT, Defendants are entitled to issuance of all writs
necessary to execute this judgment.
SIGNED on _&±H^__, 2006.- A jt /~7
^ m^£L<^// U^^ltZ*^*^—y/t/DGE PRESIDING ^T /f>^>
V ijf$ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS M t^S^Qi^y^
F E B - 1 0 - B 0 0 6 ( F R I ) U:26 o f f i c e ( F f l X ) 5 1 E 2U 3 7 7 1 P 0 1 6 / 0 1 8
i
APPROVED? AS TO FORM:
Mike jpavis L-^ UAttorney for Defendant Williamson Countyand J. PLandall Grimes
Mike JohnsonAttorney for Laurie J. Nowlin
Jim ToddAttorney for the Honorable Michael Jergins
/ ""vi- ••.
>v®~r'3'/'ORDER. D^IPOSING SAHCl'lONS 15 *IINCOLN<1
F E B - 1 0 - £ O G b ( F R I ) 1 4 : 2 6 o f f i c e ( F R X ) 5 1 2 2dd 9 7 7 1 P 0 1 7 / 0 1 8
' 81/30/2086 09:86 512-320-0577 OFC ATTV GEN GLD PAGE 02/82
JUDGE PRESIDING
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MikeT)avisAttorney for Defendant Williamson Countyand J. Randall Grimes
Mike Johnson "~Attorney for Laurie J. Novriin_ A .<^L^ p 7>UV) •JiifiTodd ^^
Attorney for tfto Honorable Michael Jcrgins
OBJ3CRIMfOSTNd SAJfCBONS \.i _ UKCQI.N3
X i JX
F E B - 1 0 - 2 0 Q 6 ( F R I ) U:26 o f f i c e ( F f l X ) 5 1 2 2dd 9771 P 0 1 8 / 0 1 8
R'X D a t e / T i m e J R N - 3 0 - 2 0 0 6 ( M O N ) 1 1 : 0 ( 1 1 5 1 2 7 0 8 B 7 7 7 P 002JflN.30.2006 10:llfln 1C MO.292 P.2
JUDGE PRESIDING
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MilceDavisAttorney for Defendant Williamson Countyand J. Randall Grimes
wji!fa.£^Klikc JohnsonAttorney for Laurie J. Nowlln
Jim ToddAttorney for the Honorable Michael Jergins
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF WILLIAMSON
CERDRED TO BE A TRUE AND CX3RRECT COPYOF THE ORIGINAL IN MY CUSTODY.GIVEhLUNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFRCEDATtTyTftWOa y^- ^/-^ AH 2oOf?
.4*v^gs.;)} ^M BONNIE J. WOLBRUECK
H:- \JT/ D^RICT CLERICOF WILLIAMSON COUNT'f-i> '<JVP* t\ ' / J,
" "6¥=A^K)u. ( ATYXi^^iBin DEPM-I-''•-IIS STAMP IS PRINTED !N SED
ORDER rMPoswo SANCTIONS 13 LI {caL^D