testimony and the value of knowledge martin kusch

41
1 Testimony Testimony and and the Value of Knowledge the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch Martin Kusch <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

Upload: keegan

Post on 09-Jan-2016

20 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

Testimony and the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch . A Communitarian Form of Value-Driven Epistemology. Guiding assumption: Human cognizers are highly gregarious and deeply interdependent. One central claim: Knowledge is a collective good. Central resources and allies: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

1

Testimony Testimony and and

the Value of Knowledgethe Value of Knowledge

Martin KuschMartin Kusch<[email protected]><[email protected]>

Page 2: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

2

A Communitarian Form of A Communitarian Form of Value-Driven EpistemologyValue-Driven Epistemology

Guiding assumption:Guiding assumption:

Human cognizers are highly gregarious and Human cognizers are highly gregarious and deeply interdependent.deeply interdependent.

One central claim:One central claim:

Knowledge is a collective good.Knowledge is a collective good.

Page 3: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

3

Central resources and allies:Central resources and allies:

[1] Genealogy of Knowledge: Craig, Williams[1] Genealogy of Knowledge: Craig, Williams

[2] Sociology of Knowledge: Barnes, Shapin[2] Sociology of Knowledge: Barnes, Shapin

Page 4: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

4

Central opponent:Central opponent:

Kvanvig, Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of UnderstandingPursuit of Understanding (2003) (2003)

Page 5: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

5

Cf. Kvanvig, Cf. Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and The Intellectual Virtues and

the Life of the Mind the Life of the Mind (1992)(1992)

Do not “divorce epistemological concerns from Do not “divorce epistemological concerns from the realities of social interaction” (Kvanvig 1992: the realities of social interaction” (Kvanvig 1992: 178).178).

Page 6: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

6

Kvanvig: Kvanvig: The Value of Knowledge and the The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of UnderstandingPursuit of Understanding (2003) (2003)

• A satisfactory account of knowledge must A satisfactory account of knowledge must explain both its explain both its naturenature and its and its valuevalue..

• Value-scepticismValue-scepticism about knowledge: there is about knowledge: there is no knowledge-specific epistemic value.no knowledge-specific epistemic value.

Page 7: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

7

The argument by The argument by eliminationelimination … …

[1] [1] E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property that renders the truth of the belief objectively that renders the truth of the belief objectively likely likely (e.g. (e.g. reliabilismreliabilism). ).

Page 8: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

8

The argument by The argument by eliminationelimination … …

[1] [1] E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property that renders the truth of the belief objectively that renders the truth of the belief objectively likely likely (e.g. (e.g. reliabilismreliabilism). ).

ObjectionObjection: : the Swamping Argumentthe Swamping Argument: The : The epistemic value of a true belief “swamps” the epistemic value of a true belief “swamps” the value value of using a method that makes the belief of using a method that makes the belief likely to be likely to be true. true.

Page 9: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

9

[2] [2] Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief plus a plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier casesfourth condition blocking Gettier cases..

Page 10: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

10

[2] [2] Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief plus a plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier casesfourth condition blocking Gettier cases..

ObjectionObjection: Fourth conditions are ever more : Fourth conditions are ever more “complex, ad hoc and gerrymandered …” “complex, ad hoc and gerrymandered …”

But to solve the problem of epistemic value, But to solve the problem of epistemic value, we need “simpler proposals in which the value we need “simpler proposals in which the value of the condition is intuitively obvious”.of the condition is intuitively obvious”.

Page 11: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

11

Craig’s Genealogy of Knowledge (1990)Craig’s Genealogy of Knowledge (1990)

Method: Method: Construct a hypothetical historical narrative Construct a hypothetical historical narrative of the process in which the concept of the process in which the concept knowledgeknowledge was was synthesisedsynthesised..

Question IQuestion I: : Why was an ancestor of Why was an ancestor of knowledgeknowledge (i.e. “(i.e. “protoknowledgeprotoknowledge”) of value in the ”) of value in the

epistemic epistemic state of nature?state of nature?

Question II: Question II: How did we get from How did we get from protoknowledgeprotoknowledgeto our to our knowledgeknowledge??

Page 12: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

12

Part I of Craig’s Genealogy:Part I of Craig’s Genealogy:

““Inquirers” need to classify “informants”.Inquirers” need to classify “informants”.

““Protoknowers” are good informants if they:Protoknowers” are good informants if they:

- fit the fit the needsneeds of the inquirer, of the inquirer,- are are honesthonest towards the inquirer, towards the inquirer,- convinceconvince the inquirer, the inquirer,- are are understandableunderstandable to the inquirer, to the inquirer,- are are detectabledetectable by the inquirer (on the by the inquirer (on the

basis of “indicator properties”).basis of “indicator properties”).

(But these are not necessary and sufficient …)(But these are not necessary and sufficient …)

Page 13: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

13

Part I of Craig’s Genealogy (cont’d):Part I of Craig’s Genealogy (cont’d):

- protoknowledgeprotoknowledge differs from differs from knowledgeknowledge::

- it is tied to testimony,it is tied to testimony,

- it is not a fully public concept,it is not a fully public concept,

- it does not figure in self-attributions,it does not figure in self-attributions,

- it is not undermined by luck.it is not undermined by luck.

Page 14: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

14

Part II of Craig’s Genealogy: “objectivisation”:Part II of Craig’s Genealogy: “objectivisation”:

[a] [a] Self-attributionsSelf-attributions [b] [b] Recommending protoknowers to others:Recommending protoknowers to others:

higher standardshigher standards

[c] [c] “Recommended” as an indicator property: “Recommended” as an indicator property: dilution of the detectability requirementdilution of the detectability requirement

[d] [d] Group action: dilution of the link to testimonyGroup action: dilution of the link to testimony

Page 15: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

15

Three “Kvanvigian” ObjectionsThree “Kvanvigian” Objections

The SwampingThe Swamping Objection Objection (2003: 86) (2003: 86)

The epistemic value of true belief swamps the The epistemic value of true belief swamps the epistemic value of true belief coming from a epistemic value of true belief coming from a tagged good informant.tagged good informant.

Page 16: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

16

The Social ObjectionThe Social Objection

What are the social consequences of knowledge What are the social consequences of knowledge attributions? And why should we ignore the attributions? And why should we ignore the

conceptual needs of the informants?conceptual needs of the informants?

Page 17: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

17

The Relevance ObjectionThe Relevance Objection

Where are the marks of the history of Where are the marks of the history of knowledgeknowledge? ? And what is history to do with us?And what is history to do with us?

Page 18: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

18

Three Modifications of Craig’s Genealogy Three Modifications of Craig’s Genealogy – – to block the three objections:to block the three objections:

[1] [1] The institution of testimony as a collective good, The institution of testimony as a collective good, underwritten by intrinsic values. (Williams)underwritten by intrinsic values. (Williams)

[2] [2] Protoknowledge attributions are attributions of Protoknowledge attributions are attributions of honour. (Barnes and Williams)honour. (Barnes and Williams)

[3] [3] Attributions of knowledge are intertwined with Attributions of knowledge are intertwined with attributions of freedom. (Barnes and Shapin)attributions of freedom. (Barnes and Shapin)

Page 19: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

19

ObjectionsObjections ModificationsModifications

SwampingSwamping One: Intrinsic valuesOne: Intrinsic values

Social Social Two: HonouringTwo: Honouring

Relevance Relevance Three: FreedomThree: Freedom

Page 20: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

20

Modification [1]: Williams’ genealogy of the Modification [1]: Williams’ genealogy of the institution of testimonyinstitution of testimony

[a] [a] real vs. imaginary genealogyreal vs. imaginary genealogy

[b] [b] a genealogy of testimonya genealogy of testimony

[c] [c] the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity”the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity”

[d] [d] the testimonial system as a collective good the testimonial system as a collective good

[e] [e] the virtues as intrinsic values: stable from the the virtues as intrinsic values: stable from the insideinside

Page 21: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

21

Intrinsic values …Intrinsic values …

- - central in our shared system of values;central in our shared system of values;

- - cannot be identified by means of Moore’scannot be identified by means of Moore’s ““method of absolute isolation”.method of absolute isolation”.

Page 22: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

22

Modification [1] blocks the Swamping ObjectionModification [1] blocks the Swamping Objection

[a] [a] The The institution of testimonyinstitution of testimony is not of merely is not of merely instrumental value to us.instrumental value to us.

[b] [b] The value of the institution of testimony is The value of the institution of testimony is not not swampedswamped by the value of true belief. by the value of true belief.

Page 23: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

23

[c] [c] Williams is right about Williams is right about intrinsic valuesintrinsic values::

Cf. Frankena’s list: “life, … health, … Cf. Frankena’s list: “life, … health, … happiness, happiness, … love, friendship, cooperation … peace … love, friendship, cooperation … peace …” …”

Page 24: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

24

Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge and Honouringand Honouring

[a] [a] The collective good of the testimony system is The collective good of the testimony system is secured by means of a system of sanctioning.secured by means of a system of sanctioning.

[b] [b] A new free-rider problem?A new free-rider problem?

Page 25: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

25

Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge and Honouringand Honouring

[a] [a] The collective good of the testimony system is The collective good of the testimony system is secured by means of a system of sanctioning.secured by means of a system of sanctioning.

[b] [b] A new free-rider problem?A new free-rider problem?

[c] [c] InteractionismInteractionism: talk is a “free resource”. : talk is a “free resource”.

[d] [d] The deference-emotion system (Scheff)The deference-emotion system (Scheff)

[e] [e] NewNew: : Protoknowledge attributions as Protoknowledge attributions as honouring. honouring.

Page 26: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

26

Modification [2] against the Relevance Objection Modification [2] against the Relevance Objection

[a] [a] The role of honouring in knowledge attributions:The role of honouring in knowledge attributions:the evidence of epistemologists and sociologiststhe evidence of epistemologists and sociologists

- Epistemic injustice (M. Fricker)Epistemic injustice (M. Fricker)

- Knowledge as credit (Greco, Riggs, Sosa)Knowledge as credit (Greco, Riggs, Sosa)

- Knowledge and moral concerns (Zagzebski)Knowledge and moral concerns (Zagzebski)

- ““Honorific uses of ‘knowledge’” (Kvanvig)Honorific uses of ‘knowledge’” (Kvanvig)

- ““Knowledge” is used to encourage good testimony Knowledge” is used to encourage good testimony (Reynolds)(Reynolds)

- The moral force of knowledge (Durkheim, Bloor)The moral force of knowledge (Durkheim, Bloor)

Page 27: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

27

More on the Relevance ObjectionMore on the Relevance Objection

Marks of Marks of protoknowledge protoknowledge in in knowledgeknowledge??

- to know to know ++ interrogative constructions interrogative constructions

- testimonial metaphorstestimonial metaphors

- evidence tells us thingsevidence tells us things- sensory organs tell us things or sensory organs tell us things or deceive usdeceive us- being informedbeing informed- martyrion martyrion and and martys martys - discoverydiscovery

Page 28: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

28

Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin on Knowledge and Freedomon Knowledge and Freedom

[a] [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of Attributions of knowledge are attributions of freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. protection from the demand to investigate further.protection from the demand to investigate further.

Page 29: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

29

Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin on Knowledge and Freedomon Knowledge and Freedom

[a] [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of Attributions of knowledge are attributions of freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. protection from the demand to investigate further.protection from the demand to investigate further.

[b] [b] We often give the good informant concerning We often give the good informant concerning topictopic

tt discretion over the social practice to do with discretion over the social practice to do with tt..

Page 30: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

30

Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin on Knowledge and Freedomon Knowledge and Freedom

[a] [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of Attributions of knowledge are attributions of freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g.freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. protection from the demand to investigate further.protection from the demand to investigate further.

[b] [b] We often give the good informant concerning We often give the good informant concerning topictopic

tt discretion over the social practice to do with discretion over the social practice to do with tt..

[c] [c] The informant has a need to distinguish between The informant has a need to distinguish between good and bad inquirers: the “protofree” can begood and bad inquirers: the “protofree” can be influenced by reports in rational ways.influenced by reports in rational ways.

Page 31: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

31

Modification [3] against the Social Objection Modification [3] against the Social Objection and the Relevance Objectionand the Relevance Objection

[a] [a] WilliamsWilliams on knowledge and freedom on knowledge and freedom

- Primo Levi’s reflections:Primo Levi’s reflections:

- to lie to someone is to violate their to lie to someone is to violate their freedom;freedom;

- the freedom to believe the truth must be the freedom to believe the truth must be shared;shared;

- - to follow the dictates of nature is not to to follow the dictates of nature is not to be be unfree.unfree.

Page 32: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

32

[b] [b] ShapinShapin (1994): Early-modern natural philosopher: (1994): Early-modern natural philosopher: the reliable testifier is a free man – a “gentleman”.the reliable testifier is a free man – a “gentleman”.

Maxims:Maxims:

““(i) assent to testimony which is plausible;(i) assent to testimony which is plausible;(ii) assent to testimony which is multiple;(ii) assent to testimony which is multiple;(iii) assent to testimony which is consistent …”(iii) assent to testimony which is consistent …”

““Assent to testimony from sources of Assent to testimony from sources of acknowledged acknowledged integrity and disinterestedness.”integrity and disinterestedness.”

Gentlemen were truth-tellers …Gentlemen were truth-tellers …

Page 33: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

33

[c] [c] Linking the Linking the imaginary to the realimaginary to the real genealogy – genealogy – understanding the understanding the performative characterperformative character of of knowledge attributions:knowledge attributions:

Precisely because knowledge attributions comePrecisely because knowledge attributions come with (a degree of) honour and freedom, gentlemen with (a degree of) honour and freedom, gentlemen

will deny knowledge to the “domestics”.will deny knowledge to the “domestics”.

Page 34: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

34

Tentative ConclusionsTentative Conclusions

[1] [1] A A communitarian value-drivencommunitarian value-driven epistemology is epistemology is possible. possible.

Page 35: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

35

Tentative ConclusionsTentative Conclusions

[1] [1] A A communitarian value-drivencommunitarian value-driven epistemology is epistemology is possible. possible.

[2] [2] There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge are are collective goodscollective goods: the costs are carried indi-: the costs are carried indi-

vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.

Page 36: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

36

Tentative ConclusionsTentative Conclusions

[1] [1] A A communitarian value-drivencommunitarian value-driven epistemology is epistemology is possible. possible.

[2] [2] There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge are are collective goodscollective goods: the costs are carried indi-: the costs are carried indi-

vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.

[3] [3] The collective good of knowledge can exist only The collective good of knowledge can exist only if the testimonial system is of if the testimonial system is of intrinsic valueintrinsic value (or (or the values underwriting it are intrinsic in the values underwriting it are intrinsic in

Williams’ Williams’ sense).sense).

Page 37: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

37

[4] [4] Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a link – at least a historical link – at least a historical linklink – between the – between the

epistemic epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the value of (proto-)knowledge and the realities realities of social lifeof social life..

Page 38: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

38

[4] [4] Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a link – at least a historical link – at least a historical linklink – between the – between the

epistemic epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the value of (proto-)knowledge and the realities realities of social lifeof social life..

[5] [5] Protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable Protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable than true belief.than true belief. The latter does not swamp the The latter does not swamp the

former since the testimonial system is itself of former since the testimonial system is itself of intrinsic intrinsic value. value.

Page 39: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

39

[6] [6] Craig’s proposal is strengthenedCraig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it by combining itwithwith(a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the (a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testi-testi-monial system as a monial system as a collective goodcollective good, , (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free free

resourceresource, and , and (c) the proposal that (c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions proto-knowledge attributions are honouringare honouring..

Page 40: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

40

[6] [6] Craig’s proposal is strengthenedCraig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it by combining itwithwith(a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the (a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testi-testi-monial system as a monial system as a collective goodcollective good, , (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free free

resourceresource, and , and (c) the proposal that (c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions proto-knowledge attributions are honouringare honouring..

[7] [7] If we want to explain our intuitions about the If we want to explain our intuitions about the links between links between knowledge and freedomknowledge and freedom, we need , we need to analyse the conceptual needs of the informant to analyse the conceptual needs of the informant alongside those of the enquirer. alongside those of the enquirer.

Page 41: Testimony  and  the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch

41

Further ObjectionsFurther Objections

Objection AObjection A: : Knowledge is not like clean air.Knowledge is not like clean air.

Objection BObjection B: : We need to understand why We need to understand why individualindividual items of knowledge are valuable.items of knowledge are valuable.

Objection Objection CC: : KnowledgeKnowledge does not factorise. does not factorise.

Objection DObjection D: : What about Gettier?What about Gettier?

Objection E: Objection E: What about What about understandingunderstanding??