Topic: Why has EU backtracked on visa liberalization for Georgia?

Berlin, July 22nd, 2016

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Contents

List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... 3

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4

2. Historical overview of EU-Georgian relations ................................................................... 5

2.1 1992 to 2003 .............................................................................................................. 5

2.2 The European neighborhood policy: 2003 .................................................................. 6

2.3The Eastern Partnership: 2009 .................................................................................... 6

2.4 Visa liberalization ...................................................................................................... 7

3. Is there a coherent objective of EU policy toward Georgia? .............................................. 8

4. The development of visa liberalization policy ................................................................. 11

4.1 German Domestic Politics: ....................................................................................... 12

4.2 Foreign Policy Considerations:.................................................................................. 14

5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 15

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List of Abbreviations

AA Association Agreements

CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany

EaP Eastern Partnership

ENP Eastern Neighborhood Policy

EPP Eastern Partnership Program

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

EU European Union

GAC General Affairs Council

GSP General System of Preferences

MFN Most Favored Nation

PCA Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany

VLAP Visa Liberalization Action Plan

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1. Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former Soviet countries made attempts to

move closer to Europe. The European Union has encouraged the movement of these

countries closer towards the EU. It has done this through the employment of “soft

power” or Ordnungspolitik, which utilizes polices, in exchange with closer partnership

with the EU, to encourage reforms within these countries, including the Eastern

European countries: Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia.

One of the most powerful of the EU’s instruments is the prospect visa liberalization,

allowing visa free travel from a non-EU state to countries in the EU.

The case of Georgia in particular is interesting since, compared to other countries in the

South Caucasus region, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia chose cooperation with the

EU attempting to enhance its relationship with the EU. Not surprisingly, the EU was

willing to work with Georgia. Visa liberalization was offered to Georgia in the form of

a Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP), which contained various benchmarks that

Georgia had to meet in order to gain visa free travel. While Georgia has apparently met

all of these benchmarks, the EU (in particular Germany), has recently backed away

from its visa liberalization policy with Georgia. What is the cause of this

backtracking? Has the EU policy with respect to visa liberalization been consistent or

has it changed with shifting geo-political considerations? This paper will examine EU

policy towards Georgia since it gained its independence by considering the

development of the EU’s policy of visa liberalization towards Georgia.

First, we will explore the general history of EU-Georgian relations, from when Georgia

gained its independence in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We will then

consider whether the EU has presented a consistent strategy with respect to Georgia or

if its strategy is coherent today. Finally, we will address the recent development with

respect to Georgia’s visa liberalization, the EU’s, and in particular Germany’s,

backtracking on its offer of visa free travel to Georgia, and the reason for this apparent

backtracking.

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2. Historical overview of EU-Georgian relations

2.1 1992 to 2003

Following the collapse of Soviet Union the European Union was forced to decide how it

would interact with its new neighbors. According to Lynch (2006), the policy that the

EU employed was that of enlargement, “wherein the union advanced its interest with

states on its boarders by transforming them into mirror images of the Union” (Lynch

2006: 11). This however, was in the place of the “genuine foreign policy” which would

have to make distinction between tactical and strategic interest as well as balance one’s

own interest without one’s neighbors since “[i]n foreign policy, your foreign partner

rarely wants to become like you and only sometimes wants the same things as you”

(Lynch 2006: 11-12). The EU had an early role in assisting Georgia in its

transformation to a democratic country with the European Commission opening a

delegation in Tbilisi in 1995 (Gabelaia 2016: 211). Shortly after in 1996 the EU-

Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into a fact in 1999,

this document forms the legal ground work for EU-Georgia relations which not

surprisingly consists of “respect for democracy, principals of international law, human

rights and market economy principles” (Commission of the European Communities,

2005: 2). The PCA offers cooperation in various spheres, such as (trade, investment,

legislative) and is aimed at promoting international peace and security. The PCA

eliminated trade quotas and granted the parties Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and

gave Georgia the benefits of the EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP)

(Commission of the European Communities, 2005: 3). The EU’s outreach towards

Georgia was clear, no significant status were taken in the direction of visa

liberalization.

In 1999 the General Affairs Council (GAC) realized the effectiveness of the European

Commission assistance in peace process between Georgia and Abkhazia and South

Ossetia but no grander EU strategy was offered other than the one outlined by PCA.

While recognizing the conflict settlements were prerequisite for effective EU

assistance, no framework was created to assist in this (Lynch 2006: 60). In 2001 the

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Swedish presidency identified the South Caucasus as a priority. A visit to Tbilisi in

2001 indicated Sweden’s believe that more consideration should be put by the EU. But

this renewed focus did not result any stronger solidification of the relationship between

Georgia and EU (Lynch 2006: 61).

2.2 The European Neighborhood Policy: 2003 With the subsequent Rose Revolution Georgia’s relationship with Europe became

stronger. Prior to this, not much concern was given to the South Caucasus. In 2004 a

policy review by the Irish presidency the EU Council decided to include Georgia in the

ENP (Lynch 2006: 63).1 In 2005 an Action Plan for Georgia was unveiled which

included not only the objectives of facilitating the rule of law, protection of human

rights, and strengthening pluralism but also, allowing the examination of the possibility

of visa facilitation (Lynch 2006: 63).

The ENP serves an important role in EU foreign policy, serving as a vital instrument in

the arsenal of “soft power” politics. It has been utilized by the EU to implement wide

ranging reforms in countries by offering various economic benefits for their compliance

(Muravska and Berlin 2016: 24). According to Muravska and Berlin (2016), the ENP,

however, has not achieved unequivocally good results, partly due to Russian external

policy (ibid.). Nevertheless, the inclusion of Georgia into the ENP, represents an

important shift in the EU’s relationship towards Georgia, since Georgia was not initially

considered for the partnership following the EU’s 2004 enlargement (Vernygora et al.:

2016: 16).

2.3The Eastern Partnership: 2009

1 Further indication of the closer bonds that the EU was attempting the form with Georgia after the Rose Revolution can be seen in the first civilian ESDP mission to Georgia, the rule of law mission in 2004 (EUJUST Themis). The intention of this mission was to assist Georgia’s reform of their criminal justices system (Lynch 2006: 63).

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The Eastern Partnership (EaP) meeting in Prague 2009 brought some of the former

post-Soviet countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,

and Ukraine) together to form a closer degree of cooperation between these countries

and Europe through the establishment the Eastern Partnership and signing the Joint

Declaration (Council of the European Union, 2009: 5). As a result of this meeting, with

the establishing the EaP platform and adopting the joint declaration, the EU enhanced

its cooperation with these countries. The main aim of the EaP platform is to allow the

acceleration of political association and to create better economic integration between

the associated countries and EU.

According to Vernigora et al. (2016) the implementation of ENP and EaP indicated

realization on the part of EU on the limits of enlargement attempting to find the

framework that would stop the enlargement for those other nations that are possibly

eligible (Vernigora et al. 2016: 11).

It was within the implementation of EaP that visa liberalization became a real

possibility for Georgia. In 2011 the visa facilitation and readmission agreement came

into fact and in 2012 the EU started to a conversation about visas with Georgia. The

visa liberalization action plan was given Georgia in 2013 and offers a course for

Georgia to establish visa free travel with the EU (Gabelaia 2016: 2012).

2.4 Visa liberalization

Georgia’s path towards visa liberalization began with the establishment of the Visa

Facilitation and Readmissions agreement, coming into force in 2011. In 2013 Georgia

acquired from the EU the VLAP, which was intended to pave the way towards visa free

travel between Georgia and the EU (Gabelaia 2016: 212). This action plan was not

without requirements for Georgia, as Georgia was told to implement various

international norms in order to ultimately achieve visa liberalization. While the EU did

not intend Georgia to view the experience of the Balkan nations as a paradigm and

precedent for its own visa liberalization, intentionally naming the Georgian plan an

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“action plan” and not a “road map” as it had done with western Balkan nations, a

precedent by the quick ascension of the Balkan nations to visa free travel was

established (ibid.). The VLAP created “four key blocks of benchmarks in the spheres of

document security, boarder and migration management, public order and security, and

external relations and fundamental rights” which had to be met in order for Georgia to

achieve full visa liberalization (Gabelaia 2016: 213).

3. Is there a coherent objective of EU policy toward Georgia?

It is important to determine what precisely is the EU’s motivation in its policy towards

the Georgia. First we must observe how Georgia is significant for the EU. Perhaps the

most important aspect in Georgia’s importance to the EU is its location (Muravska and

Berlin 2016: 30). With the enlargement of the EU, Georgia became a neighbor and

therefore problems that result from a weak or destabilized Georgia are likely to affect

the EU (Lynch 2006: 67). Having a stable Georgia that is not at risk of conflicts, which

could spread to other neighbors, is important for the EU. Further the BTC pipeline that

supplies oil from Azerbaijan to Europe is an important economic asset of the EU

(Lynch 2006: 67). Primarily Georgia’s relationship between Europe is determined by

its relationship with EU we should not overlook the individual relationships that

Georgia has with particular EU member states. For instance, its connections to Romania

and its military relationship with Germany and Britain2 (Lynch 2006: 54-57).

EU boarders expanded in the absences of any push back after the collapse of the Soviet

Union on the principle of enlargement, transforming boarder nations into “EU” states

and then integrating these states into the Union (Lynch 2006: 11). According to

Vernygora et al. (2016), the ENP appears to have represented a move away from

enlargement. The European Union recognized that it could not simply expand ad 2 While not part of the EU, Georgia also has close ties to Turkey. In 1997 a military cooperation agreement was signed with Turkey in which Turkey offered military equipment and training for Georgian troops. Turkish military funding for Georgia since 1997 is 37 million USD. Economically Turkey is a third most important investor in Georgia (after the US and UK) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan which transports oil to Turkey’s meditation coast further connects the countries (Lynch 2006: 56-57).

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infinitum but must stop simply enlarging and, with respect to its neighbors, instead

attempt to establish an alternative kind of relationship (Vernygora et al. 2016: 11). The

EU’s policy towards Georgia appears to be formed with the intention of bringing

Georgia closer to the EU while not necessarily bringing them into EU (Lynch 2006: 68-

69). And while EU rhetoric towards Georgia has utilized the distant prospect of it

joining the Union, this does not necessarily represent an immediate attempt to integrate

Georgia into the EU, although it may be viewed this way by Georgia (Lynch 2006: 14).

Indeed, as the EU commission president Prodi indicated when asked about the political

prospect of several south Caucus nations, including Georgia, he pointed out that even

New Zealanders feel they are European, but the EU must not have a natural size and not

be confined to determine ‘Europe’ by shared history (Vernygora et al. 2016: 16).

However, the EU’s implementation of the Eastern Partnership Program (EPP) has

suggested that perhaps it has other goals for Georgia. The neighboring areas that were

to be designated following the EU’s enlargement in 2004 were initial only going to be

Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. The resulting policy, however, ended up including the

three caucus states as well. The ENP bilateral action plans, which were crafted by the

EU commission, were in addition quite similar to most of the 35 chapters of the

accession process, seemingly with the intent of the ‘spill-over’ effect leading to greater

integration of these countries into the EU (Vernygora et al. 2016: 16). While the EU

may intend to stop its enlargement, its policies seem to indicate that it will enlarge.

Indeed, this is likely how it appears not only to countries like Georgia but also to

Russia. The inclusion of Georgia in the Eastern Partnership, has strained the EU’s

relations with Russia. Russia views the Eastern Partnership as an attempt not simply to

assist countries like Georgia but rather to oust Russia from the region (Vernygora et al.

2016: 13). The EU’s relationship to Georgia, therefore, cannot simply be understood

with respect to the economic and security benefits that might accrue to the EU from a

more “European” Georgia, but also the way such relations might affect the EU with

respect to its relations with Russia (Lynch 2006: 69). While the recent Association

Agreement (AA) with Georgia appears to move closer towards integration of the

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country within the EU there is a general reluctance in many EU countries, in no small

part due to Russia, about moving to fully integrate Georgia into the EU community

(Chocia and Popjanevski 2016: 207).

Lynch (2006) believes that the EU policy, as of 2006, lacked clear direction. Rather

than being guided by strategy, the EU’s policy towards Georgia has arisen out of

events, “[n]ever has the EU determined its interests in Georgia or considered the range

of tools necessary to advance these” (Lynch 2006: 66). More recent scholars have also

argued that the EU’s policy towards its neighbors is still unclear and perhaps represents

competing objectives (Vernygora et al. 2016: 19).

While some of the EU policies might tend towards indicating a desire to expand, many

EU politicians have indicated that its relations with Georgia are only to establish a

friendly neighborhood around it. So while it is certainly clear the EU is seeking closer

ties to Georgia it appears that the EU policies is not contrived in a clear manner to

effect any particular strategy. This is perhaps not surprising given the different

objectives that are likely to exists among the EU member states (e.g. Germany and

Poland). Given the influential nature of Germany in the EU, however, it might be

useful to consider how Germany views its relations towards Georgia.

Germany appears to believe that the Eastern Partnership, the Association Agreements,

and, consequently, the policy regarding visa liberalization as effective instruments to be

employed in the implementation of Ordnungspolitk or “soft power”. These tools are to

be used to influence Georgia towards a more European perspective and are not intended

as steps to lead to greater EU enlargement (Kirch, 2016: 85). One of these tools is visa

liberalization. The VLAP for Georgia is intended to move Georgian institutions closer

towards those in line with European practices and values. This is evident from the four

key benchmarks in the areas of document security, border and migration management,

public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights (Gabelaia 2016:

213). As is apparent from these fields, visa liberalization was not simply dependent on

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Georgia bringing its passport and boarder regime up to European standards, but was

also employed as a way to move Georgia closer to the political values shared by

Europe. Insofar, however, as the Eastern Policy appears to be primarily an instrument

of Ordnungspolitik, the VLAP is merely an enticing tool. The German policy with

respect to visa liberalization ought to be understood, therefore, as an instrument to

produce change within Georgia by offering a “carrot” to entice reforms (the so called

“more for more” approach). But since this policy is not intended by Germany as a step

towards Georgia’s inclusion into the EU, visa liberalization of Georgia should not be

understood as something that Germany believes is necessarily in its own interest.

4. The development of visa liberalization policy Prior to the Eastern Partnership Summit3, the first report on implementation of the Visa

Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) for Georgia mentioned it making ‘very good

progress’4 (European Commission, 2013: 1). The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs,

Cecilia Malmström explicitly highlighted Georgia’s progress: “I also wish to

congratulate Ukraine and Georgia for their progress […] Georgia has made a very good

progress during these first few months of the implementation of its Action Plan"

(European Commission, 2013: 1). In 2015 the European Commission recognized the

fulfillment by Georgia of the benchmarks outlined in the VLAP, such as the issuing of

biometrical passports. This acknowledgment brought Georgian citizens closer to the

ultimate goal of visa-free travel inside of the Schengen zone (Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili

2016: 1). Since VLAP was established to Georgia in 2013, the Georgian government

has been ‘doing its homework’ by pushing for reforms within the country. The fourth

and final progress report from the European Commission asserted that Georgia had met

3 Eastern Partnership Summit was held Vilnius on 28-29 November 2013 (COM 2013: 1).

4 That is: legislative and policy framework on document security, including biometrics, and integrated border management are at an advanced state of fulfillment as wells as relative progress is foreseen in the implementation of the benchmarks relating to migration management, asylum, public order and security, and external relations and fundamental rights (COM 2013: 2).

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all of the necessary benchmarks in the second phase of the VLAP (European

Commission, 2015: 12). It then proposed to lift visa requirements on Georgian citizens

to the EU parliament (European Commission, 2016). While the European Commission

was satisfied with Georgia’s progress, the final step of approval is left to the European

Parliament and European Council. It remains unclear when this final approval could

come and there are numerous factors that might slow down the visa-liberalization

process or even prevent it (Jorjoliani 2016: 2). As of right now, the exact time for lifting

visa requirements for Georgian citizens “remains uncertain” (Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili

2016: 1). “Georgia has done its part of the job by fully meeting all the criteria for EU

visa waiver and now it is up to the European Union to deliver”, Georgian PM Giorgi

Kvirikashvili said on June 9 (Civil Georgia, 2016).

4.1 German Domestic Politics:

One step prior to the final decision, one of the primary decision makers in this process,

Germany, began to behave strangely. Concern was expressed by the representative of

Bundestag, especially the representatives from governing coalition SPD and CDU, in

regards to the problem of Georgian criminality in Germany (Jorjoliani 2016: 3).

According to Sarjveladze’s (2016) observations, articles about Georgia from well

known German publications began to appear in the beginning of June: “Too criminal:

Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Parties Union rejects visa freedom

for Georgia”, highlighting that “the Georgian asylum seekers are more criminals than

any other foreign groups” (BILD)5, “Because of increased criminality the Christian

Democratic (CDU) and Socialists (SPD) parties fear of Georgian visa liberalization”

(N-TV), “Visa liberalization: German government is afraid of Georgian criminal gangs”

(DIE WELT) or “Fear of crime: the Christian Social Union and Christian Democratic

Union are skeptically disposed towards Georgian visa liberalization” (SPIEGEL

5 BILD’s auditory of readers is around 12.3 mil. (Sarjveladze 2016: 2).

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ONLINE)6 (Sarjveladze 2016: 1). In particular, these headlines appear aimed at the

German voters, who are concerned because of the ongoing refugee crisis, which is an

important consideration for German political parties. We are right to wonder, however,

why such a media campaign started against visa liberalization several days before the

EU interior ministers meeting held in Luxembourg. Is the size of Georgian criminality

so large huge that it could really be the justification for a German rejection of Georgian

visa liberalization (Sarjveladze 2016: 2)? Sarjveladze (2016) points out that, on the

issue of the criminality of Georgian nationals, nothing was officially announced by the

Minister of Internal Affairs of Germany, but rather only by some members of Christian

Democratic and Christian Social Fraction, such as Armin Schuster, who is considered

an expert in internal affairs (Sarjveladze 2016: 2). When we consider the claim that

Georgians are “more criminals than any other foreign groups” by viewing the

nationality of suspects compared to other countries, according to German police crime

statistics, Table 1, we see that Georgia is not even among the top ten (Sarjveladze 2016:

3). There certainly does not appear to be severe “Georgian crime” problem in

Germany. Indeed, the EU opened its border with the Republic of Serbia in 2009 despite

the fact that 4.0% of all criminal suspects in Germany were from Serbia, while only

0.5% were from Georgia. Today the numbers have not significantly changed. As we

observer from the statistics from 2015 (Table 1), the number of Georgian suspects in

Germany is only 0.9%, while the number from Serbia is 3.7%. When considering these

statistics, and the EU’s policy towards Serbia, the argument against visa liberalization

on the grounds of the a current problem from Georgian criminals seems more tenuous

(Jorjoliani 2016: 3).

6 Sarjveladze (2016) admits that parts of the German press had frequently reacted to organized crime before but on a limited scale. This time, many well-known publications, such as BILD which belongs to the big publishing company AXEL SPRINGER VERLAG as well as DIE WELT started to publish negative articles about Georgia (Sarjveladze 2016: 2). In particular, Sarjveladze (2016) draws our attention to fact that after numerous requests from Georgian Foreign Affairs and Georgian Embassy in Germany, that SPIEGEL ONLINE made changes in its articles, substituting the word “most” with “many”, which was more accurate based on the data that was provided in the article (Sarjveladze 2016: 1-2).

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We might wonder, then, if perhaps these arguments were employed in order to

strengthen German position7, offering a strong argument for Minister of Internal Affairs

of Germany, Thomas de Maizière, to employ in Luxembourg. He could refer not only

to foreign policy considerations, then, but also to domestic politics and concerns to

reject Georgian visa liberalization for the time being (Sarjveladze 2016: 2).

We cannot overlook, however, the ongoing migration crisis in Europe as a possible

cause of German reluctance to grant visa free travel to Georgia. As Jorjoliani (2016)

shows: “Another concern that Bundestag MPs expressed was Immigration from VLAP

countries. SPD member, Peter Steinbrück said that all negotiations with VLAP

countries must be put on hold until the migration crisis in Europe is resolved”

(Jorjoliani 2016: 3). But as Jorjoliani (2016) points out Georgia has not that many

asylum seekers and Germany could simply remove Georgia from the list of the asylum

seeker nations, obviating the problem (ibid.). Again, while these domestic policy

considerations might play a role, we are right to wonder if other considerations have not

lead to Germany’s recent reluctance towards Georgian visa free travel.

4.2 Foreign Policy Considerations:

It is also possible that Russia plays significant role in the EU reluctance to formal

introduce visa free travel. From the beginning of negations, Russia was opposed to the

visa free regime for Georgia and Ukraine. The Russian lobby in Germany is actively

working in the political, economic, cultural, and media sphere (Sarjveladze 2006: 4-5).

Along with the fact that Russia is Germany’s second leading trade partner, this appears

to have an effect on German-Russian policy. For instance, despite the Russian sanctions

the economic relations deepened between Russia and Germany as can be seen from the

April visit of a large German delegation to Russia (Sarjveladze 2006: 5).

7 France, Italy and Belgium also took German’s side (Sarjveladze 2016: 2).

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It is not simply Germany, however, who is conscious of Russian opinion. As Lynch

(2006) claims, the EU has “no desire to be forced to choose between” Russia and

Georgia (Lynch 2006: 70). The EU would prefer to have good relations with both

countries, although certainly to find a balance might be difficult (ibid.). Given the

strained relations between Russia and the EU we might wonder whether visa

liberalization, which in Russia’s view is likely seen as an ‘imperial’ EU encroaching

into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, might give pause to many EU countries

granting visa liberalization to Georgia, fearing Russia’s reaction to this level of

integration of Georgia into the EU.

There is further the consideration of other neighboring states seeking visa liberalization

having an effect Georgia. As an instrument of soft power, visa liberalization is used as

a negotiating chip. The prospect of visa liberalization for Ukraine has been used to try

to achieve a peace accord between Russia and the Ukraine. Ukraine, however, has

objected to the prospect of Georgia receiving visa liberalization before it, fearing how it

would make the Ukrainian government appear (Carrel and Rinke, 2016). It is not

impossible that Turkey as well, which wished to exchange visa liberalization for

assisting in the migration crisis, also objected to Georgia receiving visa liberalization

first (Koerkemeier, 2016). Indeed, considering that the German objection took place

during the negations with Turkey, it is certainly possible that Georgia’s visa

liberalization was being held up to “save face” with Turkey.8

5. Conclusion Since 1992 the EU has employed various methods of “soft power” to move Georgia

closer in line with Europe both economically and politically. While there does not

appear to be a coherent aim behind this policy, it appears that, at least for Germany, the

8 Ukraine’s ambassador to the EU said: “It’s very difficult to explain at home…why we should be linked to other countries for purely political reasons,” and added: “The key issue is not to stop this process (of approval).” (The Wall Street Journal 2016).

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ultimate aim for Georgia is not to bring them into the EU but to have a neighborhood of

friendly states around the EU. One crucial measure in this policy was visa

liberalization, which served as a carrot to entice political and economic reforms within

Georgia. But while the EU has worked to bring Georgia closer towards the EU, the

move to allow visa free travel to the EU, even though Georgia has met all the

benchmark, has been delayed by Germany.

As we saw, the domestic arguments for this delay appear to be tenuous. While much

was made in the German press about a potential criminal element from Georgia, it

appears such concerns only arose recently and did not represent a real problem. Rather,

it appears as if foreign policy concerns played a larger role in Germany’s recent

opposition to Georgia. Certainly Russian objections to closer Georgian-EU ties may

have led Germany to believe that Georgia ascension to visa free travel would be too

costly to its relations with Russia. Also, however, the negotiations between Turkey and

the EU over the migration crisis, a condition of which was visa free travel for Turkey,

might have also influenced German policies. If, like Ukraine, Turkey objected to

Georgia receiving visa free travel before it, since this would appear to make the Turkish

government look corrupt and “un-European”, it would not be surprising if German

backtracked with respect to Georgia in order to acquiesce Turkey, who has at the

moment more political leverage over Germany and the EU.

Whatever the grounds, it is apparent that the instrument of visa free travel is precisely

that, an instrument of soft power. As such it is not offered to countries in the belief that

this travel is mutual beneficial but was rather proffered to Georgia in order to induce

reform within Georgia. It is not surprising that when confronted with changing

geopolitical landscape, the German government would be willing to refuse Georgia visa

free travel even though it has met all the required reforms. This is certainly not without

its risk, since it might not only drive Georgia but other EU neighbors closer to Russia.

The employment of soft power in this way certainly makes Germany, and the EU,

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appear much less humanitarian and much more concerned about their own particular

well-being.

Word Count: 4,588 Table 1: Total non-German suspects in Germany

Source: Police Crime Statistics 2015, p. 54.

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