team games: intra- and intergroup conflict robert böhm + ori weisel § + rwth aachen university §...

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Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School Jena 2015

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Page 1: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict

Robert Böhm+ Ori Weisel§

+RWTH Aachen University§University of Nottingham

IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School Jena 2015

Page 2: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Main results so far

Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bonrstein and Ben-Yossef 1994)• Ingroup love and outgroup hate are confounded

Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference game (IPD-MD, Halevy, Bornstein, and Sagiv 2008)

• Ingroup love is the main motivation

Ontogeny of ingroup love and outgroup hate (Buttelman and Böhm 2014)• Ingroup love develops earlier

Page 3: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Parochial Altruism: The willingness to incur a personal cost to in order to favor the ingroup over the outgroup.Can be motivated by ingroup love and/or outgroup hate.

How/when did it evolve? “Groups with a greater number of courageous, sympathetic, faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other…would spread and be victorious over other tribes” (Darwin, 1873)

Implication: The human brain evolved to facilitate contributions to in-group welfare, and to defend against outside threats, including competing groups.

Page 4: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Research question: does parochial altruism have its biological basis in oxytocin?

Why Oxytocin?The “love hormone”; known for its role in pair-bonding, sexual activity, child birth, lactation and maternal bonding.

Recently found to have additional social functions:• related to recognition of emotions and faces (Domes et al. 2007; Guastella

et al. 2008, 2010)• Increases offers in ultimatum game, not in dictator game (Zak, Stanton,

Ahmadi, 2007)• Increases offers in dictator game (Knafo et al. 2008, Israel et al. 2009)• Increases trust (Kosfeld et. al, 2007)

Page 5: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Trust game (Kosfeld et al. 2007)

Both the investor and the trustee receive a 12 MU endowment.Investor can transfer 0, 4, 8, or 12 to the trustee.The transfer is multiplied by 3. Trustee can send any amount back to investor.

OxytocinPlacebo

Page 6: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Experiment 1:• Intranasal oxytocin/placebo administration• Double blind design• 30-40 minutes later: IPD-MD

• IPD-MD: two 3-person groups• Each person has a €10 endowment• Decides how much to contribute to within- and/or between group pool• Each €1 contributed to the within-group pool: +1 to each group member• Each €1 contributed to the between-group pool: + €1 to each group

member, - €1 to each outgroup member

• Two conditions: Placebo vs. Oxytocin

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Page 7: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Oxytocin increases ingroup love, not outgroup hate

Additional analysis: • Egoists -> give more to

themselves than to ingroup love or outgroup hate

• Ingroup lovers -> give more to ingroup love than to outgroup hate or to themselves

• Outgroup haters -> give more to outgroup hate than to ingroup love or to themselves

Egoists Ingroup lovers

Outgroup haters

Placebo 52% 20% 28%

Oxytocin 17% 58% 25%

Page 8: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Experiment 2:Same as Experiment 1, with classification of participants to cooperative (pro-social) vs. non-cooperative (individualistic-competitive).

Oxytocin increased ingroup love for both cooperative and non-cooperative people.

Page 9: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Experiment 3:Decisions in PD games, on behalf of the ingroup (vs. outgroup).Non-cooperation can be a result of greed (exploit the outgroup) or fear (protect the ingroup).

Greed = T - RFear = P - S

Greed = 0.40Fear = 0.40

Greed = 0.10Fear = 0.10

Greed = 0.10Fear = 0.40

Greed = 0.40Fear = 0.10

Page 10: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

The Biological Basis of Parochial Altruism (De Dreu et. al. 2010)

Oxytocin increased non-cooperation only when fear was high.

General conclusions:“Specific forms of parochial altruism have their biological roots in oxytocin.Oxytocin leads to more ingroup love (and ingroup trust), and defensive forms of out-group hate.”

Page 11: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Additional (negative) effects of oxytocin

• Promotes ethnocentrism (De Dreu et al. 2010)• Implicit association test• infrahumanization task

• Promotes groups serving dishonesty (Shalvi and De Dreu 2014)• Coin flipping task

Page 12: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love vs. universal love (Israel, Weisel, Bornstein, Ebstein 2012)

In a competitive intergroup context oxytocin leads to concentration on the ingroup.

What is the effect of oxytocin in a cooperative intergroup context?

Nested social dilemma (Wit and Kerr 2002)Choice between personal pool (keeping), local (in-group) pool, or global (collective pool).

Does oxytocin effect contributions to local and/or global pools?

Page 13: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love vs. universal love (Israel, Weisel, Bornstein, Ebstein 2012)

Personal pool6 MU to self0 MU to each in-group member0 MU to each out-group member

Local pool3 MU to self3 MU to each in-group member0 MU to each out-group member

Global pool1 MU to self1 MU to each in-group member1 MU to each out-group member

Page 14: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love vs. universal love (Israel, Weisel, Bornstein, Ebstein 2012)

• N=96, Males only, 18-35 years old• No past or present psychiatric or medical illness• No present use of medications or drugs• No history of drug or alcohol addiction

• All experiments took place at the same hour (2:30 pm)• No smoking, eating, drinking (except water) 2 hours before the experiment• Double-blind design: Hormone puffers differentiated only by random

number; puffers contain exactly the same ingredients, (save the active ingredient) - no difference in taste, smell, or ph level between hormones and placebo

• ~45 minute lag between hormones administration and the decision to allow for the hormones to exert their full effects

• Average earning per participant about €25

Page 15: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love vs. universal love (Israel, Weisel, Bornstein, Ebstein 2012)

Oxytocin increased contribution to both the local and global pools.

Conclusion: the selective effect of oxytocin on the ingroup contributions is limited to competitive intergroup contexts.In cooperative intergroup context oxytocin has an affect on contributions to the outgroup(s) as well.

Page 16: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Intergroup conflict in a repeated game (Halevy, Weisel, Bornstein 2012)

• Intergroup conflict typically involves numerous interactions• A repeated IPD-MD game may escalate into a full scale “war” • Three intergroup histories (conditions):

• 72 3-person groups (24 in each condition)• Endowment = 2 MU.• Contribution: +1 MU to each ingroup member

-1 MU to each outgroup member in IPD and between group pool in IPD-MD

Rounds 1-30 Rounds 31-60Repeated IPD-MD IPD-MD IPD-MDConflict IPD IPD-MDPeaceful coexistence PD IPD-MD

Page 17: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Intergroup conflict in a repeated game (Halevy, Weisel, Bornstein 2012)

• Even in repeated setting, very little outgroup hate in IPD-MD• Even after ‘history of conflict’, when the option to cooperate internally

was introduced, almost all participants changed their strategy almost immediately.

• Without any verbal communication, and with very little signaling (within 2 rounds)

Page 18: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Main results so far

Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bonrstein and Ben-Yossef 1994)• Ingroup love and outgroup hate are confounded

Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference game (IPD-MD; Halevy, Bornstein, and Sagiv 2008)

• Ingroup love is the main motivation

Ontogeny of ingroup love and outgroup hate (Buttelman and Böhm 2014)• Ingroup love develops earlier

Biological basis of parochial altruism (De Dreu et al. 2015)• Oxytocin related to ingroup love, not outgroup hate

Repeated IPD-MD, history of conflict (Halevy, Weisel, and Bornstein 2012)• Ingroup love is the main motivation

Page 19: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Main results so far

1. Lab experiments with minimal groups

2. Outgroup hate could be expressed only by harming the outgroup

Weisel and Böhm (2015):

1. Natural groups with increasing degrees of enmity

2. Harm vs. help avoidance

Page 20: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Why natural groups?

In real world intergroup conflict (e.g., between ethnic, religious, political groups):

• Group commitment is typically high• Opposing groups are evaluated negatively• Opposing groups are perceived as a severe threat• Conflict can have a strong moral dimension

Dortmund and Schalke fans

Page 21: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Pilot study – Football fans

FC Carl Zeiss Jena cs. FC Rot-Weiß Erfurt

Procedure:• Match in Jena, December 16th, 2011• Fans make a decision before the game• During the game – matching and prepare payment• Fans collect payment after the game

Page 22: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Hier Fragebogen ausfüllen!

Was?Befragung unter FCC-Fans

WIE LANGE?max. 5 Minuten

WARUM?Chance auf Verdienst von über 100 Euro

Unterstützung der Wissenschaft

Mitmachen und Geld verdienen!

Page 23: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

→ You are in a group with 2 other fans of FC Carl Zeiss Jena ( ).

→ The 3 of you are matched with 3 fans of FC Rot-Weiß Erfurt ( ).

→ All of you will earn real money!

→ In the frame below there are three options that you can choose from.

→ Your choice has monetary consequences for yourself, for the 2 other members of your group, and for the 3 members of the other group.

→ The other members of your group and the members of the other group all have the same options to choose from, so they can affect your outcome, just like you can affect theirs.

Read the instructions1

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Make your choice here2

You +40 €

+0 €

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Other group

You can earn up to 110€ by filling out this form!After collecting all forms, we will randomly select 6 people. Each one of these 6 people will be paid according to his/her decision and the decisions of the other 5, exactly as explained below. Please make your decision carefully, and remember that it can have real monetary consequences for you and for others.

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→ Please mark one (and only one) option.

→ Your choice will determine your effect on the amount you, your group, and the other group will earn.

→ The numbers indicate the amount you will cause each person to earn (+) or lose (-).

→ You can also earn or lose money through the decisions of the others.

→ The final amount each person will earn will be determined by combining all 6 decisions, and adding a fixed amount of 50€.

This is my choice This is my choice This is my choice

Page 24: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love and outgroup hate in Morality-based groups (Parker and Janoff-Bulman 2013)

• Moral convictions are oppositional in nature• In morality-based groups, ingroup identification seems fundamentally

based on the existence of an outgroup• Beliefs of the ingroup and the outgroup are oppositional• Morality-rooted attitudes have more motivational force/action potential• Intolerance, desire or social distance, low levels of cooperativeness

“… moral social identities are a special classification of social group memberships in which outgroup ‘hate’ naturally co-exists with ingroup ‘love’”

Page 25: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love and outgroup hate in Morality-based groups (Parker and Janoff-Bulman 2013)

Morality based groups:• Attitude regarding legal abortion (pro-life vs. pro choice)• Political ideology (Liberals vs. Conservatives)Non-morality based groups:• Sport fans (New York Yankees vs. Boston Red-Sox)• University (University of Massachusetts vs. University of Conneticut)

DV’s: • Group based emotions (angry, happy, disgusted, respectful, fearful,

positive, anxious, resentful, proud, hurt, sad, and negative)• Perceived threat (e.g., “People who are fans of the Boston Red Sox

threaten economic opportunities for others”)

Page 26: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Ingroup love and outgroup hate in Morality-based groups (Parker and Janoff-Bulman 2013)

• More positive emotions towards non-morality based ingroup• More negative emotions towards morality based outgroup• Mediated by perceived threat

Page 27: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Design (Weisel and Böhm 2015)

• Online-sample (N1=395, N2=1550), members of natural conflicting groups (fans of Bundesliga football clubs, supporters of German parties)

• 6 participants were selected for payment (in each study)

• Three degrees of enmity: no enmity, weak enmity, strong enmity (+ morality based groups)

• Three intergroup games:• Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)

• Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD)

• Positive variant of IPD-MD

Page 28: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

• Online-sample (N1=395, N2=1550), members of natural conflicting groups (fans of Bundesliga football clubs, supporters of German parties)

• 6 participants were selected for payment (in each study)

• Three degrees of enmity: no enmity, weak enmity, strong enmity (+ morality based groups)

• Three intergroup games:• Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)

• Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD)

• Positive variant of IPD-MD

Design

Page 29: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Football clubs with varying degrees of enmity

No enmity

Weak enmity

Strong enmity

Borussia Dortmund

FC Schalke 04

1. FC KölnBayer 04 Leverkusen

Page 30: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Football clubs with varying degrees of enmity

Attitude towards members of other team[1 = very negative, 7 = very positive]

No enmity outgroup

Weak enmity outgroup

Strong enmity outgroup

M = 6.31 (SD = 1.02)

M = 3.77 (SD = 1.04)

M = 2.22 (SD = 1.28)

Page 31: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Political parties with varying degrees of enmity

No enmity

Weak enmity

Strong enmity

Free Democratic

Party

Christian Democratic

Union

The Greens

Social Democratic

Party

Page 32: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Political parties with varying degrees of enmity

Social Democratic

Party

Christian Democratic

Union

Free Democratic

Party

The Greens

No enmity

Weak enmity

Strong enmity

“moral social identities are a special classification of social group memberships in which outgroup hate naturally co-exists with ingroup love”

Parker & Janoff-Bulman 2013

Page 33: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Political parties with varying degrees of enmity

Social Democratic

Party

Christian Democratic

Union

Free Democratic

Party

The Greens

No enmity

Weak enmity

Strong enmity

Morality based

Page 34: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Is NPD a morality-based outgroup?

›To what degree do you and supporters of … share similar moral values?(answered by supporters of four mainstream parties)

Page 35: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Attitudes towards party supporters

Attitudes of row-party towards supporters of column-party

GRUENE CDU FDP NPD SPDGRUENEN=458

5.90 3.50 2.86 1.24 4.92

CDUN=498

3.74 5.65 4.18 1.47 4.18

FDPN=116

3.49 4.85 5.46 1.42 3.95

NPDN=13

3.29 4.00 3.86 3.93 3.64

SPDN=478

4.78 3.61 2.99 1.31 5.72

Page 36: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Attitudes towards party supporters

Attitudes of row-party towards supporters of column-party

GRUENE CDU FDP NPD SPDGRUENEN=458

5.90 3.50 2.86 1.24 4.92

CDUN=498

3.74 5.65 4.18 1.47 4.18

FDPN=116

3.49 4.85 5.46 1.42 3.95

NPDN=13

3.29 4.00 3.86 3.93 3.64

SPDN=478

4.78 3.61 2.99 1.31 5.72

Page 37: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Political parties with varying degrees of enmity

Attitude towards supporters of other party[1 = very negative, 7 = very positive]

No enmity outgroup

weak enmity outgroup

strong enmity outgroup

M = 5.73 (SD = 0.90)

M = 4.65 (SD = 1.18)

M = 3.49(SD = 1.04)

Football dataM = 6.31

(SD = 1.02)M = 3.77

(SD = 1.04)M = 2.22

(SD = 1.28)

Page 38: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Why help-avoidance?

Present day discrimination (in America) is primarily a result of selectively helping members of the advantaged groups, rather than harming members of disadvantaged groups (Greenwald and Pettigrew 2014, Banaji and Greenwald 2013)

• E.g., “wrong number” method (Gaertner and Bickman 1971)• E.g., electric shock administration (Baron 1979)

Positive-Negative Asymmetry of Social Discrimination (Mummendey and Otten 1998)

• No ingroup bias in negative outcome allocation (e.g., aversive noise)

• Ingroup bias in positive outcome allocation (e.g., money)

Page 39: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

IPD – Intergroup Prisoner’s DilemmaBornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994

›Two 3-player groups›Each player receives an endowment of €40

›IPD› Keep: player receives €40

› Contribute to within-group pool: each ingroup member receives 20 MU

› Contribute to between-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20 and each outgroup member loses €20

Ingroup love

Outgroup hate

Page 40: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

IPD-MD – Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference

Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008

›Two 3-player groups›Each player receives an endowment of €40

›Negative IPD-MD› Keep: player receives €40

› Contribute to within-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20

› Contribute to between-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20 and each outgroup member loses €20 Outgroup hate

Ingroup love

Page 41: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

IPD-MD – Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference

Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008

›Two 3-player groups›Each player receives an endowment of €40

›Negative IPD-MD› Keep: player receives €40

› Contribute to within-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20

› Contribute to between-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20 and each outgroup member loses €20 Outgroup hate

Ingroup love

Page 42: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

IPD-MD – Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference

Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008

›Two 3-player groups›Each player receives an endowment of €40

›Positive IPD-MD› Keep: player receives €40

› Contribute to within-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20

› Contribute to between-group pool: each ingroup member receives €20 and each outgroup member receives €20

Ingroup love

Outgroup hate

Page 43: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

• Two 3-player groups • Each player receives an endowment of • Decides between contribution and non-contribution • Decides between imposing an externality on the outgroup • Payoff of player in group :

IPD:

IPD-MD:

Positive IPD-MD:

Page 44: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Decision screen – IPD

You +20 €

+20 €

+20 €Your

gro

up

-20 €

-20 €

-20 €

Other group

Option 2

You +40 €

+0 €

+0 €Your

gro

up

+0 €

+0 €

+0 €

Other group

Option 1

Page 45: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Decision screen – IPD-MD

You +20 €

+20 €

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gro

up

-20 €

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Other group

Option 3

You +20 €

+20 €

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Other group

Option 2

You +40 €

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Other group

Option 1

Page 46: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Decision screen – Positive IPD-MD

You +20 €

+20 €

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+20 €

+20 €

Other group

Option 3

You +20 €

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Other group

Option 2

You +40 €

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Other group

Option 1

Page 47: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Hypotheses

›Both studies› More overall contributions in IPD-MD (both versions) than IPD

› More enmity -> more outgroup hate

› More outgroup hate in the Positive IPD-MD than in IPD-MD

›Only study 2› More outgroup hate in interactions with a morality based outgroup

Page 48: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results - Football

• More contribution in IPD-MD games (relative to IPD)• More outgroup hate in Positive IPD-MD than in IPD-MD• Degree of enmity matters only in Positive-IPD-MD

Page 49: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

• More contribution in IPD-MD games (relative to IPD)• More outgroup hate in Positive IPD-MD than in IPD-MD• Degree of enmity matters only in Positive IPD-MD

Results - Football

Page 50: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results – Political Parties

• Without Moral Conflict:• More contribution in IPD-MD games (relative to IPD)• More outgroup hate in Positive IPD-MD than IPD-MD• Degree of enmity matters only in Positive IPD-MD

Page 51: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results – Political Parties

• Without Moral Conflict:• More contribution in IPD-MD games (relative to IPD)• More outgroup hate in Positive IPD-MD than IPD-MD• Degree of enmity matters only in Positive IPD-MD• Less outgroup hate than in football study

• With Moral Conflict:• A lot of outgroup hate

Page 52: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results – Political Parties

• Without Moral Conflict:• More contribution in IPD-MD games (relative to IPD)• More outgroup hate in Positive IPD-MD than IPD-MD• Degree of enmity matters only in Positive IPD-MD• Less outgroup hate than in football study

• With Moral Conflict:• A lot of outgroup hate – but only 50% in IPD-MD

Page 53: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Main results

›More outgroup hate in help-avoidance

›Degree of enmity related to outgroup hate only in help-avoidance

›Unless outgroup is morality-based

›Even then, only 50% of contributions in IPD-MD are outgroup hate

Page 54: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Implications

Can be avoided if group members’ altruism is directed towards internal causes

Even when enmity is high

Harder to avoid

Sensitive to degree of enmity

Harming the other group Not helping the other group

Page 55: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Negative and Positive Externalities in Intergroup Conflict (Weisel)

Research questions:

• Consistency: Is behaviour consistent between settings where outgroup hate can be displayed by imposing negative externalities, and settings where it can be displayed by avoiding to impose positive externalities, on the outgroup?

• Order: Does the order in which people encounter situations in which they can display outgroup hate by imposing negative externalities, and by avoiding to impose positive externalities, affect behaviour?

• Groupness: What is the effect of peoples’ sense of groupness—the degree to which they care about their group and its well-being—on their willingness to display outgroup hate by imposing negative externalities, and/or by avoiding to impose positive externalities, on the outgroup?

Page 56: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Procedure

• 144 participants• Cohorts of 12• 3-person or 6-person groups• Two decisions without feedback• IPD-MD and Positive IPD-MD• “Groupness” measure• Social Value Orientation measure

Page 57: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Games

Page 58: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Groupness

• It is important to me to contribute to the group

• I am committed to contribute to the group

• It is important to me to act in favor of the group

• I want the group to do well

Page 59: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results - Consistency

Page 60: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results – Order Effects

Page 61: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Results - Groupness

IPD-MD first: groupness related to both ingroup love and outgroup hate• In both the initial IPD-MD and the subsequent Positive IPD-MD

Positive IPD-MD first: groupness related only to ingroup love• In both the initial Positive IPD-MD and the subsequent IPD-MD

Page 62: Team Games: Intra- and Intergroup Conflict Robert Böhm + Ori Weisel § + RWTH Aachen University § University of Nottingham IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School

Possible explanation for order effect

• First game encountered establishes a set of available actions.

• In the Positive IPD-MD, outgroup hate is associated with helping the ingroup only.

• The action is available in the IPD-MD as well, so the association carries on.

• In the IPD-MD, outgroup hate is associated with helping the ingroup and harming the outgroup.

• This action is not available in the Positive IPD-MD, so the association does not carry on.