The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato’sTimaeus and Parmenides

Ancient Mediterraneanand Medieval Texts

and ContextsEditors

Robert M. BerchmanJacob Neusner

Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism,and the Platonic Tradition

Edited by

Robert M. BerchmanDowling College and Bard College

John F. FinamoreUniversity of Iowa

Editorial Board

JOHN DILLON (Trinity College, Dublin) – GARY GURTLER (Boston College)

JEAN-MARC NARBONNE (Laval University, Canada)

VOLUME 10

The Teachings of Syrianus onPlato’s Timaeus and Parmenides

By

Sarah Klitenic Wear

LEIDEN • BOSTON2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wear, Sarah Klitenic.The teachings of Syrianus on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides / by Sarah Klitenic Wear.

p. cm. – (Ancient Mediterranean and medieval texts and contexts) (Studies inPlatonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic tradition ; v. 10)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-90-04-19290-4 (hardback : alk. paper)1. Syrianus. 2. Plato. Timaeus. 3. Plato. Parmenides. 4. Proclus, ca. 410-485. On the Timaeus.

5. Proclus, ca. 410-485. In Parmenidem. 6. Damaskios, ca. 480-ca. 550. In Parmenidem. 7.Damaskios, ca. 480-ca. 550. Aporiai kai lyseis peri ton proton archon. I. Title.

B387.W43 2011184–dc22

2010050620

ISSN 1871-188XISBN 978 90 04 19290 4

Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

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For John M. Dillon and Kenneth Wear

With Love and Gratitude to Both

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixAbbreviations of Manuscripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A. Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3C. Philosophical Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4D. Problems of Methodology and Notes on Syrianus’Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

E. Review of Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26F. Notes on Present Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

fragments

In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

viii contents

In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200In Tim. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324In Parm. Fr. a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328In Parm. Fr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

Abbreviations of Works Frequently Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335Index of Philosophical Terms and Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345Index of Passages from Ancient Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Syrianus the Platonist on Plato’sTimaeus andParmenides is a revision of adoctoral dissertation done under the guidance of JohnM. Dillon at Trin-ity College, Dublin. It has been revised under his care and thanks to thereading of Angela Longo, Anne Sheppard and the anonymous review-ers at Brill. I would also like to thank John Finamore, Stephen Gersh,and Gretchen Reydams-Schils, who have read or heard and commentedupon sections of the text at various times. I would like to further thankMargriet van der Wel, the desk editor at Brill, for her care and help inpreparation of this manuscript.This book is dedicated to JohnM.Dillon, my beloved teacher, at whose

feet this work was composed. He has dedicated hundreds of hours overthe years to discussing Syrianus with me, and his wife Jean, facilitatedhim in doing so. Being in the presence of this great and kind man hasbeen one of the greatest blessings of my life.I would like to thank Bibliopolis for permission to reprint sections

of my article, “Syrianus’ Teachings on the Soul in Proclus’ Commentaryon the Timaeus”, in “Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’Antiquité tardive”.Actes du Colloque international Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’Antiquitétardive, Université de Genève, septembre–er octobre Ed. AngleaLongo. Bibliopolis (Naples, ); I would also like to thank ClassicalQuarterly for permission to reprint sections of my article, “Syrianus thePlatonist on Eternity and Time” Classical Quarterly (vol. ., ),pp. –. I would further like to thank The International Journal ofthe Platonic Tradition for permission to reprint sections of my article,“Syrianus on the One”, IJPT vol. ().This book is also dedicated to my sweet and good husband, Kenneth

Wear, without whose support and willingness to mind our four smallchildren, this book would never have seen its completion. I would alsolike to acknowledge our children. The children are named: Beatrice,Agnes, Myles, and Lucy. I hope they are pleased with seeing their namesin a book.

ABBREVIATIONS OF MANUSCRIPTS

In Tim. fr. – (manuscripts and abbreviations used byDiehl, In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria, vol. –)

C Coislinianus saec. XI/XIID cod. Parisinus graec. saec. XVIM Marcianus saec. XIV exeuntisP (olim F) Parisinus saec. XVIN Neapolitanus Borbonicus III D a. Q (olim P) Parisinus suppl. graec. saec. XIVQD (ς) loco quodam illius paginae ς solam exhibere te docet ueram

lectionem

ς recensio uulgatabedition Basileensis a. AMonacensis

s Schneider qui edidit a. Vratislauiaet Taylor qui vertit in linguam Anglorum a. Londinii

add addidi addidit addendumci coni conieci sim.em emendaui sim.ins inserui sim.om omisit omissismg margoor. Chald. De oraculis chaldaicis scr. G. Kroll Vratislauiae a.

〈 〉 additamenta[[ ]] delenda[ ] addenda quae ad fenestras codicum explendas inserta sunt

Abbreviations for In Parm. Fr. –,Proclus, In Parm., vol. -III Steel

A Parisinus gr. , saec. XIII ex.A1 lectio primi librariiA2 lectio secundi librarii (ante )

xii abbreviations of manuscripts

A3 lectio tertii librarii (ante )A4 lectio recentioris librarii, saec. XV?M Ambrosianus gr. (B sup.), saec. XIVMb lectio post Bessarionis correctionemF Laurentianus plut. LXXXV , saec. XV (a. )G Scorialensis T. II. (gr. ), saec. XVI (a. –)R Vaticanus Rossianus gr. , saec. XVIW Vindobonensis phil. gr. , saec. XVI (a. )P Monacensis gr. , saec. XVIΣ consensus codicum FGP (Libri IV–VII) RW (usque ad IV .)g interpretatio latina Guillelmi de Moerbeka, saec. XIII ex. (ante a.

), secundum editionem C. SteelΓ exemplar graecum Guillelmi de Moerbeka (deperditum)A8 interpretatio Guillelmi deMoerbeka in codice Ambrosiano A

sup., saec. XVI (a. )PLAT. B Bodleianus Clark. , saec. IX (a. )PLAT. C Tubingensis Mb , saec. XIPLAT. D Marcianus gr. , saec. XIIPLAT. T Marcianus App. Class. IV , saec. X medioPLAT. W Vindobonensis Suppl. gr. , saec. XIPLAT. codd. consensus codicum PLAT. BCDTW

Sigla in textu:〈 〉 additio[ ] additio ex interpretatione latina{ } textus delendus… lacunaadd. addiditcens. censuitconi. coniecitcorr. correxitdel. deleviteras. erasumexp. expunxithab. habet/habentin mg. in margineinv. invertititer. iteravitlitt. litterae (-arum, -is)om. omisitras. rasuraspat. vac. spatium (-o) vacuum (-o)stat. statuittransp. transposuit

abbreviations of manuscripts xiii

Abbreviations for In Parm Fr. –, Damascius,In Parm., De Prin., Dub. et Sol., Westerink

A Marcianus gr. , s. IX.add. addiditdel. delevit

INTRODUCTION

A. Life

Syrianus,1 successor to Plutarch of Athens as head of theAthenian schoolof Platonism from –,2 is best known through the writings of hiswell-published pupil, Proclus. In the introduction to his commentary onPlato’s Parmenides, Proclus offers the following encomium to his teacherSyrianus:

“So may all the orders of divine beings help to prepare me fully to share inthis most illuminating and mystical vision that Plato reveals to us in theParmenides with a profundity appropriate to its subject; and which hasbeen unfolded to us, with his own very lucid applications, by one whowas in very truth a fellow Bacchant with Plato and filled entirely withdivine truth, and who, by leading us to the understanding of this visionhas become a true hierophant of these divine doctrines. Of him I wouldsay that he came to men as the exact image of philosophy for the benefitof souls here below, in recompense for the statues, temples, and the wholeritual of worship, and as the chief author of salvation formen who now liveand for those to come hereafter. Somay all the higher powers be propitiousto us and be ready with their gifts to illuminate us also with the light thatcomes from them and leads us upwards.” (Proclus, In Parm. )3

1 Something of Syrianus’ background is known through works such as Damascius’Philosophical History; Syrianus was related to Aedesia and Ammonianus (Damascius, PH; ). Damascius informs us, moreover, that he was tall, good-looking, and strong andmore belovedof the gods thanAmmonianus. Regarding other details of Syrianus’ physicalappearance, the reader is left to his own imagination.

2 In addition to Proclus, Syrianus’ students included Isidore, Hermeias, and Domni-nus (Damascius, PH, D; ; A).

3 Translation Morrow-Dillon (). Proclus offers similar praise to Syrianus in PTI, pp. – (where Syrianus is called a hierophant) and In Remp. I, .. In his praise ofSyrianus in his Parmenides Commentary, Proclus makes it seem that Syrianus is one ofthe pure souls who descend willingly for the aid of the human race. This passage is nota hymn, however, because Proclus addresses the higher powers, rather than his teacher.For a hymn to a philosopher see Lucretius’ hymn to Epicurus inDe rerum naturaV. –.See also Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, ch. where Porphyry calls on the Muses before hewrites praise of Plotinus.

introduction

One gathers from this quotation that Syrianus was a figure of immensereligious and spiritual importance to Proclus. As the “exact image of phi-losophy”, Syrianus personified the philosophical art for Proclus in such away that it is impossible to avoid Syrianic thought in Proclus’ own phi-losophy, so pervasive is his philosophy in the works of Proclus. More-over, although Proclus frequently mentions his teacher when discussinga point, more often than not Syrianus is behind Proclus’ discourse evenwhen he goes unmentioned. In his Life of Proclus, Marinus discusses theclose relationship between Syrianus and Proclus:

“Now the old man lived only two years more with Proclus as his lodger,and then when he died he entrusted the young man to his successorSyrianus, as he also did his grandson Archiadas. And when Syrianus tookhim, he not only gave him more help wth his scholarly pursuits, butmade him his housemate from then on and a sharer in his philosophiclife, finding in him the sort of hearer and successor that he had longdesired to have, as he was able to receive his manifold learning and divineteachings.”4

Proclus was the hand-picked successor of Syrianus, who not only studiedat the feet of Syrianus, but lived with him and adapted his philosophicalway of life, even positioning himself within ear-shot of his Master atdeath.5Little is known about Syrianus’ personal history—the major study on

the person of Syrianus remains K. Praechter’s article, “Syrianos” in R.E(IV A –), the information for which seems based on Mari-nus’ Life of Proclus. Marinus notes that Syrianus was the son of Philox-enus and that he became head of the school of Athens in / afterPlutarch’s death.6 In addition to overseeing Proclus, he was the teacher ofHermeias and Domninus. He died, according to Marinus, shortly after aperiod when he was to read either Orphic writings or Chaldean Oracleswith Domninus and Proclus, in the midst of his service as diadochos.7

4 Marinus, Life of Proclus, , translation Edwards ().5 Marinus, Life of Proclus, . Marinus tells the story that Syrianus had requested two

vaults—one for himself, one for Proclus—in one tomb. When Proclus later worried outof piety that it would be improper for him to be buried with Syrianus, Syrianus appearedto him in a dream to persuade him otherwise (Marinus, ibid).The inscription on Proclus’tomb, which he shares with his teacher, Syrianus, onMt. Lycabettus reads: “Proclus I was,by race a man of Lycia, whom Syrianus Fostered here to become the successor to his ownschool.This is the common tombwhich received the bodies of bothmen; Ohmay a singlePlace be a portion of both their souls.” Marinus, ibid. trans. Edwards.

6 Marinus, Life of Proclus, 7 Marinus, Life of Proclus, .

introduction

After his death, Domninus took the chair at the Athenian School for ashort while, followed by Proclus, who became head until his death in.

B. Works

The written product of Syrianus’ teaching is scant: extant works includea textbook on rhetoric (In Hermogenem, a commentary on Hermogenes’De Ideis and De Statibus)8 and a commentary on Aristotle’sMetaphysics,books Β, Γ, Μ, Ν (In Metaphysica).9The Suda (IV , ) attributes thefollowing works to Syrianus s.v. Συριαν ς:

�ΕγραψενΕ�ς ��μηρ�ν �λεν �π μνημα �ν Βι�λ��ις � .Ε�ς τ"ν Π�λιτε�αν Πλ$των�ς Βι�λ�α δ .Ε�ς τ"ν '�ρ()ως *ε�λ γιαν �ι�λ�α Β [Ε�ς τ+ Πρ κλ�υ] Περ- τ.ν παρ’ /�μ0ρ1ω *ε.νΣυμ(ων�αν '�ρ()ως, Πυ(αγ ρ�υ κα� Πλ$των�ςΠερ- τ+ λ για, �ι�λ�α δ)καΚα- 3λλα τιν+ ��ηγητικ$.

There is somedebate as to whether theseworks were actually authored bySyrianus because Proclus is listed as the author of works with the sametitles, Suda s.v. Πρ κλ�ς. E. Zeller, in Die Philosophie der Griechen inihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung,10 claims that the works were writtenby Proclus and that this list was tacked on to Syrianus’ entry. Praechter,in “Das Schriftenverzeichnis des Neuplatonikers Syrianos bei Sudas”,11attributes theworks to Syrianus, arguing that Syrianus’ workswere falselyattributed to Proclus. A.D.R. Sheppard suggests that both Syrianus andProclus may have written works with the same title.12 H.-D. Saffreymaintains that Proclus edited Syrianus’ work, while R.L. Cardullo regards

8 There is actually some debate as towhether the author of InHermogenem is the sameSyrianus who was head of the Athenian School, though there is no compelling reason todeny the identification. The work is, however, dedicated to the author’s son, Alexander,of whom we have no other evidence, even as there is none of Syrianus’ being married. Itis possible that his purported son was a spiritual “son”.

9 See CAG VI. (). These are now treated in the Aristotelian Commentatorsseries, by O’Meara and Dillon (–.) It remains unclear whether Syrianus wrote acommentary on the other books of Aristotle’sMetaphysics, but probably not.

10 Zeller () ff.11 Praechter () –.12 Sheppard () .

introduction

the entire list as suspect.13 It is possible that Proclus’ works as listedare written versions and elaborations of Syrianus’ lectures on the samesubject.In addition to theworks listed in the Suda, it seems that Syrianus deliv-

ered lectures which later formed the basis for Hermias’ Commentary onthe Phaedrus. Whether he actually composed commentaries on otherdialogues of Plato remains uncertain.The issue of the possible appropria-tion of Syrianus’ unwritten teaching by Proclus in commentary-formwillbe taken up in section D of this introduction, on methodology.

C. Philosophical Position

While it is somewhat premature to summarise Syrianus’ metaphysicsbased on fragments of his teachings on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides,by gathering such evidence as appears in the attested “fragments”, wecan begin to see a picture develop of what the Syrianic cosmos lookedlike and how it influenced Proclus’ metaphysics. As the hallmark ofhis metaphysics, Syrianus postulates a new level of reality for everydifficulty he finds in the text of the Timaeus, while every step in theargument of the first and second hypotheses in the Parmenides representsalso a distinct level of reality. This reality, moreover, displays Syrianus’impulse to proliferate levels of triads—an impulse which originated withIamblichus, who distinguished three triads at the level of intellect.14Syrianus, indeed, comes to many of his conclusions by appropriating theopinions of Porphyry and Iamblichus, taking aspects of each to create, outof often contradictory views, one coherent doctrine. This doctrine wasthen elaborated upon by Proclus, who created even more ranks withinSyrianus’ tiered cosmos.

The One

Syrianus’ description of the One is encapsulated in his treatment of thefirst and second hypotheses of the Parmenides:15 what is systematicallydenied of the One in the first hypothesis is affirmed of the One in

13 Saffrey () –; Cardullo () –. C.-P. Manolea summarises thesearguments () –.

14 Cf. Procl. In Tim I , ff. and Appendix C to Dillon ().15 Unfortunately, for Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides, only his discussion of

the first hypothesis is extant (though some evidence in the interpretation of the second isderivable both from there and from the Platonic Theology.) Damascius, however, seems

introduction

the second, so that each positive attribute corresponds in order to thepreceding negation:

“All things are presented in logical order, as being symbols of divine ordersof being; and also that the fact that all those things which are presentedpositively in the second hypothesis are presented negatively in the firstindicates that the primal cause transcends all the divine orders, while theyundergo various degrees of procession according to their various distinctcharacteristics” (Proclus, In Parm. .–..)16

Hence, the first hypothesis says that the One is beyond multiplicity andsimple and partless; however, the second hypothesis allows us to notehow the One contains a beginning, middle, and end when the One islooked at with respect to others.17 The One is thus simple (with respectto itself—the Absolute One) or participated (with respect to the gen-erated cosmos): Syrianus says that when Plato discusses the One asunparticipated and participated, he distinguishes between the two byadding τι to 4νwhendiscussing the participatedOne.This concept breaksfrom Iamblichus’ discussion of the “particular”, rather than participated,One18—the ‘particular ones’ refers to a doctrine of henads, which will bedescribed below. For Syrianus, the connection between the two hypothe-ses exists because the negative propositions are tied to the positive; theways in which the One “is not” is another way of attributing somethingto the One—i.e., negative statements say that the One is other than thesethings.19 This mode of thinking is a correction to Iamblichus’ idea thatthe One is ineffable: if anything were attributed to it, such terms wouldsubtract from and diminish theOne. For Syrianus, at the intelligible level,negative statements can be specificatory: because each form has its ownidentity, it can be said that the One “is not” rest; because it is not move-ment, identity; and so forth. At the sensible level, negation is a denialof attributes. Syrianus distinguishes between περ- τ�5 6ν ς, referring tothe One, and περ- τ7 4ν, talking about the One.20 In the first case, theuse of the genitive when discussing the topic of the One is permissible,as it implies that the One is only being mentioned as a subject. In the

to have been aware of the remainder of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides andcomments on both it and Syrianus’ teaching as revealed in it.

16 Trans. Morrow-Dillon ().17 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.18 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.19 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear. Iamblichus attributes characteristics denied of theOne

itself to the lower elements of henadic realm. See Iamblichus, In Tim. Fr. Dillon.20 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.

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second case, the accusative suggests that the One is being discussed andthat things are being said about the content of the One; this is impossible,because when humans speak about the One, they use sensible language,which the One transcends. Proclus agrees with and expands his teacher’sthinking on this subject, arguing two additional ways in which the Oneis transcendent and immanent in The Platonic Theology II.: the Onehas the power of generation; the One can be approached by the soul, butonly when it leaves behind dialectic (as a form of sensible discourse) inmystical ascent.Syrianus, then, discusses the One and its relation to the generated

universe based on the first and second hypotheses of the Parmenides.Syrianus, like Iamblichus, does not consider the One in its absolutestate even in the first hypothesis; instead, he describes the One in itscapacity for generating gods. In a rather strange passage, Damasciuscredits Syrianus with positing an ineffable One beyond the One:

“There is, then, a certain relation perceived between the two, such as therelationship of extremes, these things forming a sequence: the Unified, therelation, the One, and beyond the One there will be a unique principle, theIneffable.”

(Syrianus In Parm, fr. Wear = Damascius, De Princip. II. , –.)

That Syrianus postulated an ineffable One beyond the One is a question-able proposal, as there is no other textual evidence that I have found tosupport the claim here, but since Iamblichus had done so before him, itis not impossible. It is possible that Damascius is reading into Syrianushis own structure of the Ineffable, followed by a generative One. It is alsopossible, one may suppose, that Damascius had access to more materialthat what is now extant and that Syrianus’ Ineffable One appears in nowlost material. When Proclus inherits Syrianus’ One, he tightens the sub-ject matter of the first hypothesis, arguing that it is about the absoluteOne.The ineffable, however, would not, as such, be the proper subject ofany of the hypotheses.

Peras and Apeiria

After theOne, Syrianus places peras (Limit) and apeiria (Unlimitedness),features of the henadic realm which filter down and pervade every levelof existence. The following chart, reproduced and discussed at lengthin In Parm. Fr. below, outlines the levels of being and how Limit andUnlimitedness affect them.

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Rank Unlimit (Chaos) Limit (Aether)

Matter formless of itself forms and shapes are limits ofmatter

UnqualifiedBody

divisible to infinity limited in size; body as a whole islimited

Qualities contain more and less quantity is limited in materialthings

Realm ofgeneration

constant coming into being andceaseless cycle

creation of forms in matter;nothing of all things perishes(forms continue)

circuits ofheaven

possesses unlimited power ofthat which moves it; happenscontinuously

places limit upon the disorderlyelements in matter; turns backon itself and limits itself

Soul power of unceasing motion circuits of the soul are uniformTime measures whole circuit of the

soul—power which unfoldscircuits of the soul is unlimited

proceeds according to number;measure of the circuits of thesoul

Intellect eternal motion and unfailingcontinuity

remains in itself; its life is singleand eternal and same

Eternity comprehends the wholeintellectual infinity. It is poweritself

Measure of all intellectualactivity and bound of the life ofintellect (mixed entity, formed ofLimit and Unlimitedness)

Infinity/EssentialLimit

fount of all infinity foundation of all limits

The pair reveal the transcendent nature of the One and the One asthe cause of all things; peras is responsible for unity and sameness,while apeiria causes production, procession, and plurality. Everything,thus, contains Limit and Unlimitedness, with the exception of the One,which exists beyond it. Syrianus assumes these cosmic principles fromIamblichus, who placed them after his second One.21 Unlike Iamblichus,whomade the secondOne amonad and called peras and apeiria togethera dyad, Syrianus seems to assimilate Iamblichus’ “secondOne” to peras asmonad, while characterising apeiria as an (indefinite) dyad. Proclus usesboth terms, depending on the context of his discussion.22

21 Cf. Iambl. In Tim. fr. Dillon.22 Proclus sometimes uses “dyad” to refer to peras and apeiria in his commentary on

Plato’s Parmenides, while in other writings, he refers to apeiria as the dyad. See Syrianus,In Parm. fr. Wear, and Sheppard () –.

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The Henomenon

Before the noetic triad, Syrianus discusses a relationship between theOneand what he terms, following Iamblichus, “the Unified” (to hênomenon)which relates these extremes of the henadic realm: the One, the Uni-fied, and the relationship can be taken to constitute a triad. Moreover,between the hênomenon and Being he posits a bond called dynamis; thehênomenon, Being, and this bond (skhesis) constitute a second triad.23The henomenon participates in the One and is the first product of therelationship between peras and apeiria. The second triad, of henomenonand Being (or Nous) and their bond, may owe something to Porphyry’sdoctrine of the One. Porphyry is reported by Damascius24 as making theOne the “Father” of the intelligible triad Being, Life, and Intellect, so thatthe head of the noetic world is also theOne at least in its positive, creativeaspect. Syrianus, while not adopting Porphyry’s peculiar theory, expandsthis interpretation of the One by explaining the relationship between theOne and the noetic world in terms of the two triads—different functionsof the One are expressed in terms of individual cosmic entities. Sucha thesis creates a drawn-out and elaborate cosmos, as opposed to Por-phyry’s compact universe based on the premise that the Father of theintelligible triad is the One.

Henads

In the Syrianic cosmos, the henads represent the link between the henad-ic and intelligible realm—they connect the two in a way which the abso-lute transcendence of the One would otherwise seem to render impossi-ble. As aspects of the One which pervade the universe, the henads do nothave a precise location per se, as might an hypostasis such as Intellect,or Soul, for instance. Still, it is possible to locate where they first enterthe cosmos. The henads are the lowest element in the realm of the One,below peras and apeiria, and constitute the link to the Intelligible. TheUnified (hênomenon), however, is also the product of peras and apeiriaand the link to the Intelligible. It seems, then, that either Syrianus makesthe contents of the hênomenon the henads or he makes the hênomenonthe totality of the henads. Most likely both are true, with the hênomenonpossessing the simultaneous unity and plurality which the first and sec-ond hypotheses of the Parmenides bring to light with respect to the One.

23 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.24 Damascius,De Princ. Ch. .

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There has been somediscussion as to whether the theory of the henadsoriginated with Syrianus or if they existed already in Iamblichus’ cosmol-ogy.While E.R.Dodds credited Syrianuswith first postulating the henadsin his edition of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, (pp. –), he laterretracts a key piece of evidence in his addenda and corrigenda. The pointat issue forDodds (and forDillon) is a position attributed by Proclus in InParmenidem . to “some of those revered by us” (τινες τ.ν 8μ9ν α�-δ��ων) that the first hypothesis of the Parmenides addresses “god and thegods”, by which Proclus understands “henads”. Dodds initially attributesthis statement to Syrianus, and then later retracts it. It is clear, however,that Syrianus located the gods in the second hypothesis, leaving the firsthypothesis for the One alone (.–.) and that Iamblichus ismost likely the author of this doctrine. Dillon first attributed the doc-trine of the henads referred to in .ff. to Iamblichus, arguing thatthis doctrine does, indeed, reflect Syrianus and Proclus’ concept of thehenads, rather than mere noetic beings, the suggestion of Saffrey andWesterink.25 Dillon argues that Iamblichus was prepared to identify thehenads, while serving as the lowest “participated” element of the realmof the One, also as objects of intellection.26 For Iamblichus, the One-Being exists in itself and is substantially identical with the highest levelof Nous;27 in this way that it can be viewed as a unity and multiplicity—when viewed as an intelligised multiplicity, Iamblichus calls this gods orhenads.28 Syrianusmakes the hênomenon (not the hen on) the contents ofthe forms and places gods in every level of the universe; his metaphysics,thus, prohibits the henads as objects of intellection. For Syrianus, eachintelligible level is presided over by a henad—the henads adjust to suitevery level, existing noetically in the noetic levels, noerically in the noericlevels.29The structure of the henadic realm is, therefore, as follows:30

25 Saffrey-Westerink () ix–xl. Saffrey and Westerink argue that Iamblichus usehenas to denote the forms.

26 See Dillon (). More recently, Dillon approached the topic again ().27 Cf. In Tim. fr. .28 Dillon () ff.29 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.30 This chart is reproduced and discussed in-depth in Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.

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Τ7 παντελ.ς 3ρρητ�ν Iamblichus and Syrianus agree here

4ν

π)ρας <πειρ�α

τ 8νωμ)ν�ν[6ν$δες]

Syrianus’ explanation of the first noetic triad:

4ν =ν Monad (τ7 >πλ?ς ε9ναι)

α�?ν Dyad of <ε�+ =ν (τ7 <ε- ε9ναι)(this is the σA)σις between 4ν + =ν)

Τ7 α�?νι�ν

B?η =ν�?ην�Cς

Ν�Cς =ν�?ην�Cς

The Noetic Realm

Syrianus designs the noetic realm so that every layer of reality is markedby a level of divinity. Layers of reality, moreover, inter-relate so that thelowest level of one realm is the highest of the next. Syrianus’ hierarchyof noetic, noetic-noeric, and noeric gods is further divided into triads,which become even further divided by Proclus—a cosmos he describesover the course of the Platonic Theology. The noetic realm thus has thefollowing levels of gods,31 which Syrianus relates to Parmenides E – D .32 The hierarchy, as set out in –. of J. Opsomer’s appendixto his article, “Proclus on Demiurgy and Procession: A NeoplatonicReading of the Timaeus”33 appears as follows:

The intelligible gods: Beingst intelligible triad: One-Beingnd intelligible triad: Eternityrd intelligible triad: Intelligible Intellect (Paradigm)

31 For a discussion of these levels, see Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.32 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.33 Opsomer ().

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The intelligible-intellective gods: Lifest intelligible-intellective triadnd intelligible-intellective triadrd intelligible-intellective triadThe intellective gods: Intellect (a Hebdomad)st intellective triadKronosRheaZeus (intellective intellect): Demiurgend Intellective Triad: the Maintainers; the Kouretes; the “Implacables”Seventh Divinity: membrane (hypezokos)The hypercosmic godsThe hypercosmic-encosmic godsThe encosmic gods

Zeus, as the demiurgic monad, oversees the demiurgic gods as they existin the hypercosmic and encosmic realms. Thus, the hypercosmic andencosmic realms mirror the intellective order so that each consists of atriad of which Zeus is a member. This structure seems to be adopted byProclus almost unchanged in his published works.

Aeon

Eternity is the duality <ε� and =ν and is, in a sense, an aspect of One-Being, where it remains at the summit of the intelligible realm.34 Proclusplaces Eternity in the second triad of the intelligible realm. Eternity, thus,is substantially Being, because it precedes Intellect, but it resides in thethird intelligible triad in a causal way.35 Proclus, likewise, places Eternityin the second triad of the intelligible realm and states that Eternityremains in theOne of the intelligible realm.36With this structure, Proclussays that Eternity is substantially Being, but Intellect in a causal way.

Paradigm

Syrianus, as with Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Theodore of Asine, ap-proaches the Paradigm—the sum of the forms used by the Demiurge increation—in terms of its relationship to the Demiurge. The Paradigm astheαDτ��.�ν is the third intelligible triad (afterOne-Being andEternity)and contains the causes of all being and the four forms.37 As such, it is

34 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. .35 Proclus, ET prop. ; In Tim. II, p. , –; PT III p. .36 Proclus, In Tim. II , pp. –.37 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. .

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superior to the Demiurge, Syrianus argues, and exists ontologically priorto it. The Demiurge looks to the Paradigm, contemplating it as a supe-rior object. However, were the Demiurge to contemplate the Paradigmas something external, he would see it through sensation, rather thanintellection. Vision, as sensation, moreover, would give the Demiurge anincomplete conception of the Paradigm—as an eidôlon, his vision wouldbe a shadow of the Paradigm, which we know is not possible.38 Syri-anus solves this by arguing that the Paradigm exists prior to the Demi-urge noetically, and within the Demiurge noerically: the Demiurge con-templates the Paradigm by reflecting upon himself. The Paradigm, thus,exists simultaneously as an object of thought and as thinker itself throughan act of reflective contemplation.39 This represents an innovation in thedebates over the Paradigm and its location with relation to the Demi-urge: Longinus situated the Paradigm after the Demiurge (which Syr-ianus faults because it forces the Demiurge to contemplate somethinginferior to it); Porphyry argued that the Paradigm is prior to the Demi-urge (whichwould mean that the Paradigmmust be seen by the Intellect,an impossibility were the Paradigm placed before the Demiurge); andPlotinus concluded that the Paradigm is in the Demiurge (an impossibil-ity because if the Demiurge had the forms in him primally he would benoetos—but the Paradigm cannot be in the Demiurge because the Demi-urge contains the forms of heavenly bodies). Proclus seems to adopt Syr-ianus’ opinion on the matter whole-heartedly.

Demiurge

TheDemiurge represents Zeus, the third member of the first intellectivetriad, comprised of Kronos, Rhea, and Zeus.40 Syrianus’ presentation ofthe Demiurge is based on Iamblichus’, which represented an innovationin the history of Platonic interpretation of the Demiurge. Iamblichusmade Zeus third among the fathers in the intellectual hebdomad, though,in his Timaeus Commentary at least, he seems to have characterisedthe Demiurge as embracing the whole intelligible universe, also placingclasses of being in the Demiurge.41 This was a Plotinian theory whichPorphyry had rejected in favor of locating the Demiurge in the realm

38 Plotinus, Enn. III. . .39 Proclus, In Tim I. . –.40 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. Wear; Proclus, PT V.41 Proclus, In Tim. I, .–. (Iambl. In Tim. fr. ).

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of Soul.42 Syrianus, moreover, agrees with all three—Plotinus, Porphyry,and Iamblichus—with regard to the question of how many demiurgescreated the Platonic universe. Before Iamblichus, Numenius proposedthat there were three gods: the Father, the Creator, and the creation, aposition taken up and elaborated upon by Plotinus’ pupil Amelius, whoposits three demiurges, three intellects and three kings.43 These wereassimilated to the Good as primary cause. Proclus places the Fathersecond after the Creator, asserting that Plato used the same word for“Father” and “Creator”, so thatNumenius should not identify the paternalprinciple of the universe with the first principle. Syrianus adopts Plotinus’and Iamblichus’ description of the Demiurge, interpreting Phanes as theDemiurge. Zeus, as the fifth king of gods, unifies the universe withinhimself because he contains the forms. Zeus swallows Phanes becausePhanes is identified with the intelligible monad and the αDτ��.�ν, thethird member of the triad of intelligibles who produces the sum of allliving things and embraces all.44 In swallowing this exemplary cause,Zeus is transcendent at the level of Intellect, but requires mediation inhis demiurgic activity in the form of particular fathers or demiurges.For Syrianus, the Demiurge, then, is in the realm of the Intellect,45

at the upper limit of the intellective gods who provide the mediationthe Demiurge requires. As head of the intellective gods, he is filled withintelligible monads and assumes leadership over the particular fathers inthe hypercelestial and celestial realms. As a monad, he rules over a triadof fathers. The powers of the Demiurgic monad provide the cause for allthings holistically, while the demiurgic triad, which is dependent on themonad, oversees parts holistically, wholes partially, and parts partially.46Proclus adopts this hierarchy of demiurgic creation, arguing in Pla-

tonic Theology V in favor of the Syrianic intellectual hebdomad. As withSyrianus, he says that theDemiurge is in the Intellect and that the triad ofKronos, Rhea and Zeus represent Being, Life, and Intellect. He posits thatZeus, as the third member of the triad, is intellective-intellect and acts ashead of two triads of demiurges: the hypercosmic and encosmic. He fol-lows these triads with a seventh divinity, which Proclus calls the “mem-brane”, that separates the Demiurge from the sensible world. Proclus,

42 Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.43 Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.44 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. Wear; OF ; Proclus, In Tim. I. ..45 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. Wear; Proclus, In Tim. I, .–.46 Syrianus, In Tim. Fr. ; Proclus, In Tim. I .–ff.

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moreover, posits a complex series of triads presided over by demiurges(all known as “Zeus”) who act as the monad of their particular triad:thus, the first Zeus is the monadic demiurge, the second is the monadof the hypercosmic triad, and the third is themonad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods. Proclus does not credit Syrianuswith this elaboration andit seems that it is his innovation, although, of course, it is possible that headopts this hierarchy from Syrianus without crediting him.In making the souls, Syrianus explains that the Demiurge uses the

mixing bowl because it transmits form to souls.47 Syrianus establishesthat the mixer is the Demiurge, the mixing bowl defines the form ofsouls, the things mixed are the elements of souls, which proceed fromthe Demiurge and the mixing bowl, and the product is soul itself.48 Soulis given form from the generative cause after it became one thing from theaction of the mixing bowl. Proclus broadens the function of the mixingbowl from Syrianus’ creating partial souls to containing all life, includingthe world soul.49 Proclus is also specific about the kind of partial soulscreated by the crater.These include: divine, angelic, and demonic classes.In creating, moreover, Syrianus says that the Demiurge has a paternaland maternal relationship with the encosmic gods. He contains the aitiaof both (zoe as maternal causality, on for paternal causality), which aid inhis role as being the maker of forms (ε�δ�π�ι ς) and creator of essence(�Dσι�π�ι ς).With these aitiai, the Demiurge transmits life and essenceto soul, and enforms soul, which then reaches perfection in the mixingbowl.

Psychic Realm

Syrianus presents new doctrine regarding the psychic realm by assum-ing the World Soul and hypostasis Soul into one being and by his mod-ifications to Iamblichus’ doctrine of the descent of the individual soul,including the soul’s vehicle.

Time

As with Iamblichus, Syrianus gives a non-temporal explanation for theexistence of transcendent Time.50 Time takes its beginning from above

47 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.48 Proclus, In Tim. III. .ff.49 Proclus claims to “clarify the thought of our Master” in In Tim. III. .–..50 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.

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and imitates Eternity, unfolding Eternity, as a measure of motion, ratherthan a separate thing.While Iamblichus identifies the levels of realitywiththe noeric realm, where time itself is the ordering principle, Syrianusrefers it to the levels of divine souls that participate in primal Time.51Primal Time, moreover, measures the circuits of these souls. Syrianus,relating Time to the level of divine soul, agrees with Iamblichus thatthere is higher time which relates to the level of divine soul and alevel of divine souls participates in primal time.52 He thus takes theconcept of Time unfolding Eternity and extrapolates a lower level whichunravels something contained in a concentrated form at the higher level.Syrianus innovates from Iamblichus’ concept of time by positing anintermediate entity which is superior to ordinary time, lower than aion,which is the causal principle of the intellectual world. Syrianus furtherexplains that Day and Night are creative forces causing physical time anddividing themselves into physical day and night; Day and Night are thetranscendent paradigms of day and night in the soul,53 while day andnight are the contents of this transcendent time.54 Day and Night, as theoperative parts of time, moreover, function as archetypes and creativeforces of physical days and nights.

All—Soul

Syrianus’ contribution to the doctrine of the Soul comes in his conflatingthe World Soul with the hypostasis Soul; elements of the Soul are linkedto various levels of the noetic cosmos so that Soul is related to thenoetic world on three levels.55 This is an innovation from the doctrinein which Iamblichus argues that soul is suitably related to all parts of theuniverse—it is transcendent andpart is present around earth and the bulkof the universe.56Another aspect of Syrianic innovation comes in his division of the

function of Soul into two, which is unlike Iamblichus who formulatestwo triads, and then allocates division of function to them. For Syri-anus, Soul is one as a reason principle and many because it has divi-sion.The principle of oneness in the Soul allows for its triadic remaining

51 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.52 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.53 Syrianus, In Tim. Wear.54 Syrianus, In Tim. Wear.55 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.56 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.

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in itself, proceeding and returning. This higher aspect is responsible forexercising providence over pure forms in the cosmos.The aspect ofmanyin the Soul reflects the Soul as the sum total of forms; it presides overbodies and partial beings. With these two aspects, the Soul can imitatethe holistic activity of the Demiurge, while remaining in Intellect. Thisaspect of both holistic and individual care of Soul primes the Soul fordivision into higher and lower categories—a division Syrianus employs,while maintaining the fundamental unity of Soul by making the divi-sion in terms of the Soul’s function.57 This dual nature of Soul and divi-sion of functions existed in the Platonic tradition. From Theodore ofAsine, Syrianus adopts the concept of dividing the function of soulsinto categories.58 Proclus adapts and emphasises Syrianus’ amalgamationof Iamblichus’ doctrine that the soul has a super-cosmic element in itlinked to Intellect59 and Porphyry’s doctrine that the Soul has a multi-plicity of powers which are present in suitable ways to all parts of theuniverse.

Individual Soul

Syrianus’ greatest contribution to the discussion of the individual soulcomes with his description of the descent of the soul and the vehicle ofthe soul.60 He describes how divine souls move cyclically, so that as theyapproach their end, they also produce a beginning. These souls partakein time through their circuits, which results in a cyclical motion—soulsare simultaneously younger and older than themselves. While divinesouls remain circling above, individual souls descend into generation.Syrianus refers to this descent as the first generation, although there is notone descent absolutely; instead, the soul descends once for every divinecircuit. The soul necessarily descends with every circuit because everycircuit is the same—if a soul were to descend for one circuit, which itmust, it must descend with every circuit. In order to stay above, the soulwould have to have an unchanging intellectual power, which only thedivine souls can claim. Syrianus adopts this concept that every soul mustdescend from Iamblichus.61 From Iamblichus, he acquires the natureof the soul’s procession and the concept of the triadic motion of soul.

57 See Damascius on this point, In Parm. II , –.58 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.59 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.60 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.61 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.

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Iamblichus adds, moreover, that some souls have a greater number ofdescents than others and that this repetition weakens souls.62With regard to the doctrine of the vehicle of the soul, Syrianus rec-

onciles the opinions of Porphyry,63 that the vehicle dissolves, and Iambli-chus, that the vehicle survives, by postulating a higher and lower ochema:while the higher ochema is immortal, the lower one dissolves. Proclusdoes not adopt this theory, conflating the two ochemata into one whichis made of different elements and three envelopes.

Matter and Evil

Syrianus’ doctrine on evil, reproduced by Proclus in his treatise DeMalorum Subsistentia, makes three points regarding evil: ) that whichwe often consider evil in our partial universe is good with respect tothe whole; ) essential evil cannot exist, as all being participates in thegood; ) evil can exist in a limited sort of sense, in so far as degrees ofnothingness get into the good.64 Syrianus approaches the problemby firstarguing that evil exists with respect to particular beings. Syrianus saysthat just as God relates to us in a different way from how we relate toeach other, so do the things that appear evil to us appear good to God.Moreover, the things that do appear evil to us on the level of partial beingsare actually good on the level of the whole (κα- τ7 τ1. μεν μ)ρει κακ ν,τ1. δε παντ� κα- τ�9ς �λ�ις �D κακ ν, <λλ’ <γα* ν). Syrianus arguesthat the problem is with limited human perspective, rather than divinegoodness.This idea appears in Proclus’DeMalorum Subsistentia, .– and ..While his predecessors connected evil with matter because evil exists

without being (and hence, without a participation in theGood), Syrianusdismisses the idea of anAbsolute Evil, for theDemiurgemade everythinggood. Instead, he agrees with Iamblichus’ concept of the parhypostasis, anentity that latches on to another entity and feeds off of it for survival.65 Heargues that evil is a parhypostasis in so far as it attaches to matter becauseit has no absolute form or identity of its own.

62 Proclus, In Crat. cxvii.63 Proclus, In Tim. fr. Wear; Augustine, Civ. Dei. X..64 Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.65 Reported in Simplicius, In Cat. , .

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A Note on Syrianus’ Exegesis of the Parmenides

Syrianus saw the subject of the Parmenides as theological and gave thework a metaphysical reading set apart from many earlier readings. Theinfluence of Syrianus’ interpretation of theParmenides on Proclus cannotbe overstated; on this matter, C. Steel has said “What [Proclus] owesto Syrianus is above all the general principles for consistent theologicalinterpretation of the dialectical discussion on the One, which concludesthe dialogue.”66 To those interpreting the Parmenides prior to Syrianus,Proclus attributes the following readings: there are those who approachthe Parmenides as a dialectical exercise;67 those who give an ontologicalinterpretation, focusing on theOne Intelligible Being; and thosewho givea henological interpretation. Of those who give the text a metaphysicalreading, some say that the subject of the Parmenides is Being;68 othershold that it is One-Being;69 while Syrianus’ view is a modification ofIamblichus, qualified: Syrianus argues that Parmenides discusses Beingand all beings, in so far as all beings are the product of the One.70 Thus,Syrianus developed a theological interpretation of the secondhypothesis,which had previously, for the most part, been attributed to intellect.71The structure of the Parmenides, including the number of hypotheses

it outlines, as well as their subject matter, was a topic of debate amonginterpreters of the dialogue. Syrianus identifies nine hypotheses, statingthat the first hypothesis is about the absolute God, and the second, theintelligible world. With this description, he introduced a change fromIamblichus, who said that the first hypothesis was about God and thegods and the second, intellectual and intelligible beings; instead, Syrianusseems to have returned to the first and secondhypotheses, as identified byAmelius, Porphyry, and Plutarch.72 However, in opposition to Porphyryand Iamblichus, but like his master Plutarch, he identifies the first five

66 Steel () .67 Proclus, In Parm. .–.; these interpreters suggest that the Parmenideswas

an antigraphe against Zeno.68 Proclus, In Parm., .–.. It is possible that Origen is the author of this

doctrine, as he held that the One is without existence and substance—with Intellect asthe highest principle, absolute Being and absolute One are identical.

69 Proclus, In Parm. .–..70 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.71 Steel () .72 Amelius (.–.) said that the first hypothesis was about the One, the

second, about Intellect; Porphyry (.–.) identified the first as the primalGod, the second as Intelligible. Plutarch (.–.) identifies the first and secondhypotheses as God and Intellect, respectively.

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positive ones (“if the One is”) with distinct levels of reality and thefollowing fourwith negative conclusions from the proposition “if theOneis not.” Syrianus’ greatest contribution is the doctrine thatwhat is assertedof the One in the first hypothesis is asserted of it in the second presentsus with a full panorama of levels of divinity.73 In .–. hedescribes this relationship between the hypotheses:

“… all things are presented in logical order, as being symbols of divineorders of being; and also the fact that all those things which are presentedpositively in the second hypothesis are presented negatively in the firstindicates that the primal cause transcends all the divine orders, while theyundergo various degrees of procession according to their various distinctcharacteristics.”74

The hypotheses are connected to one another in such a way as to describea complete, unified cosmos.Proclus adopts Syrianus’ relationship between the first and second

hypotheses, as well as his outline for the nine hypotheses of the Par-menides.75 He lists nine hypotheses ( positive, negative) (.–):

st: relationship of the One superior to Being to itself and other thingsnd: One coordinate with Beingrd: One inferior to Being to itself and other thingsth: relationship of others which participate in the One to themselves

and to the Oneth: the relations the others which do not participate in the One have to

themselves and to the Oneth: the relations of the One (if it does not exist), in the sense of existing

in one way and not in another, to itself and to other thingsth: the relations of the One (if it does not exist), in the sense of absolute

non-existence, towards itself and othersth: the relations of the others to themselves and to the One (when

taken as non-existent) in the sense of existing in one way and notin another

th: the relations of the others to themselves and to theOne (when takenas absolutely non-existent)

73 See PT , where Proclus praises Syrianus for corresponding the negations in thefirst hypothesis and the affirmations in the second.

74 Trans. Morrow-Dillon ().75 Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.

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One can only assume that these nine hypotheses are the same as Syri-anus’, as Proclus only lists the first five of Syrianus’. Syrianus’ subject of thethird hypothesis, on souls assimilated to gods, relates to previous com-mentators’ identification of the third hypothesis;76 Proclus does not seemto adopt this subject from his teacher, preferring to keep the subjects ofthe hypotheses focused on relationships to the One.

D. Problems of Methodology and Notes on Syrianus’ Methodology

While it is clear that Proclus adopts the bulk of his metaphysics fromhis teacher, it is difficult to sort through precisely what in his thought ispurely Syrianic and what is his own elaboration of Syrianus’ teaching.First of all, “fragment”, as a term used in this work could better bereplaced by the more accurate “testimonium.”The selections of Syrianusgiven in this collection as numbered fragments are testimonia, or reports,taken from Proclus’ commentaries on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides.The passages from Proclus and Damascius were gathered from sectionswhere they explicitly mention Syrianus with reference to either Plato’sTimaeus or Parmenides. Such a “fragment” collection, thus, poses thedifficulty that the teachings of Syrianus as gathered from Proclus andDamascius are all non-verbatim, and possibly, as we shall see, based onoral teachings, for the most part, rather than written commentaries. It isdifficult, thus, to know for certain how much of Proclus’ or Damascius’own opinions on philosophy are included in their reports of Syrianus.In addition, the work presented here attempts to determine Syrianus’

metaphysics based on the fragments of his teaching on the Timaeus andParmenides found in the writings of Proclus and Damascius. Although Ihope to expand this fragment collection at a later point, for now, com-mentaries on the Timaeus and Parmenides have been selected becausetheywere considered to be the summit of philosophical thought bymem-bers of the Athenian School of Platonism. Iamblichus, who proposed theorder of study at the Academy for Platonic dialogues,77 remarked on theimportance of the Timaeus and Parmenides:

76 Amelius makes the subject of the third hypothesis rational souls, the fourth irra-tional souls; Iamblichus identifies the subject of the third as the superior beings, the fourthas rational souls, and the fifth as secondary souls; Plutarch of Athens, Syrianus’ predeces-sor, identifies the third hypothesis as Soul.

77 Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae, .–: “We relatewhat the divine Iambli-chus did. Now he divided all the dialogues into twelve, some of which he termed

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“For indeed the divine Iamblichus is quite right in saying that the wholetheory of Plato is contained in these two dialogues, the Timaeus andParmenides; for the whole philosophic treatment of the things in thecosmos and above the cosmos has its best culmination in them, and nolevel (or system) of beings has been left uninvestigated.”78

For the most part, I stay within the confines of Proclus and Damas-cius’ commentaries on the Timaeus and Parmenides; these authors areespecially important to our understanding of Syrianus’ thought: Pro-clus, because he was the favorite pupil of Syrianus and disseminatedhis thought with little overt contradiction, and Damascius, because hisworks were, in turn, a commentary on Proclus. Syrianus’ fragments onthe Timaeus and Parmenides (–), are taken from Proclus’ reportsregarding his teacher’s opinions on various matters, which he makes inhisTimaeus and Parmenides commentaries.The last six fragments of Syr-ianus’ teachings on the Parmenides (fr. –) are taken fromDamascius’Commentary on the Parmenides andOnFirst Principles. Fragments foundin other texts, particularly those in Proclus’ Platonic Theology, are dis-cussed in the commentary on the selected fragments. Additionally, thesefragments are a fine example of Syrianus’ influential commentary style,in so far as he uses the method of providing a lemma for commenting.79Setting the parameters of a fragment proved difficult and may elicit

some debate. Proclus alerts us to Syrianus’ opinion on a given matter byreferring to the opinion of “E 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμ?ν”, “E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$-σκαλ�ς”, or “πατ0ρ”. Unlike Simplicius, however, who alerts the readerthat he is taking a direct account of Syrianus’ teaching, Proclus does notchange his vocabulary or syntax to indicate that he is quoting Syrianusdirectly.80 Other philosophers are frequently mentioned by name in the

physical, and others theological; again he reduced the twelve to two, the Timaeus andthe Parmenides, the Timaeus as head of the physical and the Parmenides as head ofthe theological dialogues.” Trans. O’Neill (). The Proleg. Phil. Plat next lists theten dialogues (in order of when they should first be read and studied): Alcibiades (itssubject being knowledge of the self), Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Phaedrus,Symposium, and Philebus (its subject matter being the Good), followed by the Timaeusand Parmenides (Proleg. –). These dialogues were arranged to proceed on a planecorresponding to the progress of mind. Westerink argues for the addition of the Sophistand the Statesman, betweenTht. and Phdr. See Westerink () . Proclus, In Alc. ,, credits Iamblichus also with deeming the ten dialogues to contain the foundation forPlato’s philosophy.

78 Trans. Dillon (). Iamblichus, In Tim, fr. Dillon (Proclus, In Tim. I, , ).79 Baltussen () .80 See Baltussen () . Here, Baltussen shows how Simplicus’ signals a near-

quotation of Syrianus’ words by changing vocabulary and style.

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Timaeus Commentary, although in the Parmenides commentary Proclusdoes not give his other authorities any such designation, but discussesthe opinions of “one group” of commentators, as opposed to “another”.81It is, however, possible to work out who Proclus is discussing based onwhat we know about the content of a commentator’s philosophy. Dillonpoints out that in Books VI and VII of Proclus’ Commentary on the Par-menides, Proclus frequently discusses commentators on a given passageusing the sequence of Porphyry—Iamblichus—Syrianus.82 While onlythe last commentator is mentioned by name, one can gather from con-text that the previous two are indeed Syrianus’ chief predecessors. Thefragments taken from Damascius’ works refer to Proclus as “the com-mentator”, but mention Syrianus by name. While in some of Damascius’commentaries he refers to Proclus and Syrianus without distinguishingbetween the two,83 in the fragments selected this tendency did not arise.Unlike Proclus, who is often not explicit about the author of philosophi-cal opinions he discusses,Damascius tends to name Proclus, Iamblichus,and Syrianus and is straightforward when it comes to comparing thethree. Damasicus, moreover, tends to give a more critical assessment ofhis predecessor thandoes Proclus. One problem that does arise, however,is that Damascius seems to introduce his own metaphysics, somewhatunconsciously, perhaps, into his description of Syrianus’ metaphysics.Once a given “fragment” taken from Proclus or Damascius’ commen-

taries is identified as a fragment, the next step consists in determiningwhere the fragment begins and ends. While the identification of a frag-ment’s beginning is, of course, clear—fragments begin when Proclus orDamascius name or refer to Syrianus and then discuss his opinion—,where a fragment leaves off is somewhat less clear, at least with respectto fragments found in Proclus’ commentaries. Generally, Proclus relayshis teacher’s view on a topic, which then dissolves into his own commen-tary. When Proclus assimilates his own view to that of Syrianus, he doesnot make a point of it. Sometimes a break in the text exists between theteacher and student marked by phrases such as “I believe” or “I think”,which indicate where Proclus begins his own commentary, but moreoften than not, change from a report on Syrianus’ teaching to Proclus’

81 One exception is Plutarch, who he denotes his “spiritual grandfather” (E 8μ)τερ�ςπρ�π$τωρ) in In Parm. , .

82 Dillon ().83 Damascius, In Phil., .–; .; Olympiodorus is also guilty of this: In Phd, ..

and ...

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own opinion is noted by no more than a move from indirect to directspeech. Other, more subtle, changes sometimes occur, and these are indi-cated in my commentary on individual fragments. It is impossible, how-ever, to select the exact instances where Proclus takes over his teacher’sopinion, but does not acknowledge Syrianus.84One indicator that Proclus assimilated his own opinion to Syrianus’

teaching was his use of γ$ρ with direct speech: this construction wasused when Proclus appropriated Syrianus’ opinion, fully agreeing with it.When Proclus makes a slight correction to Syrianus’ teaching, he tendsto use γ$ρ with the accusative and infinitive (indirect speech) to showthat he is reporting his teacher’s opinion. This “γ$ρ hypothesis”, used byDillon when he collected Iamblichus’ fragments,85 is tested further whenProclus disagrees with the opinions of other Platonists. For instance, inSyrianus In Tim. fr. Wear, Proclus uses γ$ρ with indirect speech toshow that he disagrees withTheodore and Plutarch of Athens, who arguethat the first birth is the single descent of souls into generation. For otherexamples, see notationsmade in individual fragmentswhere either directspeech or indirect speech appear.While use of direct or indirect speech, moreover, provides some in-

sight into the appropriation of teaching, use of the imperfect sheds lighton its transmission. In several instances, Proclus introduces Syrianus’opinionwith “�λ)γεν”.86 Use of the imperfectmay indicate that the teach-ingwas delivered orally.Thismethod is certainly in accordwith other evi-dence concerning teaching in the Platonic School under Syrianus, whois noted, along with his predecessor, Plutarch of Athens, for not havingwritten commentaries, but preferring to leave the writing to his students.In Marinus’ Life of Proclus, Marinus says that students were expected tocopy lecture notes and provide their own commentaries.87 In the Platonicschool, particularly in Alexandria, commentaries were often marked bythe formulaic phrase “apo phonês”, followed by the master’s name andthe name of the student auditor/copyist.88 Hermeias’ On the Phaedrus,for example, is a compilation of notes taken apo phonês from Syrianus’lecture on the Phaedrus.89 Another instance of a student recording his

84 Olympiodorus accuses Proclus of doing just this in In Phd. ..–.85 Dillon ().86 See Syrianus, In Tim. frs. , , , , , , , and Wear.87 Marinus, Life of Proclus, .88 Richard () .89 For a discussion of details of this text which feature characteristics of a lecture and

discussion, see Saffrey-Westerink () xxxi.

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teacher’s lectures occurs in Proclus’ PlatonicTheology, I.ff., where Pro-clus notes that unwritten doctrines sometimes had written conclusionsbased on them.90 InMarinus’ Life of Proclus, Marinus discusses themodeof teaching in theAthenian school, as well as themanner of commentary-making:

“In less than two whole years, he read with [Syrianus] the entire worksof Aristotle, logical, ethical, political, physical and the science of theologywhich transcends these. Once he had received sufficient direction in these,as in certain preliminary and lesser mysteries, Syrianus directed him themystagogy of Plato, in due sequence, and not, as the oracle says, ‘puttinghis foot across the threshold’, and caused him to behold the truly divinerites in Plato’s work, with the unclouded eyes of the soul and the spotlessvision of themind.Working day and night with tireless discipline and care,and writing down what was said in a comprehensive yet discriminatingmanner, Proclus made such progress in a short time that, when he wasstill in his twenty-eighth year, he wrote a great many treatises, which wereelegant and teeming with knowledge, especially the one on the Timaeus. Inthe course of these pursuits, his character also gained in beauty, acquiringthe virtues along with knowledge.”91

Here, Marinus reports how Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus waswritten based on Syrianus’ instruction.92 Proclus and Syrianus first readtogether writings of Aristotle and Plato, which Proclus then transmittedto writing in the form of a summary, to which he inserted his ownopinions. In Sheppard’s opening section of the sixth essay of Proclus’Commentary on the Republic, the description of Proclus’ method ofcommentary-making in that particular passage is useful as one exampleof Proclus’ method.93 She delineates four stages of how a commentarywas produced by Proclus, based on Proclus’ description of the occasionfor his th essay on the Republic in In Remp. .ff. The steps arescattered throughout the report; however, Sheppard arranged them in the

90 Proclus, PT I, , p. , ff. Saffrey-Westerink (): “But our guide to the truthconcerning the gods and ‘bosom companion’ (oaristês) of Plato, to borrow a term fromHomer [cf.Od. . ], having changedwhat was indeterminate in theory of the ancientsinto definiteness, and transforming their confusion of diverse ranks of being into a stateof intellectual distinctiveness, both in his oral discourses and in his treatises on thesesubjects, has urged us to maintain the division of these conclusions in accordance withtheir natural articulation, in order to apply them to the divine orders.”

91 Marinus, Life of Proclus, . trans. Edwards.92 It is uncertain whether Syrianus wrote a commentary on the Republic. See Proclus,

In Remp. II .ff. and II .ff., where Proclus refers to a possible commentary on theRepublic by Syrianus.

93 Sheppard () .

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following logical manner: ) a lecture by Syrianus (.), ) discussionsof Proclus and Syrianus on the lecture (.–), ) a lecture by Proclus,in this case, on the occasion of Plato’s birthday (.),94 and ) thetransmission of this lecture to written form comprises the sixth essayon the Republic as it stands today. Thus, Syrianus’ oral teaching wasin the form of lectures on various topics, followed by discussions withProclus.This is not to say that all of Syrianus’ teaching was unwritten. In

Marinus’ Life of Proclus, Marinus reports the following:“When I was reading the works of Orpheus in his presence, and hearingin his exegeses not only the thoughts of Iamblichus and Syrianus, butat the same time many others more germane to theology, I begged thephilosopher not to leave such inspired poetry uninterpreted, but to write amore perfect commentary on this also.His replywas that he had oftenbeeneager to write, but had been categorically forbidden by certain visions.For he said that he had seen his own master restraining him with threats.Meditating another stratagem, therefore, I besought him to make a note ofwhat he compiled, and when he had made his notes on the margin of thecommentaries, we made a single collation of them all, and the result wasthat there were many lines of notes and comments by him on Orpheus,even if in the event he did not do this on the whole of the divine myth oron all the rhapsodies.”95

It appears that Syrianus’ teachings had been recorded, although notfully.96 Proclus recorded the interpretations of Iamblichus and Syrianuson the Orphic writings in the form of scholia written on the margins of“his teacher’s books” (possibly Proclus’ lecture notes),which later formedProclus’ commentary on the Orphic writings. Proclus also refers to amonograph of Syrianus in which he interprets the myth of Zeus andHera on Mt. Ida.97 Proclus says that he excerpted this monograph andpresented the selected passages in summarised form (.–).

94 Sheppard lists these steps with their location on the text in () .95 Marinus, Life of Proclus, . trans. Edwards.96 This is a bit odd, as teachings on the great mysteries of the Orphic hymns and

Chaldean Oracles were just the sort of thing one may not want to record in writing. Inhis Life of Proclus , Marinus says that Proclus never studied the Orphic hymns withSyrianus, but instead studied Syrianus’ commentary on the hymns. It appears that thiscommentary must have been written and that Proclus picked it up at a later date. It ispossible that Syrianus wrote this commentary and it is also entirely possible that thecommentary was written by another student, although, if the latter were true, that factmight have been indicated elsewhere.

97 Proclus, In Remp. .–.; see Sheppard on this passage () .

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There is also a possibility that Syrianus may have written commen-taries on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides. Although Proclus does notexplicitly mention such commentaries, it is possible that Damascius hadaccess to commentaries by Syrianus. This possibility is discussed at InParm. Frs. , a, and , below.

E. Review of Scholarship

There has been a flurry of recent secondary literature given to Syrianus,led by A. Longo’s work on Syrianus’ Commentary on the Metaphysics.Longo’s Siriano e i principi della scienza (Naples, ) is a study of Syri-anus’sMetaphysics commentary, as are her articles “Le sostanze interme-die e le dimostrazioni astronomichenel prologo del commentodi Sirianosui libri M e N della ‘Metafisica’ di Aristotele” and “Siriano e i precedentipre-aristotelici del principio della contraddizione” both in Documenti estudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, and , respectively.Further, Longo, along with L. Corti, N. D’Andrès, D. Del Forno, E. Maffi,and A. Schmidhauser, edited the proceedings of a conference heldin Geneva on Syrianus, Syrianus et la Métaphysique de l’Antiquité Tar-dive: Actes duColloque International, Université deGenève, Septembre– Octobre (Naples, ).This important collection contains twentyarticles on aspects of Syrianus’ metaphysics, with the bulk of the articlesfocusing on Syrianus on Aristotle’sMetaphysics and Syrianus’ commentson the Parmenides. The articles that are especially noteworthy to thispresent study include, M. Frede, “Syrianus on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,”S. Klitenic Wear, “Syrianus’ Teachings on the Soul”, Steel, “Syrianus’Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides. The Time of the DivineSouls”, Dillon, “The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe Revealed:Syrianus’ Exegesis of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides”, L. VanCampe, “Syrianus and Proclus on the Attributes of the One in Plato’sParmenides,” J.-P. Schneider, “Les apories soulevées par Syrianus surla thèse de l’identité de l’un et de l’être (Syrianus, in metaph., pp. ,–, )”, O’Meara, “Le fondement du principe de non-contradictionchez Syrianus”, and P. d’Hoine, “Le commentaire de Proclus sur le Par-menide comme source du Περ- τ.ν �δε.ν λ γ�ς de Syrianus?” Anotherrecent treatment of Syrianus’ metaphysics appeared in Classical Quar-terly in (.),Wear’s “Syrianus the Platonist on Eternity and Time”.I. Mueller has made an important contribution to the study of Syrianus’concept of mathematics in “Syrianus and the Concept of Mathemati-

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cal Number”, in G. Bechtle-O’Meara (edd.), La Philosophie des Mathé-matiques de l’Antiquité Tardive, Éditions universitaires (Fribourg, ).Here, Mueller argues that Syrianus makes mathematical units or “mon-ads” the matter of number on which form is imposed.A number of pertinent editions have been published in the last several

years. Dillon and O’Meara recently published a much-needed transla-tion of Syrianus’ Commentary on the Metaphysics, Syrianus, On Aristo-tle’s ‘Metaphysics’ – and – (Ithaca, –). Steel has publisheda new edition of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides, Procli in Plato-nis ‘Parmenidem’Commentaria, tomi I–II, libros I–V continentes (Oxford,–). H. Tarrant, D.T. Runia, M. Share, and D. Baltzly have pub-lished a translation, with introduction and extensive notes for Proclus’Commentary on the Timaeus, vols. I-III (Cambridge, ).In the last ten years, the following major studies of Syrianus’ meta-

physics have been completed: C-P. Manolea’s PhD thesis, The HomericTradition in Syrianus, which was awarded in by the University ofLondon, was published in by Ant. Stamoulis Editions. The workis an engaging treatment of Syrianus’ use of Homeric interpretation andsheds light on a number of metaphysical aspects of Syrianus’ system, inaddition to setting forth his method of exegesis.With regard to Syrianus’metaphysics, two key articles byC.D’Ancona andC. Lunawere publishedin which outlined where Proclus has inherited Syrianic principlesin his philosophy.The articles are part of “La doctrine des principes: Syr-ianus comme source textuelle et doctrinale de Proclus”:98 the first part,“st Partie: Histoire du Probleme” is written by D’Ancona, and the sec-ond part, “nd Partie: Analyse des Textes”, by Luna. These studies focuson Syrianus’ Commentary on the Metaphysics, especially with respect tohis doctrine of peras and apeiria.Other important research on Syrianus includes R.L. Cardullo’s collec-

tion of Syrianus’ fragments onAristotle, as well as a number of articles onthe subject of Syrianus’ commentaries on Aristotle, published in .99Sheppard’s Studies on the th and th Essays of Proclus’ Commentary onthe Republic, published in , includes a chapter, “Proclus’ Debt to Syr-ianus”, which attributes various aspects of Proclus’ exegetical mode toSyrianus. The chapter proves helpful for study on metaphysics, more-over, because Sheppard analyses Homeric passages with respect to the

98 Segonds () and Steel ().99 Cardullo () – and () – and () –.

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metaphysics which Syrianus claims the passages uncover. Sheppard dis-cussesperas and apeiria, also, as the topic of her article “Monad andDyadas Cosmic Principles in Syrianus,” in H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd,eds., Soul andThe Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism. Syrianus, Pro-clus, and Simplicius (Liverpool, ). In the first work, Sheppard inves-tigates Syrianus’ cosmology with respect to his harmonisation of poetryand theology. In the second, she investigates the importance of peras andapeiria in Syrianus’ metaphysics.Saffrey and Westerink have discussed Syrianus’ contribution to Pro-

clus’ thought in their edition of the Platonic Theology (–):vol. III contains a discussion of his exegesis of the second hypothesis onthe Parmenides (xl–lii); vols. IV (xxix–xxxvii) and VI (xx–xxviii) discussSyrianus’ exegesis on the Phaedrus.H. Baltussen’s book,Philosophy andExegesis in Simplicius:TheMethod-

ology of a Commentator () has enlightened several readings of indi-vidual fragments, particularly with respect to how Proclus introducesSyrianus’ thought and evidence of the oral nature of Syrianus’ teachingwithin Proclus’ commentaries.Ground-breaking researchwas conducted by bothDodds and Praech-

ter over forty years ago on Syrianus. Dodds included a section on “Pro-clus and his Predecessors” (xviii–xxvi) in his introduction to The Ele-ments of Theology (Oxford, ), where he notes several Syrianic inno-vations which Proclus adopts in his metaphysics. Praechter’s survey ofSyrianic thought in “Syrianos”, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie d.klass. Altertumswissenschaft, () .A, cols. – is a semi-nal work which provided a look into Syrianus’ thought, especially withrespect to his Metaphysics Commentary. This article surveys Syrianus’works, life, and philosophy, including his teaching on the Soul, Demi-urge, and logic, among other topics. Praechter’s article, “Richtun-gen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus”, Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie,Collectanea, vol. VII, (Hildesheim-NewYork, ) contrasts major fig-ures in later Neoplatonism (including, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus,and Proclus) on a number of issues. He traces Platonism from its rootsin Plotinus and Porphyry to the Syrian and Athenian schools, the theur-gic Platonism of Julian, up to Eastern and Western Christian Platonists.Such a tremendous survey is handled through a series of themes, includ-ing modes of textual interpretation.

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F. Notes on Present Edition

The translations of Syrianus, In Tim. fr. – Wear and In Parm. fr. –Wear aremine, while I have adoptedDillon andMorrow’s translationsof Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides (Princeton, ) (hereafter,Morrow-Dillon) for Syrianus, In Parm. fr. – with negligible changes.The recent translations of Proclus’Commentary on the Timaeus, coveringIn Tim. I.-II. (In Tim. frs. – Wear) by H. Tarrant, D. Runia,M. Share, and D. Baltzly (Cambridge, –), unfortunately, werepublished after I had completedmy translations. I was able tomake use ofthese skilful translations during the revision period of this book, as notedthroughout fragments –. For the lemma for In Tim. frs. –, I usedR.G. Bury’s translations of the Timaeus (Cambridge, ) and for thelemma for fragments In Parm. –, I used Morrow-Dillon’s translations,for In Parm. –, I used H.N. Fowler’s translation of the Parmenides(Cambridge, ).For theGreek texts, I have used and reproduced the following: for Syr-

ianus, In Tim. fr. – Wear, I have used E. Diehl’s In Platonis TimaeumCommentarii, vols (Leipzig, --.) For Syrianus, In Parm. fr. – Wear, I used Proclus, Procli in Platonis ‘Parmenidem’ Commentaria,vols. I–III, ed. Steel (Oxford, –) For Syrianus, In Parm. fr. – Wear, I used Damascius, Traité des Premiers Principes vol. –, ed.Westerink and J. Combès (Paris, ) and Damascius,Commentaire duParménide de Platon, vols. – ed. Westerink and Combès (Paris, ).For Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear, I used Ruelle, Damascii Dubitationeset Solutiones. De primis principiis In Parmenidem (Paris, ).The following terms have been capitalised throughout the work: cos-

mic entities (including Soul, Being, Limit, Demiurge, etc.), as well as“Teacher” and “Master”, when the reference is to Syrianus.

FRAGMENTS

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 1

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

ΕFς, δC�, τρε9ςG E δH δ" τ)ταρτ�ς 8μ9ν, I (�λε Τ�μαιε, π�5 τ.ν A*Hςδαιτυμ νων, τ+ ν5ν δH 6στιατ ρων; [Tim. Α]

L δH E 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμMν �ν τ�Cτ�ις �π)κρινε, τα5τα 8μ9ν Nητ)α τ1.Πλ$τωνι δια(ερ ντως 6π μενα. Oλεγε δ’ �Pν, �τι �σ1ω αQ <κρ�$σειςπερ- σεμν�τ)ρων γ�γν�νται κα- �ψηλ�τ)ρων πραγμ$των, τ�σ�Cτ1ω τ7μHν τ.ν <κρ�ατ.ν �λασσ�5ται πλR*�ς, μυστικ?τερ�ν δH κα- <π�ρρη-τ τερ�ν πρ εισιν E λ γ�ς. κα- δι+ τα5τα �ν μHν τSR πρ�τ)ρTα τRς π�λι-τε�ας παραδ σει κατ+ τ"ν �ν Πειραιε9 Uυν�υσ�αν π�λVς E <κρ�ατ0ς,κα- �W γε Xν ματ�ς τυA ντες 4UG �ν δH τSR δευτ)ρTα κατ+ τ"ν Σωκρ$-τ�υς <(0γησιν τ)τταρες �Q δεA μεν�ι τ�Vς λ γ�υςG �ν δH ταCτSη κα- Eτ)ταρτ�ς <π�λε�πεται, τρε9ς δH �Q <κρ�ατα�, κα- �σ1ω κα*αρ?τερ�ςa

κα- ν�ερ?τερ�ς E λ γ�ς, τ�σ�Cτ1ω συστ)λλεται E <κρ�ατ0ς.πανταA�5 μHν γ+ρ 8 �(ηγ�υμ)νη μ�ν$ςb �στινG <λλ’ �π�υ μHν <γωνι-

στικ.ςG δι7 κα- �Q <κρ�ατα- τ τε < ριστ�ν OA�υσι κα- τ7 διωρισμ)ν�νε�ς πλR*�ς �κτειν μεν�ν, �ν 1Y τ7 περιττ7ν τ1. <ρτ�1ω συμπ)πλεκταιcG�π�υ δH <(ηγηματικ.ςd μ)ν, �Zπω 〈δ’〉e <πηλλαγμ)νης τRς μ$Aηςκα- τ.ν <γ?νων τ.ν διαλεκτικ.νG δι7 κα- �Q <κρ�ατα- τ)τταρες, τRςτετρ$δ�ς δι+ μHν τ7 τετραγωνικ7ν κα- τ7 πρ7ς τ"ν μ�ν$δα συγγενHςτ"ν Eμ�ι τητα κα- τ7 ταDτ7ν �A�Cσης, δι+ δH τ"ν τ�5 <ρτ��υ (Cσιν τ"ν6τερ τητα κα- τ7 πλR*�ςG 〈�π�υ δH〉 �USηρημ)νης μHν >π$σης <γωνιστι-κRς διδασκαλ�ας, <π�(αντικ.ς δH κα- �(ηγητικ.ς τRς *εωρ�ας �(αι-ν�μ)νηςG δι7 κα- 8 τρι+ς ��κε�α τ�9ς �π�δεA�μ)ν�ις αDτ0ν, κατ+ π$ντατSR μ�ν$δι συμ(υ�μ)νη, τ7 περιττ ν, τ7 πρ.τ�ν, τ7 τ)λει�νG [ς γ+ρτ.ν <ρετ.ν α\ μHν �ν μαA�μ)ν�ις �(εστ0κασι κα- μετρ�5σιν αDτ.ντ"ν μ$Aην, α\ δH Aωρ���υσι μHν <π7 τ.ν μαA�μ)νων, �Zπω δH αDτ.ν

a κα� ν�ερ�τερ�ς om M b γ�ρ ��ηγ�υμ�νη 〈�〉 μ�ν�ς ci Kroll c συμπλ�κεται Pd ��ηγηματικ�ςNe δ’ add Kroll

One, two, three—but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of our guestsof yesterday, our hosts of today?

But we should relate the judgement of our Master on this question, sinceit accords particularly well with the doctrine of Plato. He said then, thatin so much as the expositions concern more holy and exalted matters,in corresponding measure the number of pupils is diminished and thediscourse proceeds in a manner more secret and more ineffable. And forthis reason, in the first description of the state, during the gathering in thePiraeus, the audience was large; as regards named people, it amounted tosix. In the second, in Socrates’ narration, those listening to his words werefour. But in this present discussion, the fourth person drops out, and thelisteners are three, and so to the extent that the discourse is more pureand intellective, so the audience is reduced further.For the expository element1 is in all cases a monad: on the first occa-

sion, however, he proceeds in a mode of contention, and for this reasonthe listeners are characterised both by indeterminacy and by division intomultiplicity, in which the odd is interwoven with the even. On the sec-ond occasion, he proceeds through narration, but not apart from con-tention and the combat of dialectic, and on this account, the auditorsare four, since the tetrad by reason of its squareness and its affinity tothe monad, possesses likeness and sameness, but on the other hand, onaccount of its evenness, it possesses otherness and multiplicity. On thethird occasion, all contentious teaching is eliminated and the expositionis in consequence characterized by straight exposition and instruction.For this reason, the triad is suitable to the nature of those receiving it,since according to every aspect it is of like nature with the monad, beingcharacterized by the odd, primacy and perfection. For even as amongthe virtues, some are meant for contention and bestow measurement onthe contentious and others are meant to separate out the contentious

1 Tarrant translates “expository element” as “number in charge” () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

παντελ.ς <π)στησαν, α\ δH π$ντη κεAωρισμ)ναι τυγA$ν�υσιν, �]τωδ" κα- τ.ν λ γων �\ μHν <γωνιστικ�� τιν)ς ε�σιν, �\ δH <π�(αντικ��,�\ δH μ)σ�ι πως <μ(�τ)ρωνG �\ μHν τSR ν�ερT γαλ0νSη κα- τSR ν�0σει τRςψυARς πρ�σ0κ�ντες, �\ δH τα9ς δ�Uαστικα9ς �νεργε�αις, �\ δH τα9ς μετα-UV τ�Cτων �ωα9ς. κα- δ" κα- τ.ν <κρ�ατ.ν �\ μHν πρ7ς τ+ς �ψηλ�τ)-ρας <κρ�$σεις OA�υσι συμμ)τρως, �\ δH πρ7ς τ+ς Aαμαι�ηλ�τ)ρας. κα-�Q μHν τ.ν μει� νων <κρ�ατα- κα- πρ7ς τ+ς καταδεεστ)ρας <παντ^ν�F�� τ) ε�σιν, �Q δH πρ7ς τ+ς �λ$ττ�υς πε(υκ τες <δυνατ�5σι πρ7ς τ+ςσεμν�τ)ρας. �]τω κα- τ.ν <ρετ.ν E μHν τ+ς με���υς OAων OAει κα- τ+ς�λ$ττ�υς, E δH τα9ς �(ειμ)ναις κ�σμη*ε-ς �D π$ντως κα- τ.ν τελει�τ)-ρων �π0��λ�ς γ)γ�νε.

τ� �Pν Oτι *αυμαστ ν, ε� E τ.ν περ- π�λιτε�ας λ γων _κρ�αμ)ν�ς<π�λ)λειπται τRς περ- τ�5 παντ7ς <κρ�$σεως; μ^λλ�ν δH π.ς �Dκ<ναγκα9�ν �ν τ�9ς �α*υτ)ρ�ις τ.ν λ γων �λ$ττ�υς ε`ναι τ�Vς παρε-π�μ)ν�υς; π.ς δH �D Πυ*αγ ρει�ν τ7 δι$(�ρα μ)τρα τ.ν <κρ�$σεων<(ωρ�σ*αι; κα- γ+ρ τ.ν ε�ς τ7 Eμακ ει�νa (�ιτ?ντων �\ μHν �α*υ-τ)ρων, �\ δH �πιπ�λαι�τ)ρων aπτ�ντ� δ�γμ$των. π.ς δH �D τ1. Πλ$-τωνι σCμ(ων�ν <σ*)νειαν α�τιασαμ)ν1ω τRς <π�υσ�ας; 8 γ+ρ <δυνα-μ�α τRς ψυARς πρ7ς τ+ *ει τερα ν�0ματα τ.ν �ψηλ�τ)ρων 8μ^ς <(�-στησι συν�υσι.νG �π�υ δ" A?ραν OAει κα- τ7 <κ�Cσι�νG 6κ�Cσι�ν μHνγ+ρ π^ν τ7 μει� νως 8μ^ς b(ελ�5ν, 8 δH τ.ν τελεωτ)ρων <π πτω-σις <κ�Cσι�νG μ^λλ�ν δH α]τη μHν �DA 6κ�Cσι�ν, 8 δH �D μ ν�ν <π�-στ^σα τ.ν μει� νων <γα*.ν, <λλ+ κα- ε�ς τ"ν <πειρ�αν �πενεA*ε9σατRς κακ�ας <κ�Cσι�ν.

δι7 κα- E Τ�μαι�ς �DA 6κ ντα (ησ-ν <π�λε�πεσ*αι τRσδε τRς συν-�υσ�ας τ ν τ)ταρτ�νG �D γ+ρ �]τως <π�λ)λειπται, [ς <π στρ�(�ςπ$ντη *εωρ�ας, <λλ’ [ς τ+ με��ω μυε9σ*αι μ" δυν$μεν�ς. τ7ν μHν�Pν τ.ν περ- κ�σμ�π�ι�ας λ γων <κρ�ατ"ν κα- τ.ν περ- π�λιτε�ας<κρ�^σ*αι δυνατ ν, τ7ν δH τ.ν 〈περ-〉 π�λιτε�ας <νασA μεν�ν δι+δυν$μεως �περ��λ"ν <π�λε�πεσ*αι τ.ν περ- τ�5 παντ7ς <κρ�$σεωντ.ν <δυν$των �στ�. δι’ Oνδειαν 3ρα κα- �D δι’ �περ�A0ν, cς (ασ�

a ε�ς τ� omM �μ�κ�ει�ν Μ| cf. Iambl. uit. Pyth. cum add. Nauckii.

text and translation

elements, but they are not entirely free from them, while others again arecompletely separated, so among discourses, some are agonistic, others arepurely expository, while others are intermediate between the two. Someare proper to the intellective calm and to the intellectual activity of thesoul, but others are related to the activities of the opinionative faculty,still others with the levels of life intermediate between the two. And then,among the listeners, some are more suitable for loftier lessons, but othersto the more low-grade lessons. And those listeners capable of taking inthe loftier doctrines are able to deal also with the lower, but those whoby nature are adapted to the lesser are unable to grasp the more seriousdoctrines. And so, among the virtues, he who possesses the higher alsohas the lesser, but hewho is adornedwith the lower virtues, is not entirelyin all cases fitted to the more perfect.What wonder is it then if someone who was an auditor of the dis-

courses on the state is left out of the lecture on the universe? Or rather,how is it not necessary that in the more profound of the discourses theauditors are fewer? And how is the difference in the quantity of auditorsat the various sessions not a Pythagorean trait? For among those whoattend the lecture-hall of the Pythagoreans, some are able to grasp theprofound, but others themore superficial teachings. And how does it notaccord with Plato to give as a reason for absence an illness? For the inca-pacity of the soul with regard tomore divine concepts keeps us away fromloftier discourses. And thus even the involuntary has a place. For the vol-untary is everything which gives us benefit in more important respects,but the falling away from what is more perfect is involuntary—or ratherthis fall is not voluntary, but that which not only separates us from thebetter goods, but actually is borne away to the unlimitedness of evil isinvoluntary.It is for this reason, then, that Timaeus says that the fourth is absent

from the conversation “not voluntarily”. Thus he is not absent, as beingcompletely turned away from contemplation, but simply in not beingable to be initiated into the higher mysteries. Thus, the idea that theauditor of the discourses of the creation of the world is able to attend todiscourses on politics, but the auditor of discourses on politics is perhapsabsent through an excess of power,2 from discourses on the universe, isquite impossible. It is through lack of force and not through superiority,

2 “δι+ δυν$μεωσ �περ��λ0ν” (.) seems to be Iamblichus’ description (.). Cf.Festugière’s note, () , note .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

τινες, E τ)ταρτ�ς <π�λ)λειπται τ.ν πρ�κειμ)νων λ γων, κα- τ"ν <σ*)-νειαν �D τ.ν 3λλων πρ7ς αDτ7ν <συμμετρ�αν, <λλ’ αDτ�5 πρ7ς τ�Vς3λλ�υς ](εσιν Nητ)�νG Oστω μHν γ$ρ 8 <δυναμ�α κα- �π- τ.ν <π7 τ�5ν�ητ�5 κατι ντων κα- �π- τ.ν <ναγ�μ)νων �κ τRς *εωρ�ας τ.ν α�σ*η-τ.ν, �Wαν E �ν Π�λιτε�Tα Σωκρ$της [VII ΑΒ] Qστ ρησενG <λλ’ E τ.νπ�λιτικ.ν λ γων <κρ�ατ"ς γεγ�νMς �Dκ dν δι’ �περ�A"ν 3γνωστ�ντ�9ς παρ�5σιν <π�λε�π�ιτ� τRς τ.ν (υσικ.ν *εωρ�ας.

Commentary

Proclus provides an interpretation of Timaeus A in which Socratesasks his friend Critias and his two guests, Timaeus of Locri and Hermo-crates of Syracuse, for the whereabouts of a fourth unnamed guest:“One, two, three, where’s the fourth?” The four had attended Socrates’exposition on the ideal constitution the previous day. Before we arrive atSyrianus’ metaphysical interpretation of themissing fourth, Proclus runsthrough the opinions of previous interpreters of the Timaeus: namely,that of Porphyry, Iamblichus, and the grammarians.Porphyry gives an “ethical” interpretation to the text (.–),4 in so

far as he draws various ethical lessons. Iamblichus is named next (.–) and he is reported to have given a metaphysical interpretation ofthe Timaeus A . Proclus cites Iamblichus as saying that the absentguest is skilled in contemplating intelligible reality, and is thus unsuitedfor concerning himself with the sensible world. Iamblichus criticizesPorphyry’s moral, “political”, interpretation because the Timaeus is aphysical dialogue (.). Iamblichus’s criticism of Porphyry is givenas an indirect quotation (introduced with a participle, rather than aninfinitive) and it seems that the above Porphyry passage may have beentaken from Iamblichus, although the Porphyry passage does not containimplicit criticism.

4 On salient features of Neoplatonic exegesis, see Praechter () ff.

text and translation

as some say, that the fourth is absent from the present discussion, andone must declare that the “sickness” is not due to the others’ lack ofsymmetry with him, but to his inferiority to others. Let us grant thatthere is incapacity both for those descending from the intelligible and forthose being led up from the contemplation ofmaterial things, as Socratesreports in theRepublic (VII AB). Butwhoever is the auditor of lessonson political matters would not be absent from the teaching on physics onaccount of an excess of power, which was unknown to those present.3

3 Line . includes �`μαι, thus concluding Syrianus’ portion of the commentary andbeginning Proclus’ own opinion.

The next group of interpreters listed (though prior historically) arethe grammarians, whom Proclus praises for bringing difficulties to thereader’s attention. The primary interest of this group is identifying themissing fourth by name, and they proceedwith an historical/literal inter-pretation of the text. Aristocles of Rhodes (.–) proposes that theabsent one is Theaetetus, but Proclus argues that Theaetetus was ill ina different dialogue, hardly grounds for making him the absent partyin this one (.). Ptolemy the Platonist (.–) identified the miss-ing guest with Cleitophon, a suggestion Proclus calls “absurd” (.–): Socrates reports that Cleitophon at the time of the discussion hadreturned from his journey to the Piraeus, so he certainly could not haveattended. Dercyllides (.–) thinks that themissing one is Plato him-self, who had been absent during the time of Socrates’ death, as notedin the Phaedo (B). As with Aristocles of Rhodes’ suggestion, Proclusargues that the dates of Plato’s supposed absence and Socrates’ death donot accord (.). Proclus prefers Atticus’ identification of the miss-ing person as one of a number of Timaeus’ companions (.–).Socrates asks Timaeus where the fourth is and it is Timaeus who makesthe excuses. Timaeus’ response, according to Atticus, makes it clear thatthe absence is forced and involuntary.The account of Syrianus’ view that follows is a return to Iamblichus’

metaphysical interpretation.The fragment is quite extensive (.–.)and introduces four topics: Platonic paedagogy; numerology; the gradesof virtue; and the concept of voluntary and involuntary. To the Platonicmind, these topics are interdependent. By reading Platonic theological

syrianus, in tim. fr.

texts properly, the soul becomes ordered and able to live according tovirtue;5 likewise, the numbers themselves contain the principles for anethical life.6 All of these concepts, in turn, reveal demiurgic activity,as both the numbers and the virtues of the soul constitute an ethicalcosmology.Before elaborating on the particulars of Syrianus’ fragment here, it is

perhaps helpful to go over the connection between number and virtue inthe Platonic school. Syrianus uses Pythagorean numerology to interpretthe number of guests listening to the Socratic discourse. Pythagoreanismwas widespread in the later Platonic schools,7 and Syrianus seems tohave been influenced by the works of Nicomachus of Gerasa, as wellas Iamblichus’ Pythagorean Sequence. Syrianus refers to the writings ofboth Iamblichus and Nicomachus8 and he mentions two of Iamblichus’Pythagorean works, Περ- τRς Πυ*αγ�ρικRς αQρ)σεως (On the Pythag-orean Sect or On Pythagoreanism, as it is better known) and 8 τ.νΠυ*αγ�ρε�ων δ�γμ$ των συναγωγ0 (The Collection of PythagoreanDoctrines).9 Nicomachus’ work is important for drawing parallels be-tween mathematical and ethical principles. For Nicomachus, virtue liesin the mathematical mean:

“For in the realm of the greater there arises excesses, overreaching, andsuperabundance, and in the less need, deficiency, privation, and lack; butin that which lies between the greater and the less, namely, the equal, are

5 On this topic, see Coulter ().6 Mueller () –.7 For a general account of Pythagoreanism on this point, see O’Meara ().8 Syrianus, In Met. , –:

Ε� δ) τινι κα- τRς <νελ�Uεως κα- διεU�δικωτ)ρας �(ηγ0σεως Iν <νεγρ$ψαμεν πρ�-�λημ$των Oρως �ν)στακται (ιλ�μα*0ς, �ντυAMν �eτ�ς τα9ς τε Νικ�μ$A�υ συναγω-γα9ς τ.ν Πυ*αγ�ρε�ων δ�γμ$των κα- τα9ς τ�5 *ε��υ 'Ιαμ�λ�A�υ περ- αDτ.ν τ�Cτωνπραγματε�αις <π�πλ0σει τ7ν Oρωτα, τ�5 μεν Qστ�ρικ.ς gπαντα κα- (ιλαλ0*ως <(η-γ�υμ)ν�υ, τ�5 δε κατασκευα9ς κα- <π�δε�Uεσι κα- ν�ερωτ)ραις �πι��λα9ς αDτ+ δια-κ�σ0σαντ�ς.

Nicomachus of Gerasa was a contemporary of Numenius, best known for four works onmathematics, Introduction to Arithmetic,Manual of Harmony, Geometrical Introduction,and theTheologoumena. The last work assimilated theology and ethics with mathematicsfor an explanation of virtue. Syrianus refers to the title, On Pythagoreanism in In Herm.I , –; On the Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines appears in In Met. , ; , .There is a rather extensive list of commentaries on this work, from Iamblichus’ importantIn Nicomachi Arithmeticam Introductionem Liber, to Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville’sversions, through the medium of Boethius’ Latin version. See O’Meara () .

9 Syrianus refers to the title, On Pythagoreanism in In Herm. I , –; On theCollection of Pythagorean Doctrines appears in In Met. , ; , .

commentary

virtues, health, moderation, propriety, beauty and the like, to which theaforesaid form of number, the perfect, is most akin.” (I. .)10

The mean refers to the Platonic and Aristotelian μετρ��ν as the vir-tuous measure between excessive qualities; e.g., courage is the meanbetween rashness and cowardice. Nicomachus places this understand-ing of virtue as moderation within themathematical realm of the perfectnumber.11 Numbers contain the code for virtuous conduct, with particu-lar numbers representing particular virtues, such as “five” indicating jus-tice.12 These aspects of Nicomachean Pythagoreanism were adopted byIamblichus,13 who, following Nicomachus, placed theology as the stagefollowing preparatory mathematics. Syrianus obtained his knowledgeof Pythagorean arithmetic14 through Iamblichus’ On Pythagoreanism,book IV15 and cites the Sacred Discourses, a book of Pythagorean the-ology attributed to Pythagoras.16In .–, Syrianus gives an account of the cosmos based on Pyth-

gaorean number theory.17 He begins by saying that the audience duringthe previous day’s talk on the ideal state amounted to six.The number sixhere refers to the Pythagorean arithmetical representation for the physi-cal world, six being the total of the first even (two) multiplied by the firstodd (three): here “odd is interwoven with the even.” It is the first perfect

10 �ν μHν γ$ρ τ1. πλε��νι αW τε �περ��λα- κα- �περκπτ?σεις κα- περισσ τηες γ�ν�ν-ται, Oν δε τ1. �λ$ττ�νι αQ 4νδειαι κα- Oνδειαι κα- �λλε�ψεις κα- στερ0σεις κα- Xλιγ�εU�αι�ν δε μετ$Uυ τ�5 πλ)�ν κα- τ�5 Oλαττ�ν κειμ)νω, � Oστιν hσ1ω <ρεται τε κα- �γιε9αι κα-μετρι τητες κα- εDπρ)πειαι κα- κ$λλη κα- τ$ =μ�ια. Iν γενικ?τατ�ν τ7 λ)A*εν τ�5<ρι*μ�5 ε`δ�ς τ7 τ)λει�ν. Translation D’Ooge () .

11 Nicomachus, Introduction, I, , , . This alludes to Euclid’s definition, Elem. VII,: “A perfect number is one that is equal to its own parts.” For instance, Nicomachus tellsus that six has the factors , , and these added together make six. See Introd. I, , .D’Ooge () .

12 D’Ooge () .13 Iamblichus’ major commentary on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic, On

Pythagoreanism, is divided into nine books. See the description of Iamblichus’ use ofNicomachus in D’Ooge () ff., including the summary of Iamblichus’ referencesto Nicomachus in his Commentary at p. .

14 See O’Meara () on this topic, particularly for references.15 On Pyth. IV, , – = Iamblichus, In Nic. , –; cf. Syrianus, In Met. ,

–, = = Iamblichus, In Nic. , –; Syrianus, In Met. , – = Iamblichus, InNic. , –.

16 Syrianus, In Met. , –; , ; , ; , .17 See Dillon-O’Meara () , on the two kinds of mathematical numbers: one

is monadic and made up of units, the other is substantial, and corresponds to form.Syrianus, In Met. , –; , –. On Pythagorean numbers and the creation of theuniverse, see Burkert ().

syrianus, in tim. fr.

number, and was often identified with soul.18 In Pythagorean cosmol-ogy, the active principle of the monad (which he mentions in the nextline) acts on the number six as the physical universe and imposes def-inition on the indefinite.19 By referring to the audience as the physicaluniverse, Syrianus places the majority in the category of the unformedand hence uninitiated. At the time of the second narration, however, theaudience has dropped to four. Syrianus likens the tetrad to themonad byits squareness, but finds it akin tomultiplicity because of its evenness.Thefirstmembers of the tetrad are the “monad itself ” and “dyad itself ”, whichcontains the intellectual decad of forms.20This tetrad contains the intelli-gible decad of forms. Hence, the tetrad signifies a metaphysical rank justbelow the monad. Next, Syrianus calls the triad “suitable to the natureof those receiving it” as it is the mean: a combination of odd and evennumbers. The triad is the most similar to the monad as a recombinationof monads.21 On a metaphysical level, it seems possible that this triad,that is most similar to a monad, could be the Iamblichean triad of Limit,Unlimitedness, and their combination. The henads act as the content ofthe combination of Limit and Unlimitedness, with the lowest level of thehenadicworld, being the highest of the noetic world. Iamblichus includesa monad and a dyad, as well as a triad containing the divine numberswhich are unities.22 Syrianus likewise speaks of forms prior to demiur-gic (intellectual) forms, between unified and essential numbers (In Met., –; , ).The triad, following the tetrad (ormonad and dyad)seems to exist on a henadic level.23 Mueller has argued persuasively thatfor Syrianus, units of mathematicals are monads which must have formimposed on them as triad, pentad, heptad, etc.Thesemonads, moreover,are our souls, while a higher unit exists outside the soul in the intelligibleworld (In Met. , –; , –).24

18 Iamblichus,Theologoumena Arithmeticae, p. ff. See D’Ooge () .19 According to the Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae, a document appearing after

Proclus and perhaps belonging to the Alexandrian School, auditors in Platonic dialogueswere thought to be “objects of discursive reasoning”, as the rational world is the image ofthe intelligible world (XIII).Thismode of Platonic exegesis, although later than Syrianus’,reflects Syrianus’ interpretation of the audience as the arithmological intelligible realm.

20 Sheppard ().21 D’Ooge () .22 O’Meara () .23 Proclus, In Parm. .–, PT I, lxxxvi. See O’Meara () .24 Mueller () ; see also Dillon-O’Meara, () .

commentary

In .ff., Syrianus enters a discourse on the three levels of virtues.Plotinus first systematised25 virtues in Ennead I., where he addressedTheaetetus AB, in which virtue is not the exercise of the rational overthe irrational, as we see in the Republic, but “likeness to God.”26 Here,Plotinus divided virtue into three kinds:27 the civic, a level of virtue basedon practical wisdom, discursive reasoning, and control of emotions;28purificatory, the virtue that enables the soul to act apart from the body’sinfluences—this virtue is an intermediary one, as the soul is still notgodlike, as it continues to possess an irrational part;29 and the highervirtue, marked by the soul’s activity towards the intellect, its self-control,and its freedom.30 The higher virtues alone deify the soul, although allvirtues are contained in the higher stage.31In Sententiae , Porphyry further formalizes the Plotinian scale of

virtues, which he arranges according to the degree to which they divinizethe human soul. As with Plotinus, his virtues range from the political,through the cathartic, to the “paradigmatic”. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyryis more explicit on the issue of how virtues affect the soul versus theintellect, so that the lower virtues, such as the political and cathartic,relate to the soul, whereas the higher act on the intellect. Porphyry’shighest level of virtue, “the paradigmatic”, is really an archetype of virtue,not clearly recognized by Plotinus. This is taken up and elaborated bySyrianus.

25 Dillon () .26 Also the definition given by Alcinous in Didaskalikos, chapter .27 The passage of Plotinus cited here adapts the Stoic theory of grades of virtue.

Plotinus, however, seems to complicate matters a bit and the later Platonists follow hislead in doing so. For instance, inDidaskalikos , Alcinous divides virtue into the perfectand the non-perfect. Non-perfect virtues use the same name as the perfect virtue, suchas “brave” even when referring to a rash man, as long as the non-perfect virtue bearsany similarity to the perfect virtue. He makes further distinctions by classifying typesof perfect virtues, as well. Also, Alcinous does not posit an intermediate virtue per se,although he does explain that an intermediate disposition allows one to be virtuous(and hence possess perfect virtue) and vicious at various times—as he rightly says mostmen are. Of the perfect virtues, some are predominant, referring to natural qualities inRemp. II C, and others are subsidiary, which are obtained from knowledge. Generally,however, the Stoics, Middle Platonists, Plotinus and Syrianus all build from the samePlatonic principle as seen in the Republic that the virtues are epistemai. See Dillon’scommentary () §, .

28 Plotinus, Enn. . . , –.29 Plotinus, Enn. . . .30 Plotinus, Enn. . . .31 Plotinus, Enn. . . , ff.; Proclus ET prop. , the higher grades contain the lower

and so contain the qualities and powers of them.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

In .ff., Syrianus distinguishes between intellective calm and intel-lective activity of the soul and the opinionative faculty. Although he usesthe terms noera and noeta to refer to these principles, it appears that thefirst two terms take on the samemeaning and that Syrianus does not useterms to differentiate between levels of metaphysical reality as opposedto baser opinion. As usual, Syrianus places an intermediary level betweenthe two. This finds its parallel in lines .ff. in his discussion of whichsort of listeners are more appropriate for particular lectures.After ., Diehl divides the text, suggesting that Syrianus ends here

and Proclus begins; this seems entirely possible, and Proclus seems togradually enter with his own opinion, but the division is still an artificialone, as there is no change from indirect to direct speech. This sectionseems to me to be very close to the thought of Syrianus and so I haveidentified it as Syrianic doctrine. In lines .ff., Syrianus discussesthe quantity of auditors as a Pythagorean trait in a way that recollectsIamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras (). Here, Iamblichus writes that themajority of Pythagoras’ followers were disciples called akousmatikoi, whoseemed to follow Pythagorean teaching less because of an intellectualor philosophical understanding of his doctrine, than out of a religiousfaith in him and his teachings. The minority were called mathematikoior “philosophers”, and they had a higher understanding of Pythagoras’teachings. Syrianus alludes to this division among Pythagoras’ pupils toshow a division among the early followers of Plato, although it seems thatthe basic division between pupils who understand philosophically andthosewho follow based on amuch lower understanding is fairly universaland much discussed in late antiquity.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 2

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

��πως δH δ" κατ+ δCναμιν εD*Vς γ�γν�ιν*’ [ς 3ριστ�ι τ+ς (Cσεις 4ωςτ�5G τCAην 8γ�υμ)ν�ις α�τ�αν τRς Uυλλ0Uεως; [Tim. DE]

E δ) γε 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ς πρ.τ�ν μHν _U��υ *εωρε9ν, �τι E Πλ$τωναDτ7ς πρ�σ)*ηκε τ7 Wνα [ς 3ριστ�ι γ�ν�ιντ� τ+ς (CσειςG δ)A�νταιγ+ρ �Q πα9δες Eμ�ι τητα (υσικ"ν <π7 τ.ν πατ)ρων κα- τRς εDγενε�αςμεταλαγA$ν�υσι τRς τ.ν γεννησαμ)νων κατ+ τ+ς (υσικ+ς <ρετ$ςG

Oπειτα κ<κε9ν� �νν�ε9ν, �τι ε� κα- μ" συγκατα�$λλεσ*αι τ�9ς σπ)ρ-μασιν τ+ς ψυA+ς <λη*)ς, <λλ+ κατ’ <U�αν γε ε`ναι τ"ν τ.ν Xργ$νωνδιαν�μ0νG �D γ+ρ ε�ς τ+ τυA ντα =ργανα αQ ψυAα- π^σαι ε�σ�ικ���ν-ται, <λλ’ 6κ$στη ε�ς τ7 6αυτSR πρ�σRκ�νG �σ*λ+ μ)ν (ησιν ��μηρ�ς [i].

�σ*λ7ςa Oδυνε, A)ρεια δH Aε�ρ�νι δ σκεν.Oτι δH cσπερ E τελεστ"ς σCμ��λα 3ττα τ�9ς <γ$λμασι περιτι*ε-ς

�πιτηδει τερα αDτ+ κα*�στησιν ε�ς μετ�υσ�αν δυν$μεων �περτ)ρων,�]τω δ" κα- 8 (Cσις 8 �λη τ+ σ?ματα πλ$ττ�υσα τ�9ς (υσικ�9ς λ γ�ις<γ$λματα τ.ν ψυA.ν 3λλην gλλ�ις �πιτηδει τητα 〈�ν〉σπε�ρει πρ7ς3λλων κα- 3λλων ψυA.ν �π�δ�A0ν, <μειν νων τε κα- Aειρ νωνG

a σ!λ�ς om C

And in order that, to the best of our power, so that they might at oncebecome as good as possible… .seeing that they will ascribe the allotmentto chance?

Our teacher, however, first wished to bring to our attention the fact thatPlato himself added the phrase “in order that they might be engenderedwith the best possible natures”; for children receive a physical likenessfrom their parents and they acquire a share of the good breeding of theirparents on the level of natural excellences.Then, secondly, one should take into consideration that, even if it is not

true that souls are not emitted with sperm, the distribution of bodies isaccording to merit. For all souls are not established in bodies by chance,but each soul into the body that suits it. For, as Homer says, “the goodone put on the good (armour), but gave the worse to the worse.”1And further, just as the theurgist,2 by attaching certain symbols to

statues, makes them more receptive to participation in higher powers,even so the Universal Nature, in shaping the bodies as receptacles forsouls bymeans of natural reason-principles,3sows one or other bodywitha receptivity for the reception of one kind of soul or another, some soulsbeing better and others worse.

1 Homer, Il. XIV.. This refers to a scene in the Iliad where, at the bidding ofPoseidon, the Greek leaders order the good warriors to put on the good armour, and theworse, theworse. Proclus regardedHomer as a theologian anddeveloped a complexmodeof exegesis. Syrianus’ method of allegorising Homer seems reflected in that of Proclus,who divided poetry into three categories: at the levels of the gods; the intellect of thesoul; and the sense perceptions of the soul. The allegory of this passage seems to fall inthe second category, which Proclus says is characterised by good advice and moderation(In Remp. I. .–) and lacks the shock value typical of the poetry of the first category.By reading this poetry, the soul was meant to turn within itself in contemplation, as thelines embody the power of physical re-structuring. Regarding Syrianus’ interpretation ofHomer, the Suda lists twoworks onHomer,Notes on theWhole of Homer andOn the Godsin Homer, and attributes them to both Proclus and Syrianus. On Syrianus andHomer, seeManolea ().

2 Tarrant translates this as “initiate” () .3 Tarrant translates as “nature formulae” () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

jν κα- E π�λιτικ7ς Xρ*.ς �πιστ$μεν�ς κα- τ.ν σπερμ$των π�ιε9ταιλ γ�ν π�λVν κα- π$σης τRς (υσικRς �πιτηδει τητ�ς, Wνα δ" αDτ1. κα-αQ ψυAα- 3ρισται �π- (Cσεσιν <ρ�σταις γ�γνωνται.a τα5τα κα- πρ7ς τ"ν<π�ρ�αν τ�5 Λ�γγ�ν�υ Nητ)�ν.

a α" om MP γ#γνωνται C: πρ�σγ#γνωνταιM: πρ�σγ�νωνται P

Commentary

This passage refers to a discussion in the opening conversation of theTimaeus between Timaeus and Socrates. Socrates summarizes his argu-ment regarding procreation of childrenwhich he had included in his con-versation about the ideal state (Rep. A) presented the previous day.Socrates recalls that magistrates must make arrangements for the con-tracting of marriages, so that people would be apportioned partners likethemselves. The fragment brings to light Syrianus’ opinion on whethersoul is generated at fertilization (the Platonic view) or at the first breath(the Stoic view), as well as the allotment of bodies to soul, some bodiesbeing more receptive to divinity than others.The first section, .– introduces the issue of whether souls are

emitted with sperm. These lines refer to the debate between Platonists,who generally argued that the soul was emitted with the sperm, andStoics, who held that soul was not formed until the embryo “cooled”—atthe first breath, at which point the embryo was ensouled. As is often thecase in matters of orthodoxy, two of the most prominent members of thePlatonic school, Syrianus and Porphyry, strayed from the generally heldopinions of their school and adopted the Stoic argument that the embryois ensouled at its first breath.Syrianus, as with other Platonists, holds that souls are independent

entities. While Syrianus’ argument is not elaborated here, it does seem torefer to one aspect of the debate, the extent to which the embryo’s parentsinfluence its soul. The closest parallel to Syrianus seems to be the view of

text and translation

It is this that the statesman understands correctly, and thus takesgreat account of insemination and of the whole question of naturalsuitability, in order that the best souls may come to be in the bestnatures. So much then needs to be said regarding the point raised byLonginus.4

4 In , – Longinus says that “Plato never supposed that souls are emitted alongwith sperm. In order that the best [offspring] may exist, he pairs together like people withlike people in marriage.”

Chrysippus as quoted in Plutarch’s de Stoicorum repugnantiis. In F,Plutarch first gives Chrysippus’ account as follows:

“Chrysippus believes that the foetus in the womb is nourished by naturelike a plant, but that at birth the vital spirit, being chilled and tempered bythe air, changes and becomes animal and hence soul has not inappropri-ately been named after this process.”5 Translation: Babbitt.

Chrysippus gives the Stoic view that the embryo is nourished like aplant (and thus has life), but not soul. Later, in D Plutarch debatesaspects of Chrysippus’ argument.The passage is worth quoting in full, asSyrianus seems to reflect Chrysippus’ doctrines in his own views of thesoul:

“In his account on the generation of soul the demonstration is in conflictwith the doctrine, for, while he says that the soul comes to be when thefoetus has been brought to birth, the vital spirit having changed underchilling as if under tempering, yet as proof that the soul has come to be andis junior to the body he usesmainly the argument that the offspring closelyresembles their parents both in bent and in character. The discrepancy ofthese assertions is obvious: it is not possible for the soul, coming to be afterthe birth, to have its character formed before the birth or else it will turnout that before soul has come to be it is similar to a soul, i.e., both exists,in that it has similarity, and because it has not yet come to be, does not

5 Τ7 �ρ)(�ς �ν τR γαστρ- (Cσει τρ)(εσ*αι ν�μ��ει κα*$περ (Cτ�νG lταν δε τεA*R,ψυA μεν�ν �π7 τ�5 <)ρ�ς κα- στ�μ�Cμεν�ν τ7 πνε5μα μετα�$λλειν κα- γ�γνεσ*αι�1.νG �*εν �Dκ <π τρ π�υ τ"ν ψυA"ν bν�μ+σ*αι παρ+ τ"ν ψ5Uιν.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

exist; but, if one should say that, the similarity originating in the blendof the bodies, the souls change after they have come to be, the argumentfor the generation of soul is ruined, since in this way the soul may also beungenerated and upon entering the body,may also change under influenceof the blend that constitutes the similarity.”6,7 Translation: Babbitt

Plutarch summarises the Stoic view, namely that the soul comes to be atbirth. In thewomb, the embryo takes a physical shape first and resemblesthe parents. When it is born, it becomes soul and takes a natural shapeso that offspring resemble parents in character. Plutarch counters thatthe soul could be ungenerated and still be changed as it enters thebody as an embryo. He says that similarity cannot exist between theembryo and parents before the birth because therewas no soul, accordingto Chrysippus, before birth. Were the embryo to take on the physicalcharacteristics of its parent, it would be undergoing the same basicprocess that embryos being ensouled would undertake. Plutarch faultsChrysippus’ logic: if souls are not generated until birth, the embryocannot take up characteristics of its parents, because that would beevidence of soul.Proclus does not give Porphyry’s view on the matter, rather he stops

short by merely saying that he agrees with Longinus, who held the “at-first-breath stance”, but that Porphyry does not argue this sufficiently(, –). In ad Gaurum, a text formerly believed to be authored byGalen, two somewhat differing views on the subject are accredited to

6 E περ- ψυARς γεν)σεως αDτ1. λ γ�ς μαA�μ)νην OAει πρ7ς τ7 δ γμα τ0ν <π δειUιν.γ�γνεσ*αι μεν γ$ρ (ησι τ"ν ψυA"ν =ταν τ7 �ρ)(�ς <π�τεA*SR κα*$περ στ�μ?σει τSRπεριψCUει τ�5 πνεCματ�ς μετα�αλ ντας <π�δε�Uει δε AρRται τ�5 γεγ�ν)ναι τ"ν ψυA"νκα- μεταγενεστ)ραν εhναι μ$λιστα τ1. κα- τ7ν τρ π�ν κα- m*�ς �U�μ�ι�5σ*αι τ+ τ)κνατ�9ς γ�νε5σι. Βλ)πεται δε 8 τ�Cτων �ναντ�ωσις. �D γ+ρ �F�ν τε τ"ν ψυA"ν πρ7 τRς<π�κυ0σεως 8*�π�ιε9σ*αι, γιγν�μ)νην, μετ+ τ"ν <π�κCησιν, n συμ�0σεται, πρ-ν nγεν)σ*αι ψυA0ν, Eμ��αν ε`ναι τSR Xμ�ι τητι κα- μ" ε`ναι δι+ τ7 μ0πω γεγ�ν)ναι. ε� δ)(0σει τις lτι, τα9ς κρ$σει τ.ν σωμ$των �γιγν�μ)νης τRς Eμ�ι�τητι, αQ ψυAα- γεν μεναιμετα�$λλ�υσι, δια(*ε�ει τ7 τεκμ0ρι�υ τ�5 γεγ�ν)ναι τ"ν ψυA0νG �νδ)Aεται γ+ρ �oτωςκα- <γ)νητ�ν �Pσαν, �ταν �πεισ)λ*η, μετα�$λλειν τSR κρ$σει τRς Eμ�ι τητ�ς.

7 See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I, : “Are we then to believe Panaetius when he disagreeswith his revered Plato? For whilst he calls him at every mention of his name inspired…he yet fails to approve of this one opinion of his about the immortality of the souls. For heholds what nobody denies, that whatever has been born perishes; but he asserts that soulsare born, as is shown by the resemblance of children to their parents, which is manifestin dispositions and not only in bodily features.” Trans.: King ().

Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quidquid natum sit interire, nasci autem animos, quoddeclaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur, quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibusappareat.

commentary

Porphyry. Smith lists two fragments for ad Gaurum, the first of which istaken from Iamblichus:8

“According to Hippocrates the Asclepiad, the soul is enformed in theembryo (since it has the ability to participate in life); according to Por-phyry, it is in the first stage of generation rather than at birth that it actuallyreceives life and that the soul might be present.”9

Porphyry argues that soul appears with the sperm’s injection into themother.10 This opinion seems to agree with the opinion Proclus, rathervaguely, assigns to Porphyry in In Tim. ., the line just precedingSyrianus’ opinion. A second fragment of Porphyry’s, however, cites acontrary view. In Fragment Smith, Porphyry says that the embryois neither alive nor ensouled. Rather, it is rooted like a plant and movedby nature, not by soul.11 This closely parallels a Stoic idea of embryonic

8 Porphyrii Philosophi Fragmenta, Smith (), fragment F.9 Κατ+ δ’ 'Ιππ�κρ$την τ7ν τ.ν 'Ασκληπιαδ.ν, �ταν πλασ*SR τ7 σπ)ρμα (τ�τε

γ+ρ �πιτηδε�ως OAειν αDτ7 μεταλαμ�$νειν �ωRς), κατ+ δ) Π�ρ(Cρι�ν �ν τR πρ?τη<π�γενν0σει τ�5 τικτ�μ)ν�υ πρ?τως 8 κατ’ �ν)ργειαν �ωπ�ι�α κα- παρ�υσ�α τRςψυASRς (Cεται. Iamblichus, de anima ap. Stob. I , (I , –). Festugière says thatthe source of Iamblichus is most likely a treatise of Porphyry. See () p. for theeditor’s speculation that Iamblichus agreed with Porphyry on this issue. Festugière citesthe following opinion of Iamblichus made before Iamblichus’ quotation of Porphyry.Festugière surmises that Iamblichus must have agreed with Porphyry:

γ)ν�ιτ� δ’ dν κα- dλλη τις δ Uα �Dδ)πω κα- ν5ν Nη*ε9σα . et γ)ν�ιτ� δ) κ+ν 3λληδ Uα �Dκ <π �λητ�ς ., dλλ�ς dν τις κα*αρ?τερ�ν αDτ"ν πρ�στ0σαιτ� τελε?-τατα ., cσπερ 3ν τις νεωτερ�σεσιεν �ν τα9ς �πιν��αις ., τ$Aα 3ν τις �πιν�0σειεκαιν τερ�ν, �Dκ <πι*$νως ., �\�υς 3ν τις *ε�η τ�Vς καιν.ς μεν <πτα�στως δε<ντιλαμ�αν�μ)ν�υς τ.ν λ γων ., [ς dν (α�η S8 νεωστ- παρευπε*ε9σα aδε αWπε-σις .. p παρ$κειται δ Uη �D παραδ�*ε9σα μεν, δυναμ)νη δε πι*αν.ς λ)γεσ*αιαWπεσις .. Cf. , n. .

Smith includes Porphyry’s statement in his fragment collection as fr. . See Porphyry,Περ- τ�5 π.ς �μψυA�5ται τ+ qμ�ρυα, Kalbfleisch ().

10 Cf. Porph. II , p. . K.11 Τρισ-ν �ν)τυA�ν μ�ν�Β��λ�ις περ- τ�Cτ�υ τ�5 �ητ0ματ�ς, 'Ιπ�κρ$τ�υς, Π�ρ(υ-

ρ��υ κα� Γαλην�5, Yν E μεν 'Ιππ�κρ$της κα- Γαλην7ς �1.�ν αDτ ν (ασ�ιν �ν τSR γαστρ-ε`ναι, κα- κινε9σ*αι �π7 ψυARς τ7 μ)ν 3λ�γ�υ τRς <λ γ�υ, τ7 δ) λ�γικ7ν τRς λ�γι-κRς, τρ)(εσ*αι τε �ν τSR μ0τρTα δι+ τ�5 στ ματ�ςG εhναι γ+ρ �ν ταCτη *ηλ+ς τιν+ς κα-στ�μ$τα δι’ Yν τρ)(εται. E δ) γε Π�ρ(Cρι�ς π�λλ�9ς λ�γισμ�9ς κα- <π�δ)ιUεσι διατε�-νεται μ" ε`ναι τ7 Oμ�ρυ�ν μηδε �μψυAωμ)ν�ν, <λλ+ δ�κην (υτ�5 καταπε(υτε5σ*αι �ντSR μ0τρTα κα- κινε9σ*αι �DA �π7 ψυARς, <λλ’ �π7 (Cσεως, cσπερ δ" κα- δ)νδρα κα- τ+(υτ+ κινε9σ*αι εrω*ε, τρ)(εσ*αι τε �D δι+ τ�5 στ ματ�ς, <λλ+ δι+ τ�5 A�ρ��υ κα- τ�5Xμ(αλ�5G �*εν τ�5τ�ν εD*)ως <π�δεσμ�5σιν αQ μα9αι, Wνα δι+ τ�5 στ ματ�ς τ7 γεν-νη*)ν τρ)(ηται. Quotation fromMichael Psellus, de omnifaria doctrina = PorphyryFr. Smith.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

nourishment in which the embryo is like a plant in that it has life, but nosoul, and hence seeks only nourishment. In Ps-Plutarch’s Placita V ,Ps-Plutarch states “Diogenes’” opinion on the matter: “Diogenes [sc.believes] that the embryos are generated without soul, but in warmth;that is why the innate heat draws the cold into the lungs as soon as theembryo is poured forth” (Plac. V .).This accords with a better-knownfragment Kalbfleisch identifies as Porphyry’s in which he says that theimmortal soul enters the body only at the moment of birth. This view,moreover, accords well with the one that appears in a fragment on thesubject Kalbfleisch attributes to Porphyry.12 It seems fair to agree with theconsensus and say that Porphyry places the formation of the soul at birth,a view also held by Syrianus. Syrianus’ opinion, thus, seems contraryto the orthodox Platonic opinion as found in Plutarch, for instance. Itappears, moreover, that Proclus adopts his master’s view on this topic.The second issue this passage raises is the distribution of souls into

bodies. Syrianus says that souls are distributed according tomerit, so thatthe best souls are assigned to the best bodies. By this, Syrianus intendsdiffering levels of suitability in different bodies in relation to the body’sownnatural virtue.The first part of this process is alluded to in .–,wherein Syrianus explains that the physical logos is projected into naturefrom the Universal Nature and enforms a physical body using the reasonprinciples.13 It is nature that characterises a body and gives it qualities.These qualities make it the enmattered form which defines the physicalbody:14

The World Soul possesses the principles and the hypostasising powers ofall encosmic things, and has not only the intellective causes of man andhorse and all other animals, but also all the portions of the world.

(Proclus, In Tim, II. .–.)15

When nature enmatters body and gives it qualities, it imparts qualitiesto the body which vary from body to body.16 The body created precedesthe soul and is naturally receptive to a particular kind of soul.17 Here,

12 Ps-Galen, ad Gaurum, Kalbfleisch () ch. XIV, pp. .–..13 Proclus, In Tim. I..–; III..–; III...14 Siorvanes () .15 Translation Siorvanes () .16 Proclus, In Tim. I., –, ; In Remp. II., .–; In Parm. . See

Dodds’ commentary, Proclus ET, prop. –.17 A parallel idea to this exists in the Old Academy, in which the nature of beings is

reflected in their habitat.This is especially true in the Old Academic interpretation of thepseudo-Platonic Epinomis, whereby creatures are assigned a cosmic rank in descending

commentary

Syrianus uses the technical term �πιτηδει της, often used to refer toa theurgic object’s ability to receive divine power18—an object, as witha soul, might be more or less receptive to the divine depending onwhat kind of power the object itself has (i.e., where the object falls ina metaphysical hierarchy). Objects closer to the One, or objects locatedin the samemetaphysical rank as a higher power are more attuned to thehigher power and better able to receive it (as a sunflower sits in the samerank as the sun, so it is able to receive the sun’s power).19 One object inparticular considered by the theurgists to receive divine power was thestatue,20 which Syrianus gives as an analogy to the body’s ability to receivesoul.This view is thus very different from the one offered by Longinus that

the receptacle is neutral, and Syrianus alludes to this fact in .– bysaying that his opinions are a response to Longinus’.

order of dignity. The author of this work established a five-tiered universe in whicheach tier consisted of either fire, aether, air, water, or earth (B). Soul endowed eachof these ranks with appropriate beings. The rank of fire was the highest and it was thedwelling place of heavenly gods. Beings reflect their dwelling place, so that the aery raceof deamons inhabit the zone of air.This idea recurs in the Middle Platonic period as well.From this idea of beings inhabiting cosmic stations appropriate to their natures, we seethe beginnings of what Syrianus posits in lines –. Syrianus, however, elaborates thisview immensely.

18 For Iamblichus’ use of �πιτηδει της, cf. DM ..; .; .; .; ..;..; ..; ..; ..; for Proclus’ use of the term, cf. In Prm: .; ., , and ; . and ; .; ..

19 Proclus, De Sacrificio, II .20 Proclus, In Tim. III , – and In Crat. §, p. , ff. See Shaw () and

Sheppard () –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 3

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

Πρ.τ�ν μHν τ7 τ.ν Qερ)ων γ)ν�ς <π7 τ.ν 3λλων Aωρ-ς <(ωρισμ)ν�ν1

[Tim. A]

μ0π�τε �Pν κ$λλι�ν cσπερ E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ς διS0ρει π�ιε9σ*αιτ"ν �U0γησιν, μ�αν μHν δυ$δα *εμ)ν�υς τ7 Qερατικ7ν κα- μ$Aιμ�ν, 6τ)-ραν δH τ7 δημι�υργικ7ν κα- γεωργικ ν, τρ�την δH τ7 ν�μευτικ7ν κα-*ηρευτικ ν,a κα- λα� ντας τ�ιαCτην τ$Uιν τ+ παραδε�γματα μεταδι?-κειν αDτ.ν.

Oστι γ+ρ κα- τ7 Qερατικ7ν �ν τ�9ς *ε�9ς τ�9ς <ναγωγ�9ς κα- τ7 μ$Aι-μ�ν �ν τ�9ς (ρ�υρητικ�9ς κα- τ7 δημι�υργικ7ν �ν τ�9ς τ+ εhδη π$ντακα- τ�Vς λ γ�υς διακρ�ν�υσι τ.ν �γκ�σμ�ων, τ7 δH γεωργικ7ν �ν τ�9ςτ"ν (Cσιν 3νω*εν κιν�5σι κα- τ+ς ψυA+ς διασπε�ρ�υσι περ- τ"ν γ)νε-σινG σπ�ρ+ν γ+ρ κα- E Πλ$των Xν�μ$�ει τ"ν ε�ς γ)νεσιν πτ.σιν τRςψυARς, τ7 δH σπε�ρειν ��κει τατ�ν τ�9ς γεωργ�9ς, cσπερ κα- τ7 συλ-λαμ�$νειν τα9ς τRς (Cσεως <π�γενν0σεσι. τ7 δH ν�μευτικ7ν 〈�ν〉 τ�9ςτ+ εhδη π$ντα τRς �ωRς διακεκριμ)νως �πιτρ�πεC�υσι τ+ �ν τSR γεν)σει(ερ μεναG κα- γ+ρ �ν τ1. Π�λιτικ1. [ D] ν�μ)ας *ε��υς τιν+ς αDτ7ς8μ9ν παραδ)δωκε. τ7 δH *ηρευτικ7ν 〈�ν〉 τ�9ς τ+ Oνυλα π$ντα πνεC-ματα διατ$ττ�υσιG κα- γ+ρ *Rρας �κε9να καλε9ν O*�ς �στ- τ�9ς *ε�λ -γ�ις.

κα- τα5τα π$ντα τ+ γ)νη τSR μ)σSη πρ�σ0κει δημι�υργ�Tα, τ7 �πιστρε-πτικ ν, τ7 (ρ�υρητικ ν, τ7 τ+ς ψυAικ+ς λ0Uεις δι)π�ν, τ7 τ+ εhδη τRς�ωRς διακυ�ερν.ν τ+ γενεσι�υργ$, τ7 δημι�υργικ7ν π^ν κα- τ.ν �νC-λων ε�δ�π�ι ν, τ7 τ.ν �σA$των πνευμ$τωνb τακτικ ν. τ�Cτων δH τ.νγεν.ν π$ντων 4τερ�ν 〈δε9〉 τι*)ναι τ7 τRς (ρ�ν0σεως �πιμελ�Cμεν�ν

a !ηρατικ�ν N schol. M bis b πνευμ�τωνMN: πραγμ�των P1 While the lemma only refers to the priestly class, the fragment reflects Tim. AB,

where the priest relates to Solon the Egyptian civic classes in their laws: “You see firsthow the priestly class is separated off from the rest; next, the class of craftsmen, of whicheach sort works by itself without mixing with any other; then the classes of shepherds,hunters, and farmers, each distinct and separate. Moreover, the military class here, as nodoubt you have noticed, is kept apart from all the other classes, being enjoined by the lawto devote itself solely to the work of training for war.” Trans.: Bury ().

You see, first, how the priestly class is separated off from the rest;

Perhaps then it might be better to make our interpretation accord withour Master’s division of the text, postulating as a first pair the priestlyand war-like, as a second the craftsmanly and the agricultural, and as athird the shepherds and hunters, and in postulating such an order seekto investigate their models.For the “priestly” class is to be found among the anagogic gods and

the warlike class among the guardian gods, and the class of craftsmen isamong those who discriminate all the forms and the creative principles2of the universe, and the agricultural are among those that move thenatural world from above, and sow the souls into the realm of creation:for Plato calls the “sowing” the fall of the soul into generation, andsowing is most suited to farmers, even as conception is most suited to theproducts ofNature. But the herdsman class is found among the gods whoindividually administer all the forms of life being brought into creation:for in the Statesman3 [Plato] gave us divine shepherds. But the hunterclass is among those gods who organise all the spirits involved inmatter:4and indeed the theologians are accustomed to call them “beasts”.5And all these classes belong to the median level of creation, the class

which stimulates return towards the gods, that which guards, that whicharranges the psychic orders, that which directs the creative forms of life,all thatwhich creates and produces the forms of things immanent inmat-ter, that which bestows order on the lowest level of spirits. But as differentfrom all these classes, we may postulate another which cares for wisdom

2 Tarrant translates as “encosmic things” () .3 Plato, Statesman D.4 Oνυλ�ς is a term referring to enmattered souls. Cf. Proclus ET prop. ; Plotinus,

Enn. II..; DamasciusDe Pr. ; Iamblichus, DM, .; Syrianus, In Met. ,.5 Chaldean Oracles fr. Des Places.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

κα- *εωρητικ ν,l κα- αDτ7ς �π- π^σιν �Uυμν0σει πρ?τ�υ μνησ*ε-ς τ�5Qερατικ�5 γ)ν�υς [ς QερεCς.

6πτ+ �Pν τ+ π$ντα, κα- 8 μ�ν+ς �US0ρηται τRς 6U$δ�ς, κα- j μHν <ν$-λ�γ ν �στι τ1. 6ν- ν1., τ1. π^σαν συν)A�ντι τ"ν δημι�υργ�αν τ.ν γενη-τ.ν, j δH τ�9ς �π’ αDτ7ν μερικωτ)ρ�ις O*νεσιν, <ναγωγ�9ς, (ρ�υρη-τικ�9ς, ε�δ�π�ι�9ς �1ω�π�ι�9ς, <γελ$ρAαις τRς 8μ)ρ�υ �ωRς, κρατητι-κ�9ς τRς *ηρι?δ�υς (Cσεως, L δ" κα- �ν τ1. παντ- δι?ρισται <π7 τ.ν>πλ.ν.κα- δ" κα- �ν τ�9ς <ν*ρ?π�ις,(ησ�, τα5τα π$ρεστιν Eρ^ν,πρ?-τως μHν παρ+ τ�9ς 'Α*ηνα��ις, δευτ)ρως δH παρ+ τ�9ς Σαsταις, κατ+τ"ν τ.ν γεν.ν δια�ρεσιν 6κ$στ�υ τ7 ��κε9�ν Oργ�ν <π�πληρ�5ντ�ς<(ωρισμ)νωςG τ�5τ� γ+ρ δηλ�9 τ7 <π7 τ.ν 3λλων κα- τ7 Aωρ�ς, Wνατ"ν <μιγR κα*αρ τητα τ.ν γεν.ν ν�0σωμεν 3νω*εν 3Aρι τ.ν �σA$-των πρ�ϊ�5σαν δι’ �()σεως.

Commentary

This fragment equates the Egyptian civic classes with classes of being inthe cosmos. Syrianus’ interpretation is preceded by that of Porphyry andIamblichus and, in typical Syrianic fashion, reacts to the metaphysicalinterpretations of both. This fragment is of particular interest as Syri-anus discusses not only the particular function of grades of daemonsin .–., but he shows the relationship between the grades in.–.. This relationship forms the basis for key propositions ofProclus’ Elements of Theology.While Syrianus does not mention Porphyry or Iamblichus in his com-

mentary, his views clearly reflect those of both authors, whose interpre-tations Proclus discusses before that of his Master.6 In his interpreta-tion, Syrianus corrects his predecessors (introduced by μ0π�τε) (.),whom he criticizes for dividing the classes incorrectly. He distinguishesτ7 δημι�υργικ ν as a separate category and makes three groups of two,a division that seems to be in accordance with the text of the Timaeus.Porphyry and Iamblichus, however, omit the last category and proposefive classes of divine power which are not in pairs. Porphyry calls the

6 Porphyry and Iamblichus’ interpretations of thisTimaeus passage have been treatedquite thoroughly by Dillon (), Iamblichus, In Tim fr. Dillon.

text and translation

and is contemplative; this he himself will celebrate beyond everything bymaking mention first as a priest himself, of the priestly class.So these classes in total are seven, and as the monad is separate from

the hexad it is analogous to the single Intellect, which holds togetherthe created existence of beings, while the hexad is analogous to theclasses that are more particular and subordinated to the Intellect, thoseclasses which elevate, guard, produce the forms, create life, shepherdthe tame creation, control the wild nature, which classes are kept apartthroughout the universe from the simple classes. Indeed, even amongmen, as he says, it is possible to see that these classes are present, firstamong the Athenians, secondarily among the Saitans, each performingits own work separately according to their division of classes. For thisis what is demonstrated by the phrases, “apart from the others” and“separate” in order that we may grasp that the unmixed purity of theclasses proceeds down to the lowest ranks of Being by descent.

entire sublunary realm demiurgic, while Iamblichus does not use theterm demiurgic in his interpretation, but still describes the agriculturaldaemons in much the same way as Syrianus.7 It has been posited thatPorphyry and Iamblichus chose such a division because it correspondedto an accepted division of cosmic powers.8 In their respective inter-pretations, Porphyry understands the Egyptian classes as levels of dae-mon,while Iamblichus makes ametaphysical reading, understanding theclasses as levels of superior being. Iamblichus follows Plato, who gives thetriadic structure of priest, craftsman, and soldier. Syrianus elaborates thisexegesis further, so that each level of Egyptian society corresponds witha level of god.Because Syrianus builds on Iamblichus’ interpretation, it is useful to

see how Iamblichus9 thinks the Egyptian classes are secondary divinities,

7 See Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. , – Dillon.8 See Dillon’s commentary on Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon () .9 I , ff.: “The divine Iamblichus, on the other hand, criticises these theories

as being neither good Platonism nor true—for archangels never merit so much as amention in Plato, nor is the warlike class of the souls that are inclined towards bodies;for these should not be distinguished from gods or daemons; and indeed it is absurd, ifwe rank these in the middle class, and gods and daemons among the lowest demiurgicclasses; nor should those be shepherds who have failed of humanmind, but have a certainsympathetic connection with living things; for it is not from human species that thosedaemons who watch over human nature derive their essences; nor are they hunters who

syrianus, in tim. fr.

as opposed to Porphyry,10 who interprets them as levels of daemon.Iamblichus’ interpretation is a response to Porphyry’s, and, before mak-ing his own statements about the Egyptian classes, he begins by work-ing through each of Porphyry’s types of daemons. The interpretationsof Porphyry and Iamblichus are as follows. Both provide identificationsfor priests, soldiers, shepherds, hunters, and farmers. Porphyry begins bysaying that the priests are archangels turned towards the gods, a sugges-tion criticised by Iamblichus in a dialectical point who argues that Platonevermentions archangels. Iamblichus suggests that the priests representsecondary �Dσ�αι and δυν$μεις, who honor and tend α�τ�αι (primarypowers) prior to them.Next comes thewarlike class, which Porphyry saysis analogous to souls that descend into bodies. The source of Porphyry’sdemonology here has been identified11 with Origen’s περ- δαιμ νων.Iamblichus says that Porphyry places this level too low; they should oper-ate at the transcendent level. For Iamblichus, the soldiers are those whoturn back all that is godless and give power to the divine. The third class

shut up the soul in the body as in a cage; for this is not the way that the soul is united withthe body, nor is this a type of theory proper to philosophy, but one full of unhellenictrumpery; nor are the farmers to be related to Demeter; for the gods transcend theimmediate causes of Nature.

Having made these criticisms, he establishes the priests as analogous through theirsimilarity to all the secondary essences and powers, such as honour and serve the causesprior to themselves, and the shepherds to all those in the cosmos that have been allotteddominion over life that inclines towards the body and over the irrational powers, whicharranges these in order, and the hunters to the general powers, which order the secondarypowers by means of their search for Being, and the farmers to those who bring about theefficacy of those seeds which are borne down from heaven to earth, and the warriors tothose who overthrow all that is godless, and make the divine to triumph.” Trans. Dillon,Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon () –.

10 “The philosopher Porphyry lays down as follows: the priests are analogous to thearchangels in heaven turned towards the gods, of whom they are messengers, and thewarlike class are analogous to the daemons that descend into bodies, and the shepherds,again to those who are appointed over the herds of animals, whom they declare in secretteachings to be souls who have failed of human intelligence, and have a dispositiontowards animals; since there is one who has charge of the herd of men and certainparticular ones, some overseeing races, other cities, and others yet individuals; and thehunters are analogous to those who hunt down souls and enclose them in bodies; forthere are some who take pleasure in hunting after living things, such as they make outArtemis to be and with her a further multitude of hunting daemons; and the farmers arethose given charge over the crops. And this whole polity of sublunary daemons, dividedinto many classes, is called by Plato demiurgic through the fact that he was looking to afinished product already existing or coming to be.”

11 Lewy () Excurses XI, ff. identifies Porphyry’s demonology with Origen’s inthis passage and in Porphyry’s De Abst. II –. Cf. Dillon () .

commentary

for Porphyry is the shepherds, who are souls who have failed of humanintelligence and have a disposition towards animals. Iamblichus attacksthis reading, which involves existing at a certain rank out of punishment,and denies that they ever were human souls, let alone malicious humansouls. Instead, he credits the “shepherds” with having �πιστασ�α overbodily and immaterial life—they are divinities which supervise irrationallife; as general powers, shepherds bring order to secondary orders. Thelast two groups Porphyry defines in terms of their tasks. The “hunters”comprise the fourth group, and according to Porphyry their job is to huntsouls and enclose them in bodies, while the farmers, as the fifth group,are given charge over crops. Iamblichus says, further, that the huntersorder their secondary powers by means of their search for Being and thefarmers are entities who “sow” heavenly seeds (presumably here souls)into the earthly realm. Iamblichus’ point is that Plato would not haveput lower entities before others, and he argues against Porphyry for notpreserving the proper analogies Plato offers in the text. For Iamblichus,secondary powers such as priests and shepherds guide the souls, whilehunters organise souls and farmers prepare the perfection of the universeusing the seeds sown from heaven to earth. Iamblichus is not clear whatlevel of beings he is talking about, whetherminor divinities or secondarydivinities.Syrianus divides the classes by looking to models at higher levels

(.).12 He groups together the priestly and warlike class, which heplaces at the hieratic level of the anagogic gods (.). Although thetwo classes are grouped together, they differ in function: the priestly classraises souls and perfects all the effects contained in their activity. Thesoldiers, also in the first group, are a guardian class (.). The sec-ond group consists of the demiurgic and agricultural classes (.–).The demiurgic class makes the forms and the farmers bring the soulsinto generation (.ff.). The last group is that of the shepherds andhunters, the former of which administers all forms of created life, whilethe latter organises spirits placed in matter. Syrianus’ interpretation canbe understood in the light of Proclus’ theory of divine series, which seemsto be an adaptation of the Syrianic principle of divine series elucidatedhere. Divine series, as they appear in Proclus, are based on the premise

12 It is possible that this class was modeled on higher levels, although it was muchlower itself. Proclus subsumes these Syrianic classes into the lower orders: that of thefatherly series (the demiurgic group), the γεννητικ ς and �ω�γ ν�ς, and the <ναγωγ ς,a perfecting group which returns effects to their causes. See Rosán () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

that immediate effects of the unparticipated One are a series of gods(or henads), unities that contain aspects of the One but are plural. Eachhenad embraces (or “possesses”) a particular quality of the unpartici-pated One. The henads, moreover, are themselves each subdivided intovertical series, so that higher gods are said to posseses a quality, whichis passed to the lower gods, who possess a less intense version of thatquality.13Proclus generally divides his series into triads which oversee existence,

power, and activity respectively: a triadic division that reflects Syrianus’triads here. The names Proclus uses for his classes often vary betweenorders and the text he is interpreting, but we also see some parallelsbetween his names and the names Syrianus uses. In Proclus’ Elementsof Theology, the first class which oversees existence14 is often calledthe guardian class. It is a paternal order analogous to the Good whichholds the levels together in a singular manner.15 It seems that Syrianus’priestly/warlike class, as the highest order of the three, could have beena prototype for Proclus’ gods of existence. As a guardian class, this classcould have been seen as preserving unity.16 The second Procline level,that of power, is a productive power. Proclus often describes it as life-giving (�ω γ�ν�ς), in so far as it is a divinity that bestows life.17 Thislevel seems to parallel the demiurgic order which distinguishes formsand portions out souls at creation. Proclus gives as his third categorythose which oversee activity and are engaged in perfecting. He generallyrefers to this group as <ναγωγ ς,18 as it returns effects to their cause. Itseems that Syrianus’ third class engages in a particular type of demiurgicactivity, as an offshoot of his second class. Syrianus’ herdsman/huntergroup administers forms of life and arranges spirits, which seems to be�ω�γ νικ�ς, rather than noetic, as Proclus generally describes his thirdcategory.

13 In ET prop. , Proclus says that “Every god is possessed directly by some actualthing and everything which is divine returns to one god so that the number of the godsis identical with the number of real things that possess them.” Trans. Dodds ().

14 Proclus, ET prop. ; and Proclus, PT –.15 Proclus, ET prop. : “All that is protective in the gods preserves each principle in

its proper station, so that by its unitary character it transcends derivative existences andis founded upon the primals.” Trans. Dodds ().

16 Proclus, ET prop. : identity preserved ((υλ$ττει) in procession.17 Proclus, ET prop. and ET prop. .18 Proclus, ET prop. .

commentary

For Syrianus, the noetic category appears in a group he adds in addi-tion to his original five groups in .–. This noetic class overseeswisdom and is *εωρητικ ν as a kind of one-intellect (.). The one-intellect is analogous to the monad which acts upon the hexad (being)to produce the created universe. Syrianus makes it clear that the classeswhich compose the hexad are less simple than the monad and are pro-duced by higher ranks. The idea that higher classes are more simpleand without mixture, while lower classes are impure and produced isan important principle that re-appears in Proclus’ discussion of divineseries.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 4

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–

/Ημ^ς δH τ�Vς περ- παντ7ς λ γ�υς π�ιε9σ*α� πSη μ)λλ�ντας v γ)γ�νενv κα- <γεν)ς �στιν, ε� μ" παντ$πασι παραλλ$ττ�μεν [Tim. C]

Μ0π�τε �Pν,cσπερ Oλεγεν E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ς, τ.ν λ γων π�λλα-A.ς λεγ�μ)νων—3λλ�ι γ$ρ ε�σιν �Q <π7 ν�5 πρ�ϊ ντες δημι�υργικ�-λ γ�ι, �W�υς κα- E δημι�υργ7ς �ρε9 [.] πρ7ς τ�Vς ν)�υς *ε�CςG κα-γ+ρ τ"ν ψυA"ν λ)γει [ A] κιν�υμ)νην πρ7ς 6αυτ0νG κα- 3λλ�ι τινHς�Q �ν τSR �πιστ0μSη *εωρ�Cμεν�ι, κα- 3λλ�ι τρ�την <π στασιν <π7 ν�5λαA ντες, �Q �ν πρ�(�ρT διδασκαλ�ας 4νεκα κιν�Cμεν�ι κα- τRς πρ7ς<λλ0λ�υς κ�ινων�ας—

ε�δMς E Τ�μαι�ς, �τι τ�Vς μHν δημι�υργικ�Vςa λ γ�υς E δημι�υργ7ς�(�στησιν, τ�Vς δH �πιστημ�νικ�Vς �D ν5ν μ)λλει γενν^ν, <λλ’ �ν 6αυ-τ1. πρ�ε�λη(εν αDτ�Cς, μ ν�υς δH τ�Vς �ν πρ�(�ρT λ γ�υς π�ι0σεταιΣωκρ$τ�υς 4νεκα, δι+ τ�5τ� τ�Vς περ- τ�5 παντ7ς O(ατ� π�ι0σεσ*α�πSR λ γ�υςG 3λλ� γ$ρ �στι τ7 ν�ερ.ς, 3λλ� τ7 �πιστημ�νικ.ς, 3λλ� τ7διδασκαλικ.ς,κα- τ7 πS" τ+ς δια(�ρ+ς ταCτας �νδε�κνυται τ.ν λ γων.

a δημι�υργικ�&ς (ικ in lit.) C

We therefore who are pursuing to deliver a discourse concerning theUniverse, how it was created or haply is uncreate (if so be that we arenot utterly demented)

Perhaps, therefore, as our Master says, since logoi1 have many senses—for some logoi are demiurgic, proceeding from Intellect, which are suchas the Demiurge will utter to the young gods (A–E); and again,he says that the soul “speaks”2 ( A) when moved towards itself;3 andothers are to be seen as contemplated in thought, and a third kind,while isallotted a third remove from the Intellect, are stirred to external utterancefor the sake of teaching and of communion with one another.Timaeus, then, knowing that the Demiurge generates demiurgic logoi,

but is not now intending to create logoi of pure thought4 (these he hasconceived beforehand in himself), said that he will, for the sake of Socra-tes, only create logoi in external utterance, for this reason has declaredthat he will deliver logoi in some way concerning the universe. For it isone thing to speak noetically, another scientifically, another instructively,and the expression “in some way” indicates these differences.

1 I take logoi here to be understood by Syrianus as “reason-principles”. Runia andShare translated it as “accounts” () .

2 Better to read λ)γειν (ησ� with ms. M (i.e., λ γ�ι πρ�(�ρικ��).3 Runia and Share translate this sentence, “the soul when moving speaks to itself ”

() .4 �πιστημ�νικ ς in sense of pure thought in the mind.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This aporia concerns the textual criticism of πSη, for which there is anelaborate history of Platonic interpretation.The criticism ofπSη falls into alarger discussion on Platonic textual emendation in C of the Timaeus.Themajor issues included whether in the phrase “η γ)γ�νεν η κα- <γεν)ς�στιν” (..ff.) the first and secondη are aspirated, or not: either Sp…v (a suggestion also taken bymostmodern editions of the text, includingOCT, Budé, and Teubner) or v… v (accepted by Porphyry, Iamblichus,and Proclus) and used to express that a temporal creation is not to betaken literally.5 Another textual problem for the Platonists included onementioned by John Philoponus6 of Calvenus Taurus, whereby Taurusreads C as “ε� γ)γ�νεν, ε� κα- <γεν)ς Oστιν” (“whether it was created,even if it is uncreated”), a reading Philoponus himself accepted.7In the light of this history of textual criticism on Tim. C, our

fragment discusses the πSη (“a discourse in some way concerning theUniverse”). Regarding theMiddle Platonic tradition, Proclus tells us thatthis πSη had been discussed by Albinus, who understood it to mean thatthe cosmos was eternally existent in some way, in so far as it contains theprinciple of createdness.8 Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his Commentaryon the De Caelo, omitted theπSη, whichDillon takes to indicate that it wasan addition of the second century Platonists.9The first view given is by Proclus, who says that Plato meant to attach

the πSη with the π�ιε9σ*αι πSη μ)λλ�ντας λ γ�υς, making the text read“those who in some way intended to make logoi on the universe”(.).10 The next view given is that of �Q παλαι τερ�ι τ.ν �Uηγητ.ν11

(.ff.) (rather than Porphyry, whomProclus usually names first) whotake the πSη with <γεν)ς and γενητ ν so that the universe is in somewaysuncreated, in other ways created.12 Next comes the view of Iamblichus,(.ff.), who attaches the πSη to περ- τ�5 παντ7ς so that the dialoguewas “in someway” about the universe, but “in someway” not. Iamblichusunderstands this as Plato leaving aside discussion about unlimited and

5 See Proclus, In Tim. I. .ff.6 Philoponus, De Aeternitate Mundi, p. , ff. Rabe.7 On Philoponus and Taurus’ emendation of the Timaeus, see Dillon () –.8 Proclus, In Tim. I. .ff., see Dillon () –.9 Quoted in Philoponus, Aet. p. , ff. Rabe.10 λ)γει.γ+ρ τ�Vς περ- παντ7ς λ γ�υς π�ιε9σ*αι πSη μ)λλ�ντας.11 Possibly pre-Plotinian philosophers.12 Τ7 π^ν πS" μεν.

commentary

formless matter,13 but investigating the Forms and their variety withinthe universe.14 For Iamblichus, the difficulty lies with the fact that we arediscussing forms, not matter.The indirect quotation from Syrianus begins with the imperfect �λ)γεν

(. ), which makes what follows sound like it comes from Syrianus’lectures. Proclus later adapts Syrianus’ interpretation, which places theπSη with the λ γ�ς so that Plato τ7 πS" τ+ς δια(�ρ+ς ταCτας �νδε�κνυταιτ.ν λ γων. Syrianus distinguishes three types of λ γ�ι: the noetic, sci-entific, and instructive (.–). These seem, moreover, to fall underthe Stoic categories of logos: logos endiathetos and logos prophorikeos.The first logos in nous is the creative principle of the universe. This

logos exists within the Demiurge, as do the scientific words. These linesmost likely reflect Tim. A–E, whereby the Demiurge created theuniverse by speaking to the lower gods. Here, Syrianus’ first type of logosis the Stoic demiurgic logos, the intermediary reason-principle by whichthe creator creates the universe without directly involving himself.15The second logos is in the individual at the level of understanding

(episteme). The Stoics also employed logos as a reason or kind of knowl-edge used by men to understand intellectual presentations.16 In this way,logoswas connected to physis, in so far as logos forcedmen to understandand connect to reality.17The third kind of logos Syrianus lists is instructive, thosewords uttered

by us for the purpose of communingwith each other.18The logoswas con-sidered to be the first part of dialectic, while the lektonwhich interpretedand gavemeaning to the utterance, was the second. Porphyry,19according

13 Dillon notes in p. that Iamblichus maintains that there is no reference to matteror material creation until E ff., so that apparent references before that point must referto a noetic form of hule.

14 E δε γε Θε9�ς 'Ι$μ�λιA�ς π" μεν περ- τ�5 παντ7ς Oσεσ*α� (ησ- τ7ν λ γ�ν, πS" δ’�ZG Τ"ν γ+ρ ]λην gτε < ριστ�ν �Pσαν κα- <νε�δε�ν 3ρρητ�ν <(�ησι, τ"ν δε ε�δητικ"νπ^σαν �ν τ1. κ σμ1ω π�ικιλ�αν <νασκ)ψεται.

15 The Stoics closely connect the creative seminal reason principles with the creator.See Philo Aet. .–; Seneca, Nat. Quaest. ..; Diog. Laert. Lives .–; Ploti-nus Enn. ..

16 Chrysippus, SVF II ; Diogenes VII ; Sandbach () . Stobaeus includedamong his definitions of episteme: episteme is a “systema of specific items like the rationalapprehension of particulars present in the good man” Ecl. II pp. ff. (SVF II I ).

17 On the connection between truth and logos, see Long () –.18 This seems parallel to the Stoic category of logos as “significant utterance” or sound

which acted as a dialectical sign. Diogenes Laertius VII (SVF III p. ). See Lloyd() –.

19 Porph. ap. Simpl. In Cat. (CAG VIII) pp. , ; , .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

to the Stoic division of dialectic, examined grammar and divided thenouns and verbs as elements of logos and all other parts of speech aslexis, as all other parts of speech depend on nouns and verbs for mean-ing.20 It is clear that logos and lektonweremainstays of Stoic grammaticaleducation, and hence it makes some sense that Syrianus might call logosinstructive.That the Demiurge has a special connection to the logoi is hardly

new to Platonic interpretation of the Timaeus: the most pronouncedunderstanding of this probably occurs in Philo, who places the logoiwithin the Demiurge so that the idea of the universe exists within theDemiurge from the beginning of time.21 Syrianus takes this idea of logosand the Demiurge, however, and categorises three Stoic meanings forlogos in order to show different aspects of the Demiurge’s intellectualcreation. Syrianus’ categorisation of the demiurgic logoi underscores hisinterpretation of the Demiurge as generative Intellect: hence, Syrianuscan call his creation “noetic”.TheDemiurge is generative as an entity whoproduces the realm of becoming, including all intelligibles.22 That thecreation is scientific and instructive shows how the Demiurge supervisesa range of demiurgic activity, including that of the younger gods.

20 Lloyd () .21 Philo, Leg. All. ; Heres. –; Cher. . See Dillon () –.22 Proclus, In Tim. I..–. See Opsomer () –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 5

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–

Τ7 μHν δ" ν�0σει μετ+ λ γ�υ περιληπτ ν, <ε- κατ+ ταDτ+ =ν, τ7 δH αPδ USη μετ’ α�σ*0σεως <λ γ�υ δ�Uαστ ν, γιγν μεν�ν κα- <π�λλCμεν�ν,=ντως δH �Dδ)π�τε =ν [Tim. A].

Τ�Cτ�ις δ" τ�9ς <νδρ$σιν εP λ)γ�υσι κα- E 8μ)τερ�ς _ρ)σκετ� διδ$σ-καλ�ςG κα- γ+ρ ε� μικρ ν πως τ"ν λ)Uιν μεταρρυ*μ�σαιμεν, αDτ *ενOσται τ7 π^ν κατα(αν)ς G τ7 μHν δ" <ε- κατ+ τ+ αDτ+ =ν �στι ν�0-σει μετ+ λ γ�υ περιληπτ ν, τ7 δH γιγν μεν�ν κα- <π�λλCμεν�ν, =ντωςδH �Dδ)π�τε =ν, δ USη μετ’ α�σ*0σεως <λ γ�υ δ�Uαστ νG τα5τα γ+ρκα- τ�9ς πρ�ειρημ)ν�ις <κ λ�υ*αG τ� τ7 xν <ε�, γ)νεσιν δH �Dκ OA�ν,κα- τ� τ7 γιγν μεν�ν, xν δH �Dδ)π�τεG τ�5 μHν <ε- κατ+ ταDτ+ =ν〈τ�ς〉τ7 <ε- xν κα- γ)νεσιν �Dκ OA�ν δηλ�5ντ�ς—�σ�δυναμε9 γ+ρ τ7 κατ+ταDτ+ τ1. γ)νεσιν �Dκ OA�ν- τ�5 δH γιγν�μ)ν�υ μ)ν, �Dδ)π�τε δH =ν-τ�ς τ1. γιγν�μ)ν1ω κα- <π�λλυμ)ν1ω κα- =ντως �Dδ)π�τε =ντι τ7 αDτ7σημα�ν�ντ�ς, ε� κα- σα()στερ�ν <π0γγελται, δι+ τRς τ�5 =ντως πρ�σ-*0κης �νδεικνυμ)ν�υ τ�5 Πλ$των�ς, �τι κα*7 μHν γιγν μεν ν �στιν,�Dκ Oστι, κα*7 δH hνδαλμα τ�5 =ντ�ς <π�()ρεται, κατ+ τ�σ�5τ ν �στιν�D γιγν μεν�ν. �ν γ+ρ τ�9ς Eρισμ�9ς κα- τ+ Eριστ+ μ^λλ�ν �σα(0νισεδι+ τ.ν πρ�σ*)σεωνG l μHν γ+ρ ε`πεν 3νω <ε- =ν, τ�5τ� πρ�σ*ε-ς ε`-πεν <ε- κατ+ τ+ αDτ+ =ν, Wνα μ" τ7 <ε- τ7 Aρ�νικ7ν <κ�Cσωμεν, <λλ+τ7 α�?νι�νG τ�5τ� γ+ρ Eμ�5 π^ν κα- κατ+ τ+ αDτ+ =ν, τ7 δH Aρ�νικ7ν

Now the one of these is apprehensible by thought with the aid of rea-soning, since it is ever uniformly existent; whereas the other is an objectof opinion with the aid of unreasoning sensation, since it becomes andperishes and is never really existent.

These latter authorities speak well, and our teacher approved their view.For if we rearrange the text just a little, at once everything will be clear:that which is ever uniformly existent “is”, that which is apprehensibleby thought with the aid of reasoning, whereas that “which is coming tobe and perishing and is never really existent” is “an object of opinionwith the aid of irrational sensation.” For this is in accord with what haspreceded: “What exists eternally, and has no generation, and what iscoming into being, but is never existent?”1 ( D ). Since the phrase“that which is ever uniformly existent” means the same as “that beingis eternal and does not have creation.” There is an equivalence between“identical with itself ” and “not coming to be”—and “that which is cominginto being but never exists” has the same significance as “that whichis born and dies and is never really being”, except that this has beendescribed in a manner more precise, with Plato showing through theaddition of “really” that, in so far as it is coming into being, it is not, inso far as it has acquired a trace of being, to that extent it is not somethingwhich comes into being. [Plato] has also, in these definitions, renderedmore clear also the objects to be defined through the words that he hasadded. What has been described above as “being which is always”, thishe calls now by an addition, “always existent in the same terms”, lestwe understand the “always” as temporal, but rather as eternal. For thisone is all things together, and existent in the same terms whereas what

1 Whittaker maintains that <ε- after γιγν μεν�ν is an ideological emendation. Ontextual emendations and late antique readers of the Timaeus, see Whittaker () –. Whittaker points out that the second <ε- is not present in the Vaticanus Palatinusgr. (P). On the history of the second <ε- and textual emendation in the Timaeus, seeDillon () , where he says that the whole Platonic tradition omits the second <ε-.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

τ1. <πε�ρ1ω τ�5 Aρ ν�υ συνεκτ)ταταιG l δH ε`πε γιγν μεν�ν, τ�5τ�μετ+ τ�5 <π�λλCμεν�ν εhρηκεν, Wνα μ" τ+ς πρ� δ�υς >πλ.ς γεν)σεις<κ�Cσωμεν, l κα- �π- *ε.ν τ$ττεται τ.ν �π)κεινα τ�5 =ντ�ς, <λλ+τ+ς τ"ν <π?λειαν �A�Cσας σCστ�ιA�ν. ε�σ- δ’ �Pν �Q <π�δ�*)ντεςEρισμ�- τ�ι�5τ�� τινεςG <ε- =ν �στι τ7 ν�0σει μετ+ λ γ�υ περιληπτ νGγιγν μεν ν �στι τ7 δ USη μετ’ α�σ*0σεως <λ γ�υ δ�Uαστ ν.

Commentary

This is a discussion of the contrast between the physical and intelligibleworld, spurred by literary criticism based on a lemma. Unlike the previ-ous fragments, Proclus uses γ+ρ with direct speech, rather than γ+ρ fol-lowed by an accusative and infinitive of indirect speech (.). It seemsthat in the first construction, Proclus has more or less appropriated theopinion of his teacher. With indirect speech, Proclus creates some dis-tance between himself and his teacher, and this construction is usuallyfollowed by some correction, however slight.There is some history regarding textual emendation of this passage by

Platonists. While the second <ε- is omitted by the entire post-Platonictradition,4 including Cicero and Calcidius, it is included by Philoponusand several others.5 It is interesting that, unlike Proclus, Syrianus doesnot address this issue of the meaning or relevance of the second <ε-.6

4 Dillon () . Dillon also lists Nicomachus of Gerasa, Intro. Arith. .., Nume-nius fr. Des Places, Alexander of Aphrodisias ap. Philop. Aet. .–, and SextusEmpiricus AM . as omitting it. Dillon () .

5 Philoponus, In de An. .f.; in Phys. .ff., Eusebius, P.E. . and a probablereading in Pseudo-Justin, Cohort. See Dillon () .

6 Proclus, In Tim. I. .ff.: “Why, they say, did Plato not add<ε- to γιγν μεν�ν also,as he did to =ν, or π�τ) (‘at one time or another’), so that he could have a thorough-goingantithesis to “<ε� =ν.” On this passage, Whittaker takes Proclus’ interpretation to meanthat he knows a reading without the second <ε�, while Dillon shows that there was “some

text and translation

is temporal is stretched out along the infinity of time.2 The one whichhe said is “created” he said this would be destroyed, in order that we notunderstand the processions simply as creations, sometimes that is appliedto the gods also beyond being, but those [other] processions whichhave destruction associated with them. Thus, these are the definitionspresented. The being which always is, is “that which is apprehended byintellection joined to a definition”, whereas “what is coming into being”,is that which is apprehended by a conjectural judgement founded on anirrational sensation.3

2 The previous opinion is possibly that of Iamblichus, and Syrianus is, in effect,arguing with him and expanding him.

3 In his quotation of the text, Proclus seems to leave out the second <ε-.

Syrianus leaves the text but understands it differently—Proclus saysthat by rearranging the word order, the syntax emerges more plainly:7

. <ε- κατ+ ταDτ+ =ν (τ7 =ν <ε� δε �Dκ OA�ν): The thing which isalways unchangeably real.

. γ�γν�μεν�ν κα- <π�λλCμεν�ν, =ντως δ) �Dδεπ τε =ν (τ7 γιγν με-ν�υ μ)ν <ε� �ν δε �Dδεπ τε): The thing that becomes and passesaway, but never has real being.

The terms to be defined correspond to the definitions (Eρισμ ι) so thatthe first part of the definition answers the first part of the question, andthe second part of the definition answers the second part of the question:

. τ7 ν�0σει μετ+ λ7γ�υ περιληπτ ν: That which is apprehended bythought.

. τ7 δε αP δ USη μετ’α�σ*0σεως <λ γ�υ δ�Uαστ ν:That which is theobject of belief with unreasoning sensation.

speculation on thematter, whichmay precisely have led to the inclusion of the<ε�.” Dillon() , note . While it does seem that Proclus may be arguing against a particularreading of the text, he does not use “hoi men”, “hoi de” to refer to other commentators,as he often does in the Timaeus commentary. Based on the fact that Proclus does notspecifically address other commentators, I would agree with Dillon’s more conservativeinterpretation of Proclus’ remarks.

7 Taylor emends the text in his translation, so that the predicate is the subject whichis to be defined.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

The text now reads: The definition of “that which is always real” is“apprehended by thought”; and the definition of that “which becomesand passes and never has real being” is “that which is the object of beliefwith unreasoning sensation.” This sentiment is repeated again in C:“as we saw, sensible things, that are to be apprehended by belief togetherwith sensation, are things that become and can be generated.”Syrianus’ arrangement of the text thus differs from the older inter-

preters.We are told that “some” (possibly pre-Plotinian) (.–) havemade one proposition (λ γ�ς) out of the two parts of the clause (κ.λ�ν).For these interpreters, the definition of “being which is always” is “thatwhich is apprehended by thought, always exists”, and the definition of“becoming” is “that which is apprehended by a conjectural judgementfounded on irrational sensation, which comes and goes is never reallyexisting” (.–). Proclus criticises this interpretation for includingthe term to be defined in the definition. This group essentially defines“being which always is” by “being which is identical to itself ” (.–) and being which becomes is defined according to “that which comesand goes and is never really existent”, both of which contain the terms tobe defined. Proclus calls this “a great ignorance of dialectic” (.–).The second group of interpreters (Porphyry and Iamblichus?) marks adivision in each κ.λ�ν and so separates the definition from that which isto be defined (.–.). They say that in the first part the definitionis “that which is apprehended by intellect”, and what is to be defined is“always being”; in the second part, the definition is “that which is appre-hended by a conjectural judgement founded on an irrational sensation”,while the other words are the subject of the definition (.–). Thisgroup receives approval from Syrianus (.).Syrianus makes a text-critical reference (.), where he praises

Plato for clarifying his argument through the addition of =ντως and (in.) κα*7. His point is that Plato’s text should be read carefully, asPlato argues precisely, using adverbs to clarify the meaning of importantwords. In this case, Plato shows, according to Syrianus, that coming intobeing is not “really” the same as being, whereas “always” refers to aneternal state.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 6

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

Τ7ν μHν �Pν π�ιητ"ν κα- πατ)ρα τ�5δε τ�5 παντ7ς ε�ρε9ν τε Oργ�ν κα-ε�ρ ντα ε�ς gπαντας <δCνατ�ν λ)γειν [Tim. C].

Τ+ μHν �Pν τ.ν παλαι.ν �Uηγητ.ν περ- τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 δ γματατ�ια5τα 3ττα �στ-ν [ς συντ μως ε�πε9νG L δH κα- τ1. 8μετ)ρ1ω κα*η-γεμ νι περ- τ�Cτ�υ τε*ε?ρηται,()ρε,συνελ ντες <ναγρ$ψωμεν,L κα-μ$λιστα στ�A$�εσ*αι τRς τ�5 Πλ$των�ς 8γ�Cμε*α διαν��ας. Oστι τ��-νυν E δημι�υργ7ς E εFς κατ’ αDτ7ν E τ7 π)ρας τ.ν ν�ερ.ν *ε.ν <(�-ρ��ων *ε7ς κα- πληρ�Cμεν�ς μHν <π7 τ.ν ν�ητ.νa μ�ν$δων κα- τ.ντRς �ωRς πηγ.ν, πρ�ϊ)μεν�ς δH <(’ 6αυτ�5 τ"ν �λην δημι�υργ�αν κα-πρ�στησ$μεν�ς μερικωτ)ρ�υς τ.ν �λων πατ)ρας, αDτ7ς δH <κ�νητ�ς�ν τSR κ�ρυ(SR τ�5 '�λCμπ�υ διαιων�ως Qδρυμ)ν�ς κα- διττ.ν κ σμων�ασιλεCων �περ�υραν�ων τε κα- �Dραν�ων,<ρA"ν δH κα- μ)σα κα- τ)λητ.ν �λων περι)AωνG τRς γ+ρ δημι�υργικRς >π$σης διακ�σμ0σεως τ7μ)ν �στι τ.ν �λων Eλικ.ς δημι�υργικ7ν αhτι�ν, τ7 δH τ.ν μερ.ν Eλι-κ.ς, τ7 δH τ.ν �λων μερικ.ς, τ7 δH τ.ν μερ.ν μερικ.ς. τετραπλRς δHτRς δημι�υργ�ας �Zσης 8 δημι�υργικ" μ�ν+ς ε�ς 6αυτ"ν <νεδ0σατ� τ"νEλικ"ν τ.ν �λων πρ ν�ιαν, �U0ρτηται δH αDτRς 8 δημι�υργικ"b τρι+ςEλικ.ς �πιτρ�πεC�υσα τ+ μ)ρη κα- τ"ν τRς μ�ν$δ�ς διελ�μ)νη δCνα-μιν, cσπερ αP κα- �π- τRς 6τ)ρας τRς μεριστRς δημι�υργ�ας 8 μ�ν+ς8γε9ται τRς τρι$δ�ς, 8 τ+ �λα μερικ.ς τRς τ+ μ)ρη μερικ.ς διακ�σμ�C-σηςG τRς δH τρι$δ�ς τ7 σCμπαν πλR*�ς περιA�ρε5�ν αDτ"ν κα- διαιρ�C-μεν�ν περ- αDτ"ν κα- μερι� μεν�ν αDτRς τ+ς π�ι0σεις κα- πληρ�Cμε-ν�νc <π’ αDτRς. cσπερ �Pν τ.ν π�λλ.ν παραδειγμ$των 8γε9ται τ7 4ν,�]τω κα- τ.ν π�λλ.ν δημι�υργ.ν E εFς, Wνα π$ντα <λλ0λ�ις 4πηται,τ7 yν παρ$δειγμα τ7 ν�ητ ν, E εFς ν�ερ7ς δημι�υργ ς, E εFς μ�ν�γεν"ςα�σ*ητ7ς κ σμ�ς.

a '��ρ#(ων–ν�ητ�ν om N b μ�ν�ς–δημι�υργικ) om C c περ�—πληρ�*μεν�ν omC

Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a taskindeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were athing impossible.

Such, then, in summary form, are the opinions of the ancient commen-tators concerning the Demiurge; come now, let us recount the theoriesof our Master on this question, which we consider particularly to accordwith the thought of Plato. The Single Demiurge, according to him, is thegodwhodefines the (upper) limit of the noeric gods andwho, being filledby the noetic monads and the sources of life, while projecting from him-self the entire demiurgic creation and assuming leadership over themoreparticular fathers of the universe, is established eternally motionless onthe “summit of Olympus”1 ruling at once over the two cosmoses, thehypercelestial and celestial, and embracing the beginning, middle, andend of all things.2 In the demiurgic order as a whole, there is a demiurgiccause of whole things holistically, of parts holistically, of wholes, partially,and of parts partially. The demiurgic operation being thus four-fold, thedemiurgic monad has attached to himself the universal providential careof wholes and from this there depends the demiurgic triad which gov-erns parts in a universal manner and divides the power of the monad,just as, again, in the case of the second demiurgic level which is partial,the monad rules over the triad, that which organises the wholes partiallyruling over what organises the parts partially, and the whole multiplic-ity [sc. of secondary beings] depends upon the triad, dancing around itand dividing itself about it and apportioning between them its creativeactivities and being filled by it. Just as, therefore, the one Paradigm rulesover the many paradigms, so the unique Demiurge rules over the manydemiurges in order that all thingsmay follow upon each other, the uniquenoeticModel, the unique noeric Demiurge, the unique sensible universe.

1 Il. XX .2 Laws IV E.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This fragment discusses the place of the Demiurge in Syrianus’ structureof the cosmos, aswell as how the placement of theDemiurge correspondsto his function. Syrianus’ view is picked up by Proclus and appears inbooks and of the Platonic Theology which focus on the Syrianicopinion that at the level of particularity, demiurgic triads divide thepower of the monad.Before Proclus propounds the view of his master, he gives a lengthy

doxography of the opinions of eight Platonists on the identity of theDemiurge. He sets out to consider who the Demiurge is and in what sortof class he is placed in the range of beings (.–.).The first opinion considered is that of Numenius,3 who posits three

gods: the first is called “father”, the second “creator” and the third “cre-ation”,4 relating how the universe is a god (πατ0ρ-π�ιητ0ς-π��ημα)5(.–.).6 The first god is assimilated to the Good as primarycause.7 Numenius elaborates on this system in fr. des Places, wherehe states that the first is not a creator, but is the father of demiurgic god(–).8 This primal god is “inactive in respect of all works” (3ργ�ς Oρ-γων συμπ$ντων, , ); however, theDemiurge leads through the heav-ens (8γεμ�νε9ν δι’ �Dραν�5 � ντα, ).9 In .–, Proclus lodges his

3 This is included as Numenius fr. des Places (Test. L, fr. , Thedinga).4 Dillon finds a problem with the identification of the “third god” here. Dillon says

that while Proclus recognises the third god as the cosmos, it seems that in fr. des Placesit is identified with a world Soul as the lower aspect of the Demiurge. See Dillon, () note .

5 He is also said to call these three π$π�ς, Oγγ�ν�ς, <π γ�ν�ς (.).6 Numenius claims that Socrates first conjectured three gods, fr. (.L.) . (=

Eusebius, P.E. XIV, , , p. c Viger): τρε9ς *ε�Vς τι*εμ)ν�υ Σωκρ$τ�υς…. Cf. Puech() –. Numenius finds further justification in the Pseudo-Platonic Ep. , E –.

7 des Places argues that Numenius here contradicts Tim. E where π�ιητ0ςprecedes πατ0ρ; cf. Festugière () , n. : “Numénius a… tort d’assimiler ‘Père’au Bien. Car, d’une part, c’est l’accoupler à π�ιητ0ς et, d’autre part, c’est le faire passer ausecond rang puisque π�ιητ0ς vient d’abord chez Platon.” See also Numenius fr. desPlaces, where the primal god as Good is the first principle of Being, while the Demiurgeis in the realm of becoming.

8 �Zτε δημι�υργε9ν �στι AρεMν τ7ν πρ.τ�ν.9 This dichotomy is continued in Numenius fr. des Places, where the primary

god is at rest and concerns himself with the intelligible realm, while the Demiurge is inmotion and is concernedwith the intelligible and sensible realms. Formore discussion onNumenius and the Demiurge, see Dillon () – and des Places’s introductorysection on the theology of Numenius () –.

commentary

criticism against this understanding of theDemiurge. Proclus argues thatin Plato, “father” is in the second rank after “creator.” Moreover, Nume-nius places the transcendent and that which is below the transcendenton the same rank. Proclus says that it is necessary that these be placedbelow the first. Next, Proclus argues that Numeniusmust not identify thepaternal principle of the universe to the first principle, since the pater-nal principle should reside in the two classes that come after the FirstPrinciple. Third, Proclus does not accept a distinction between “father”and “creator”, and holds that Plato uses these two names for the samegod.The next opinions given are those of Harpocration, a student of Atti-

cus (.–.), followed by Atticus (.–). Harpocration fol-lows Numenius in his doctrine of the three gods, naming the first god“Heaven” and “Chronos”, the second god “Zeus” and “Zan”, and the third“heaven” and “universe” (.–). He calls the first God “Zeus” and“king of the intelligible” and the second “leader”. The first god is thefather, first principle of theParmenides ofwhomevery property is denied.Atticus identifies the Demiurge with the Good, calling it “good”, but not“the Good.” In this way, the Good is the cause of every essence and isbeyond Being. Proclus finds fault with this, however, in so far as theParadigm is placed before the Demiurge and is more elevated in dignityto the Good.10After the three Middle Platonists, Proclus gives an account of the Plo-

tinian Demiurge (.–.), which appears to be based on EnneadIII. . . In this treatise, Plotinus associates the Demiurge with Intellect,which gives form to soul, the maker of the visible universe.11 Accordingto Proclus, Plotinus rightly posits two demiurges, one in the intelligiblerealm, the other the Leader of theUniverse (.–). He identifies theDemiurge with the encosmic Nous, the region between the One and theuniverse (.),12 and never associates the Demiurge with the One.13Porphyry (.–.) agrees with Plotinus, but clarifies his think-ing so that the Demiurge is not the Intellect, but the hypercosmic Soul.

10 See Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.11 On Plotinus’ Enn. III.., see Armstrong () , note . Armstrong says that

nous and to zoon must be distinguished as Intellect from object. See Enn. V. on therelation of Intellect to ideas.

12 ..13 Plotinus, Enn. II...; II..; II..; IV., . He attributes the association of nous

and Demiurge to Plato in Enn. ... See Dillon () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Plotinus criticises Porphyry and does not equate Soul with Demiurge(.–).14Amelius’ interpretation follows that of Plotinus (.–); he imag-

ines three demiurges, three intellects, and three kings: he who is, he whohas, and he who sees (Oστι-OAει-EρT ), an exegesis of Tim. E .15 Ame-lius bases this on the three kings of Plato’s Second Letter, E – (.) and the three Orphic gods: Phanes, Ouranos, and Kronos (OF ).16Iamblichus refutes the opinion of Porphyry (.–)17 by show-

ing that his understanding of the Demiurge is not Plotinian. Iamblichuscalls the Demiurge the intelligible universe, which Proclus finds morePlotinian than Porphyry’s analysis (.). Following this interpreta-tion, Proclus cites Iamblichus as having written a more accurate (<κρι-�)στερ�ν) work on the Demiurge entitled, “On the Discourse of Zeusin the Timaeus.” In this treatise, which Syrianus parallels in his com-mentary of Tim. C, Iamblichus makes the Demiurge the third amongthe fathers in the intellectual hebdomad, after the triads of intelligiblegods and intelligible-intellective gods (.–).18 As with Plotinus,Iamblichus places the Demiurge in the realm of Intellect as opposed tothe realm of Soul, where Porphyry places it. More precisely, Iamblichuslocates theDemiurge third in the intellectual triad of Kronos-Rhea-Zeus.Iamblichus says that the Demiurge “gathers into one and holds in sub-jection to himself ” the intelligible realm.19 This hebdomadic structureof intellect reappears in Proclus’ Platonic Theology V . Here, Proclusdescribes amonad overseeing two triads, the first of which is “the fathers”

14 Porphyry appeals to Tim. A, on the creation of the soul linked to the creation ofthe divided nature.

15 Dillon () . See also Dillon () .16 Proclus, In Tim. ..ff. on Tim. E, Amelius’ source for his triad of demiurgic

intellects—the first, “he who is” (based on the phrase, “the really existing living being”),the second, “he who possesses” (based on “existing in”), and the third, “he who sees”(based on the word “behold” in the text). See Dillon () .

17 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.18 “That Iamblichus was speaking more generally here, but dealt with the position

of the demiurge more accurately elsewhere, may be gathered from the following: whencomposing his essay, ‘On the Speech of Zeus in the Timaeus’, following on the intelligibletriads and the three triads of [intelligible and] intellectual gods, he allots theDemiurge thethird rank among the fathers in the intellectual hebdomad.” Translation: Dillon (). It is interesting that Proclus’ hebdomadic structure finds its roots in Iamblichus’demiurgic hebdomad, which seems to have been made into a structure of seven so as tomimic, or rather, to prefigure, the seven planets. See Julian’s Hymn to King Helios wherethe intermediate level is also hebdomadic.

19 Dillon () .

commentary

who preside over the activity of the Intellect, the second are the “uncon-taminated entities” (or implacable gods) who guard each father individ-ually.20 In the first triad, the first father oversees essence, the second life,and the third father is the Demiurge proper, who oversees nous.Syrianus’ interpretation of this passage appears to be drawn from

Iamblichus, who returns the Demiurge to the realm of Intellect, ratherthan Soul. Syrianus states the following characteristics of the Demiurgewhich establishes his cosmic place (.–): the Demiurge is at theupper limit of the noeric gods, he is filled by noetic monads; he assumesleadership over particular fathers; he is motionless; and he rules over thehypercelestial and celestial realms. Syrianus establishes that the Demi-urge is at the level of Intellect21—as such, he is transcendent, and hence,motionless—and his causal activity must be mediated.22 Because theactivity of the Demiurge requires mediation, Syrianus mentions a seriesof “more particular” fathers in the hypercelestial and celestial realms.What follows, then, is a discussion of demiurgic activity based on thestructure Syrianus sets forth. The demiurgic monad, who projects fromhimself creation, rules over the demiurgic fathers, who form a triad.Thistriad flows from themonad anddepends upon it, so that the two levels areinter-connected.The relationship between monad and triad is describedas a curious four-fold power, the demiurgic cause of:

. Wholes holistically: τ.ν �λων Eλικ.ς. Parts holistically: τ.ν μερ.ν Eλικ.ς. Wholes partially: τ.ν �λων μερικ.ς. Parts partially: τ.ν μερ.ν μερικ.ς

These four powers are divided into two demiurgic levels (.–)—that which pertains to the monad, and that which is particular to thetriad. The first power listed is that of the monad—the monad has uni-versal care of the whole (he imposes order on the whole universe in auniversal manner);23 the highest element of the demiurgic triad ordersthe universals in an individualising manner (he distinguishes the totality

20 On Proclus’ hebdomad, see Siorvanes () –.21 Plato, Tim. E –; Intellect transmits power of the higher realm to the physical

realm, which is precisely the activity of the Demiurge. As discussed earlier, Syrianus wasnot the first to place the Demiurge at the level of Intellect. Plotinus placed him at thehypostasis of Intellect, as did Iamblichus.

22 Opsomer () .23 This is the reading Dillon () –, note .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

of creation into genera and species);24 then, the two remaining demiur-gic “fathers” are said to engage in division into parts in a universalisingmode (or to firm up the connections of species);25 and to link parts towholes in a partial manner (establish the individuality of the individual).The partial forms of demiurgy associated with the triad are dependenton the monad.Proclus readily adopts Syrianus’ demiurgic structure. In PlatonicThe-

ology V, Proclus describes an intellectual hebdomad, an elaboration ofthe one set forth by Iamblichus. The Demiurge exists in the Intellect,which is broken into a triad whosemembers are given theOrphic names,Kronos-Rhea-Zeus.26The Demiurge is Zeus (the intellective-intellect, orlower limit of the first intellective triad) because it alone is capable of thereversion necessary to impose forms.27 The demiurgic function is lowerbecause it needs a proper mix of distinction and unity for its creation.28Zeus as the intellective-intellect is head of two triads of demiurges—onein the hypercosmic realm, the other in the encosmic—as well as “theseventh divinity,” separating the demiurges from the sensible realm.Theinternal structure of the two triads,moreover,mimics that of themonad’srelationship to its own place in the Intellect: namely, each triad has itsownmonad.The hyperocosmic triad is headed by Zeus-Poseidon-Pluto,followed by a hypercosmic-encosmic triad, headed by Zeus-Poseidon-Hephaistos.29While Syrianus characteristically divides the function of theDemiurge

into categories, he makes a point of having one Demiurge who presidesover amultiplicity of demiurges (theDemiurge in themost specific sensebeing Zeus.) Syrianus holds true to the Timaeus’ visible cosmos, whichPlato describes as one because it is trying to be a copy of the Paradigm.The noetic cosmos is likewise one because the Demiurge contemplatesit as a Paradigm, with the result that it possesses the uniqueness of thecreator.

24 Dillon interprets the passage in this way () –, note .25 Again, Dillon’s interpretation in () , note .26 Based on theGorgiasmyth, wherebyZeus, Poseidon andPluto divided the kingdom

of fate into three parts (A–).27 Zeus is the third father, after Kronos (who could not be Demiurge because he is too

unified), and Rhea (who cannot bring about reversion). Proclus, PT V . p. , –.28 Dillon () .29 Opsomer has drawn a nice chart of this () .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 7

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

Τ7ν μHν �Pν π�ιητ"ν κα- πατ)ρα τ�5δε τ�5 παντ7ς ε�ρε9ν τε Oργ�ν κα-ε�ρ ντα ε�ς gπαντας <δCνατ�ν λ)γειν [Tim. C].

ε� τ��νυν E BεCς �στιν E τ7 yν κρ$τ�ς OAων, E τ7ν Φ$νητα καταπι?ν,�ν 1Y πρ?τως αQ ν�ητα- τ.ν �λων α�τ�αι, E π$ντα παρ$γων κατ+ τ+ς�π�*0κας τRς Νυκτ ς, E τ�9ς *ε�9ς τ+ς �U�υσ�ας παραδιδ�Vς τ�9ς τε3λλ�ις κα- τ�9ς τρισ- Κρ�ν�δαις, �eτ ς �στιν E τ�5 κ σμ�υ παντ7ςεFς κα- �λ�ς δημι�υργ ς, π)μπτην OAων �ν τ�9ς �ασιλε5σι τ$Uιν, [ςκα- τ�5τ� <π�δ)δεικται τ1. 8μετ)ρ1ω κα*ηγεμ νι δαιμ�ν�ως �ν τα9ς'�ρ(ικα9ς συν�υσ�αις κα- σCστ�ιA�ς {ν �Dραν1. κα- Φ$νητι, δι7 κα-π�ιητ0ς �στι κα- πατ"ρ κα- Eλικ.ς 6κ$τερ�ν.

Commentary

According to the Suda, Syrianus authored two works regarding Orphictheology:On the Theology of Orpheus and On the Agreement of Orpheus,Pythagoras and Plato. The passage above is interesting because it alertsus to the fact that Syrianus held Orphic seminars in which theTheologywas discussed.2 In the following passage from Marinus’ Life of Proclus,it seems that Proclus’ own commentary on the subject was taken fromnotes on the writings of Syrianus:

2 On Orpheus as a theologian, see Manolea () ; Hermias, In Phaedr. .–..

Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a taskindeed; and having discovered Him, to declare Him unto all men were athing impossible.

If then Zeus is the one who is holding unitary power, he who swallowedPhanes, in whom primally are situated the intelligible causes of theuniverse, producing everything according to the instructions of Night,and transmitted these powers to the gods, and in particular to the threeoffspring of Kronos, it is he who is the single and universal Creator ofthe entire cosmos, holding the fifth rank among the Kings, as has beendemonstrated marvellously well by our master in his Orphic seminars,1and of like rank with Ouranos and Phanes, on which account he is both“creator” and “father”, and each universally.

1 sunousia can refer to conversations; see Plato, Sph. E, Smp. E; La. C;Phd. B; as well as intercourse with a teacher and attendance at his teaching: Plt. C. See Frede () .

“Once when I was reading the works of Orpheus with him, and hearingin his exegeses not only what is in Iamblichus and Syrianus but furthermaterial, apter to theology, I asked the philosopher not to leave such aninspired poem unexplained but to write a fuller commentary on this too[in addition to the Chaldean Oracles].3 He said that he had often felt anurge to write one, but had been prevented by dreams in which he hadseen his teacher deterring him with threats. I thought of a way round, andproposed that he should mark the passages in his tutor’s volumes whichhe approved. He acquiesced (image of goodness that he was), and markedthe commentaries in the margins. We collected the passages together, andthus obtained his notes and comments on quite a number of verses of

3 On Proclus and the Chaldean Oracles, see Saffrey ().

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Orpheus, even if he did not manage to make up the whole of the divinemythology or all of the Rhapsodies.”4

Marinus terms the Orphic poems “Rhapsodies” after theHieroi Logoi in Rhapsodies listed in the Suda as awork authored byOrpheus.5Accord-ing toM.L.West, the Orphic theogony that was discussed by the late Pla-tonists was based on this “Rhapsodic Theogony”, whose story differedsomewhat from other prevailing theogonies.6 It appears from the Mar-inus passage above that the exegesis of Syrianus on the Orphic poemslargely agreed with that of Proclus. Proclus’ comments that he fearedwriting a full commentary on the poems are strange. Centrally, they arein the form of dreams—which Proclus often uses to reinforce what hedoes or does not want—as a way to pay respect to his teacher. It seemsthat Syrianus’ teachings on the subject were not exclusively oral, as thereexisted “volumes” of his opinions on the topic. It is possible that the vol-umes were the products of Syrianus’ oral teaching, and that he did notwant authority given to them through the use of a secondary commen-tary written by Proclus.7This passage fromMarinus is delightful becauseit tells us rather explicitly just how Proclus went about his method ofcommentary-making: he marked the passages from his master’s volumes(or notes from another student on Syrianus’ teaching) and then collectedhis own notes and commentary on his master’s teachings.In this passage from Syrianus, as well as Proclus’ own recounting of

Orphic theology, Zeus is named as the Demiurge (.), a monadicprinciple in the universe (.) that preceded the other children ofKronos (.). He is the fifth king of the gods, after Aeon, Night, thenoetic/noeric cosmos, andAether (Phanes, Night, Ouranos, andKronos)(.).8

4 Marinus’ Life of Proclus , trans. Rosán () . L. Brisson notes that this passageis difficult to translate because of the verb παραγρ$(ειν, which he interprets as Proclustaking notes from lectures, which were then elaborated upon in the margins of the notes.See Brisson () .

5 West () .6 Proclus mentions the Rhapsodies times in the Timaeus Commentary. On Pro-

clus’ use of the Rhapsodies, see Brisson () ff.7 Proclus’ marginal notes could have been considerable enough to be a commentary

in themselves. Di Sarzana makes this argument () –.8 See Scholia, p. , Diehl In Tim. :

πρ.τ�ς �ασιλεVς E Φ$νηςG E γ+ρ α�Mν κα- πρ?τ�ς τρι+ς �περ τ"ν τ�5 �ασιλ)ωςε�σι τ$Uιν. δεCτερ�ς �ασιλεVς 8 ΝCU, 8 πρ?τη τ.ν ν�ητ.ν gμα κα- ν�ερ.ν τρι$δων.τ)ταρτ�ς E Α�*0ρ, 8 τρ�τη τ.ν αDτ.ν τρι$ς. π)μπτ�ς E BεCς.

commentary

According to theTheogony, Zeus first learns that he is destined to bethe fifth king of the gods (OF , ) when he is hiding in the caveof Night to escape Kronos’ swallowing him and he is instructed on howto overcome Kronos (OF ). In Orphic Fragments –, Zeus asksNight howhe can order theworld so as to preserve the unity of theworld,while not destroying its individuality: “How shall all things be one, yeteach divine?”

Night answered:

Catch all in infinite aither round about,there in the sky, the boundless earth, the sea,and therein all the encircling signs of heaven.When you have strung a firm bond round them all,to the aither fasten a golden chain.9

This chain unifies all multiplicity in the world by placing the contents ofthe universe in a connected link of nature, soul and intellect that comesto represent a series of encosmic gods (.–). Not only does Zeusas the Demiurge unify the universe through the golden chain, but heunifies the universe within himself because he contains all the forms.10According to the Rhapsodic Theogony, Demeter arranged a banquet (OF) where Zeus castrated a drunk Kronos (OF ). After this takeover,Zeus swallowed Phanes, reuniting aether, heaven, sea, and earth in hisbelly (OF , , , ). Proclus’ refers to OF in which Zeuscontains the aether, heaven, water, earth, ocean and the gods, once hehas absorbed Phanes (.–). According to Brisson, who interpretsthis passage,11 the swallowing of Phanes is important in the exegesis ofSyrianus, and later Proclus, because Phanes is identified not only with theintelligible model, but with the αDτ7�1.�ν (OF ), the third memberof the third triad of intelligibles12 who produces the sum of all the livingthings and who embraces all.13 The, also the αDτ7�1.�ν exemplary cause,

9 C.f. Il. ..10 Chrysippus gives a Stoic account of this: “that the whole of existence is unified

because of a breath which extends throughout it, by which the universe is held togetherand remains together, and whose changes it shares.” (SVF ii. . ).

11 Brisson () . See also his discussion on the place of Phanes in Syrianus’thought in () where he looks at comments on the Phaedrus (Proclus, in Phaedr., –, ), in particular, as a place where Syrianus corresponds the intelligibleuniverse to Phanes, once he is swallowed by Zeus.

12 Damascius, De Princip. Ruelle I .–. Phanes is the primordial egg, the thirdmember of the triad Metis, Erikopaios, and Phanes.

13 Brisson ibid.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

swallows Phanes so that he contains everything as an ideal form (.;) and embraces the entire universe (OF ). Zeus swallowing Phanesis thus the appropriation by the Demiurge of the intelligible model whichdirects creative action.14 In this respect, Zeus is the intellective monadbecause he contains everything (.–). He is demiurgic in so far as hebrings everything forth again to create the current world (OF ).This fragment relates to Fr. above, as here what we really see is

a further elaboration of the Demiurge as Intellect. Syrianus connectsthe Orphic tale of Phanes and Zeus with the Timaeus, and draws amore complex picture of the Intellect which he introduces in ..ff.Proclus elaborates this further, making Phanes part of the second andthird intelligible-intellective triads. In PlatonicTheology V, –, Proclusequates anOrphic divinity with eachmember of the hebdomad.He iden-tifies Being, Life, and Mind with Kronos, Rhea and Zeus. He associatedKronos with Being (intellect fire) (OF , , , ) and interpretsKronos’ castration of his father andhis own castration.15Rhea, Zeus’wife,is the source of repose andmotion, and Zeus is the source of identity andotherness (PT V, ).In .ff., Syrianus says that Zeus is the fifth king of the gods.

While it is impossible to know whether Syrianus already had a detailedmetaphysics in place regarding Zeus, Proclus explains such a structure.16The first Zeus is the monadic demiurge, the ruler of the world, the thirdking, with Kronos and Rhea, of the intellectual hebdomad;17 kings fourand five could refer to the secondZeus (monad of the hypercosmic triad)and the third Zeus (monad of the hypercosmic-encosmic gods).18 BothSyrianus andProclus equate theDemiurge of theTimaeuswithZeus, whooccupies the lower limit of the first intellective triad as the third positionin the triad of Being-Life-Intellect. Syrianus, it seems, corresponds orphicfigures to levels of the universe.19

14 Brisson ibid.15 Brisson () .16 Proclus, PT VI, , p. .–; VI, , p. .–; VI, , pp. –.17 On Syrianus and the intellectual hebdomad, see Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.

See also Dillon () . Dillon summarises Iamblichus’ opinion on the subject inIamblichus, In Tim, fr. Dillon (= , , ff.).

18 On the place of Zeus in Syrianus’ hierarchy of gods, see Manolea () –.19 See the elaborate chart detailing the correspondence between Orphic figures and

the Syrianic cosmos in Brisson () pp. –. On the place of Zeus in Syrianus’hierarchy of gods, see Manolea () –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 8

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

Τ δε δ’ �Pν π$λιν �πισκεπτ)�ν περ- αDτ�5, πρ7ς π τερ�ν τ.ν παρα-δειγμ$των E τεκτην$μεν�ς αDτ7ν <πειργ$�ετ�, π τερ�ν [ς πρ7ς τ7κατ+ ταDτ+ κα- [σαCτως OA�ν v πρ7ς τ7 γεγ�ν ς [Tim. C–A].

E δ) γε 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμMν κατ+ τ"ν Oν*ε�ν 6αυτ�5 ν�0σιν κα-τ δε τRς πρ�σηκ�Cσης δια�της _U�ωσενG �πε- γ+ρ τ.ν παλαι.ν �\ μHναDτ7νa τ7ν δημι�υργ7ν �π��ησαν OA�ντα τ+ παραδε�γματα τ.ν �λων,[ς Πλωτ9ν�ς, �\ δH �Dκ αDτ ν,b <λλ’ nτ�ι πρ7 αDτ�5 τ7 παρ$δειγμα,v μετ’ αDτ ν, πρ7 αDτ�5 μHν [ς E Π�ρ(Cρι�ς, μετ’ αDτ7ν δH [ς EΛ�γγ9ν�ς, _ρ?τα, π τερ�ν E δημι�υργ7ς εD*Vς μετ+ τ7 4ν �στιν, vc

κα- 3λλαι τ$Uεις ε�σ- ν�ητα- μεταUV τ�5 τε δημι�υργ�5 κα- τ�5 6ν ςG ε�μHν γ+ρ μετ+ τ7 yν E δημι�υργ ς, 3τ�π�ν τ7 σCμπαν ε`ναι τ.ν ν�ητ.νπλR*�ς μετ+ τ7 <πλ0*υντ�νG δι+ γ+ρ τ.ν τ1. 6ν- πρ�σεA.ν <ρι*μ.ν 8πρ �δ�ς 8 �π- τ7ν �λ�ν <ρι*μ7ν κα- τ7 �λ�ν πλR*�ς. ε� δH κα- 3λλαιμεταUV τ�5 6ν7ς κα- τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τ$Uεις ε�σ�, π τερ�ν �ν αDτ1.πρ?τ1ω τ7 παρ$δειγμα τ�5 παντ7ς v μετ’ αDτ7ν v πρ7 αDτ�5 �ητητ)�νGε� μHν γ+ρ �ν αDτ1. πρ?τ1ω, π^ν τ7 ν�ητ7ν πλR*�ς �ν αDτ1. *0σ�μενG τ7γ+ρ τ.ν ν��υμ)νων κ$λλιστ�ν τ7 παρ$δειγμ$ �στινG cστε π$λιν Oσταιν�ητ7ς κα- �Dd ν�ερ ς, l μικρ1. πρ τερ�ν <πεδε�κνυμεν.

κα�τ�ι τ7 μHν παρ$δειγμα μ νας �δ)ας OAει τ)τταρας, αDτ7ς δH κα-τ+ς Oτι μερικωτ)ρας �κε�νων, 8λ��υ, σελ0νης, 6κ$στ�υ τ.ν <ιδ�ων. ε�δH μετ’ αDτ ν, �π- τ7 Aε9ρ�ν �στραμμ)ν�ς Oσται κα- τ7 <τιμ τερ�ν, l

a α+τ�ν CN: α+τ,ν P b �+ κατ’ α+τ�νN c - CN: ε� P d �+ om C

However, let us return and inquire further concerning the Cosmos,—after which of the Models did its Architect construct it? Was it after thatwhich is self-identical and uniform, or after that which has come intoexistence?

Coming to our Master, this time again, in virtue of his own divinely-inspired way of thinking, he has thought it proper to apply to the subjectthe appropriate treatment. For, whereas, of the ancients, some, such asPlotinus, have asserted that the Demiurge himself contains the Para-digms of the universe, while others have placed the Paradigm prior to theDemiurge or after him—prior, as Porphyry does, or after him, as doesLonginus—Syrianus raises the question whether the Demiurge comesimmediately after the One or if there are other intelligible intermediariesbetween the Demiurge and the One. If, in effect, the Demiurge comesafter the One, it is odd that the total multiplicity of the intelligiblescomes directly after a non-multiplicity. For it is through the intermediacyof numbers immediately contiguous to the One that there occurs theprocession towards the total sum of number and total multiplicity. But,if there are other classes of being between theOne and the Demiurge, wemust ask if the Paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurge principallyor after him or before him.1 If the Paradigm is in him principally, wecan place him in the sum of intelligibles: since the Paradigm is themost beautiful of intelligible beings. So that, again, the Demiurge wouldbe intelligible, and not intellective, as we demonstrated a little earlier[.].However, the Paradigm contains only four forms, while the Demiurge

contains forms rather more partially than these: one of the sun, moon,and each of the eternal beings. But if [the Paradigm] [comes] after theDemiurge, it will be turned towards the inferior and less honorable,

1 γ$ρ is used here with the nominative and indicative, possibly indicating Proclus’agreement with Syrianus.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

μηδεν- τ.ν *ε�ων �π$ρUαι *)μιςG cστε πρ7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τ7 παρ$-δειγμ$ �στιν. <λλ’ ε� πρ7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5, π τερ�ν Eρ^ται �π’ αDτ�5v �DA Eρ^ται; τ7 μHν �Pν μ" Eρ^σ*αι λ)γειν κα- τ�5 Πλ$των ς �στιν<ν0κ��ν κα- τRς τ.ν πραγμ$των (CσεωςG 3τ�π�ν γ+ρ τ"ν μHν 8μετ)-ραν ψυA"ν Eρ^ν �κε9ν� κα- περ- αDτ�5 λ)γειν, ν�5ν δH κα- τ7ν �λ�νν�5ν μ" Eρ^ν. ε� δH EρT τ7 ν�ητ7ν E δημι�υργ ς, π τερ�ν ε�ς 6αυτ7ν�στραμμ)ν�ς EρT , v OUω μ ν�ν 6αυτ�5; <λλ’ ε� μHν OUω μ ν�ν 6αυτ�5,εhδωλα EρT τ�5 =ντ�ς κα- 4Uει αhσ*ησιν <ντ- ν�0σεωςG ε� δH ε�ς 6αυ-τ ν, Oστι κα- �ν αDτ1. τ7 ν��Cμεν�νG cστε κα- πρ7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τ7παρ$δειγμ$ �στι κα- �ν αDτ1., ν�ητ.ς μHν πρ7 αDτ�5, ν�ερ.ς δH �ναDτ1..a

δ�κε9 δH κα- τ+ τ�5 Πλ$των�ς N0ματα π�τH μHν 4τερ�ν αDτ�5 π�ι-ε9ν τ7 παρ$δειγμα, π�τH δH ταDτ νG �ταν μHν γ+ρ λ)γSη [E] τ G Spπερ�Pν ν�5ς �ν�Cσας �δ)ας �ν τ1. � �στι �1.�ν, �σαι τε κα- �Fαι κα*�ρT ,τ�σαCτας διεν�0*η κα- τ δε τ7 π^ν σAε9ν, [ς 4τερ�ν τ�5 παραδε�γμα-τ�ς τ7ν δημι�υργ7ν �π- τ7 αDτ��1.�ν <νατε�νεσ*α� (ησι, κα- αP �ταν(SR [C]G τ�νι τ.ν �1?ων αDτ7ν ε�ς Eμ�ι τητα E συνιστ+ς συν)στησε;τ.ν μHν �ν μ)ρ�υς εhδει πε(υκ των, μηδεν- καταUι?σωμενG �eb δ) �στιτ+ 3λλα �1.α κα*’ yν κα- κατ+ γ)νη μ ρια, τ�Cτ1ω π$ντων Eμ�ι τατ�ναDτ7ν ε`ναι τι*.μενG κα- γ+ρ �ν τ�Cτ�ις δι�ρ��ει τ7 συνιστ+ν <π7 τ�5παραδε�γματ�ς. �ταν γε μ"ν π$λιν διαρρ0δην λ)γSη [E] τ G <γα*7ςmν, <γα*1. δH �Dδε-ς περ- �Dδεν7ς �Dδ)π�τε �γγ�γνεταιc (* ν�ςG τ�C-τ�υ δH �κτ7ς |ν, π$ντα �τι μ$λιστα _��υλ0*η γεν)σ*αι παραπλ0σιαα�τ1., δηλ�5ν (α�νεται τ"ν τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 πρ7ς τ7 παρ$δειγμα ταυ-τ τηταG

cστε κα- E Πλ$των Oστι μHν �πSη ταDτ ν, Oστι δH κα- �πSη (ησ-ν4τερ�ν, κα- τ�Cτ�ιν 6κ$τερ�ν ε�κ τωςG ν�ητ.ς μHν γ$ρ ε�σιν αQ �δ)αιπρ7 τRς δημι�υργ�ας, τ)τταρες �δε.ν μ�ν$δες, πρ εισι δH κα- ε�ς τ7νδημι�υργ7ν 8 ε�δητικ" τ$Uις, κα- Oστι μ�α τ.ν �ν αDτ1. μ�ν$δων E τ.ν�δε.ν �λ�ς <ρι*μ ς.

τα5τα δH κα- E '�ρ(εVς [frg. ] �νδεικνCμεν�ς καταπ�νεσ*αι τ7νν�ητ7ν *ε7ν O(ατ� παρ+ τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τ.ν �λωνG κα- E μHν Πλ$των�λ)πειν ε�ς τ7 παρ$δειγμα τ7ν δημι�υργ7ν �π)*ετ�, τ"ν ν ησιν δι+ τRς

a ν�ητ�ς–α+τ.� om P b �/ CN: �+ P c γγ#γνεται N: γ#νεται P

text and translation

which is not lawful to assert about any of the divine beings, so that theParadigmmust be above the Demiurge. But if it is prior to the Demiurge,is it seen by theDemiurge or not? To say that it is not seen is to be ignorantof the doctrine of Plato and of the nature of reality. For if our soul seesthat [Paradigm] and is able to speak about it, it is absurd to suggest thatintellect, and especially the universal Intellect, does not see it. But if theDemiurge sees the Intelligible, does he see it by reflecting on himselfor only as an object exterior to him? But if he only sees it as an objectexterior to him, he sees images of being, and he has sensation instead ofintellection. But if he sees it by reflecting upon himself, the thing that heis contemplating is also in himself. So the Paradigm will be both prior tothe Demiurge and with him on the intelligible level, but in him on theintellective.And indeed the actual text of Plato sometimes makes the Paradigm

different from theDemiurge, but on other occasionsmakes it identical toit. For when he says [ E], “According, then, as Reason perceives Formsexisting in the absolute living creature, such and somany exist therein, somany did he deem that this world should possess”on the assumption thattheDemiurge is different from the Paradigm, he speaks of him as strivingtowards the Essential Living Being. And again when he says, [ C ],“In the likeness of which of the living creatures did the constructor ofthe cosmos construct it? We shall not deign to accept any of those whichbelong by nature to the category of ‘parts’, for nothing that resembles theimperfect would ever became fair. But we shall affirm that the cosmos,more than anything else, resembles most closely that living creature ofwhich all other living creatures, severally and generically, are portions.”Here he separates the “constructing” element from the Paradigm. Butagain, when he says the following explicitly [E], “He was good andin him that is good no envy comes about concerning anything ever;and being without envy he desired that all should be, so far as possible,like himself,” he seems to indicate that there is an identity between theDemiurge and the Paradigm.So that Plato says in one place that they are the same, while in another

he says that they are different, and each of these statements is reasonable.Since the forms are prior to the Demiurge on the noetic levels, i.e. thefour monads of the forms, but the system of forms proceeds also into theDemiurge, and one of the monads with him is the sum-total of forms.This is what Orpheus [OF a Kern] indicates when he says that

the noetic god is swallowed by the creator of the universe. And Platopostulates that the creator looks to the Paradigm, indicating intellection

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Eρ$σεως �νδεικνCμεν�ς, E δH *ε�λ γ�ς κα- �F�ν �πιπηδ^ν αDτ7ν τ1.ν�ητ1. κα- καταπ�νειν, [ς E μ5*�ς O(ησενG Oστι γ$ρ, ε� Aρ" διαρρ0δηντ+ τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς λ)γειν, E παρ+ τ1. '�ρ(ε9 Πρωτ γ�ν�ς *ε7ς κατ+τ7 π)ρας τ.ν ν�ητ.ν Qδρυμ)ν�ς παρ+ τ1. Πλ$τωνι τ7 αDτ��1.�νGδι7 κα- α�?νι ν �στι κα- τ.ν ν��υμ)νων κ$λλιστ�ν, κα- τ�5τ’ Oστιν�ν ν�ητ�9ς, �περ E BεVς �ν ν�ερ�9ςG π)ρας γ+ρ 6κ$τερ�ς τ.νδε τ.ντ$Uεων, κα- l μHν τ.ν παραδειγματικ.ν α�τ�ων τ7 πρ?τιστ�ν, l δH τ.νδημι�υργικ.ν τ7 μ�ναδικ?τατ�νG δι7 κα- 6ν�5ται πρ7ς �κε9ν�ν E BεVςδι+ μ)σης τRς Νυκτ7ς κα- πληρω*ε-ς �κε9*εν γ�νεταιa κ σμ�ς ν�ητ7ς[ς �ν ν�ερ�9ς.

}ς τ τε Πρωτ�γ ν�ι� AανMν μ)ν�ς 'Ηρικεπα��υ τ.ν π$ντων δ)μαςε`Aεν 6SR �ν- γαστ)ρι κ��λSη, μ9Uε δ’ 6�9ς μελ)εσσι *ε�5 δCναμ�ν τε κα-<λκ0ν, τ�Zνεκα σVν τ1. π$ντα Δι7ς π$λιν �ντ7ς �τCA*η.

ε�κ τως 3ρα κα- ν5ν E Πλ$των ε�ς τ7 παρ$δειγμα �λ)π�ντ$ (ησιδημι�υργε9ν αDτ ν, Wνα τ1. ν�ε9ν �κε9ν� π$ντα γεν μεν�ς τ7ν α�σ*ητ7ν�π�στ0σηται κ σμ�νG τ7 μHν γ+ρ mν ν�ητ.ς π^ν, αDτ7ς δH ν�ερ.ς π^ν,E δH κ σμ�ς α�σ*ητ.ς π^νG δι7 κα- E *ε�λ γ�ς (ησ�G

π$ντα τ$δε κρCψας αP*ις ($�ς �ς π�λυγη*)ς μ)λλεν <π7 κραδ�ηςπρ�()ρειν π$λι *)σκελα N)�ων.

a πρ�τ�γ�νι� C sic: πρωτ�γ�νων P: πρωτ�γ�ν�ς N

text and translation

through talk of vision, while the theologian portrays the Demiurge asleaping upon the object of the intellect and swallowing it down, as themyth says. For, if we may refer directly to the teaching of our Master,the god Protogonos, according to Orpheus, established at the limit of theintelligibles, is the Essential Living Being, according to Plato.That is whyhe is, eternal and the “most beautiful of the intelligible beings” [ D ]and he is among the intelligible realities, just what Zeus is among theintellective. For each is the limit of their reproductive orders, the onebeing the first of the paradigmatic causes, the other the most unitaryof the demiurgic causes. On account of this, Zeus is united to that one[Protogonos] through the intermediary of Night, having been filled fromthis source, and hence becomes an intelligible universe on the level of theintellective [OF a–], so

“As Zeus swallowed the force of the First-Born Erikepaios, he held in hisown belly the body of all things, he mixes with his own members thepower and strength of the gods, on account of which, together with him,everything comes to be again within Zeus.”

Quite reasonably, then, does Plato now say that he creates while lookingto the Paradigm, in order that having become everything by intelligizinghe should establish the sensible universe.TheParadigm, then, is all thingsin an intelligible mode, the Demiurge in an intellective mode, and theuniverse is everything in a perceptible mode. And hence, theTheologiansays,

“After having hidden all these things, he was once more about to bringthem into the joyful light fromhis heart, performing again wondrous acts.”

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This topic answers Plato’s question as to what class of being the Paradigmof the universe belongs. Prior to this query, Proclus established thatthe Demiurge is a god and the process of creation is eternal (.ff.).He further postulated that the universe had been created following aParadigm; this is because the creator, if he wishes to create accordingto an ordered plan, must have the idea of the object he wishes to create(.). Deliberation on the genre of the Paradigm for both Syrianusand his predecessors focuses on its relationship to the Demiurge andthemetaphysical result of theDemiurge’s contemplation of the Paradigm(the Intelligible Living Being (αDτ7�1.�ν) which contains all things).The first issue addressed by Syrianus is the Paradigm’s location with

respect to the Demiurge. Such a relationship is important as it dictatesthe relationship between nous and the object of its contemplation. Beforegiving the long citation from Syrianus, Proclus summarises the opin-ions of Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Theodore of Asine, without dissect-ing or disputing their arguments. Proclus begins by switching the usualchronological order of Porphyry-Iamblichus and begins with Iamblichus(.–), who says that the Paradigm is separated from everything,so that theOne-Being is placed beyond the Paradigm. In this way, Essen-tial Being is superior to the Paradigm, but still co-ordinate with it. Hedefines the Paradigm of the universe as “being qua being” that is appre-hended by intellection. While Proclus does not state where Iamblichuscritiques Porphyry’s opinion, Iamblichus’ opinion is underscored by hisdoctrine being placed first. Porphyry (.–) is reported to have iden-tified the Demiurge with the unparticipated Soul and the Paradigm withthe Intellect. Iamblichus was likely to have been criticising Porphyry fornot making a proper distinction as to what part of the noetic world theDemiurge is contemplating. Theodore is the third of the ancients whosedoctrine is reported (.–). Proclus inserts Theodore into the com-mon sequence of Porphyry—Iamblichus and then views his opinion asan oddity. Theodore, who inherited a love of triadic constructions fromAmelius, divides into three each term of the demiurgic triad and dis-tinguishes in each a first monad, a middle and a final term. The lastterm is the Essential Living Being (autozoon), which connects immedi-ately with the other terms. The first principle is the Demiurge, who cre-ates according to an inferior Paradigm (.). He likely bases this onAmelius’ triad of demiurges (In Tim. I. .ff.; In Tim. III. .ff.),where the first demiurge is true being, E |ν, the second is the one

commentary

who possesses the Intelligible within him, E OAων, and the third pos-sesses the contents of the second intellect and sees the first element, EEρ.ν.2The opinions of Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Theodore all share an

awareness of the relationship between nous and its object of intellectionas it was first formally expressed in Enn. III.., Plotinus’ commentaryon Tim. E. In his article “Plotinus, Enn. .., and Later Views on theIntelligible World”, Dillon argues that E OAων possesses the content ofτ7 �1.�ν, which is not nous, but the noêton. Such an arrangement wouldhave nous contemplating the noêta outside of itself. Once these noêta areoutside ofnous, however, they are not real being, but eidôla, an impossiblescenario.3 In Enn. III.. Plotinus, after raising this aporia, solves it asfollows:

“Now, even if the two are different from each other, they are not separatefrom each other except in so far as they are different. Further, there isnothing in the statement against both being one, but distinguished bythought, though only in the sense that one is intelligible object, the otherintelligent subject; for Plato does not say that what it sees is in somethingabsolutely different, but in it, in that it has the intelligible object in itself.”4

The ideas exist in nous, so that intellect and object of intellection are atonce coordinate, yet retain individual qualities. Hence, while Amelius’triads express such a distinction in triadic unity (nous as possessor andnous as the one seeing), Plotinus’ Intellect is simultaneously identicalwith and separate from its object of intellection. While Syrianus doesnot point explicitly to this debate, his conclusion as to how the Demi-urge relates to the Paradigm clearly reflects Plotinus’ solution in Enn.III...5Syrianus’ opinion on the Demiurge and the Paradigm follows the tra-

ditional line of argument on the subject of Intellect (here the Demiurge)and ideas (or the Paradigm as the sum of forms). Syrianus first estab-lishes that theDemiurge would have to come after theOne, as unity mustprecede total multiplicity, with an intermediary of numbers betweenthe extremes. In an argument typical of Syrianus, he favors a series of

2 Derived from Tim. E.3 Dillon () .4 Trans. Armstrong.5 Plotinus develops this theory further in Enn. V., where nous cognises an outflow

of forms. Numenius, meanwhile, postulated a higher nous. The divine for Numenius wasnous at rest.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

gradations rather than an infinite multiplicity. Next, he addresses thequestion as to where the Paradigm should be placed with respect to theDemiurge:

.The Paradigm is after the Demiurge (the opinion of Longinus): but thenthe Demiurge would be contemplating something inferior to it, which isnot lawful for divine beings.

.The Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge (the opinion of Porphyry): but ifthe Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge, it must be seen by the Intellect assomething external. For if our soul can contemplate the Paradigm, thensomust the universal Intellect. However, if the Intellect does contemplatethe Paradigm as something higher than it, the Paradigm as an exteriorobject would hence be, as it were, an object of sense perception, ratherthan intellection.This was Plotinus’ concern regarding nous contemplat-ing the ideas as they exist in the prior living creature. Once the eidê arenot nous, but an object of intellection, they are no longer cognised imme-diately, but as images:

τ7 τ��νυν �1.�ν αDτ� �D ν�5ς, <λλ+ ν�ητ7ν αDτ� (0σ�μεν κα- τ7ν OUω(0σ�μεν αDτ�5 g EρT OAειν. Εhδωλα 3ρα κα- �D τ<λη*R OAει, ε� �κε9τ<λη*R. (III. ., –.)

Syrianus draws a similar conclusion:

Ε� δε EρT τ7 ν�ητ7ν E δημι�υργ ς, π τερ�ν ε�ς 6αυτ7ν �στραμμ)ν�ςEρT , n OUω μ ν�ν 6αυτ�5; <λλ’ �ι μ)ν OUω μ ν�ν 6αυτ�5, εrδωλα EρTτ�5 =ντ�ς κα- 4Uει αrσ*ησιν <ντ- ν�0σεως. (I. .–.)

.The Paradigm is in the Demiurge (the view of Plotinus): Plotinus comesto the conclusion in Enn. III.. that Intellect and the ideas are differentas distinguished by thought: one is intelligible object, the other intelligentsubject. Otherwise, the two coincide, and the forms exist within theIntellect:

'Η, κ'$ν 4τερ�ν 6κ$τερ�ν, �D Aωρ-ς <λλ0λων, <λλ’ v μ ν�ν τ1. 4τερα./Επειτα �Dδ)ν κωλCει �σ�ν �π- τ1. λεγυμ)ν1ω 4ν ε`ναι 3μ(ω, διαιρ�Cμεναδε τSR ν 0σει, εhπερ μ ν�ν [ς xν τ7 μεν ν�ητ ν, τ7 δε ν��5νG l γ+ρκα*�ρT �Z (ησιν �ν 6τ)ρ1ω π$ντως, <λλ’ �ν αDτ1. τ7 ν�ητ7ν OAειν.

(.., –.)

Syrianus likewise says that the Paradigm and Demiurge are the same insome ways, different in others, and cites Tim. E and C as evidence.Syrianus says that the sameness is due to how theDemiurge contemplates

commentary

the Paradigm—by reflecting upon himself (ε� δε ε�ς 6αυτ ν, Oστι κα- �ναDτ1. τ7 ν��Cμεν�ν, .–). He adds, citing Tim. E, that thissameness is due to divine goodness; an identity exists between Demiurgeand Paradigm because the divine wanted everything to be as like him aspossible (.–). Thus, if the Demiurge had the forms in him primallyhe would be noêtos, an impossibility—the Paradigm cannot be in theDemiurge because the Demiurge contains the forms of heavenly bodies.The Paradigm thus must be noêtos above the Demiurge because hecontemplates it as a prior model. The Paradigm is in some way superiorto the Demiurge, which Syrianus explains using the Platonic theory ofsight: there must be an intermediary between the thing seen and theorgan of vision. Physical sight can only see images of reality, while nouscognises reality directly.6 The Demiurge knows the Paradigm throughintellection.7The Paradigm, thus, exists at the same time noerically in the Demi-

urge because the Demiurge is an intellective entity, and noetically abovehim. Syrianus elaborates this simultaneous sameness and difference ofthe demiurgic Paradigm—because the Paradigm exists at once as objectof thought and as thinker itself through an act of reflective contempla-tion, Syrianus says: “πρ7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τ7 παρ$δειγμ$ �στι κα- �ναDτ1ω, ν�ητ.ς μεν πρ7 αDτ�, ν�ερ.ς δε �ν αDτ1.” (.–). Syrianusexplains that the forms are prior to the Demiurge noetically as the fourmonads of forms (.–). This refers to Tim. E – A , inwhich the Demiurge planned to make in this universe the “four kinds”:gods, birds, fish, and land animals, representing the four elements, fire,air, water, and earth—a passage Syrianus alludes to in .ff. The sumtotal of these forms, however, exists in the Demiurge noerically as anorder of monads (.). In this way, the Demiurge differs from the αD-τ��1.�ν, which contains themultitude of forms.8These inherent monadsallow the forms themselves to be real, rather than eide, and they allow theDemiurge to comprehend the forms as being inherent within him.More-over, the statement that “one of the monads with him is the sum-totalof the forms”, implies that there are other monads within him. It seemsentirely possible that the Demiurge has (the) active or creative principlesin him that are not the forms.

6 Plotinus, Enn. V..7 See Proclus, PT V, , pp. – and Syrianus, In Met. p. , pp. –..8 Opsomer () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Both Plotinus and Amelius distinguish three elements in intellection:the living creature itself, the intellect, and the planning principle (all ofwhich are διαιρ�Cμενα τSR ν�0σει).9 Syrianus places less emphasis on theplanning principle, collapsing that quality into the Demiurge as Intellect,hence increasing its superiority.In the last section, Syrianus launches into an Orphic interpretation

of the Demiurge’s relationship to the Paradigm. Syrianus describes howProtogonos is established as the limit of the intelligibles throughNight toestablish the intelligible on the level of intellectives. In his Commentaryon the Phaedrus, Hermias recalls that Syrianus calls the “supercelestialplace” Night in Orphic terms.10 The swallowing of Phanes, identified asthe αDτ��1.�ν, by Zeus (identified with the Demiurge) establishes thepresent order of things.11

9 Plotinus, Enn. III..–.10 .–.; PT IV,, .–; PT IV, , –; In Tim. III, .–; .;

Hermias, In Phaedr. .–.11 Brisson () and ().

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 9

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.

Β�υλη*ε-ς γ+ρ E *ε7ς <γα*+ μHν π$ντα, (λα5ρ�ν δH μηδHν ε`ναι κατ+δCναμιν [Tim. A].

8 μHν �Pν <π�ρ�α τ�ιαCτη. λεκτ)�ν δH αDτ.ν τ.ν τ�5 Πλ$των�ς �(α-πτ�μ)ν�ις κατ+ τ7ν 8μ)τερ�ν διδ$σκαλ�ν, �τι δ" τρ π�ς 4τερ�ς τRςτε *ε�5 πρ7ς τ+ πρ$γματα σA)σεως κα- τRς 8μ.ν αDτ.ν κα- αP τ.νπραγμ$των πρ ς τε τ7 Oν*ε�ν κα- πρ7ς 8μ^ςG 3λλ�ν γ+ρ OAει λ γ�ντ$ τε �λα πρ7ς τ+ μ)ρη κα- τ+ μ)ρη πρ7ς 3λληλα. *ε1. μHνa �Pν �D-δ)ν �στι κακ ν, �DδH τ.ν λεγ�μ)νων κακ.νG AρRται γ+ρ κα- τ�Cτ�ιςεPG τ�9ς δH αP μερικ�9ς Oστι τι κακ ν, L κα- π$σAειν �π’ αDτ�5 π)(υκε.κα- τ7 αDτ7 τ1. μHν μ)ρει κακ ν, τ1. δH παντ- κα- τ�9ς �λ�ις �D κακ ν,<λλ’ <γα* νG Sp γ+ρ =ν �στι κα- Sp τ$Uεως μετ)Aει τιν ς, <γα* ν �στιGτ�5τ� γ+ρ τ7 λεγ μεν�ν κακ7ν ε� μHν Oρημ�ν <γα*�5 παντ7ς �π�λ$-��ις, �π)κεινα π�ιε9ς αDτ7 κα- τ�5 μηδαμ.ς =ντ�ςG [ς γ+ρ τ7 αDτ�-αγα*7ν πρ7 τ�5 =ντ�ς, �]τω τ7 αDτ�κακ7ν μετ+ τ"ν �Dδ)νειαν τ�5μ" =ντ�ςG τ7 γ+ρ πλε9στ�ν <(εστ7ς τ�5 <γα*�5 τ7 κακ ν �στι κα- �Dτ7 μηδαμ.ς =ν. ε� �Pν τ7 μηδαμ.ς xν μ^λλ ν �στιν v τ7 αDτ�κακ ν,<λλ’ �κε9ν� τ.ν <δυν$των ε`ναι, π�λλ1. 3ρα τ�5τ� μει� νως <δCνα-τ�ν. ε� δH μ" π$ντη κακ ν, <λλ+ τ1. <γα*1. συμπεπλεγμ)ν�ν, δ?σειςτε αDτ1. A?ραν �ν τ�9ς �Pσι κα- τ�9ς �λ�ις αDτ7 π�ι0σεις <γα* ν. π.ςγ$ρ, εhπερ =ν �στι; τ7 γ+ρ xν μετ)Aει τ�5 =ντ�ςG τ7 τ�5 =ντ�ς μετ)A�νκα- 6ν7ς μετ)AειG τ7 6ν7ς μετ)A�ν <γα*�5 μετ)AειG τ7 3ρα κακ ν, εhπερ�στ�ν, <γα*�5 μετ)AειG δι περ �Dκ <κρ$τως �στ- κακ7ν �DδH π$ντηπλημμελHς �DδH < ριστ�ν. τ�ς �Pν αDτ7 π�ιε9 τ�ι�5τ�ν; τ�ς δH μ)τρ�ναDτ1. παρ)Aεται κα- τ$Uιν κα- �ρ�ν; δRλ�ν, [ς E δημι�υργ ς, E π$ντα6αυτ1. παραπλ0σια <περγα� μεν�ςG �eτ�ς γ+ρ κα- τ+ �λα κα- τ+ μ)ρηπληρ�9 τ.ν <γα*.ν. ε� δ" π$ντα <γα*Cνει κα- αDτ7 τ7 κακ7ν τ1.

a !ε�μεν C

For God desired that, so far as possible, all things should be good andnothing evil

This, then, is the difficulty. We may address it by fastening on to theseactual words of Plato, in accord with our Master, and saying that theway in which God is in relation with things is not the same as our way,and again things do not relate in the same way towards the divine andtowards us. For the relation of the whole towards the parts is differentfrom the parts towards each other. For God, there is no evil, not even ofthe things that are said to be evil; for as to these things, God puts themto a good use. For the particular beings, which are of such a nature as tosuffer from it, there is such a thing, as the same thing may be evil for apart, but for the whole and in wholes, it is not evil, but good. For in sofar as it is a being and participates in a certain order, it is good. For thisthing said to be evil, if you assume it is void of all good, you conceive it asbeyond even absolute not-being. For even as the Good in itself is prior toBeing, so evil in itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-being. Forthat which is furthest removed from the good is evil and not absolutenon-being.Therefore if absolute non-being has more existence than Evilin itself, but that is an impossibility, then far more is this impossible.But if it is not evil, but is in conjunction with the good, you will granta place to this among beings, and you will make it good on the holisticlevel. Howmight it [not be good], if it is being? For being participates inabsolute Being. And that which participates in Being also participates intheOne. But that which participates in theOne participates in the Good;so then, Evil, if it exists, participates in the Good. That is why there is noEvil pure and simple, nor anything wholly disordered, nor indetermined.Who would make such a thing?Who would give measure to it and orderand limit? It is clear, that it would be the Demiurge, who makes all

syrianus, in tim. fr.

<γα*1. Aρ?ννυσιν, �Dδ)ν �στι (λα5ρ�ν κατ+ τ"ν δCναμιν τ0ν τε τ�5*ε�5 κα- τ"ν τ.ν δεA�μ)νωνG διττ" γ+ρ 8 δCναμις, j μHν τ�5 *ε�5a

κα- τ"ν π�λυ$ρατ�ν κακ�αν <γα*Cν�υσα, j δH τ.ν δεA�μ)νων 〈τ.ν〉μ)τρ1ω τRς 6αυτ.ν τ$Uεως τRς <γα* τητ�ς τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 μεταλα-� ντων. τ1. 3ρα δημι�υργ1. ��υλ�μ)ν1ω μηδHν ε`ναι κακ7ν �Dδ)ν �στικακ ν.

a κα� τ)ν–τ�0 !ε�0 om C

Commentary

Syrianus argues that evil is necessary in the universe and not at allincompatible with the notion of Providence. The ideas in this passagereappear in a much more extensive treatment in Proclus’ de MalorumSubsistentia.2 Prior to reporting Syrianus’ opinion, Proclus states theaporia: if God is good, how could he have wished evil to exist? If hedid not wish it, how does it exist? (.–.). Syrianus makes threepoints regarding evil: ) that which we often consider evil in our partialuniverse is good with respect to the whole (.–); ) essential evilcannot exist, as all being participates in the good (.–.); ) evilcan exist in a limited sort of sense, in so far as degrees of nothingness getinto the good (.–.). Syrianus approaches the problem by firstarguing that evil exists with respect to particular beings. Syrianus saysthat just as God relates to us in a different way from how we relate toeach other, so do the things that appear evil to us appear good to God.Moreover, the things that do appear evil to us on the level of partial beings

2 See the recent edition, Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, trans: Opsomer-Steel() and the French edition, Isaac (). Steel gives a thorough treatment of Proclus’argument in (), which summarises the argument. Proclus also discusses evil In Remp.I, .–.; I, .–.; II, .–.; In Parm. .–.; PT I, , p. .–..

text and translation

things like himself.1 For it is he who fills both wholes and parts withgood. But if hemakes all things good and tinges Evil itself with theGood,there exists no badness according to the power either of God or of thereceptacles. For power has a double sense, on the one hand that of Godwhichmakes good even themuch—detested evil, and on the other hand,there is the power of those receiving who participate in the Good ofthe Demiurge according to their rank. So, in accord with the will of theDemiurge that there should be no evil, there is no evil.

1 Tim. E –.

are actually good on the level of thewhole (κα- τ7 τ1. μεν μ)ρει κακ ν, τ1.δε παντ- και τ�9ς �λ�ις �D κακ ν, <λλ’ <γα* ν).3 Syrianus argues thatthe problem is with the limited human perspective, rather than divinegoodness. This idea appears both in Proclus’ De Malorum Subsistentia.–, which addresses the question of providence: “quod ex animaet idemmalumquidem erit singularibus, totis autembonum”, and .ff.,where he says that Providence and evil have their place among beings—the gods produce evil qua good.4The clearest expression of Syrianus’ viewis stated by Proclus in .– of On the Existence of Evils:

“Therefore, Plato in the Timaeus is right in saying that in accordance withthe will of the demiurge, ‘all things are good and nothing is bad.’ In hisdiscussion with the geometer [sc.Theat. A], however, he contends that‘evil things cannot possibly cease to exist’ and that ‘by necessity’ they havecome to exist among beings. For all things are made good by the will ofthe Father, and with respect to his productive activity, none of the things

3 Plutarch, On Stoic Contradictions, –.4 Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, .–: “Now, if we are right in stating this,

all things will be from Providence and evil has its place among beings. Therefore thegods also produce evil, but qua good. The gods know evil, since they possess a unitaryknowledge of evils, a unitary knowledge of plurality. For the knowledge of the soul differsfrom that of intellect, which again differs from that of the gods themselves. For theknowledge of the soul is self-moving, that of intellect is eternal, and that of the gods isineffable and unitary, knowing and producing everything by the One itself. Souls have alimited understanding of knowledge, because they are able to cognise only a portion ofthe universe at any given time. Gods, however, see the entire universe and hence, see theplace of evil with respect to the whole.” Trans. Opsomer-Steel.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

that are or come to be are evil. However, when he distinguishes degrees innature he does not escape the consequences that there is evil for particularthings, evil which destroys the good [in them].”5

Syrianus connects evil and will in lines .–..6In .–, Syrianus, after presuming evil for particular beings,

opens the ontological question of evil and argues that being or existencecannot be attributed to evil. This is a rather awkwardly constructedargument, and it would seem that this second point should come beforepoints one and three, as they do in Proclus’ treatise on evil. Still, afterarguing that there is no evil for God, only for particular beings, Syrianusdelves into a discussion on the ontology of evil. He first argues againstthose who posit that evil is a deprivation, that it is a form of non-being.Syrianus says, if a thing is said to be evil and void of all Good, it mustexist beyond absolute non-being. But, as the Good is prior to being, evilwould then have to exist before the nothingness of non-being, making itontologically prior (and hence, superior) to non-being—an impossibilityfor Syrianus. Anything that participates in being necessarily participatesin absolute Being, which in turn, participates in the Good, as the Goodis the highest principle (.–: τ7 γ+ρ xν μετ)Aει τ�5 =ντ�ςG τ7τ�5 =ντ�ς μετ)A�ν κα- 6ν7ς μετ)AειG τ7 6ν7ς μετ)A�ν <γα*�5 μετ)AειGτ7 3ρα κακ ν, εhπερ �στ�ν, <γα*�5 μετ)AειG δι περ �Dκ <κρ$τως �στ-κακ7ν �Dδε π$ντη πλημμελHς �Dδε < ριστ�ν). Evil, then, can onlyexist beyond absolute non-being and hence essential evil cannot actually

5 Trans. Opsomer-Steel.

Recte ergo Plato in Timeo quidem secundum conditivam voluntatem bona quidem omnia,pravum autem nihil esse ait; in sermonibus autem ad geometram neque utique perdi mala,et ex necessitate in entibus facta esse pretendit. Nam omnia bonificantur voluntate patris etnihil ad illius condituram malum neque entium neque fientium; et non diffugit malum essepartialibus quorum bonum perimit, naturam per gradus distinguens.

6 In Enn. III.., Plotinus explains that Providence is at the level of Intellect and takesin the universe all together as one:

“Being is the true and first universe, which does not stand apart from itself and is notweakened by division and is not incomplete even in its parts, since each part is not cut offfrom the whole; but the whole life of it and the whole intellect lives and thinks all togetherin one, and makes the part the whole and all bound in friendship with itself, since onepart is not separated from another and has not become merely other, estranged from therest; and therefore, one does not wrong another, even if they are opposites.”

Evil, as it appears to beings in the partial levels of existence, has a place in the All thatmakes the universe good as a whole. Later, Plotinus analogises the universe to a play thatneeds both good and bad characters (Enn. III..).

commentary

exist.7 Evil cannot exist in an absolute sense, but, rather in a limited,relative sense.Syrianus’ last point is to argue that a limited sort of evil exists. Such

an argument answers Plotinus’ notion that evil is a privation of theGood, but still exists. In Ennead I.., – Plotinus argues that evil isa privation of the good—and what is absolutely deficient of good is, inturn, deficient of being, which participates in the good. Still, this is notto say that evil does not exist—in fact, matter exists without Being andwithout participation in the Good. Syrianus and Proclus argue that noabsolute evil exists, for the Demiurgemade everything good (.–:E δημι�υργ ς E π$ντα 6αυτ1. παραπλ0σια <περγα� μεν�ς).8 Syrianusadopts the Iamblichean idea of evil as a parhypostasis9—somethingwhichexists together with another entity, a kind of parasite. Because there canbe no absolute deficiency of the Good, Syrianus says that evil exists whenit is mixed withmatter. As Proclus puts it, Evil is limited to the particular:

“Thus, all things are good to the father of the All, and there is evil inthose things that are not capable of remaining established in completeaccordance with the Good; for this reason evil is ‘necessary’ as we havesaid earlier. In what sense evil exists and in what sense it does not is clearfromour argument. For both those who assert that all things are good, andthose who deny this, are right in one respect and wrong in another. Indeed,it is true that all beings are, but non-being, too, is interwoven with being.Therefore all things are good, since there is no evil that is unadorned andunmixed. And also evil exists, namely for the things for which indeed thereis evil: it exists for the things that do not have a nature that is disposed toremain in the good in an unmixed way.”10

On the Existence of Evils .–.

7 This line of argument occurs in Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, , –: “Whyshould we say more? For if the One and what we call the nature of the good is beyondbeing, then evil is beyond non-being itself—I mean absolute non-being, for the Good isbetter than absolute Being”, trans.: Opsomer-Steel, and PT I, , p. , –.

8 Matter is generated by God (Philebus C) and is not evil. Proclus,On the Existenceof Evil, .

9 Simplicius, In Cat. , .10 Trans. Opsomer-Steel.

Omnia igitur bona omnium patre, et est malum in non omnino secundum bonum starepotentibus; propter quod autem et hoc necessarium esse diximus prius. Qualiter quidemigitur est et qualiter non est malum, ex hiis palam. Omnes enim dicunt sic quidem recte, sicautem non recte, quique omnia bona dicunt et qui non. Et enim, quod omnia entia sunt,verum; sed et non ens est enti complexum. Omnia igitur bona per nullum scire maluminoratum et impermixtum; et malum est, quibus et est malum: est autem, quorum naturain bono manere impermixtim non est nata.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

While the Demiurge makes all things good, degrees of unlimitednesscan enter the goodwhen the beings do not use their own power to partic-ipate in the good (.–: a δH τ.ν δεA�μ)νων τ.ν μ)τρ1ω τRς 6αυτ.ντ$Uεως τRς <γα* τητ�ς τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 μεταλα� ντων). Here, evil isthe result of the free will of beings who choose to reject the good.11

11 Also the view of Origen on evil. Proclus repeats this portion of Syrianus’ doctrineon evil inOn the Existence of Evil, pp. and .This concept of providence and free willdiffers from Plotinus, who seems to wrestle with how blame can fall on the individual ina divinely-ordered universe. On Plotinian free will, see Enn. III.. Plotinus differentiatesbetween the freewill experienced only by the higher part of the soul and the fate commonto the lower part.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 10

Proclus, In Tim. I. .–.1

�Ενα, εhπερ κατ+ τ7 παρ$δειγμα δεδημι�υργημ)ν�ς Oσται [Tim. A].

E δH 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ς κα- 3λλως τ"ν <π�ρ�αν ταCτην δι)λυε π�λ-λαA.ς. Oλεγε δ’ �Pν, �τι π^σα μHν 8 ν�ητ" �Dσ�α μ�ν�ειδ0ς �στι κα-α�?νι�ς, τ.ν δ’ �γκ�σμ�ων πραγμ$των τ+ μHν μ^λλ�ν Eμ�ι�5σ*αι δC-ναται πρ7ς τ+ς 6αυτ.ν �Dσ�ας, τ+ δH pττ�νG �σα μHν γ$ρ �στιν <υλ -τερα κα- κα*αρ?τερα, μ^λλ�ν, �σα δH �νυλ τερα κα- παACτερα, pτ-τ�ν. =ντων �Pν >π$ντων τ.ν παραδειγμ$των �ν �Dσ�αις μ�ναδικα9ςτε κα- <ιδ��ις τ+ μHν κρε�ττω τ.ν �ν τ1. παντ- μ$λιστα μεμιμημ)νατ+ς 6αυτ.ν α�τ�ας κατ+ π$ντα τ�9ς παραδε�γμασιν Eμ�ι τατα γ)γ�νε,κατ+ τ7 μ�ναδικ ν, κατ+ τ7 �Dσι.δες, κατ+ τ7 <�δι�ν, τ+ δH Aε�ρω]στερ�ν ε`δ�ς Eμ�ι?σεως λαA ντα πS" μHν [μ��ωται τ�9ς σ(.ν αDτ.να�τ��ις, πS" δH �Z. τρι.ν �Pν =ντων τ�Cτων �ν τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς εhδεσι, τ�5μ�ναδικ�5, τ�5 �Dσι?δ�υς, τ�5 διαιων��υ, π τερ�ν τ7 μHν μ�ναδικ7ναDτ.ν μιμ0σεται κα- τ7 <�δι�ν, τ7 δH �Dσι.δες �Dδαμ.ς; <λλ’ 3τ�π�νGδ)δεικται γ$ρ, �τι �Dσ�ας ε`ναι Aρ" τ+ <π’ αDτ.ν κατ’ αDτ7 τ7 ε`ναιπ�ι�Cντων.

<λλ+ κατ+ μHν τ7 μ�ναδικ7ν κα- τ7 �Dσι.δες Oσται μιμ0ματα �κε�-νων, κατ+ δH τ7 <�δι�ν �Z; <λλ+ κα- τ�5τ� <δCνατ�ν. <π�λε�πεται γ+ρ4καστ�ν μ�ναδικ7ν μHν =ν, μ" <�δι�ν δ)G δι τι μHν γ+ρ �Dκ <�δι�ν, ε�ςτ7 μ" xν ��A0σεται, δι τι δH μ�ναδικ ν, �Dκ Oστιν �U �τ�υ γεν0σεται.κα- �λως π^ν τ7 �U <κιν0των α�τ�ων �π�στ+ν <μετ$�λητ ν �στι κατ’�Dσ�αν, <κ�νητα δH τ+ εhδηG ν�ητ+ γ$ρ �στιν. v τ��νυν gπαντα μιμε9-σ*αι δυνατ7ν v τιν$. π$ντα δH <δCνατ�νG τ+ γ+ρ π�ρρωτ)ρω τ.ν <ρ-A.ν pττ�ν Eμ�ι�5ται πρ7ς αDτ$ςG κα- γ+ρ τ�5 Πυ*αγ ρ�υ π$σας �πι-στ0μας OA�ντ�ς l μHν �γγυτ)ρω π^σαν αDτ�5 τ"ν γν.σιν �π�δ)Aεταιδευτ)ρως, l δH π�ρρωτ)ρωa τ+ς μHν διδ$σκεται τ.ν �πιστημ.ν, πρ7ςδH τιν+ς <σCμμετρ ς �στιν.

a � δ1 π�ρ�*ρι�ςM fort. recte π�ρρωτ�ρωςM1 The whole discussion of which this is a part continues for a number of pages; how-

ever, at . Proclus begins a new argument with “yτι κα- κατ’ 3λλ�ν τρ π�ν �πιAειρε9ν8μ9ν δυνατ ν”, indicating that he has merged his own opinion to that of Syrianus.

One it must be termed, if it is to be framed after its Pattern.

Our teacher resolved this aporia differently, and in many ways. He usedto say,2 then, that the whole of intelligent being is unitary and eternal,but among cosmic things, some can be more assimilated to their ownessences, but others less so. For such things as are more immaterial andpurer are more so, but the more material and the crasser are less so.Whereas all models are characterised by the unique and eternal essences,the more superior in the universe mimic more closely their causes, havebecome the most similar to their models in all respects, with respect tounity, substantiality, and eternity, while those which are being allocateda lower, worse type of similarity are, in one respect, assimilated to theirown causes, in another respect, not. Since there are three elements in theintelligible forms, unity, substantiality, and eternity, will they imitate theirunity and eternity, but in no way their substance? But that is absurd. For,indeed, it has been shown that that which issues from the forms must besubstances, since they create by way of their very existence.But will they be copies with respect to unity and substantiality, but not

in respect to eternity? This also is impossible. The remaining possibilityis that each is unique, but not eternal. For if it is not eternal, it will dis-solve into non-being, but if it is unique, there is nothing fromwhich it canarise. But generally, everything brought forth into being from immovablecauses is unchanging according to its essence, and the forms are immov-able; for they are intelligible. So, either it is possible to imitate all aspects[of forms] or only certain ones. But those farther from their first prin-ciples are less similar to them: for example, while Pythagoras possessesall the sciences, he who is closer to him receives all his knowledge in asecondary way, whereas he who is farther away learns the doctrines ofsome sciences, but is unequal to other ones.

2 �Ελεγε δ’ �Pν, .: use of the imperfect here, once again, possibly indicates thatSyrianus said the things which follow in a lecture.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

ε� τ��νυν π$ντα <δCνατ�ν, λε�πεται τιν$. κα- ε� τιν$, τρι.ν =ντων �ν�κε�ν�ις τ.ν ν�ητ.ν ε�δ.ν Aαρακτηριστικ.ν, [ς Oσται δRλ�ν, τρι.νδ’ �Pν =ντων, [ς εhπ�μεν, v τ+ 3κρα μεμιμημ)να τ�5 μ)σ�υ γ)γ�νεν3μ�ιρα, v τ+ δC� τ+ πρ.τα δεU$μενα τ�5 τρ�τ�υ (α�ν�ιτ’ dν <π�λε-λειμμ)να, v τ�5 πρ?τ�υ μ" τυA ντα τ.ν μετ’ αDτ7 μετε�ληAεν. <λλ+μ"ν δ)δεικται μηδ)τερ�ν τ.ν πρ?των <λη*Hς =νG <ν$γκη 3ρα τ7 μHνμ�ναδικ7ν αDτ+ μ" <π�τυπ?σασ*αι τ.ν ε�δ.ν, τ7 δH �Dσι.δες μ ν�νκα- τ7 α�?νι�ν, δι7 π$ντα μHν τ+ �γκ σμια εhδη �Dσ�αι κα- <ε- [σαC-τως 6στηκ τα, �D π$ντα δH μ�ναδικ$G �D γ+ρ π$ντα πρ7ς π$σας OAειτ+ς τ.ν παραδειγμ$των δυν$μεις συμμ)τρως.

�τι δH π^ν τ7 ν�ητ7ν ε`δ�ς κα- �λως παραδειγματικ7ν αhτι�ν πρ?-τως xν μ�ναδικ ν �στι κα- <�δι�ν κα- �Dσι.δες, δRλ�νG εhτε γ+ρ μ"�Dσ�α εhη, συμ�ε�ηκ7ς Oσται, π^ν δH συμ�ε�ηκ7ς περ- τ"ν ]λην �(�-σταται κα- τ+ �ν ]λSη =ντα, <λλ’ �Dκ �ν τ�9ς Aωριστ�9ς α�τ��ις. εhτε μ"<�δι�ν, �Dδ’ dν 8 ε�κMν αDτ�5 <�δι�ς εhηG δε9 δ), εhπερ �κ π$ντων <ε-τ.ν ε�δ.ν E κ σμ�ς. <ρARς δH <π�λ�μ)νης �Dδεμ�α μηAαν" σ1?�εσ*αιτ7 <π’ αDτRς. εhτε μ" μ�ναδικ ν, �Dκ)τ’ dν εhη πρ?τως παρ$δειγμαGδC� γ+ρ ε`να� τι πρ?τως <δCνατ�ν, cς (ησι κα- E �ν Π�λιτε�Tα [� C] Σωκρ$της. αDτ�9ς γ+ρ τ�Cτ�ις 8 ταυτ της π *εν v <(’ 6ν ς τιν�ςκ�ιν�5 εhδ�υς; τα5τα 3ρα τ+ τρ�α π^σιν �π$ρAει τ�9ς πρ?τ�ις παρα-δε�γμασι, κα- O�ικε τ7 μHν μ�ναδικ7ν αDτ�9ς <π7 τ�5 π)ρατ�ς �π$ρ-Aειν, τ7 δH <�δι�ν <π7 τRς <πειρ�ας, τ7 δH �Dσι.δες <π7 τRς πρ?της�Dσ�ας.

text and translation

Then, if it is impossible to imitate everything, it remains that oneimitates some. And if some, then, there being three characteristics ofintelligible forms, as it will appear—there being three, as we said—eitherthey imitate extremes, without having a share in the mean, or taking onthe first two, they might appear to be without a third, or not acquiringthe first, they participate in those after it. But it has been demonstratedthat neither of the first two are true; for it would be necessary, then,that they do not reproduce the unity of forms, but only the substanceand the eternity, and for this reason, all encosmic forms are substances,and eternally established, but they are not all monadic, for not all havesuitability to all the powers of the paradigms.So then, it is clear that every intelligible form and generally the para-

digmatic cause firstly is a monadic being and eternal and substantial.For if it were not a substance, it will be an accident. But the accidentalis always attached to matter and the things in matter, but not in thetranscendent (i.e. separated) causes. And again, if it were not eternal, thecopy of it would not be eternal. But it must be, if the universe is alwayscomposed of all the forms. But if the cause is being destroyed, there isno means by which that coming from it can be preserved. Again, if it isnot unique, it would not be primally a paradigm. For it is impossible,as Socrates says in the Republic [ C], for there to be two primalentities; for where would the similarity between these two come fromother than some common single source? So then, these three charactersbelong to all the primal paradigms, and it is reasonable to assume thatthe monad springs from the Limit, the Eternal from Unlimitedness, andthe Substantial from the Primal Essence.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This is a rather scholastic look at the question of why some forms onlyproduce one substantiation (e.g., the form of the sun produces only onesun) but others a multiplicity (the form of rabbit produces many rab-bits)3 (Proclus’ aporia: .–). Syrianus tediously derives a solution,whereby not all products imitate their causes to the same degree.4The basis of this argument rests on the three characteristics of forms:

unity, substantiality, and eternity (.). The first two of these charac-teristics must be passed on to their products, while the third term, refer-ring to a kind of monadicity, is only passed from some forms to someproducts (.–). Only beings that are suitable to uniqueness par-take of themonadic quality. Syrianus explains that beings aremore or lesssimilar to their forms, depending on their level of materiality (.–). Those less material contain greater similarity to their forms, whilethosemorematerial contain fewer similarities.This concept relates to thetheory that when the power of the forms (henads) processes outward, itdecreases in power the farther it proceeds from its source.Copies mimic their forms depending on which of the characteristics

are granted to them,which is in turn according to their rank. Substantial-ity must be bestowed on their products: forms can only create substantialthings because they create by their own substance (.–.). Eter-nity, moreover, must also be granted: if it were not, certain products—say, rabbits—would disappear (.). Syrianus argues that since we seeall the products remain, theymust partake of eternity: i.e., while individ-ual rabbits die, the form of “rabbit” in matter is eternal—clearly, Syrianusdid not believe in the process of extinction or Darwinism! A monadicquality, however, is not necessarily granted, as it requires that nothingfurther from it can arise (.–). This seems an odd conjecture, as agenerated thing with amonadic quality surely exists; it just exists alone asunique.This section also explains that theremust be three forms, becausethere cannot be two extremes without a median.In the last section (.–.), Syrianus steps backwards and ex-

plains why a form must be a monadic being, eternal, and substantial. Ifa form were not substantial, it would be an accident and hence linked

3 See Proclus’ aporia, .–.4 Syrianus gives a lengthy description of which things on earth are not associated

with forms. See In Metaph. .ff.; Proclus, In Parm. ., where Proclus discussescategories of forms; cf. Gersh () pp. –.

commentary

to matter, rather than existing as a transcendent cause (.–). If itwere not eternal, its copies would likewise not be eternal, and breeds ofsub-lunar beings would continually cease existence (.–). Finally,if it were not a uniquemonad, it could not be a paradigmatic cause. CitingRepublic C, Syrianus argues that there cannot be two different formsfor the same copy: there would have to be a third, higher transcendentcause that acts as the cause of the similar two (.–).Lines .– link the three characteristics of forms to the triad that

exists in the realm of the One: peras, apeiria, and primal being (whichmust, in the context, refer to the “unified”, as τ7 4ν =ν). Here, monadicityis associated with peras, eternity with apeiria, and substantiality withprôte ousia. This is an in accordance with Iamblichus’ understanding ofthree entities (where peras and apeiria precede the One Existent, whichis their product, the μικτ ν or 8νωμ)ν�ν).5 Proclus, in his turn, attachesthe three to the principle of the Primal One, One-Being, and Eternity, ashe explains it in In Parm. .–.:

“The forms are of universal substances and of their perfections: for theseare the most characteristic attributes of Forms: goodness, essentiality,eternity—the first being derived from the primary cause, the second fromthe One Being, and the third from Eternity. They descend into the firstorder of Forms, a rank, however, which is second toEternity and third fromthe One Being but dependent, like all beings, on the cause of all good.”6

Proclus descends further down the ranks of the One—placing the lastform of the eternal into the noetic rank, just as he corresponds thecharacteristics of forms with their sources. Thus, the forms are not onlyin the realm of the One, but also in the Intelligible realm.This looks backto Iamblichus’ principle of the One Existent which was also known as theaeon: this was both the ruling monad of the intelligible realm and thelast rank of the henadic realm.7 Proclus shows a return to Iamblichus’more systematic ordering of the forms and a desire to connect them tothe noetic realm.

5 See Dillon () .6 Trans: Dillon ().7 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. and Dillon.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 11

Proclus, In Tim. II. .–

Ε� μHν �Pν �π�πεδ�ν μ)ν, �$*�ς δH μηδHν OA�ν Oδει γ�γνεσ*αι τ7 τ�5παντ7ς σ.μα, μ�α μεσ της dν �U0ρκει τ$ τε με*’ 6αυτRς Uυνδε9ν κα-α�τ0νG ν5ν δ)—στερε�ειδR γ+ρ αDτ7ν πρ�σRκεν ε`ναι, τ+ δH στερε+μ�α μHν �Dδ)π�τε, δC� δε <ε- μεσ τητες πρ�σαρμ ττ�υσι [Tim. AB].

ε� μ" 3ρα κα- �κε9ν� <λη*)ς, �περ Oλεγεν E 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμ?νG Oλεγεδ), �τι δ)�ι λαμ�$νειν τ7ν αDτ7ν �ν τα9ς μεσ τησι λ γ�ν, �ς �στιν �ντα9ς πλευρα9ς τ.ν 3κρων. �F�ν ε� E μHν εhη κC��ς Xκτ?, E δH 6πτ+κα- εhκ�σι, τ+ς μεσ τητας αDτ.ν ε�ρ�σκ�μεν, ε� λ$��ιμεν τ+ς πλευρ+ςαDτ.ν, τ7ν δC� κα- τρ�α, κα- π�ι0σαιμεν αDτ�Vς �π’ <λλ0λ�υς κα- �π-τ7ν �U <μ(�9ν 6κ$τερ�νG Oσ�νται γ+ρ �Q μ)σ�ι δι+ τ�5 8μι�λ��υ λ γ�υa

συν$πτ�ντες τ�Vς 3κρ�υς, �σπερ mν κα- �ν τα9ς �U <ρARςb πλευρα9ςτ.ν κC�ων. τ�5 τ��νυν αDτ�5 λ γ�υ =ντ�ς Oν τε τα9ς πλευρα9ς τ.νκC�ων κα- �ν τ�9ς μ)σ�ις δC� �U <ν$γκης �Q μ)σ�ι, (α�η dν E Πλ$των.κα- τ�5τ� συμ(ων τερ�ν πρ7ς τ"ν πρ�κειμ)νην (υσι�λ�γ�ανG κα- γ+ρ�ν τα9ς δυν$μεσι τ.ν στ�ιAε�ων κα- �ν τ�9ς >πλ�9ς εhδεσι πρ7 τ.νσυν*)των �ντ�*ησιν E δημι�υργ7ς τ"ν κ�ινων�αν.

a τ�ν �μι�λ#�υ λ�γ�ν P b 'ρ2α3ς P

Now if the body of the All had had to come into existence as a planesurface, having no depth, one middle term would have sufficed to bindtogether both itself and its fellow-terms; but now it is otherwise; for itbehoved it to be solid of shape, andwhat brings solids into unison is neverone middle term alone but always two.

Unless this also might be true, what our teacher said. He said that it isright to assume that the same ratio obtains in the middle terms as in thesides of the extremes. For example, if one cube might be , but another, we find their middle term if we were to take their sides, and , andmultiply them to each other and each both according to the product. Forthe middle terms will be joining the extremes in the ratio of 1/2 to ,which was the ratio also of the original sides of the cubes. If then theratio is the same, both in the sides of the cubes and in the means, themeans will be by necessity two, according to Plato. And this is more inaccord with the previously-stated account of nature. For the Demiurgeestablished a common bond between the powers of the elements and thesimple forms before he established composite things.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This mathematical description of the cosmos shows the composition ofthe universe into its four elements (fire, air, water, and earth), each ofwhich is related to and dependent on the others. The notion of suitablemeans, as derived mathematically by Syrianus here, shows how elementsare necessarily proportional in the universe, so that all together, theyform the cosmos as one.1 This is a nice example of Syrianus explainingPlatonic arithmetic and geometry in terms of ontology, which is alludedtowith the term “natural causes” ((υσι�λ�γ�α) in .. In InMet. .–., Syrianus says:

“The five figures which are discussed in the Timaeus and which are em-ployed in the formation of the cosmic elements are, on the one hand,interpreted in mathematical terms, but on the other hand, hint at activeand creative powers in nature.”2

This fragment, however, ends at the point where the connections aremade between geometry and hierarchical metaphysics.While the commentary tradition on this passage from the Timaeus is

indeed thorough and plentiful, the Platonists tend, for the most part, tostay close to the text when explicating Tim. A. In Tim. B, Platosays that the Demiurge first made the universe from fire—to make itvisible—and earth—tomake it tangible, but needed a third to connect thetwo.This bond must be in perfect proportion to the two it is connecting.This concept is Empedoclean, who listed fire and earth as a requirementfor its visibility and resistance to touch, and then demanded a third tobond the two extremes.3 In A, Plato says that whenever there are threenumbers, themiddle one is first proportioned to the last, so that the last isin proportion to themiddle, the middle to the first, and hence, the first isproportioned to the last.What follows both in the text of theTimaeus andSyrianus’ commentary on the Timaeus is an exposition on proportionalmean terms both for square numbers and for cubes.4The short version of

1 The geometrical formation of the spheres is expressed in the souls of the world; thedemiurge makes the soul in a straight line, cuts it lengthwise in two, curbs the two partsinto two circles, and divides one of the circles into seven.These geometrical figures existas forms at the level of intellect. See Steel () –.

2 Trans. Siorvanes () .3 Cornford () . This is also cited by Nicomachus, Introd. Arith. ii, , p.

and Iamblichus, In Nicom. Ar. Introd. p. .4 Proclus’ geometrical theology depends heavily on Philolaus whose fragments are

found solely in Proclus. Philolaus dedicated angles of geometrical figures to gods, so that

commentary

the argument is that the four elements which comprise the cosmos createa “solid”, or cube. This cube and the four elements have two mean termswhich allow them to inter-relate proportionately.With the rule of suitablemeans, the cosmospartakes in a continual existence as all its similar partsgrant it unity.While Syrianus’ explanation begins at the point of the three-dimen-

sional cube, both Plato and various Platonists begin their query withthe plane, or square numbers: C : Eπ ταν γ+ρ <ρι*μ.ν τρι.ν Oτε=γκων εhτε δυν$μεων [ντινων�5ν. Here, δCναμις most likely refers tosquare and =γκ�ς to cube.5 Drawing on theorems in Euclid’s Elements6viii, , , Plato (and Syrianus) build on the statement that between twosquares there can be one proportional mean, while between two cubesthere are twomeans (Proclus also states this in .).7 For instance, usingthe numbers for two cubes Syrianus shows us that the middle terms caneasily be found if we take their sides: (m) and (n). By multiplyingvariations of the sides: ×× (m2n) and ×× (n2m), two middlenumbers are found, and , so that the two proportional means of and are and : , , , .8 The progression for cubic numbersis thus 1/2 to (meaning that when one adds half of the present numberto itself, one derives the next successive number).Proclus describes an elaboration to this system, so that the cubic

(or three-dimensional) structure of this world is found in ratios of theelements:9

the angle of the square is devoted to Rhea, Demeter and Hestia. See Procl. In Eucl. ,–. On Proclus’ use of Philolaus, see Steel () . In this article, Steel shows howProclus connects the efficiency of the angles of the triangle with divine providence.

5 Both Cornford () and Heath, Thirteen Books of Euclid () ii, , offerthesemeanings. Liddell, Scott, and Jones,AGreek-EnglishDictionary (Oxford, ), givefor δCναμις the definition: “product of two numbers” and list this under usages found inPlat. Tim. B; A; Iamblichus. Theol. Ar. and and In N.C. p. P. =γκ�ς isdefined as “bulk, size, mass.” The citations are mostly from Plato, referring to numbers:Tht. A; etc., although it is also listed as appearing in Empedocles fr. ..

6 In his commentary on Euclid’s Elements, Proclus only refers to Syrianus once. SeeIn Eucl. , on the quantity and quality of angles.

7 In all fairness to his predecessors, Democritus, Archytas, Menaechmus, and Eratos-thenes likewise note proportional numbers in cubes and derive solutions. They differ,however, on the number of means and manner of derivation.

8 This is explained in more detail by Proclus in .–.9 Siorvanes discusses this passage, see () .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

fire = a2(a)earth = b2(b)air = a2(b)water = a(b2)

Thus, the universe is comprised of elements fundamentally similar toone another, each being the product of the same components in differ-ent ratios. In his Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, , sq., Proclususes the development from point to line to surface to volume to illus-trate the progress from unity-dyad-triad-and tetrad. It is at the stage ofvolume, the “summit of beings”, he says, in which the tetrad (symbolicof the four elements) becomes generative of the total cosmic order.10 Inthis system,moreover, point engenders line, which causes surface, whichengenders volume: just as every being in the universe is limited by itscause, so are the mathematical causes superior to their effects.11 Whileafter Syrianus’ fragment Proclus goes into much greater detail as to var-ious cubic connections, his statement directly after the lemma encapsu-lates both his point and Syrianus’ “natural causes”. He argues that everygeneration indicates a change and a change indicates two terms: with-out the four elements and their unity there would be no generation andstability.It is only after Proclus gives Syrianus’ explanation and his own account

that he brings Iamblichus into the story (..ff.).12 According toProclus, Iamblichus finds onemean for the simple reason-principles andforms, but two means for the material bodies, which are composed ofform and matter. A dyad presides over the latter’s composition.13

10 Proclus, In Eucl. , – and , –, . Charles-Saget discusses such aspectsof Proclus’ thought, () . See also fr. II Lang Tarán Speusippus’ On Pythagore-an Numbers (Theol. Ar. (, –)) which says that , , , correspond to point, line,triangle and pyramid.This passage discusses the Pythagorean correlation between point,line, surface, and solid with , , , . See Mueller () .

11 Proclus, ET prop. ; . Charles-Saget () .12 = Iamblichus, in Tim. fr. Dillon.13 See Dillon () –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 12

Proclus, In Tim. II. .–.

Δι7 δ" κατ+ ταDτ+ �ν τ1. αDτ1. �ν 6αυτ1. περιαγαγMν αDτ7 �π��ησεκCκλ1ω κινε9σ*αι στρε( μεν�ν, τ+ς δH 4U >π$σας κιν0σεις <(ε9λεν κα-<πλανHς <πειργ$σατ� �κε�νων. �π- δH τ"ν περ��δ�ν ταCτην gτε �DδHνπ�δ.ν δ)�ν <σκελHς κα- 3π�υν αDτ7 �γ)ννησεν [Tim. A].

Τ7 μHν παρ$δειγμα τRς κυκλ�(�ρ�ας �τι ν�5ς �στι κα- (ρ νησις, εh-ρηται πρ τερ�νG τ�ς δ) �στιν α]τη κα- π.ς <πεικ$�εται πρ7ς ν�5ν, �ντ�Cτ�ις παραδ�δωσιν E λ γ�ςG Oστι γ+ρ 8 κυκλ�(�ρ�α κ�νησις κατ+ τ+αDτ+ κα- �ν τ1. αDτ1. κα- �ν 6αυτSR περιαγ�μ)νη, κα*$περ �ν τ�Cτ�ιςτ) (ησιν E Τ�μαι�ς κα- �ν Ν μ�ις [� Α] E 'Α*ηνα9�ς i)ν�ςG Yν τ7μHν κατ+ ταDτ+ ταDτ ν �στι τ1. κα*’ 4να λ γ�ν κα- μ�αν τ$Uιν.

τ� γ$ρ, ε� κιν�9τ� μHν τ7 π^ν κυκλικ.ς, μετα�$λλ�ι δH 3λλ�τε 3λλως<νατ)λλ�ν v δ5ν�ν, cς (ησιν E �ν τ1. Π�λιτικ1. [ Α] μ5*�ς; Wν’ �Pνμ" τ�5τ� �π�λ$�ωμεν, τ7 κατ+ ταDτ+ πρ κειται τ.ν 3λλων περ- αDτRςNημ$των. �Dκ 3ρα Xρ*.ς E Πλατωνικ7ς ΣευRρ�ς—παρρησιασ με*αγ+ρ �ντε5*εν πρ7ς αDτ ν—τ+ς <νακυκλ0σεις τ+ς μυ*ικ+ς πρ�σ)με-ν�ς κα- γενητ7ν �]τω π�ι.ν κα- <γ)νητ�ν τ7ν κ σμ�νG τ7 μHν γ+ρ π^νκατ+ ταDτ$ (ησιν E Πλ$των [Leg. . c.] κα- [σαCτως κινε9σ*αι κα-κα*’ 4να λ γ�ν κα- μ�αν τ$UινG 8 δH <νακCκλησις �]τως, cσπερ λ)γε-ται, τ"ν μ�αν <ναιρε9 τ$Uιν τRς κιν0σεως. <λλ’ α]τη μHν �πως διαμε-μυ*�λ γηται πρ7ς τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν �ν τ�9ς ε�ς �κε9ν�ν <ναγε-γραμμ)ν�ις τ7ν δι$λ�γ�ν εhρηται τ1. Πλ$τωνι κατ+ ν�5ν.

Wherefore1He spun it round uniformly in the same spot andwithin itselfand made it move revolving in a circle; and all the other six motions Hetook away and fashioned it free from their aberrations. And seeing thatfor this revolving motion it had no need of feet, He begat it legless andfootless.

That the paradigm of circular motion is Intellect and understanding hasbeen said earlier (, ).What this samemotion is, and how it is likenedto Intellect, is set out in the present passage. For the circular motion ismotion “going around in the same way and in the same place and initself ”, even as Timaeus puts it in the present passage and as the AthenianStranger says in the Laws (X A)—where the expressions “accordingto one ratio and one order” is equivalent of “in the same way.”For how would it be if the universe were to move in a circle, but were

to change by at one time or another moving clockwise or anti-clockwise,as the Myth in the Statesman presents it [ A]? Therefore, lest weassume this, the phrase “in the same way” stands before the rest of thedescription of it. Thus the Platonist Severus—indeed, let us speak freelyabout this—was not correct in adopting these mythical alternations ofcycles andmaking the cosmos both generated and ungenerated; for Platosays that the universe “moves uniformly and regularly, and according toa single rational principle and order” [Laws, ibid]; but the revolution,nevertheless, just as was said, destroys the ordinance of motion; this so-called alternation of cycles, however, destroys the single order of motion.But that that account is couched in mythical form has been explained byour Master in his commentary on that dialogue, in accordance with theintentions of Plato.

1 This translation is a modification of Dillon’s; see () –.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This passage is a commentary on Plato’s six sublunary motions and acritique of the theory of alternating cycles (which implies that the worldhad a beginning in time).To support his interpretation of Tim. A, Syrianus addresses Laws

A and Statesman A. The Laws passage looks to Book on cir-cular motion, which is characterised by movement in the same condi-tions, same speed and same angle (κατ+ τ+ αDτ+ κα- �ν τ1. αDτ1. κα-�ν 6αυτSR περιαγ�μ)νη, .). The Statesman fragment is of particularimportance as it is likely evidence that Syrianus wrote a commentary onthe Statesman: not only does Syrianus refer to the Statesman in ., butin .– Proclus states that there was a written monograph on the topic(τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν �ν τ�9ς ε�ς �κε9ν�ν <ναγεγραμμ)ν�ις τ7ν δι$-λ�γ�ν εhρηται τ1ω Πλ$τωνι κατ+ ν�5ν), especially with respect to howthe myth should be understood (“διαμεμυ*�λ γηται” .). While noPlatonic commentary on the Statesman exists that we know of, it formedpart of the curriculum for study in the Platonic Academy.2 The passagein the Statesman that Syrianus refers to is the myth in A, “μετα�$λ-λ�ι δε 3λλ�τε 3λλως <νατ)λλ�ν v δ5�ν” (.), which discusses thechanging, rising and setting of the universe—Kronos is said to wind theuniverse one way, while under the rule of Zeus, the universe winds in theopposite direction.In .ff. Syrianus criticises Severus’ position on Statesman A.

Severus answers the problem of whether the universe was created oruncreated with the Stoic concept of apokatastasis, the periodic destruc-tion of the world and its circles. Proclus summarises Severus’ position inIn Tim. I. , ff.:

“[Severus] says the cosmos is eternal in the absolute sense, but that thispresent one, moving in its present direction, is created. For there are twocycles, the one on which the universe is at present turning, and the otherone which is opposite to it. The cosmos, in so far as it is turning according

2 Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, ch. (Prolégomènes à la philoso-phie de Platon), ed. by Westerink and translated by Trouillard and Segonds (). Wes-terink () xxxviii opines that Iamblichus considers the Statesman to be a discussionof the heavenly Demiurge, since he takes the Sophist to be about the sublunar demiurgein his commentary on Sophist A. Dillon () . See Iamblichus, In Soph. fr. Dillon (= Hermann, Plat. Dial. VI pp. –, and Greene, Scholia Platonica, pp. =.).

commentary

to this cycle, is created and had a beginning, but in the absolute sense it isnot.”3

In this sense, Severus gives a more literal interpretation of Statesman A.While the universe is uncreated in eternity, the circuits of the universeare created in time. Both Syrianus and Proclus interpret the cycles to besimultaneous with each other. Proclus addresses Severus’ quotation inthe lines that follow:

“You [Severus] are improperly transferring the riddling account of mythonto the level of a scientific discussion. Soul that originates movementcould never leave off its activity and alter its original circuit. And how,then, if both moved and mover preserve their original states, is there anyplace for this alternation of cycles?”4

Syrianus, likewise, criticises apokatastasis as destroying the concept ofμ�α τ$Uις, or single order of motion as understood by Plato (.).Syrianus bases his critique on the concept that alternating cycles would

imply a change in the Demiurge—from creating to not-creating—, a cri-tique that was taken up in the above passage by Proclus. Proclus, more-over, further allegorises cosmic cycles in the Statesman. The followingtwo passages are worth examining in detail to consider Proclus’ adap-tation of Syrianus’ Statesman interpretation. The position is stated in InTim. I. , ff.:

“If the creator is one of the eternal beings, it cannot be the case that at onetime he creates, and at another time he leaves hold of the rudder-handles,for he would not in that case maintain uniformity or unchangeability.”5

Proclus does not accept that the Demiurge moves from one action toanother—such a change in demiurgic activity would not be in line withthe late Platonic notion of eternal creation.With the problem of two separate activities for the Demiurge estab-

lished, Proclus explains how the two ages of Kronos represent simulta-neous metaphysical states.While he does not credit Syrianus, it is a mostSyrianic concept. In In Tim. III. .ff., he explains that a cycle of Kro-nos governs in the intelligible realm, while a cycle of Zeus rules in thephysical realm. PlatonicTheologyV. , , ff. goes into this idea in moredetail. Here, the cycle of Kronos is at the summit of the intelligible levelof being on which the souls on the intellectual level of reality depend.

3 Dillon () .4 Dillon () .5 Trans. Dillon ().

syrianus, in tim. fr.

The cycle of Zeus occurs simultaneously to that of Kronos, but it takesplace at the physical level. Platonic Theology V. (, ff.) explains thisrelationship between the two levels:

“There are, then, two sorts of life in the world, the one invisible andintellectual, the other physical and manifest, the former being defined byProvidence, the latter proceeding irregularly according to Fate. Of these,that which is secondary andmultiform and realised inNature is dependentupon the order of Zeus, while that which is more simple and intellectualand invisible depends upon on that of Kronos. And this is clearly indicatedby the Eleatic Stranger when he calls the one of the cycles “Zeusian” andthe other “Kronian”. In fact Zeus is also cause of the invisible life of theuniverse, and is the dispenser of intellect to it, and its leader to intellectualperfection, but he elevates all beings to the realm of Kronos, and it isbecause he is leader along with his father that he brings into existence thecosmic intellect as a whole. Indeed, if we are to tell the whole truth, eachof the two cycles, I mean the visible and invisible, has a connection withboth these gods, though the one is preeminently proper to Kronos, whilethe other pertains more to the regime of Zeus.”6

These cycles comprise two aspects of the metaphysical universe. Therealm of providence is governed by Kronos, while the realm of fate,which has immediate, but not supreme control over the natural world, isgoverned by Zeus. Proclus, moreover, finds evidence that the two cyclesare ruled by Kronos and Zeus in Statesman E –, which he citesin In Tim. III. .ff. in a discussion of providence and fate. WhileProvidence and Kronos have supreme control over the universe, actualcontrol of the cosmos is governed by Zeus, the Demiurge, who acts as acatalyst using fate in the physical world.It might be objected, in conclusion, that the present passage is a frag-

ment, not of the Timaeus commentary, but of a Statesman commentary.One can only plead, in response, to that, that Syrianus may well havetaken the opportunity, in commenting this passage, of alluding to hisviews on the Statesmanmyth, even as does Proclus.

6 Trans. Dillon () .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 13

Proclus, In Tim. II. .–.

ΨυA"ν δH ε�ς τ7 μ)σ�ν αDτ�5 *ε-ς δι+ παντ ς τε Oτεινε κα- Oτι OUω*εντ7 σ.μα αDτSR περιεκ$λυψεν [Tim. B].

E δ) γε 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμMν πρ�σ(υ)στερ�ν τ�9ς τ�5 Πλ$των�ς N0-μασιν �π�ιε9τ� τ"ν �U0γησινG τRς γ+ρ τ�5 παντ7ς ψυARς �A�Cσης μ)ντι κα- �περκ σμι�ν κα- �USηρημ)ν�ν τ�5 παντ ς, κα*7 συνRπται πρ7ςτ7ν ν�5ν, l δ" κε(αλ"ν αDτRς � τε Πλ$των �ν τ1. Φα�δρ1ω [ Α]κα- E '�ρ(εVς �ν τ�9ς περ- τRς �Ιπταςa λ γ�ις πρ�σων μασεν, �A�CσηςδH κα- δυν$μεων 3λλ� πλR*�ς <π7 τRς μ�ν$δ�ς ταCτης πρ�ϊ7ν κα-μερι� μεν�ν περ- τ7ν κ σμ�ν κα- π$σαις ��κε�ως παρ7ν τα9ς μ��ραιςτ�5 παντ ς, κα- 3λλως μHν περ- τ7 μ)σ�ν,3λλως δH περ- τ"ν γRν,3λλωςδH περ- τ7ν aλι�ν, 3λλως δH περ- 6κ$στην τ.ν σ(αιρ.ν, τα5τα π$ντα EπαρMν O(η λ γ�ς �νδεικνCμεν�ς,[ς 3λλως μHν ψυA�9 τ7 μ)σ�ν, 3λλωςδH τ7ν �λ�ν =γκ�ν, 3λλ� δ) τι πρ7 τ�Cτων <(�ησιν �USηρημ)ν�ν τ�5παντ ς.

a 4ππας ς: 4πτας PQ

And in themidst thereofHe set Soul, whichHe stretched throughout thewhole of it, and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body

As for our Teacher, he produces an interpretation more suitable to thewords of Plato. Whereas the Soul of the universe has on the one handan aspect which is hypercosmic and transcendent over all the universein virtue of which it is attached to Intellect, which Plato in the Phaedrus( A) and Orpheus in his Discourse on Hipta,1 called the “head of theSoul,” and on the other hand, a multitude of powers coming forth fromthis monad and dividing themselves in one way around the centres, andpresent in the appropriate mode to all parts of the universe, in one wayaround the earth, in another around the sun, and still others around eachof the spheres, the present utterance indicates all these, how in one way itensouls the middle,2 and in another the whole bulk (of the world); whilethere is another aspect, prior to these, which he leaves as transcendingthe universe.

1 This is a very odd reference. Hipta appears as a minor mythological figure, nurse ofDionysus after his rebirth from Zeus’ thigh. She is equated by Proclus with the All-Soul.Her noeseis are given substance in the highest form of movement. She appears in Kern’sOrphic fragment collection, although the primary references are from Proclus. See OF Kern, Proclus In Tim. B (II , Diehl) (sc. Iamblichus); �Ιπτας Diehl (PQ) andvulgo; Proclus In Tim. B (I , Diehl) (cf. in Tim. B) [II , Diehl] et II ,Herm. XXIV. XLIII; Lob. I ; Luebbert De Pindaro theologiae Orphicae censore IndexBonnens. / p. XX; Holwerda ; Kern Genethliakon für Robert . Hymn.XLVIII Σα�α���υ (Quandt, De Baccho ab Alexandri aetate in Asia minore culto. Diss.Hal. XXI , ): Hymn. XLIX

Nutricis Bacchi nomen genuinum restituit Ios. Keil e duobus titulis dedicatoriis in MatremHiptam in Maeonia repertis Eranos zur Grazer Philologenversammlung , (Keilet de Premerstein Denkschr. Akad. Wien Phil.-hist. Kl. LIV , n. ) Με(λ)τ�νηΜητηρ^ Μητρ- �ΙπτTα εDA0ν et n. Μητ"ρ �ΙπτTα κα- Διε- Σα(Βα��1b); v. KernGenethl. . Keil has confirmed that “Hipte”, not “Hippe” is the correct form of the nameon the basis of a number of inscriptions which name her as “Mother Hipte”.

2 Τ μ)σ�ν is used by Plato, but he seems to say this is what the Pythagoreans call thecentral fire of the universe. Syrianus takes this as the middle bulk of the universe.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

After considerable doxography on the part of Proclus, Syrianus is shownto have adopted a portmanteau solution comprising the opinions ofPorphyry and Iamblichus, as will be shown below. Syrianus argues thatthe Soul Plato speaks of here has a super-cosmic element in it that islinked to Intellect (the view of Iamblichus), but it also has a multiplicityof powers which are present in suitable ways to all parts of the universe(Porphyry’s opinion).3The latter notion, that the Soul is in some sense the middle of the

universe and wraps around its body seems to be the consensus priorto Porphyry and Iamblichus (.–ff.), because that is what theTimaeus says. Proclus reports that some say the middle is the center ofthe earth, and that the power of this center holds together the wholeperiphery; while others say it is the moon, in so far as it is situatedbetween the sublunar beings and the divine being—here, it is a kind ofconnecting point between the generated and the divine which changesthrough itsmotion the sublunar generations;4while a third group say thatthe sun, as being situated at the heart of the universe, heats and vivifiesbeings.Yet another group of opinions understand “the middle” in an exter-

nal way. One group says that the middle is the circle of the equatorwhich divides the world in two, while a second argues that the middleis the cyclical passage of stars in the signs of the zodiac, also referredto as the circle of the elliptic. Dillon postulates that the above-statedfive opinions—the practice of stating five pre-Plotinian interpretations isfound to be typical of Procline exegesis—are pre-Plotinian andwere orig-inally collected by Porphyry, possibly summarised by either Iamblichusor Proclus.5Both Porphyry and Iamblichus criticise interpretations which accept

“middle” in a local and spatial sense. Rather, they argue that the Soul ispresent everywhere and has authority6 over all things according to itsown movements (.). In the exegesis which follows, Proclus uses

3 Porphyry says that the soul belongs to intelligible being and is consubstantial withdivine Intellect because it is ν�ητ" �Dσ�α. This account can be found in Aug.De Civ. Dei.X (= De Reg. An. Fr. ).

4 Plotinus, Enn. II...–.5 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.6 'ΕνεU�υσια��υσ$ν, .: This is an Iamblichean word. Proclus is possibly reading

Iamblichus’ monograph on the subject of the Soul. Cf. DM II, . and III, ..

commentary

Iamblichus to obtain Porphyry’s opinions. Proclus reports that Porphyryhas understood Soul of the All as a mean in respect of psychic essence(.). It is a median between the intelligible and sensible realms, andhe cites Tim. B that the Soul is in themiddle and stretches it all aroundthe periphery.7Iamblichus (.ff.) uses the notion of the transcendent (�USηρημ)-

ν�ς), hypercosmic (�περκ σμι�ς) Soul, as it was introduced by Plotinusin Ennead IV. . , ε� μ0 τις τ7 μεν 4ν στ0σειεν �(’ 6αυτ�5 μ" π�πτ�νε�ς σ.μα ε9τ’ �U �κε�ν�υ τ+ς π$σας, τ0ν τε τ�5 �λ�υ κα- 3λλας, as anexplanation for the unity of the Soul.8 Dillon connects this Plotinian con-cept to Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon,9 in which the Soul of the Allderives from the principle of π$σης τ$Uεως 8 <με*εκτ�ς 8γε9ται μ�ν+ςπρ7 τ.ν μετεA�μ)νων, which is, in turn, dependent upon μ�α κα- �περ-κ σμι�ς ψυA0 at the level of Soul. Proclus, when discussing Iamblichus,goes into indirect discourse in .: μηδε γ$ρ ε�ναι, which not onlysignals that he is quoting Iamblichus, but that he also disagrees with him.In this passage, Iamblichus describes Soul as an independent entity thathas authority (�νεU�υσι$��υσαν) over all things, particularly encosmicsouls. The monadic soul occupies a “middle” position in so far as it ispresent to and equally far from all things.10 Beings, however, are all notequally distant from it, as each participates according to its power andability.11 Iamblichus’ transcendent soul seems to envelope the cosmos.

7 Trans. Dillon, Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon (= Proclus, In Tim. II, , .–):

“Porphyry takes this soul as being that of this universe, and explains ‘the middle’ in termsof the essential position of the Soul, that is, its middle position between the noetic andsensible realms. But if the passage is taken in this sense it seems to contribute nothing tothe progress of Plato’s argument; if we take it as meaning that the Universe is made up ofMind and Soul and Body and is a living Being possessed of Soul andMind, we shall findthe Soul to occupy amiddle position in this arrangement. But since Plato has already saidthis, he would now seem to bemerely saying again that the Soul of the cosmos is extendedthroughout the Universe, having been allotted in it the middle rank; for secondary thingsalways partake of what is prior to them, as Body, the lowest essence, partakes of Soul, themiddle one, and Soul of mind, which is prior to it.”

8 Dillon () .9 Proclus, In Tim. II, .ff.10 The Soul is assigned a status in the middle of reality—according to Iamblichus, it

is simultaneously Being and Becoming. Thus, Soul in its entire substance is divided andundivided; as such, it can constitute the middle reality between Being and Becoming. SeePriscianus, In De Anima, , . Proclus, however, argues that the soul has its substancein eternity, but its activities take place in time. See Proclus, ET –; . See Steel() ; –.

11 Trans. Dillon, Iamblichus, Dillon Fr. In Tim, (= II. , –):

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Proclus introduces the opinion of Syrianus with direct speech and γ$ρ,signalling that he adopts the views of his master in full, as an exegesis“more naturally akin to the views of Plato.” Syrianus offers a solutionwhich combines that of Porphyry and Iamblichus in which the Soulhas a super-cosmic element in it, but also contains a part which is inthe universe. He explains the transcendent element which is linked toIntellect with reference to Phaedrus A, a passage in which Platodiscusses the transcendent part of the world soul.12 Syrianus discussesPhaedrus A by mentioning Hipta (OF ), whom the Platonistsidentified with the World-Soul, which is presented as having both a“head” and amultitude of other powers bywhich it relates to the universe.In .–, Syrianus adopts the Iamblichean understanding of the Soul’smiddle position, namely that the soul is ��κε�ως, or suitably related to allparts of the universe.13 In this way, part of the Soul is transcendent, partis present around the earth, sun, heavenly spheres, and the bulk of theuniverse.This description of the Syrianic soul raises the question of in what way

the World Soul—which ensouls Soul from within—is different from thehypostasis Soul—the transcendent Soul. Here, it seems that Syrianus isconflating the two into one entity. While the Middle Platonists did notsee a difference between these two, Plotinus differentiates them inEnneadIV,, a treatise on whether all souls are one. Porphyry, on the other hand,

“But the divine Iamblichus considers that we should understand here that Soul which istranscendent and hypercosmic and independent and exerting authority over all; for Platois not here concerned with the Soul of the cosmos, but that soul which is imparticipableand placed over all the souls in the cosmos as their monad; for such, he says, is the natureof the first Soul, and ‘the middle’ refers to it as being equally present to all things, throughbeing the Soul of no body nor yet being relative in any way, both ensouling everythingequally and being equally separate from everything; for it is not less distant from somethings andmore fromothers—it is, after all, unrelated,—butequally distant from all, eventhough all things might not be distant from it in the same way; for it is in the things thatparticipate that degrees of more and less arise.”

See Dillon and Finamore’s description of Iamblichus’ psychological doctrine in ().

12 “Of the other souls that which best follows a god and becomes most like thereuntoraises her charioteer’s head into the outer region, and is carried round with the gods inthe revolution” Phaedrus A, trans. Hackforth ().

13 Iamblichus, likewise, discusses Phdr. A: “What ismeant by this charioteer? Is henot themost sublime and, asmany say, the principal part of us (τ7 κε(αλα-ω- δ)στατ�ν)?He governs our whole body and he may view the supercelestial sphere.” (Proclus, In Tim.III, , –.) Trans. Steel () . See also Hermias, In Phdr. , , where theIamblichean doctrine appears, stating that the entire soul descends.

commentary

seems to conflate world Soul and the hypostasis Soul. Iamblichus, how-ever, rejects the Porphyrian stance and separates them, distinguishing inparticular the monad of Soul, which he characteristically identifies as ahigher level of Soul than Porphyry. Proclus looks to the Phaedrus mythto show how only the faculties of the soul are in conflict when the horseand charioteer descend.14

14 Proclus, In Tim. III, , –; In Alc. , –. See Steel () , note .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 14

Proclus, In Tim II. .–.

Μ�αν <(ε9λε τ7 πρ.τ�ν <π7 παντ7ς μ�9ραν. μετ+ δH ταCτην <(S0ρειδιπλασ�αν ταCτης, τ"ν δH αP τρ�την 8μι�λ�αν μHν τRς δευτ)ρας, τρι-πλασ�αν δH τRς πρ?της [Tim. Β].

'Επ- δH τ�Cτ�ις κατ�δωμεν 3λλ�ν τρ π�ν λ γων, lν E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$-σκαλ�ς, �ν)κρινε, κα- �DA 4να τ�5τ�ν, <λλ+ π�λλ.ν 8μ9ν κα- *αυμα-στ.ν �πι��λ.ν γεννητικ ν, �e κα- 8με9ς �δραττ με*α πρ τερ�νG λ)γειγ+ρ �Pν, �τι διA.ς τ"ν πρ?την 4καστα τ�Cτων <κ�υστ)�ν, �(’ �ληςτε τRς ψυARς [ς μι^ς κα*’ 4νωσιν κα- �π- τ.ν π�λλ.ν �ν αDτSR λ γωνκα- τ�5 πλ0*�υς τ�5 �ν αDτSR κατ+ δια�ρεσινG Oστι γ+ρ 8 ψυA" κα- yνκα- πλR*�ς κα- εFς λ γ�ς κα- <ρι*μ7ς παντ��ων ε�δ.ν, κα- μιμε9ταιτ0ν τε Eλ τητα τ"ν δημι�υργικ"ν κα- τ"ν δι$κρισιν τ.ν δυν$μεων τ�5πατρ ς. πρ.τ�ν τ��νυν αDτ"ν κα*’ �λην aτις �στ- καταν�0σωμεν, μ)-ν�υσ$ν τε κα- πρ�ϊ�5σαν �ν 6αυτSR κα- �πιστρ)(�υσαν, κα- δ" κα- πρ�-ν��5σαν 3λλως μHν τ.ν <Cλων κα- κα*αρ.ν ε�δ.ν τ.ν �γκ�σμ�ων,3λλως δH τ.ν σωμ$των >π$ντων κα- τRς μεριστRς �Dσ�ας, κα- ν�0σαν-τες μ)νειν μHν αDτ"ν κατ+ τ"ν μ�αν μ�9ραν (.μεν, πρ�ϊ)ναι δH κατ+τ"ν δευτ)ραν, τRς πρ� δ�υ *ε�ας �Zσης,<λλ’ �DA- κατ+ π$*�ςa v <�ρι-στ�αν ν��υμ)νης, �πιστρ)(ειν δH κατ+ τ"ν τρ�την (τ7 γ+ρ τελεσι�υργ7ν<π7 ταCτης παραγ�νεται τ�9ς �Pσιν), Eλ�τελR δH �Pσαν κα- �νιδρυμ)-νην τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς κα- μ)ν�υσαν �ν τ1. ν1. διαιων�ως πρ�ν�ε9ν κα- τ.νδευτ)ρων, κα- 3λλως μHν τ.ν πρ�σεA.ς αDτRς �Uημμ)νων,b 3λλως δHτ.ν στερε.ν αDτ.ν =γκων, 6κατ)ρων δH διA.ςG τ$ τε γ+ρ πρ�σεA.ςαDτRς <π�λαC�ντα κα- πρ εισιν <π’ αDτRς κα- �πιστρ)(ει πρ7ς αD-τ0ν, πρ�ϊ ντα μHν κατ+ τ"ν γ νιμ�ν τRς τετ$ρτης δCναμιν, �πιστρ)-(�ντα δH κατ+ τ"ν τRς π)μπτης �π- τ"ν μ�αν α�τ�αν <ναγωγ0ν. κα- δ"κα- τ+ στερε+ τα5τα κα- �ν =γκ�ις *εωρ�Cμενα π$ντα εhδη πρ εισιμHν κατ+ τ"ν Xκταπλασ�αν τRς πρ?της, δυαδικ"ν �Pσαν κα- στερε+νκα- gμα μHν γ νιμ�ν, gμα δH �π- π^ν πρ�ϊ)ναι δυναμ)νην, �πιστρ)(ειδH κατ+ τ"ν ε�κ�σικαιεπταπλασ�αν, στερε.ν �Pσαν �πιστρ�(0ν, [ς

a πλ5!�ς P b 6 α+τ5ς �μμ�νων P

First He took one portion from thewhole; thenHe took a portion doubleof this; then a third portion, half as much again as the second portion,that is, three times as much as the first

Further to this, let us consider another line of argument, which ourMaster chose to pursue, a simple line at that, but one productive ofmany remarkable conceptions, such as we have actually drawn on earlier.Therefore, he says that it is necessary to understand, first, each of thesethings in two ways: ) in reference to the whole Soul as one in a unifiedmode and ) in reference to the many reason-principles in it (the Soul)and themultiplicity present in it by division. For the Soul is both one andmany, both a single reason-principle and a sum-total of all kinds of forms,and it imitates both the demiurgic creation as a whole and the division ofpowers within the Father. First, then, let us consider what is the Soul as awhole, remaining within itself and proceeding and returning, and indeedexercising providence in one way over immaterial and pure forms withinthe cosmos, and in another way over all the bodies and partial beings,and having considered (this), let us say that it remains in respect of one“portion”, but it proceeds in respect of a second, since the processionis divine, but not to be considered as accidental or unlimited, while itreturns in respect of the third (it is from this that perfection arises inbeings), and thus, while being complete and established in the intelligiblerealm, and remaining in Intellect, it eternally exercises providential careover secondary things, in one way over those beings situated proximateto it, and in another over solid bodies, and each of these in two ways: forthose things which draw immediate benefit from it, proceed from it andreturn to it, proceeding according to their productive power of the fourth“portion”, and returning according to the power of the fifth, which leadsback to their first cause. And all these three-dimensional forms whichare viewed as solid bodies, proceed according to that “portion” which iseight times the first, being dyadic and solid, and likewise generative andat the same time capable of proceeding in all directions, while it returnsaccording to thatwhich is twenty-seven times the first, being the return of

syrianus, in tim. fr.

τριαδικ"ν κα- [ς τRς ταDτ�5 (CσεωςG τ�ι�5τ� γ+ρ τ7 περιττ ν. τρε9ς�Pν αQ πρ �δ�ι κα- τρε9ς αQ �πιστρ�(α- περ- τ"ν μ�αν κα- 8νωμ)νηνστ$σιν τRς ψυARς. δι7 κα- τρε9ς �Q 3ρτι�ι κα- �Q περιττ�- τρε9ς, <π7μ�ν$δ�ς πρ�ϊ ντεςG κα- συμπλ)κ�νται <λλ0λ�ις, �τι κα- 8 ψυA" πρ ει-σ� τε αDτ" κα- �πιστρ)(ει, κα- �πιστρα(ε9σα παρ$γει τ+ς πρ?τας αD-τRς �π�δ�A+ς κα- τ7 πρ?τως �σAηματισμ)ν�νG κα- παρ$γ�υσα μHν αD-τ7 δι$στασιν αDτ1. δ�δωσι κα- =γκ�ν, �πιστρ)(�υσα δH αDτ7 σ(αιρ�-ειδHς π�ιε9G κα- τ�5τ� τ�ι�5τ�ν �π�στ0σασα κα- τ7ν κ σμ�ν �ν αDτ1.παρ$γει, τ"ν μHν πρ �δ�ν <ρτιακ.ς, τ"ν δH �πιστρ�("ν περισσ�ειδ.ς<περγα��μ)νη, κυ�ικ.ς δH <μ(�τ)ρας, �τι τ"ν τ.ν στερε.ν <π�γ)ν-νησιν �π�ιε9τ� κα- �πιστρ�(0ν. τριπλR �Pν 8 πρ �δ�ς κα- �πιστρ�(0,j μHν <σAημ$τιστ�ς, j δH �σAηματισμ)νη πρ?τως, j δH �σAηματισμ)νηδευτ)ρως, π$ντα δH [ς �ν <ρι*μ�9ς.

Commentary

In B, Plato discusses the formation of Soul from a blending of theSame, Other, and Being. These are then portioned into seven parts ar-ranged in two triads. As one might imagine, the Platonists certainlyhad a field day with this account. Proclus describes and discounts thecustomary astronomical interpretations of the five anonymous MiddlePlatonists (.ff.). Dillon neatly summarises these as follows:1

. �\ μ)ν: wish to relate the seven numbers to the seven planetaryspheres

. �\ δ): the distances of the seven planetary spheres to the center ofthe earth

. �\ δε, ε�ς τ+ς κιν0σεις: the movement of the spheres. �\ δ), ε�ς τ+ μεγ)*η τ.ν <στ)ρων: the various sizes of the planets. �\ δ), ε�ς τ+ τ$Aη τ.ν κCκλων: their speeds of revolution.

Proclus dismisses all five: ) modern astronomical theories disprovethem; ) Plato only generally describes planets as being greater or smallerthan one another; ) Plato is describing the formation of the Soul ratherthan the cosmos.2

1 Dillon () .2 Dillon () .

text and translation

solid bodies, as being triadic and of the nature of the same. For this isthe nature of odd number. Therefore, there are three processions andthree returns involved in the simple and fixed unity of the Soul. Becauseof this there are three even and three odd numbers, proceeding fromone. And they are intertwined with each other, as the Soul proceeds andreverts, and in reverting, it creates the first receptacles of itself, and theprimal object of structuring, andproducing it, it gives to it dimension andvolume, and in returning, it makes it spherical. And undertaking this, itmakes an ordered structure in it, continuing its procession through evennumbers, and its reversion through odd ones, and in each case to thelevel of cubes, because reversion is also a generation of solids. So then, theprocession and the return are both triple, the first devoid of structuring,the second involved in a primary structure, and the third in secondarystructures, but all in accordance with numbers.

Five later commentators reportedly deal more seriously with this pas-sage: Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Theodorus, and Syrianus. Dillondeals with Amelius, Porphyry and Iamblichus in Iamblichi Chalciden-sis.3 As Syrianus relies heavily on Iamblichus, we will repeat much of thatargument; however, it is sufficient to summarise Amelius and Porphyry’sarguments. In .ff. Amelius arranges the series of seven numbers intoa monad and three pairs, with the pairs representing better and worsedaimones, men, and wild and tame animals. Porphyry (.ff.) doesnot give individual characteristics to the seven numbers, but says thatthe numbers represent the scale of harmony in the Soul.Syrianus’ interpretation closely follows the interpretation of Iambli-

chus, who identifies the seven numbers with an aspect of the internalmechanism of the Soul. Especially important is that both Iamblichus andSyrianus use B to describe the process of μ νη-πρ �δ�ς-�πιστρ�(0:for Iamblichus, this is a process within a given hypostasis, whereaswewillsee that, for Syrianus, B denotes a process specific to Soul and particu-lar to its own demiurgic, providential activity. Both are interpretations ofnumbers of the soul and ways of arranging the seven numbers. Syrianus’commentary on Tim. B closely follows Iamblichus’ interpretation ofthis passage, as reported in II..ff.:

3 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon (= Proclus, In Tim. II, .).

syrianus, in tim. fr.

“The philosopher Iamblichus, on the other hand, sings the praises ofthe numbers (under discussion) with all his power as containing variousremarkable properties, calling theMonad the cause of Sameness andUnity,the Dyad the organiser of Procession and Division, the Triad leader ofReturn for what has gone forth, the Tetrad the true embracer of all har-mony, containing in itself all the reason-principles and showing forth initself the second cosmic order, the Ennead the creator of true perfectionand similarity, being the perfect product of perfect components and par-taking of the nature of the same; he calls the Ogdoad the cause of Pro-cession to all points and of Progression through all, and finally, the Hep-takaieikosad the force stimulating Return even of the lowest elements (ofthe Universe), in order that on each side of the Tetrad there might be astatic, a progressing, and a returning principle, on the one side on the pri-mary level, on the other, on the secondary level; for the Ennead has a rela-tionship to the Monad, being ‘a new one’, and the Ogdoad to the Dyad,being the cube from it, and the Eikosiheptad to the Triad for the samereason. Through the former he grants to the simpler entities stayings andprocessions and returns, through the second to the more composite, andthe Tetrad, being in the middle, through being a square has the qualityof proceeding, through being filled with all the reason-principles comingfrom the monad, the quality of returning. And these are symbols of divineand esoteric things.”4

Dillon draws an extremely helpful diagram of this process, wherebyIamblichus divides activity into two triads: one for the noetic world(represented by the monad, dyad, and triad), another for the world ofbecoming (ennead, ogdoad, and heptakaieikosad), with the tetrad as themediator between the two triads, “the embracer of all harmony.”5 Thetetrad projects forth a second realm of reality as the ennead, for truecompletion and similarity.The second triad also partakes in the nature ofthe same as the cause of all procession. Iamblichus makes clear that thereis a return even of the lowest level of reality. In his discussion, Iamblichusbases the two triads on Plato’s division in B of the parts of the soul intothree evens (, , as the second, fourth, and sixth portions of the soul)and three odds (, , as the third, fifth, and seventh portions of thesoul).Theodore of Asine offers a new theory (.ff.). After the one, there

is a triple soul: Soul in itself (8 κα*’ αDτ ); another that is a universalSoul (8 κα* λ�υ), and a third that is the Soul of the universe (3λλην τ"ντ�5δε τ�5 παντ ς). The soul engages in a motion in three stages, each of

4 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon. Translation Dillon ().5 Dillon () . Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.

commentary

which corresponds to themotion of the three souls (.). Next, ratherthan discussing the seven portions, Theodore connects the division tocelestial things in a series of doubles, and sublunaries in a series of triples(.ff.). He assigns the numbers to each of the elements: to earth, to fire, to air, to air. These elements are harmoniously connectedthrough , , , , so that earth as seven is a combination of , , ;water is a combination of , , ; air is a combination of , , ; andfire is a combination of , , . Theodore’s theory, thus, while displayingthe Pythagorean connection between elements and numbers as found inIamblichus’ thought, seems to accord more with that of Porphyry or theMiddle Platonists than his immediate predecessor.Syrianus possibly uses Theodore’s distinction between types of souls,

although Syrianus limits his division to two: the whole Soul and thesouls comprising it. Although he innovates by dividing the Soul intotwo categories, Syrianus imitates Iamblichus’ activity of the Soul as itcorresponds to the seven Platonic portions. Because the Soul is bothone, as a reason principle, and many, because it has division, it imitatesthe demiurgic completeness.The principle of oneness in the Soul allowsfor its triadic activity of remaining in itself, proceeding, and returning.This higher aspect is also responsible for exercising providence over pureforms in the cosmos.The aspect of many in the Soul reflects the Soul asthe sum total of forms, or the souls comprising it.This aspect of Soul presides over bodies and partial beings. This dual

aspect, likewise, allows the Soul to imitate powerswithin the Father (whois at a higher level than the Demiurge proper) exhibited at the timeof demiurgic creation. Imitating the holistic activity of the Demiurge,Soul remains in Intellect in respect of one portion and comes to thesecondary things most close to it. Hence, being complete and rooted inthe intelligible world and remaining in Intellect, soul exercises pronoiaover secondary things. With respect to its second portion, it proceedsindividually to preside over individuals. Syrianus clarifies that the Soulproceeds providentially, and is, hence, not affected by the procession assubject to pathos or Unlimitedness.The last five portions relate to the functions of the first two. When the

Soul does proceed, it proceeds with respect to ) immediate secondarythings; ) the less immediate solid bodies. This idea governs the nextseries of portions. The third portion is moira, which endows comple-tion over individuals, as a kind of revertive power proper to the sec-ond portion. The fourth and fifth portions are more specific kinds ofprocession and return with respect to the providential care of the most

syrianus, in tim. fr.

proximate secondary things. Soul proceeds to proximate things accord-ing to the productive power of the fourth portion and returns in virtueof the fifth portion. With regard to the less immediate solid bodies, soulproceeds according to its eightness (3) and returns with respect to itstwenty-sevenness (3). Procession thus takes place through even num-bers, epistrophe through odd, both of which are cubed.Lines .ff. describe the demiurgic function of Soul. Syrianus gives

the Soul three processions and returns respective to its own self, prox-imate, and three-dimensional objects. As the Soul proceeds from themonad, it creates its own receptacle and the world. Producing it, it givesit dimensionality and bulk. By turning back, Soul makes theworld spher-ical. Having produced this as such, it generates a cosmos.Syrianus’ interpretation borrows from Theodore and Iamblichus.

From Theodore, Syrianus derives the concept of dividing functions ofSoul into categories. Much is borrowed from Iamblichus: the nature ofthe Soul’s procession, as well as the concept of the triadic motion of thesoul, an activity divided into particular motions, each of which corre-spond to one of Plato’s seven portions.6 Syrianus’ two-fold division, how-ever, occurs not in formulating two triads, as does Iamblichus, but individing the function of the Soul into two. The major innovation hereseems to be the holistic and individual concern of the soul—Syrianusmakes two activities out of one entity, which makes this structure seemprimed for a division of Soul into a lower and higher order.

6 See Syrianus, In Tim.fr. Wear for a discussion of the Soul’s essence as middle.Iamblichus discusses the triadic motion of soul in Ps. Simpl. In De Anima p. , wherethe Soul processes from itself and returns to itself, while abiding in itself. Steel argues thatin so far as Iamblichus’ Soul proceeds out of itself, it resembles the divisible world, butin so far as it remains, it is similar to the purely indivisible Being. See Steel () fora discussion of how the Iamblichean Soul remains in itself and simultaneously proceedsfrom itself as awhole, especiallywith reference to Proclus, In Tim. II, .– andDodds() xix–xxii and –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 15

Proclus, In Tim. II. .–.

Κα- τ7ν μHν OUω, τ7ν δH �ντ7ς �π�ιε9τ� τ.ν κCκλων. Τ"ν μHν �Pν OUω(�ρ+ν �πε(0μισεν ε`ναι τRς ταDτ�5 (Cσεως, τ"ν δH �ντ7ς τRς *ατ)ρ�υ[Tim. C].

'Αλλ’ <π�ρ�5σι πρ7ς τα5τ$ τινες, �πως τRς ψυARς Eμ�ι�μερ�5ς �Zσηςl μHν ταDτ�5 τ.ν κCκλων, l δH *ατ)ρ�υ, κα- l μHν �ντ ς, l δH �κτ7ς<π�π)(ανταιG τα5τα γ+ρ <νατρ)πειν τ"ν Eμ�ι�μ)ρειαν.

E μHν �Pν Π�ρ(Cρι�ς �π- τ+ α�σ*ητ+ (ερ μεν�ς κα- �π- τ+ς μ�Uειςτ+ς �νCλ�υς τ7 μελ�κρατ�ν κα- τ7 ��ν μελι 3νω κα- κ$τω *ρυλε9 π^νμHν Eμ�ι�μερHς =ν, 3λλ�ις δH 3λλ� π$*�ς �μπ�ι�5νG τ�Vς μHν γ+ρ 8��ν?δεια μ^λλ�ν, τ�Vς δH 8 γλυκCτης διατ�*ησιν.

E δH 8μ)τερ�ς πατ"ρ _U��υ πρ)π�υσαν τ�9ς <Cλ�ις κα- <σωμ$τ�ιςτ"ν μ9Uιν τ.ν γεν.ν *εωρε9ν. j δ) �στιν �D κατ+ σCγAυσιν τ.ν ε�δ.ν�DδH κατ+ σCμ(*αρσιν τ.ν δυν$μεων, <λλ’ �κε�νων σ1ω��μ)νων κα*’4νωσ�ν τε κα- τ"ν δι’ <λλ0λων A?ρησιν.

And the outer motionHe ordained to be theMotion of the Same, and theinner motion the Motion of the Other.

But some at this point raise the difficulty how, if soul is the same uniformsubstance, one of the circles has been declared a circle of the same, theother circle that of the other, the one being interior, the other exterior;for these distinctions tend to undermine its uniformity.Porphyry, being distracted in the direction of the sensible realities and

material mixtures, rambles at length about mixtures of milk and honeyand of wine and honey, which, although on the one hand they are arehomoeomeric as a whole, on the other hand, the different kinds produceeach a different effect; some are more affected by the flavour of wine,others by the sweetness of the honey.Our Father, however, preferred to consider the mixture of kinds in a

way proper to immaterial and incorporeal entities. This (mixture) doesnot include a co-mingling of kinds nor a mutual destruction of theirpowers, but comes about with the preservation of their identity alongwith their mutual co-penetration.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

The two circles of the soul here refer to the construction of soul by theDemiurge out of the rings of Sameness and Otherness: the outer ringcontains the nature of the Same, while the inner contains the nature of theOther. These two are joined together forming a cross shape and revolvein opposite directions from one another. What is of interest to Porphyryand Syrianus is how there can be two circles of soul in light of the factthat it is a uniform substance.The survey in this aporia affords the rare situation, where Syrianus

responds to an attempt at a solution from Porphyry without mention ofIamblichus’ opinion. It is highly improbable that Iamblichus had nothingto say on the topic; rather, Syrianus most likely adopted the Iamblicheanposition on this particular aporia. Iamblichus discusses the two soul-circles ofTimaeus C (II. .), althoughnothing is recorded there onhis view regardingmixture and the two souls.1 In In Tim. .ff. Proclussays that Iamblichus argues against Theodore, who says that the soul ischained to the circle of the Same and shaken from the circle of the Other(.–). Iamblichus takes these two circles as describing types ofNous.That is why he is excluded from this discussion presently.Porphyry is criticised byProclus for adducing examples from the phys-

ical world because the mixture of the physical involves diminution ofphysical powers in so far as both the wine and the honey have lesspotency when mixed (.–). At the intelligible level, componentsof a complex entity maintain their unity and inter-pentetration of pow-ers, whereas honey and wine are thoroughly affected by each other andchanged when mixed. Matter is an inappropriate example as it is notcapable of preserving individual qualities. Syrianus argues that imma-

1 Proclus, In Tim. II, .. Iamblichus, In Tim. Dillon fr. , trans. Dillon ():

“These two circles the divine Iamblichus referred respectively to theMind separated fromsouls and the unseparatedMind, as he does the ‘motion carried round in the same place’which encompasses them round about, inasmuch as the former contains the two souls,while the latter is in them, and the former is unmixed with the other life and the powersof the Soul, while the latter is mixed with them and organises them, for which reason theWhole Soul acts in a state of rest and is united to the Demiurge himself.” The motions ofthe Same andOther are here analogous to ν�5ς Aωριστ ς and ν�5ς Aωριστ ς. Iamblichusmakes nous inherent in souls and their motions types of souls. Iamblichus’ interpretationdraws in levels of metaphysics in so far as the Unparticipated Intellect embraces the twosouls, but remains distinct from them, while the immanent intellect acts within the souland orders their lives and powers. Distinction and Mixture are addressed, but only withregard to Intellect and Souls.

commentary

terial things can be mixed with the peculiarity that each blending of themixture remain unconfused. While a mutual blending of powers mayoccur, each power is preserved.The argument about the mixture of the two circles of souls resurfaces

in the discussion about the descent of the soul. Iamblichus makes thepoint that the soul does not remain above because the two circles of thesoul are engaged in different activities which distorts the soul and movesit below.2 Damascius argues that when the soul descends, both parts ofthe soul descend (the circle of the other, which is thrown into confusionat descent, and the circle of the same, which is in a state of intellectualactivity). Thus, the entire soul is bound up as one despite being engagedin different activities.3

2 Steel makes this point with reference to Proclus, In Tim. .– in () .3 Damascius, In Parm. II, .–. See Steel () .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 16

Proclus, In Tim. II. .–.

Τ"ν δH �ντ7ς σA�σας 6UαASR 6πτ+ κCκλ�υς <ν�σ�υς κατ+ τ"ν τ�5 διπλα-σ��υ κα- τριπλασ��υ δι$στασιν 6κ$στην �Dσ.ν 6κατ)ρων τρι.ν κατ+τ<ναντ�α μHν <λλ0λ�ις πρ�σ)ταUεν �)ναι τ�Vς κCκλ�υς, τ$Aει δH τρε9ςμHν Eμ��ως, τ�Vς δH τ)τταρας <λλ0λ�ις τε κα- τ�9ς τρισ-ν <ν�μ��ως, �νλ γ1ω δH (ερ�μ)ν�υς [Tim. D].

ε� δH δε9 κα- σCμπασαν τ"ν τRς ψυARς σCστασιν ε�ς τ+ς *ε�ας <ναπ)μ-πειν τ$Uεις—-ε�κ νας γ+ρ OAει πασ.ν–ληπτ)�ν τ"ν <ρA"ν <π’ αDτ.ντ.ν πρ?των περ- αDτRς λ γων, �ν �Fς Oλεγε [bc] δεδημι�υργRσ*αιτ"ν ψυA"ν �DA [ς 8με9ς (αμεν, νεωτ)ραν τ�5 σ?ματ�ς, <λλ+ γεν)σεικα- <ρετSR πρ�τ)ραν κα- πρεσ�υτ)ραν, [ς δεσπ τιν κα- 3ρU�υσανG�κε9*εν γ+ρ [ρμ0*η λ)γειν περ- αDτRς E Τ�μαι�ς, τ+ πρεσ�ε9α δ�VςαDτSR πρ7ς τ"ν γ)νεσιν τRς σωματικRς �λης συστ$σεως.

λεκτ)�ν δ" �Pν <ν$γεσ*αι τ"ν πρ �δ�ν αDτRς [ς μHν 3ρA�υσαν κα-δεσπ τιν ε�ς τ"ν π$ντων <ρA0ν, [ς δH τριπλεκR κα- gμαa 8νωμ)νην�π στασιν λαA�5σαν ε�ς τ"ν <κρ τητα τ.ν ν�ητ.ν <ναπ)μψ�μεν, κα-[ς �U �Dσ�ας κα- ταDτ�5 κα- *ατ)ρ�υ γεν�μ)νην ε�ς π^ν τ7 ν�ητ7ν=ντως πλ$τ�ς, �e τ7 μHν 3κρ�ν 8 �Dσ�α κατ)Aει κα- τ7 =ν, τ7 δH μ)σ�νE α�Mν τRς �ν ταDτ1. διαμ�νRς π^σιν αhτι�ς |ν, τ7 δH π)ρας τ7 ν�ητ7ν�1.�ν 6τερ�ι.σαν 6αυτ7 τα9ς ε�ς τ+ ν�ητ+ �1.α πρ� δ�ις, �πε- κα- τ7�λ�ν �κε9 τ7 �U <ν�μ��ων μερ.ν, [ς E Παρμεν�δης [Α ss] διδ$σκειGτ�ι�5τ�ν δH κα- τ7 τριπλεκHς �λ�ν τ�5τ� στ�ιAε�ων <ν�μ��ων (Cραμαγεγ�ν ς.

[ς δH <ρι*μ7ν αDτ γ�ν�ν κα- ν�ητ7ν ε�ς τ"ν <κρ τητα τ.ν ν�ητ.νκα- ν�ερ.ν διακ σμωνG �κε9 γ+ρ E πρ.τ�ς <ρι*μ7ς μετ+ τRς 6τερ -τητ�ς, �πε- κα- πρ?την �κε�νην τ"ν τ$Uιν, [ς �Q *ε�λ γ�ι (ασ�, τε*ε-$με*α σειρ.ν �Pσαν α�τ�αν κατ’ <ρι*μ7νb διSηρημ)νων. �κε9 δH κα- E

a 7μα om Q b 'ρι!μ�ν P

Whereas He split the inner Revolution in six places into seven unequalcircles, according to each of the intervals of the double and triple inter-vals, three double and three triple.These two circles thenHe appointed togo in contrary directions; and of the seven circles into which He split theinner circle, He appointed three to revolve at an equal speed, the otherfour to go at speeds equal neither with each other nor with the speedof the aforesaid three, yet moving at speeds the ratios of which one toanother are those of natural integers.

But if we are to relate the entire structure of the soul to the divine orders—for the [soul] preserves images of everything—we should take our startfrom the first statement concerning the soul, in which he said [bc]that “the soul is created, not as we say, younger than the body, but prior toand older than the body in generation and excellence as befits a ruler andmaster,” for it is from this that Timaeus takes his start in talking about thesoul, having given to it the dominant role for the generation of the entirecorporeal structure (sc. of the world).Wemust say, then, that the processionof the soul as “ruler andmaster”

is to be linked back to the first principle of all things, but as being allotteda three-fold and at the same time unified existence, we refer it back to thesummit of the intelligible realm; and as being composed from Essenceand the Same and Other, in effect, to the whole noetic level of Being,of which Essence and existence occupies the summit, while Eternityoccupies the middle as being the cause of remaining in the same stateof all things, but Intelligible Living Being occupies the (lower) limit, asdifferentiating itself by its processions into intelligible living beings, sincethewhole there is [generated] fromdifferent parts, as Parmenides teaches[Parm. A ff]. Such is this three-fold whole, coming into being as amixture of dissimilar elements.But as a self-produced and intelligible number, we shall refer it to the

summit of intelligible-intellective orders. For there is situated the firstnumber that accompanies Otherness, since, as the theologians say, it isthat class first that we can see as cause of series that are divided according

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Παρμεν�δης τ7ν �λ�ν �π)στησεν <ρι*μ7ν κα- �κε9*εν π$ντα τ+ =νταa

�U)(ηνεν.[ς δH �κ τ.ν τρι.ν μεσ�τ0των συγκειμ)νην κα- �λ�ν �Pσαν �κ

μερ.ν Eμ��ων—π$ντα γ+ρ �κ τ.ν τρι.ν �στι στ�ιAε�ων—ε�ς τ"ν Eλ -τητα τ"ν ν�ερ+ν τ"ν συνεκτικ"ν τ.ν τε �λων κα- τ.ν μερ.νG αQ γ+ρτρε9ς μεσ τητες <π’ �κε�νων �(0κ�υσι τ.ν συνεκτικ.ν *ε.ν, j μHν<π7 τ�5 πρ?τ�υ τ�5 περι)A�ντ�ς τ�Vς λ�ιπ�Vς κα- κα*’ 4να λ γ�νπ$ντα συν$γ�ντ�ς ε�ς 4να κ σμ�ν κα- μ�αν 4νωσιν, j δH <π7 τ�5δευτ)ρ�υ τ�5 τ�9ς μHν 3λλην, τ�9ς δH 3λλην �νδιδ ντ�ς σCνδεσιν,bμε���σι μHν με���να, �λ$σσ�σι δH �λ$σσ�να, j δH <π7 τ�5 τρ�τ�υτ�5 τ�9ς τρ�τ�ις �λλ$μπ�ντ�ς <(’ 6αυτ�5 κ�ινων�αν, παρ’ �Fς τ+ μHν�λ$ττ�να κατ+ τ7ν =γκ�ν aνωται μ^λλ�ν, τ+ δH με���να �λασσ νωςGτ�5τ� δ" τ7 τRς <ρι*μητικRς μεσ τητ�ς �Uα�ρετ�ν.

[ς δH �δ)αν OA�υσαν τ�ι$νδε κα- διασAημ$τισιν κα- εD*ε�Tα πρ� δ1ωκα- �πιστρ�(SR κυκλικSR Aρωμ)νην, κα*’ jν πρ�ε�π�μεν [p. s]α�τ�αν,ε�ς τ"ν τ�5 ν�ερ�5 σA0ματ�ς τρι$δαG τ7 γ+ρ εD*V πρ.τ�ν �κε9 κα- τ7περι(ερ)ς, δι7 κα- �ν τSR �δ)Tα τRς ψυARς γραμμα� τε παρελαμ�$ν�ντ�κα- κCκλ�ι μετ’ <λλ0λων τε κα- Aωρ�ς.

[ς δH δυν$μεις �π�δεUαμ)νην μ�ναδικ$ς τε κα- 6�δ�μαδικ+ς ε�ςτ"ν 6�δ�μ$δα τ"ν ν�ερ$ν, [ς δH μ)σην τ.ν τε α�σ*ητ.ν κα- ν�η-τ.ν κα- [ς <(�μ�ι�5σαν τ+ α�σ*ητ+ τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς ε�ς τ"ν 8γεμ�νικ"νσειρ$νG α]τη γ$ρ �στιν <(�μ�ιωτικ" τ.ν δευτ)ρων πρ7ς τ+ς 6νια�ας<κρ τητας.

[ς δH �νεργ�5σαν �νεργε�ας διττ$ς, τ+ς μHν πρ�στ$τιδας τ.ν α�-σ*ητ.ν, τ+ς δH τ.ν ν�ητ.ν <ντεA�μ)νας, πρ7ς τ�Vς <π�λCτ�υς, �\κα- gπτ�νται κα- �DA gπτ�νται τ�5 παντ ς. τα5τα μHν �Pν δι+ �ρα-A)ων ε�ρημ)να τ�Vς παρηκ�λ�υ*ηκ τας �π�μν0σει τ�9ς τ�5 κα*ηγε-μ ν�ς 8μ.ν συγγρ$μμασιν, �ν �Fς περ- τ�Cτων �κ(α�νει τ+ <π ρρητατ�5 Πλ$των�ς =ντως ν�0ματα.

a τ� 8ντα om Q b σ*νδεσιν P: σ*στασιν Q

text and translation

to number. For it is there that Parmenides established number as a wholeand it is for that source that he revealed all beings.1But again, as being composed of threemeans and constituting a whole

of similar parts—for all things come from these three elements2—we willrefer it to the entire intellective realm, embracing both wholes and parts.For the three means arise from the connective gods, the one derivingfrom the first which embraces the remaining ones and, while accordingto a single ratio, gathers all things into one ordered whole and a singleunity, while a second derives from the second, which grants to differentthings different degrees of cohesion, greater to the greater, less to the less,and the third derives from the third god, which beams cohesiveness fromitself upon the third level of being, amongwhich those lesserwith respectto their mass are more unified, but those with a greater mass are lessunified. Indeed, this is the particular trait of the arithmetic mean.But inasmuch as possessing such a form and shape as this and making

use of procession in a straight line and cyclical return, for the reason wehave stated earlier, we will refer it to the triad of the intellective order.For both the straight line, first of all, and circle, appear on that level,on account of which, also in the form of the soul, lines and circles areincluded both with each other and separately.But inasmuch as it receives bothmonadic and hebdomadic powers, we

will refer it to the intellective hebdomad, but as being median betweenthe sensible and intelligible realm and assimilating the sensible to thenoetic, we will refer it to the series of leader gods [.]. For this iswhat assimilates secondary entities to their unitary summits.But again, as acting according to a double activity, the one presiding

over the sensible, the other laying hold of the intelligible, we will referit to the absolute gods,3 who both fasten and are not connected withthe universe. Therefore, these brief remarks will serve as a reminder tothose who have studied the writings of our Master, in which he has trulyrevealed on these subjects the secret thoughts of Plato.

1 Sc. in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, esp. D ff.2 Being, Same and Other.3 The reference is to Proclus, In Tim. II. . here.This is Proclus speaking, but that

passage, too, is possibly inspired by Syrianus.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This passage, on the Demiurge’s division of the circle of the Same intoseven circles, is a fine panorama of Syrianic metaphysics. Elements of thesoul are here linked to various levels of the noetic cosmos, emphasizingthe relationship between the noetic and noeric cosmos, similar to thatwhich is found in the Iamblichean and Procline universes.The first explanations given to the lemma (.–.) are the

astronomical accounts typical of the Middle Platonists who take a mate-rial account of the passage. Five accounts are listed, all confining them-selves to purely astronomical considerations.4 The fifth account is mostrelevant to the passage at hand: this literal opinion states that Plato hassaid that the Demiurge has made the circles go in opposite directionsso that the circle of the one (diurnal revolution) is opposed to the sevenplanetary circles. This explanation Proclus declares to be more akin tothat of the truth, since it dispenses with the theory of epicycles and eccen-tric movements, which are alien to the doctrine of Plato (.). Pro-clus goes on to argue in .ff. that astronomical interpretations alsoinclude the factor of speed.Three circles are said to be of the same speed,including planets such as the Sun, Mercury, and Venus; while four are ofunequal speed: Moon, Saturn, Mars, and Jupiter (Rep. X AB).After dealing with the astronomical data on the cosmic level, Pro-

clus next applies the circles of Timaeus D to the soul (.–.).The initial description relates the two circles to an astronomical expla-nation. Proclus here calls the circle of the Same that of the fixed sphere,which imitates the uniform and intellective power of the soul. The circleof the Other is that of the planets and is a multiform power.These circlesare explained further in .–., whereby the circles and the soulare divided into another category—rather than Same and Other, Proclus

4 . Some say that themoon and sunmove on their epicycles inmotions opposite thatof the revolution of the fixed spheres (.);

. While the other planets perform a regular and uniform revolution, and an irregularrevolution (.);

. Or, alternatively, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars make their initial appearances, after theirunion with the sun in the morning, because the sun travels faster than they do along theelliptic (the sense of τ+ 8γ�Vμενα here) (.);

. Or alternatively, planets experience pauses, progressions and return, and they makethese motions in opposition to one another; some in a northerly direction, others, in asoutherly (.).

commentary

introduces the division ofmonad and hebdomad.Monad and hebdomadrepresent an important division that relates both to the soul (with partic-ular reference to the circles of the soul in Tim. D) and the intellect.In Platonic Theology V, the hebdomad is the structure particular to thedivine Intellect: the noeric realm is hence comprised of a seventh entity,the “membrane”, followed by two monadic triads.5 In Platonic TheologyV. .ff., Proclus further relates that Plato divided the Soul into one cir-cle and seven circles—a monad and hebdomad. The hebdomadic struc-ture of the planets and soul are two images that are related to the noericrealm in PlatonicTheology V,, where Proclus shows how the intellectivedivinities are the causes of the soul as the Demiurge engenders the circlesof the soul in a hebdomadic structure. Proclus stresses the relationshipbetween the circles of the monad and hebdomad by explaining that themonad is the whole soul which precedes the hebdomad (In Tim. .–).Moreover, the circles of the same andother are also divided asmonadand hebdomad, with the circle of the same asmonad, in opposition to thehebdomad, as the circle of other (.–.).This structure ofmonadand dyad, with dyad being further divided into a monad and a dyad, is abit confusing, but certainly in accord with Syrianus’ concept of the pri-mordial monad and dyad. This is rather the point of In Tim. .ff.,where the soul is intellective as it receives the monadic and hebdomadicpowers.The circles of Same and Other relate to the soul because the soul

contains the causes of similarity and dissimilarity between the circles(.).Themonad and hebdomad are the circles of the Same and Otherwhich the Soul of the universe embraces as all the parts of universe(.). The hebdomad is a division of four odds (, , , ) and threeevens (, , ).6

5 For a discussion of Proclus’ numeric structuring of the universe, see Damascius, InParm. R. II, p. , –., whereby Damascius relates the following:

noetic gods: divided into levels of monad, dyad, triad, depending on the power of theparticular god

noetic-noeric gods: divided into tetrad, pentad, hexadnoeric: divided into hebdomad

For a discussion of Damascius’ critique of the Procline intellective hebdomad, see SaffreyandWesterink () xviii.

6 These numbers have the following Pythagorean analogies: = truth; = beauty; =proportion; = stability; =movement; = sameness; = otherness. See In Tim. .and Saffrey andWesterink () , note .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

In Syrianus’ discussion on Tim. D, he first shows that soul is priorto body in generation (.–) and then spends the remainder of thefragment relating soul to levels of the noetic world. In .ff., soul isrelated to three levels:

. The One. The summit of Noetic Being (<κρ τητα τ.ν ν�ητ.ν), as unifiedand triple (τριπλεκ0ς), self-produced and intelligible number

. The whole level of the noetic being (π^ν τ7 ν�ητ7ν =ντως πλ$-τ�ς)—composed of essence (�Dσ�α) and same and other. This levelrelates to the three levels of the noetic world:a. essence and existence (8 �Dσ�α κα- τ7 =ν): summit, cause ofreturn

b. eternity (E α�?ν): middle, cause of remainingc. Intelligible Living Being (τ7 ν�ητ ν �1.�ν): lower limit, causeof procession.

Here, Syrianus sets forth that soul, in the noeric world, has analoguesin the noetic level, which is further broken into triads of being, life,and mind. Soul, as noeric, relates to the One, insofar as it is unified,and to the noetic world, the first triad for which is listed by Syrianusas 4ν =ν, α�?ν and ν�ητ7ν �1.�ν. Soul participates in each level of ν�5ςμε*)κτ�ς and through it is joined to the divine intellect.7 The two arelinked in particular, in so far as the lowest level of the noetic realm,according to Platonist metaphysics, is soul’s own highest element. Eachof these levels, moreover, engages in the Platonic activity of remaining,procession, and return.The third element, τ7 ν�ητ ν �1.�ν, forms in theParadigm (the highest element of the noetic realm) and then projectsitself in the physical world. Hence, Syrianus cites Parmenides A asproof text of this activity, where the whole is said to be formed from likeandunlike parts (τ7 �λ�ν �κε9 τ7 �U <ν�μ��ων μερ.ν).The soul is furtherrelated to the triad of the intellect in so far as it progresses in a straightline and returns in a circular motion.8

7 See Iamblichus on soul’s participation of Intellect in his exegesis of Tim. CD,Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. and Dillon.

8 The monad and hebdomad are numbers of circular movement and circular move-ment is particular to the intellect, see In Tim. II, .– and Saffrey andWesterink ()xiv. Damascius, In Parm. p. .–. (W-C): Procession proceeds from a monadtowards a triad. At the point of reversion, the monad becomes a hebdomad. Intellectleaves from the intelligible realm and then reverts towards it.

commentary

Lines .ff. offer a survey of Syrianus’ metaphysics by way ofhis interpretation of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides.9 For thesecond hypothesis of the Parmenides he gives four different conclusionsbased on the single syllogism, “if the One is”. Each conclusion defines adegree of being according to a class of gods (henads) which participatein Being.10 Each class, moreover, is governed by a particular property:such as Whole, Multiplicity, Limitlessness, Limit.11 In this way, Syrianusdemonstrates the uniqueness of each divine class, but also underscorestheir unity, in so far as they all relate to the premise, “the One is”.Lines .–, for instance, concern soul as an intelligible and self-

produced number, a notion which re-appears in proposition of theElements of Theology.12 Here, Syrianus alludes to Parmenides C – E , which he interprets as a discussion of the summit, or first triad,of the noetic-noeric realm, to which he attaches the property of totality.Soul is related to the summit of the noetic-noeric realm in so far asit contains an intelligible aspect which allows it to be conjoined to theintelligible realm, just as the noetic-noeric realm unites to the intelligiblerealm through its summit. The first triad of the noetic-noeric realm isalso charaterised by essence and Eternity,13 also found in the remainingaspect of soul which allows it to move, on the one hand, to the higherrealm (before descending again to the lower). The summit of the soul,thus, is particularly related to the first triad, in so far as its eternal aspectparticipates in the intelligible world.14In .–., referencing Parm. E – C , Syrianus applies

a schemeof wholes and parts to the degree of being.This degree of being,moreover, is the mark of the second triad of the noetic-noeric realm, arealm inhabited by the connective gods (συνεκτικ�- *ε ι).15 The secondtriad contains the συνεκτικ7ι *ε ι which connect the intelligible realmwith the intellectual realm. Soul relates to this realm in so far as it is anefficient cause for connection. While body is not able to make such aconnection between disparate realms, souls, being incorporeal and self-moving, can unite the prior intelligible to the posterior intellectual realm.

9 See Saffrey andWesterink () xlix.10 See Proclus, In Parm. VI, col. .–..11 Proclus, In Parm. VI, col. .–..12 π^σα ψυA" αDτ �ως �στ�ν.13 See PT IV, on the first noetic-noeric triad.14 See PT IV, .15 See PT IV, , on the second noetic-noeric triad.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

.– refers to the third triad of the noetic-noeric realm, a realmdefined by shape (such as the straight line of procession or circle ofcyclical return, .–), as presented in Parm. A–B. Again, soulis related to this realm insofar as itmoves, both in a straight line (themarkof procession) and a circle (the motion of reversion)..– mentions only briefly the the first triad of intellective gods,

the second triad of intellective gods, and the “membrane”, which com-prises the noeric world. This passage concerns Parm. B– B .This is a summary of realms following the noetic-noeric triad..– seems to relate the soul and the hegemonic gods, seen

by Syrianus as the subject of Parm. C – D , which concernslikeness and unlikeness..– relates to the <π λυτ�ι gods. This section is of particular

interest because Proclus refers to his Master’s συγγρ$μματα, which, tojudge from the phraseology, is most likely not a commentary on theTimaeus, but could perhaps refer to his Symphonia (see introduction,p. )This whole passage, therefore, constitutes further useful evidence forSyrianus’ system of identification for the various segments of the SecondHypothesis of the Parmenides.16

16 See Dillon () –.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 171

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

/Η μHν �Pν τ�5 �1?�υ (Cσις �τCγAανεν �Pσα α�?νι�ς, κα- τ�5τ� μHν τ1.γενητ1. παντελ.ς πρ�σ$πτειν �Dκ mν δυνατ ν. ε�κM δH �πιν�ε9 κινητ ντινα α�.ν�ς π�ιRσαι, κα- διακ�σμ.ν gμα �Dραν7ν π�ιε9 μ)ν�ντ�ςα�.ν�ς �ν 6ν- κατ’<ρι*μ7ν ��5σαν α�?νι�ν ε�κ να τ�5τ�ν lν δ" Aρ ν�νbν�μ$καμεν [Tim. D].

ε� δH E α�Mν δυ$δα �μ(α�νει, κdν π�λλ$κις αDτ7 κρCπτειν σπ�υδ$-�ω�μεν τ7 γ+ρ <ε- τ1. =ντι συν$πτεται κατ+ ταDτ7ν κα- Oστιν α�Mν E<ε- |ν, O�ικεν OAειν τ"ν μ�ν$δα τ�5 =ντ�ς πρ7 αDτ�5 κα- τ7 yν xν κα-μ)νειν �ν τ�Cτ1ω τ1. 6ν�, [ς 1|ετ� περ- τ�Cτ�υ τ�5 6ν7ς κα- E 8μ)τερ�ςκα*ηγεμ?ν, Wνα κα- αDτ7ς yν Sm πρ7 τRς δυ$δ�ς, gτε τ�5 6ν7ς μ" <(ι-στ$μεν�ς, κα- 8 μHν �ν αDτ1. πρ�εμ(α�ν�υσα τ7 πλR*�ς δυ+ς 6ν��ηταιτ1. 6ν- =ντι, �ν 1Y μ)νει E α�?ν, τ7 δH πλR*�ς τ.ν ν�ητ.ν αDτ1. τ1. α�.νιπερι)A�ντι αDτ.ν κα- συν)A�ντι π$σας �USηρημ)νως κα- 6νια�ως τ+ς<κρ τηταςG �τι γ+ρ 8 τ�5 =ντ�ς 6ν7ς κα- 8 τ�5 α�.ν�ς Oνν�ια δια()-ρ�υσι, δRλ�νG τ7 γ+ρ <ε- ε`ναι κα- τ7 >πλ.ς ε`ναι π$ντως 4τερ�νG εh τιγ�5ν <ε� �στι, τ�5τ� κα- OστινG �Dκ <ν$παλιν δH εh τι Oστι, τ�5τ� κα-<ε� �στινG Eλικ?τερ�ν 3ρα κα- γενικ?τερ�ν τ�5 <ε- ε`ναι τ7 ε`ναι κα-δι+ τα5τα �γγυτ)ρω τ�5 π$ντων α�τ��υ κα- τ.ν =ντων κα- τ.ν 6ν$δωντ.ν �ν τ�9ς �Pσι κα- αDτRς τRς γεν)σεως κα- τRς ]λης. τρ�α �Pν τα5τ$�στιν 6URςG τ7 yν xν [ς μ�ν+ς τ.ν =ντων, E α�Mν [ς δυ+ς μετ+ τ�5 ε`ναιτ7 <ε- OA�υσα, τ7 α�?νι�ν μετ)A�ν κα- τ�5 ε`ναι κα- τ�5 <ε- κα- �D τ7πρ?τως <ε- xν [ς α�?ν. κα- τ7 μHν yν xν τ�5 ε`ναι μ νως αhτι�ν π^σιτ�9ς Eπωσ�5ν|a εhτε =ντως εhτε �Dκ =ντως, E δH α�Mν τRς �ν τ1. ε`ναιδιαμ�νRς.

a 〈�9σιν〉 sensui sufficit QD ς.1 Festugière () , attributes .– to Syrianus, citing Diehl, app crit and the

Addenda of Diehl () . The phrase “τ1. *ε�λ�γικωτ$τ1ω τ.ν �Uηγητ.ν”, however,seems to refer not to Syrianus, who is generally “our Teacher” or “my Master”, but toIamblichus. The content of the discussion, moreover, seems to concern a secondary Onedistinct from the first principle, which would certainly be an Iamblichean concept. Themain point is that the first view is that Eternity rests in the One, whereas for Syrianus, itrests in the One-Being, summit of the noetic world.

But inasmuch as the nature of the LivingCreaturewas eternal, this qualityit was impossible to attach in its entirety to what is generated; whereforeHe planned tomake amoveable image of Eternity, and, as He set in orderthe Heaven, of that Eternity which abides in unity He made an eternalimage, moving according to number, even that which we have namedTime.

If Eternity reveals a duality, even though we often strive to conceal this(for the “always” is linked co-ordinately with “being” and aiôn is thatwhich “always” is), so if that is the case, it would seem to have themonad of being prior to it and the One-Being, and that it is this “One” inwhich it is remaining, as indeed our teacher thought in reference to thisOne, in order that it itself should be a one prior to the dyad, inasmuchas it does not depart from the One. The duality which manifests itsmultiplicity in it in an anticipatory way is united to the One-Being inwhich Eternity remains, while the multiplicity of intelligibles are unitedto Eternity which holds together all of their summits transcendently andunitarily.That the concepts of the One-Being and Eternity differ, after all,is obvious: the concepts of eternal existence and of simple existence arecertainly different. At any rate, if something exists eternally, this thingalso exists; but conversely, if something exists, it is not the case that italways exists. Existence is a more universal and generic concept thaneternal existence and for this reason it is nearer to the cause of all, both oftrue beings and of henads in the realm of true being, and of generationand of matter. So then there are these three entities in order: the One-Being as the monad of beings: Eternity as a dyad, containing eternityalong with being; and the eternal, which participates in being and theeternal and is not the primal eternal being as is Eternity. And the One-Being is the cause of simple existence to all things which exist in any way,either real or unreal; while Eternity is the cause only of their remainingin existence.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

Here is a discussion of Eternity and its metaphysical place in the Syrianiccosmos. Syrianus proposes the etymological explanation that Eternity isthe duality of “always” and “being” (<ε� + =ν). Prior to aiôn are, moreimmediately, One-Being (the product of peras and apeiria) and, at ahigher rank, One. Aiôn is better understood as one aspect of One-Being:hence, at the level of One-Being there is a triad of to hen on, aei, andto aiônion, the first participant of Eternity (.–). Lines .–and . offer the puzzling description of Eternity as ‘Eternity whichremains in the one.’ For Iamblichus, the “one” in which eternity remainsis theGood (sc. theOne). Syrianus, however, seems to argue that Eternityremains, rather, in One-Being as the summit of the intelligible realm. Inthis way, Syrianus makes use of the Iamblichean development that thelowest element of one cosmic level is the highest of the one following it;still, aiôn is distinct and secondary to One-Being.It is perhaps helpful to compare Syrianus’ system here with that of

Iamblichus, as the two are similar but deviate in slight ways. For Iambli-chus, the One presides over the dyad of Limit and Unlimitedness, fol-lowed by the product of Limit and Unlimitedness, the henômenon or“Unified.” In the Syrianic cosmos, the One-Being is also the product ofthe Limit andUnlimitedness, as the summit of the noetic world. Syrianus’one qualification is that the henads are the contents of the henômenon.Lines .–: Being is a more general and more generic category

than eternal being, in so far as it is nearer to the cause of all things.2Lines .–: τ7 δε πλR*�ς τ.ν αDτ1. τ1. α�.νι περι)A�ντι αDτ.ν

κα- συν)A�ντι π$σας: the dyad in Eternity gives an anticipatory imageof multiplicity. Aion contains the summit of forms—the monads of theforms, which are in beings and act as archetypes of beings—but is notmixed with them. In otherwords, it relates to themwithout them relatingto it, and thus preserves its ownunity while embracing theirmultiplicity.3

2 Proclus, ET, prop. : lines ff.: “For if it is a cause, it is more perfect and morepowerful than its consequent. And if so, it must cause a greater number of effects: forgreater power produces more effects, equal power, equal effects, and less power, fewer.”Translation Dodds ().

3 See Opsomer (b) .That Eternity holds an image of the forms is also evidentin so far as the paradigmatic Model participates in Eternity: in terms of the threeintelligible triads, the One and One-Being exist in the first triad, Eternity in the second,and the αDτ��1.�ν (the paradigmatic Model) in the third.

commentary

Iamblichus, on the other hand, argues that forms are not in the One-Being, but monads of forms are in the One-Being.4 In this system,Iamblichus’ henads are objects of intellect transferred as contents of thehen on—they are still noêtoi, but noêtoi in the intelligible realm.Lines .– and .ff.: Directly preceding and following Syrianus’

discussion, Proclus gives the opinion of the Peripatetic philosopher Stra-to of Lampsacus, who says that the eternal is joined to α�?ν. This is ofinterest mainly because it is unusual that Proclus (or possibly Syrianus)was able to make a reference to Strato, the materialist leader of theAristotelian school in the third century bc.

Henadic realm

Τ7 παντελ?ς 3ρρητ�ν Iamblichus and Syrianus

�Εν

Π)ρας <πειρ�α

Τ _νωμ)ν�ν[6ν$δες]

Syrianus’ explanation

�Εν =ν5 Monad (τ7 >πλ?ς ε`ναι)

Α�?ν6 Dyad of <ε�+ =ν (τ7 <ε- ε`ναι)

Τ7 α�?νι�ν7

B?η =ν�?ην�Cς

Ν�Cς =ν�?ην�Cς

4 Iamblichus, In Philebum, Dillon fr. (Damascius, In Philebum , pp. –West):“Not even in the second realm is there separation properly so called. For the creation ofdistinct forms is a function of Intelligence in the first place, and the first Intelligence is thePure Intelligence; for which reason Iamblichus declares that on this level one may placethe monads of the Forms, meaning by ‘monads’ the undifferentiated element in each.Wherefore it is the object of intellection for the intellective realm, and the cause of Beingfor the Forms, even as the second element is the cause of Life in the intellective realm,and the third the cause of their creation as Forms.” Trans. Dillon ().

5 The One-that-is is the cause of the existence of beings.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Proclus’ doctrine of Eternity places eternity in the second triad of theintelligible realm, suitable to eternity’s dyadic character, as it likewiseis dyadic.8 As with Syrianus, Eternity remains in the “One” of the firstintelligible realm, to hen on, and precedes Intellect—residing in the thirdintelligible triad—in a causal way. Thus, Proclus says that eternity issubstantially Being through participation and Intellect, in a causal way.9

6 Cause of existence as a whole—it unites intelligibles. Eternity unites the intelligiblehenads. Proclus, In Tim. II, , pp. –. In In Tim. II, –, ff., Proclus says, “Whatelse would eternity be but the one embracing principle of the intelligible henads and of thesummit of their multitude (by henads I mean the forms of the intelligible creatures andthe classes of all these intelligible forms); also the one cause of the unchangeable durationof them, not existing on the levels of the many intelligibles, nor assembled therefrom,but present to them transcendently, of itself arranging and as it were shaping them, andeffecting this by their simultaneous totality.” Trans. O’Neil ().

7 Participates Being and everlastingness.8 See O’Neil () –.9 Proclus, ET prop. . See also Proclus, In Tim. II, p. , –; PT III, p. , note

(p. ).

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 18

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

/Ημ)ρας γ+ρ κα- νCκτας κα- μRνας κα- �νιαυτ�Cς, �Dκ =ντας πρ-ν�Dραν7ν γεν)σ*αι, τ τε gμα �κε�ν1ω συνισταμ)ν1ω τ"ν γ)νεσιν αDτ.νμηAαν^ται. τα5τα δH π$ντα μ)ρη Aρ ν�υ, κα- τ τε mν κα- Oσται Aρ ν�υγεγ�ν τα εhδη [Tim. DE].

Oστι τ��νυν, [ς E 8μ)τερ�ς �(ιλ�σ (ει πατ0ρ, �Dκ �π’ <ναιρ)σει τ.ν(αιν�μ)νων/λεγ)τω γ+ρ κα- τα5τα E Τ�μαι�ς, L κα- τ�9ς π�λλ�9ς εhω*ελ)γεσ*α�, <λλ’ �π- τ+ς κυριωτ)ρας �π�στ$σεις κα- τα5τα <ν$γων, cσ-περ ε�?*ει π�ιε9ν, 8μ)ρα μHν κα- νVU μ)τρα τ�5 Aρ ν�υ δημι�υργικ$,π^σαν διεγε�ρ�ντα κα- συνελ�σσ�ντα τ0ν τε �μ(ανR �ω"ν κα- τ"ν <(α-νR �ω0ν τε κα- κ�νησιν κα- διακ σμησιν τRς <πλαν�5ςG τα5τα γ+ρ κα-μ ρι$ �στιν <λη*ιν+ τ�5 Aρ ν�υ κα- π^σι κατ+ ταDτ7ν π$ρεστι, κα-τRς (αιν�μ)νης 8μ)ρας κα- νυκτ7ς τ"ν πρωτ�υργ7ν α�τ�αν πρ�ε�λη(εν3λλης �Zσης �ν τ1. �μ(ανε9 Aρ ν1ω τ�Cτων 6κατ)ρας, ε�ς jν κα- E Τ�-μαι�ς Eρ.ν �π�μιμν0σκει, π.ς gμα τ1. �Dραν1. γ)γ�νε Aρ ν�ς, δι7 κα-πλη*υντικ.ς ε`πεν 8μ)ρας κα- νCκτας, [ς κα- μRνας κα- �νιαυτ�Cς.τα5τα δ" τ+ πρ Aειρα π^σινG αQ γ+ρ <(ανε9ς τ�Cτων α�τ�αι μ�ν�ειδε9ςε�σι πρ7 τ.ν πεπλη*υσμ)νων κα- �π’ 3πειρ�ν <νακυκλ�υμ)νων, κα-<κ�νητ�ι πρ�ϋπ$ρA�υσι τ.ν κιν�υμ)νων κα- ν�ερα- πρ7 τ.ν α�σ*η-τ.ν. 8μ)ρα μHν �Pν κα- νVU 8 πρωτ�στη ν�ε�σ*ω τ�ι$δε τις 6κατ)ρα.μ"ν δH τ7 τ"ν σεληνιακ"ν σ(α9ραν κα- π^σαν τ"ν <π�τελεCτησιν τRς*ατ)ρ�υ περι(�ρ^ς συνελ�σσ�ν, *ε9�ν [ς <λη*.ς Aρ�νικ7ν μ)τρ�ν.

For simultaneously with the construction of theHeavenHe contrived theproduction of days and nights and months and years, which existed notbefore the Heaven came into being. And these are all portions of Time;even as “Was” and “Shall be” are generated forms of Time

Let us then, in accordance with the theories of our Master,1 not forthe purpose of denying the phenomena of the heavens (let us acceptthat Timaeus used this terminology also in the way that the many areaccustomed to do) but referring these terms to higher levels of being,declare as he was accustomed2 to do, that “day” and “night” are creativemeasures of time, stirring up and rolling together both the manifestlife and invisible life, and the movement and ordering of the sphereof the fixed stars.3 For these (sc. night and day) are true parts of timeand are present to all things (in the same way) and contain withinthemselves the primordial cause of the visible day and night, each ofthese being something different at the level of visible time, and it is withreference to this that Timaeus makes mention of how time came intobeing simultaneously with the heavens, for which reason he talked ofdays and nights in the plural, as also he did of months and years; forthese are entities familiar to all. The invisible causes of these, on theother hand, are unitary and prior to their multiple products, involvedas they are in endless cycles, and exist as motionless prior to what isin motion and intellective as prior to the sensible. So “day” and “night”,then, in themost primal sense may be taken to be such as this. As for the“month”, it is that which binds together the sphere of the moon and thewhole completion of the circle of the Other, in truth a divine measure oftime.

1 Proclus uses the imperfect tense, possibly showing that a commentary on thispassage was delivered in the form of a lecture by Syrianus.

2 Use of the imperfect occurs again.3 Usually τ <πλ$νες refers to the sphere of the fixed stars.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

�νιαυτ7ς δH τ7 τ"ν μ)σην �λην δημι�υργ�αν τελει�5ν κα- συν)A�ν,κα*’ jν κα- E aλι�ς Eρ^ται τ7 μ)γιστ�ν OAων κρ$τ�ς κα- π$ντα σVν τ1.Aρ ν1ω μετρ.νG �Zτε γ+ρ 8μ)ρα v νVU 3νευ 8λ��υ �Zτε μ"ν �Zτε π�λλ1.πλ)�ν �νιαυτ7ς �Zτ’ 3λλ� τι τ.ν περικ�σμ�ων μ)τρ�ν �Dδ)ν.

κα- �D λ)γω κατ+ τ"ν �μ(ανR μ ν�ν δημι�υργ�αν/τ�Cτων γ+ρ τ.νμ)τρων κα- E (αιν μεν�ς aλι�ς αhτι�ς’, <λλ+ κα- κατ+ τ"ν <(ανR κα-�πανα�ε�ηκυ9αν E <λη*)στερ�ς aλι�ς συμμετρε9 τ1. Aρ ν1ω τ+ π$ντα,Aρ ν�υ Aρ ν�ς {ν <τεAν.ς κατ+ τ"ν περ- αDτ�5 τ.ν *ε.ν Xμ(0νG�τι γ+ρ κα- Πλ$των �D τ+ (αιν μενα τα5τα μ ν�ν �`δεν, <λλ+ κα-τ+ *ε9α, �Fς τα5τα Eμ?νυμα, δηλ�9 τ+ �ν τ1. δεκ$τ1ω τ.ν Ν μων [Α Β]G δε�Uας γ+ρ μεστ+ π$ντα *ε.ν �π0γαγεν, �τι κα- �Ωρας 3ρακα- ΜRνας *ε9α �ρ�5μεν �]τως, [ς OA�ντα *ε�ας �ω+ς �(εστ?σαςκα- ν ας *ε��υς, �oς κα- τ7 π^ν. ε� δH ν5ν μ^λλ�ν λ)γει περ- τ.ν(αιν�μ)νων, �D *αυμαστ ν, δι τι (υσι�λ�γε9ν πρ κειται ν5ν. τα5ταμHν �Pν Oστω μ ρια Aρ ν�υ, Yν τ+ μHν 1bκε�ωται τ�9ς <πλαν)σι, τ+ δHτ�9ς περ- τ�Vς π λ�υς τ�5 λ�U�5 στρε(�μ)ν�ις, τ+ δH 3λλ�ις *ε�9ςv *ε.ν Eπαδ�îς v �1?�ις *νητ�9ς v <*αν$τ�ις v μερ�σι τ�5 παντ7ς�ψηλ�τ)ραις v Aαμαι�ηλ�τ)ραις.

text and translation

Lastly, the “year” is that which brings to completion and holds togetherthe whole median level of creation in accordance with which the sun isseen as that which possesses the greatest power and measures all thingsalong with time. For, neither day nor night can exist without the sun, noryet the month, nor, even more so, the year, nor any other of the measuresof the cosmic circuits.I do not speak in relation to visible creation only (for of thesemeasures

even the visible sun is a cause) but it is in relation to the invisible andmore ultimate [creation], the more true sun measures all things in time,being the “time of Time” atemporally according to the oracle of the godsconcerning this.That Plato did not knownot only these visible things, butalso the divine, of which these [visible things] are homonyms, is apparentfrom the tenth bookof theLaws (AB). For he advanced the argument,after having shown that everything is full of gods, that we can call bothseasons and months divinities, as being and presiding over divine livesand divine intellect, which is the universe. For if Plato now speaks ofphysical phenomena, there is nothing marvellous in this, since it is nowhis purpose to discuss physics. Let these things, then, be the ‘parts ofTime’, of which some are appropriate to the fixed stars, others to thoserotating around the poles of the ecliptic, and others to other gods, or tothe followers of gods, or to living things mortal or immortal, or to theparts of the universe, whether more elevated or more base.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

The lemma here concerns the question of what is meant by day andnight and seasons and months and whether they are parts of time. AsIamblichus had argued before him,4 time is here seen as a thing, not just ameasure of motion; it is a mode of existence and its divisions are creativeforces.5 Day and Night are the operative parts of time and function asboth archetypes and the creative forces of physical days and nights.Lines .– provide a nice observation on Syrianic exegetical

method. Proclus says that Timaeus generally uses the terms “day” and“night” in the sense in which they are usually taken, i.e., as physical phe-nomena. Syrianus keeps this obvious literal meaning, but adds to it ahigher meaning—this method is typical of Syrianus. Proclus, moreover,contrasts Syrianus with the “majority” (�Q π λλ�ι) who are led astraytowards the commoner, rather than more accurate meaning.In lines .–. Syrianus postulates the form of day and night as

the transcendent paradigms of Day and Night in the soul. He differenti-ates these from physical day and night, which are its products, not partsof time. They are true parts of time, present to all things in the same wayeven if they are participated in partially. In this way, Day andNight are inthe fabric of time. This appears to be a development of Iamblichus’ tran-scendent time as distinct from eternity in the soul.6 The innovation onSyrianus’ part is in making days and nights the contents of transcendentTime.

4 Iamblichus condemns the Aristotelian definition of time as motion. Iamblichus, InTim. fr. Dillon (Simpl., In Phys. I , CAG): “Iamblichus, in the eighth book of hisCommentaries on the Timaeus, contributed the following arguments on the subject:

‘If every motion is in time, many motions arise simultaneously. But the parts of timeare different at different times. Motion takes place in relation to something static, butTime has no need of Rest. To motion there is opposed either (another) Motion or Rest,to general Motion general Motion (or Rest), to particular particular, but to Time there isnothing opposed.’”

5 On the partlessness of Eternity, see Sorabji () –; Plotinus Enn. III...6 Iamblichus, In Tim. frs. – Dillon distinguishes Time from Eternity. In fragment

, Iamblichus places Eternity in the noetic sphere and time as the median betweenEternity and Heaven. Time, thus, comes into being with the heavens and acts as an imageof Eternity. Proclus states the distinction between Time and Eternity in terms of theirparticipants in ET prop. : “Prior to all things eternal there exists Eternity; and prior toall things temporal, Time.” Thus, things with soul participate in Time or true Day andNight, while living things participate in Time.

commentary

“gμα τ1. �Dραν1. γ)γ�νε Aρ ν�ς” (.–) (Tim. D): Syrianusposits that a transcendent Time was formed at the same time as theheaven and is thus a real hypostasis.7This phrase also concerned Iambli-chus, who appears to give it a similar interpretation. Simplicius cites thefollowing as coming from book VII of Iamblichus’ Commentary on theTimaeus:

“Its essence in activity we regard as the same as this setting in order whichgoes forth and is united with its creations and is unseparated from thethings brought to completion by it. For the phrase ‘simultaneously withthe construction of the Heaven he makes…’ signifies this, that the cominginto existence of Time is conjoined with the setting in order which goesforth from the Demiurge…”8

As archetypes of physical day and night, Day andNight are the actual cre-ative forces (δημι�υργικ$) and contain the primordial causes (πρωτ�υρ-γ7ι α�τ�αι) which cause time to divide itself, creating physical day andnight.This point is likewisemade by Iamblichus: “We too agree that thereis an order of Time, not however an orderwhich is ordered, but onewhichorders…”.9That Day and Night are transcendent principles in time is further

stressed by Syrianus discussing them in the singular (.–). As un-seen, singular entities they stand prior to and generate the endless cycleof days and nights. Day and Night as forms (intellectual entities) pre-exist what is in motion. The analogue of Day and Night, furthermore,is Month and Year, both of which function as archetypes when they areused in the singular (.–). Month is the summation of the cycleof the moon and brings to completion the circle of the Same. Year isconnected to the sun, which measures all things together with Time.It brings to completion the median creation (μ)ση δημι�υργ�α). Thismedian creation refers to the heavenly bodies as genera; the highestcreation is the generic forms and the lowest are the physical bodies.The last section, .–., elaborates on this, making seasons and

months divinities, and showing how the sun and fixed starsmeasure timethrough the rotations which are visible and apparent. Proclus discusses

7 Dillon explains Iamblichus’ interpretation of this phrase: “[Iamblichus] lays stresson its creation simulteanously with the heavens… Time proceeds not <π7 τRς ψυARςκιν0σεως v �ωRς but <π7 τη. It is not a subjective phenomenon, but a real hypostasis.”() .

8 Simpl., In Phys. I , CAG; Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon, translation Dillon().

9 Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon, translation Dillon ().

syrianus, in tim. fr.

this visible division of time in III. .–. in light of the second creationof the Demiurge (marked by visibility and multiplicity). He says that thefirst creation formed Time in its essence—itself eternal and a monad—and the second created the time which participates in the first—it isvisible andmultiple.The time of the second creation divides the power ofthe supramundane time and grants cycles to the sun, moon, and stars.10

10 Iamblichus distinguishes between higher and lower time: he posits an unpartici-pated universal, the participated universal which it generates, and the particular which itparticipates. See Proclus, ET prop. –; ; In Tim. II, .–; .ff.; .–.See also Sorabji’s discussion in () .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 19

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

Ε�σ- δH δ" τ)τταρες, μ�α μHν �Dραν�ων *ε.ν γ)ν�ς, 3λλη δH πτην7ν κα-<ερ�π ρ�ν, τρ�τη δH Oνυδρ�ν ε`δ�ς, πε�7ν δH κα- Aερσα9�ν τ)ταρτ�ν[Tim. E–A].

τ�ιαCτης δH τRς τ.ν �Uηγησαμ)νων δια(�ρ^ς �Zσης *αυμ$��μεν μHντ7ν (ιλ�*ε$μ�να τ.ν πραγμ$των, πειρ?με*α δH 4πεσ*αι τ1. 8μετ)ρ1ωκα*ηγεμ νι κα� (αμεν τ7 μHν �Dρ$νι�ν τ.ν *ε.ν γ)ν�ς π$ντων ε`ναιπεριληπτικ7ν τ.ν �Dραν�ων γεν.ν εhτε *ε�ων εhτε <γγελικ.ν εhτε δαι-μ�ν〈�〉ων,a τ7 δH <ερ�π ρ�ν π$ντων τ.ν Eπωσ�5ν �ν <)ρι τεταγμ)νωνεhτε *ε.ν τ.ν τ7ν <)ρα κληρωσαμ)νων εhτε δαιμ νων 6π�μ)νων τ�C-τ�ις εhτε �1?ων *νητ.ν �ν <)ρι διαιτωμ)νων, τ7 δH Oνυδρ�ν π$ντων τ.νδιαλαA ντων τ7 ]δωρ γεν.ν κα- τ.ν �ν ]δατι τρε(�μ)νων, τ7 δH πε�7ντ.ν τ"ν γRν κατανειμαμ)νων κα- �ν γSR συνισταμ)νων τε κα- (υ�μ)νων�1?ωνG

� τε γ+ρ δημι�υργ7ς gπαU >π$ντων �στ-ν αhτι�ς τ.ν �γκ�σμ�ων ε�-δ.ν κα- κ�ιν7ς π$ντων πατ0ρ, τ+ μHν *ε9α γ)νη κα- τ+ δαιμ νια παρ’6αυτ�5 μ ν�υ κα- δι’ 6αυτ�5 γενν.ν, τ+ δH *νητ+ τ�9ς ν)�ις παραδι-δ�Vς *ε�9ς [ D], [ς �κε�νων πρ�σεA.ς αDτ+ γενν^ν δυναμ)νων, κα-τ7 παρ$δειγμα �D τιν.ν μ)ν �στι �1?ων αhτι�ν, τιν.ν δH �Dκ Oστιν, <λλ+π$ντων OAει τ+ς Eλικωτ$τας α�τ�αςG κα- γ+ρ αP κα- ε� τ.ν μHν *ε�ωνγεν.ν αhτι�ν εhη κα- τ.ν δαιμ�ν�ων, τ.ν δH *νητ.ν μηδαμ.ς, �Dκ)τιτ.ν *νητ.ν μ" γεν�μ)νων �Dραν7ς 〈π〉α〈ν〉τελ0ς, [ς τ+ π$ντα γ)νητ.ν �1?ων �Dκ OAωνG Oστι γ+ρ �μ�ι�ς τ1. παραδε�γματι κα- παντελ0ς,τ+ς τ)τταρας �δ)ας τ�5 αDτ��1?�υ μιμησ$μεν�ς.

a δαιμ�νων Q ς : δαιμ�νικ�ν D: em s

And these Forms are four,—one of the heavenly kind of gods; anotherthe winged kind which traverses the air; thirdly, the class which inhabitsthe waters; and fourthly, that which goes on foot on dry land.

Such being the difference among the exegetes, we pay due reverence tothe connoisseur ofmetaphysical reality,1 but wewill venture to follow ourTeacher and say that the heavenly race of gods embraces all the celestialclasses, whether divine or angelic or daemonic, while in that class whichgoes through the air he wants to include all these entities in any wayassigned to the air, whether gods which are allotted to the air—or thedaemons following upon them, or the mortal beings that spend theirtime in the air; the “watery” combines all those classes of being whichhave been assigned the water and are nourished in water,2 and the footedclass comprises those beings which roam upon the earth and which areestablished and grow in the earth.For the Demiurge is the cause alike of all forms of beings within the

cosmos and he is the common father of all things, generating the divineclasses and the daemons from himself alone and through himself, while“the mortal classes he hands over to the young gods” (Tim. D) onthe grounds that they are able to create these things in the immediatesense. And the Paradigm is not the cause of some living things and notothers, but it contains the most general causes of all. For after all, if theParadigm were the cause of the divine classes, and of the daemonic, butnot ofmortals, then ifmortals had not come into being, the heavenwouldnot yet be complete ( D), inasmuch as it would not have all the classesof living things. For it is like its Paradigm and complete in as much as itimitates the four forms present in the Essential Living Being.

1 Φιλ�*ε$μ�να is a slightly sarcastic term from the Republic (ab) which possiblyrefers to Theodore of Asine here.

2 Such as fish.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

Interpreters of the four classes of being in Tim. E–A3 take issuewith Plato’s listing birds and fish before men, while to describe an orderfrom gods to men with no intermediary would be an abrupt move.Later Platonists felt there should be some mention of an intermediaryclass between gods and men and often interpreted the categories ofinhabitants of air and water as referring to the daemonic classes ofbeing. Syrianus’ major innovation here is that he places all the races—gods, daemons and souls—within each of the higher cosmic levels. Thispractice, moreover, is noteworthy as it seems in accord with his customof placing different manifestations of the same god at each level of theuniverse.Prior to the stated opinion of Syrianus, Proclus gives us three accounts

of interpretations of Tim. E (.–.):

. �\ μHν: (.): The first group gives a literal interpretation of themiddle categories, claiming that they are birds and fish.This groupsays that the Platonic text moves “ε�ς *ε�Vς κα- τ+ *νητ+ γ)νη”.

. �\ δH: (.): This second group refers to a more sophisticatedclass of intermediaries: “ε�ς *ε�Vς κα- τ+ κρε�ττ�να 8μ.ν γ)νηπρ7ς τ+ πρ$γματα <π��λ)π�ντες.”This perhaps refers to the Iam-blichean stance, as “τ+ κρε�ττ�να 8μ.ν γ)νη” appears elsewhereattributed to Iamblichus.4 The superior class pre-exists mortals, asthe Demiurge was said to have made this intermediary class beforemortals (.). Iamblichus did not identify the third hypothesisof the Parmenides with Soul, but declared that it concerned thekreittona gene, that is “angels, daemons, and heroes.”

. �W δH(.ff.): The final group combines the first two positionsand creates a hierarchy, whereby gods have subsistence in the heav-ens; daemons in the air; demi-gods in the water; and men and liv-ing things on the earth. This hierarchy is connected to Epinomis

3 Plato’s four forms are as follows: “the heavenly kinds of gods; the winged kind thattraverses the air, the class which inhabits the waters, and that which goes on foot on dryland.” Tim. E, trans. Bury ().

4 Iamblichus, In Parm. fr. Dillon, on references of hypotheses: τ"ν δε τρ�την �DκOτι περ- ψυARς, [ς �Q πρ7 αDτ.ν, <λλ+ περ- τ.ν κρειττ νων 8μ.ν γεν.ν, <γγ)λων,δαιμ νων 8ρ?ων.

commentary

B5 on the four types of being between fire and earth: thismakes the middle three classes intermediate between the heavenlygods and man. Syrianus uses the passage from the Epinomis on thefour types of being, which he superimposes upon the Timaeus, butinterprets it with the understanding that Plato proceeds in orderfrom gods to men. A series of Middle Platonic philosophers like-wise interpreted the Epinomis and Timaeus together, describing theinhabitants of the various orders, each of which contained differentkinds of being.6

Syrianus, following a penchant for combining pre-existing opinions,derives a system of two intermediaries. As with group one, he includesthe literal interpretation so that the ranks include birds and fish, but withthe second group, he reads the text allegorically, so that the ranks includegods, daemons andmortals. Syrianus differs from the third group, whichalso combines the first two methods of interpretation in a similar way, inso far as he includes various genres in each rank. His system is as follows:

. among divine classes, he includes gods, angels, and daemons. in the air, there exist some gods, daemons, and birds. at the watery level, there exist spirits proper to water and fish. on land, however, there are only mortal creatures—animals, plantsand humans.

As with group two (Iamblichus?), Syrianus argues that the Demiurgetakes care of the divine classes, but the young gods fashion the mortals,as they are the more immediate generators of those. This system serves

5 Epinomis ( B): “Well then, for the present let us attempt so much in treating ofthe gods, as to try—after observing the two living creatures visible to us, of which wecall one immortal, and the other, all earthy, a mortal creation—to tell of the three middlethings of the five, which comemost evidently, according to the probable opinion, betweenthose two.” Translation Lamb ().

6 In the first century bc, Philo listed the inhabitants of the air and water, starting withgods and ending withmen.He said that intermediate entities should be higher than thosein earth, lower than gods (de Gigantibus –). The primary argument for him was thatno part of the world should be without a share in soul. See Dillon and Winston ().Alcinous (Didask. ) says, “There are, furthermore, other divinities, the daemons, whomone could also term ‘created gods,’ present in each of the elements, some of them visible,others invisible, in aether, fire, air andwater, so that no part of theworld should bewithouta share in soul or in a living being superior to mortal nature. To their administration thewhole sublunar and supercelestial sphere has been assigned.” Alcinous, The Handbookof Platonism, translation and commentary by Dillon (). See also Apuleius, de DeoSocratis (–) and Calcidius, In Tim. (–) on the four classes of being and Tim. D and Epin. BC.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

as a precursor to Proclus’ cosmos in PlatonicTheology VI, where Proclusborrows Syrianus’ system whereby the same god exists, but in a differentmanifestation, at each cosmological level.With this hierarchy, Syrianus thus criticizes transcendental predeces-

sors because they do not give a thought to humbler entities, such asfish. Iamblichus, for one, argues that birds and fish are proper to earth.The debate between Syrianus and his predecessors can further be tracedto their opinions about the Paradigm. For Syrianus, the only way theuniverse can be παντελ0ς is for it to imitate all the classes of being inthe essential Being—the divine, daemonic, and mortal class of beings(.ff.).In line ., Syrianus first mentions that the Demiurge is the primal

cause of all being, but that the young gods are the immediate creators.Next, he discusses how the Paradigm, which the Demiurge uses in hiscreation, contains the causes of all the classes of being. Syrianus hereconnects the αDτ��1.�ν—identified with the third intelligible triad asthe Paradigmatic Model—with the four primordial species which arecontained in it, based on an exegesis of C – and C – A .7The four classes of being exist in the tetradic αDτ��1.�ν as an archetype,proceeding vertically to each level of the universe.8 The ideas of thelevels of gods and the four classes are connected quite clearly in PlatonicTheology III., where Proclus interprets the four classes as a monadfollowed by a triad, each related to levels of gods: ) celestial gods; ) airwandering class: connected to uniform and generative gods; ) aquatic:gods that are suppliers of motion; ) earth: generative gods.

7 See Proclus, PT III, and In Parm. VII, .–. Cf. Opsomer () .8 Intellect establishes the forms in itself: Syrianus, In Metaph. .–; Intellect

embraces the forms: Proclus, In Parm. .–. See Gersh () . Regardingarchetype of class, see Proclus, PT III, p. , –, ch. and Opsomer () .

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 20

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

Περ- δH τ.ν 3λλων δαιμ νων ε�πε9ν κα- γν.ναι τ"ν γ)νεσιν με9��ν vκα*’ 8μ^ς [Tim. D].

�πανελ* ντες δH ε�ς τ"ν πρ�ρρη*ε9σαν �0τησιν λ)γωμεν περ- τ.νγενεσι�υργ.ν *ε.ν τ�Cτων, �πHρ Yν E λ γ�ς, τ� δ0π�τε δα�μ�νας �ντ�Cτ�ις 3ρα τ�9ς N0μασι πρ�σων μασεν.

E μHν �Pν Θε δωρ�ς 3λλ�ν τρ π�ν τα5τα μεταAειρι� μεν�ς δα�μ�-νας μHν [ς �ν σA)σει, *ε�Vς δH αDτ�Vς [ς <σA)τ�υς καλε9σ*α� (ησιν,[ς �ν τ�9ς �π7 σελ0νην τ$ττων αDτ�Vς μ)ρεσι τ�5 παντ7ς κ σμ�υ 3λ-λ�υς 3λλως ψυA?σαντας τ7 π^ν.

E δH 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμMν πρ.τ�ν _U��υ δα�μ�νας αDτ�Vς <κ�Cειν[ς πρ7ς *ε�Vς τ�Vς �Dραν��υςG �κε�νων γ+ρ �U0ρτηνται κα- μετ’ �κε�-νων πρ�ν��5σι τ.ν ��κε�ων κλ0ρων.κα- Oστιν 8 δι$ταUις α]τη Πλατω-νικ0G κα- γ+ρ �ν Συμπ�σ�1ω [ Ε ΒC] δα�μ�να τ7ν �Ερωτα πρ�-σε�ρηκεν [ς Eπαδ7ν τRς 'Α(ρ�δ�της κα- [ς <π7 τ�5 Π ρ�υ *ε�5 [ς<λη*.ς =ντ�ς πρ�εληλυ* τα, κα�τ�ι γε �ν Φα�δρ1ω [ D] *ε7ν αD-τ7ν ε`ναι τι*)μεν�ς [ς πρ7ς τ"ν <ναγ�μ)νην �π’ αDτ�5 �ω0ν. Oπειτακατ’ 3λλην �πι��λ"ν ε`ναι μHν κα- �ν τ�9ς �Dραν��ις δα�μ�νας κα- �ντ�9ς �π7 σελ0νην *ε�Cς, <λλ’ �κε9 μHν τ7 γ)ν�ς gπαν καλε9σ*αι *ε�Cς,δι7 κα- τ"ν �δ)αν τ.ν �Dραν�ων *ε.ν �κ$λει [ E] γ)ν�ς, κα�τ�ι κα-δαιμ νων κατ’ �κε�νην παραγ�μ)νων, �ντα5*α δH π^ν τ7 πλR*�ς δα�-μ�νας, �κε9 μHν τRς *ε�ας, �ντα5*α δH τRς δαιμ�ν�ας κρατ�Cσης �δι -τητ�ς, ε�ς aν τινες κα- μ νην <π��λ)ψαντες διε9λ�ν τ τε *ε9�ν κα- τ7δαιμ νι�ν κατ$ τε τ7ν �Dραν7ν κα- τ"ν γ)νεσιν, δ)�ν �ν <μ(�9ν μHν3μ(ω τ$ττειν, <λλ’ �κε9 μHν πλε�ν$�ειν τ7 *ε9�ν, �ντα5*α δH τ7 δαι-μ νι�ν, ε`ναι δH κ<ντα5*α τ7 *ε9�νG

ε� γ+ρ �λ�ς E κ σμ�ς *ε7ς εDδα�μων �στ�ν [ Β], �Dδ)ν �στι τ.νσυμπληρ�Cντων αDτ7ν μ�ρ�ων 3*ε�ν κα- <πρ�ν ητ�ν. ε� δH κα- *ε�5π$ντα μετ)Aει κα- πρ�ν��ας, *ε�αν OλαAε (Cσιν. ε� δH τ�5τ�, κα- ��κε9αι

Concerning the other divinities, to discover and declare their origin istoo great a task for us

[Going back to the previous subject of inquiry, let us say about these godsin charge of generation which are the subject of the discussion here, whyon earth he has termed them daimones in this passage.Theodorus takes a different approach to this.They are called daimones,

he says, as being in relation, but gods as being unrelated to what is belowthem, ranking them in the parts of the whole cosmos below the moon,as ensouling the universe in different ways in each case.]On the other hand, our Teacher first of all deemed it fitting to under-

stand them as daimones in distinction from the heavenly gods, for theyare dependent upon them, and it is in conjunction with them that theyexercise providence over their own allotments. This arrangement is Pla-tonic. For, after all, in the Symposium [ E, bc] he calls Eros a dae-mon, as being a follower of Aphrodite and as proceeding from Resourcewho is truly a god, although in the Phaedrus [ D] he postulates thathe is a god, with regard to the life brought forth by him. Then, startingfrom another angle, he says that there are both daemons in the heavenlyrealm and gods in the realm beneath the moon, but in the former realmthe whole class of them is called “gods”, wherefore also he called the for-mal grouping of the heavenly gods a “class” ( E) although daemonsare there also envisaged under that heading, but in the latter realm thewhole group is called daimones, since there it is the divine characteristicwhich prevails, whereas here it is the daemonic, an exclusive concentra-tion on which has led certain critics to divide the divine and the dae-monic along the lines of the heavenly and the generated realms, whereasin fact one should rank both in both areas and say that the divine pre-vails there, the daemonic here, but the divine is present in this realmalso.For if the whole universe is a “happy god” [ B], there is none of the

parts which compose this god that are devoid of divinity and providence.But if all partake in god and providence, they have been assigned a divine

syrianus, in tim. fr.

τ$Uεις *ε.ν �(εστ0κασιν αDτ�9ςG ε� γ+ρ κα- E �Dραν7ς δι+ μ)σωνψυA.ν κα- ν ων μετ)Aει τRς μι^ς ψυARς κα- τ�5 6ν7ς ν�5, τ� Aρ" περ-τ�Cτων �hεσ*αι τ.ν στ�ιAε�ων; π.ς �D π�λλ1. μ^λλ�ν τα5τα δι+ δ0τινων μ)σων *ε�ων τ$Uεων μετε�ληAε τRς μι^ς τ�5 κ σμ�υ *ε τητ�ς;

Oτι δH κ<κε9ν� 3τ�π�ν, τ7 τ"ν μHν τελεστικ"ν κα- Aρηστ0ρια κα-<γ$λματα *ε.ν Qδρ5σ*αι �π- γRς κα- δι$ τινων συμ� λων �πιτ0δειαπ�ιε9ν τ+ �κ μερικRς ]λης γεν μενα κα- (*αρτRς ε�ς τ7 μετ)Aειν *ε�5κα- κινε9σ*αι παρ’ αDτ�5 κα- πρ�λ)γειν τ7 μ)λλ�ν, τ7ν δH τ.ν �λωνδημι�υργ7ν μ" �πιστRσαι τ�9ς �λ�ις στ�ιAε��ις <(*$ρτ�ις �Pσι τ�5 κ -σμ�υ πληρ?μασι ψυA+ς *ε�ας κα- ν ας κα- *ε�CςG π τερ�ν γ+ρ �D��Cλεται; κα- π.ς �D ��Cλεται, π$ντα 6αυτ1. παραπλ0σια π�ιRσαι��υλ μεν�ς; <λλ’ <δυνατε9; κα- τ� τ7 �μπ�δ���ν; Eρ.μεν γ+ρ τ�5τ�δυνατ7ν �κ τ.ν τRς τελεστικRς Oργων. ε� δH κα- ��Cλεται κα- δCνα-ται, δRλ�ν �τι κα- �π)στησε *ε�Vς τRς γεν)σεως �( ρ�υς λ0Uεις τεκεκληρωμ)νας.a �πειδ" δH πανταA�5 τ7 τ.ν δαιμ νων γ)ν�ς Eπαδ ν�στι τ.ν *ε.ν, ε�σ- κα- γενεσι�υργ�- δα�μ�νες, �\ μHν �λων στ�ιAε�ων�π$ρA�ντες, �\ δH κλιμ$των (Cλακες, �\ δH �*ν.ν 3ρA�ντες, �\ δH π -λεων, �\ δ) τινων γεν.ν, �\ δH κα- τ.ν κα*’ 4καστα O(�ρ�ιG κ$τεισι γ+ρ8 (ρ�υρ+ τ.ν δαιμ νων ε�ς τ7ν OσAατ�ν μερισμ ν. τ�5τ� μHν �Pν yνπρ �λημα περ- Yν μ)λλει λ)γειν ��ητ0σ*ω.

a κκεκληρωμ�νας D: κεκληρ�υμ�ν�υς ci s | latet fort. sub κ- cod. D κ〈ε3〉

text and translation

nature. And if this is the case, then designated orders of gods presideover them; for if the heavens partake through the medium of souls andintellects of the One Soul and One Intellect, what should we think aboutthese elements? How would these not far more partake in the singledivinity of the cosmos through the agency of intermediate divine orders.And this also would be strange, that the art of theurgy, and oracles and

statues of gods are established on the earth, and through the applicationof certain symbols should be made receptive, formed as they are fromparticular and corruptible material, and made capable of participatingin god and being moved by him and foretelling the future, whereas thecreator of all should not place in control of the elements as a whole, whichare indestructible components of the cosmos, divine intellects, souls andgods. Is it that he did not wish to? And howwould he not wish to, since hewishes to make all things like unto himself [Tim. E]? Or is he perhapsunable to? But what is stopping him? For we see it is possible from theworks of theurgy. So if he is willing and able, it is plain that he establishedgods as overseers of generation, with areas of interest allotted to them.But since everywhere the class of daemons is in the service of the gods,there are also daemons in charge of generation, some of whom presideover whole elements, others which are guardians of regions, others againare rulers of nations, others of cities, others of clans or whatever, andothers are overseers of individuals; For the guardian role of the daemonsdescends to the lowest realm of specificity. So, let that be our discussionabout one problem concerning what he is going to say.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

Syrianus discusses the relationship between gods and daemons withrespect to why Plato calls gods daimones in Tim. D . While Plato(and earlier thinkers, such as Homer) did not find the categorisation ofgods as daimones problematic, later Platonists thought daemons weredifferent entities altogether. We have a basic Syrianic principle at workin this passage, namely that the whole world is full of gods.Before hearing Syrianus’ opinion, we learnTheodorus of Asine’s inter-

pretation of the nature of daimones (.–): Theodore labels dai-mones those beings which are subordinate to other gods, but still callsdaimones gods, in so far as they are free from relation to what is belowthem. Here we see the Platonic distinction between levels of an entity orhypostasis, particularly the Platonic rule that lower ranks are related tohigher, but higher ranks do not participate in lower.In his discussion of the divine qualities of daemons, Syrianus first looks

to a difficulty within the Platonic corpus: in the Symposium ( D ; B ), Eros proceeds fromPoros as a daemon, but in thePhaedrus ( D),Eros is a source of life and is viewed as a god. In the paragraphs whichfollow, Syrianus shows how the daemons are distinct from and related tothe heavenly gods.They are distinct, in that they preside over generation;but related, because along with gods they exercise providential care overtheir own allotments—with this in mind, Syrianic metaphysics seem tocall for mention of subordinate gods before daemons.Lines . ff. offer “another view-point”. Here, Syrianus discusses

the placement of gods and daemons within the cosmos. Unlike MiddlePlatonic predecessors, he argues that gods should not be confined to theheavenly realm and daemons to the sublunar realm. While, generallyspeaking, gods are above the moon and daemons below, both entitiesare in both places as well. This is not to say that Platonists making sucha distinction are entirely wrong: while gods and daemons inhabit bothregions, god is the more dominant characteristic of the heavenly realmand daemon of the sublunar realm.The sublunar realm remains the placeof genesis, the trait which defines it as daemonic.1Syrianus also makes clear that, just because daemons and gods share

a cosmic place, they are not of equal status. In lines .–ff., hesays that in order to possess a divine nature something must first par-

1 Cf. Iambl. DM. I .

commentary

ticipate in the divine—a notion which relies upon a subordinate beingor class of beings partaking in a higher divine realm. It is important toSyrianus, however, that the divine display pronoia to everything depen-dent upon it, so that the entire world is a god and all the parts of theworld are divine.This is an attack against Aristotelians who denied prov-idence to the sublunar realm.2 Again, we see the Syrianic principle thatthe gods are everywhere tempered by the belief that a distinction con-tinues to exist between gods and dependent beings. Proclus discussesthe differences between gods and daemons, with respect to Plato call-ing them both gods in In Tim. .–., as part of a more gen-eral discussion on angels, daemons, and heroes. At In Tim. ., dae-monic races are said to proceed according to the universal providenceof the Demiurge. Each race of daemon, moreover, is suspended fromits own class of god, so that generator gods suspend generator dae-mons (.ff.).The entire generator class, although divine, remains sub-servient to the gods which give participation to it as sublunar beings(.f.).Lines .– emphasize (somewhat convolutedly) the point that

inhabitants of the heavenly realm are gods and daemons. Syrianus drawsthe analogy that if the heavens relate to the hypostases of Soul and Intel-lect, which are outside the heavens, then the heavens should relate evenmore properly to theWorld Soul, to which it has an internal relationship.As a single organism, the cosmos inter-relates everything and deifies allthrough sublunar divinities.The reason why Syrianus specifies that generator gods are daemons,

unlike Proclus, who makes his discourse about the relationship betweengods and daemons, is most likely that Syrianus is attempting what heconsiders a literal reading of Tim. D. Generator gods were discussedby Iamblichus as part of a triadic succession of entities occuring in InSophistam fr. Dillon. Here, the sublunary, genesiurgic demiurge takesthird place after the Father of demiurges and the heavenly demiurges.Iamblichus calls this demiurge creator of the sublunar world of genesis,fromwhich depend the γενεσι�υργ7ι *ε ι, or daemons, who administera tertiary providence (In Soph. , ).

2 See Atticus, fr. , A where Atticus attacks Aristotle, arguing against Aristotle’sclaim that God exercises no intervention in the world, des Places () fr. (bis)Alexander Aphr. Quaestio , ap. Suppl. Arist II , p. , – Bruns. See Merlan() –, where Merlan compares the theology of Aristotle with that of Epicurus.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

The last section (.ff.) uses the analogy of the theurgist—if atheurgist can ensoul a statue, surely the god can ensoul the variouscosmic elements. These lines accept Syrianus’ belief in theurgy. If hispremise here is “if a theurgist can ensoul a statue”, it is assumed that itis a non-controversial subject for him.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 21

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

ΓRς τε κα- �Dραν�5 πα9δες 'Ωκεαν7ς κα- Τη*Vς �γεν)σ*ην [Tim. E].

τα5τα δH ε�δMς 8γ�5μαι δε9ν cσπερ <σ(αλ�5ς πε�σματ�ς OAεσ*αι τRςτ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν παραδ σεωςG δι+ γ+ρ ταCτης τ+ μHν πλημμελRτ.ν δ�Uασμ$των (ευU με*α, τα9ς δH κα*αρωτ$ταις �νν��αις 'Ιαμ�λ�-A�υ συνεψ με*α.πρ.τ�ν �Pν �π�μν0σ�μεν 8μ^ς αDτ�Cς, �τι περ- τ.ν�π7 σελ0νην *ε.ν E λ γ�ς κα- �τι πανταA�5 π$ντες κα- �τι κατ’ <να-λ�γ�αν πρ�εληλC*ασι τ.ν ν�ητ.ν κα- ν�ερ.ν �ασιλ)ων. Oπει*’ ��τωσ-τ�Cτ�ις πιστεC�ντες λ)γ�μεν, �τι κα*$περ E πρ?τιστ�ς �Dραν7ς τ.νν�ερ.ν *ε.ν �ρ�ς �στ- κα- συν�AεVς τ7 μ)τρ�ν Oκ τ’ αDτ�5 〈τ<γα*�5〉κα- <π7 τ.ν ν�ητ.ν *ε.νa ε�ς τ�Vς ν�ερ�Vς διακ σμ�υς pκ�ν συν-)Aων, τ7ν αDτ7ν τρ π�ν κα- �eτ�ς E �Dραν7ς �ρ�ς �στ- τ.ν γενεσι-�υργ.ν *ε.ν κα- συν�AεVς τ7 μ)τρ�ν τ7 δημι�υργικ7ν κα- τ7 �κ τ.ν�Dραν�ων *ε.ν πρ�ελ*7ν ε�ς τ�Vς τ"ν γ)νεσιν λαA ντας συν)Aων �ν6ν- π)ρατι κα- συν$πτων αDτ�Vς πρ7ς τ"ν �Dρ$νι�ν 8γεμ�ν�αν τ.ν*ε.νG <ν+ λ γ�ν γ+ρ [ς E δημι�υργ7ς πρ7ς αDτ7 τ<γα* ν, �]τως 8μ�α τ�5 �Dραν�5 τ�5δε *ε της πρ7ς τ7ν ν�ερ7ν �Dραν ν. cσπερ �Pν�κε9 τ7 μ)τρ�ν κα- τ7 π)ρας �κ τ�5 <γα*�5 �(0κει δι+ τ�5 �Dραν�5π^σι τ�9ς ν�ερ�9ς, �]τω δ" κα- �ντα5*α τ�9ς γενεσι�υργ�9ς *ε�9ς τεκα- τ�9ς κρε�ττ�σι γ)νεσιν <π7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 κα- τRς <κρ τητ�ς τ.ν�γκ�σμ�ων E �ρ�ς �(0κει, λ)γω δ" τRς τ�5 �Dραν�5 τ�5δε συν�AικRςμεσ τητ�ςG ταCτην γ+ρ OλαAε τ"ν τ$Uιν E πανταA�5 πρ�ϊMν �Dραν ς,�π�υ μHν 8νωμ)νως κα- κρυ(�ως, �π�υ δH �κ(αν.ς κα- διSηρημ)νωςbG�π�υ μHν γ+ρ ψυAα9ς �πι()ρει τ7ν �ρ�ν, �π�υ δH τ�9ς τRς (Cσεως Oρ-γ�ις, �π�υ δH 3λλως 3λλ�ις, κα- �ν <)ρι μHν πρ?τως, �ν δH τα9ς �νυδρ�-�ις τ$Uεσι δευτ)ρως, �ν δH τSR γSR κα- τ�9ς A*�ν��ις Oργ�ις �σA$τως. ε�σ-δH κα- συμπλ�κα- τ�CτωνG 3λλ� γ+ρ τ7 *ε�ως �ν <)ρι κα- τ7 δαιμ�ν�ως[κα-] �π- γRςG �π�υ μHν γ+ρ E τρ π�ς E αDτ7ς �ν δια( ρ�ις τ$Uεσιν,

a :ρ�ς–!ε�ν om D b :π�υ μ1ν–δι;ηρημ�νως om D

Of Gê and Uranus were born the children of Oceanus and Tethys

While realising this, I believe it is necessary to cling as to a safe cable[Laws X B] to the account given by our Master; for through thisteaching we will avoid the errors of false opinion, and we will followthe purest insights of Iamblichus. First, let us remind ourselves thatthe discussion concerns the gods beneath the moon, and that all areeverywhere and that they have proceeded forth according to the analogyof the intelligible and intellectual kings.1 Thus, trusting in these, we saythat even as the primal heaven is the boundary and the maintainer ofthe intellectual gods which holds together the measure which proceedsfrom the Good itself and from the intelligible gods to the intellectiveorders, in the sameway this heaven too is the boundary andmaintainer ofthe generative gods, holding together within a single limit the demiurgicmeasure which proceeds from the heavenly gods to those allotted therealm of generation, and linking them to the heavenly rule of the gods.For the same analogy obtains between the Demiurge and the Gooditself, and between the single divinity of this heaven in relation to theintellectual heaven. Even as, therefore, measure and limit proceed fromthe Good through heaven to all the intellectual beings, so here too theboundary extends to the generative gods, and to the higher classes ofbeing from the Demiurge and from the summit of the encosmic realm,by which I mean the connective median of this heaven. For this is therole that has been assigned to heaven, to proceed in all directions, insome cases unitarily and secretly, in others manifestly and dividedly. Forit imposes a bound in one case to souls, in another to theworks of nature,in still other ways to other things; and primally in the air, to a secondaryextent to thewatery orders, and at the lowest level to the earth and earthlyproductions. And there are links between these: for it is a different thingto exist in a divine but demonic mode in the air, and on the earth. In the

1 These gods would seem to refer to the triad of Kronos, Rhea, and Zeus.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

�π�υ δH E τρ π�ς 4τερ�ς �π- μι^ς λ0Uεως. τα5τα μHν �Pν περ- τRς�Dραν�5 δυν$μεως.

'Επ- δH τ"ν γRν μετ+ τ�5τ�ν τραπ μεν�ι κα- παρακαλ)σαντες αDτ"νσυνε($ψασ*αι τ.ν περ- αDτRς λ γων 8μ9ν π$λιν <π7 τRς πρ?της αD-τRς �κ($νσεως τ7ν περ- αDτRς �ρ�ν <π�δ.μεν. �κε�νη μHν �Pν �ν τα9ςμ)σαις τρι$σιν �κ(ανε9σα τ.ν ν�ερ.ν *ε.ν gμα �Dραν1. τ1. συν�Aε9τ.ν �λων ν�ερ.ν *ε.ν <ν+ λ γ�ν τε πρ εισι πρ7ς τ"ν ν�ητ"ν γRν, jνκα- πρωτ�στην ε�ρ�σκ�μεν τ.ν ν�ερ.νa τρι$δων, κα- [ς �ν �1ω�γ ν�ιςτ$Uεσιν <(�μ�ι�5ται πρ7ς τ"ν <πειρ�αν τ"ν πρ?την, Oστι δH E �κδ Aι-�ς κ λπ�ς τRς �Dραν�5 γεννητικRς *ε τητ�ς κα- τ7 μ)σ�ν κ)ντρ�ν τRς�κε�ν�υ πατρικRς <γα* τητ�ς, συμ�ασιλεC�υσα αDτ1. κα- �Pσα δCνα-μις αDτ�5 πατρ7ς =ντ�ς. 8 δH <ν+ λ γ�ν αDτSR κα- �ν τ�9ς �π7 σελ0νηνπρ�ϊσταμ)νη γR �F�ν δCναμ�ς �στι γ νιμ�ς τ�5 �Dραν�5, τ"ν πατρι-κ"ν αDτ�5 κα- Eριστικ"ν κα- μετρητικ"ν κα- συν�Aικ"ν πρ ν�ιαν �κ-(α�ν�υσα, κα- γ�ν�μ�ις �π- π$ντα διατε�ν�υσα 〈δυν$μεσιν〉, αDτ" τ"ν<πειρ�αν π^σαν τ.ν �π7 σελ0νην <π�γενν.σα, cσπερ E �Dραν7ς τ"ντ�5 π)ρατ�ς συστ�ιA�αν, E τ7ν �ρ�ν κα- τ7 π)ρας �πι()ρων τ�9ς δευ-τ)ρ�ις. E μHν �Pν �ρ�ς �eτ�ς κα- τ7 π)ρας <(�ρ��ει τ"ν ]παρUιν 6κ$-στ�υ, κα*’ jν κα- δα�μ�νες κα- *ε�- κα- ψυAα- κα- σ?ματα συν)Aεται,κα- 6ν�π�ιε9 τ+ μιμ�Cμενα τ"ν μ�αν 6ν$δα τ.ν �λων. 8 δH <πειρ�α π�λ-λαπλασι$�ει τ+ς 6κ$στων δυν$μειςG π�λV γ+ρ τ7 π)ρας �ν gπασι τ�9ς�π7 σελ0νην, π�λV δH κα- τ7 3πειρ�ν δι$ τε *ε�5 κα- τ.ν μετ+ *ε�Vςδιατε9ν�ν[[τα]] π$ντων.

a ν�ερ�ν: ν�ητ�ν ci t

text and translation

one case, the mode [of being] is the same in different classes, but in theother, it is different in the same class. So much, then, for the heavenlypower.Turning to Earth after this, and after having called upon it to accord

with us in these discussions, let us define on the basis of this first man-ifestation its definition. That entity, then, being manifested in the mid-dle triads of the intellective gods at the same time as the Heaven whichis the maintainer of all the divine intellects, proceeds analogously withthe intelligible Ge, which we discover to be first of the intellective tri-ads, and at the level of the zoogonic classes, it is assimilated to the pri-mal Unlimitedness. It is the ‘receiving bosom’ of the generative deity ofheaven and the center-point of that paternal goodness, ruling with it andbeing a power of it, it being the Father. But the earth which stands forthanalogously to it in the realm below the moon, is, as it were, a fecunda-tive power ofHeaven, revealing its paternal and defining and preservativeprovidential care, and extending to all things with its generative powers,produces all the Unlimitedness in the realm below the moon, just as theheaven produces the column of Limit, imposing bound and limit uponsecondary things.Therefore, this boundary and limit determine the exis-tence of each thing, in accordance with which (both) daemons and godsand souls and bodies are held together, and it unifies these, as they imi-tate the single henad of the universe. Unlimitedness, on the other hand,multiplies the powers of each thing; for there is much Limit in all sublu-nar things, and much Unlimitedness also, extending through both Godand all things after the gods.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This fragment concerns the nature of Ouranos and Ge and does nottouch upon the second half of the lemma, onOkeanos and Tethys, whichProclus discusses in .–.. In the discussion, Syrianus concernshimself first with Ouranos as the Limit of the planetary gods, and thenwith Ge, as representing the force of Unlimitedness (apeiria).While Proclus credits Syrianus with the “purest opinions of Iambli-

chus”, his interpretation on the face of it is somewhat at odds with that ofIamblichus, whose explanation encompassed Ge and Ouranos as forcesproper to encosmic gods. Iamblichus talks of Ge as “τ7 μ νιμ�ν π^νκα- στα*ερ7ν” (.–) in the encosmic gods. Prior to the opinionsof any named philosophers, Proclus outlines the interpretations of eightun-named exegetes.Their interpretations of Ge include the material andimmaterial (.–):

. �Q μ)ν: understand Ge as solid earth;. �Q δ): the earth represents matter, as the foundation for beings;. �Q δ): Ge represents intelligible matter;. �Q δ): it represents the power of intellect;. �Q δ): Life;. �Q δ): an incorporeal form inseparable from earth;. �Q δ): Soul;. �Q δ): Intellect

The following eight interpretations are given for Ouranos (.ff.). Itis assumed that the eight interpreters of Ge correlate to those of Ouranos,although oddly enough they are not given in the same order:

. �Q μ)ν: understand Ouranos as the visible heaven;. �Q δ): the movement around the centre;. �Q δ): the power which proceeds in accord with this movement;. �Q δ): the possessor of Intellect;. �Q δ): the pure and separated Intellect;. �Q δ): the nature of the celestial revolution;. �Q δ): Soul;. �Q δ): Intellect.

While these interpretations vary from amaterial to an intelligible under-standing of Ge and Ouranos, beginning with Iamblichus, and after him,Ge and Ouranos took on the meaning of two principles, working intandem at the intelligible level. For Iamblichus (.), Ge represents

commentary

aspects of permanency in the encosmic gods (this stable element beinganalogous to earth), while Ouranos refers to the total demiurgic activ-ity, which acts as the limit of the entire universe.2 Earth and heaventhus function as the stable and active elements—two extremes—for theencosmic gods. Next, Proclus gives the opinion of Theodorus (.),who holds to the ancient opinion linking Ge with matter, but, alongwith Iamblichus, makes heaven a boundary, in this case an intellectwhich divides the lowest level from the first. Theodore’s proposal hereis terribly complex, as he links Ge and Ouranos to two powers thatrelate to the soul of the universe (and, in turn, a triad of powers par-ticular to the soul of the universe).3 Proclus dismisses this opinion,favoring that of Iamblichus, which he modifies so that Ge and Oura-nos, while representing two extreme forces in the universe, indicateperas and apeiria, both in the intellective and in the sublunary realm(.ff.).The view of Syrianus given here represents a nice link between Iambli-

chus and Proclus, although Syrianus’ opinion is focused primarily on thesublunar gods (.: �Q �π7 σελ0νην). These sublunar gods have pro-ceeded from the intelligible and intellectual kings (.: ν�0τ�ι κα-ν�)ρ�ι �ασιλε9ς), who seem to refer to the triad of Kronos, Rhea, andZeus that guide the intellectual triad of =ν, �ω0, ν�5ς. Next, Syrianusdraws an analogy between the primal heaven (.) (or noetic heaven)as the container of the intellectual gods and “this heaven”, which containsthe encosmic gods. The Demiurge, as the single divinity of this heaven,keeps the ranks of the cosmos together.The connective boundary (�ρ�ς)between the generative gods and superior gods comes from the Demi-urge, at the summit of this heaven (.). The summit of the encosmicworld is, thus, the connective mean of this heaven. In this way, the <κρ -της of one realm is the lowest element of the previous realm. In the lastsection (.ff.), Syrianus shows how the same tropos occurs in differenttaxeis.

2 Iamblichus, In Tim., fr. Dillon: “I know, indeed, that the divine Iamblichusunderstands ‘Earth’ as that which encompasses all that is permanent and steadfast in thesubstance of the encosmic gods and in their activity and in their eternal revolution, andwhich encompasses the greater powers and universal life-principles, and ‘Heaven’ as thecreative activity proceeding from the demiurge, which is whole and perfect and full of itsown powers, and which subsists around the Demiurge as being a limit for itself and forthe universe.”

3 See Festiugère () , note onTheodore and his Amelian triads.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

After Iamblichus, the interpretation of heaven and earth rest onGe andOuranos being dyadic forces which act as extremes of the universe. ForIamblichus, in an opinion not adopted by Proclus, heaven representedthe activity of the Demiurge. Syrianus moves the discussion from theencosmic to the planetary realm. The opinions of Iamblichus and Syr-ianus manifest themselves in Procline thought in In Tim. .ff. Inhis argument at the beginning of the discussion on the lemma, Proclussays that earth and heaven function as two causes, with earth as motherand heaven as father, from which all beings spring (.ff.). Proclus,hence, treats earth and heaven not just as two bodies encompassing oth-ers ormarking boundaries, but as causative principles. His interpretationbecomesmoremetaphysically complex towards the end of the discussion(.–), where he says heaven and earth act as two which precedethe dyad of Okeanos and Tethys. This is noteworthy as Syrianus’ perasand apeiria function as two preceding the dyad which comprises the restof the universe.As for Ge, she represents the element of Unlimitedness in the cosmos

that is responsible for the multiplicity of individual entities, and the lim-itless productivity of the sublunary realm. Here we may note a differencebetween Syrianus and Iamblichus, since Iamblichus chose to emphasiserather the permanence attributed to the idea of earth.It is notable that, at this point, Proclus himself seems to take over

the expositions, but it is inevitable that Syrianus also presented his viewof Ge, with which Proclus would have no dispute, so I feel justified inincluding at least the present passage. The influence of Syrianus may, ofcourse, continue much further.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 22

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

Θε�- *ε.ν [Tim. Α].

ε� δH μηδHν τ.ν ε�ρημ)νων <ντιλαμ�$νεται τRς ΠλατωνικRς �νν��ας,τ� π�τε αDτ7 δηλ�5ν Nητ)�ν; κ$λλι�ν δ" κα- �ντα5*α πρ7ς τ"ν τ�5κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν δι$ν�ιαν <νατρ)Aειν. λ)γει δH α]τη τ�Vς �γκ�σμ�-�υς π$ντας *ε�Vς �DA >πλ.ς ε`ναι *ε�Cς, <λλ+ τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ� με*ε-κτ�Vς *ε�CςaG Oστι γ+ρ �ν αDτ�9ς τ7 μ)ν τι Aωριστ7ν κα- <(ανHς κα-�περκ σμι�ν, τ7 δH �μ(ανHς 3γαλμα αDτ.ν �ν τ1. κ σμ1ω τεταγμ)νων.κα- πρ?τως μ)ν �στι *ε7ς τ7 <(ανHς αDτ.νG ν�ε�σ*ω γ+ρ δ" ν5ν [ς<δια�ρετ�ν κα- 4ν, δευτ)ρως δH τ7 =Aημα τ�5τ� τ7 �Uηρτημ)ν�ν τRς<(αν�5ς �ν αDτ�9ς �Dσ�αςG ε� γ+ρ κα- �(’ 8μ.ν διττ7ς E 3ν*ρωπ�ς, lμHν �ντ7ς κατ+ τ"ν ψυA0ν, l δH (αιν μεν�ς lν Eρ.μεν, π σ1ω μ^λλ�ν�π- τ.ν *ε.ν <μ( τερα Nητ)�ν κα- τ7ν *ε7ν διττ ν, τ7ν μHν <(ανR,τ7ν δH (αιν μεν�ν;

τ�Cτων δH �]τως �A ντων τ7 *ε�- *ε.ν Nητ)�ν πρ7ς gπανταςλ)γεσ*αι τ�Vς �γκ�σμ��υς, �ν �Fς συμπλ�κ0 τ�ς �στι τ.ν <(αν.ν *ε.νπρ7ς τ�Vς �μ(ανε9ςG με*εκτ�- γ$ρ ε�σιν. �λως δH διττ.ν διακ σμων�π7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 παραγ�μ)νων, τ.ν μHν �περκ�σμ�ων, τ.ν δH�γκ�σμ�ων κα- τ.ν μHν <με*)κτων =ντων, τ.ν δH με*εκτ.ν, ε� μHνπρ7ς τ�Vς �περκ�σμ��υς διελ)γετ� ν5ν, ε`πεν dν πρ7ς αDτ�Vς *ε�-μ ν�ν/ ε�σ- γ+ρ <μ)*εκτ�ι κα- Aωριστ�- κα- <(ανε9ς, �πειδ" δH πρ7ς�γκ�σμ��υς E λ γ�ς, *ε�Vς αDτ�Vς <π�καλε9 *ε.ν, [ς μετεA�μ)ν�υς�π’ 3λλων �μ(αν.ν *ε.ν.

�ν δ" τ�Cτ�ις περιλαμ�$ν�νται κα- �Q δα�μ�νεςG κα- γ+ρ αDτ�- κατ+τ"ν πρ7ς τ�Vς *ε�Vς τ$Uιν ε�σ- *ε��, μετ)A�ντες <διαιρ)τως τRς �κε�-νων �δι τητ�ς. �]τω τ�ι κα- �ν Φα�δρ1ω [ E] *ε.ν κα- δαιμ νων

a 'λλ�–!ε�*ς om Q

Gods of Gods

But if none of the aforementioned views express the meaning of Plato,what are we to say reveals it? It is better here once again to take refugein the opinion of our Master. This view states that all the encosmic godsare not gods in the absolute sense, but as a composite thing, participatedgods. For there is in them one element that is transcendent and invisibleand hypercosmic, but also another that is a manifest image of themarrayed in the cosmos.1 And what is god in a primary sense is theirinvisible part (which one can understand as their unitary and invisibleaspect), while the secondary aspect is this vehicle which is attached totheir invisible substance. For, after all, if, in our case, man is double, theinternal aspect represented by the soul and the other visible, which wesee, how much more in the case of the gods are both these aspects tobe reckoned, and god taken as double, the one aspect visible, the otherinvisible?This being the case, the phrase “Gods of gods” must be taken to refer

to all encosmic gods, in whom there is a linkage of invisible god withvisible ones; for they are participated. So then, since two orders have beencreated by the Demiurge, one of the hypercosmic gods and another ofthe encosmic gods, the one being unparticipated, the other participated,if he [the Demiurge] had been speaking to the hypercosmic gods nowin the present instance, he would have addressed them simply as “gods”(for they are unparticipated and transcendent and invisible), but sincehis address is to the encosmic gods, he calls them “gods of gods”, as beingparticipated in by other visible gods.Among these are also included the daemons. For these, in respect of

their relation to the gods, are gods, since they participate indivisibly intheir characteristics. Thus, in the Phaedrus [ E], when he talks of the

1 Kroll deletesαD, although Festiugière prefersαDτ.ν τ.ν, referring to the hypercos-mic, transcendent aspect of gods. See Festiugière () , note .

syrianus, in tim. fr.

8γεμ νας ε�πMν τ�Vς δ?δεκα *ε�Vς �μως τ�Vς 6π�μ)ν�υς gπαντας*ε�Vς <πεκ$λεσεν �πενεγκ?ν [ E]G κα- �eτ�ς μHν *ε.ν ���ς. π$ν-τες �Pν ε�σι *ε�- *ε.ν , [ς συμπεπλεγμ)ν�ν OA�ντες τ1. <(ανε9 τ7 �μ-(ανHς κα- τ1. �περκ�σμ�1ω τ7 �γκ σμι�ν. τα5τα μHν �Pν περ- τRς �ληςε�ρ0σ*ω τ�5δε τ�5 πρ�σρ0ματ�ς �νν��ας.

Commentary

This fragment discusses the true meaning of the mysterious mode ofaddress by the Demiurge to the young gods, “gods of gods”.It may be helpful to begin with the phrase “gods of gods”, which proved

controversial in late Antique Platonic thought,2 as prior to Syrianus’opinion, Proclus gives an extensive survey of earlier exegetes of “*)�ι*ε.ν”:

. (.ff.): Some attach “of gods” to that which follows so that theentire phrase now reads: “Gods, of which gods I am the creator”(Yν *ε.ν �γM). These exegetes Proclus dismisses on the grammat-ical grounds that such a phrase would merely be a repetition andaltogether superfluous.This seems to be the interpretation preferredby modern commentators, such as A.E. Taylor and F.M. Cornford.While Cornford does not find it plausible that Plato would write

2 For a review of ancient and modern scholarship on the meaning of *ε7ι *ε.ν,see Taylor () – and Cornford () –; –. Taylor suggests that*ε.ν is an ancient corruption of �σων, so that the text should read: “*ε�- �σων �γMδημι�υργ ς…”. Among the opinions he counters, he lists the following alternatives: )gods sprung from gods, as interpreted by Cicero (“vos qui deorum satu orti estis”). Taylorobjects to this interpretation as there is nothing to suggest the genitive is a genitive oforigin. ) Gods who are *ε7ι of other gods, as in the case of Zeus in B of theCritias (*ε7ς E *ε.ν BεCς) who is the one being whom the other gods worship. This isthe opinion Proclus attributes to his second category of exegetes (.ff.). Cornfordremarks that Proclus does not include this interpretation in his catalogue of ancientinterpretations of A. ) Archer-Hind () and Apelt () suggest that *ε ι *ε.νis intensive, i.e., that the gods of gods are a kind of superlative (Taylor [] –;Cornford [] ), an idea Taylor condemns because the gods in the text are beingcompared to the creator, to whom they are clearly not superior.

text and translation

twelve gods as being “leaders of gods and daemons,” he nevertheless callsall those following in their train, “gods” [ E], when he says below,“this is the life of the gods.” Therefore, all of them are “gods of gods” ashaving a visible element woven together with an invisible element, andan encosmic element woven in with the hypercosmic.Let this much be said about the meaning of the mode of address in

general.

*)�ι *ε.ν to mean “gods, of whom”, he does repunctuate the text toread τ+ for L, with as the subject of *ε.ν �ργ.ν τε: “Gods, of godswhom I am maker and of works the father, those which…”.3 Thisrevised form now refers to both gods and works, which comprisethe whole universe. Taylor comes up with a similar explanation. Heexplains Oργα g by omitting the g and replacing it with Oργων:4 thetext now reads, Oργα Iν Oργων (“works whereof I am maker andfather, inasmuch as they are my handiwork, are indissoluble”);5

. (.ff.): Others have said that “gods of gods” refers to encosmicgods which are copies of intelligibles, so that the entire universe is“the image of eternal gods” ( C ). This interpretation is interest-ing as it provides insight into the Platonic opinion that, in a partic-ular way, encosmic gods are inferior to or dependent on the noeticrealm. This explanation may be from Porphyry,6 who discusses theencosmic eikones of the noetic world. Proclus, however, calls thisinterpretation incorrect, as encosmic gods do not have the exclusiveright to being copies of the Intelligible—such a claim is also valid formortal beings, who as “things of god” are copies of the Intelligible.Thus, all the gods, visible and invisible, are addressed.

3 Cornford () .4 Cicero, “quorum operum ego parens effectorque sum, haec sunt indissolubilia me

invito”, which Augustine cites in De Civitate Dei iii..5 Calcidius offers another method. He retains the g, along with Oργων and Iν “di

deorum, quorum opifex idemque pater ego, opera siquidem vos mea”. See Taylor ().

6 I think it is likely to be Porphyry because this commentator is the first part of a threepart sequence culminating in Syrianus, which occurs typically in Proclus’ ParmenidesCommentary.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

. (.ff.): Still others claim that Plato means by “gods of gods”the more universal henads of the encosmic gods. The henads herewould be unificatory principles of lower gods. Proclus protests thatall the encosmic gods are included among those addressed. Thisinterpretation possibly stems fromTheodore of Asine.

Syrianus in this fragment argues that when Plato says “gods of gods” hemeans the encosmic gods, the genitive indicating their participation inthe hypercosmic gods. The encosmic gods are not called simply “gods”because they are participated in by other gods; as μ)*εκτ�ι *ε ι (.),the fact that they are participated in makes them a composite thing, τ7�λ�ν τ�5τ� (.). Kroll suggests that this phrase be re-read as a gen-itive, τ�5 �λ�υ τ�Cτ�υ, so that the phrase, rather than establishing theencosmic gods as a level of participated gods, instead indicates that theyare participated in by the universe. Based on other uses of τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ�in the Timaeus Commentary, Diehl’s usage, which makes the μ)*εκτ�ι*ε ι into a class of gods appears appropriate.7This participation gives theencosmic gods a composite quality; hence they have an invisible, tran-scendent, unitary aspect, by which they participate in the hypercosmicgods, and a secondary, physical element, apparent in their physical man-ifestation as planets. By this element, Syrianus can only refer to the vehi-cles of the planetary gods, their fiery bodies.The vehicle is attached to theinvisible essence in the encosmic god.The divine element is primarily theinvisible aspect, while the visible aspect is not Oν, but extended. Here wehave a nice description of planetary gods as entities half invisible, halfvisible as pure fire.In lines .ff., Syrianus brings in daimones, whom he places in

a subcategory of the encosmic gods as being “gods of gods” and beingsomewhere in-between the visible (<(ανHς) and invisible (�μ(αν)ς).Only the hypercosmic are purely *ε�-. He proves this with a linguisticargument based on a reading of Phaedrus E. Syrianus’ new theory

7 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. I, .: “The races are in effect destroyed by the waters,which are created by the celestial revolutions and have for matter water, which is whythis class [τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ�]] is called “a celestial stream”.” Festiugère notes that τ7 �λ�ντ�5τ� is used in a way similar to III, ., where he suggests τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ� is theappropriate usage and that Syrianus says the μ)*εκτ�υς *ε�Cς is a class of participatablegods () , note . See also III, ., where planets are described as a class withthe terminology τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ�: τ�ια5ται αι γ+ρ αQ πλ$ναι τ.ν �Dραν�ων, <πλανε9ςπλ$ναι τ7 �λ�ν τ�5τ� �π$ρU�υσι κα- α�- �ν τ)λει �eσαι κα- πρ7ς 4ν σπεCδ�υσαιτ)λ�ς.

commentary

here is that there are both celestial daemons and sublunar daemons.Proclus uses daimones and theoi interchangeably here, as all of them aregods of gods and mix the encosmic and hypercosmic.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 23

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

Τ7 δH λ�ιπ7ν �με9ς <*αν$τ1ω *νητ7ν πρ�συ(α�ν�ντες [Tim. CD].

μ0π�τε �Pν κ$λλι�ν �]τω λ)γειν, cσπερ E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ς, τ+ςμHν <κρ τητας τRς <λ γ�υ �ωRς τ7 πνε5μα περι)Aειν κα- ε`ναι ταCταςμετ+ τ�5 XA0ματ�ς <ιδ��υς [ς <π7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 παρηγμ)νας, ταC-τας δH �κτειν�μ)νας κα- μερι��μ)νας π�ιε9ν τ"ν �ω"ν ταCτην, jν πρ�σ-υ(α�ν�υσιν �Q ν)�ι *ε��, *νητ"ν μHν �Pσαν δι τι τ7ν μερισμ7ν τ�5τ�ν<π�τ�*εσ*α� π�τε τ"ν ψυA"ν <ναγκα9�ν, �ταν <π�καταστSR τυA�5σακα*$ρσεως, π�λυAρ�νιωτ)ραν δH τRς τ�5 σ?ματ�ς τ�Cτ�υ �ωRςG κα-δι+ τ�5τ� τ"ν ψυA"ν κα- �ν �Αιδ�υ κα- τ�Vς ���υς αQρ�υμ)νην OAειν τ"ντ�ιαCτην �ω0νG κατ+ γ+ρ αDτ"ν τ"ν N�π"ν πρ�σλαμ�$νει τ"ν *νητ"νταCτην �ω"ν <π7 τ.ν ν)ων *ε.ν.

For the rest, do you weave together the mortal with the immortal

Might it not be better to say, as does our Master, that the spirit comprisesthe summits of irrational life, and these are immortal along with thevehicle as being created by the Demiurge, but these when extended anddivided create this life that the young gods weave on, which is on the onehand mortal because it is necessary for the soul at some stage to cast offthis divided statewhen it attains purification and is restored (to its properstate), but on the other hand, is longer-lived than the life in this body; andit is for this reason that the soul possesses this sort of life both in Hadesand when it chooses lives for itself, for it is in virtue of this tendency thatit takes on this mortal life from the young gods.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

This fragment understands the weaving together of the mortal and im-mortal as a discussion of how the soul relates to the body. Later Platonists,Porphyry in particular, thought the mortal and immortal could notrelate, but also dismissed the concept of reconstitution mentioned in., which permitted the soul to remain intact (although disunified)through periodic renewal. Instead, Platonists developed the notion ofthe ochema, a pneumatic vehicle of the soul that related soul to body,after Plato’s imagery in Tim. E.1 The vehicle encased the rational soulwhen it descended from the noetic universe and, through its purification,enabled the soul to return to the higher realm.2 The concept appears inAristotle3 and Middle Platonic sources,4 and is rather developed in thethought of Plotinus, although he never used the term ochema.5

1 Tim. E –, “Andwhen [the Demiurge] had compounded the whole he divided itinto souls equal in number to the stars, and each soul he assigned to one star, and settingthem each as it were in a chariot (ochema) he showed them the nature of the universe…”.Trans. Bury (). Later Platonists understood the chariot to be the vehicle of the soul.

2 Finamore lists these two functions, along with a third which is not addressed in thisfragment: that the vehicle acts as an organ of sense-perception () .

3 Aristotle’s pneuma is in some ways quite unlike the Platonic ochema, in so far as itexists in the body, but in other ways it provides a good example of the early concept ofthe ochema—for example, it acts as a carrier for the irrational soul (GA, bff.). SeeDodds () .

4 According to Dodds () , the earliest extant passage which uses ochema andpneuma together occurs in Galen’s de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, p. f. Müller.Origen (adv. Celsum II. , A Migne) and Hippolytus (Philosph. . Diels) referto an ethereal body. Atticus and Albinus are named by Proclus (In Tim. .–) asspeaking of the ochema, although Festiugère and Dodds doubt that these writers wereaware of the vehicle. According to Proclus, Atticus and Albinus say that the vehicle andthe irrational soul are mortal, possessing life only κατ+ τ"ν ε�ς γ)νεσιν N�π"ν τRς ψυARς(In Tim. III, .–). Dodds says that Proclus is perhaps “reading into these writers thebelief in a pneumatic vehicle” () , note . He explains that in the Didaskalikos(c. ), Albinus speaks of the physical body as the ochema of the embodied soul andthe stars as the ochemata of the souls without bodies. Dodds () . The opinion ofAtticus is as follows: De Anima, ap. Stob. § Trans. Finamore-Dillon ():

“Atticus and 〈certain other〉 Platonists, however, do not agree with this view; they uniteall souls with bodies by a single method of incorporation. Always in the same way inevery embodiment of souls, they first posit an irrational, disorderly, enmattered soul andthen introduce an association of the rational soul with this soul as it is being brought intoorder.”

5 Plotinus established that souls require a body through which means it can descend(Enn. IV. ff.). He connected souls to the body through a sort of vehicle in the formof a pneumatic encasement that souls take on or off during heavenly descent or ascent

commentary

Lines .ff. contest Porphyry’s position on the ochema:“But will this be the case, what some say, that the same thing both remainsintact and is dissolved through being reconstituted and because of this is atonce mortal and immortal? But this suggestion is intrinsically unreason-able. When unity is destroyed how can we say that the same thing persists?For the irrational soul is not a collection of lives, but rather one single lifeof many forms. Furthermore, he [Plato] concedes that the heavenly bod-ies receive at one time diminution and at another time additions, which iscompletely alien to them. But are we to leave this life as destructible andscattered at the same time as the body? [Rep.X] If irrational soul dissolves,what about punishments, purifications, and how about the choice of lives,some in obedience to imagination, some to spirit, some to desire? Andwhat about the entry into irrational animals? For the connection with theirrational is through the irrational Soul, even as connection to intellect isthrough Intellect.”

Here, Proclus refutes the opinion that soul cannot be a collection of lives,an opinion we know to be Porphyry’s, as it reflects the account Proclusgives in . ff. Here, Porphyry and his followers deny the destructionof the vehicle and the irrational soul6 by claiming instead that they are re-constituted (<ναστ�ιAει�5σαι) into their fundamental components anddissolved (<ναλCεσ*αι) into the celestial spheres which acted as theirprimordial homes.7 According to Porphyry, as the rational soul entersthe body, it collects from each planetary sphere an element proper toeach planet. What it collects are known as garments and the sum total ofthese garments are the soul’s vehicle—moreover, each garment collectedadds to the vehicle’s visibility and shape.8 Conversely, when the bodydied, according to Porphyry, the garments were shed during the soul’sascent through the spheres. Porphyry explained that the vehicle wasgathered from heavenly bodies during ascent. The rational soul alone—unlike the irrational soul and vehicle—avoided the cycle of gathering andridding itself of celestial bodies. The end result of the soul’s re-ascent

(Enn. IV...–). His description of the pneumatic body explains how it provided anethereal encasement for the immortal soul, thus allowing Plotinus to explain any changein the soul’s structure as that of a change in the soul’s vehicle.

6 Speusippus and Xenocrates had already posited the immortality of the irrationalsoul. See Olympiodorus, In Phd. ..

7 See Dillon’s commentary on this passage () –. Cf. Porphyry, de AntroNymph. ;ChaldeanOracles p. ; Lewy () n. ; ProclusET prop. ; PlotinusEnn. IV.. and .

8 Porphyry. de Antro Nymp. ; de abst. II ; Origen, adv. Celsum II. ( AMigne).

syrianus, in tim. fr.

and dismissal of celestial bodies is the soul’s purification from evils andpermanent union with the Father (De Regressu Animae fr. ).9 It was awide-spread concept that the soul added successive layers to its garmentduring descent,10 although Iamblichus, forever contrary to Porphyry,disagreed on that matter.While Iamblichus accepted the concept of the vehicle, he attacked

in particular Porphyry’s claim that the vehicle was multiform and dis-solved itself as a series of garments.11 For Iamblichus, the vehicle wascreated from ether in its entirety, rather than mixtures from heavenlybodies (In Tim. fr. Dillon), and survived as a whole—even when thesoul ascended, the vehicle remained and waited to be reclaimed at thesoul’s inevitable descent. The soul underwent judgement, punishmentand purification in the vehicle and reascended in the vehicle.12 Boththe ochema and the irrational soul survived intact (i.e., do not dissolve)because they take their origins from the gods themselves (In Tim. fr. Dillon). Iamblichus thus creates a system whereby the soul exists in dif-ferent forms depending on which cosmic level it occupies. The soul firstexists in a pure state at the highest, supercelestial level where it has a lumi-nous vehicle.13 In its next stage, the soul is brought into the cosmos andsowed among planets and stars, at which point it takes on an etherealvehicle.14 At the point when the soul descends into the material realm,it puts on a corporeal body.15 The major difference between Iamblichusand his predecessors is his rejection of the theory that one level of soulremains above.

9 Augustine,Civ. Dei x, ; Bidez. Fr. , *; purification of the pneuma conduced tothe removal of(αντασ�α. See Smith () . Plotinus refers to the progressive embod-iment of the soul inEnn. IV..ff. Smith () compares Plotinus’ use of �$ρυνσις (ideaof the soul’s weight forcing it down) and the concept of dragging (�(ελκ�μ)νας) with theterminology in Porphyry, Sent. xxix, p. .; p. .; p. , ; p. . See also Ad Gaurum,p. , ff.; de Antro Nymph., Nauck , .

10 The concept of the chiton appears in Empedocles, fr. Diels, where the body isencompassed with flesh; Philo (Leg. All. III. ff.), the irrational soul acts as chitoneswhich envelop the logikon; Porphyry (de abst. II. ), the pneumatic body is chiton.Dodds, .

11 Proclus, In Tim. III, .–; Dillon () –; Dodds () ; Smith() ; Finamore () .

12 Finamore and Dillon () .13 Finamore and Dillon () .14 Finamore and Dillon () .15 Finamore and Dillon () .ff.; . Finamore () –.

commentary

In lines .ff., Proclus argues that the irrational soul cannotmerelydissolve, as we know from RepublicX that it undergoes punishments andpurifications.16 He argues, agreeing with Iamblichus,17 that the soul usesthe immortal vehicle inHades (.–). Porphyry argued that vehicleand irrational soul survived bodily death, and could thus be punished,before return to the firmament.18Next, he makes an odd reference to entry into irrational animals, a

phenomenon nobody seems to have accepted after Porphyry’s dismissalof it.19 Proclus is perhaps being rhetorical here, arguing that interactionsrequire appropriate intermediaries.Proclus arrives at the opinion of “our Master” in lines .ff. Syr-

ianus reconciles the opinions of Porphyry—who says the vehicle dis-solves—and Iamblichus—who argues that it survives—by positing ahigher and lower ochema.20 Syrianus here posits two vehicles, a higherochema, which is immortal and a lower one, which dissolves. Along withIamblichus, he held that this upper vehicle undergoes creation first. Thedissolvable vehicle endures bodily death, as does Porphyry’s, so that theirrational soul may undergo purification. The young gods constructedthe lower vehicle, as the Demiurge cannot be held responsible for mor-tal material. In addition, Proclus adopts Porphyry’s concept that the soulobtains layers of elements during its descent, which are later removedduring its ascent to the cosmos (.ff.). Proclus construes a vehiclemade of different elements and three distinct envelopes: the first alwaysexists, as it is encosmic; the second exists before the body and after it; thethird, the soul exchanges once it is on earth (.–.).

16 Iamblichus holds that the soul descends either voluntarily or involuntarily as partof its punishment.

17 Iamblichus argues that the soul is purified after death of the body in its etherealvehicle. See Finamore and Dillon () –.

18 Dodds () . Porphyry argues that that natural death is not the completerelease of soul in Sent. xxix.

19 Mentioned by Nemesius, de Naturae Hominis.20 Finamore () –;Dillon () –.Damascius, aswith Syrianus and

Proclus, posits a higher and lower vehicle. Damascius, In Phd. .. Souls are punishedin the lower, pneumatic vehicle, In Phd. ., .. See Finamore and Dillon ().

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 24

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–.

Κα- π$λιν �π- τ7ν πρ τερ�ν κρατRρα, �ν 1Y τ"ν τ�5 παντ7ς ψυA"νκεραννVς Oμισγε, τ+ τ.ν πρ σ*εν �π λ�ιπα κατεAε9τ� μ�σγων [Tim. D].

E δ) γε 8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμ?ν, 3νω*εν cσπερ <π7 σκ�πι^ς τ+ =ντα*ε?μεν�ς κα- τα9ς τ.ν *ε�λ γων �(ηγ0σεσιν 6π μεν�ς, nδη μHν κα-�ν αDτ1. τ1. πατρ- κα- δημι�υργ1. τ.ν �λων τ"ν γ νιμ�ν <πετ�*ετ�δCναμιν, κα*’ jν μιμ�Cμεν�ς τ7ν ν�ητ7ν *ε7ν κα- πατρικ"ν OAει κα-μητρικ"ν πρ7ς τ�Vς �γκ�σμ��υς *ε�Vς α�τ�αν, αDτ7ς �Dσι�π�ι ς, αD-τ7ς �1ω�γ ν�ς, αDτ7ς ε�δ�π�ι ς.

�πειδ" δH δε9 κα- διωρισμ)νην α�τ�αν ε`ναι τRς ψυAικRς �ωRς τ"νσυνδημι�υργ�5σαν αDτ1. τ7ν �λ�ν κ σμ�ν κα- <π�γενν.σαν π^σαντ"ν ψυAικ"ν �Dσ�αν, κα- ταCτην δι+ τ�5 κρατRρ�ς Oλεγεν 8μ9ν παρα-δ�δ�σ*αι. κα- τ�Vς μHν *ε�λ γ�υς, �ν <π�ρρ0τ�ις λ)γ�ντας L λ)γ�υσι,γ$μ�υς τε κα- τ κ�υς �πιν�ε9ν *ε.ν, δι’ Yν α�ν�σσ�νταιa τ+ς �ν τ�9ς*ε�9ς τ.ν <π�γενν0σεων Eμ�ν�ητικ+ς κ�ινων�ας, τ7ν δH Πλ$τωνακρ$σεις τε κα- συγκρ$σεις διαμυ*�λ�γε9ν, τ+ μHν γ)νη τ�5 =ντ�ς <ν-τ- τ.ν σπερμ$των, τ"ν δH μ9Uιν <ντ- τ�5 γ$μ�υ παραλαμ�$ν�νταGκα- γ+ρ αQ ψυAα- κατ+ μHν τ7 �ν αDτα9ς xν <π7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5παρ0A*ησαν, κατ+ δH τ"ν �ω"ν <π7 τ�5 κρατRρ�ςG α�τ�α γ$ρ �στι

a < λ�γ�υσι–α�νισσ�νται om D

And oncemore into the former bowl, whereinHe had blended andmixedthe Soul of the Universe, He poured the residue of the previous material,mixing it

But my Master, viewing reality as from a higher vantage point1 andfollowing the guidance of the theologians,2 already places in the Fatherand theDemiurge of the universe himself the generative power, in accordwith which, in imitation of the intelligible god, he possesses both apaternal and a maternal causal relationship with the encosmic gods, hehimself producing their essence, he himself the generator of their life, hehimself the creator of their form.3But since there had to be a particular cause of psychic life, whichwould

assist him in creating the entire cosmos, and which generates the entireessence of soul, he said4 that this also was transmitted to us by means ofthe mixing bowl. The theologians, uttering their teachings in secret for-mulae, postulate marriages and births of gods, through which they hintat the harmonious union of generation among the gods, whereas Platopresents us with a mythical account of mixtures and blendings, posit-ing the genera of being instead of seeds and the mixture as answeringto marriage.5 For indeed, the souls in respect of the being inherent inthem are produced by the Demiurge, while in respect of their life theyare produced in the mixing bowl; for it is the vivifying cause of all truly

1 Cf. Rep. IV C: “ ‘And truly’, said I, ‘now that we have come to this height ofargument I seem to see as from a point of outlook (σκ�πι$) that there is one form ofexcellence.’” Proclus here implicitly compares Syrianus to Socrates.

2 Julian (Diehl, ed. .); Festugière suggests that the “theologians” includeChaldeanOracles, (Or.ch. .) and Orpheus (OF .; Hesiod .s.) based on Proclus’account in .ff. It seems that in ., however, that Proclus is paraphrasingSyrianus and adding these quotations for authority, so I would not attribute the Chaldeanor Orphic quotations to Syrianus here.

3 I.e., he contains within himself the triad of Being-Life-Intellect (= form).4 'Ελ)γεν (.) governs �πιν�ε9ν (.) and διαμυ*�λ�γε9ν (.).5 I.e., the five genera of the Sophist and of the Timaeus.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

�1ω�γ ν�ς τRς ψυAικRς �Dσι?δ�υς �ωRς. �πειδ" δH μ^λλ ν ε�σι �ωα-κα- πρ7ς τ"ν �1ω�γ�νικ"ν 1bκε�ωνται τ$Uιν, δι+ τ�5τ� 3ρAεται μHν 8μ9Uις <π7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5, τελει�5ται δH �ν τ1. κρατRριG πανταA *ενγ+ρ �eτ�ς περι)Aει τ+ γ)νη τ.ν ψυA.ν �ν 6αυτ1. κα- μετ+ τ�5 δημι�υρ-γ�5 συναπ�γεννT^ τ+ς ψυA$ς. τ)τταρα �Pν τα5τ$ �στιν, E κεραννVς Eκρατ"ρ τ+ κιρν$μενα τ7 κρ^μα, κα- l μHν τ"ν πατρ7ς OAει τ$Uιν, l δHτ"ν γεννητικ"ν κα- <(�ριστικ"ν τ�5 εhδ�υς τ.ν ψυA.ν, τ+ δH πρ εισιμHν <π’ <μ(�9ν, μ^λλ�ν δH �κ τ�5 πατρ ς, τ7 δH ε�δ�π�ιε9ται κατ+ τ"νγεννητικ"ν α�τ�αν 4ν τι γιγν μεν�ν �π7 τ�5 κρατRρ�ς.

ε� δH δε9 παραγυμν.σαι τ"ν τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν δι$ν�ιαν, �σ-τ)�ν, �τι τRς �1ω�γ ν�υ *ε τητ�ς π$σας τ+ς πηγ+ς �ν 6αυτSR περιεA�C-σης τRςa �ωRς, �σαι τε ψυA.ν ε�σι γεννητικα- κα- �σαι τRς δαιμ�ν�αςτ$Uεως κα- �σαι τ+ς <γγελικ+ς <π�τ�κτ�υσι σειρ+ς κα- �σαι τ"ν (C-σιν �π’ �σA$τ�ις παρ$γ�υσι, πρ εισ� τις <π’ αDτRς μ�α *ε της �1ω�γ -ν�ς, πηγ" π$σης τRς τ.ν ψυA.ν πρ� δ�υ κα- <π�γενν0σεως, j κα- τ1.δημι�υργ1. συνταττ�μ)νη συνυ(�στησιν αDτ1. τ7ν ψυAικ7ν �λ�ν δι$-κ�σμ�ν, π^σαν μHν τ"ν �περκ σμι�ν <π�γενν.σα ψυA0ν, π^σαν δHτ"ν �γκ σμι�ν, πρ�ϊ�5σα δH �π- π$ντα κα- �ω�π�ι�5σα κα- τ7ν �λ�νκ σμ�ν, jν E μHν '�ρ(εVς [fr. ] �σ�τελR τ1. δημι�υργ1. καλε9 κα-συν$πτει κα- συ�εCUας μ�αν π�ιε9 μητ)ρα π$ντων Yν E BεVς πατ0ρ, EδH Πλ$των κρατRρα πρ�σε�ρηκεν, [ς πηγ"ν �ωRς ψυAικRςG

�eτ�ς γ+ρ E κρατ"ρ �π�δ)Aεται τ"ν γεννητικ"ν �ν)ργειαν τ�5 πα-τρ7ς τ.ν ψυA.ν, κα- κατ+ τ�5τ�ν ε�δ�π�ιε9ται τ7 ε`δ�ς τ.ν ψυA.ν,�*εν κα- κρ^μα πρ�σηγ ρευται. OAει μHν �Pν κα- E BεVς �ν α�τ1. �ασι-λικ"ν ψυA0ν,cσπερ ε`πεν E �ν τ1. Φιλ0�1ω [D]Σωκρ$της, OAει δH κα-τ"ν πηγ"ν ταCτην συνεργα��μ)νην αDτ1. τ7ν ψυAικ7ν δι$κ�σμ�ν. κα-�Q μHν �$ρ�αρ�ι τ"ν �1ω�γ�νικ"ν ταCτην α�τ�αν πηγα�αν ψυA"ν <π�-καλ�5σι μετ+ τRς πηγα�ας <ρετRς <να(ανε9σαν <π7 τ.ν λαγ νων τRς�λης �1ω�γ ν�υ *ε τητ�ς, �ν Sp περι)A�νται π$σης �ωRς πηγα�, *ε�ας<γγελικRς δαιμ�ν�ας ψυAικRςb (υσικRς.E δH *ε�λ γ�ς E παρ’ �Ελλησιν[Hes.Theog. s] �Ηραν αDτ"ν πρ�σε�ρηκε μετ+ τRς /Εστ�ας <να(α-νε9σαν <π7 τRς μεγ�στης /Ρ)ας, j περιε�λη(εν >π$σας τ+ς �1ω�γ�νικ+ςδυν$μεις, �π- τ)λει κα- αDτ"ν <π�τ�κτ�υσα τ"ν ΦCσιν, ε� κα- συντ$ττειτ1. δημι�υργ1. τ"ν �Ηραν [ς μητ)ρα πατρ�, κα- π$σης τRς ΤιτανικRς

a (.ω�γ�ν�υ–τ5ς om D b π�σης (ω5ς–ψυκι25ς om D

text and translation

existent psychic life.6 But since [the souls] are predominantly lives andassimilated to the life-giving order, on this account, the mixture origi-nates from the Demiurge, but is brought to completion in the mixingbowl; for in every way this embraces the classes of souls in itself and,along with the Demiurge, assists in their generation. There are thereforethese four: the mixer, the mixing bowl, the things being mixed, and themixture. The first has the rank of Father, the second has the role of whatis generative and definitive of the forms of souls, the things being mixedcome from both of these, but more from the Father, but the mixture isgiven form in accordance with the generative cause, being made into onething by the mixing bowl.But if we must unveil the thought of our Master, one must know that,

since the vivifying divinity encompasses all the sources of life in itself,both such as are generative of souls and such as are generative of thedaemonic class, such as bring to birth the angelic series, and such as leadsNature down to the ultimate level, there springs from that one, a certainvivifying deity, the source of the entire procession and generation ofsouls, which conjoined to the Demiurge calls into existence with him theentire cosmos, generating both all the supracosmic Soul and all encosmicSoul, proceeding to all things and giving life to the entire cosmos, whichOrpheus calls the ‘consort’ of the Demiurge, and limits it with him, andyoking them together, he makes it the unique mother of all beings ofwhich Zeus is the Father, while Plato calls it the mixing-bowl, as beingthe source of all psychic life.For this mixing bowl receives the productive activity of the Father of

souls, and in accordance with that, produces the form of souls, whenceit is called the mixture. Zeus, after all, has in himself ‘a royal soul’, justas Socrates said in the Philebus, but he has also that same ‘fount’ thatproduces with him the psychic cosmos. Even the barbarians (sc. Chal-daeans) call the life-producing cause the ‘fountal soul’ which manifestsitself, along with the source of virtue, from the ‘flanks’ of the whole life-producing deity, in which are contained the sources of all life, divine,angelic, daemonic, psychic, and physical. But the theologian of theGreeks (sc. Hesiod) has called her Hera, appearing with Hestia fromthe great Rhea, who contains all the life-producing powers and she her-self finally producing Nature, even if he links Hera to the Demiurge, asmother to father, and presents her as the originator of the entire Titanic

6 Distinction between on and zoe.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

διαιρ)σεως OUαρA�ν αDτ"ν παραδ�δωσι τRς [[τε]] �ν ψυAα9ς *εωρ�υμ)-νης κατ+ τ+ς μ��ρας διακρ�σεως α�τ�αν. E δH Πλ$των κρατRρα, κα- τ7κρ^μα κα- τ+ς μ��ρας <π�λαμ�$νωνG �κε9ν�ς γ+ρ αhτι�ς τRς τ.ν μ�ι-ρ.ν διαιρ)σεωςG δι7 κα- �D πρ τερ�ν διαιρε9, πρ-ν �ν τ1. κρατRρι τ+γ)νη σπαρSR.

Commentary

In this commentary on the mixing bowl, Syrianus explains how themixing bowl acts as the generative cause of souls in so far as it transmitsform to souls, while the Demiurge, as mixer, produces psychic life.Before giving the opinion of Syrianus, Proclus lists the readings of

Theodore of Asine, Atticus, and Iamblichus. Theodore (.–.)distinguishes two krateres: the first being portions of the mixture—theSoul itself (the universal Soul),7 the souls of the celestial gods, and oursouls; the second being the mixture. Proclus condemns this interpre-tation because Plato only mentions one krater in which he mingles allsouls. He finds little use for a secondmixing bowl. Next-mentioned (outof chronological sequence), is Atticus (.–), who, in his inter-pretation of the Phaedrus, also posited a two-fold krater. Proclus findsthis out of character with Atticus’ usual interpretations of Plato, as hetends to stick close to the text. It is interesting that Proclus next discussesIamblichus, who said there was only one mixing bowl, and skips overPlotinus’ discussion of two mixing bowls entirely.8 Iamblichus (.–) posits one mixing bowl, which comprehends all life as “one vivificcause.”The penetrative logos pours out of themixing bowlwith directionson how to order life. He allots to each soul, depending on its lexis, a par-ticular measure of connection (apparently to the mixing bowl or divinecreation). Based on a passage in In Tim. .–, Dillon understandsthis as the Demiurge granting different proportions of being, samenessand otherness to divine, demonic, and individual human souls.9 These

7 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. II, .; soul in universal sense.8 Plotinus,Enn. IV..–, where hementions the products of Plato’s “second”mixing

bowl.9 Cf. Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon; Dillon () .

text and translation

division, as cause of the division according to Fate seen in souls. But Platocalls it ‘mixing bowl’—distinguishing from it the mixture and the fatedportions. For that is the cause of the division of fated portions. It is onaccount of this that he did notmake a division before he sowed the genera[of souls] into the mixing bowl.

are alloted an order by way of procession from the mixing bowl as theyreceive definitions of life. Iamblichus describes the relationship of theworld soul to the individual soul by describing two mixtures, adoptingthe olive oil pressing imagery employed by Plato—there is a first pressing,in which the ingredients produce theWorld Soul, and a second pressing,in which the remnants of the first mixture produce the secondary souls.Proclus comes to the opinion of “our Master” in lines .. He

situates the creative power in the “Father of all things”, the title granted tothe Father of the triad of demiurges. Syrianus places the γ�νιμ0 δυναμ�ςin the Father, here a ν�ερ ς divinity, so that this power is associatedwith the summit of the intelligible world. As an intellective creature, theDemiurge imitates the intelligible god and relates back to the intelligiblegod. The hierarchy Syrianus describes here can be outlined:

Noetic (intelligible)Noetic-Noeric (intelligible-intellective)Noetic: Demiurge/intellective level

|Father of intelligibles in contact with intelligible “being”

Syrianus describes the Father as having a paternal and maternal rela-tionship with the encosmic gods, by which he means he contains aitiaof both—�ω0, as the maternal causality and =ν as the paternal causal-ity.10 He is the maker of forms (ε�δ�π�ι ς),11 the creator of essence

10 There is a triad of demiurgic fathers, with the middle one actually being a mother(Rhea or Hekate). See Dillon ().

11 Damascius, In Parm .; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Parm .; InParm .; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Phil .; Proclus, PT IV, .; PT V,.; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Tim I, .; In Tim II, .;In Tim III, ..

syrianus, in tim. fr.

(�Dσι�π�ι ς).12 Syrianus next lists what the Demiurge generates: he isthe generator of life, essence, and form—the Platonic triad of the sec-ond hypostasis, with εhδ�ς standing in for ν�5ς.TheDemiurge transmitsthese qualities to soul when he causes pyschic life, in so far as he assistsin creating the whole cosmos and generates the whole of psychic reality.In line ., we come to Syrianus’ discussion of the mixing bowl.

Syrianus compares Plato’s mixing bowl image to the theologians’ talkof marriages among the gods. While theologians say that marriagesand births of gods13 are a form of mixing and blendings of genres,Plato replaces the concept of births with that of the genres of beingand marriage with that of mixture.14 The mixture discussed here is theformation of souls—the mixture itself originated with the Demiurge butreaches perfection in the mixing bowl. The parts of the mixture seemto be essence and life, which relate to the mixer and mixing bowl in sofar as =ν is the Demiurge and �ω0, the mixing bowl. Because souls aremore akin to �ω0 than �Dσ�α (.–), the process of the mixtureof souls begins with the Demiurge and ends with the mixing bowl. Themixing bowl functions by transmitting and generating the essenceof souland is the life-giving cause of all �ω0. The mixing bowl’s role in creationmakes it both the life-giving cause and the life-giving element in the soul.The maternal Demiurge thus plays a greater role than the paternal, withrespect to elements in the soul. Syrianus outlines the four elements of thisprocess further in .ff.:

. the mixer = Demiurge (Father). the mixing bowl = the (female) power that is generative and defini-tive of form of souls

. the things mixed (elements of soul); γεν0 τ.ν =ντων A–B: theseproceed from both, although more from the Father

. Syrianus, In Tim. fr. the product (soul itself): given form fromthe generative cause having become one thing from the action ofthe mixing bowl.

12 First used in Hermias on the Phaedrus, a transcription of Syrianus’ lectures, InPlatonis Phaedrum scholia .. The term is used later by Proclus and Damascius:Proclus, PT IV, .; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Parm .; In Cra .;In Tim III, .; In Euc .; and Damascius, De Princ I, .; In Parm. .; InParm. .; In Parm. .; In Parm. .; In Parm. .; In Phil. ..

13 Orph. .; .. See Praechter () ..14 The allusion to the genres of being could indicate the five genres in the Sophist. In PT

V, , p. , Proclus places the genres of being in the summit of the intelligibles becausethat is where the forms are located.

commentary

From .–. Proclus sets out to “clarify the thought of ourMaster” (ε� δε δε9 παραγυμν.σαι τ"ν τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν δι$-ν�ιαν), noting that Syrianus himself adduced the Oracles and Orpheus.He rephrases the earlier statements of Syrianus, while taking note that, inaddition to generating partial souls, the mixing bowl also generates thehypercosmic order of Soul and theWorld Soul. By broadening the func-tion of the mixing bowl from creating partial souls exclusively, which ishow Syrianus describes its function, Proclus argues that the mixing bowlcontains all life, including the World Soul. He is also explicit with ref-erence to the kind of partial souls created by the crater: these includethe divine, angelic and demonic classes. This passage is a nice display ofProclus’ exegetical technique. It seems he paraphrases the gist of Syri-anus’ teaching on the topic, then re-interprets it to fit a broader categorythan Syrianus had initially outlined. Once he extends the category dis-cussed, Proclus gives authority to his interpretation by citing Orpheus,15the Chaldeans,16 and Hesiod.17

15 OF : He calls the mixing bowl a vivific deity equal in dignity to the Demiurge.16 Or. Ch. .: the mixing bowl is called the vivifying cause and the source of souls

which comes from the Demiurge and contains the divine, angelic and demonic natures.17 Or. Ch. .; Hes. Theog. – identifies the vivific cause with Juno although

all these analogies are probably derived from Syrianus, who after all composed a concor-dance (symphonia) of Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato.

SYRIANUS, IN TIM. FR. 25

Proclus, In Tim. III. .–

��τι γ)νεσις πρ?τη μHν Oσ�ιτ� τεταγμ)νη μ�α π^σιν, Wνα μ0 τις �λατ-τ�9τ� υπ’ αDτ�5 [Tim. E].

3λλ�ς δH <κρι�)στερ�ς κα- τ�5δε λ γ�ς, lν E 8μ)τερ�ς διδ$σκαλ�ςπαρεδ�δ�υ, π$σSη ψυASR μερικSR μ�αν <(ωρ�σ*αι κ$*�δ ν (ησιν �DA>πλ.ς, <λλ+ κα*’ 6κ$στην τ�5 *ε��υ γενητ�5 περ��δ�νG �Dδεμ�ανγ+ρ ψυA"ν �Zτε τ.ν <Aρ$ντων καλ�υμ)νων �Zτε τ.ν κακCνεσ*αικα- πλαν^σ*αι δυναμ)νων π^σαν περ��δ�ν 3νω μ)νειν ε�κ ςG τ7 γ+ρκα*’ �λην περ��δ�ν μ�αν <κλινHς κα- 3τρεπτ�ν διαμ)ν�ν 3νω �DδHκατ’ 3λλην Oτι κατελ*ε9ν ε�ς γ)νεσιν δυνατ νG π$ντα γ+ρ <νελιττ μενατ+ σA0ματα τ�5 παντ7ς 3πτωτ�ν διε(CλαUεν αDτ0νG <ε- δH τ+ αDτ+σA0ματα π$λιν κα- π$λιν. Oτι δH 8 �ω" τRς μερικRς ψυARςa �λ$ττων �στ-τRς περι δ�υ τ�5 παντ ς, cστ’ ε� κατ+ π^σαν ταCτην nρκεσε πρ7ς τ"ν3νω διαμ�ν0ν, 3τρεπτ�ν OλαAε τ"ν ν�ερ+ν δCναμιν �SR γ+ρ [σαCτωςτ7ν �λ�ν Aρ ν�ν, cστ’ ε� μηδHν ε�ς αDτ"ν καιν7ν E σCμπας OδρασεAρ ν�ς �Uελιττ μεν�ς, τ.ν <ε- μεν�υσ.ν �στιν �ν τ1. κατ+ (Cσιν.

<ν$γκη 3ρα π^σαν ψυA"ν μερικ"ν �ν 6κ$στSη περι δ1ω μ�αν π�ι0σα-σ*αι κ$*�δ�ν, πλε��υς δH 3λλας 3λλων, π�λλ1. τ1. αDτεU�υσ�1ω Aρη-σαμ)νας. ταCτην δ" τ"ν κ$*�δ�ν E Πλ$των πρ?την γ)νεσιν πρ�σε�-ρηκεG δηλ�9 δH αDτ ς, Eπ ταν διαλεA*ε-ς περ- τ.ν μετ+ τ"ν πρ?τηνγ)νεσιν λ0Uεων �π$γSη [ B]G σ(αλε-ς δH τ�Cτων ε�ς γυναικ7ς (Cσιν �ντSR δευτ)ρTα γεν)σει μετα�$λ�ι. πρ?την 3ρα γ)νεσιν τ"ν <π7 τ�5 ν�η-τ�5 λ)γει κ$*�δ�ν.

a ψυκ5ς A: b (im): (ω5ςQDb

How that the first birth should be one and the same ordained for all, inorder that none might be slighted by Him

But there is another account more accurate even than this, that ourMaster used to expound,1 which says that for every individual soul thereis one descent designated, not absolutely but in the course of each circuitof the divine creation (Rep. VIII B ):2 for, it is reasonable to supposethat no soul, neither one of those termed “pure”, nor any of those prone tobe corrupted and sent astray, remains above during an entire revolution.For that which remains above undeviating and unchanged throughout awhole period cannot descend into generation in any other period. All theconfigurations3 of the universe as they turn have preserved it unchanged,for the same constellations go round again and again. And further, thelife of the individual soul is less than the circuit, so that if it lasted theentire revolution, it would have been allotted an intellectual power thatis unchanging (for it would be living in an equalmanner during thewholeof time.) So that if the whole of time in its unrolling4 did nothing new toit, it would be in its nature one of those things that remain always.It is necessary, then, that every individual soul in each cosmic period

make one descent, and some do more than others, making use of morefree will. It is this descent that Plato calls “the first generation.” He makesthis clear when, concerning the allotment of lives following on the firstdescent, he says [ B]: “If it fails in this, it changes into the nature ofa woman.” He means, then, by the first generation the descent from theintelligible world.

1 Παρεδ�δ�υ: Note the use of the imperfect.2 “Now for divine begettings, there is a period comprehended by a perfect number…”.

Oστι δε *ε�1ω μεν γεννητ1. περ��δ�ς.3 ΣA0ματα in an astrological sense.4 'ΕUελ�ττ�μεν�ς.

syrianus, in tim. fr.

Commentary

Syrianus here describes the πρ?τη γ)νεσις as the descent of the indi-vidual soul. Proclus gives two other opinions on the topic before that ofSyrianus. Iamblichus appears first (.ff.):

“As for the ‘first birth’ which the philosopher now relates, and which theDemiurge, in announcing the laws of fate, declares to the souls, what arewe to say that it is? For more than one view is taken of it. The divineIamblichus, for one, calls the ‘sowing’ (of souls) into vehicles the firstbirth, and admittedly what follows bears him out; for Plato added directlyfollowing on this passage the phrase ‘and how it was needful that they,when sown…’”5

For Iamblichus, the sowing of souls into their γ)νεσις is the first birth.6Regarding the ochema, Proclus explains that souls, once in a primordial,non-bodily form, are sown into vehicles and given their allotments.7After this point, souls are placed under fate and must descend andassociate with generation.8 The second explanation of the “first descent”(.ff.) is from an anonymous source, possibly Theodore or Plutarchof Athens, who argues that the first birth is the single descent of souls into

5 Trans. Dillon (), Iamblichus, In Tim. fr. Dillon.6 See Iamblichus, de Anima, : Plotinus, Porphyry, and Amelius assign equal status

to all souls and bring them forth from the supercelestial soul to reside in bodies:

“The depiction of the soul’s first coming into existence seems very different in theTimaeus. The Demiurge sows them among all the superior classes, throughout all theheaven, and into all the elements of the universe.Thus, the demiurge’s sowing of souls willbe divided around the divine creations, and the first processions of souls will come intoexistence along with it and will comprise the receptacles for the souls.” trans. Finamore-Dillon. In section , Iamblichus says that there are three classes of souls, the first twodescend willingly, while the third is forced to descend. It appears that even the pure souldescends, although he is not explicit in arguing this: “For the soul that descends for thesalvation, purification, and perfection of this realm is immaculate in its descent.The soul,on the other hand, that directs itself about bodies for the exercise and correction of itsown character is not entirely free of passions and was not sent away free in itself.The soulthat comes down here for punishment and judgement seems somehow to be dragged andforced.” Trans. Finamore-Dillon ().

7 Finamore and Dillon () : “The ‘first coming into existence’ (πρ?τη �π -στασις) is the soul’s earliest and highest existence at the supercelestial level; the ‘sowing’(σπ�ρ$) brings the soul into the cosmos and associates it and its ethereal vehicle with asoul and vehicle of a leader-god; the descent (κ$*�δ�ς) brings the soul into the world ofgeneration and into its corporeal body.” See Finamore () –.

8 Proclus, In Tim. III, .–.. Porphyry’s position on this is that only the soulof the philosopher can escape the cycle of reincarnations. De Regressu Animae (Bidez,fr. ), , p. *f. See Smith () .

commentary

generation—8 μ�α κ$*�δ�ς τ.ν ψυA?ν (<πλ.ς δι�ρ��εται μ�αν γ) τινακ$*�δ�ν). Proclus addresses this opinion using γ$ρ with indirect state-ment (.), indicating that he disagrees with 3λλ�ς τις. The problem,however, is not with the chronology of the soul first being sown into thevehicle, followed by a descent into generation, but rather with denotingthe sowing as “the first descent” in particular.Syrianus’ interpretation, as the third listed, responds to the anonymous

opinion (.). While he agrees with the anonymous interpreter thatthe “first generation” refers to the descent of the soul into generation, heargues that there is not one descent absolutely. Instead, Syrianus says thatthe soul descends once for every divine circuit.9 He gives the argumentthat if a soul were to descend for one circuit, it must necessarily descendwith every circuit, as every circuit is the same, and it does notmake sensethat a soul would remain above for some circuits, but not others.The difficulty with the argument rests with whether a soul can stay

above for every circuit. That every soul descends is a Iamblichean opin-ion10 that is contrary to Plato’s account in the Phaedrus.11 Neverthe-less, Syrianus eliminates the possibility for a class of souls that does notdescend with little explanation. The mainstay of the argument appearsin .– where Syrianus says that the life of the individual soul isinferior to the circuit of the all. If it were able to stay aloft throughoutthe whole circuit it would require an unchanging intellectual power—the argument Proclus uses to explain why every soul must descend.12 It

9 Rep. B. Cf. Dam. In Phaed. II West., a comment on Phaed. e, whereSyrianus is reported as holding, in a manner corresponding to this, that the assertionthat the souls of the worst sinners never reascend from Tartarus must refer simly to anygiven cosmic cycle (περ��δ�ς).

10 In passages – of the de Anima, Iamblichus discusses the descent of souls.He appears to argue that every soul must descend, either voluntarily or involuntarily,according to the Timaeus. Iamblichus, de Anima, : “Some of them [Taurus and hisfollowers], consistently with the Timaeus, teach that this [the descent of the soul] occursfor the completion of the universe so that there will be just as many living things in thecosmos as there are in the intelligible realm.”

11 Phaedrus and the myth of the charioteer: Aff. As the charioteer goes round thecircuits of the universe, it is possible for him to command “the wicked horse” and notdescend ( E).

12 See Proclus, ET, prop. : “For suppose that some part of the soul remains in theintelligible. It will exercise perpetual intellection, either without transition from objectto object or transitively. But if without transition, it will be an intelligence and not afragment of a soul, and the soul in question will be one which directly participates anintelligence; and this is impossible (prop. ). And if transitively, the part which hasperpetual intellection and that which has intermittent intellection will be one substance.But this is impossible, for they differ in kind, as has been shown (prop. ); and it is,

syrianus, in tim. fr.

is thus in the nature of the soul to descend so that each soul in everycircuit must descend once using its own free will (.–).Although all souls make their first descent from the intelligible realm,

some souls have a greater number of descents than others.13 Accordingto Syrianus, in the second descent of the soul, the soul takes on theform of a woman—hence, it seems that while all souls must descend,the necessarily repetitious descents in some way weaken or diminish thesoul. Proclus attaches the idea of the descent of the soul to the nature ofthe soul, which is mixed with good and strife. This is most clear in hisexposition of the charioteer in the Phaedrusmyth as it appears in In Alc...14

moreover, unaccountable that the highest part of the soul, if it be perpetually perfect, doesnot master the other facilities and render them also perfect. Therefore every particularsoul descends entire.” Translation Dodds ().

13 Proclus, ET prop. . Certain exceptional souls might spend many periods in theintelligible world (Proclus, In Crat. cxvii).

14 “The Socrates of the Phaedrus says that our faculties are mingled with the oppositeof good and are filled with strife against each other and on this account sometimesthe better prevail, sometimes the worse. And why waste words, seeing that the samespeaker observes that even the charioteer is corrupted: ‘wherein, through the fault of thecharioteer, many souls are lamed, and many have much of their wings broken.’ Yet whatis nobler within us than the power of the charioteer?This it is which recalls things divineand uses the secondary and tertiary faculties as means towards recollection and this isclearly stated in the Phaedrus.” Proclus, In Alc. .ff., trans. O’Neill (). Two aspectsof soul, when in conflict, cause the soul to descend.The soul descends in its entirety (seeProclus, ET prop. ). This notion is contrary to Porphyry’s, which states that part ofthe soul remains permanently above. Porphyry, in turn, adapts Plotinus’ view that somesouls never descend into the body but are able to govern their lower selves unaffectedby trouble (Enn. IV..). Human souls, however, through their own fault and boldnesssink partially, although part of the soul remains in contemplation of the intelligible (Enn.VI..).

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 1

Proclus, In Prm. .–.

�� μ�ν ��ν παλαι�� περ� τ�ς τ�� Παρμεν�δ�υ πρ���σεως τ��τ�ν δι�-στησαν τ�ν τρ�π�ν� �σα δ� συνεισ γαγε τα"ς τ�#των $πιστ%σεσιν &'μ�τερ�ς κα�ηγεμ)ν, *δη λεκτ��ν. ε+ναι μ�ν δ, κα� α.τ�ς τ�ν σκ�π�νπραγματει)δη τ�� διαλ�γ�υ τ�"ς �/τως 0λ�μ�ν�ις τ1ν πρεσ2υτ�ρων3μ�λ�γει, τ ν τε 4ντιγρα5,ν 3ς 4π��αν�ν 6α�ρειν 45ε�ς—τ� γ7ρ δε"-σ�αι μ�ν τ�ν 8 νωνα τ�� Παρμεν�δ�υ τ�"ς παρ��σι γυμν%σαι τ,ν μ�-��δ�ν, $κε"ν�ν δ� $ν τ91 γυμν%:ειν 4μ#νεσ�αι τ,ν 8 νων�ς πραγμα-τε�αν, πρ�ς τ�"ς ;μπρ�σ�εν ε<ρημ�ν�ις παντελ1ς 4π��αν�ν—κα� πρ�ςτ=� 4ντιγρα5=� τα#τ=η τ=� ληρ)δει τ�ν περ� τ�ς γυμνασ�ας τ�ς $κκειμ�-νης σκ�π�ν� ε< γ7ρ ;δει τιν�ς παραδε�γματ�ς α.τ91 πρ�ς τ,ν τ�ς με��-δ�υ σα5 νειαν, >λλ� τι τ1ν πρ�6ε�ρων ?ν παρ�λα2εν $@αρκ��ν ε<ςπαραδε�γματ�ς <δ�αν, 4λλ’ �.6� τ� σεμν�τατ�ν τ1ν 0αυτ�� δ�γμ%τωνπ%ρεργ�ν ?ν $π�ι σατ� τ�ς κατ7 τ,ν γυμνασ�αν διδασκαλ�ας, κα�τ�ιν��ις πρ�σ κειν τα#την 'γ�#μεν�ς, $κε"ν� δ� πρεσ2υτικ�ς ε+ναι δια-ν��ας κα��ρAν, κα� �.δ�4ν�ρωπ�νης,3ς $ν τ�"ς π�ι μασ� 5ησιν, 4λλ7ν#μ5ης BΥψιπ#λης τιν�ς.Τ�ι��τ�ν δ’ ��ν �<�μεν�ς ε+ναι τ�ν σκ�π�ν,�Fτεπερ� τ�� Gντ�ς �Fτε

περ� τ1ν Gντων α.τ�νa ε+ναι μ�νων διετε�νετ�� συγ6ωρ1ν δ� ε+ναι περ�τ1ν π%ντων, H@��υ πρ�στι��ναι κα�’ �σ�ν 0ν�ς π%ντα $στ�ν ;κγ�νακα� ε<ς Iν 4ν ρτηται π%ντων αJτι�ν…

a α�τ�ν corr. Steel ex g (ipsam): α�τ�ν ΑΣ

These are the differences of opinion among the ancients with respect tothe purpose of the Parmenides. Now we must say what our Master hasadded to their interpretations. He agrees with those of our predeces-sors who thought the aim of the dialogue is metaphysical, and dismissesthe idea that it is a polemic as implausible. That Zeno should ask Par-menides to practise hismethodbefore the company and that Parmenidesin exhibiting it should defend himself against the treatise of Zeno is alto-gether incredible in light of what has been said: and to make its purposean exposition of method is as silly as the idea that it is a polemic. For ifhe had need of an example in order to make his method clear, he wouldhave taken some other readily available topic as an illustration, insteadof making the most august of all his doctrines incidental to the teachingof method, though he considered this method appropriate only to youngmen. To understand that august doctrine requires the intellect of an olderman, and indeed an intellect more than human, as he says in his poem,and rather that of a nymph, Hypsipyle.1

Considering such to be the dialogue’s purpose, our Master denied thatit was about Being, or about real beings alone; he admitted that it wasabout all things, but insisted on adding “in so far as all things are theoffspring of one cause and are dependent on this universal cause.”

1 This is a very odd reference, which Proclus keeps a mystery. Dillon notes that this,Proclus’ name for Parmenides’ divine guide in the poem, is not mentioned elsewhere() , note . The name is borne in mythology elsewhere by the queen of Lemnos,who had two children with Jason, but she is hardly relevant; cf. Apollodorus BibliothekeI, ix, ; III, ; Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica I, –.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

In this fragment, Syrianus adopts the view that the subject of the Par-menides is metaphysical. Syrianus’ contribution to the topic was to set theOne, rather than Being, as the topic for the first hypothesis of the Par-menides. Before giving his Master’s opinion, Proclus runs through pre-vious commentators on the Parmenides, whom he groups according totheir opinions on the subject of the dialogue; a grouping which also hap-pens to be fairly chronological as well. There are those who approach theParmenides as a dialectical exercise; those who give an ontological inter-pretation, focusing on theOne Intelligible Being, in particular; thosewhogive a henological interpretation; and others, including Proclus and Syri-anus, who give a theological reading of the text.2 I will run through theserather cursorily here, as they have been adequately treated by Dillon inhis introduction to the Commentary on the Parmenides.3

The first group (.–.) which Proclus lists in his history ofinterpretation includes those who thought that the Parmenides was anexercise in logical method with a polemical aim. Proclus says that theseinterpreters suggest the Parmenides was an antigraphe against Zeno onthe intelligibles, a suggestion he dismisses. The second view (.–.) argues that the dialogue could not have a polemical purposeas that is not consistent with its contents. This group claims that thedialogue is a logical exercise with the aim of offering practice in theexercise of logical disputation.4 It appears, on the other hand, that thefirst century ce Neopythagorean Moderatus appealed to a metaphys-ical interpretation of the Parmenides,5 making use of the first three

2 These categories were created by Steel, who emphasizes the henological interpreta-tion of the text in his article () .

3 Dillon () –.4 See Alcinous,Didaskalikos , where he finds in the Parmenides the ten categories of

Aristotle. See Festugière () . On the Parmenides as a logical exercise, see Albinus,Isagoge ; Diogenes Laertius III, ; Philoponus In Anal. Pr. . –; Alex. Aphr. InTopica, .–.; and is the topic of Proclus’ Platonic Theology I, .

5 Dodds () –, argued that the following passage from a work of PorphyryOn Matter presents us with an interpretation of the first three hypotheses of Plato’sParmenides: “It seems that this opinion concerningMatter was held first amongGreeks bythe Pythagoreans, and after them by Plato, as indeedModeratus tells us. For he (sc. Plato),following the Pythagoreans, declares that the first One is above Being and all essence,while the second One—which is the ‘truly existent’ and the object of intellection—hesays is the Forms; the third—which is the soul-realm—participates in the One and the

commentary

hypotheses, at least, and it is possible that the practice of interpretingthis dialogue goes back to Speusippus, though that must be regarded asspeculative.6 In PlatonicTheology I. , Proclus gives a lengthy discussionof why the Parmenides is a dialogue on Being, not a gymnasia of dialectic.In Platonic Theology I. . p. , lines –, Proclus says, “We then have areason to say that the Parmenides does not have logic as its aim, rather itseems to constitute a science of all the first principles as its aim.”

The next group identified by Proclus concerns those who hold thatthe Parmenides is a metaphysical dialogue. While philosophers sincePlotinus declared that the first hypothesis concerns the primal Good,7an argument existed based on what, if anything, to include with the One.This group is again broken into three groups, the third being the opinionof Syrianus, while the first two groups are attributed to “the ancients” bySyrianus.

The first group (.–.), which holds a doctrine of One Being,rather than the One, says that the subject of the Parmenides is Being.This group citesTheaetetus ( E) where Socrates says that in his youthhe heard an old Parmenides philosophise about Being. The supporter ofthis opinion claims that logical gymnastics are important, but only forelucidating the real purpose of the Parmenides. In . he brings up thepoint that no Platonic dialogue has the study of a method for its topic.Thus, Plato did not introduce logic as the subject of the Parmenides, butas a means of positing both existence and non-existence of the subjectBeing. It has been suggested that the proponent of this argument is

forms, while the lowest nature which comes after it, that of the sense-realm, does noteven participate, but receives order by reflection from those others, Matter in the sense-realm being a shadow cast by Not-Being as it manifests itself primally in Quantity, andwhich is of a degree inferior even to that.” The first One is above Being and all essence, aview adapted and elaborated upon by Porphyry and Iamblichus. For a discussion of thisModeratus passage, see Dillon () –.

6 See Dillon’s argument () –. In the following passage in Plato’sCommentaryon the Parmenides (VII, pp. , –, Klibansky): “For if the first One participated inBeing in some way, although it is higher than Being and produces it, it would be a onewhich took over the mode of reality which belongs to Being. But it is not a one, andis the cause not just of Being but of everything, though of Being before the rest. Andif everything must participate in its cause, there must be a “one” other than a simplyOne, in which Being participates; and this “one” is the principle of beings. This is alsohow Speusippus understands the situation (presenting his views as the doctrines of theancients).” Proclus credits Speusippus with the doctrine of a first One followed by asecond One, which Being participates.

7 Proclus, In Parm. .–.; Steel () .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Origen the Platonist.8 While Proclus refers to the doctrines of Origenanonymously in theCommentary on the Parmenides,9 he refers to Origenexplicitly in the Platonic Theology. In Platonic Theology II. , Proclusrefutes Origen, who did not accept the Plotinian One, but rather tooktheParmenides’ denial of all things posited in the first hypothesis tomeanthat the transcendent One did not exist. Origen maintains that the Oneis without existence and substance; Intellect is the highest principle; andabsolute Being and the absolute One are identical.10

The second group listed (.–.) likewise agrees that the sub-ject of the Parmenides is metaphysical, but supposes that the dialogueis about the One Being (0ν Gν) and all those who get their reality fromthe One (περ� Mπαν%ντων τ1ν 4π� τ�� 0ν�ς Nπ�στ%ντων). This groupposits that all things attributed and denied of the One cannot be appliedto the One Being alone, hence the discussion must be about all thingsfrom the primary cause down to the lowest (.–). This view is con-sistent with that of Plotinus,11 Porphyry, and Iamblichus.12 In PlatonicTheology I. , Proclus explains the Plotinian doctrine as follows:

8 See the introduction to the Saffrey and Westerink () x–xx. See also, Dillon() .

9 Saffrey andWesterink point to a number of passages in theParmenides Commentaryin which Proclus refers to “a certain one” who holds the doctrine that the first hypothesisis an impossibility. Saffrey andWesterink attribute these passages toOrigen: In Parm. VII,P. .–; In Parm. VII, p. .–; and In Parm. VII, p. .–. are key passages.

10 See Proclus, PT II, , p. .–. The key passage for this interpretation is Par-menides (A–). In Proclus’ commentary on this lemma, he regards Origen as fol-lows: “Some people have therefore been persuaded by this passage to say that the firsthypothesis reaches impossible conclusions, and so that the One is not a real subject. Forthey associate all the negations into one hypothetical syllogism: ‘If the One exists, it is nota whole, it has not a beginning, middle or end, it has no shape’, and so on, and after allthe rest, ‘It has no existence, is not existence, is not expressible, is not nameable, is notknowable.’ Since these are impossibilities, they concluded that Plato himself is saying thatthe One is an impossibility. But this was really because they themselves held that thereis no One that is impartipable by existence, and, therefore, that the One is not differentfromBeing nor from the One-Being, and that ‘One’ has asmanymodes as being, and thatthe One that is beyond being is a mere name.” VII, .–. See .ff. where Proclusintroduces this discussion.

11 Plotinus, Enn. V..12 Proclus attacks Iamblichus in PT III, : “The argument in the first hypothesis is

not, as some say, about God and the gods. For it is not lawful to connect the multiplicitywith the One itself and the One with the multiplicity; for the primal God is absolutelytranscendent above all things. But in the first hypothesis, he denies both being and theOne itself of the first. This, however, does not befit the other gods, as is evident foreveryone.” Translation Steel () .

commentary

“But some people who follow the philosophy of Plotinus say that the noeticnature that is shown there, gaining its subsistence from the hyperessentialcause of everything, and they attempt to harmonize all the conclusionsderiving from this with the unique and perfect nature of the intellect”

(I. , p. , –, S-W).

This is certainly consistent with Iamblichus, who derives a hierarchyof being from the One and who attributes a positive reference to allnine hypotheses.13 Iamblichus co-united henads with the One in thefirst hypothesis and placed intelligible beings in the second hypothesis.Iamblichus, furthermore, places the hen on at the summit of the intelli-gible realm.14

The third metaphysical opinion is that of Syrianus. Proclus lumps theviews of Syrianus’ predecessors together as those of “the ancients” (��παλαι��), emphasizing his own closeness in time and doctrine to Syr-ianus. Syrianus accepts the opinion of the second group that the dia-logue is primarily metaphysical. While he does not mention the opin-ion of the first group that the dialogue is possibly logical in aim, he doesdispute claims that the Parmenides is polemical. If Zeno’s purpose wasto teach a dialectical method, Syrianus argues, he would not have cho-sen such a difficult metaphysical topic to use as an example (.–).This is especially true as one usually teaches dialectical methods to youngmen, who would most certainly misunderstand the weighty doctrine ofthe dialogue. Next, Proclus reports that Syrianus believes (�<�μεν�ς ε+-ναι τ�ν σκ�π�ν) the skopos of the dialogue is about neither Being norabout real beings only. Here, Syrianus accepts the view of his predeces-sor (Iamblichus?), but qualifies it in a characteristic way: the Parmenides

13 Iamblichus places the henads in the first hypothesis with the One. Cf. In Parm..–., where Iamblichus makes the first hypothesis about “God and gods”, theOne and the divine henads, and ., where Proclus states the following: “Necessarily,then, if indeed only the divine is above Being, and all that is Divine is above Being, thepresent argument could be either only about the primal God, who surely is the only entityaboveBeing, or else it is about all the gods alsowhich are after him, as someof thosewhomwe revere hold. So they argue that since every god, inasmuch as he is a god, is a henad(for it is this element, the One, which divinises all being), for this reason they think itright to join to the study of the First a discussion of all the gods; for they are all supra-essential henads and transcend the multiplicity of beings, and are the summits of beings.”On the debate concerning Iamblichus and the henads, see Dodds () – and; Dillon () –; Saffrey and Westerink () xxviff; Dillon () –.While Dillon identifies these intelligible unities as henads, Saffrey andWesterink identifythem as intelligible gods.

14 Steel () .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

discusses Being and all beings, in so far as all beings are the product ofthe One.15

We see this opinion reappear in .ff., which, based on a state-ment in . regarding Proclus’ guide of philosophy in Athens, ap-pears to be Syrianus’ view on the matter. Proclus reports the followingof Syrianus in .: “His view, then, also is that the first hypothesis isabout the primal God, and the second is about the intelligible world”, andhe takes up the issue again in .–., this time without creditinghis teacher. In .ff., Proclus declares that the One, not One-Being, astranscendent cause, apart from the divine orders, is the subject of the firsthypothesis.Thus, Syrianus recognizes the different attributes of being oneare the different classes of gods such that the attributes coming from “theOne that is” are the equal to the series of divine classes.16 Proclus, more-over, adapts this position expressed in PT , , p. , –.

15 Steel attributes this interpretation to Iamblichus () .16 Steel () .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 2

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

�Η ��Cλεσ*ε, �πειδ0περ δ�κε9 πραγματει?δη παιδι+ν πα��ειν, <π’�μαυτ�5 3ρU�μαι κα- τRς �μαυτ�5 �π�*)σεως, περ- τ�5 6ν7ς αDτ�5�π�*)μεν�ς, εhτε 4ν Oστιν εhτε μ" 4ν, τ� Aρ" συμ�α�νειν;—Π$νυ μHν �Pν,($ναι τ7ν B0νωνα [Parm. b–].

Ε� δH δε9 τ<λη*)στατα λ)γειν, ��τωσ- Nητ)�ν [ς E 8μ)τερ�ς �(ηγε9τ�κα*ηγεμ?ν, 3ρAεσ*αι μHν αDτ7ν <π7 τ�5 6ν7ς 〈=ντ�ς〉a—τ7 γ+ρ ε�yν Oστιν, OA�ν πρ7ς τ1. yν κα- τ7 Oστι, ταCτSη πρ�σ0κει τSR τ$Uει τ.νπραγμ$των—, <νατρ)Aειν δH <π7 τ�5 6ν7ς =ντ�ς �π- τ7 yν, δεικνCντασα(.ς �τι τ7 κυρ�ως yν μ ν�ν τ�5τ� ��Cλεται τ7 yν ε`ναι κα- >ρπ$�ει6αυτ7 <π7 τ�5 =ντ�ςG κα- [ς δεCτερ�ν <π7 τ�Cτ�υ τ7 yν xν δι+ τ"ν](εσιν ε�ς τ7 ε`ναι πρ�ελ* ν, αDτ7 δH τ7 yν κρε9ττ�ν κα- τ�5 OστιG κα-τ�5 ε� OστινG gμα γ+ρ τ1. Oστιν �D μ)νει τ7 κυρ�ως 4νG cστε κα- �τι τ7=ντως xν �π�τ�*εται κα- τ7 yν xν, <λη*)ς, κα- �τι δι+ τRς �π�*)σεωςταCτης 3νεισιν �π’ αDτ7 τ7 yν, �περ αDτ7ς <νυπ *ετ�ν �ν Π�λιτε�Tαπρ�σ�ν�μ$�ειG δε9ν γ$ρ (ησιν <ε- δι’ �π�*)σεων Aωρε9ν, Wνα τελευτ0-σωμεν <νι ντες �π- τ7 <νυπ *ετ�ν, τ7 4νG π^σα γ+ρ �π *εσις Oκ τιν ς�στιν 3λλης <ρARς. ε� δ) τις τ"ν �π *εσιν <ρA"ν π�ι0σαιτ�, περ- |τ�C-τ�υ τα5τα Nητ)�ν, [L] περ-b τ.ν γεωμετρικ.ν �κε9ν�ς εhρηκενG 1Y γ+ρ<ρA" μHν l μ" �`δε, τελευτ" δH κα- μ)σα �U Yν �Dκ �`δε �Dδεμ�α μηAα-ν" τ7 τ�ι�5τ�ν �πιστ0μην ε`ναιG μ ν�ν �Pν <ρA" κα- <νυπ *ετ�ν τ7 yν,cστε τ7 �π�τι*)μεν�ν 3λλ� τ� �στι κα- �D τ7 4νG 3νεισι δH <π7 τ�Cτ�υπρ7ς τ7 4ν, [ς <π7 �π�*)σεως �π- τ7 <νυπ *ετ�ν.

�*εν δ" κα- *αυμ$σειεν 3ν τις τ7ν Παρμεν�δην τRς �λης μεταAειρ0-σεως τ.ν λ γωνG εhτε γ+ρ [τ7 4ν �π)*ετ�],c τ7 <νυπ *ετ�ν ε�ς �π *ε-σιν 〈dν〉 παρ)λα�ε, κα- τ7 3ναρA�ν [ς �U <ρARς, κα- �Dδ’ dν _κ�λ�C*ει

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“Would you like me, since we decided to play out this laborious game, tobegin frommyself and my own hypothesis, hypothesisng about the Oneitself, that is, what must follow if one assumes that the One is, or that itis not?” “By all means,” said Zeno.

But if one is to get nearest to the truth, one must follow the line ofour Master, that Parmenides begins from the One (for the proposition“If there is a One,” since it contains besides “One” also the concept ofexistence, belongs to this rank of things), and ascends from the One-Being to the One, thus demonstrating clearly that the One in the strictsense wishes only this, to be One, and ‘snatches itself away’ from Being;and that the One Being is second to this by reason of its descent towardsBeing, whereas the One itself is superior even to the designation “is”and the hypothesis “if it is”; for as soon as we add “is”, the One in thestrict sense will no longer remain. So that it is true that he hypothesisesReal Being and One-Being, and that by means of this hypothesis heascends to the One itself, which he himself in the Republic [VI B]describes as “non-hypothesised.” For he says that it is necessary always toproceed through hypotheses, in order that we may culminate our ascentat the non-hypothesisedOne; for every hypothesis starts from a principleother than itself. But if one were to make the hypothesis a first principle,one would have to say about it something which he [Plato] said aboutgeometry; if something has a first principlewhich one does not know, anda conclusion and middle terms, therefore, built up from what one doesnot know, in no way can such a thing be an object of scientific knowledge[Rep. VII C]. The only thing, then, that is non-hypothesised is theOne, so that whatever is hypothesised is something else and not theOne;but he ascends from this to the One, as from an hypothesis to the non-hypothesised.Onemight thus properly wonder at thewhole structure of Parmenides’

discourse here; for if on the one hand, he had assumed as an hypothe-sis that which was non-hypothesised, and taken what has no first prin-ciple as proceeding from one, then he would not have been following

syrianus, in parm. fr.

τSR με* δ1ω λεγ�CσSη π$ντως �π�*)μεν ν τι σκ�πε9ν τ7 6URςG εhτε μ" τ7yν 〈xν〉 �π)*ετ�,a <λλ$ τι τ.ν π�ρρωτ)ρω τ�5 6ν ς, �Dκ dν τ"ν �π’ αD-τ7 NTαδ�αν �π�ι0σατ� μετ$�ασιν, �Zδ’ dν αDτ�(υ.ς κα- <�ι$στως <ν-)(ηνεν 8μ9ν τ"ν πρ7 τ�5 =ντ�ς α�τ�αν. �ιν’ �Pν κα- τ7 yν <νυπ *ετ�νμ)νSη, κα- �μως <π τιν�ς �π�*)σεως ��κε�ας αDτ7ς �π- τ7 yν <ναδρ$-μSη, τ7 yν xν �π)*ετ� πρ�σεA.ς xν μετ+ τ7 yν, �ν 1Y τ$Aα κα- πρ?τως τ7yν κυρ�ωςG �π- γ+ρ τ�5 6ν7ς τ�5 �π)κεινα �DδH τ�5τ� κυρ�ως. Κα- �]-τως <π τε τRς ��κε�ας �π�*)σεως, (ησ�ν, 3ρAεται τ�5 yν =ν [=ντ�ς],bκα- τ�5τ �στι τ7 ε� yν OστιG κα- �π- τ7 <νυπ *ετ�ν �γγC*εν μεταστ$ς,<να(α�νει τ"ν <π7 τRς �USηρημ)νης 6ν$δ�ς τ.ν =ντων >π$ντων �π -στασιν.

a ?ν… �π�!ετ� Strobel: unum supponibile g νυπ�!ετ�ν Σg 'νυπ�!ετ�νA3 b @ν 8ν Σg:Aν�ς A | 8ντ�ς delevimus ex g

text and translation

his method, which calls for in every case hypothesising something andseeing what follows from it; or, on the other hand, if he assumed whatwas not hypothesised, but somethingmore or less remote from the One,it would not have been easy for him tomake the transition to it, norwouldhe have been able to reveal to us the cause of Being naturally and withoutstrain. In order, then, that the One might remain non-hypothesised, andyet that it might ascend easily to the One from an hypothesis closely akinto it, he postulated the One-Being, as being next in order to theOne, andin which the term “one” finds, perhaps, its first proper use; for in the caseof the One itself which is “beyond”, not even this term is proper. And inthis way, as he says, he both begins from his own hypothesis, which isthe One-Being, and this is the significance of the hypothesis “If there isa One;” and moving thence to the non-hypothesised, he makes manifestthe derivation of all things from the transcendent henad of beings.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

This fragment discusses the meaning of the second hypothesis, “if theOne is”, in which Plato focuses on the fact that the One exists. Proclusquestions why Parmenides calls his hypothesis an exposition of the Onein this lemma, when it seems that he only discussed Being in his poem.Syrianus reasons that Parmenides can move his discourse from Beingto the One based on the understanding that the postulation of the Oneinvolves Being. Syrianus invokes a modification to the more elaborateposition of the predecessors that Plato is simply following a doctrineof the One or the historical Parmenides by arguing that all this can bederived from Parmenides’ own hypothesis.Syrianus does not dispute with predecessors here, but begins with

Parmenides’ hypothesis in the text. While Plato’s One in the Parmenidesis a higher entity, Parmenides’ description of the One begins with OneBeing. He takes his start from the lower entity of One Being becausehe says he cannot begin with that which is unhypothesisable, if theOne is indeed a remote and transcendent entity.1 Syrianus explains thatParmenides begins from his own first principle of the One Being andmakes the premise the same in the first and secondhypothesis: in the firsthypothesis, he focuses on oneness and in the second, he focuses on thefact that it exists.2 He then ascends from the One Being to the One itself.He makes this move fromOne Being to One through a logical argumentthat if theOne is just one, it is impossible to speak of it. Since it is possibleto speak of the One, it exists and must partake in existence. The OneBeing, thus, for Parmenides is the One in the strictest sense.In . Proclus states the opinion of tines, lumping together the

opinions of a set of people which may well include Porphyry and Iambli-chus. Proclus begins the discussion by questioning how Parmenidescould have called the One his own hypothesis when he never discussedthe One. For Proclus, the postulation of the One cannot be a logicalexercise, but the basis of an ontological metaphysics that encompasses all

1 Syrianus says that both Plato and Plotinus propose that the One is �περ�Cσι�ν (InMet. N, , – Kroll). The interpretation of Plato’s Good as the One beyond Being ishardly new to Platonic thought. See Dodds () – andRist () on the historyand Neopythagorean background of the One in Platonism. See Steel () , where heargues that Plato never intended for the One to be beyond One-Being.

2 Steel puts it nicely, saying that this is based on the premise that the first principlecannot be the One which is the object of the second hypothesis, the One which is. Steel() .

commentary

other hypotheses.This group claims that Parmenides says nothing aboutthe One. The question in the lemma, thus, is a deliberate correction byPlato of the historical Parmenides, who is made to present a doctrineof the One that is not being. These critics make three points: ) Platocorrects Parmenides by drawing out the implications of Parmenides’position; ) Parmenides in his Poem only talks of Being because whatis not (including what is above Being) cannot be discussed; ) WithZeno, however, he discussed a higher principle. What follows is then anaporia byPorphyry on the historical Parmenideswho argued that the firstprinciple is the One that is Being, not hen. Plato, according to Porphyry,makes Parmenides say that the One is superior to Being by creating theParmenidean hypothesis “if being is one”. Furthermore, Plato is possiblyjustified in doing this due to what may have been discussed betweenParmenides andZeno in unwritten discourses onhigher being. Plato thusnot only corrects Zeno but he reminds us of the unwritten Parmenides.With this, Plato presents a more refined Parmenides than what probablyexisted in reality: the Platonic Parmenides called his own hypothesis “theone which postulates the hen”.In .ff., Syrianus, while not referring to his predecessors, re-

sponds to their argument that Plato was being non-Parmenidean bydrawing on unwritten doctrines. Syrianus disagrees and comes to adifferent conclusion by incorporating everyone else’s solution into hisown. Syrianus investigates the relation betweenOne andOne Being. OneBeing is an intermediary principle that connects the transcendent Onewith Being—as such, it acts as the first member of the second hypostasis.The One-Being is characterised by a multiplicity denied of the One3 thatconnects it to the rest of differentiated existence; the presence of One-Being, thus, allows Syrianus, and Proclus to create a fluid, connecteduniverse, while protecting the transcendent nature of the One. That theOne exists beyond Being is at the heart of both the Parmenides andSophist for the Neoplatonists.4 Proclus uses both texts to show how theOne is separated from the One Being because it exists beyond Being.5One Being functions as the first member of the second hypothesis as itis the lowest aspect of the One as found in Intellect. The purpose of thediscussion here is to relate One and One Being; Syrianus’ (and Proclus’)

3 Steel () .4 See Sophist B– D on the existence of the One beyond Being.5 Proclus discussesParm. C – in a number of passages: See In Parm. .–;

.–.; .–.; .–.; .–..

syrianus, in parm. fr.

argument for this states that ) the first hypothesis is a reality and ) thefirst hypothesis does not allow one to identify One and Being, somethingbothOrigen and Porphyry are responsible for doing, which leads to theirproposition that Intellect is the first principle or, in Porphyry’s case, thatthe One is also the first element of the intelligible triad; thus, Origen andPorphyrys’ positions are not the same.6

6 See Proclus PT II, .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 3

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

Ε�εν δ0, ($ναιG [ε�] 4ν Oστ-ν, 3λλ� τι �Dκ dν εhη π�λλ+ τ7 4ν.—Π.ς γ+ρ3ν;—�Zτε 3ρα μ)ρ�ς αDτ�5 �Zτε �λ�ν αDτ7 δε9 ε`ναι. -Τ� δ0; [Parm.c–].

Δ�κε9 μHν γ+ρ δ" κα- αDτ1. τ0ν τε πρ?την �π *εσιν ε`ναι περ- *ε�5τ�5 πρωτ�στ�υ κα- τ"ν δευτ)ραν περ- τ.ν ν�ητ.νG <λλ’ �πειδ" πλ$τ�ς�στ-ν �ν τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς κα- π�λλα- αQ τ$Uεις ε�σ- τ.ν *ε.ν, 6κ$στην τ�C-των τ.ν *ε�ων τ$Uεων συμ��λικ.ς �π7 τ�5 Πλ$των�ς Xν�μ$�εσ*αι,κα- π$σας δι’ Xν�μ$των (ιλ�σ (ων �κ()ρεσ*αι, κα- �Zτε τ.νa ε�ω* -των �π7 τ.ν τ+ς *ε�γ�νíας γραψ$ντων �μνε9σ*αι �Zτε τ.ν τ+ς �π$ρ-Uεις αDτ.ν δηλ�Cντων, �Fαι δ0 ε�σιν αQ παρ+ τ.ν *ε.ν �κδεδ�μ)ναιτ.ν *ε�ων �πωνυμ�αι γεν.νG <λλ’, [ς O(ην, δι+ τ.ν γνωρ�μων τ�9ς(ιλ�σ (�ις,�F�ν Eλ τητ�ς,πλ0*�υς, <πειρ�ας, π)ρατ�ς, ��κε�ως �A ν-των πρ7ς αDτ+ς παραδ�δ�σ*αι, τ$Uιν �A ντων πρ)π�υσαν, κα- π$σας<παραλε�πτως <(ερμηνεCεσ*αι τ+ς *ε�ας πρ� δ�υς, ν�ητ$ς, ν�ερ$ς,�περκ�σμ��υςG κα- δι+ τ�5τ� παραλαμ�$νεσ*αι τ+ 6π μενα π$ντα,σCμ��λα τ.ν *ε�ων =ντα διακ σμωνG κα- �π- τ�Cτ�ις π$ντα �σα κατα-(ατικ.ς �ν τSR δευτ)ρTα λ)γεται τ.ν �π�*)σεων, τα5τα <π�($σκεσ*αικατ+ τ"ν πρ?την ε�ς OνδειUιν τ�5 τ"ν μHν πρ?την α�τ�αν πασ.ν �USηρR-σ*αι τ.ν *ε�ων διακ�σμ0σεων, �κε�νας δH 3λλας κατ’ 3λλαςb <(ωρι-σμ)νας �δι τητας πρ�εληλυ*)ναιG τ7 γ+ρ �ν ταCτSη yν �Zτε τ7 πρ.τ ν�στι—συμπ)πλεκται γ+ρ π^ν τ1. =ντιc—�Zτε τ7 <A?ριστ�ν τ�5 =ντ�ςκα- �]τως [ς 4Uις τις �ν αDτ1. =νG σα(.ς γ�5ν αDτ7 διακρ�νει,κα- Aωρ-ςε`να� (ησι τ�ι�5τ�ν τ7 yν τ�5τ�. δRλ�ν δ" �τι *ε�ας 6ν$δ�ς �στ-ν αD-τ�τελ�5ς σημαντικ νG π^ν γ+ρ τ7 Aωριστ7ν αhτι�ν πλ0*�υς 8γ�Cμε-ν�ν διττ7ν <π�γεννT^ πλR*�ς, τ7 μHν Aωριστ7ν 6αυτ1. �μ�ι�ν, τ7 δH<A?ριστ�ν τ.ν μετεA ντωνG /ως γ�5ν 8 μ�α ψυA" τ+ς μHν �γενν0σατ�ψυA+ς σωμ$των Aωριστ$ς, τ+ς δH <Aωρ�στ�υς, [ς E εFς κα- �λ�ς ν�5ς

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“Well then,” said Parmenides, “if there is a One, of course the One wouldnot be many.” “How could it?” “So there cannot be any parts of it, nor canit be a whole.” “Obviously.”

His view, then, also is that the first hypothesis is about the primal God,and the second is about the intelligible realm. But since there is a broadrange in the intelligible realm, and there aremany orders of gods, his viewis that each of these divine orders has been named symbolically by Platoand all have been expressed by philosophical names, not by suchnames asare customarily celebrated by those who compose theogonies, but whichdo not reveal their essences, such as are the epithets of the divine classesgiven out by the gods, but rather, as I said, by names familiar to philoso-phers, such as Whole, Multiplicity, Limitlessness, Limit, which are suit-able for application to them, all having their proper rank, and portrayingwithout omission all the divine stages of procession, whether intelligi-ble, intellectual or supracosmic, and that thus all things are presentedin logical order, as being symbols of divine orders of beings; and alsothat the fact that all those things which are presented positively in thesecond hypothesis are presented negatively in the first indicates that theprimal cause transcends all the divine orders, while they undergo vari-ous degrees of procession according to their various distinct character-istics. For the One in the second hypothesis is neither the primal One(for it is complex, being entirely interwoven with Being) nor is it thatwhich is inseparable from Being and thus, as being a state of it, is in it.He thus clearly distinguishes this One from the first and declares thatthis One, being such as it is, is distinct. It is plain, in fact, that this termsignifies an autonomous divine henad; for every transcendent cause atthe head of a multiplicity produces a double multiplicity, one which istranscendent like itself, and another which is immanent in its partici-pants. Even as the single Soul has generated some souls separate frombodies, and some which are inseparable, and as the one and whole Intel-lect has given substance to some intellects separate from souls, and otherswhich are in them as functions of them, so also the One has produced

syrianus, in parm. fr.

�π)στησε τ�Vς μHν ν ας Aωριστ�Vς τ.ν ψυA.ν, τ�Vς δH �ν αDτα9ς=ντας κα*’ 4Uιν, �]τω κα- τ7 yν παρ0γαγε τ+ς μHν αDτ�τελε9ς 6ν$δας�USηρημ)νας τ.ν μετεA ντων, τ+ς δH [ς 6ν?σεις 3λλων �Zσας τ.ν κατ’αDτ+ς 8νωμ)νων κα- �ν �Fς ε�σιG π^σαν �Pν τ"ν δευτ)ραν �π *εσιν�κ(α�νειν 8μ9ν 6ν$δων πλR*�ς αDτ�τελ.ν, Yν �U0ρτηται τα5τα περ-Yν διδ$σκει 8 δευτ)ρα �π *εσις, τ+ς �δι τητας αDτ.ν δι+ τ�Cτων,Eπ�9αι δ0 τιν)ς ε�σιν, | 8μ9ν �μ(αν���υσα π$σας �(εURς. ε� δH τ�5τ�<λη*)ς, δε9 σκ�πε9ν 4καστα τ.ν συμπερασμ$των π��αις πρ�σ0κειτ$Uεσι *ε�αις, κα- �]τω δ" κατ’ 3ρ*ρα π�ιε9σ*αι τ"ν τRς δευτ)ρας�π�*)σεως δια�ρεσιν.

τ0ν γε μ"ν τρ�την �DA >πλ.ς ε`ναι περ- π$σης ψυARς, <λλ’ �ση μετ+τ"ν *ε�αν πρ�ελ0λυ*εG π^σαν γ+ρ τ"ν *ε�αν �ν τSR δευτ)ρTα περι)Aε-σ*αιG σα(.ς γ�5ν �ν �κε�νSη κα- αDτ7ς E Πλ$των εhρηκεν �τι 3ρα τ7 yνκα- Aρ ν�υ μετ)AειG τ7 δH Aρ ν�υ μετ)Aειν ψυAα9ς πρ�σ0κει πρ?ταις,κα- �D τα9ς ν�ερα9ς �Dσ�αις παρ’ αFς �Zτε τ7 mν �Zτε τ7 Oσται, <λλ+μ ν�ν τ7 Oστι τ7 α�?νι�ν.

διSηρημ)νης �Pν τRς �λης �Dσ�ας εhς τε τ"ν �κ*ε�υμ)νην κα- τ"νκα*’ 6αυτ"ν Eρωμ)νην, π^σαν >πλ.ς τ"ν �κ*ε�υμ)νην �ν τSR δευτ)ρTαπαραδ�δ�σ*αι τ.ν �π�*)σεων, εhτε ν�ητ"ν, εhτε ν�ερ+ν, εhτε ψυAικ"ν�π$ρA�υσαν, cστ’ εhπερ �*)λ�ις κα- κατ+ ταCτηνa τ"ν *εωρ�αν <κ�5-σαι τ+ς �π�*)σεις 6URς �πως διετ$A*ησαν, τ"ν μHν πρ?την �π *εσιντ�*ει περ- τ�5 6ν7ς ε`ναι *ε�5, π.ς γεννT κα- διακ�σμε9 π$σας τ+ς τ$-Uεις τ.ν *ε.νG τ"ν δH δευτ)ραν περ- τ.ν *ε�ων τ$Uεων πασ.ν π.ςπρ�εληλC*ασιν <π7 τ�5 6ν7ς, κα- 〈περ-〉b τRς συνε�ευγμ)νης 6κ$σταις�Dσ�αςGc τ"ν δH τρ�την περ- τ.ν ψυA.ν τ.ν Eμ�ι�υμ)νων μHν *ε�9ς,�Dσ�αν δH �κ*ε�υμ)νην �D κληρωσαμ)νωνG τ"ν δH τετ$ρτην περ- τ.ν�νCλων,π.ς παρ$γεται [κα-]d κατ+ π��ας τ$Uεις <π7 τ.ν *ε.νG τ"ν δHπ)μπτην περ- ]λης �πως <μ)τ�A ς �στι τ.ν ε�δητικ.ν 6ν$δων, 3νω*εν<π7 τRς �περ�υσ��υ κα- μι^ς 6ν$δ�ς λαA�5σα τ"ν �π στασινG μ)Aριγ+ρ τRς ]λης τ7 yν κα- 8 τ�5 6ν7ς Oλλαμψιςe aκει, (ωτ���υσα κα- τ7ταCτης < ριστ�ν.

a κατ� τα*την Dillon: κατ’ α+τ)ν ΑΣg b περ� add. Steel c�+σ#ας corr. Steel ex g(substantia): �+σ#αις ΑΣ d κα� add. Steel ex g (et) e λλαμψις Dκει inv. A

text and translation

some autonomous henadswhich transcend their participants, and otherswhich act as unifications of other entities which are unified in virtue ofthem and in which they inhere. The whole second hypothesis, therefore,he says, reveals to us a multiplicity of autonomous henads, on whichare dependent the entities about which the second hypothesis teachesus, revealing to us in its terms all their specific characteristics in turn. Ifthis is true, we must examine each of the conclusions to see to which ofthe divine orders it is appropriate, and thus make division of the secondhypothesis “limb by limb” (Phaedr. E).As for the third, it is not about all Soul pure and simple, but such as

has proceeded forth from the divine Soul; for the whole divine Soul iscomprised in the second hypothesis. For Plato himself has clearly statedthere that the One partakes also of Time; and partaking of Time is theproperty first of souls, not of intellectual beings, among whom there isneither “was” nor “will be”, but only the eternal “is” [cf. Tim. E ff.].So then, having divided thewhole of Being into the divinised, and that

which is taken on its own, he declares that the whole of the divinisedBeing is presented in the second of the hypotheses, be it intelligible,intellectual, or psychic. So if you would like to hear the subjects of thehypotheses in order according to this theory also, the first he declaresto be about the One God, how he generates and gives order to all theorders of gods. The second is about all the divine orders, how they haveproceeded from the One and the substance which is joined to each. Thethird is about the souls which are assimilated to the gods, but yet have notbeen apportioned divinised being. The fourth is about Forms-in-Matter,how they are produced according to what rankings from the gods. Thefifth is about Matter, how it has no participation in the formative henads,but receives its share of existence from above, from the supra-essentialand single Monad; for the One and the illumination of the One extendsas far as Matter, bringing light even to its boundlessness.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

At the start of his discussion of the first hypothesis, Proclus traces theidentification of the number and subject matter of the Parmenideanhypotheses in the history of the Platonic school. In a pivotal passagefor our appreciation of Syrianic metaphysics, he arrives at Syrianus’statement on the nine hypotheses in which Syrianus says that what issystematically denied of the One in the first hypothesis is affirmed of theOne in the second hypothesis, so that each positive attribute correspondsin order to the preceding negation. This exegesis provides the shape ofProclus’ metaphysics as laid out in his Commentary on the Parmenidesand PlatonicTheology.Proclus’ own statement on the nine hypotheses, as well as his survey of

the philosophical history of the nine hypotheses, is well laid out byDillonin Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides1 and Saffrey and Westerinkin Platonic Theology I.2 Still, this survey should be summarised hereto show the importance of Syrianus’ interpretation, especially where itdiffers from Iamblichus’.Proclus establishes that the Parmenides has nine hypotheses (five pos-

itive, four negative) expressing the different senses of One and Not-Being.3 The five positive hypotheses represent the three ways in whichtheOne relates to Being (.ff.): ) in so far as it is superior to Being(identified with One); ) coordinate with Being (Intellect); and ) infe-rior to Being (Soul).4 The two remaining positive hypotheses representthe two senses of Not-Being. It is “Not Being” in its relationship to otherswhich participate it: ) relative or contingent (physicalworld); ) absoluteNot-Being (pure matter).5 This system includes all meanings of the One,in so far as it is One, Being, or One and Being, or when it is not-existentin some senses or absolutely not-existence.Thus, Proclus lists the nine hypotheses ( positive, negative) as

follows (.–):

1 Dillon () –.2 Saffrey-Westerink () lxxix–lxxxix.3 Proclus defends this in . by arguing that if the One were to only have one

sense, there need be only one hypothesis.4 Proclus cites the Timaeus; see In Tim. II, .ff. (on Tim. C).5 Proclus finds proof for this in Plato’s Republic V B ff.

commentary

st: relationship of the One superior to Being to itself and other thingsnd: One cordinate with Beingrd: One inferior to Being to itself and other thingsth: relationship of others which participate in the One to themselves

and to the Oneth: the relations the others which do not participate in the One have to

themselves and to the Oneth: the relations of the One (if it does not exist), in the sense of existing

in one way and not in another, to itself and to other thingsth: the relations of the One (if it does not exist), in the sense of absolute

non-existence, towards itself and othersth: the relations of the others to themselves and to the One (when

taken as non-existent) in the sense of existing in one way and notin another

th: the relations of the others to themselves and to theOne (when takenas absolutely non-existent.)

Dillon identifies an early group of commentators who take the One inonly one sense, which Proclus touches very briefly upon in .–..6 While he does not identify this group and it seems the groupcould be a rhetorical device, Proclus condemns the view, arguing thatsuch amultiplicity of hypotheses—somearguing positively, others, nega-tively—would be impossible. The Middle Platonic delineation of thehypotheses is dismissed without discussion in ..Proclus next elaborates on the views of three groups of Platonic philos-

ophers before he gives the view of Syrianus.7 Proclus dismisses thesegroups as not looking at the structure of Parmenides’ procedure(.). All three groups identify the hypotheses with divine ranks,although they differ with regard to the ranks and to the number of hy-potheses. Again, these authors have been surveyed already8 with regardto their view of the number of hypotheses, and will be only briefly cov-ered here. Iamblichus’ opinion on thematter, however, will be elaboratedwhen we come to Syrianus’ discussion.

6 Dillon writes about possible identification of this non-Neoplatonic group in hisintroduction to book VI of the Parmenides Commentary. See () .

7 He describes the subject of the first hypothesis as One, the second, as Intellect, thethird, Soul. See Dillon () –. In Enn. IV...–, on forms in Matter andMatter alone.

8 See Dillon () ff. and Saffrey and Westerink () lxxx ff.

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The first group consists of Amelius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus(.–.). Proclus lumps these commentators into a singlegroup, despite their differences, because they do not see that the first fivehypotheses concern positive conclusions and the last four, negative ones(.ff.) and so attempt to identify a distinct level of reality for each ofthem.According to Amelius9 (.–.), Parmenides describes

eight hypotheses which correspond to orders of reality, structured asOne, Intellect, Soul (two classes), and Matter:

st: Onend: intellectrd: rational soulsth: irrational soulsth: matter in so far as it participates in formsth: matter in its ordered aspectth: matter in its aspect as totally devoid of formsth: Form-in-Matter

Proclus agrees in principles with the subjects, but he finds fault withthe number of hypotheses (.–). He also criticises the ordering ofreality, arguing that Form is superior to Matter and should not be eighth,especially since Matter cannot receive Form (.–).Next are the philosophers who identify nine hypotheses. The first

among these is Porphyry10 (.–.):

st: primal Godnd: Intelligible realmrd: Soulth: ordered Bodyth: unordered Bodyth: ordered Matterth: unordered Matterth: Forms-in-Matter, considered in their substratumth: Forms-in-Matter, considered by themselves apart fromMatter

9 There is some uncertainty as to whether this figure is Amelius. See Saffrey andWesterink () lxxx.

10 On the identification of Porphyry, see Saffrey and Westerink () lxxxi–lxxxii.This fragment is further evidence that Porphyry wrote a commentary on the Parmenides.

commentary

Proclus approves of the order and principle of division, but criticisesthis scheme for being redundant in places (.–). Proclus arguesthatmatter does not differ fromunordered or ordered body.Also, Proclussays that Porphyry does not confine himself to the first principles ofthings, as ordered body is not a principle (.ff.).The next philosopher is identified as Iamblichus (.–.).11

Iamblichus identifies the following nine hypotheses:12

st: God and the gods (the divine henads)13nd: intellectual and intelligible beingsrd: superior beings (angels, daemons, and heroes)14th: rational soulsth: secondary souls woven onto the rational soulsth: Forms-in-Matter and the seminal reason-principlesth: Matter itselfth: body in the heavensth: generated body beneath the moon

Proclus faults this view for including the superior classes of beings; ifthey are at the intellectual level, then they ought to be in the secondhypothesis, if they are at the level of soul, they ought to be included inthe hypothesis about soul (.–).15 This scheme, moreover, alsoincludes products (sc. body), rather than only first principles, accordingto Proclus (.–).Thefirst commentator to arrange the hypotheses into positive andneg-

ative conclusions was the “the philosopher from Rhodes”,16 a mysteriousfigure who delineated ten hypotheses, which he divided into two groupsof five (.–.). The first five describe the state of being if the

11 On the identification of this commentator as Iamblichus, see Saffrey andWesterink() lxxxii, note . See Iamblichus In Parm. Fr. Dillon.

12 See Proclus, PT I, on Iamblichus’ identification of hypotheses.13 One of the few interpretations which does not say that the first principle concerns

only the primal god.14 Proclus finds this rather remarkable, as Iamblichus makes these classes of beings

superior to universal souls. Damascius attributes this doctrine to Iamblichus in DePrincip. II, p. .– Ruelle (= Iambl. In Parm. fr. Dillon).

15 In Proclus, PT III, , Proclus accuses Iamblichus of addressing the intelligible godstwice in the first hypothesis. On this criticism, see Steel () .

16 For a discussion on the identification of this figure, see Saffrey (), who thinksit may conceal a reference toTheodore of Asine.

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particular level in question exists, the second group shows what therewould be if it were not to exist. The second group of five concerns thefirst five:

st and th hypotheses: One (if the One were to exist, if it were not toexist).

nd and th hypotheses: intellect and intelligible (if the intellect andintelligible realm exists, what may be true, if itdoes not exist, thatwhat was said in the secondhypothesis is now no longer true.)

rd and th hypotheses: discursive intellects (if they exist, they are inaccordance with our conceptions, if they donot exist, they are in discordance with them.)

th and th hypotheses: embodied forms (if the One exists, these exist;if the One does not exist, they do not exist,either.)

th and th hypotheses: receptacle of bodies (the receptacle is harmo-nised through the existence of the One, thereceptacle is not harmonised because the Oneis non-existent.)

Proclus praises the structural neatness of this passage, but criticises it fordescribing ten hypotheses and calls some of the pairings absurd (.–).The last commentator (.–.) before Syrianus is the only

one mentioned by name: Plutarch, “our grandfather”, returns to Por-phyry and Iamblichus’ description of nine hypotheses. Plutarch, how-ever, like the previous commentator, divides the conclusions into twosets. Plutarch, most notably, divides the conclusions into “true conclu-sions” if the One exists, and “absurd conclusions” if the One does notexist.The first five concern those external to things and those immanentin them if the One exists:

st: Godnd: Intellectrd: Soulth: Forms-in-Matterth: Matter

The last four show that if the One present in beings does not exist:

th: If the One does not exist, only sensible beings will existth: If the One does not exist, every mode of knowledge will not exist

commentary

th: If theOne does not exist, things are in a state of dreams and shadowsth: If the One does not exist, things will not even obtain dreamlike

substantiality.

Plutarch’s system proves important for Proclus because it creates a hier-archy whereby all orders of reality are connected to the One.17Proclus admires this arrangement, as it makes the first hypothesis

about the One and hypotheses two through five about things eternallyexistent, followed by four hypotheses which show the absurdities if theOne does not exist (.ff.).The last opinion arrived at is Syrianus’ (.–.), who treats

the subject on the theological level.18 Syrianus uses the hypotheses todescribe the entire intelligible universe, including all the divine ranks.As with Porphyry and Plutarch, he states that the first hypothesis is aboutthe primal God and the second, the intelligible world.The third hypoth-esis concerns souls proceeding from the divine soul, the fourth, beingunited to matter, and the fifth, matter. As with the other Platonic com-mentators, Syrianus aligns themegista genewith the divine orders, so that“Limit” and “Unlimitedness” represent ranks of gods. As with Porphyry,Iamblichus and Plutarch, he delineates nine hypotheses, dividing theminto two groups; the first five are positive, describing “if the One is”, thenext four are negative, describing “if the One is not”. Proclus lists the firstfive as follows:

st: One God—generates and gives order to godsnd: the divine orders and how they proceeded from the Onerd: souls assimilated to gods19th: forms in Matterth: Matter, how it has no participation in the henads, but receives its

share of existence from above

This division of two groups, one five, the other four, which have a loosecorrespondence with one another, is similar to the one the philosopherfromRhodes and Plutarch describe (apart from,with respect to Plutarch,reversing which group describes “if the One is” and “if the One is not”);it differs in its content, that is, its hypostases outline divine beings as they

17 Saffrey andWesterink () lxxxvii–iii.18 In his historical survey of the interpretation of the Parmenides in In Parm. .–

., Proclus says that Syrianus is the inventor of the theological interpretation of theParmenides (cf. .; .ff.).

19 The first three of these appear in Proclus, PT I, , p. x.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

emanate from the One, and it differs in the way in which the hypothesesrelate to one another. Perhaps Syrianus’ greatest contribution to the issuecomes at .–:

“… all things are presented in logical order, as being symbols of divineorders of being; and also that the fact that all those things which are pre-sented positively in the second hypothesis are presented negatively in thefirst indicates that the primal cause transcends all the divine orders, whilethey undergo various degrees of procession according to their various dis-tinct characteristics.”20

What is negated of theOne in the first hypothesis has a positive analoguein the second hypothesis. The hypotheses describe a complete universe.Unlike his predecessors, moreover, he argues that the hypotheses areconnected to one another so that the higher produce the lower andcontain the lower. Syrianus does not consider theOne in its absolute stateeven in the first hypothesis; instead, Syrianus describes the One in itscapacity for generating gods.21What, onemay ask, is Proclus’ objection toIamblichus? I think it is two-fold: . Hypothesis I is not about the henads,it is about how the One generates henads; and . Iamblichus seems tohave described his henads as noeta, objects of intellection, which wouldfor Proclus be the subject of Hypothesis II.In , Proclus recounts Syrianus’ concept of the henads—that each

intelligible level is presided over by a henad.22Syrianus clarifies the content of the second and third hypotheses.The

second concerns the intelligible/intellective realm, including the pureSoul,23 while the third concerns souls which proceed from pure soul.24This passage follows the subject of In Parm. ., with few substantialdifferences. Here, Proclus says that Syrianus shows the second hypoth-esis includes a discourse about the All-Soul, while the third hypothe-sis is about soul in itself. The three hypotheses relate in so far as the

20 Trans. Morrow-Dillon.21 In this way, Syrianus is similar to Iamblichus, who said that the first hypothesis is

about God and gods. Unlike Iamblichus, however, Syrianus leaves a full discussion ofdivine orders to the second hypothesis. See Steel () .

22 Whether debt is owed to Iamblichus on this theory or not has been the subject ofmuch debate, although in a nod to Dillon, I will have to concur that Iamblichus seemsto be the author of at least a basic doctrine on the henads. On the debate concerningthe authorship of the henads, see Saffrey and Westerink () ix–xvii, li–lxxvii, whoattribute the doctrine of the henads to Syrianus. Dillon in () –, and ()identifies Iamblichus as the author of the doctrine.

23 Plato, Parm. E–C.24 Plato, Parm. E–B.

commentary

second proceeds from the first, and the third from the second.The fourthhypothesis discusses forms in matter and the fifth, matter.Proclus elaborates on Syrianus’ statement on the relationship between

soul and time in In Parm. .– (Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear)and in Platonic Theology I, , he discusses how time relates to thethird hypothesis, especially how individual souls are characterised byparticipation in time.

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 4

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

�Dκ�5ν ε� μηδHν OAει μ)ρ�ς, �Zτ dν <ρA0ν, �Zτε τελευτ0ν, �Zτε μ)σ�νOA�ιG μ)ρη γ+ρ dν nδη αDτ�5 τ+ τ�ια5τα 〈εhη〉.a Xρ*.ς. [Parm. d–]

Εhρηται μHν �Pν, �περ O(ην, κα- τα5τα Xρ*.ς. Oτι δH τελει τερ�ν E8μ)τερ�ς κα*ηγεμMν Oλυε τ"ν Oνστασιν, λ)γων �τι μ" ταDτ ν �στιν�πισκ�πε9ν 8μ^ς �πως OAει πρ7ς 6αυτ7 κα- π.ς πρ7ς τ+|3λλα τ7 yν,κα*$περ �πεσημην$με*α π�λλ$κις. τ�Cτων δH διακεκριμ)νων τ.νπρ��λημ$των, ε�κ τως E Πλ$των νυν- *εωρ.ν τ�να �DA 4πεται τ1. 6ν-πρ7ς 6αυτ , κα- <ρA"ν κα- μ)σ�ν αDτ�5 κα- τελευτ"ν <π)(ησεG τα5ταγ+ρ πλR*�ς dν 8μ9ν τ1. 6ν- συνεισ0νεγκεν. E δ) γε 'Α*ηνα9�ς U)ν�ς �Dπ.ς OAει πρ7ς 6αυτ7ν E *ε7ς εhρηκεν, <λλ+ π.ς OAει πρ7ς τ+ 3λλα,κα- �τι τ"ν <ρA"ν OAει κα- τ+ μ)σα κα- τ"ν τελευτ0ν, τ�Cτων μHν �ντ�9ς π^σιν =ντων, <λλ’ �Dκ �ν τ1. *ε1., τ�5 δH *ε�5, δι τι πρ7 π$ντων�στ� κα- τ�5 OAειν <ρA"ν κα- μ)σα κα- τελευτ"ν {κα-}b κα*αρεC�ντ�ς,συν)A�ντ�ς δH τ+ =ντα π$ντα, �ν �Fς τ+ τρ�α τα5τ$ �στιν. cστε, κα-ε� περ- τ�5 πρ?τ�υ π�ι�9τ�c τ7ν λ γ�ν κα- �ν �κε�ν�ις, �D μ$Aεταιτ�9ς �ντα5*α λεγ�μ)ν�ιςG �D γ+ρ �τι �ν 6αυτ1. κα- πρ7ς 6αυτ7ν τ"ντρι$δα ταCτην E *ε7ς OAει, λ)γει E 'Α*ηνα9�ς U)ν�ς, <λλ’ �πως π^σιν�πι�)�ηκε τ�9ς �Pσιν �ν �Fς τ+ τρ�α τα5τ$ �στιν.d ε� δH �ν 'Επιστ�λα9ςπερ- τ7ν π$ντων �ασιλ)α τ+ π$ντα ε`να� (ησι κα- �κε�ν�υ 4νεκα π$ντακα- �κε9ν� αhτι�ν π$ντων καλ.ν, δRλ�ν δ" �τι κα- <ρA" π$ντων �στ-ν�κε9ν�ς κα- τ)λ�ς κα- μ)σ�ν, <λλ’ �DδH δι+ τ�5τ� αDτ7ς <ρA"ν OAει κα-μ)σ�ν κα- τελευτ0νG κα- γ+ρ �κε9ν�e π.ς OAει πρ7ς τ+ 3λλα διδ$σκει,κα- �D π.ς OAει πρ7ς 6αυτ . τ.ν �Pν 3λλων �στ-ν <ρA", μ)σ�ν, τ)λ�ς τ7πρ.τ�ν, <λλ’ �D κα*’ α�τ7 διαιρε9ται ε�ς <ρA"ν κα- μ)σ�ν κα- τ)λ�ςGκα- γ$ρ �στιν <ρA" μHν π$ντων, �τι <π’ αDτ�5 π$νταG τ)λ�ς δ), �τι�π’ αDτ7 π$νταG π^σα γ+ρ bδ-ς κα- π^σα κατ+ (Cσιν =ρεUις πρ7ς τ74ν, [ς μ νως <γα* ν, <νατε�νεταιG μ)σ�ν δ), �τι π$ντα τ+ κ)ντρα τ.ν

a εEη add. Steel ex. A PLAT. codd. (cf. infra, .): om. Σg b τελευτ)ν ΑΣ: finem etconsummationem g| κα�2 del. Steel cum M c π�ι�3τ� scrip. Steel: π�ι�3 ΑΣ d τα0τ� στιν inv. A e κε3ν� scrip. Steel: κε3να ΑΣg

“So then, if it has no parts, it has neither a beginning nor an end, nor amiddle; for such things would already be parts of it.” “Quite right.”

These views, as I have said, are quite correct. But our own Master hassolved the objection still more perfectly, saying that it is not the samething for us to examine how the One is related to itself and how it isrelated to others, as we have indicatedmany times before this.Once theseproblems have been sorted out, it seems reasonable that Plato here, wherehe is considering what does not follow for the One in relation to itself,has denied it beginning and middle and end; for these would as far as weare concerned have introduced with themmultiplicity into the One. TheAthenian Stranger [Laws IV, E], on the other hand, is not saying whatrelation God has to himself but what relations he has to others, and thathe possesses beginning and middle and end, these things being presentin the universe and not in God, while God himself, because he is priorto everything, is pure from having beginning and middle and end, butholds together all existing things, in which these three elements exist. Sothat even if the discussion does concern the first God in that passage also,it does not contradict what is said here. For the Athenian Stranger is notsaying that god possessed this triad in himself and in relation to himself,but that he transcends all the beings in which these three elements are.And if in the Letters [II, E] he declares that all things are about theking of all, and for his sake all things are and he is the cause of all nobility,it is plain that he says this because that entity is the beginning of all thingsand their end and their middle, but he is not because of this himselfpossessed of beginning andmiddle and end; for that passage teacheswhatrelation God has to others, and not what his relation is to himself. Ofother things, then, the first principle is beginning and middle and end,but he is not himself divided into beginning and middle and end; forhe is the beginning of all things because all things are directed towardshim; for all pangs of desire and all natural striving are directed towardsthe One, as the sole Good; and he is the middle because all the centres

syrianus, in parm. fr.

=ντων, εhτε ν�ητ.ν, εhτε ν�ερ.ν, εhτε ψυAικ.ν, εhτ’ α�σ*ητ.ν, ε�ς yναDτ+ �περε�δεται,a cστε [κα-]b <ρA" κα- τ)λ�ς �στ- κα- μ)σ�ν π$ντωντ7 yνG αDτ7 δH πρ7ς 6αυτ7 τ�Cτων �DδHν OAει, δι τι μηδH 3λλ�|τιπλR*�ς. <λλ+ μ"ν �DδH πρ7ς 4τερ�νG �Zτε γ+ρ <ρA"ν OAει, δι τι μηδHναDτ�5 κρε9ττ�ν μηδH <π’ α�τ�ας �στ�νG �Zτε τ)λ�ςG �Dδεν7ς γ$ρ �στιν4νεκ$ τ�υ, π^ν δH τ7 OA�ν τ)λ�ς 4νεκ$ τ�υ π$ντως �στ�, τ7 δH yν μ ν�ν�e 4νεκα, κα*$περ 8 ]λη κα- τ7 OσAατ�ν τ.ν �λων 4νεκ$ τ�υ μ ν�νG�Zτε μ)σ�ν �στ- τ�5 6ν ς, περ- � �στι [ς μ)σ�ν τ7 yν, Wνα μ" π�λλ+εhη τ7 yν Yν �στι μ)σ�ν. π$ντων 3ρα τ�Cτων �US0ρηται τ7 yν κα- �DδHνδε9 τ�Cτων αDτ1. πρ�σ()ρειν, <λλ’ cσπερ E Πλ$των �(ηγε9ται, μ)νειν�π- τ.ν <π�($σεων. κα- γ$ρ, �ταν αDτ7 λ)γωμεν �(ετ7ν v τ)λ�ς, τ"ντ.ν 3λλων δηλ�5μεν <ν$τασινG (Cσεως γ+ρ <ν$γκSη π$ντα τ+ μετ+τ7 πρ.τ�ν �(�εται τ�5 πρ?τ�υG κα- π.ς γ+ρ dν �γκεκεντρισμ)ναc

τ1. πρ?τ1ω κα- �νερρι�ωμ)να δCναιτ� μ" �(�εσ*αι τRς 6αυτ.ν α�τ�ας;τα5τ’ �Pν �στι τ+ πρ7ς �κε9ν� τ"ν σA)σιν <ναδεδεγμ)να, �κε9ν� δH>π$ντων Eμ��ως �US0ρηται.

a περε#δεται corr. Steel ex g (firmantur):διαιρε3ταιΑΣ ( να+τ.� ν#δρυται coni. Cous2)b κα�1 add. Steel ex g (et) c γκεκεντρισμ�να corr. Steel ex g (incentrata): κεκεντρισμ�ναΜΣ κ�ντρα Fπεται A4

text and translation

of existent things, whether intelligible, intellectual, psychic or sensible,are established in the One; so that the One is the beginning, the middleand the end of all things, but in relation to himself he possesses noneof these, seeing that he possesses no other type of multiplicity; but notin relation to anything else either, for he neither has beginning, becausenothing is superior to him, nor does he derive from a cause; nor does hehave end, for he does not exist for the sake of anything, but everythingthat has an end in all cases exists for the sake of something and theOne isonly that for the sake of which things exist, even asMatter, and in generalthe lowest element in all things, is only for the sake of something; nor isthere a middle of the One, around which as middle the One exists, thatthe One may not be a Many of which there is a middle element.The Oneis, then, transcendent over all these things, and one should not apply anyof them to it, but, as Plato instructs us, we should rest content with thenegations. For when we say that it is an object of striving or an end, weare indicating the efforts of other things towards it; for by the compulsionof nature all things after the First strive towards the First. How indeed,if they are centred and rooted in the First, could they not strive towardstheir own cause? These, then, are things which have acquired a relationtowards it, but it is transcendent over all things equally.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

Parmenides D raises the question of whether the One has parts andhow these parts may or may not preclude it having a beginning, middleand end. This negative argument has its positive counterpart in theSecondHypothesis at a–,which argues that theOne is an unlimitedentity which contains wholes and parts in a transcendent fashion (seebelow, In Parm. Fr. .) In this first hypothesis, Syrianus argues that theOne is beyondmultiplicity and only contains beginning, middle and end“with respect to others”, i.e, in so far as it contains everything in theuniverse. Syrianus’ opinion is in answer to an aporia stated in Proclus’Commentary on the Parmenides . in which Laws IV E andParmenides D are alleged to contradict one another on whether Godcan have a beginning, middle and end.Before Proclus comes to the aporia, he addressed the geometrical

and arithmetical problems raised by commentators on the lemma. First,he defines beginning, middle and end as parts, and then defines part.Proclus argues that the One can have no beginning, middle and endbecause these entities are parts and only more partial, inferior beingshave parts.1The first group of commentators argues that everything witha beginning, middle, and end must have this beginning, middle and endas parts of itself. Nothingwith a limit, for instance, can have an unlimitednumber of parts. These commentators give the example of a line: a linebegins and ends with a point, but contains an unlimited number ofpoints.2 The line, then, cannot be comprised of these points, althoughpoints constitute its limits. Moreover, he says that because the One isunlimited, it could contain beginning, middle, and end as its parts. Thediscussionmoves to an explanation of part, which is denied of the One.3

1 Proclus, In Parm. ; ET prop. “that which causes all wholes to be wholes isprior to the parts”. Proclus says that eachmember of the triad is representedby beginning,middle and end. See also Proclus, PT II, , p. , ff.

2 Proclus, In Parm. .–. See Nicomachus, Intr. Arith. II p. : “Unityoccupies the place and character of a point, will be the beginning of intervals and ofnumbers, but not itself an interval or number, just as the point is the beginning of a line,but is not itself a line or interval.”

3 The discussion of beginning, middle and end is an offspring of the much widerdebate, which considers the relationship of wholes and parts. See Proclus, ET ; PT III,, p. ; for three senses of whole: whole before parts, whole of parts, whole in parts. Inher article Glasner differentiates between division into parts and division into beginning,middle and end. Division into parts, she says, is interpreted in terms of “whole beforeparts” () .

commentary

TheOne cannot be composed of different elements because it is a unitaryentity.Secondly, even if it were to have limits, these limits must be composed

of parts with limits.4 Beginning, middle, and end are parts and hencelimits. The conclusion to be drawn is that the One, as an unlimited body,cannot contain limits.In In Parm. .–, Proclus sets out the three definitions of part:

. A part is that which contains the same elements as the whole,5 onlyin a partial6 manner.7

. A part makes up a totality.8. A part is linked with other things for the completion of one entity.9

Because theOne is removed from all multiplicity, it can contain no parts,including beginning and end, in all three of the above senses.10After Proclus sets out the issue of the whole and part, he addresses

the aporia raised by those who advance the statement of the AthenianStranger in Laws IV E,11 where he finds his solution with Syrianus.The problem lies in Parmenides’ apparent contradiction of the Athe-nian Stranger in the Laws, where the Stranger says that God possessesbeginning, middle and end.12 Proclus gives the opinion of two sets ofcommentators in reply to this aporia. The first group of commentators

4 The argument also reflects a larger discussion regarding forms and matter. Proclus,In Eucl. .–.: “In the forms separable frommatter, the ideas of the boundaries existin themselves and not in the things bounded… but the forms inseparable from matter,the limits surrender themselves to the things they limit, they establish themselves in thembecoming, as it were, parts of them and being filled with their inferior character.” Trans.Morrow (). The One falls into the category of the first—an entity in which the ideaof boundary exists in itself.

5 See Proclus, ET props. –.6 Theodore of Asine (Proclus, In Tim. II, .): three modes of wholeness; see also

Proclus, ET prop. and .7 Part is measure. See Euclid’s Elements VII, def. ; Proclus, PT XXV.: identifies

the relation of whole before parts to wholes of parts with genus and species.8 pars qua quantum, Aristotle’s Met. b, book V Euclid’s Elements. See Parm.

C: whole is the form where no part is missing.9 Prot. D: parts can be similar to the whole, like pieces of gold, or different like

parts of a face. In the second hypothesis, the understanding of part is one being becauseof its parts. See Glasner () . See also Sophist E: a whole in the sense that it hasthe property of unity.

10 Proclus, In Parm. .11 “O men, that God who, as old tradition tells, holdeth the beginning, the end, and

the centre of all things that exist, completeth his circuit by nature’s ordinance in straight,unswerving course.” Translation Bury (). Bury notes that this is probably Orphic.

12 Proclus, In Parm. .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

says that God contains beginning, middle, and end in a hidden mode.13Proclus argues against the concept that the One contains parts in anexpressible manner as only secondary entities can contain multiplicity.This idea is based on the connection between the term kruphios (in ahidden mode) and diêrêmenôs (distinction). The concept seems partic-ularly Iamblichean based on a comment in Iamblichus’ Phaedrus Com-mentary where he says that forms are present at the higher level of nousonly as monads of forms, in a hidden manner.The second group,14 iden-tified as Plutarch of Athens by Dillon—although the author could beIamblichus—says that both the Athenian Stranger and Parmenides aretalking about God, but theAthenian Stranger is discussing the Demiurgein particular. Proclus is polite about this group, which is to be expected,considering that Plutarch is Proclus’ spiritual grandfather. This group—in what seems to be typical Syrianic mode—refers to how the Demiurgeis divided into a triad, with its beginning, middle, and end compared toeach member of the demiurgic triad.In In Parm. ., Proclus arrives at the view of Syrianus, who

denies the possibility that the god discussed is the Demiurge. Instead,he argues that the one god is discussed in two different aspects in the twotexts. In the Parmenides, Plato looks only to how the One relates to itselfand denies it a beginning, middle, and end. In the Laws, however, theAthenian Stranger discusses how the One relates to the world. Syrianus’solution to this apparent contradiction is that both parties are correct.Because it is impossible to believe that Plato contradicts himself, Syrianusconjectures that Plato gives a different emphasis to different things. In theLaws, the relation of God is to creation—in this kind of external relation,God functions as a triad. With himself, however, as in the case of theParmenides, God acts as a monad.15 Syrianus’ explanation delves intothe two aspects of God, with the purpose of denying multiplicity to the

13 In his introduction to book VI of the Parmenides Commentary, Dillon tentativelyidentifies this commentator as Iamblichus, whereas Hadot connects him with Porphyry.Of late, however, Dillon retracts this, noting that it can perfectly well be Porphyry andthe second commentator Iamblichus, as the philosophy actually fits Porphyry’s doctrineof the One being father of the noetic triad. See Dillon () and note ; Hadot().

14 See Dillon () , note .15 This distinction between “with respect to itself ” and “with respect to others” is

prior to that of beginning, middle and end; see Glasner () . In In Euclid .–, Proclus says, “the point is twofold, because it exists either by itself or in the line.”The division into beginning, middle and end relates to the concept of part and boundary(Proclus, In Parm. ; ; In Eucl. .–.).

commentary

One, but attributing all things to it as the cause of creation. Because thebeginning, middle, and end are present in the universe, they must alsoexist inGod. Syrianus explains that theOne is the beginning as the sourceof all things, the centre of all things because all things are established init, and the end, because it is the goal to which all things strive.16 Still, theOne is not himself possessed of beginning, middle and end. Proclus usesthis passage of the Parmenides to prove the existence of the absolute One.Hemakes the case in PlatonicTheology II, that the absolute One existsbeyond the total (π$ν), since the total relates to the parts that comprise itby encompassing those parts. Instead, the Absolute One is better called“entire” (�λ�ν), a total entity that is not full of parts.17In Platonic Theology II, , Proclus associates whole and parts with

the second triad of the intelligible-intellectual gods.18 The intelligibletriads of the Parmenides correspond to the conclusions of the secondhypothesis, with the first intelligible triad corresponding to the firstconclusion (if the One is, it participates in Being: Parm. B–C—characterised as intelligible essence); the second triad corresponds to thesecond conclusion: if the One is, it is a totality and it has parts (Parm.C–D—characterised as intelligible life); the third triad correspondsto the third conclusion; if the One is, it is an infinite multiplicity ofparts (Parm. D – A ).19 Beginning, Middle and End are thusrelegated to the second triad of the second hypothesis, which concernsthe intelligibles. In In Parm. .–., a passage attributed toSyrianus (fr. above),20 the divine classes are given names, such as“totality”, “multiplicity”; the names given to the intelligibles in the secondhypothesis are precisely those denied of the One, as we see in In Parm..ff. Proclus uses the Parmenidean statements concerning whichproperty denied of the One can be attributed to a divine class as it existsin the second hypothesis. These statements, thus, are used by Proclus tooutline the world of divine beings.21

16 Syrianus cites Plato, Ep. E.17 Proclus, PT II, , p. , –; , –; II, , , –. See Steel () .18 The other two include hen on, holon, and pan.19 Saffrey and Westerink attribute this passage to Syrianus in Proclus, PT II, –;

in Sophist B–B, Plato has expressed the same doctrine of the triads in order toshow that the One in itself transcends the summit of Being. Steel discusses this passagein () .

20 Saffrey andWesterink () xlv.21 Saffrey andWesterink outline this in () lxix and () xlix. Proclus, following

Syrianus, places the metaphysical attributes of the five genera at the intellectual level so

syrianus, in parm. fr.

In what will become more clear in the fragments which follow, thedifferent orders of the intelligible contain the five genres of Being; in sofar as the Platonic Theology22 and the Commentary on the Parmenides23discuss the ways in which the One transcends these genres and thesecondhypothesis affirms them, both texts act as Platonic interpretationsof the Sophist.

that they do not follow immediately upon the absolute unity of the One. See Van Campe() .

22 Proclus, PT I, p. ff.; III, , p. , –, .23 Proclus, In Parm. .–..

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 5

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

κα- μ"ν τελευτ0 γε κα- <ρA" π)ρας 6κ$στ�υ.—π.ς δ’ �Z;—�Απειρ�ν3ρα τ7 4ν, ε� μ0τε <ρA"ν μ0τε τελευτ"ν OAει.—�Απειρ�ν. [Parm. d–]

/Ημε9ς δH Aαρ�εντα μHν κα- τ+ τ�ια5τα π$ντα ν�μ���μεν, ε� κα- τ+ μHνμ^λλ�ν, τ+ δH pττ�ν <π�δεA με*α, πεισ με*α δH τ1. 8μετ)ρ1ω κα*η-γεμ νι, π$νυ γε σ( δρα, κα- �ν τ�Cτ�ις εD*υ� λως τ"ν τ�5 Πλ$τω-ν�ς τε*ηρακ τι δι$ν�ιαν, κα- <Uι?σ�μεν τ�Vς τRς <λη*ε�ας (ιλ�*ε$-μ�νας EρT ν πρ.τ�ν μHν π σαι τ$Uεις ε�σ-ν �ν τ�9ς �Pσι τRς <πειρ�ας,Oπειτα π�9αι ταCταις �F�ν <ντικε�μεναι τ�5 π)ρατ�ς πρ �δ�ι, |κα- μετ+τα5τα λ�ιπ7ν �πισκ)πτεσ*αι τ� τ7 �ντα5*α 3πειρ�νG τ�9ς γ+ρ τ7ν τρ -π�ν 8μ9νa τ�5τ�ν μετι�5σι τ"ν τ�5 πρ�κειμ)ν�υ �0τησιν NTαδ�ως <να-(αν0σεται π^ν τ7 τ�5 Πλ$των�ς ��Cλημα.

Τ"ν τ��νυν <πειρ�αν, Wνα κ$τω*εν π�ιησ?με*α τ"ν <ρA0ν, *εατ)�νμHν κα- �π- τRς ]λης, δι τι < ριστ�ς κα*’ α�τ"ν κα- 3μ�ρ(�ς κα- <νε�-δε�ς, τ+ δH εhδη κα- αQ μ�ρ(α- π)ρατα τRς ]λης. *εατ)�ν [δH]b κα- �π-τ�5 <π���υ σ?ματ�ς κατ+ τ"ν δια�ρεσινG �π’ 3πειρ�ν γ+ρ τ�5τ� πρ.-τ�ν διαιρετ ν, gτε πρ.τ�ν [lν]c διαστατ ν. *εατ)�ν δH κατ+ τ+ς περ-τ7 3π�ι�νd πρ?τας �(ισταμ)νας π�ι τητας, �ν αFς τ7 μ^λλ ν �στι κα-pττ�ν πρ?ταιςG τ�Cτ�ις γ+ρ κα- E �ν Φιλ0�1ω Σωκρ$της �Aαρακτ0ρισετ7 3πειρ�ν. *εατ)�ν δHe κα- �π- π$σης τRς γεν)σεωςG κα- γ+ρ α]τη τ73πειρ�ν OAει κατ$ τε τ"ν <ειγενεσ�ανf κα- τ7ν ταCτης 3παυστ�ν κC-κλ�ν, κα- κατ+ τ+ς <�ρ�στ�υς τ.ν γεννητ.νg �Uαλλαγ+ς γιγν�μ)νων<ε- κα- (*ειρ�μ)νων, �ν �Fς κα- 8 κατ+ τ7 πλR*�ς <πειρ�α τ"ν γ)νε-σιν OAει �ν τ1. γ�γνεσ*αι μ ν�ν �Pσα, π^σα δH Eμ�5h μηδ)π�τε �Pσα.

a �μ3ν om. A b δ1 add. Steel ex g (autem) c Gν add. Steel ex g (ens) d Bπ�ι�ν Σ ('πει�νRa’) g: Bπειρ�νA e δ1 corr. Steel ex g (autem): μ)ν ΑΣ f 'ειγενεσ#αν Σ: 'ειγεννησ#ανA g γεννητ�ν corr. Steel ex g (generabilium): γεννητικ�ν ΑΣ h πCσα….�μ�0 Strobel:παραδε�μεν�ν A8 παραδε�μ�ν�υ Σ περιδε�μ�ν�υ A περ� δ1 τ� Hν Westerink | �9σα2

ΑΣ g: λε#π�υσα coni. Taylor

“And further, the end and the beginning are the limits of each thing.”“Obviously.” “So then the One is unlimited, if it has neither beginningnor end.” “It is unlimited.”

We, however, accept all these suggestions as having a certain attraction,even though we incline to some more than to others; but we are verystrongly indeed influenced by our own Master, who in this passage aswell has very accurately tracked down the intention of Plato, and wewould recommend all lovers of truth to see first how many orders ofUnlimitedness there are among beings, then what processions of Limitthere are, as it were, set over against these, and after that to turn tothe consideration of what Unlimitedness is being referred to here; forif one treats the inquiry into the present question in this way the wholeintention of Plato will readily become clear.Unlimitedness, then, if we start frombelow,may be reviewed inMatter

because it is unlimited and shapeless and formless of itself, whereas theforms and shapes are limits of Matter. It may be seen also in unqualifiedbody in respect of division; for this is the entity which is primally divisibleto infinity, in so far as it is the first which is extended. It may alsobe viewed in the qualities which come into being primally about theUnlimitedness, which are the first things to contain the more and less;for these are the elements by which Socrates in the Philebus [ B]1characterised the Unlimitedness. It may also be seen throughout thewhole of the realm of generation; for this possesses Unlimitedness, bothin respect of its constant coming into being and in the ceaseless cycleof this, and in respect of the unlimited exchanges with each other ofgenerated things as they constantly come into being and perish, amongwhich also Unlimitedness in respect of multiplicity has its origin, since itonly has existence in the process of coming to being, never attaining true

1 Proclus cites Philebus in his discussion of how God produced beings through amixture of Limit and Unlimited; see PT III, .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

πρ7 δH τ�Cτων τ7 3πειρ�ν *εατ)�ν �π- τRς τ�5 �Dραν�5 κυκλ�(�ρ�αςGOAει γ+ρ κα- αDτ" τ7 3πειρ�ν δι+ τ"ν <πειρ�δυναμ�αν τ�5 κιν�5ντ�ςGσ.μα μHν γ$ρ, κα*7 σ.μα, δCναμιν 3πειρ�ν �Dκ OAει, δι+ δH τ"ν τ�5ν�5 μετ�υσ�αν κα- τ7 σ.μα <ε- Oστι, κα- 8 κ�νησις 3πειρ�ς. <κατ$λη-κτ�ς γ�5ν �στι κα- συνεA"ς τ7 αDτ7 π�ι�υμ)νη τελευτ0ν τε κα- <ρA0ν.κα- πρ7 τ�Cτων �π- τRς ψυARς τ7 3πειρ�ν ληπτ)�νG μετα�ατικ.ς γ+ρν��5σα, δCναμιν <παCστ�υ κιν0σεως OAει κα- Oστιν <εικ�νητ�ς, συν-$πτ�υσα τ+ς περι δ�υς <λλ0λαις, κα- 3τρυτ�ν π�ι�υμ)νη τ"ν �ν)ρ-γειαν κα- μ�αν <ε- κα- <ν)κλειπτ�ν. Oτι πρ7 τRς ψυARς �π’ αDτ�5 τ�5Aρ ν�υ *εατ)�ν τ�5 μετρ�5ντ�ς τRν ψυAικ"ν π^σαν περ��δ�νG κα- γ+ρ�eτ ς �στιν 3πειρ�ς �λ�ς, δι τι 8 �ν)ργεια αDτ�5, δι’ pς <νελ�ττει τ+ςκιν0σεις τ.ν ψυA.ν κα- δι’ pς μετρε9 τ+ς περι δ�υς αDτ.ν, κατ’ |<ρι-*μ7ν ��5σα, 3πειρ ς �στι κατ+ τ"ν δCναμινG �Dδ)π�τε γ+ρ <π�λ0γειμ)ν�υσα κα- πρ�ϊ�5σα, κα- τ�5 6ν7ς <ντεA�μ)νη κα- τ7ν <ρι*μ7ν <νε-λ�ττ�υσα τ7ν τ.ν κιν0σεων τ.ν �λων μετρητικ ν.<λλ+ δ" κα- πρ7 τ�5Aρ ν�υ *)αa μ�ι τ7 3πειρ�ν �π’ αDτ�5 τ�5 ν�5 κα- τRς ν�ερ^ς �ωRςGα]τη γ+ρ <μετ$�ατ�ς κα- <ε- π^σα κα- <*ρ α π$ρεστιν, α�?νι�ς δHκα- <πειρ�δCναμ�ςG τ7 γ+ρ <κ�νητ�νb αDτRς κα- <ν)κλειπτ�ν �Dσ�ας�στ- κα- δυν$μεως �Dκ �πιλειπ�Cσης, <λλ’ <ε- τ7 �Rν 3γρυπν�ν �A�C-σης, δι’ jν κα- π^ν τ7 κιν�Cμεν�ν <ε- δCναται <ε- κινε9σ*αι, μετ)A�ν �ντSR κιν0σει τRς 6στ?σης <πειρ�ας. κα- �Dκ 3Aρι τ�Cτων μ ν�νc τ7 3πει-ρ�ν,<λλ+ κα- πρ7 τ�5 ν�5 π$ντως αDτ7ς E π�λυCμνητ�ς α�Mν 3πειρ�ς,lς κα- π^σαν περι)Aει τ"ν ν�ερ+ν <πειρ�αν. π *εν γ+ρ τ1. ν1. τ7 α�ων�-ως �Rν v �κ τ�5 α�.ν�ς; �eτ�ς �Pν 3πειρ�ς πρ7 ν�5 κατ+ τ"ν δCναμινGμ^λλ�ν δH τ+ μHν 3λλα κατ+ τ"ν δCναμιν 3πειρα, E δH α�Mν δCναμιςGκα- γ+ρ �Dκ 3λλ� τ� �στιν v δCναμις E πρ.τ�ς α�?ν.

'επ’ αDτ"ν δ" τ"ν πρωτ�στην πηγ"ν τRς <πειρ�ας <ν$δραμε λ�ιπ7νκα- τ"ν κρC(ι�ν α�τ�αν π$ντων τ.ν Eπωσ�5ν <πε�ρων γενντικ"νd

κα- <ναδραμMν =ψει π$ντα κατ+ τ"ν δCναμιν 〈τ"ν〉e �κε9*εν 3πειραGτ�ι�5τ�ν γ$ρ, ε� ��Cλει, τ7 αDτ�$πειρ�νG τ�ι�5τ�ν παρ’ '�ρ(ε9 τ7A$�ς, περ- �e κα- �κε9ν�ς, εhρηκε τ7 �Dδ) τι πε9ρας �πRν. E μHν γ+ρα�Mν, ε� κα- δι+ τ7 <ε- 3πειρ�ς, <λλ+ [ς μ)τρ�ν δ0π�υ τ.ν α�ων�ωνκα- π)ρας �στ�. τ7 δH A$�ς πρ?τως 3πειρ�ν κα- μ νως 3πειρ�ν κα-πηγ" π$σης <πειρ�ας, ν�ητRς, ν�ερ^ς, ψυAικRς, σωματικRς, �λικRς.

a !�α corr. Steel ex g (vide): !ε� ΑΣ b Iκ#νητ�ν Σg: 'εικ#νητ�ν A1 sl c μ�ν�ν Σg:μ�νων A d γεννητικ)ν Dillon: γεννJσας AΣg (cf.Theol. plat. V , p. .). e τ)ν2

add. Steel, que add. g (τ� Γ?)

text and translation

existence. And prior to these the Unlimitedness may be observed in thecircuits of the heavens; for it also possesses Unlimitedness by reason ofthe unlimited power of thatwhichmoves it; for body, in so far as it is body,does not have unlimited power but through the presence in it of intellecteven body exists eternally, and its motion is unlimited; it is unceasingand continuous, having the same thing as its beginning and end. Priorto these again, the Unlimitedness may be perceived in the Soul, for asit thinks transitively, it possesses the power of unceasing motion and iseternally mobile, joining its circuits one to the other and producing anactivity which is unwearied and always one and unfailing. Further, priorto Soul, the Unlimitedness may be perceived in the case of Time itself,which measures the whole circuit of the Soul; for this is limitless as awhole because its activity, through which it unfolds the motions of soulsand through which it measures their circuits as it proceeds according tonumber, is unlimited in its power; for it never stops resting and goingforward, both clinging fast to the One, and unfolding Number, whichmeasures the motions of all things. But indeed, even prior to Time,behold the Infinite in Intellect itself and intellectual life; for this is non-transient and always a totality and present as a whole and eternal andinfinite in power; its immobility and unfailing continuity is a mark ofan essence and power which does not give out, but always preservesunsleeping life, through which also everything that is in motion is ablealways to move, participating through its motion in stable Infinity. Andthe Unlimitedness does not extend only as far as these, but also, priorto Intellect, the much-celebrated Eternity itself is necessarily infinite,seeing that it comprehends the whole intellectual infinity. For whencewould Intellect derive its eternal life, if not from Eternity? So then thisis Unlimitedness, prior to Intellect, in respect of power; or rather all thethings are infinite in power, but Eternity is power itself; for indeed theprimal Eternity is nothing else than Power.Ascend then to the primal fount of Infinity, and the hidden cause

generative of all other infinite things of whatever kind, and when youhave thus ascended you will see that all things are infinite in respectof power from that source. For such, if you will, is Essential Infinity;such is what is termed by Orpheus “chaos”, about which he himselfhas said, “Nor was there any bound beneath it” [OF Kern]. ForEternity, even if it is unlimited in respect of everlastingness, neverthelessas being the measure of things eternal is also a limit; chaos on theother hand is primally unlimited and solely unlimited, and is the fountof all Infinity—intelligible, intellectual, psychic, corporeal, or material.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

EρT ς �Pν �σαι τ$Uεις τRς <πειρ�ας κα- [ς <ε- αQ δεCτεραι τ.ν πρ7αDτ.ν �U0ρτηνταιG a τε γ+ρ �λικ" <πειρ�α συν)Aεται δι+ τRς <ειγενε-σ�ας, a τε <ειγενεσ�α δι+ τ"ν <εικινησ�αν τ�5 α�*)ρ�ς �στ-ν <ν)κλει-πτ�ς, κα- 8 <εικινησ�α τ�5 α�*)ρ�ς δι+ τ"ν τRς *ε�ας ψυARς 3παυστ�νπερ��δ�ν <π�τελε9ταιG μ�μημα γ$ρ �στιν �κε�νης, κα- 8 ταCτης περ��-δ�ς δι+ τ"ν τ�5 Aρ ν�υ συνεAR κα- <ν)κλειπτ�ν δCναμιν <νελ�ττεται,τ"ν αDτ"ν <ρA"ν π�ι�υμ)νη κα- τελευτ"ν δι+ τ7 ν5ν τ7 Aρ�νικ ν, κα-E Aρ ν�ς <πε�ρως �νεργε9 δι+ τ"ν ν�ερ+ν <πειρ�αν τ"ν <ε- 6στ.σανGτ7 γ+ρ κατ’ <ρι*μ7ν � ν, �ταν 3πειρ�ν Sm, δι+ τ"ν μ)ν�υσαν <ε- α�τ�αν3πειρ�ν, περ- jν <νελ�ττεται τ�5τ� κα- jν <ε- [σαCτως περιA�ρεCει.κα- E ν�5ς �π’ 3πειρ�ν �SR δι+ τ7ν α�.ναG τ7 γ+ρ α�?νι�ν π^σιν �κ τ�5α�.ν�ς, κα- �eτ ς �στιν �*εν �U0ρτηται π^σι, τ�9ς μHν 〈�ναργ)στερ�ν,τ�9ς δH〉a <μυδρ τερ�ν, τ7 ε`να� τε κα- �SRν. κα- E α�Mν 3πειρ�ς δι+ τ"νπηγ"ν τRς <πειρ�ας, j κα- �Dσ�αις π$σαις κα- δυν$μεσι κα- �νεργε�αιςκα- περι δ�ις κα- γεν)σεσιν 3νω*εν A�ρηγε9 τ7 <ν)κλειπτ�ν. κα- μ)AριταCτης <νι�5σι κα- <π7 ταCτης κατι�5σιν αQ τ.ν <πειρ.ν τ$UειςGb κα-γ+ρ 8 τ.ν καλ.ν <π7 τ�5 αDτ�κ$λλ�υς, κα- 8 τ.ν �σ�τ0των <π7 τRςπρ?της �σ τητ�ς, [cσ]cτε κα- 8 τ.ν <πειρι.ν <π7 τRς αDτ�απειρ�ας.

'Αλλ+ περ- μHν τ.ν τ�5 <πε�ρ�υ τ$Uεων ε�ρ0σ*ω τ�σα5τα. τ"ν δHτ�5 π)ρατ�ς σειρ+ν ταCτSη συμπρ�ϊ�5σαν 3νω*εν �πισκεπτ)�νG δC�γ+ρ ταCτας α�τ�ας gμα παρ0γαγεν E *ε7ς, π)ρας κα- 3πειρ�ν, v ε���Cλει λ)γειν 8μ^ς '�ρ(ικ.ςG α�*)ρα κα- A$�ς. τ7 μHν γ+ρ 3πειρ�νA$�ς �στ-ν, [ς A�ρηγ7νd π$σης δυν$μεως κα- π$σης <πειρ�ας κα- [ςπεριληπτικ7ν τ.ν 3λλων, κα- �F�ν τ.ν <πε�ρων τ7 <πειρ τατ�νG τ7 δHπ)ρας E α�*0ρ, �τι κα- �eτ�ς E α�*"ρ τ+ π$ντα περατ�9 κα- μετρε9.πρ.τ�ν �Pν π)ρας τ7 αDτ�π)ραςG πηγ" 〈γ+ρ〉e κα- 6στ�αf π$ντων �στ-

a ναργ�στερ�ν… δ1 add. Cous2 (cf. In Parm. III .–) b α"… τ�(εις corr. Steel exg (ordines): �… τ�6ις ΑΣ c Kστε corr. Steel ex g (quare): τε Σ om. A d 2�ρηγ�ν corr.Steel ex g (elargitiuum): 2�ρητικ�ν ΑΣ 2ωρητικ�ν Cous. e γ�ρ add. Strobel f Aστ#αcorr. Strobel ex g (origo): στ#γμα ΑΣ στJριγμα Taylor

text and translation

You see, then, howmany orders of Infinity there are, and how in each casethe secondary depend upon those prior to them; for material unlimited-ness is held together through eternal generation, while eternal generationis unfailing by reason of the eternal motion of the aether, and the eter-nal motion of the aether is brought about by the unceasing circuit of thedivine Soul; for it is an imitation of that entity, and the circuit of the Soulis unfolded through the continuous and unfailing power of Time, whichmakes the same things to be beginning and end by means of the tem-poral present, and Time exercises its activity without Limit by virtue ofthe unlimitedness of Intellect, which is always static; for that which pro-ceeds according to Intellect, when it is infinite, is infinite by virtue of aneternally static cause, around which this unfolds itself and about whichit performs its eternally uniform dance. And Intellect possesses eternallife by virtue of Eternity; for eternity comes to all things from Eternity,and it is this on which all depend, some more manifestly, others moreobscurely, for their being and life; and Eternity is infinite by virtue of thefount of infinity, which from above provides unfailingness to all essencesand powers and activities and circuits and generations. Up to this, then,there ascends, and from this there descends, the orders of things infinite;for even as the order of things beautiful descends from Essential Beauty,and the order of things equal from Primal Equality, even so the order ofthings infinite descends from Essential Infinity.Enough has now been said about the orders of infinity. We must next

turn to examine the chain of Limit which proceeds parallel with this.For these two causal principles were produced simultaneously by God—Limit and Unlimitedness, or, if you wish us to express them in Orphicterms, Aether and Chaos.2 For the infinite is Chaos, in so far as it isreceptive of every power and every type of Unlimitedness, and in so faras it encircles everything else, and is as it were the most infinite of allthings infinite. Aether is Limit because this (visible) aether too limitsand measures all things. The primary limit is Essential Limit, the fount

2 Syrianus uses theOrphic principles of Aether andChaos to express how all of realityis derived from the countering principleswhich exist as a dyad after theOne. See Syrianus,In Met. .–; .–. and Proclus, In Tim. I, .–.; .–; PT III, ,.–. Cf. D’Ancona () . The principles of peras and apeiria were revealed byOrpheus to Pythagoras, by Pythagoras to Plato. The key passage for peras and apeiria inthe thought of Syrianus occurs in In Met. p. .–.. See D’Ancona () . OnSyrianus invoking theological authorities on numbers, see O’Meara () . See alsoIamblichus, In Tim. Fr. Dillon, where Limit and Unlimitedness are a dyad immediatelyfollowing the One.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

τ.ν περ$των, ν�ητ.ν, ν�ερ.ν, �περκ�σμ�ων, �γκ�σμ�ων, μ)τρ�ν αDτ7τ.ν π$ντων κα- �ρ�ς πρ�ϋπ$ρA�ν. δεCτερ�ν δH τ7 κατ+ τ7ν α�.ναGα�Mν γ+ρ Eμ�5 κα- 3πειρ ς| �στιν, [ς εhρηται, κα- π)ραςG κα*7 μHνγ+ρ <νεκλε�πτ�υ �ωRς �στιν αhτι�ς κα- [ς δCναμις τ�5 <ε- A�ρηγ ς,3πειρ ς �στιG κα*7 δH μ)τρ�ν �στ- π$σης ν�ερ^ς �νεργε�ας κα- �ρ�ςτRς τ�5 ν�5 �ωRς 3νω*εν αDτ"ν Eρ��ων, π)ρας �στ�G κα- �λως κα-αDτ7ς τ.ν μικτ.ν �στι τ.ν �κ π)ρατ�ς κα- <πειρ�ας �(ισταμ)νων,�*εν αDτ7ν �Zτε τ7 πρ?τως 〈π)ρας �Zτε τ7 πρ?τως〉a 3πειρ�ν λ)γειν_Uι�5μενG τ7 γ+ρ πρ?τως 6κατ)ρ�ν �US0ρηται τ.ν μικτ.ν π$ντων, cς(ησιν E �ν τ1. Φιλ0�1ω Σωκρ$της.

τρ�τ�ν τ��νυν τ7 π)ρας �ν τ1. ν1. *εατ)�νG κα*7 γ+ρ �ν τα�τ1. μ)-νει κατ+ τ"ν ν ησιν, κα- μ�αν κα- <ε- κα- τ"ν αDτ"ν OAει �ω0ν, cρισταικα- πεπ)ρασταιG τ7 γ+ρ <μετ$�ατ�ν κα- τ7 6στMς πεπερασμ)νης �στ-(CσεωςG κα- �λως <ρι*μ7ς {ν δηλ�ν τι ταCτSη μετ)Aει τ�5 π)ρατ�ς. τ)-ταρτ�ν τ��νυν E Aρ ν�ς π)ρας, κα- [ς κατ’ <ρι*μ7ν πρ�ϊMν, κα- [ς μ)-τρ�ν τ.ν ψυAικ.ν περι δωνG πανταA�5 γ+ρ τ7 μετρ�5ν, κα*7 μετρε9,κα- τ7 <(�ρ���ν τ+ 3λλα, τRς τ�5 π)ρατ�ς α�τ�ας μετ)A�ν, μετρητι-κ ν �στιν αDτ.ν κα- <(�ριστικ ν. π)μπτ�ν �π- τ�Cτ�ις 8 τRς ψυARςπερ��δ�ς, κα- E κCκλ�ς [σαCτως <π�τελ�Cμεν�ς μ)τρ�ν �στ-ν <(α-νHς πασ.ν τ.ν (αιν�μ)νων κιν0σεωνG <π7 γ+ρ τRς �ωτικRς περι(�ρ^ςEρ��εται π^σα τ.ν 6τερ�κιν0των 8 <ν)λιUις.

4κτ�ν 8 κατ+ ταDτ+b κα- �ν τ1. αDτ1. κα- περ- τ7 αDτ7 τ�5 α�*)ρ�ςκ�νησις περατ�9 πανταA *εν τ7 3τακτ�ν τ.ν �νCλων κα- ε�ς 4να συνε-λ�ττει κCκλ�ν κα- αDτ" κα*’ 6αυτ"ν cρισταιG τ7 γ+ρ 3πειρ�ν αDτRς �ντ1. π$λιν κα- π$λιν �στ-ν, <λλ’ �D τ1. μ" <νακ$μπτειν, �DδH �Fα κατ’εD*ε9αν 3πειρ�ν, �Dδ’ [ς �στερημ)ν�ν π)ρατ�ς κ<ντα5*α τ7 3πει-ρ�νG 8 γ+ρ μ�α περ��δ�ς τ1. π�λλ$κις �στ-ν 3πειρ�ς. 4�δ�μ�ν 8 <ν)-κλειπτ�ς τ.ν ε�δ.ν �π στασις, τ.ν �νCλων λ)γω, κα- τ1. μηδHν τ.ν�λων <π�λλCσ*αι κα- τ1. π$ντα [ρ�σ*αιG τ+ μHν [γ+ρ] κα*’ 4καστατ�9ς κ�ιν�9ς, τ+ δH μ)ρη τ�9ς �λ�ις, δε�κνυσι τ"ν �ντα5*α τ�5 π)ρα-τ�ς πρ7ς τ7 3πειρ�ν <ντ�*εσινG <πειραA.ς γ+ρ �Uαλλαττ�μ)νων τ.νγεννητ.ν, �μως cρισται τ+ εhδη κα- τ+ αDτ+ διαμ)νει, μ0τε πλε�ω μ0τε

a π�ρας… πρ�τως add. Steel b τα+τ� corr. Steel ex g (eadem): τα0τα ΑΣ

text and translation

and hearth of all limits, intelligible, intellectual, supracosmic, encosmic,preexisting itself as the measure and bound of all things. The secondlimit is that associated with Eternity; for Eternity is simultaneously bothUnlimitedness, as it has been said, and Limit; in so far as it is thecause of unfailing life and the power which bestows everlastingness, itis Unlimitedness; inasmuch as it is the measure of all intellectual activityand the bound of the life of intellect, bounding it from above, it is Limit.And in general it is one of thosemixed entities which are formed of Limitand Unlimitedness, for which reason we do not see fit to call it 〈eitherthe primal Limit or〉 the primarily Unlimited; for that which is primarilyanything is transcendent over either of every pair of all mixed entities, asSocrates says in the Philebus [ C].The third class of Limit is to be seen in Intellect; for in so far as it

remains in itself in virtue of its intellection and possesses a life which issingle and eternal and the same, it is bounded and limited; for that whichis non-transitive and static belongs to the limited nature, and in generalin that it is a number it plainly in this respect partakes of limit. Fourthly,Time is Limit, both in so far as it proceeds according to number, and inso far as it is the measure of the circuits of the soul; for everywhere themeasuring element, in so far as itmeasures, and that which sets bounds toother things, partakes of the causal principle of Limit and is a measuringand limiting element of other things. Fifth after these comes the circuit ofthe Soul, and its cycle as it is uniformly completed, which is an invisiblemeasure of all visiblemotions; for it is on the basis of the circuit of life thatall the unfolding of those things which are moved by an external agencyis given definition.The sixth form of Limit is the motion of the aether on the same terms

and in the same place and about the same centre, which bestows Limitfrom all aspects upon the disorderly element in material things, and rollsthem together in one cycle and is itself limited by itself; for its unlimitedelement consists in its happening again and again, but not in its notturning back on itself, nor on the grounds that it is unlimited in onedirection, nor does Unlimitedness here too consist in the fact that it isdevoid of Limit; but the single circuit is unlimited in that it occurs manytimes. Seventh is the unfailing creation of the forms in matter, and thefact that nothing of all things perishes, and the fact that all things arebounded, individual things by common terms, parts by their wholes.All this shows in this realm the opposition of Limit and Unlimitedness;for although generated things alter in unlimited ways, nevertheless theirforms are limited and persist the same, becoming neither more nor less.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

�λ$ττω γιγν μενα. =γδ��ν καλε�σ*ω π)ρας τ7 π�σ7ν π^ν �δ�ως �ν τ�9ς�λικ�9ς, κα*$περ τ7 π�ι7ν �λ)γετ� πρ τερ�ν 3πειρ�νG �D γ+ρ �πιδ)-Aεται τ7 μ^λλ�ν κα- pττ�ν, [ς κα- �ν Φιλ0�1ω λ)γει Σωκρ$της. Oννα-τ�ν 〈τ7〉a 3π�ι�ν σ.μα [ς �λ�ν π)ρας �στ�νG �D γ$ρ �στι κατ+ μ)γε*�ς3πειρ�ν, <λλ+ τ�σ�5τ�ν �σ�ν τ7 π^νG δε9 γ+ρ �λ�ν �π�κε�μεν�ν αD-τ7 λ)γεσ*αι τ�5 παντ ς. δ)κατ�ν αDτ7 τ7 Oνυλ�ν ε`δ�ς, l κατ)Aει τ"ν]λην κα- περι�ρ��ει τ7 < ριστ�ν αDτRς κα- 3μ�ρ(�ν, ε�ς l κα- <πιδ ν-τες τινHς μ ν�ν ε�ς ]λην κα- ε`δ�ς <ν$γ�υσι τ τε π)ρας κα- τ7 3πειρ�ν.τ�σα5ται μHν �Pν κα- αQ τ�5 π)ρατ�ς τ$UειςG [ς συλλ0�δην γ+ρ ε�πε9ν,τ�Cτων π�λλ+ς *εωρ0σ�μεν δια(�ρ τητας.

a τ� add. Steel.

Commentary

In this fragment, we see how Syrianus develops the system of Platonicprinciples, in which reality results from the conjunction of two contraryprinciples, Limit and Unlimitedness.4 Proclus seems to adopt Syrianus’view in its entirety, as a solution to the problem of how multiplicityderives from the One.5 Proclus divides Syrianus’ solution to the probleminto two sections, with a third section based on Syrianus’ teaching, butcoming from Proclus:

. .–.: the classes of Unlimitedness. .–.: the processions of Limit. .–.: solution of the exegetical question

For the first two sections, Proclus shows how Syrianus divides the uni-verse into levels of Limit and Unlimitedness. Syrianus runs through allthe levels of the universe to show how the aporia is seen at every level.

4 On the development of this doctrine from Plato to Aristotle to the late Platonists,see Merlan () for a discussion of Syrianus’ use of Aristotle and the doctrine ofdualism. According to D’Ancona, Syrianus uses the monism of Pythagoreans paired withthe dualism of Aristotelian principles. See D’Ancona () ff.

5 Proclus, ET, props. and .

text and translation

As an eighth type of Limit let us mention all quantity as it particularlyappears in material things, even as quality was previously stated to beunlimited; for it does not allow of the more and less, as Socrates says inthe Philebus [ B]. Ninthly, unqualified body as a whole is Limit; for itis not unlimited in size, but it is of the same extent as the universe; forit must as a whole be said to be the substratum of the universe. A tenthtype of Limit is the form3 inmatter itself, which holds togethermatter andbounds its boundlessness and shapelessness, and it is this, indeed, solelythat some people think of when they refer Limit and Unlimitedness tomatter and form alone. Somany, then, are the orders of Limit; to sum up,we shall see many different characteristics of these.

3 The creation of Forms in Matter was dealt with at the seventh level, but to get tenlevels in total (an important number in Pythagorean numerology/cosmology), Syrianusbrings in Form in Matter here “in itself ”.

This section of theParmenides Commentary begins with Proclus deny-ing Limit to the One (.ff.). He first addresses how the One’s lackof Limit depends on it having no beginning, middle and end.6 In thepassage being addressed here, Proclus, following Syrianus, sets out howLimit andUnlimitedness exist at every level of reality. Here, he elaborateson Plato’s argument in the Philebus, which regards Limit and Unlimit-edness as existing in the Forms and acting as the ultimate elements ofthings.7 Syrianus describes the hierarchy of the universe with respect tothe principles of Limit and Unlimitedness,8 particularly with respect to

6 See Syrianus, In Parm. fr. Wear.7 Proclus, In Tim. II, p. .–..8 The concept of Sameness and Otherness as two principles upon which the universe

is built finds its roots in the Pythagorean peras and apeiria. In their introduction toNicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, Robbins and Karpinski give a briefhistory of the two principles () –. Nicomachus gives his statementon samenessand otherness in II. .: “Regarding the solid numbers, this is for the present sufficient.The physical philosophers, however, and those that take their start with mathematics,call the ‘Same’ and ‘the Other’ the principles of the universe, and it has been shown thatthe ‘Same’ inheres in unity and the odd numbers, to which unity gives specific form,and to an even greater degree in the square, made by the continued addition of oddnumbers, because in their sides they share in equality; while the ‘other’ inheres in two andwhole even series, which is given specific form by two, and particularly in the hectometricnumbers, which are made by the continued addition of the even numbers, because of the

syrianus, in parm. fr.

the various ways Limit and Unlimitedness are used at various levels ofthe universe. It seems from his description that peras and apeiria are fea-tures of the henadic world that filter down in the universe—both exist atevery level.9 This concept relates back to Iamblichus’ theory of peras andapeiria as two principles extending through the entire universe, locatedafter the second One:

“For since all things derive both from the One and from the Dyad afterthe One and are united in a way with each other, and have been allotted anantithetical nature, so also in themajor categories of Being there is a certainantithesis of the Same as against the Other, and of Motion as opposedto Rest, and all things that are in the cosmos partake of these classes, itwould indeed be suitable to consider the conflict as extending through allthings.”10

This passage parallels one in Syrianus’ In Metaph. , :�Ελεγ�ν μεν �Q 3νδρες μετ$ τ"ν τ.ν π$ντων <ρA0ν, jν τ<γα*7ν κα- τ7Dπερ�Cσι�ν 4ν _U��υν καλε9ν,δC� ε`ναι τ.ν �λων α�τ�ας, μ ναδα κα- τ"ν<πειρ�δCναμ�ν δυ$δα, κα- ταCτας τ+ς <ρA+ς κα*’ 6κ$στην τ.ν =ντωντ$Uιν ��κε�ως <πετ�*εντ�.

Syrianus places a monad (here, Limit) after the One, followed by a dyad(Unlimitedness). Syrianus’ doctrine of Limit and Unlimitedness differsfrom Iamblichus’ with respect to his use of the terms “monad” and“dyad”. While Syrianus makes Limit—the principle of unity—a monad,and Unlimitedness—governed by multiplicity—a dyad, Iamblichus pos-tulates the second One of the intelligible world as the monad, with thedyad being Limit andUnlimitedness following themonad as a pair. Shep-pard points out a difficulty with respect to Proclus’ use of terminologyfor Limit and Unlimitedness in her article, “Monad and Dyad as CosmicPrinciples in Syrianus.” She notes that, depending on the text, Proclussometimes uses “dyad” referring to the pair of principles together; othertimes, he speaks of peras as “monad”, apeiria as “dyad”.11

share of the original inequality and ‘otherness’ which they have in the difference betweentheir sides.”

9 D’Ancona argues that Limit and Unlimitedness interact with the henads in twodifferent ways: sometimes the henads are subordinated to Limit and Unlimitedness, inwhich case they act as the supreme principles of the intelligible world; other times theyare independent from it, transcending otherness, and as such they act as the fundamentalelements of the intelligible world. See ().

10 Proclus, In Tim. I, , ff. (= Iamblichus, In Tim. Fr. Dillon). Trans. Dillon.11 Proclus, In Tim. I, .ff. (esp. I, .–): Proclus uses “dyad” of peras and

apeiria together and of apeiria, as opposed to peras (implying that peras is a monad). In

commentary

Syrianus’ commentary on peras and apeiria responds to the aporiaat the end of , which asks in what sense the One is unlimited.Here, the One is a limiting agent, regarded as the measure of measureswhich comprehends both time and eternity.12 Next, he addresses howthe One has no limit because it exists outside the chain of Limit andUnlimitedness. Proclus gives three ways in which the One is unlimited,according to commentators:

. It is untransversable by us; it is the limit of everything else.TheOneis: ) incomprehensible; ) unencompassable by all ascending to it.13(.)

. It is infinite in power:14 the power of the One extends throughoutthe universe. (.–)

. Intellect is Limit; One is above Intellect, so they have termed itUnlimitedness. One is also motionless; Soul is motion, above soul.(.–)

Proclus does not give much credit to any of these opinions. While thetheories attempt to explain the power of the One by showing how itis responsible for multiplicity while remaining unified, they leave theOne open to degradation. Syrianus innovates here, by coming up withthe solution that two principles placed immediately after the One (Limitand Unlimitedness) draw intelligible multiplicity from the One withoutexposing the One to multiplicity.In .–., Proclus lists Syrianus’ levels of Infinity and Limit,

which he seems to adopt without correction. Syrianus runs through theten levels of Limit and Unlimitedness by moving from the lowest pointof Unlimitedness to the highest, and then from the highest point of Limit

the Platonic Theology, Proclus refers to the principles as peras and apeiria, and refers tothem as a pair using “dyad.” Sheppard further points out that Syrianus, in hisMetaphysicsCommentary, uses<πειρ�δCναμ�ς δυ$ς for apeiria. See Sheppard on this and onProclus’terminology for Limit and Unlimitedness () . Sheppard attributes the difference interminology to the subject matter of the texts being interpreted.

12 Plato Laws C.13 Plotinus criticises this view; see Plotinus, Enn. VI. and Anon. .14 Possibly stems fromAristotle’s notion of the infinite, incorporeal power of the prime

mover as it is extended to the finite heavens. See Proclus, ET prop. , where the potencyof a finite body is never infinite. The first recorded use of apeirodynamis is by Porphyry(Sent. , p. . Lamberz), who uses it of soul. Dillon notes that Porphyry also describesto ontôs on as apeiron kai adiexitêton () .–. Still, he does not use it of the One.Dillon concludes that this commentator ismost likely Iamblichus, see () , note .See Dillon () .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

to the lowest.15 Every grade of reality is infinite in potency. For instance,Unlimitedness exists in matter; an unqualified body can be infinitelydivided and so is unlimited, as the infinitely extensive is unlimited. At thelevel of physical body, physical number is infinite. With respect to Souland time, Syrianus discusses theway in which Soul thinks discursively, soit is eternally mobile, and Time unfolds Soul and proceeds according tonumber, hence it is unlimited in power. Syrianus’ metaphysical mode ofTime andEternity are thus Iamblichean.Here, he places Time above Soul,at the limit of the noeric world—this is themetaphysical place granted byIamblichus, which Proclus also later copies. Syrianus hypostasises Timeand makes it the condition of Soul. While Iamblichus makes Time thelife of the Soul (Soul falls away from Intellect and thinks discursively—this quality of Soul is Time), Syrianus holds that Time is its own entity,not just a quality of soul. At the level of the intellect and intellectual life(ν�ερ$ς �ωRς), the ranks of Unlimitedness begin with matter and worktheir way to Infinity itself, while the description of Limit begins at thehighest rank (Limit) and works its way down.According to Proclus, everything contains a mixture of Limit and

Unlimitedness,16 with the exception of primitive Limit and Unlimited-ness, because the first manifestation is said to be free from other charac-teristics.17 Infinite is “chaos”—inOrphic terms—because it is receptive ofevery power and limitation, while Limit imposes measure on all thingsvisible and invisible. Limit and Unlimitedness reveal two natures of theOne—the One as a perfect, transcendent entity and the One as the causeof all things. In his description of principles, he sets forth that all beingdescends from the two principles and that the two principles pervadebeing.18 Syrianus begins his discussion of Unlimitedness withmatter andworks his way upward to Unlimitedness in itself, while in his descrip-tion of Limit, he begins with Limit in itself and works down to matter.The chart below re-configures the descriptions so they run parallel, withevery level coinciding except for the extreme terms—Unlimitedness initself and Limit in itself:

15 Wemay suspect Syrianus here of seeking the perfect Pythagorean number of levels.16 Proclus, ET prop. .17 Proclus, ET prop. ; PT III, . Proclus credits the Philebus and Philolaus with the

concept that beings result from a mixture of Limit and Unlimitedness.18 Proclus, In Remp. I, p. , –; In Tim. p. , –; p. . –, p. . –; In

Met. p. . –.

commentary

Rank Unlimit (Chaos) Limit (Aether)

Matter formless of itself forms and shapes are limits ofmatter19

Unqualified Body divisible to infinity limited in size; body as a wholeis limited

Qualities contain more and less quantity is limited in materialthings

Realm ofgeneration

constant coming into beingand ceaseless cycle

creation of forms in matter;nothing of all things perishes(forms continue)

circuits of heaven possesses unlimited power ofthat which moves it; happenscontinuously

places limit upon thedisorderly elements in matter;turns back on itself and limitsitself

Soul20 power of unceasing motion circuits of the soul are uniformTime measures whole circuit of the

soul—power which unfoldscircuits of the soul is unlimited

proceeds according to number;measure of the circuits of thesoul

Intellect21 eternal motion and unfailingcontinuity22

remains in itself; its life issingle and eternal and same

Eternity23 comprehends the wholeintellectual infinity. It is poweritself

Measure of all intellectualactivity and bound of the life ofintellect (mixed entity, formedof Limit and Unlimitedness)

Infinity/EssentialLimt24

fount of all infinity25 foundation of all limits

19 Proclus, ET prop. . Spatial infinity exists because infinite body may be divisible atany point.

20 Proclus, PT VI, p. : soul depends on Limit, because it measures its own life byperiods; because it never stops moving, it is Unlimitedness.

21 Proclus, PT VI, p. : intellect is limit in so far as it is uniform and total, it producesall things eternally—as intelligible measure it participates in limit; as essential power, itparticipates in Unlimitedness.

22 Infinitude in the intelligible world receives diversity of forms (is analogous tomatter); cf. Plotinus, Enn. II..; Dodds () .

23 Proclus, In Tim. I, .—Essential Infinity,OF .24 ΑDτ�μ�ν$ς and αDτ�δCας are used in In Met. . to refer to the supreme dyad

in relation to numbers. See Sheppard () .25 Proclus, ET prop. —Infinite descends from Essential Infinity. αDτ�απειρι$ is

neither the first principle nor Being, but between the two. Proclus, ET prop. : priorto all that is composed of Limit and Infinitude there exists substantially First Limit andFirst Infinity.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Limit is static, non-transitive, and all adjectives that can be said ofa unified, unchanging principle. Syrianus makes use of the previousobjection that the One has no limit, but gives limit to everything else.26Last on the chart is the transcendent Limit and Unlimitedness—theuncoordinated principles whence all divine beings first process. So, itseems the first two principles of beings exist in themselves as causes ofthe universe before un-participated Being andmixtures which constitutebeings.27 While the two, moreover, seem of parallel strength in thisfragment, Syrianus argues that peras is superior to apeiria because itis more similar to the transcendent One in a number of passages inProclus.28 What Syrianus leaves out in his study, however, is a detaileddiscussion of just how the two principles work at every level of reality.29Syrianus’ enumeration of Limit andUnlimitedness as they exist at var-

ious levels of being occurs in PlatonicTheology III , p. .–.. Here,Proclus mentions six terms, as opposed to the ten terms listed in thisfragment, and does not distinguish between Limit and Unlimitedness inhis enumeration of the levels of being:30

. Eternity. Nous. Soul. the entire universe. the entire creation. form and matter31

The extreme terms have been omitted (Limit and Unlimitedness), as hasthe rank of time and body. Such an enumeration of levels is also found inIn Met. .–, where Syrianus sets out the following five levels:

26 Plato, Laws IV E.27 Proclus, PT III, .28 D’Ancona lists the following: Proclus, In Tim. I, p. .–; p. .–; p.

.–; p. .–.; II, p. .–; p. .–.; p. .–; In Parm. II,.–; .–; IV, .–; VI,.–.; PT III, , p. .–.; IV, ,p. .–; p. .–. See () , note .

29 Luna () .30 Luna discusses this passage in () .31 Matter imitates the last of Unlimited. In In Met. p. .–, Syrianus affirms that

matter is an image of the indefinite dyad. Proclus discusses the relationship betweenmat-ter and form and form and limit in PT III, –. Form and matter imitate the principles,with form imitating Limit andMatter, Unlimited. Cf. Syrianus, In Met. p. .–; Lunaexplains that matter and form play, in the universe of becoming, the same role as theprinciples play at the level of intelligibles () .

commentary

. the entire Intellect and divine realm. the psychic essence. the physis of all things. heaven. creation

τ7 αVτ�π)ρας is the superior to 8 αDτ�απειρ�α because it displays uni-tary properties similar to theOne’s unity. It is the supremeprinciple aboveall unity32—everything has Limit, except for the One, which is situatedabove it and matter, which is below it.33 8 αDτ�απειρ�α is the transcen-dent source of all plurality.34 While the uniformity of Limit is said tomaintain the universe, Unlimitedness marks the beginning of proces-sion from the One which culminates in a generative series that is theuniverse.35 Only the Infinite is absolutely infinite, for each grade of real-ity is said to be infinite in potency, according to Proclus.36 By “infinityin potency”, Proclus means that while it has a limit, its content is neverexhausted, a notion he adopts from Syrianus, who inherits it from pre-decessors, such as Porphyry.37Proclus describes Limit and Unlimitedness as a relationship akin to

the one between substance and potency. Intelligibles, thus, contain aninfinite active potency, an infinite potency of becoming (in the realm ofsoul, heaven, animate and inanimate and material species), an infinitevariability and infinite divisibility of body; pure passive potentiality ismarked by indefiniteness and relates to pure matter. In Elements of The-ology proposition , Proclus places the τ7 αDτ�π)ρας and 8 αDτ�απει-ρ�α immediately after the One, a view which differs from Syrianus’, whoencapsulates peras and apeiria in the broader terms of monad and dyad.Syrianus, however, differs fromother philosophers in so far as his monadand dyad, while conferring sameness and otherness on the universe, donot generate the universe. Still, these differences are minor.Monad and Dyad exist in the universe after the single principle of all

existence, and they reappear at every level of existence. Syrianus makeshis most extensive discussion on the topic in his critique of Aristotle’s

32 Proclus, ET prop. .33 Proclus, ET prop. .34 Proclus, ET prop. .35 Proclus, PT III, , p. .36 Proclus, ET prop. .37 Syrianus, In Met. . and Porphyry, Sent. xxxi.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Metaphysics, booksM andN. The best statement on this matter occurs InMet. .ff.:

For these men (sc. The Platonists) said that after the first cause of allthings was the Good and transcendent One, and they see fit to call itthe One above being, while as second of the causes among the wholes,they established the Monad and the Dyad of infinite potentiality andthey established these as archai in each rank of beings. For that which isanalogous to the Good is present in every order of existence, and also thosethings akin to the first monad and dyad. (In Met. .ff.)

In this section of the commentary on Metaphysics, Syrianus discussesMet. M a., regarding Aristotle’s views on the Platonic Forms. Theessential Monad (archike monas) is the principle responsible for same-ness, unity and eternal life, while lower principles, corresponding to themonad,make all things one.TheDyad is responsible for production, pro-cession, and plurality while other levels of dyad are required for multi-plicity at every level.38 In “Monad andDyad as Cosmic Principles in Syri-anus”, Sheppard notes that Syrianus does not always distinguish betweenthe transcendent One and the Monad, placing emphasis instead on thedifference between the One (or Monad) and the Dyad of infinite power(apeirodunamos dyas).39 It seems that it is Proclus who takes Syrianus’terms of Monad and Dyad and refers to them as peras and apeiria. Syri-anus, on the other hand, uses these terms in In Met. .ff. and .ff.for principles discussed by the other philosophers, including the Orphicpair of aether and chaos.40Theprinciple of themikton is added to these, asProclus uses terminology from thePhilebus to reconfigure Syrianus’ prin-ciples of theMonad andDyad. Sheppard attributes this different vocabu-lary to the nature of texts being commented upon—Syrianus commentsupon Aristotle’s Monad and Dyad in Met. M and N, whereas Proclus,commenting on Plato’s Parmenides, uses Platonic language.41 Proclus,moreover, uses the term “dyad” to refer to peras and apeiria as opposed tothe monad42 in the PlatonicTheology43 and Elements of Theology;44 how-ever, the pair of principles is called peras and apeiria in the ParmenidesCommentary.

38 Sheppard () .39 Sheppard () .40 Sheppard () .41 Proclus, In Tim. I, .– uses “dyad” ambiguously.42 Sheppard () .43 Proclus, PT III, , p. , .44 Proclus, ET prop. , , .

commentary

The place of matter in this system is worth noting, as the Monad andDyad affect it in special ways. The discussion on the infinity of matterstates that while a numerical series is infinite, it is actualised in successivefinite parts:45 e.g., an infinite succession of animals maintains a specificexistence.46 According to Aristotle, sameness ofmatter is one componentof “Same”, the other being essence.47 Plotinus, building onAristotle’s con-cept of the infinity of matter,48 refers to matter as the “fullest manifesta-tion of infinity.”49 Syrianus, however, argues that the corporeal universenecessarily has infinite potency in order to be eternal.50 The corporealuniverse, thus, has an infinite potency.51In the last section of this passage, Syrianus sets out how each rank in

the universe depends on the rank above it:

Rank Dependent on one above

Material held together through eternal generationeternal generation eternal motion of aether

eternal motion of the aether unceasing circuit of the divine Soul

circuit of the soul unfolded through continuous power of TimeTime exercises its activity by virtue of the unlimitedness of

eternally static intellect

Intellect possesses eternal life by virtue of eternity, upon whichall things depend for being and life

Eternity infinite by virtue of the fount of infinity, whichprovides unfailingness to all essences and powers

Infinity order of all things infinite descend from EssentialInfinity

Here, the ranks of the universe function as conditions for each other.Chronos is superior to psyche, aion is superior to the noetic world—

45 Proclus, ET prop. .46 Plotinus, Enn. II..; See Syrianus, In Tim. fr. Wear.47 Aristotle, Metaph. IV. , a ff.: “And these things are called ‘same’ in the

preceding way, but other things are called ‘same’ absolutely, as ‘one’ is. For ‘same’ ispredicated of those things whose matter is one, either in kind or in number, as well asof those whose essence is one; and so it is evident that ‘sameness’ is a kind of ‘oneness’ ofbeing, either of a plurality of objects or of one thing which employs it as a plurality, as forexample when one says that a thing is equal to itself, for then he employs it as two things.”

48 Aristotle’s Phys. Γ .. .49 Plotinus, Enn. II...50 Proclus, In Tim. I. .ff.; .ff.51 Syrianus, In Met. .ff.; Proclus, In Parm. .; PT II, ..

syrianus, in parm. fr.

these entities function as conditions for each other. From this scheme,Syrianus comes to the conclusion that the One is not unlimited. Rather,an antithesis exists in the One between One and multiplicity, both andneither. Syrianus makes use of the previous objection that the One has alimit, but it gives limit to everything else (Laws IV E) to show thatthe One is bounded by nothing. This section shows how levels of realityreflect its previous level.

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 6

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

'Εν 3λλ1ω μHν xν κCκλ1ω π�υ dν περι)A�ιτ� �π’ �κε�ν�υ �ν 1Y dν �νε�η,κα- π�λλαASR dν αDτ�5 gπτ�ιτ� π�λλ�9ςG|τ�5 δH 6ν ς τε κα- <μερ�5ςκα- κCκλ�υ μ" μετ)A�ντ�ς <δCνατ�ν π�λλαASR κCκλ1ω 3πτεσ*αι.—'ΑδCνατ�ν. [Parm. a–]

�αμειν�ν �Pν,[ς E 8μ)τερ�ς �(ηγε9ται πατ0ρ, κατ’ �κε�νην τ"ν �μ(ρ�-νεστ$την κα- <σ(αλεστ$την Eδ7ν, τα5τα λ)γειν τ�5 6ν7ς <π�($σκειναDτ ν, �σαa κατα($σκεται �ν τSR δευτ)ρTα τ�5 6ν7ς =ντ�ς, κα- �]τως<π�($σκειν, [ς �ν �κε�ν�ις κατα($σκεται, κα- δ" κα- τ7 �ν 3λλ1ω τ�ι-�5τ�ν *εωρε9ν, �F�ν �ν �κε�ν�ις δRλ ς �στιν E (ιλ σ�(�ς λαμ�$νων.σα(.ς γ�5ν �κε9 τ$Uιν τιν+ *ε.ν �κ(α�νων, κα- �ν 6αυτSR (ησιν αDτ"νε`ναι κα- �ν 3λλ1ω, κα* τι κα- Oστραπται πρ7ς 6αυτ"ν ν�ερ.ς, κα- μ)-νει διαιων�ως �ν τ�9ς α�τ��ις 6αυτRς μ�ναδικ.ςG μ�ν+ς γ$ρ �στιν �κε�νητ.ν ν�ερ.ν *ε.ν, μ)ν�υσα μHν κατ+ τ"ν 6αυτRς �περ�A"ν �ν τ�9ς πρ7αDτRς ν�ητ�9ς *ε�9ς, �κ(α�ν�υσα δH κα- τ7 �δ�ωμα τ7 ν�ερ7ν κατ+ τ7�ν α�τSR κα- περ- α�τ"ν �νεργε9ν. τ7 τ��νυν �ν 3λλ1ω τ�ι�5τ ν �στιν,Eπ�9�ν τ7 �ν τSR α�τ�Tα μ)ν�ν κα- περιεA μεν�ν �π7 τRς ��κε�ας α�τ�ας.τ�5τ� �Pν �στιν ε�κ τως κα- τ7 π�λλαASR κα- π�λλ�9ς 6αυτ�5 τRς α�τ�ας>πτ μεν�νG δι τι γ+ρ περι)Aεται �π’ αDτRς, μερικ?τερ ν �στιν αDτRς.π^ν δH τ7 μερικ?τερ�ν μ^λλ�ν πεπλ0*υσται τRς 6αυτ�5 περιληπτικω-τ)ρας α�τ�αςG μ^λλ�ν δH πεπλη*υσμ)ν�ν τα9ς 6αυτ�5 π�ικ�λαις δυν$-μεσι συν$πτεται πρ7ς �κε9ν� κα- 3λλως 3λλαιςG τ�5τ� γ+ρ τ7 π�λλαARGκατ’ 3λλας γ+ρ κα- 3λλας δυν$μεις 3λλως κα- 3λλως 6ν�5ται πρ7ς τ7πρ7 αDτ�5 ν�ητ ν.

<λλ’ α]τη μHν 8 τ$Uις τ.ν =ντων, Sp τ7 �ν 6αυτ1. πρ�σ0κει μετ+τ�5 �ν 3λλ1ω, κα- π�λλ$ �στι- μετ)Aει γ+ρ τ�5 ν�ητ�5 πλ0*�υς—, κα-μ)ρη OAει—μετ)Aει γ+ρ τ.ν μ)σων �ν τα9ς πρ7 αDτRς α�τ�αις γεν.ν—,κα- κυκλικ0 π?ς �στι—μετ)Aει γ+ρ τRς τελευτα�ας τ.ν μ)σων τ$Uεως,

a :σα corr. Steel ex g (quecumque): < ΑΣ

“If it were in another, it would be encircled all round by that in whichit was contained, and would have many contacts with it at many points;but it is impossible for there to be contact at many points all round in acircle with a thing which is One and has not parts and is not round.” “Itis indeed impossible.”

Better then, following the lead of my own Father, to proceed along thatmost sensible and safest course and say that he is denying of theOne herejust what is asserted of the One-Being in the Second Hypothesis, and heis denying it in the sameway as it is asserted there, and indeed one shouldview the meaning of being “in another” as being the same as that whichthe philosopher clearly understands it to be in that place. Since it is clear,then, that there he is manifesting a certain class of gods, and says that thisclass is “in itself and in another” in virtue of the fact that it is both turnedtowards itself intellectually and remains eternally in monadic form inits causes; for that class is the monad of the intellectual gods, restingin virtue of its own superiority in the intelligible gods prior to it, butrevealing also its intellectual characteristic by activating itself in itself andabout itself—the sense of “in another”, then, is that of remaining at restin its cause and being comprehended by its own cause. This, therefore isalso the reasonable sense in which to take “in many ways,” and touchingits own cause “at many points”; for because it is surrounded by it, it ismore particular than it; and everything that is more particular is morepluralised than its own cause which comprehends it, and being morepluralised it is joined to it by its own various powers and in different waysby different of them, and this is what is meant by “in many ways”; for invirtue of its various powers it is variously united to the intelligible whichis prior to it.But this order of beings, to which “being in itself ” along with “being

in another” properly applies, is also a multiplicity (for it partakes of theintelligible multiplicity), and it has parts (for it partakes of the medianclasses among the causes prior to it), and it is in a way circular (for itpartakes of the ultimate class of the middle gods—I mean the shape that

syrianus, in parm. fr.

λ)γω δ" τ�5 �κε9 σA0ματ�ς. δι περ �Zτε 4ν �στιν >πλ.ς, <λλ+ π�λλ$,�Zτε <μερ0ς,a <λλ+ μ)ρη OA�υσα, �Zτε �π)κεινα σA0ματ�ς παντ ς,<λλ+ κυκλικ0. κα-, [ς μHν π�λλ+ �Pσα, δCναται π�λλ�9ς gπτεσ*αιτ.ν πρ7 αDτRς, [ς δH μ)ρη OA�υσα, π�λλαASR αDτ�9ς κ�ινωνε9ν κα-δια( ρως, [ς δH �σAηματισμ)νη, κCκλ1ω περι)Aεσ*αι �π’ αDτ.νG τ7γ+ρ σAηματι� μεν�ν π^ν �π7 τ�5 σAηματ���ντ�ς περι)AεταιG τ7 δHyν �Zτε μ)ρη OAει �Zτε κCκλ�υ μετε�ληAεν, cστε �D δυνατ7ν α�τ�ανε`ναι πρ7 αDτ�5 τ"ν π�λλαASR κα- κCκλ1ω τ�5 6ν7ς >πτ�μ)νην, <λλ’Oστιν �π)κεινα π$ντων, [ς [dν]b α�τ�αν κρε�ττ�να �Dκ OA�νG <δCνατ�νγ+ρ ε`να� τι κCκλ1ω αDτ�5 κα- π�λλαAR >πτ μεν�ν, 6ν7ς =ντ�ς κα-<μερ�5ς κα- κCκλ�υ [μ"]c μετ)A�ντ�ςG τα5τα γ+ρ π$ντα πρ�σ)*ηκενWνα (ανSR τ+ π�λλ$ τ7 μ)ρη OAειν, τ7 κCκλ�υ μ ν�νd μετ)Aειν, L δ"π$ντα πρ�σ0κει ταCτSη τSR τ$Uει τ.ν =ντων, Sp τ7 �ν α�τ1. κα- �ν 3λλ1ωπρ�σ()ρ�μενG π�λλ$ τε γ$ρ �στιν [ς πρ7ς τ"ν ν�ητ"ν 4νωσιν, κα- μ)ρηOAει κα- κCκλ�υ μετε�ληAεν, �πειδ" τ+ δεCτερα δε9 μετ)Aειν τ.ν πρ7αDτ.ν. �πε- κα- �ταν λ)γηται μ�ν$ς, [ς �ν ν�ερ�9ς �στι μ�ν$ςG ε� δHμ0, πλR* ς �στι πρ7ς τ+ς ν�ητ+ς μ�ν$δαςG κα- �ταν λ)γηται �λη κα-<μ)ριστ�ς, [ς �ν ν�ερ�9ς κα- τα5τα λ)γεται παρ’ 8μ.νG ε� δH μ0, μ)ρηOAει πρ ς γε τ"ν Eλ τητα τ"ν ν�ητ0νG κα- �ταν <σAημ$τιστ�ς, π$λιν[[ς]e �ν ν�ερ�9ς, �πε- π$ντως αDτ"ν <ναγκα9�ν μετ)Aειν τ�5 σA0ματ�ςτ�5 πρ7 αDτRς.

a 'μερJς GPRg: 'μερ�ς AcF b Lν add. Strobel ex g (utique) c μ) add. Steel ex g (non)(add. �+ ante κ*κλ�υ Cous2) (cf. Parm. a) d μ�ν�ν corr. Steel ex g (solum): μ) ΑΣe Mς add. Steel ex g (ut)

text and translation

is proper to that order.)Wherefore it is not one absolutely, but many, noris it partless, but has parts, nor is it beyond all shape, but circular. And, asbeingmany, it is able to touch what is prior to it atmany points; inasmuchas it has parts, it is able to communicate with its priors in many differentways; and as endowedwith shape, it is surrounded in a circle by them; foreverything which is shaped is surrounded by that which gives it shape,whereas the one neither has parts nor participates in circularity. So that itis not possible for there to be a cause prior to it which touches the One inmany places and in a circle, but it is beyond all things, as having no causalprinciple superior to itself; for it is impossible for there to be anythingwhich touches it in a circle and inmany places, since it is One and partlessand not partaking in circularity; all these things he has added in orderthat there should appear the characteristics of multiplicity, having partsand partaking in circularity, all of which are proper to this class of beings,in which we also locate the characteristics of being in oneself and inanother; for this class is many in comparison with the intelligible unity,and has parts and partakes in circularity, since all secondary things mustpartake in what is prior to them. Since even when it is called a monad, itis a monad in a mode proper to the intellectual realm; otherwise, it is amultiplicity in comparison with the noetic monads; and when it is saidto be whole and partless, that is in relation to the intellectual realm, andthis is said from our perspective; and even if it does not have parts, yet ithas parts in comparison with intelligible wholeness; and when we say itis without shape, once again this is in the intellectual realm, since in anycase it is necessary for it to partake in the shape that is prior to it.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

In this discussion of the role of κCκλ1ω in κCκλ1ω π�υ dν περι)A�ιτ�,Proclus lays out the Syrianic syllogism,1 “if the One is in itself/if the Oneis not in itself,” in order to prove that the One is neither in itself nor inanother. The point Parmenides makes in is that everything whichis in something else is contained “in a circle” and it touches whatevercontains it at many points. He argues that the One cannot be in anotherbecause, if it were, it would be encircled and would have contact at manypoints. The One, however, cannot be encircled because it is not roundand it cannot have contact at many points because it does not have parts.Building on the previous lemma, moreover, he argues that because theOne has no beginning, middle or end, it is not contained. What is ofinterest here is how Syrianus looks beyond issues of place and spatialextension with regard to en allo and en heauto. Syrianus addresses thelemma by working back from the second to the first hypothesis, showingthat the various layers of the intelligible world are not attributable tothe One. Syrianus wants to unite the positive statement of the secondhypothesis with the negative statements of the first hypothesis, makingthe second hypothesis a description of levels of gods.Prior to Syrianus’ opinion, Proclus presents two other commentators,

likely to be Porphyry and Iamblichus. The first commentator (.f.)requires that the One be spatially extended in some way and deniesthat the One is “in a place”. Proclus says that he views the topic “in arestricted sense”—as in “in a place” or “in a container.”2 Proclus says thathe reconciles the text well enough, but he still rejects this theory, sayingthe Platonist theory is that all higher entities, even individual souls, arenot in a place3—when discussing the One, then, there must be more tothe lemma than an argument based on place.4 The second commentator

1 Here, the attribute “in itself ” and “in another” is denied of the One. See Proclus,In Parm. .–. (a commentary on Parm. A–) which demonstrates thatthe One is not in another. For Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Syrianus, “in another” signifies“that which remains in its cause.” Saffrey andWesterink () .

2 Dillon identifies the commentator as Porphyry based on the use of “in a restrictedsense.”He cites Proclus, In Tim. I, .ff. where Porphyry treats a dialoguemerikoteron,as opposed to Iamblichus, who treats it epoptlikoteron. See Dillon () and Dillon() .

3 Proclus, In Tim. I, .–; In Remp. ..4 Syrianus, and later, Proclus, regard space as a corporeal entity and only other

corporeal entities could interact with space. Spacewas the physical boundary of corporealbodies. On late antique views of place, see Sambursky () II . Schrenk explains why

commentary

(.ff.), most likely Iamblichus,5 denies of the One every sense ofbeing in something else. He considers how Plato takes the sense of beingin something—just as a monad is a sort of point and a point is in a line,does not mean it is contained by something else, just as a point is notcontained in a line (a point is not contained κCκλ1ω by the line, nor is ittouched π�λλαA�5). Proclus’ complaint is that this approach is far tooliteral: even if a point is not in a line spatially, it can be contained in otherways.The line, for instance, contains the characteristics of the point, suchas its limit.In .ff. Proclus gives Syrianus’ opinion that the lemma must

refer to the μ�ν$ς �ν ν�ερ�9ς which experiences the higher participationof intelligible-intellectual gods and relates back to the source in theintelligible level. The monad at the intellectual level rests in its causeand is comprehended in the cause. Syrianus refers here to the secondhypothesis, which was for him a blue-print of the whole intelligibleworld. All intelligible characters are attributed to theOne, which, in turn,transcends the highest class of intellectual gods belonging to the One-Being at B ff. in the second hypothesis.6 He works from the secondto the first hypothesis, which expresses what is denied of the One. Allcharacteristics denied of theOne are references to a distinct section of thesecond hypothesis, which embraces layers of the intelligible, including:the noetic triads; noetic-noeric triads; and the noeric hebdomad.7 Thiselement of the intellectual realm is the highestmonad of the noeric gods.Syrianus denies this level of being to the One in order to assert that theOne is both the cause of them and transcends them. Proclus reports hisMaster’s argument also in Platonic Theology II, , placing emphasis onthe One’s distinction from the summit of the intellectual world.8

space must be corporeal for Proclus—in order to bridge the intelligible and sensiblerealms—in his article on space as light ().

5 Dillon identifies the commentator as Iamblichus based on Proclus’ praise of Iambli-chus for looking μ^λλ�ν ε�ς τ+ πρ$γματα (Proclus, In Tim. III,.–). Dillon, (). Dillon also notes Iamblichus’ interest in the various senses of “in” in Iamblichus’Commentary on the Categories (ap. Simpl. in Cat. [CAG VIII] , –, ); see Dillon() .

6 Dillon () .7 See Van Campe () : Syrianus interprets different attributes of Being as

attributes of different gods; the deduction “that the One is” starts from the highest levelof intelligible Being, “the One Being”, which comprehends all attributes in a unified way,while still acting as the procession of beings into multiplicity; Proclus, PT I, , p. ,–.

8 Proclus, PT II, , p. , –: “Such is the One, says Parmenides, since it is neither

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Syrianus here also presents a discussion on the nature of cause; notably,that a cause, as more general, is participated in by the more particular,which is joined to the cause in various ways. The One, as ultimate cause,is not comprehended by any entity. While it does remain in itself andprocess out of itself, it does not remain in another.

In Parm. .–. seem to be Syrianic, although it is less clearhere that Proclus refers to his teacher directly. In this section, Proclusargues that theOne does not derive fromanother cause—once it has beenestablished that the One is neither in itself nor another. He says that theOne is not many, as what is many can touch what is prior to it at manypoints and it does not have shape, as whatever has shape is surrounded bythat which gives it shape. Hence, the One does not have points and doesnot participate in circularity. It is not possible for there to be a cause priorto theOnewhich touches theOne inmany places and in a circle.TheOneis thus superior to self-constituted entities, including the monads whichinhabit the intellectual realm, as well as wholes and parts.

in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehendedby that in which it is and would everywhere touch that which comprehends it.” Trans.Taylor ().

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 7

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

�DδH μ"ν ταDτ ν γε 〈�Zτε〉 6τ)ρ1ω �Zτε 6αυτ1. Oσται, �Dδ’ αP 4τερ�ν�Zτε 6αυτ�5 �Zτε 6τ)ρ�υ dν εhη.—ΠSR δ0; [Parm. b–].

�eτ�ι μHν �Pν τ�ια5τα διαπ�ρ�5ντες λ)γ�υσιν. ε� δH δε9 κα- διαιτR-σαι τ�9ς λ γ�ις τ.ν �]τω κλειν�τ$των κα- *ε�ων <νδρ.ν, κα- τα5τατ.ν πρ�κειμ)νων OUω τRς τ�ιαCτης �Zσης �ν τ1. παρ ντι �ητ0σεως κα-�ν 3λλ�ις 8μ9ν δι+ πλει νων �Uετασ*ε�σης, 'απ7 τRς τ�5 κα*ηγεμ -ν�ς 8μ.ν �(ηγ0σεως ��στ)�νa κα- τ�Cτωνb τ"ν κρ�σιν <Uι�5σαν <μ-(�τ)ρ�υς λ)γειν Xρ*.ς, κα- τ�Vς πανταA�5 τ+ γ)νη τι*εμ)ν�υς κα-τ�Vς μετ+ τ7 yν �D πρ�σιεμ)ν�υς τ�5τ�ν τετ$A*αι τ7ν <ρι*μ νG ε`-ναι μHν γ+ρ κα- �ν τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς κα- �ν τ�9ς ν�ερ�9ς τ+ γ)νη κατ+ τ"να�τ.ν τ$Uιν, <λλ+ 3λλως μHν �ν τ�9ς πρ?τ�ις, 3λλως δH �ν τ�9ς δευ-τ)ρ�ις, �π�υ μHν ν�ητ.ς, �π�υ δH ν�ερ.ςG τ�5τ� δH ταDτ7ν τ1. �π�υμHν 6ν�ειδ.ς| κα- <διακρ�τως, �π�υ δH διακεκριμ)νως �δ�Tα κατ+ τ7ν��κε9�ν <ρι*μ ν. cστ’ �Dκ dν *αυμ$σαις ε� 8 μ�ν+ς 8 ν�ητ" περι)-Aει τ"ν ν�ερ+ν πεμπ$δα π^σαν <διαιρ)τως κα- 6ν�ειδ.ς, �π�υ δι+τ"ν 4νωσιν κα- 8 στ$σις τρ π�ν τιν+ κα- 8 κ�νησις yν κα- 8 ταυτ -της κα- 8 6τερ της, <διακρ�των π$ντων =ντων κατ+ σκ�τ εσσαν Eμ�-Aλην, (ησ-ν E *ε�λ γ�ς. ��π�υ γ+ρ κα- 8 τ.ν μ�ναδικ.ν <ρι*μ.ν α�-τ�α μ�ν+ς π$ντας <π�δε�κνυται περι)A�υσα τ�Vς λ γ�υς �oς δεκα-δικ.ς μHν 8 δεκ+ς περιε�λη(ε, τετραδικ.ς δH 8 τετρ$ς, τ� Aρ" *αυ-μ$�ειν ε� κα- �π- τ.ν =ντων μ�ναδικ.ς μHν 8 ν�ητ" μ�ν+ς περι)Aειπ$ντα τ+ γ)νη κα- <διακρ�τως, δυαδικ.ς δH 3λλη τις τ$Uις κα- 3λλητετραδικ.ς; �πε- κα- τ+ς �δ)ας ε`ναι κα- �ν τ�9ς ν�ητ�9ς, �μως �D τ7ναDτ7ν τρ π�ν αDτ+ς �νπερ �ν τ�9ς ν�ερ�9ς �(εστ$ναι λ)γ�μεν Eλι-κ.ς, 8νωμ)νως, πατρικ.ς, �ντα5*α δH διSηρημ)νως. μερικ.ς, δημι-�υργικ.ς, <ν$γκη δH πανταA�5 τ7ν τ.ν �δε.ν <ρι*μ7ν �UηρτRσ*αιτ.ν τ�5 =ντ�ς γεν.ν. εhπερ �Pν αQ ν�ερα- �δ)αι μετ)A�υσι τ.ν ν�ε-ρ.ν γεν.ν, δRλ�ν �τι κα- αQ ν�ητα- με*)U�υσι τ.ν ν�ητ.ν. ε� δ" κατ+τ7 π)ρας τ.ν ν�ητ.ν αQ πρ?τισται τ.ν �δε.ν τ)τταρες, δε9 πρ7 τRς

a ��στ��ν AFPRg: �στ��νMG b τ�*των ΑΣg: τ�*τ�υ Cous2

“Further, the One cannot be either the same as another or the same asitself, nor yet other than itself or other than another.” “Why is that?”

On the basis of the teaching of our Master, we may at any rate make clearhis judgment that considers both schools of opinion to speak rightly, boththose which place the genera at every level and those who do not allowthis number to be ranked directly after the One; for the genera are in theintelligible and in the intellectual realms according to the rank properto them in each case, but in one way among the primal entities, and inanother among the secondary—here intelligibly, there intellectually. Andthis is the same as to say here unitarily and indivisibly, and there divisblyeach according to its own number, so that one should not wonder if theintelligiblemonad comprehends thewhole intellectual pentad indivisiblyand unitarily, where we find that subsumed under unity both Rest insome way and Motion are one, and also Sameness and Otherness, allbeing undivided “in the darkling mist”, as the theologian says.1 For wherealso the monad which is the cause of monadic numbers is shown tocomprehend all the reason-principles which the decad comprehendsdecadically, and the tetrad tetradically, why should one wonder if on theplane of beings, the intelligible monad comprehends all the classes ofbeing monadically and indivisibly, while some other order comprehendsthem dyadically, and yet another tetradically, since the Ideas are also inthe intelligible realm; but neverthelesswe do not say that they exist in thesame way as in the intellectual realm, but there as wholes, unitarily andpaternally, whereas in this latter realm they exist separately, individually,and demiurgically, but it is necessary that everywhere the number of theideas be dependent upon the genera of being? If, then, the intellectualideas partake of the intellectual species, it is plain that also the intelligibleideas will partake of the intelligible species. If, then, at the limit of theintelligibles the primary ones among the ideas are four, there must be

1 Orpheus,Hymn ..

syrianus, in parm. fr.

ε�δητικRς τετρ$δ�ς ε`ναι τ"ν μ�ναδικ"ν �π στασιν τ.ν γεν.νG �]τωγ+ρ κα- �ν τ�9ς ν�ερ�9ς πρ7 τRς δεκαδικRς �π$ρUεως τ.ν �δε.ν 8πεμπαδικ" τ.ν γεν.ν �στιν α�τ�α.

Commentary

In this fragment, Syrianus discusses how the genera of being in Plato’sSophist A ff. are related to the similar genera of being denied here ofthe One.2 Syrianus combines the Porphyrian claim that the genera existat every level with the Iamblichean argument that these genera are not tobe ranked directly after theOne, but only in the intellective realm, as theyconstitute a pentad, and nothing more than a triad would be proper tothe intelligible realm.3 Syrianus posits that the genera are present at thelevel of the intelligible and intellectual realms, which is possible becausethemonad encompasses the intellectual pentad.This fragment builds onSyrianus’ claim that Parmenides B asserts the One is fixed beyondthe intellectual realms. Syrianus identifies what is being denied of theOne here as the demiurgic order of gods, the first level of the intellectiveorder.In .ff., Proclus gives the opinion of a commentator likely to be

Porphyry.4 This commentator5 takes terms in an exclusively philosoph-ical sense,6 and remarks that Motion, Rest, and Sameness and Other-ness are denied of the One, but not all forms. This group identifies theforms with the genera of being, which, according to this authority, existat every level. The Primally Existent, moreover, (to protôs on) compre-hends all these genera, after proceeding forth from the supra-essentialand becoming Being. The Primally Existent has Sameness, in so far as it

2 For a general discussion of forms and the genera of being, see Gersh () –.3 See Van Campe () , where she argues that the five genera of Being are

situated in the intellectual realm, rather than immediately after the absolute unity of theOne.

4 Dillon () .5 Dillonnotes that “(ιλ�σ (ως μ ν�ν ταCτα λαμ�αν ντες” sounds anti-Porphyrian.

Porphyry is often criticised for not taking things subtly. See Dillon () , note .6 As opposed to the theological sense.

text and translation

prior to the tetrad of forms a monadic creation of the genera; for thusalso in the intellectual realm prior to the decadic generation of the ideasthere exists a pentadic cause of the classes of being (gene).

is similar to what produced it, and Otherness, in so far as it is different.It embraces both motion—as it proceeds forth—and stability, becauseit is established in the One. Dillon relates this passage to Plotinus’ Enn.VI. , but credits the authority with a great deal of innovation regardingSameness as an imitation of the One’s unity, Otherness as the reflectionof the One’s distinction from itself.7 The authority, moreover, associatesMotion with procession from the One, and Rest with remaining. Dillonnotes that we know fromMarius Victorinus that Porphyry developed thetriad of monê-proodos-epistrophê, and he goes on to say that Porphyryuses the genera of Being to distinguish Intellect or Being from the primalOne.8Proclus dismisses this commentator, saying that the genera should

be understood in the context of the One and not of Being. The generaare symbols of actual divine orders and not just genera of being orforms.9 These genera, moreover, should be denied of the One, as it hasno attributes and does not participate in transcendent negations.The second commentator (.), identified as Iamblichus by Dil-

lon,10 places the genera in the intellectual realm and says that these aregenera of Being and do not derive existence from the One. He arguesthat themultiplicity derived from theOne ismost akin to theOne—whilemonads and triadsmight be found in the realms next door to theOne; thepentad, however, is too different from theOne to be found contiguous. InIn Tim. fr. Dillon, Iamblichus places τ7 α�- =ν11 on a higher level than

7 Dillon () .8 See Dillon () . Dillon refers to Anon. Taur. (XIV, –).9 Van Campe () .10 Dillon identifies this commentator as Iamblichus based on his use of vocabulary,

() .11 This includes thewhole reality down to the individualmind. See Iamblichus, In Tim.

fr. Dillon, p. .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

τ+ γ)νη τ�5 =ντ�ς, and places it at the summit of the noetic realm. ForIamblichus only triads are proper to the intelligible realm, while Syrianusargues that pentads can be seenmonadically. He attributes characteristicsdenied of the One to the noeric realm—an innovation which sets thestage for Syrianus’ interpretations of the negations in the first hypothesis,which become assertions in the second hypothesis.12Syrianus, as is most frequently the case, considers both schools cor-

rect—he agrees that there are genera of being at every level of reality andsays that these genera exist not directly after the One, but at the intelli-gible and intellectual levels. The genera are able to exist in both of theselevels because they exist suitably according towhatever rank they inhabit.Thus, at the intelligible level, the genera exist intelligibly, at the intellec-tual level, the genera exist intellectually.13 Proclus here gives Syrianus’hierarchy of the intelligible-intellectual universe, in which Syrianus char-acterises the intelligible and intellectual universes as places of oppositionbetween unity and multiplicity. He describes the intelligible universe asa place of unity and the intellective universe as one of multiplicity. Syr-ianus posits that the intelligible monad subsumes within itself the intel-lectual pentad.This pentad is said to contain Rest andMotion, Samenessand Otherness, as well as Being, because its chief characteristic is that oftotality.14Later in the fragment, the genera come to represent the forms, so that

the ideas exist in every level of the intelligible and intellectual universe,although in the former level, which represents wholes, they are taken upas wholes, and in the latter universe, representing multiplicity, they are

12 Dillon () .13 Van Campe () ; See Syrianus, In Met. , –, where essential attributes

descend from the intelligible realm above and spread over all beings.14 Proclus, PT II, , p. .–.. PT IV, , proposes the following:

Intelligible gods:st level: monadnd level: dyadrd level: triad

Intelligible-intellective gods:st level: tetradnd level: pentadrd level: hexad

Intellective:hebdomad.

commentary

taken up individually.15 While Proclus does not allude to this theory here,in In Parm..ff. themegista gene of the Sophist are identified with theIntellect itself.16 The genera are situated at the first level so that they actas supra-essential forms, in which other manifestations in lower realmsparticipate.In PlatonicTheology II, , Proclus gives an overview of same and dif-

ferent as it is applied to the second hypothesis. Here, the third order cor-responds to the demiurgic order and sameness and difference is affirmedfor the hypercosmic gods.17The placement of the genera of being has changed from Porphyry to

Syrianus: Porphyry argues that the genera of being can be seen at everylevel, while Iamblichus says that they are only at the intelligible level, asonly a triad can follow from the One, while Syrianus puts the thoughtof the two together, saying that pentads can be seen monadically—the group of the five megista gene are inherent in the monad of theintelligible world monadically. Proclus further systematises the thoughtof Syrianus, taking the five genera as properties of being and spreadingthem throughout the different orders of the intelligible universe.18 InPlatonicTheology III , Proclus describes how the genera are situated inthe three intelligible triads: the first triad contains “essence” and endowsintelligibles with a stable power; the second is the cause of “movementand repose” and is the place where Limit and Unlimitedness exist, andthe third, is characterised as “same and other”—here, the IntelligibleIntellect, the Essential Living Being, also houses the forms.19

15 On the question of whether intelligible substances participate in the Ideas, Syrianusargues that some of the intelligible substances are only paradigms, while others partici-pate in higher ones; Syr., In Met. .–. See D’Hoine () .

16 In other places, Proclus says that the five genera merely characterise Intellect; seePT V, . and Steel () .

17 Proclus, PT VI, affirms the hypercosmic gods; In Parm. .–., deniesthem.

18 Steel () .19 See also PT II, , p. , ff. and Saffrey and Westerink’s discussion () .

For a discussion of the relation between the three intelligible triads and the genera, seeOpsomer () .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 8

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

Τ� δ); πρεσ�Cτερ�ν v νε?τερ�ν v τ"ν αDτ"ν 8λικ�αν OAειν τ7 yν δ�κε9τ1. δυνατ7ν ε`ναι;—Τ� δ" γ+ρ �Z; [Parm. e–].

Μ0π�τε �Pν 3μειν�ν κ<ντα5*α τRς τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν μεμνRσ*αιπαραδ σεως, �τι δ" περ- τ.ν *ε�ων ψυA.ν E λ γ�ςG αeται γ+ρ �κ*ε-�5νται τ1. μετ)Aειν <ε- τ.ν *ε.νG ταCταις δH πρ�σ0κει Aρ ν�ς E πρ?-τιστ�ς, �DA E πρ�ελ*Mν ε�ς τ7 �μ(ανHς, <λλ’ E <π λυτ�ς κα- 3σAετ�ς,κα*’ lν αQ περ��δ�ι π^σαι μετρ�5νται τ.ν ψυA.ν, κα- περ- τ7 ν�η-τ7ν A�ρε9αιa 〈κα-〉b <νακυκλ0σειςG 3νω*εν γ+ρ 3ρAεται μιμ�Cμεν�ς τ7να�.να τ7ν π$ντων περιεκτικ7ν κα- συν)Aει π^σαν κ�νησιν, εhτε ψυAι-κ"ν εhτε �ωτικ"ν εhτε Eπωσ�5ν �(�στασ*αι λεγ�μ)νην, κα- <νελ�ττεικα- τελε9�ι, κα- Oστι ν�5ς μHν αDτ7ς κατ’ �Dσ�αν, A�ρε�αις δH τα9ς *ε�-αις ψυAα9ς κα- τRς περ- τ7 ν�ητ7ν <πε�ρ�υ κιν0σεως αhτι�ςG δι7c κα-�ν ταCταις �στ- τ7 πρεσ�Cτερ�ν 〈κα- νε?τερ�ν〉d κα- τ"ν αDτ"ν 8λι-κ�αν 3γ�νG κα- τα5τα π$ντα διA.ςG τ τε γ+ρ πρεσ�Cτερ�ν �ν αDτα9ςπρ7ς μHν 6αυτ+ς, κα*’ �σ�ν τα9ς κρε�ττ�σιν 6αυτ.ν δυν$μεσι μ^λλ�ν<π�λαC�υσι τRς <πειρ�ας τ�5 Aρ ν�υ κα- πλ)�ν αDτ�5 μετ)A�υσιν—�D γ+ρ τRς Eμ��ας πληρ�5ται τελει τητ�ς <π7 τ.ν *ει�τ)ρων κατ+π$σας 6αυτ.ν τ+ς δυν$μεις, <λλ+ τα9ς μHν πλ)�ν, τα9ς δH Oλαττ�νG τ7δH πλε��ν�ς Aρ ν�υ μετ)A�ν πρεσ�Cτερ ν (αμεν—, πρ7ς δH τ+ 3λλα,κα*’ �σ�ν αQ μHν αDτ.ν τ"ν �λην �π�δ)A�νται| τ�5 Aρ ν�υ μ)τρησινκα- τ"ν π^σαν Oκτασιν τ"ν ε�ς τ+ς ψυA+ς πρ�ϊ�5σαν, αQ δH μερικωτ)-ραις μετρ�5νται περι δ�ιςG πρεσ�Cτεραι �Pν Yν 8 περ��δ�ς Eλικωτ)ρακα- �π- Aρ ν�ν πλε�ω �κτειν�μ)νη. κα- δ" κα- τ7 νε?τερ�ν, [τ7 μHν [ς

a 2�ρε3αι ΑΣ: choreales g b κα�2 add. A c δι� corr. Steel ex g (propter quod): δι’ HMb

δι’ Nν ΑΣ d κα� νε�τερ�ν add. Steel.

“Well then, can it be held that the One can be older or younger thananything, or as the same age as anything?” “Why not?”

It is after all better, then, in this case also to call attention to the teachingsof our Master, to the effect that the text here concerns divine souls;for these are divinised by participating eternally in the gods, and it isto these that the most primal time properly refers, not that which hasproceeded into the visible realm, but that which is absolute and not-relative, according to which are measured all the circuits of the souls,and their dances and encirclings around the intelligible.1 For it takes itsbeginnings from above, imitating that eternity which comprehends allthings and holds together all motion, whether it be psychic or vital orhowever it be said to arise, and it unfolds it and brings it to completion,and it is itself in essence an intellect, while acting as cause for divine soulsof their “dance”, and of their infinite motion around the intelligible, andby means of which there also arises in them that which is “older” and“younger” and “of the same age”. And all these terms can be taken in twosenses, for “older” in them can be understood in relation to themselves,in so far as by virtue of their superior powers they get more benefit fromthe infinity of time and take a larger share of it; for they are not filledwith the same degree of completeness from the orders more divine thanthemselves in respect of all their powers, but more in virtue of some andless in virtue of others, and that which partakes of more time we call“older”; and in relation to other things, inasmuch as some of them acceptthe whole measurement of time and the whole extension of it whichproceeds into souls, while others are measured by its more particularcircuits.Those, then, are “older”, the circuit of which is more general andextended over more time.

1 C.f. Iamblichus, ap. Simpl. In Categ. , –, : Time is “a kind of dance of thesoul around the Intellect” (A�ρε�Tα τιν- τRς ψυARς περ- τ7ν ν�5ν). Iamblichus identifiesthis theory as a Pythagorean doctrine. C.f. Sambursky and Pines () , note ; .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

πρ7ς 6αυτ7 τ�ι�5τ ν �στιν �F�ν τ7 τα9ς �(ειμ)ναις δυν$μεσιν Oλαττ�νAρ ν�υ μετ)A�ν—6αυτ�5 γ+ρ τ7 τ�ι�5τ�ν νε?τερ�ν],a 3νω μHν �F�νπ�λι�Cμεν�ν τ1. συνεκτε�νειν 6αυτ7 πρ7ς τ"ν �λην τ�5 Aρ ν�υ δCνα-μιν, κ$τω δH Oτι νε$��ν τ1. μερικ?τερ�ν <π�λαCειν τ�5 Aρ ν�υ—[ςδH πρ7ς τ+ 3λλα, κατ+ τ"ν ](εσιν τRς �νεργε�αςG τ7 γ+ρ δι’ �λ$ττ�ν�ςπερι δ�υ μετρ�υμ)νην OA�ν τ"ν 6αυτ�5 περι(�ρ+ν νε?τερ ν �στι τ�5δι+ πλε��ν�ς.

τ γε μ"ν τ"ν αDτ"ν 8λικ�αν 3γ�ν 6αυτ1. τε κα- τ�9ς 3λλ�ις �Dκ3δηλ�ν �πως 6π- τ.ν συστ��Aων *εωρε9ται πραγμ$των, �(’ Yν 8 αDτ"μ)*εUις κα- τ7 αDτ7 τRς τελει τητ�ς μ)τρ�ν. π^σα δH *ε�α ψυA0, κdνκα*’ 4τερ�ν Aρ ν�ν αDτRς 8 περ��δ�ς μετρRται, κα*’ 4τερ�ν δH τ�5�Uημμ)ν�υ σ?ματ�ς 6αυτRς, <λλ’ OAει τ"ν hσην <π�κατ$στασιν, α]τητH κατ+ τ7ν α�τRς <ε- Aρ ν�ν κ<κε9ν� κατ+ τ7ν 6αυτ�5G δι7 π$λιν�σ0λικ ς �στιν 6αυτSR τε κα- �κε�ν1ω κατ+ τ7 <ν$λ�γ�ν.

�Dκ 3ρα �π- τ7ν συνεγνωσμ)ν�ν Aρ ν�ν <ναγκασ*ησ με*α κατα-(εCγειν δι+ τ7 γ�γνεσ*αι τ�5τ� κα- γεγ�ν)ναι—κα- γ+ρ τα5τ$ �στιν �ντα9ς περι δ�ις τ.ν *ε�ων ψυA.ν—, �Dδ’ αP �π- τ7ν α�.να μετα�ησ -με*α δι+ τ"ν δευτ)ραν �π *εσιν κατα($σκ�υσαν τ7ν Aρ ν�νG π^σανγ+ρ �κε9 (αμεν κατ+ τ7 6URς παραδεδ σ*αι τ"ν τ�5 =ντ�ς πρ �δ�ν,3νω*εν <π7 τ.ν ν�ητ.ν μ�ν$δων δι+ τ.ν ν�ερ.ν τ$Uεων κα- �περ-κ�σμ�ων κα- �γκ�σμ�ων �π- τ"ν �κ*ε�υμ)νην <σ?ματ�ν �Dσ�αν καταν-τ0σασαν.

6π με*$ γε μ"ν τ1. Πλ$τωνι κα- �ν Τιμα�1ω τ7ν Aρ ν�ν π$σης μ)τρ�ν<π�(ηναμ)ν1ω �ωRς μετα�ατικRς, κα- τ"ν ψυA"ν 3ρUασ*αι *ε�ας �ωRςκα- Oμ(ρ�ν�ς ���υ πρ7ς τ7ν σCμπαντα Aρ ν�ν, κα- �ν τ1. Φα�δρ1ω δι+Aρ ν�υ τ7 xν αDτ+ς λ)γ�ντι κα*�ρ^ν, δι τι Aρ�νικ.ς, <λλ’ �Dκ α�ων�-ως Eρ.σι. κα- �DδHν δεησ με*α τ7 πρεσ�Cτερ�ν κα- νε?τερ�ν κα- τ"ναDτ"ν 8λικ�αν 3γ�ν �π- τ$Uεως <κ�Cειν κα- τRς κατ+ τ7 αhτι�ν κα- α�-τιατ7ν δια(�ρ^ς, �DδH �ητε9ν τ� τ7 τRς τ$Uεως ταCτης αhτι�ν, <λλ’ αD-τ�(υ.ς �π- τ.ν Aρ�νικ.ν μ)τρων τ+ τ�ια5τα παραλαμ�$ν�μεν τ.ν τεμει� νων κα- �λαττ νων κα- τ.ν 3λλ0λ�ις Eμ�στ��Aων.

a τ�2…νε�τερ�ν add. Steel ex g (hoc quidem ut ad se ipsum tale est quale quod submissispotentiis minus minus tempore participat—se ipso enim quod tale iunius)

text and translation

And indeed the expression “younger” has a similar range ofmeanings;in relation to itself, it is such as to participate less in Time than powersinferior to it; for being younger than itself, in its relation to what is aboveit, it is as it were grown ancient by extending itself in parallel to thewholepower of time; while in relation to what is below it, it is still youthful byreason of its more partial enjoyment of Time. In relation to other things,the term has reference to the declination of its activity, for that whichhas its circuit measured by a lesser circumference is “younger” than thatwhich has it through a larger one.As for the concept of being “like in age”, both in relation to itself and to

other things, it is plain howone should relate it to things at the same level,which enjoy the same method of participation and the same measureof perfection. Every divine soul, after all, even if its circuit is measuredaccording to a different time from that of its dependent body, yet has thesame period of return, and this is always measured by its own time, whilethat of the body is measured according to the time proper to it; for whichreason in turn it is of equal age both to itself and analogously to the bodyalso.Wewill not then be forced to resort to the normal sense of timemerely

because of the mention of coming to be and having come to be; for thesealso are to be found in the circuits of divine souls; nor on the other handwill we have to resort to identifying it with Eternity, because the SecondHypothesis asserts time of the One; for we declare that there we find setout in order the procession of Being right from the intelligible monadsthrough the intellectual and supracosmic and encosmic orders down toan encounter with divinised incorporeal being.We are following here the doctrine of Plato, who both declared in the

Timaeus [ C] that Time is the measure for all things of transitive life,and that Soul is the first principle of divine life and intelligent living forthe whole of time; and who has declared in the Phaedrus [ D] thatthe souls behold Being because they view things in Time, not in Eternity.And therewill be no need for us to understand the expressions “younger”and “older” and “of the same age” as referring to order of being and thedifference between the cause and the caused, nor will we need to enquirewhat is the cause of that order, but we can take such expressions in theirnatural sense as referring to measures of time greater and less and equalto others, as the case may be.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

In this discussion of the One’s transcendence over Time, Syrianus relatesParmenides’ lemma that the One is younger and older and the sameage as everything, to the divine soul which participates in primal Time.Syrianus’ doctrine of primal Timehere relates to his concept ofwhat takesplace in the second hypothesis—he offers a determined effort to identifyeach level of divine entities.2The One, moreover, is denied of all levels inturn.Regarding the lemma, Proclus wishes to prove that the One does not

participate in Time by demonstrating that the One does not participatein being younger or older or of the same age. Proclus gives the viewsof five commentators on this topic, beginning with the view of thosewho believed that all things, including God, were comprehended bytime (.ff.). This group of physical philosophers say that all things,including God, are comprehended by Time. The physical philosophersdeny progress of time to the One, placing the intelligible world in a stateof eternity and positing the Stoic position of the Soul as the supremeprinciple. There is, thus, no difference between higher and lower time.Anaxagoras reflects this idea with his concept of the soul, but morepointedly, this theory reflects Plotinus and the idea of holistic time—puresoul is not subject to our temporality, rather discursive thought is true ofworld soul. Proclus responds that the One is not in body (for it wouldhave to be in another), not in Soul (for it does not partake in Time), andnot in Intellect (for it does not experience motion or rest, the definingcharacteristic of Intellect).Next, he discusses what Plato means by time in .ff., dividing

the discussion into the views of five groups of commentators. The firstcategory, “[m]ost of those who have concerned themselves with this”,seems to include Plotinus (Enn. VI. ..), and says that Plato refers tothe “obvious type of time”, explaining that Plato says coming to being isparticular to those which participate in time (Parm. A). This viewis based on Parmenides A where Plato says that coming to be isproper to those things that participate in time. Proclus points out thatthe transcendence of ordinary time is not particular to the One becauseIntellect transcends ordinary time, as well (.ff.). Because the Onetranscends Intellect, it must transcend Eternity, the realm of the Intellect.

2 Steel () .

commentary

The second group of commentators (.ff.), who may possiblyrepresent the opinion of Amelius,3 equates time with eternity. Thesecommentators claim that in the second hypothesis (Parm. A), thenotion that the One participates in Time refers to Eternity. Proclusprotests that Plato cannotmean Eternity here, because he uses distinctivetemporal expressions, “older than oneself ”, “younger than oneself ”, andso on.The third commentator (.) uses the Neopythagorean identifi-

cation of the primal god with kairos.4 This position says that the Oneexists in the level of being superior to eternity, in a state of instantaneous-ness. Dillon identifies this commentator with Porphyry,5 who describesthe One as beyond Time and Eternity. Porphyry, moreover, fits the billas this commentator with his description of the primal god (ho prôtostheos) as Occasion, the second god, Eternity and the third, Time. TheOne, meanwhile, exists beyond time and eternity. Proclus dismisses thisopinion, remarking that it does not explain the ways that characteristicsparticipate in one another.The fourth opinion (.) appears to be that of Iamblichus,6 who

postulates an archetypal Time. He argues that the One is not Eternity,and is not established with Time.7 Time is, instead, the causal principle

3 Dillon offers Porphyry, Iamblichus, or Amelius as the author of this opinion. Be-cause the third group of commentators represents the opinion of Porphyry, while thefourth that of Iamblichus, I have taken the second group to be that of Amelius, givenProclus’ trajectory in offering school opinions. Still, it is perhaps best to defer to Dillon’smore cautious and educated identification.

4 According to Dillon, this is a Neo-Pythagorean deduction from the Philebus A,Politicus E, and Laws IV B. For a discussion on kairos as the supreme principle,see Proclus, In Alc. ; Plotinus Enn. VI...; Damascius, In Phil. – p. .

5 See Proclus,PT I, p. .. In hisπερ- <ρA.ν, Porphyry declares the highest aspectof nous (the supreme principle) to be πρ�αι?νι�ς, while nous is α�?νι�ς. See Dillon() , note .

6 Proclus, In Tim. III, , ff.; see Iamblichus In Tim. fr. Dillon.7 Simplicius, In Phys. I , CAG (Iamblichus, In Tim, fr. Dillon):

“The notion of ‘before’ and ‘after’ in this order we do not understand in the sense ofchanges involving movements, nor in any other such sense, but we define it as thesequence of causes and the continuous combination of generations and primary activityand power which brings motions to fulfilment and as all things of this sort.

Further, we say that Time, and at the same time the Heaven, were not created alongwith the motion or life proceeding from the soul, but from the intellectual setting-in-order proceeding from the Demiurge; for it is in conjunction with this that Time and theCosmos are established in him. And indeed the ancient account unequivocally revealsGod as ordering and producing Time at the same time as he makes the Heaven. And

syrianus, in parm. fr.

of the intellectual order—terms such as “older”, “younger” and “the sameage” reflect relative levels of intellect.8 In Simplicius’ Commentary on thePhysics, Iamblichus argues for an ungeneratedNowand a time of a higherorder than temporal things.The relationship between Time, the soul, andintellect is evident in the following passage:

“Reasonably time is defined as the moving image of eternity inasmuch asit is modelled upon the intellect and its thoughts are made to resemblethe intellections, as the indivisible Now which is in the soul is made toresemble the Now which rests in the One; as the time which encompassesall things in this world is made to resemble the time of the intellectualworld which encompasses, simultaneously, and everlastingly, the thingswhich really are 〈and do not become〉; as the moving time of this world ismodelled upon the static time of the intellectual world, and as the measureof becoming is made to represent the measure of the essences 〈that reallyare〉.” (Iamblichus, In Tim., fr. Dillon.)9

An intellectual Time exists which transcends the cosmos and measuresactivities in the world of becoming. This transcendent Time governs theprinciples of the psychic world, as well. Iamblichus’ notion of prehistorictime influences Syrianus’ reading of the Parmenides on time.Syrianus starts from Iamblichus’ concept that there is a higher kind of

Time which relates to the level of divine soul. Adapting the Iamblicheanconcept that a level of divine souls participate in primal Time, Syrianussays that Time takes its beginning from above and imitates eternity. Syri-anus, thus, presents a doctrine on time which is similar to Iamblichus’, asboth give a non-temporal explanation for the existence of a transcendentTime. While Iamblichus identifies the levels of reality with the noericrealm—time itself is the ordering principle—, Syrianus refers it to levelsof divine souls that participate in primal Time—primal time measuresthe circuits of these souls. He takes the concept of time unfolding eter-nity and extrapolates a lower level which unravels something containedin a concentrated form at a higher level. In apparent concordance withIamblichus’ concept of transcendent Time as the ‘causal principle of the

one might declare Time to be a measure, not in the sense of measuring the progress (ofthe Universe), or of being measured by motion, or of revealing the revolution (of theHeavens), or of being revealed as such, but in the sense of being the cause and one thinguniting all these.”

8 The “older” is superior in essence, “younger” is inferior, and those at the same levelof being or those which have the same age, are at the same cosmic level.

9 Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics, p. , –. Trans. Sambursky and Pines() .

commentary

intellectual order’ (τ7 τ"ς τ$Uεως τRς ν�ερ^ς αhτι�ν), Syrianus arguesthat pure Time acts as the cause for the divine souls of their dance! Syri-anus’ proposal is thus equivalent to Iamblichus, who suggests an interme-diate entitywhich is superior to ordinary time, lower than aion, the causalprinciple of the intellectual world. Proclus, however, disagrees with Syri-anus that the lemma refers not just to beings whomove cyclically, but allbeings in time.10As regards the troublesome “temporal” expressions in the lemma, we

know that we are dealingwith souls that change or “dance”, progressing intheir circuits. He proposes the following solution: thosewhich are termed“older” in relation to themselves, those which get more benefit frominfinity of time, and those which are “younger” in relation to themselves,participate less in time than those which are below them. That which isyounger than itself is more youthful, while those which are older are inrelation to intelligible entities and extend in infinity of time.11Those equalin age with each other have uniform circuits.

Older Younger The Same Age

Relation toThemselves

Partakes more ofinfinity

Participates less intime

All souls have thesame method ofparticipation andperfection

Relation toOthers

The wholemeasurement of time,measured by a longercircuit

What has its circuitmeasured by a lessercircumference isyounger than whathas a larger one(if measured bythe moon, with asmall circuit, it isyounger than what ismeasured by Saturn,which has a longercircuit)

At the same level—has the same methodof participation

Syrianus gives a non-temporal meaning to temporal expressions, justas Iamblichus makes older and younger matters of seniority and prece-

10 Steel () .11 For Proclus, the phrases “in relation to themselves” and “in relation to others” direct

his understanding of “older” and “younger” in his discussion here. See In Parm. .f.,where he says that the higher intelligible orders are older in respect to causes. For adiscussion of tense and its relation to Eternity, see Plass ().

syrianus, in parm. fr.

dence.12 Proclus, in his account of archetypal time, connects it to thenoeric level,13 just above soul,14 so that it is not quite time. Proclus adoptsthe concept of Time as an intellectual entity which is measured by themotion of soul.Syrianus thus gives a non-temporalmeaning of time and lays out three

modes of time: eternity, kairos, and transcendent Time, which he makesthe causal principle of the intellectual order. When Proclus discussestime, however, he does not make time the ordering principle but thinkstime orders circuits of souls (which, in turn, order theuniverse). Syrianus’interpretation is another example of how Syrianus divinizes being in hismetaphysics.

12 See note above.13 Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics, p. , ff.14 Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics, p. , .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 9

Proclus, In Parm. .–.

�Dκ�5ν τ γε πρεσ�Cτερ�ν <ε- νεωτ)ρ�υ πρεσ�Cτερ�ν;—[Τ� μ0ν;—Τ7πρεσ�Cτερ�ν]a 3ρα 6αυτ�5 γιγν μεν�ν κα- νε?τερ�ν 6αυτ�5 gμα γ�-γνεται, εhπερ μ)λλει �Aειν �τ�υ πρεσ�Cτερ�ν γ�γνεται.—Π.ς λ)γεις;—�Ωδε [Parm. a–b]

Π$λιν �Pν 8μ9ν �π- τ7ν 8μ)τερ�ν κα*ηγεμ να τρεπτ)�ν κα- τ"ν �κε�-ν�υ παρ$δ�σιν ε�ς μ)σ�ν <κτ)�ν,(.ς <ν$πτ�υσαν ε�ς π$ντα τ7ν πρ�-κε�μεν�ν λ γ�ν. διττ7ν δ" τ7 Aρ ν�υ μετ)A�ν �στ�, τ7 μHν �F�ν [κατ’]bεD*ε9αν Eδε5�ν, κα- <ρA μεν ν τε <π τιν�ς κα- ε�ς 3λλ� καταλRγ�ν,τ7 δH κατ+ κCκλ�ν περιπ�ρευ μεν�ν, κα- <π7 τ�5 αDτ�5 πρ7ς τ7 αDτ7τ"ν κ�νησιν OA�ν, 1Y κα- <ρA" κα- π)ρας �στ- ταDτ7ν κα- 8 κ�νησις <κα-τ$ληκτ�ς, 6κ$στ�υ τ.ν �ν αDτSR κα- <ρARς κα- π)ρατ�ς =ντ�ς, κα- �D-δHν pττ�ν <ρARς v π)ρατ�ς. τ7 δ" κυκλικ.ς �νεργ�5ν μετ)Aει τ�5 Aρ -ν�υ περι�δικ.ς, κα- �πειδ" τ7 αDτ7 κα- π)ρας αDτ1. τRς κιν0σε?ς �στικα- <ρA", κα*’ �σ�ν μHν <(�σταται τRς <ρARς, πρεσ�Cτερ�ν γ�γνεται|κα*'�σ�ν δH �π- τ7 π)ρας <(ικνε9ται, νε?τερ�ν γ�γνεταιG γιγν μεν�νγ+ρ Oγγι�ν τ�5 π)ρατ�ς �γγCτερ�ν γ�γνεται τRς ��κε�ας <ρARςG τ7 δHτRς ��κε�ας <ρARς �γγυτ)ρω γιγν μεν�ν νε?τερ�ν γ�γνεταιG τ7 3ρα �π-τ7 π)ρας <(ικν�Cμεν�ν κυκλικ.ς νε?τερ�ν γ�γνεται τ7 αDτ7 κατ+ τ7αDτ7 κα- πρεσ�Cτερ�ν γιγν μεν�νG τ7 γ+ρ τ1. 6αυτ�5 π)ρατι συνεγγ�-��ν �π- τ7 πρεσ�Cτερ�ν πρ εισιν. 1Y μHν �Pν <ρA" 3λλ� κα- [τ7] π)ρας,τ�Cτ1ω κα- τ7 νε?τερ�ν 4τερ�ν v τ7 πρεσ�Cτερ�νG 1Y δH ταDτ7ν <ρA"κα- π)ρας, �DδHν μ^λλ�ν νε?τερ ν �στι {τ7 νε?τερ�ν}c v πρεσ�Cτε-ρ�ν, <λλ’ [ς E Πλ$των (ησ-ν, gμα νε?τερ�ν 6αυτ�5 κα- πρεσ�Cτερ�νγ�γνεταιG τ7 μHν γ+ρ κατ’ εD*ε9αν κιν�Cμεν�ν �Dκ OAει, δι τι π)ρας κα-<ρA" δια()ρετ�ν �π’ αDτ�5, τ7 δH κατ+ κCκλ�ν OAει τ7 νε?τερ�ν 6αυ-τ�5 τ1. πρ7ς τ7 αDτ7 κα- [ς <ρA"ν κα- [ς π)ρας γ�γνεσ*αι τ"ν κ�νη-σιν. π^ν 3ρα τ7 Aρ ν�υ μετ)A�ν, ε� πρεσ�Cτερ�ν 6αυτ�5 γ�γνεται, κα-νε?τερ�ν 6αυτ�5 γ�γνεταιG τ�ι�5τ�ν δH τ7 κυκλικ.ς κιν�Cμεν�ν. �*εν

a Τ#… πρεσ>*τερ�ν2 add. Steel ex Ag PLAT. codd.: om. Σ b κατ’ add. Cous2 secundumg c τ� νε�τερ�ν del. Steel ex g

“Does not, then, ‘older’ always mean older than something younger?”“Obviously.” “Well then, whatever is becoming older than itself, mustalso be at the same time becoming younger than itself, if it is to havesomething thanwhich it is becoming older.” “What do youmean?” “This.”

Wemust therefore turn once again to ourMaster, and bring to bear uponthe problemhis discussion,which throws light upon thewhole precedingargument.Thatwhich partakes inTime is of two sorts; the onewhich, as itwere, proceeds in a straight line, beginning fromone point and ending inanother; the other which travels round in a circle and pursues its motionfrom the same point to the same point, so as to have a beginning andan end which are the same and a motion which is unceasing, since eachpoint of its progress is both beginning and end, and is no less a beginningthan an end. That, then, which enjoys cyclical activity partakes in Timeby circuits, and since the same point is for it both an end and a beginningof motion, in so far as it departs from a beginning, it becomes older,whereas in so far as it arrives at an end, it becomes younger; for as itcomes to be nearer to its end, it comes to be nearer to its own beginning;and thatwhich comes to be nearer to its ownbeginning becomes younger.So then, that which arrives cyclically at its end becomes younger, whileat the same time and by the same process also becoming older; for thatwhich draws near to its own end proceeds towards being older; so forthat which has a beginning different from its end, becoming younger isdifferent from becoming older; but for that of which its beginning is thesame as its end, its youngness is no younger than it is older, but as Platosays, “It becomes simultaneously younger than itself and older.” For thatwhich ismoved in a straight line does not have this characteristic, becauseend and beginning are different in its case, whereas that whichmoves in acircle has the quality of being younger than itself by reasonof the fact thatits motion comes about in relation to the same point as both beginningand as end. So then, everything that partakes in time, it if becomes olderthan itself, also becomes younger than itself; and what is of this sort isthat which moves in a circle.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

ε�κ τως �*�ρυ��5ντ� κα- �Q <ρAα9�ι μ0 πSη σ�(ισματ?δης �eτ�ς Eλ γ�ς �στ-ν, ε�ς τ+ κατ’ εD*ε9αν κιν�Cμενα �λ)π�ντες, δ)�ν διελ)σ*αικα- *εωρRσαι τ�σι μHν τ7 αDτ7 κα- <ρA" κα- π)ρας, τ�σι δH 4τερ�ν, κα-�τι ν5ν περ- τ.ν *ε�ων ψυA.ν E λ γ�ς, 〈α\〉a κα- Aρ ν�υ μετ)A�υσιπερι�δικ7ν OA�υσαι τ7ν Aρ ν�ν τRς ��κε�ας κιν0σεως, cσπερ κα- τ+XA0ματα τ+ �Uημμ)να αDτ.ν.

'αλλ’ �eτ�ς μHν E λ γ�ς τ�5 κα*ηγεμ ν�ς 8μ.ν.

a αP add. A

Commentary

Syrianus argues that divine souls (and their vehicles) move cyclically,which means that as they approach their end, they also approach theirbeginning. He applies this psychic circular motion to Plato’s premise thatsomething becoming younger than itself also becomes older than itself,and something older than itself becomes younger than itself.Proclus gives the opinion of three sets of commentators before launch-

ing into Syrianus’ teaching on the subject.

. Some commentators (.): dismiss the argument altogether, say-ing that Plato indulges in sophistry here.

. Others (.): say the same thing is at the same time youngerand older—it is younger with respect to the future, and older withrespect to the past. Proclus criticises this argument for concentrat-ing on how something is simultaneously older or younger thananother, but not adequately explaining in what way something issimultaneously older and younger than oneself.

. The third group (.): says that everything is both older andyounger than itself; what is now existent is older, what used to beexistent is younger. This argument addresses the relative aspects ofa thing based on what that thing is at a certain time, so that what isolder is older than what used to be younger. Proclus says that thismisses the spirit of Plato’s argument, which looks at a thing beingsimultaneously younger and older than itself at one point in time.

text and translation

For this reason the ancients were understandably disturbed lest thisargument be in some way sophistical, since they were looking to thingsthatmoved in a straight line, whereas they should havemade the distinc-tion and considered what things have the characteristic of having theirbeginning and end the same, and what have them as different, and theyshould have considered that the subject of discussionnow is divine souls,which partake in time in the respect that they have a periodic time oftheir propermotion, as indeed do the vehicles which are dependent uponthem.This, then, is the argument of our Master.

To Proclus, Syrianus’ opinion is the most credible. He says that soulspartake in time through circuits, which results in cyclical motion andtime for souls and their vehicles. Souls, thus, moving in circles, aresimultaneously younger and older than themselves. For, as soon as theydepart from a point, they become older, but simultaneously younger, asthey move still closer to their own beginning. As souls move nearer totheir end, they move nearer to their beginning, which is spatially next tothe endon a circle. Proclus adapts Syrianus’ statement on souls inPlatonicTheology II, , p. , ff., where he notes that souls are peculiar in sofar as they are both younger and, at the same time, older than themselvesand other things. He then goes on to state that this phenomenonof beingboth older and younger occurs because they move according to cyclicaltime. Proclus, however, takes all of this a step further by saying that theages of souls themselves are responsible for preserving the measures oftime.Syrianus’ discourse on circular motion and Parmenides AB is sig-

nificant, not least for its teaching on the behaviour of souls within Syri-anus’ metaphysics.That circles and lines have ametaphysical importancebeyond their geometrical aspects is evident in Chaldean thought,1 andcertainly reappears in Platonic thought. In his commentary on Euclid’sElements, Proclus says that a circle and straight line are two basic types

1 The Chaldeans held that forms emanate from divine mind to matter through atireless whirlwind (<κ��μητ�ς στρ�($λιγU). Cf. Gersh () .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

of line based on the fundamental principles of Limit and Unlimitedness(In Eucl. .).2 The circle and circular line correspond to Limit, whilethe straight line corresponds to Unlimitedness. The spiral is a mixture ofLimit andUnlimitedness (In Eucl. .ff.).The behaviour of a line underthe influence of Limit andUnlimitedness displays themost elaborate rolefor lines and circles in the cosmos; looking at the process in another light,the processive and revertive function is, in fact, in the causal process ofremaining, procession, and reversion.Gershmakes the case that the threegeometrical shapes correspond to the three processes based on Proclus’assertions that the point3 is most akin to remaining, the line4 to proces-sion, and the circle5 to reversion.6This concept is reflected in Proclus’ discussion of generation in In

Parm. :“One may also see on the level of generation these two qualities [line andcircle]. One may view in the cycle of existence here (for generation returnsto itself cyclically, as is written in the Phaedo [ C ff.]) the circular; whilethe straight onemay see in the procession of each thing from its birth to itsdecline, and the middle here, which is in front of the extremes, as its peakof development.”

Based on the Phaedo, Proclus argues that the process of generation is acyclical one in which a being reverts upon itself for regeneration.7The concept of generation is particular to soul—souls are constructed

out of straight lines and circles, because circles are only one type of line.8In his Commentary on Euclid, Proclus says,

“It is because of the circular revolutions of the heavens that generationreturns in a circle upon itself and brings its unstable mutability into adefinite cycle. If you divide bodiless things into soul and nous, you willsay that the circle has the character of nous, the straight line that of soul.This is why the soul, as it reverts to nous, is said to move in a circle.”

(In Eucl. ..)9

2 Proclus, In Eucl. .ff.: “There is a line which is finite but does not have points asits limits. The circle is such a line, bending back upon itself and making no use of limitsas does the straight line.” Trans. Morrow ().

3 Proclus, In Eucl. .ff.; .ff.4 Iamblichus In Tim. fr. Dillon; Proclus, In Eucl. .–, .–.5 Proclus, In Eucl. .ff.6 Gersh () .7 Sorabji makes the point that Parmenides was a member of the Pythagorean school

and that Pythagorean thought said that everything will happen in cycles, precisely as it ishappening now.The universe, though finite, will have no beginning or end. () .

8 Proclus, In Eucl. .; Tim. C–C.9 Trans. Morrow ().

commentary

That soul moves in a circle because of its revertive tendencies is acommon thought in Iamblichus’ de Anima. The soul, however, movesaccording to different shapes depending on in what action it is engaged:

“Thedemiurgic nous has set up these two principles in himself, the straightand circular, and produced out of himself two monads, the one acting ina circular fashion to perfect all intelligible essences, the other moving ina straight line to bring all perceptible things to birth. Since the soul isintermediate between sensibles and intelligibles, she moves in a circularfashion in so far as she is allied to intelligible nature, but in so far as shepresides over sensibles, exercises her providence in a straight line.”

(In Eucl. .ff.)10

The soul moves in a straight line when it extends in generation, a circlewhen it returns during reversion. In this respect, the soul acts as anintermediate, binding together the intelligible and sensible realms.

10 Morrow ().

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 10

Proclus, In Parm. VII, , –, Steel1

m δυνατ7ν �Pν περ- τ7 yν τα5*’ �]τως OAειν; �Zκ�υν Oμ�ιγε δ�κε9.[Parm. a–].

Dicendum autem et ut noster magister, quod abnegationes in entibusexquisite dicuntur esse circa illam rem, circa quam sunt abnegationes,alicubi quidem et specionaliter, alicubi autem solum priuatiue. Puta inexemplo, stationem dicimus non ens—non enim est motus neque iden-titas neque alteritas—, et motum similiter non ens uocamus; non enimest aliorum entium neque unum. Et totaliter unumquodque entium sin-gulariter quidem ens est, qua ipsum, multipliciter autem non ens, quaab aliis remotum est. Attamen et si alia abnegamus ab ipso, sed abnega-tiones circa ipsum sunt mixte aliqualiter affirmationibus. Participat qui-dem enim et aliorum unoquoque; seruans autem sui ipsius puritatemest quod est. Specionales igitur abnegationes in ipso; nam non ens illudalterum erit; hoc autem species est intellectualis. Ostensum est enimquod que alterius natura dispartita facit quod in |illis non ens; hoc autemerat abnegatio.Iterum in sensibilibus Socratem dicimus neque equum esse neque

leonem neque aliorum nullum. Omnium igitur aliorum habet priua-tiones. Unum enim aliquod ens infinita alia non est, et sunt in ipsoomnium priuationes, priuationes entes solum. Non enim participat ali-qualiter aliis, sicut in intelligentialibus dicebamus, neque propter puri-tatem le non participare, sed propter debilitatem materialis et corporalis

1 This passage, forming part of the last section of Proclus’ Commentary on the Par-menides, only survives in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke (translatedbetween –). Klibansky, who discovered the work, and Labowsky published anedition and English translation of this work, Parmenides usque ad finem primae Hypoth-esis nec non Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem pars ultima adhuc inedita interpreteGuillelmo de Moerbeka ediderunt praefatione et adnotationibus instruxerunt (Plato Lati-nus, vol. III), London . For this passage, I refer to the more recent edition of Steel(). Of interest is the Greek retroversion, originally the work of Rumbach, correctedby Steel, and published along with an English translation by GregoryMacIsaac .Thisretroversion was revised in vol. III, Steel ().

Is it possible that all this is true about the one? I do not think so.

Following our Master, we must also say that negative propositions in thesphere of real beings have different meanings according to their subjectmatter, sometimes a specific significance, sometimes only a privative one.E.g., we say “is not” in speaking of rest because it is not movementor identity or difference, and similarly we say “is not” in speaking ofmovement because it is not any of the other things; and in general eachthing is in a single way, inasmuch as it is itself, but in many ways it is not,inasmuch as it is distinguished from other things. But though we denyother things of it, these negative propositions are in a particular way tiedup with the positive propositions. For it does also participate in each ofthe other things, yet it keeps its own integrity and is what it is. In thiscase, then, the negative propositions are specific, for not being that, itwill be the other; and this will be an intellectual form. For it has beenshown that it is the character of difference as distributed in this spherethat makes “not being” true in it; this is what constituted negation here.On the other hand, in speaking of sensible objects we say that Socrates

is not a horse and not a lion, and is not any of the other things, for helacks all the other characters. For, being one particular thing, he is not aninfinite number of others, and in him there are lacks, which are nothingbut lacks, of all of those characters. For he does not in a particular wayparticipate in the other things, as we said was true of intelligibles. Andthis non-participation is not due to the purity of the idea “Socrates,” butto the weakness of a material and corporeal subject, which is incapable

syrianus, in parm. fr.

ypostaseos non potentis omnibus simul participare entibus. Igitur causaintelligentialibus abnegationes circa ipsa sunt; qui igitur abnegantur et insensibilibus, ibi quidem specionaliter, hic autem priuatiue.Que itaque unius abnegationes, non sunt circa unum. Nichil enim

totaliter illi adest, neque ut species, neque ut priuatio; sed sicut diceba-mus quod nomen hoc, scilicet unum, est eius qui in nobis conceptus,sed non ipsius unius, sic utique dicimus quod et abnegatio circa huncest, circa illud autem unum nulla est dictarum abnegatiuarum conclu-sionum; sed exaltatum est propter simplicitatem ab omni oppositione etomni negatione.Merito ergo in fine apposuit quod abnegationes hee nonsunt circa unum. Aliud enim est esse de uno et aliud esse circa unum.Etenim sermo circa unum quidem non est—indeterminabile enim est—,de uno autem est, ipsum hoc dicentibus nobis quod indicibile. Quare etdicte abnegationes non sunt circa unum, sed de uno. Neque ergo hiis queintelligentialium neque hiis que sensibilium abnegationibus nichil ipseassimilantur. Hee quidem enim circa hec illa sunt quorum utique et suntabnegationes, hee autem nullatenus sunt circa unum.

text and translation

of a simultaneous participation in everything. For this reason negativepropositions in the intelligible sphere really express something aboutthe predicates. The same holds true also of negative propositions aboutobjects of sense; but in the former case they are specific, while in the latterthey are merely privative.But negative propositions about theOne donot really express anything

about the One. For nothing at all applies to it, either specifically orprivatively, but, as we have said, the name “one” names our conceptionof it, not the One itself, and so we say that the negation also is aboutour conception, and none of the negative conclusions that have beenstated is about the One, but because of its simplicity, it is exalted aboveall contrast and all negation. So he rightly added at the end that thesenegative propositions do not express anything about the One.It is not the same thing to refer to the One and to express something

about the One. The argument does not express anything about the One,for it is indefinable. So the negative propositions that have been stated donot express anything about the One, but do refer to the One. This is whythey resemble neither those which occur in the intelligible sphere northose which are about the objects of sense. For the former are about thesame things of which the negations also are predicated, while the latterdo not in any way express anything about the One.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

This fragment assesses the first hypothesis of the Parmenides and debateswhat, if anything, can be said of the One—as so often, in response to anaporia which raised the question whether this final passage does not ineffect nullify the whole previous enquiry.Proclus gives the replies of two others on the matter. The first group

(likely to be Origen the Platonist)2 says that there is indeed no positivesubject of the first hypothesis. This account denies that the One acts asthe subject matter of the first hypothesis because the first hypothesisreaches impossible conclusions. When dismissing the first hypothesis,this group of commentators deem the following hypothetical syllogismsimpossible: “if theOne exists, it is a whole, it has not a beginning, middle,or end, it has no shape”, and “it has no existence, is not existence, isnot expressible, is not nameable, is not knowable.” Proclus replies thatthis group must attribute some kind of existence to the One because itholds that the One is participated by existence; the One is essentiallythe same as One-Being or Being. Proclus also criticizes Origen for thisopinion in In Parm. .ff., where he says that the group supposesthat “the One in its absolute form is without subject (anhupostaton), andthat this hypothesis produces impossible conclusions” (.). Proclus’criticism is based on the exegetical doctrine that Plato did not come upwith any hypotheseswhichwould lead to impossibilities; instead, Proclusfinds Origen’s reasoning impossible.The origin of the whole aporia, then, seems to derive from Origen’s

account of the One, concerning which there has been much recent dis-cussion.3 Origen connects the One to the Intellect, thus supporting thenegation of the transcendence of the One.4 In Origen’s treatise, On theFirst God, he follows Numenius in making the first God basileus—thefirst principle of the universe, a supreme Intellect, and the secondpoietes—the maker of the universe. In Platonic Theology II, , Proclussays of those who want to make the Intellect the first principle of allbeings,

“I find marvellous all those commentators of Plato who have admittedthe kingship of the intellect over beings, but have not revered the unspoken

2 Origen the Platonist is attacked for this view by Proclus in PT II, .3 Hadot () – and Saffrey andWesterink () x–xii.4 Saffrey andWesterink () xi.

commentary

transcendence of the One and its transcendent existence over the entireuniverse, especially Origen who shares in the same teaching as Plotinus.”

(p. , –.)

As with this passage, the mainstay of Proclus’ criticism is Origen’s failuretomake theOne transcendent. Based on three key passages fromProclus’Parmenides Commentary, Saffrey andWesterink summariseOrigen’s the-ory on the relationship between the One and Intellect:5

. The One is entirely without existence or substance (In Parm..–.);

. The Intellect is supreme (In Parm. VII. .–);. Absolute Being and Absolute One are identical.

For the third summation of Origen’s thought, Saffrey and Westerinkcredit In Parm. VII, p. .–. This section, however, discusses therelationship between the First hypothesis and the henads and seemsbetter identified as Iamblichus, as Dillon notes.6The secondopinion, a group of commentators that probably comprises

Porphyry, offers a literary solution. Porphyry does not reject the Plo-tinian One, but regards the first principle as being also the Father of thenoetic triad when looked at in its relation to what follows it.7 Here, Por-phyry’s proposal to move this statement to the beginning of the secondhypothesis may be seen as an aspect of this strategy of linking the twohypotheses more closely.8 If the Father of the noetic triad is expressible,

5 Saffrey andWesterink () xii.6 Dillon () , note .7 Porphyry, Commentary on the Parmenides fr. where the One is subject of both

hypotheses, although its meaning changes when it is associated with Being. See Bechtle(). See also the discussion of this fragment in Dillon and Gerson () –.

8 The key passage for this occurs in Proclus, In Parm. , ff.:

“We shall, therefore, be very far frommaking the primal god the summit of the intelligibleworld, as I observe to be the practice of some leading authorities on divine matters, andmaking the Father of that realm the same as the cause of all things. For this entity is aparticipated henad. After all, he is called an intelligible Father and the summit of theintelligible world, and even if he is the principle of coherence for the whole intelligibleworld, yet it is as the Father that he is so.The primal god, however, who is celebrated in thefirst hypothesis, is not even a father, but is superior also to all paternal divinity.The formerentity is set over against its Power and its Intellect, of whom it is said to be the Father, andwith those it makes up a single triad, whereas this truly primal god transcends all contrastand relationship with anything, so a fortiori is not an intelligible father.” TranslationMorrow-Dillon (). For Porphyry, the Father does not transcend the triad becausehe is the first member of the triad. Cf. Dillon () . Porphyry’s doctrine of the Oneis based on a tension between the One as uncoordinated in one respect, coordinated in

syrianus, in parm. fr.

characteristics can be attributed to it. Proclus describes the Porphyriansystem as taking the first hypothesis to be about theOne above all things,9and the second as concerning the intelligible level of being (τ7 ν�"τ�νπλ$τ�ς), without any indication of the complexity of Porphyry’s positionas postulated here, but we may suspect him of over-simplifying thesituation. Proclus puts a positive gloss on Porphyry’s position, explainingthat he thinks it helps to bridge the gap between the two hypotheses asan opening leading to the second hypothesis.The third opinion, identified as Iamblichus10 by Dillon, says that the

conclusion contains everything.11 With his usual method for compar-ison, Proclus compares Porphyry, whose theory is piecemeal and eth-ical, with Iamblichus, whose opinion looks towards the metaphysicaltruths. Iamblichus argues that whenever something is said of the One,this attribute is added to it, putting the One in danger of being “particu-lar something” rather than simply One. To prevent this, Iamblichus saysthat the One contains all things as their cause. Any negation regardingthe One, then, does not mean non-existence, but refers to the One asseparate from its effect, but at the same time the cause of all existence.12Syrianus builds on Iamblichus but disagrees in a key area. Iamblichus

says that the One is an entity in itself; if anything should be attributedto it, such terms would subtract from and diminish the One. Syrianus,however, says that negative propositions are tied to the positive, in so faras identifying that theOne is not, is anotherway of attributing something

another. For a discussion of being in Porphyry and the One, see Smith () –.Damascius, reporting on Porphyry’s interpretation of the One, remarks how Porphyrymakes the Father connumeratedwith the intelligibles and calls the One the Father of thefirst noetic triad, but as ineffable cause it still surpasses everything (Dub. Et Sol. I, p. ,). Porphyry’s doctrine of the One is further complicated by the fact that statements inhis Philosophical History seem to contradict those in Damascius’ account (frs. –Smith). See Hadot () –.

9 Dillon, who, alongwithHadot, identifies the author ofTheAnonymousCommentaryon the Parmenides as Porphyry, points to fragment of that work as an example of theOne’s transcendence over Intellect. While the Intellect is different from the One, One isnot different from Intellect. Any traits such as Difference, would compromise the One’ssimplicity (IV, ff.). Cf. Dillon () .

10 Cf. Proclus, In Parm. .–. for Proclus’ discussion of the One beginningwith Amelius, Porphyry and ending with Iamblichus.

11 Iamblichus posits two Ones, the first a transcendent entity, the second, connectedto the henads. For Iamblichus on the One, cf. Proclus, In Parm. .ff.; Damascius,de Princip. I, , p. .ff.

12 Steel () , says that Iamblichus avoids the real problem of the text by takingthe τα5τα to refer, not to the conclusions, but to the attributes listed in the conclusions:“whole”, “totality”, “in itself ”, “in rest”.

commentary

to theOne—i.e., negative statements specifically say that theOne is otherthan all these things. At the intelligible level, Syrianus notes that we speak“ε�δητικ.ς”, meaning that negative statements can be specificatory (onthe level of the intelligible), rather than just negative; this approach looksback to themegista gene of the Sophist,13 where one type of being “is notto be”.14 At the intelligible level, each form has its own identity, so thatwe can say “is not” when speaking of rest, because it is not movement,or identity or difference. Each form is different and specific, but stillcommunicates with other forms.15 Terms trying to characterize the One,then, are specifics that do not affect the integrity of the One.In this passage, further, Syrianus discusses negation as it relates to

sensible objects. On the sensible level, a negative proposition implies areference to some reality for which we are denying the attributes. Unlikeintelligibles, which participate in each other, sensibles, being particularthings, are not in another. Syrianus gives the example that Socrates, beinga man as a particular thing, is not a horse and not a lion—he lacks thecharacters of lion and horse. Hence, negation at the sensible level is notspecificatory (like the forms, where negations maintains their identity),but privative.This does not mean that the One is not, it just means that One is other

than the listed negatives. The propositions about the One do not expressanything about it, rather, they express our conceptions of it, i.e., negationsof the One are the negations of our concepts about it. In other words, itseems that Syrianus credits negative statements with the samemetaphys-ical weight as positive statements—both are limited manners of express-ing the One.16 Syrianus distinguishes between referring to the One (περ-τ�5 6ν ς) and talking about the One (περ- τ7 4ν). The constructionwith the genitive indicates a discussion where the noun in the genitiveis the general subject matter, but does not imply anything about the sub-ject matter.The construction with the accusative, however, indicates thatsomething is being said about the subject matter in particular—such anaccusative construction is, according to Syrianus, impossible when the

13 Plato, Soph. E: “And we shall say that (the character of difference) pervades all(the forms)…” and E: “The characterof difference seems tome to have been parceledout.”

14 On the sensible level, a negative proposition implies a reference to some reality forwhich we are denying the attributes. Steel () .

15 Steel () .16 Steel credits Syrianus with being the first to understand A– “as a request to

deny all negations” () .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

“One” is the object in the accusative.17 Steel notes two parallels to Syr-ianus’ unusual distinction between περ- τ�5 6ν ς and περ- τ7 4ν in InParmenidesVII, .– and PlatonicTheology II, . p. .18 In the firstpassage, Proclus says,

“For that in fact we say nothing in the proper sense about the One (�π- τ�56ν7ς), we will hear the philosopher demonstrating a little later. Neverthe-less, we do talk about it (περ- αDτ�5) because of the natural striving of thesoul towards the One (περ- τ7 4ν).”

The first use of the genitive with �π- is rather like Syrianus’ use of περ-with the genitive, in so far as it indicates the impossibility of a discussionabout real qualities of the One. The second preposition, that of thegenitive with περ- however, is equivalent to Syrianus’ use of περ- τ76ν ς in line ; it indicates a discussion that merely refers to the One—such a discussion is entirely possible. The last use of a preposition withOne, περ- τ7 4ν, is similar to �π- τ�5 6ν7ς, as it indicates a discussionabout the nature of the One, which is impossible. This last prepositionaluse is attached to the soul’s revertive journey to the One; it is describedusing the accusative construction as the soul’s return is towards theOne’sabsolute Nature (see Proclus, In Parm. .). In Platonic Theology II, ,p. ,19 Proclus says,

“It is impossible to describe the One because it is indescribable, but what-ever you may say, you will say something and you will talk of it (περ- �κει-νRς) but not express it itself.”20

Use of περ- and the genitive denotes general reference to the One, butnot a discussion of its qualities—hence, this usage is similar to Syrianus’mode of describing speech and the One. Syrianus concludes: first, thatthe statements do not mean that the One is not; rather, the One is otherthan the listed negations. Second, Syrianus says that propositions about

17 For a grammatical explanation of this passage, see Steel () . Steel says thatthe construction with the genitive is used for titles of works, e.g., “on the soul” and in thetreatise of the sophist Gorgias, “περ- �Dδεν ς” “on nothing.” Klibansky and Labowskytranslate περ- plus the accusative as expressing something about the One () –.

18 Steel () .19 In Proclus, PT II, , Proclus uses περ� and the accusative (prefaced by alpha-

privative) to describe how discourse on the One is limited as it is “<περ�γρα(�ν”.According to Saffrey andWesterink, this word is rare in negative theology and appears inthe following passages: Proclus, In Parm. ., In Tim. I, p. .,DeDecemdub. §.incircumscriptibilem;De prov. §. incircumscriptibile. See Proclus,PT II, p. , note .

20 Trans. Steel () .

commentary

the One do not express anything about the One, but are merely ourconceptions of it.Other explanations for this lemma follow this section; however, they

do not appear to be attached to Syrianus. Proclus lists the following solu-tions, based in part on Syrianus’ explanation to the problem, (summa-rized in PlatonicTheology II,):

. .ff.: Proclus interprets the phrase, “these things are not possible(δυνατ ν)” to indicate that the One cannot be credited with thepower (δCναμις) of generation, since it transcends such an activity.

. .ff.: This solution shows how the soul approaches the Onethrough a mystical ascent in which it must leave behind dialecticalenterprise.

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 11

Damascius,De Princ. ch. , II p. , –W-C

4ν ε� Oστιν, �ρα �F�ν τε αDτ7 ε`ναι μ)ν, �Dσ�ας δε μ" μετ)Aειν; �Dκ �F ντε. [Parm. B–].

�Αλλ� μHν τ7 8νωμ)ν�ν, 3λλ� δH τ7 4ν, [ς δε�κνυσι Πλ$των κα- 8 κ�ι-ν" Oνν�ια πρ�σαπαιτε9. τ7 γ+ρ 8νωμ)ν�ν τ�ι�5τ ν �στιν �F�ν πεπ�ν-*7ς τ7 4ν. αDτ7 δH l μ ν�ν yν �π$ρAει �πHρ τ7 8νωμ)ν�νG �D μ)ντ�ι<π)σπασται τ7 4τερ�ν τ�5 6τ)ρ�υ παντελ.ς, <λλ+ τ�5 6ν7ς μετ)Aει τ78νωμ)ν�ν. OAει τιν+ 3ρα μεταUV τ.ν δC� σA)σιν *εωρ�υμ)νην, �F�νσCνδεσιν τ.ν 3κρων τα5τα �(εURςG τ7 8νωμ)ν�ν, 8 σA)σις, τ7 4ν, κα-�πHρ τ7 yν Oσται μ�α <ρA0, τ7 3ρρητ�ν. αQ δH λεγ μεναι δC� 4ν τε κα-8 σA)σις, a �στιν 8 δCναμις (πρ?τη γ+ρ 8 δCναμις σA)σεων >πασ.ν)Gτρ�τ�ν δH E ν�5ς κα- �περ xν <νυμν�5μεν. 'αλλ’ α]τη μHν 8 <π δει-Uις Συριαν1. τε κα- Πρ κλ1ω γ)γραπται ε�ς τ7ν| Παρμεν�δηνG τ7 γ+ρ 4ν�στ�ν �ν <ρASR τι*)μεν�ν τRς δευτ)ρας �π�*)σεως τ"ν τρι$δα σημα�-νειν.

If the one is, can it be and not partake of being? No, it cannot.

The Unified is one thing, the One, another, as Plato shows, and as com-mon opinion demands as well. For the Unified is something such as hasoneness as an attribute, while that which is simply One exists prior to theUnified. The one, however, is not detached from the other completely,but the Unified participates in the One. There is, then, a certain relationperceived between the two, as it were a binding together of the extremes,these things forming a sequence: the Unified, the Relation, the One, andbeyond theOne there will be a unique principle, the Ineffable.The thingsthat are spoken of as two are the One and the relation, which is potency(for this potency is the first of all bonds.) Third comes Intellect and thevery thing which we celebrate as Being. This is the exegesis presentedby Syrianus and Proclus in their commentary on the Parmenides; for theexpression “theOne is”, placed in the beginning of the second hypothesis,signifies this triad.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Commentary

Damascius, in discussing the number of principles which exist before thenoetic triad, comes to the lemma in Parmenides B–: “Oν ε� Oστιν,�ρα �Q�ν τε αDτ7 ε`ναι μ)ν, �Dσ�ας δε μ" μετ)Aειν;”—the opening ofthe Second Hypothesis. Here, he explains that the subject of the secondhypothesis is the One as the unified principle, the lowest element of thehenadic realm and highest of the noetic realm.1 He presents Syrianus’interpretation of this, which amounts to a description of the first hyposta-sis in the form of two triads: ) the One, the unified (henomenon) andthe bond between them; and ) the unified, nous and the bond betweenthem.Syrianus first presents the relationship between the One and the Uni-

fied; while the two are separate entities, they are related in so far as theunified participates in the One. This participation is a relation betweenthe two, relating the two extremes of the One—the pure One at the sum-mit, while the unified One functions at the lowest point, which is alsothe highest level of the noetic realm.2 This henomenon is a unified prod-uct of the syndesis. Beyond the One is an ineffable principle. WhetherSyrianus actually presents a doctrine of two Ones seems rather doubt-ful, as we do not hear about it in other writings. It is possible, then, thateither Damascius deliberately interpolates his own concept of the Oneinto his discussion of Syrianus, or that he is presenting two aspects ofthe One—One as immanent, relating to the henadic world, and One astranscendent.The triad presented here bears a resemblance to Iamblichus’ picture of

the One (which Damascius likewise borrows from Iamblichus). In Dub.et Sol. (I p. , Ruelle), Damascius presents Iamblichus’ theory of thetwo Ones: the first One is ineffable, the second One presides over thedyad of Limit and Unlimitedness. In ch. (I , ff.), Damascius saysthe following of Iamblichus’ One:

1 Damascius’ first intelligible triad occurs in a number of passages in De Princ.,especially in (iii. –): De prim. princ. (iii..–). The first intelligibletriad is marked by the unity between its three parts, which makes it, on the one handsimilar to aspects of unity within the trinity of the Cappadocian Fathers, but still quitedifferent as the henadic realm transcends distinction. Dillon discusses the henomenon asthe ultimate moment of the henadic realm in () .

2 See Proclus, PT III, , p. .– where Proclus discusses the triad in the begin-ning of the second hypothesis, whereby One is connected with Being via One-Being.Proclus seems to adapt Syrianus’ view as depicted in this passage.

commentary

“For, indeed the one first principle is prior to the two; and this is the “simplyOne”, which Iamblichus postulates in between the two first principles andthat absolutely ineffable (first principle). These two principles may betermed Limit and theUnlimited, or if one wishes, One andMany, the ‘One’here to be taken as ‘One’ as opposed to ‘Many’, not the One which is priorto both these and has nothing opposed to it.”3

Dillon notes that the henomenon is themikton resulting from the unionof peras and apeiria.4 Damascius, likewise, posits the following chain:the Ineffable, the One, Limit-Unlimit, followed by the unified. As inIamblichus’ chain, there is no relationship between the ineffable and theunified.Damascius next shifts the argument to report a second triad (, ff.):

henomenon, and Being, and the relationship (skhesis) between the two.Damascius reports that Syrianus calls the relationship a dynamis, whichacts as the second “person”. He also reports that the third person, Being,can be called nous. This second trinity of Syrianus’, then, resembles thatwhich is found in Porphyry’s doctrine of the One.In Dub. et Sol. ch. (I , Ruelle), Damascius presents Porphyry

on this triad, reporting that “the single first principle of all things is theFather of the noetic triad”.5 This refers to Porphyry’s doctrine of the Oneas the Father of the intelligible triad of Being, Life, and Intellect and as theOne, generator of all being.Thehead of the noeticworld is the Fatherwhois also the One, viewed in a different way. Porphyry’s first hypostasis is acondensed version of what later becomes expanded into several layers, aswe see in Syrianus’s metaphysics. Dillon notes in his paper, “What Pricethe Father of the Noetic Triad? Some Thoughts on Porphyry’s Doctrineof the First Principle”6 that Syrianus’ triad differs from this PorphyrianOne in so far as it is tempered by the first triad Syrianus mentions: One,henomenon, skhesis. Thus, by juxtaposing the two triads he makes clearthat the henomenon, as first principle (or father) of the noetic triad, is notthe pure One, in which it participates. Dillon also notes that dynamis,the skhesis between One (henomenon) and Being (nous), functions as agenerative force which allows for creation, which Being, or Intellect, as areflective element, cannot provide.

3 Trans.: Dillon () .4 See Dillon () . See Proclus, In Tim. I, , f., on Iamblichus and the second

One and the Dyad of peras and apeiria.5 Translation Dillon ().6 Dillon () .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 12

Damascius, In Parm. ch. , II p. , –W-C

<λλ’ εhπερ γ), �`μαι, Oστιν, <ν$γκη αDτ7 <ε�, 4ωσπερ dν Sm, 4ν γ) τι ε`ναι,μηδHν δH <δCνατ�ν. [Parm. c–].

�Ενατ�ν, τ� τ7 4ν γ) τι σημα�νει, κα- τ7 τ- πρ�σκε�μεν�ν; �Αρα �τι<ντ�κειται τ1. �DδHν τ7 τ� [ς Π�ρ(Cρι�ς, v �τι τ7 τ� δηλ�9 τ7 με*εκτ7ν4ν. ε�a γ+ρ yν τ7 <μ)*εκτ�ν τ7 με*εκτ7ν τ� 4νG gμα γ+ρ τ� κα- με*εκτ ν,l σημα�νει τ7 τ�, [ς E (ιλ σ�(�ς Συριαν ς.

a ε�Westerink: 'ε� A

Commentary

In his commentary on Parmenides C , Damascius asks what ismeant by One with a ‘some’ added to it (Oν γε τι), a ninth question ina series of ten questions on A– C , which Damascius takesto be a discourse on the summit of the noetic-noeric realm. In Parm.. represents Damascius’ enquiry into the significance of the τι. In ascholastic analysis of τι, Damascius accepts Syrianus’ solution that this“some” when added to the One seems to be specificatory. Damasciusfirst cites Porphyry’s opinion, saying that the some (One) is opposite tosaying that it is nothing—this is dismissed as too simple.1 Next, he givesSyrianus’ opinion, that the “some” indicates a participated One.

1 Westerink notes () , lines –, p. a parallel attributed to Porphyry (=fr. Smith, ). Here, the “some One”, an affirmative, has its contradiction with “thenot someOne”, the universal negative, in this sense �D τι. See Hadot () –; ; and note ; Dillon () and Iamblichus, In Parm, fr. Dillon. Dillon says thatthe interpretation of Porphyry gives the literal sense of the expression ‘Oν γε τι.’ Porphyryconsiders this phrase in opposition towhat immediately follows in the text of Plato (Parm. C –).

But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; itcannot be nothing.

Ninthly, what is the significance of “someone at least” (ge) and specificallythe “some”which is attached? Is it that the “some” is opposed to “nothing”,as Porphyry says? Or is it that the “some” indicates the participated One?For if the One is imparticipable, the participated is “some One”. For it isat the same time “some” and “participated” that is signified by the “some”,as the philosopher Syrianus [says].

Syrianus argues that τι indicates a participated One (μ)*εκτ�ν). Hesays that if the unparticipated One is One simply, then the participatedOne must be “some One”. The “some One” and the participated One arethus synonymous, according to Syrianus. Thus, Syrianus shows that theOne can be simple or participated, in so far as the participated One isparticipated in by Being, for instance.In p. , ff., Damascius quotes Iamblichus on this topic, who sees

the τι as signifying a particular One.2 It is rather difficult to see whatthe difference is between them—Iamblichus gives a more detailed anal-ysis, explaining the process of individualisation leading to the world ofindividuals. Iamblichus says that following “simply each thing”, there isa particular x—after “simply One”, there is the “particular One”. Theseparticular ones should be applied, each particular one to its correspond-ing particular being. This theory relates to the Iamblichean concept ofthe henads, each individual henad having an analogue in every sphere ofexistence, here the sphere of being. The “some”, then, qualifies how theOne refers to a henadic entity.

2 Dillon uses this fragment as Iamblichus, In Parm. fr. Dillon. Cf. Iamblichus’comments on a above, pp. –. He dismisses τι there also.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

The question of how Damascius gains access to this teaching of Syri-anus is of interest. While he usually quotes Syrianus with Proclus, in thisfragment he bypasses Proclus, instead using Syrianus before he relays fur-ther information about Iamblichus. It appears that Damascius is doingeither one of two things here: ) either he has access to commentaries ofSyrianus unavailable to us or ) he could, as modern commentators ofthe Platonists do, infer from Proclus’ text whom Proclus is referring to,and present those names as if they were stated in the text itself. In addi-tion, if Damascius were supposed to be using a commentary of Syrianus’,this would prove that there was such a commentary—alas, however, thisis just speculation.

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 13

Damascius, In Parm. ch. , III, p. , –W-C

Sp μHν 3ρα τ7 yν �λ�ν, �ν 3λλ1ω �στ�νG Sp δH τ+ π$ντα μ)ρη =ντα τυγA$νει,αDτ7 �ν 6αυτ1.G κα- �]τω τ7 yν <ν$γκη αDτ τε �ν 6αυτ1ω ε`ναι κα- �ν6τερ1ω. [Parm. e –].

Β)λτι�ν �Pν τ"ν τ�5 (ιλ�σ (�υ Συριαν�5 *αυμασ�αν �πι��λ"ν �κδ)-Aεσ*αι, [ς τρι.ν �Dσ.ν �πιστρ�(.ν 8 μHν πρ7ς τ7 Aε9ρ�ν �DδHνπρ�σ0κει τ1. ν1. (3λλως τε (α�η dν κα- τ1. Κρ ν1ω)G

�D γ+ρ �ς ]λην π5ρ �π)κεινα τ7 πρ.τ�ν 6"ν δCναμιν κατακλε�ειG

8 δH ε�ς 6αυτ7ν κα- ε�ς τ7 κρε9ττ�ν κα- π$νυ hδι�ςG Yν τ"ν μHν 8 �ν α�τ1.,τ"ν δH 8 �ν 3λλ1ω δηλ�9 κατηγ�ρ�α, κα- δ" δι+ τ�5τ� κρε9ττ�ν ε`ναι τ7�ν 3λλ1ω τ�5 �ν 6αυτ1..

Commentary

This discussion of “in itself and in another” is part of Damascius’ sixthquestion on Parmenides B–E, which represents, in Syrianus’ sys-tem, the first intellective order. In his discussion on the sixth question,Damascius contrasts his interpretation with that of Proclus, whom hedismisses, preferring the view of Syrianus, who understands the text bea discourse on the first order of the intellectuals; not only is the intellec-tual cosmos demiurgic, but the Demiurge contains within himself all theelements of the universe.1

1 Opsomer gives an account of how Proclus connects the Demiurge (who impartsintellect to the cosmos) with intellect () .

Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other; and inasmuch as it isall its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.

Therefore, it is better to accept the excellent notion of the philosopherSyrianus that there being three types of conversion, that which turnstowards the worse is not suitable to Intellect—otherwise, as he might sayof Kronos:

“For the primary fire which is beyond does not enclose its power as far asMatter.” (Or. Chald. Fr. )

But the conversion into itself and into the better is entirely proper to him;and of these the former is categorised by “in itself ”, while the latter iscategorised by “in another”, and indeed for this reason is superior to the“in itself.”

Damascius discusses Proclus, whohe says has already refuted the oldercommentators. In p. , – Proclus says that “in itself ” refers to theimplacable order of gods (<μ)ιλεκτ�ι) (see In Parm. fr. below).Damascius gives a thorough exposé of Proclus’ statement on the im-

placable gods in his response to the third question.2 Here, Damasciuscritiques Proclus’ divine hebdomad, which Damascius refuses to find inthe Parmenides. Proclus’ interpretation focuses on the Demiurge, takinga broad approach to the intellective universe, which is demiurgic as theDemiurge containswithin himall orders of the universe. For this passage,the association of Kronos with “in another” is notable, as Damasciuskeeps this identification.

2 Damascius, In Parm. III. p. .ff.

syrianus, in parm. fr.

Damascius’ interpretation of Proclus seems to have been borrowedeither directly from Platonic Theology V, p. .–. and VI, p. .–, or is based on the teachings imparted there. In this chapter,Proclus argues that there are two kinds of reversion:3 to self and toanother. Reversion to another is considered superior to reversion to selfbecause reversion to another always implies reversion to a higher entity.4This argument is based on Proclus’ premise that divine entities can onlyrevert to higher entities, whichmeans that when they are in another, theyare actually partaking in a higher rank.5 Kronos, the intellectual fatherand primal intellect, reverts to those above him because they contain thepowers which he uses. Proclus elaborates that “in another” is excellentbecause an entity pertains to a higher entity as a whole, while an entitypertains to itself only in parts.Damascius finds it better to accept the opinion of Syrianus, who gives

amoremetaphysical interpretation than that of his student. Syrianus saysthat “in itself ” and “in another” refer to three types of epistrophe properto the summit of the noetic world: towards the inferior, towards itself,and towards the superior.6 Damascius reports that Syrianus says that thefirst, inferior type of reversion has nothing to do with intellect, citing thetranscendence of Kronos. He quotes the Oracles (Or. Chald. .– p. Majercik), to the effect that the first principle is not immediately related tomatter and reversion is to oneself and other. Syrianus thus interprets “inoneself ” as signifying epistrophe towards oneself—Nous reverts towardsbeing and to self, but also to something higher. What Plato means by “inanother”, according to Syrianus, is reversion towards somethinghigher—“in another” is the superior reversion. Although Damascius reports that

3 Proclus, PT V, .ff.4 Proclus, ET –: “anything which revertsmay revert either upon itself or upon

the superior principle.” Trans. Dodds ().5 Proclus, In Alc. .: “But reversion to the inferior is a misfortune of the soul that

has ‘shed its wings’ and fallen into forgetfulness both of itself and at the same time of whatprecedes it; whereas reversion both upon self and upon the superior principle occurs notonly in souls but also among the divine beings”; and further, ff.: “Parmenides informsus, positing two kinds of reversion, and showing how on the one hand the divine is turnedback upon itself and exists in itself, and how on the other hand it reverts to what precedesit, in which respect it is both embraced with another and united with the superior gradeof being.” Trans. O’Neill ().

6 Cf. Proclus, In Alc. .–: “Now there are three kinds of reversion: everything thatreverts either reverts to what is inferior to itself by falling away from its own perfection,or is elevated to what is superior through its own life and natural activity, or revertsupon itself according to the knowledge that is coordinate itself, and the middle form ofmovement.” Trans. O’Neill ().

commentary

Syrianus lists three kinds of reversion, he focuses on two which are mostimportant for divine kinds:7 reversion to self and reversion to another.This is certainly in line with what we hear about Syrianus from Proclusin Platonic Theology V, , where Proclus reports Syrianus’ statementon divine beings existing “in itself ” and “in another”. Syrianus says that“another” pertains to the first triad as the source of paternal power. Allintellectual gods are united to the intelligible-intellectual gods as theyrevert back to them.Damascius corrects this (μ0π�τε), arguing that “not in itself ” should

not mean something superior but refers to the relationship towardsinferior things. This reversion to inferior things marks Kronos’ (fatherof first noeric triad) reversion to himself and thus begins the reversionto inferior things to which Kronos relates in a transcendental way (p. –). Damascius thus alters Syrianus’ account in twoways: ) he placesKronos in the category of “in another” only, as opposed to Syrianus, whoplaces him in the categories of—what he calls—the second and thirdreversions (both “in itself ” and “in another” respectively); ) Damasciusidentifies “in another” with the reversion to lower things.This fragment also provides a nice comparison between Syrianus’

teaching on a topic and Proclus’. Chiefly, Syrianus’ discussion on rever-sion starts offwith three categories, although the teaching quickly focuseson the last two kinds, reversion “in itself ” and “in another”. By the timewe get to Proclus, the first of the three reversions has been abandonedand we hear about two, both in Damascius’ account of Proclus and inProclus’ Platonic Theology, although the three reversions do crop up inProclus’ Commentary on the Alcibiades.

7 Proclus, In Alc. .–: “… as Parmenides informs us, positing two kinds ofreversion, and showing how on the one hand the divine is turned back upon itself andexists in itself, and how on the other hand, it reverts to what precedes it…” Trans. O’Neill().

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 14

Damascius, In Parm. ch. , III p. , –W-C

<ν$γκη 3ρα τ7 4ν, αDτ τε �ν 6αυτ1. <ε- xν κα- �ν 6τερ1ω, <ε- κινε9σ*α�τε κα- 6στ$ναι. [Parm. a–].

'Αλλ+ τ�ς 8 στ$σις κα- τ�ς 8 κ�νησις; τ�5τ� γ+ρ mν τ)ταρτ�ν τ.ν πρ��ε-�λημ)νων. �Αρα 8 στ$σις E <με�λικτ�ς, �ςa Oστι τ�Cτ�υ τ�5 ν�5; Oσται3ρα κ�νησις μ ν�ν 8 �ω�γ ν�ς [8]b *ε ς; κα�τ�ι [ς κα- πρ σ*εν �λ)-γ�μεν, 6κ$στη <ντ�*εσις 6κ$στ�υ 6ν7ς κατηγ�ρε9ται. �)λτι�ν 3ρα [ς E(ιλ σ�(�ς Συριαν ς �π- τ�5 αDτ�5 ν�5 6κ$τερ�ν <κ�Cειν, �πειδ" κα-<ν$γκη τ7 κιν�Cμεν�ν 6στ7ς �]τω κινε9σ*αιG κα- Oστιν <ντ- μHν τ�5 �ν6αυτ1. τ7 6στ$ναι, <ντ- δH τ�5 �ν 3λλ1ω τ7 κινε9σ*αι.

a :ςWesterink: Mς (in ras.) A b � del. Westerink.

Commentary

This regards question four on rest and motion: ‘what is rest and motionand which is superior.’ This fragment is connected to In Parm. fr. abelow, which is a fragment from question four of the same lemma.Damascius offers Proclus’ response first:“Is stasis the implacable god who is attached to this Intellect? Will motionbe only the vivifying goddess?”

According to Proclus, rest represents the implacable level of gods,1 whilemotion refers to Rhea, the vivifying deity. Damascius criticises this,claiming that each oppositionmust be attributed to both causes, whereas

1 Proclus, PT V, , p. .–.

Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be inmotion and at rest.

But, what then is repose or movement? This was the fourth amongthe problems. Is repose the implacable god, who is attached to thisIntellect? And so will motion be only the vivifying goddess? And yet,as we said earlier, each opposition is affirmed of each one. Better then, asthe philosopher Syrianus [said], to understand that motion and rest referto the same intellect, since it is necessary that the thing being moved ismoved after having been in repose; and it is possible to relate being ‘initself ’ to ‘repose’ (or ‘motion’), and being ‘in another’ to motion.

Proclus divides the antithesis, attributing one to one level of Being,another to another.2Next, we have Syrianus’ solution the problem: it is better to understand

rest and motion as referring to the same intellect. This solution saysthat both rest and motion refer to the primal intellect, just viewed in adifferent way. Rest refers to “in oneself ”, whilemotion to “in another”, butboth to Kronos as the primary intellect. Such a connection is possible, hefurther explains, because what is moved is moved from a state of repose.This connection of all levels of being is found in Iamblichus’ explanationof “in itself ” and “in another”, which is referred to as two aspects of onething. Iamblichus’ explanation of “in itself ” and “in another”, as reportedby Damascius in the thirteenth problem, unites both as describing theIntellect:

2 Westerink and Combès () , note .

syrianus, in parm. fr.

“… and the phrase ‘itself in itself and in another’ demonstrates the syn-thesis of the antithesis; for ‘in itself ’ and ‘in another’ are not two states,but the two are one, and the dyad here a monad, and what is ‘in itself ’ is‘in another’; and what is ‘in another’ is ‘in itself ’; for thus does the greatIamblichus draw the whole antithesis into one unified conception.”3

It seems that Syrianus, in this respect, follows Iamblichus’ line of argu-ment, while Proclus deviates from the teaching of his master on the sub-ject. Combès notes Syrianus’ similarity to Iamblichus, and attributes Pro-clus’ separation of the Parmenidean opposites as an innovation meant toconform better to his demiurgic hebdomad.4Damascius suggests the following solution, introducing an additional

complexity:“Perhaps, the primal intellect was of the unique form, of the indivisible andof the substantial form, as expressed by the substance of the intellect, butthe second in proceeding and being divided from itself is vital, is seen to bethe sort subsisting in procession and on account of this it is in motion andin repose, just as the third, the entire procession of intellect already havingcome forward, is differentiated in sameness and otherness. But the secondis differentiated in repose and in motion, but the first is undifferentiated,as is said of nous, consisting in a unified division.”5

Damascius argues that: ) the primal intellect is both unitary and essen-tial and ) that motion and rest can be viewed more distinctly withrespect to Rhea, not Kronos.

3 Damascius,Dub et Sol. II, , – (= Iamblichus, In Parm. fr. b Dillon). Trans.Dillon ().

4 Damascius, In Parm. III, p. , note .5 (= Iamblichus, In Parm. fr. b Dillon). Trans. Dillon ().

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 14A

Damascius, In Parm. ch. , III p. , –

ΔεCτερ�ν δ), ε� �ν τ1. δημι�υργ1. τ+ γ)νη τ�5 =ντ�ς Wδρυται, [ς _U��υE μ)γας 'Ι$μ�λ�A�ς, μ^λλ�ν δH κα- E τ�Cτ�υ Xπαδ7ς Συριαν ς, [ςν5ν Qστ�ρε9 κα- αDτ ς, τ1. κα*ηγεμ νι συν)πεσ*αι Eμ�λ�γ.ν, κα�τ�ι3λλ�*ι π�λλαA�5 κα- �ν τ�9ς πρ7 τ�5 δημι�υργ�5 τα5τα τι*)μεν�ς.

Commentary

This addresses Parmenides E –A–being in motion and at rest.While it is not immediately obvious what the γεν0 τ�5 =ντ�ς have todo with motion and rest, both concern the middle order, making itnecessary to inquire about the Parmenidean categories of the genres ofbeing. Namely, are Sameness andOtherness genera of being, and if so, arethey in theDemiurge or superior to theDemiurge? I have added an “a” tothe numbering of this fragment, for one, to connect it with its corollary,but also to qualify it: while Syrianus appears here, he appears in a mostambiguous way—a situation not helped by the fact that Syrianus does notappear in Damascius’ answer to the question.Regarding themiddle order of the intellective world, Damascius poses

fifteen questions on the characteristics proper to the middle triad. Thesecond of these questions asks if the genera of being are established inthe demiurge. Damascius first states the opinion of Iamblichus, followedby that of Syrianus: Damascius makes clear that Syrianus is a followerof Iamblichus, and bases this relationship on Proclus’ authority. Syrianushere is said to agree with Iamblichus, which is, to Proclus, an unusualproposition; Proclus neither links his teacher with Iamblichus, nor doeshe represent Syrianus approving of Iamblichus by name. For Iamblichuson this question, Dillon outlines Iamblichus’ view of the Demiurge inhis collection of Iamblichus on the Timaeus. In In Tim. fr. Dillon,

The second question is whether the classes of Being are established in theDemiurge, as was the view of the great Iamblichus, and indeed also of hisfollower Syrianus, as he himself (sc. Proclus) now tells us, admitting thathe is following his master, although in many contexts he places them alsoin the realms above the Demiurge.1

Iamblichus describes how the Demiurge embraces within himself thegenera of being, as he comprises the whole noetic world.2The “αDτ ς” in line is ambiguous, although I, like Dillon, assume it

refers to Proclus,3 this being Damascius’ way of referring to him.Damascius’ reply is much more complicated and it is difficult to say

whether Syrianus is in the background of the metaphysics presentedhere. Damascius says that genera of being are in both the intelligible-intellective realm and in the intelligibles themselves. While all exists inthe Demiurge (who comprises Intellect), each appears in different waysthe various realms.This, presumably, is a modification of Proclus’ propo-sition that theOne exists in all things, and each receives it according to itsown capacity. Most importantly, while Damascius’ reply actually refers toProclus, the fragment is important because it indicates either that Dam-ascius has access to Syrianus through Proclus or that he has access to acommentary by Syrianus.

1 Trans. Dillon (). Damascius,Dub. et Sol. II , ff. (= Syrianus, In Parm. aWear).

2 Cf. Proclus, PT V, , p. .–.3 Dillon () .

SYRIANUS, IN PARM. FR. 15

Damascius,Dub. et Sol. section , III p. .–

τ7 yν ε� Oστιν �F�ν διεληλC*αμεν, �ρ’ �Dκ <ν$γκη αDτ , 4ν τε xν κα-π�λλ+ κα- μ0τε yν μ0τε π�λλ+ κα- μετ)A�ν δρ ν�υ, �τι μεν Oστιν 4ν,�Dσ�ας μετ)Aειν π�τ), �τι δ’ �Dκ Oστι, μ" μετ)Aειν αP π�τε �Dσ�ας;<ν$γκη. [Parm e, –].

τ7 τ��νυν π)μπτ�ν nδη μεν κα- αDτ1. μ�ι �δ κει, ε]ρισκ�ν δε κα-τ7ν (ιλ σ�(�ν Συριαν7ν ��υλ μεν�ν κα- τ+ς 3λλας �π�*)σις κα- τ+3ρ*ρα διαιρε9,cσπερ τ"ν δευτ)ρανG ε�πMν δε <π)λειπεν τ"ν δια�ρεσιν.Μ0π�τε �Pν 4U εhδη ψυA.ν �ν τ�Cτ�ις παραδ�δωσιν E Παρμεν�δης.

Commentary

Damascius discusses the third hypothesis, a commentary on In Parm. E, the Onewhich is one andmany and neither one normany in time.More particularly, Damascius is likely commenting on Proclus’ lost com-mentary on the third hypothesis, summarised in In Parm. .1 Damas-cius follows Proclus in identifying the subject matter of the third hypoth-esis as the realm of the particular soul.2 In this fragment, Damascius

1 “As for the third, it is not about all Soul pure and simple, but such as have proceededforth from the divine Soul; for the whole divine Soul is comprised in the second hypothe-sis. For Plato himself has clearly stated that the One partakes also of Time; and partakingof Time is the property first of souls, and not of intellectual beings, among whom thereis neither ‘was’ nor ‘will be’, but the eternal ‘is’.” Trans. Dillon ().

2 Iamblichus differs from most of the post-Plotinian philosophers by identifying thesubject of the third hypothesis as the ‘superior classes’, that is, intermediate beings suchas angels and daemons. Damascius’ interpretation of the third hypothesis is summarisedin section § of Dub. et Sol., where the skopos is Proclus’ interpretation, that the “souldescends to becoming and ascends out of becoming.”

If the one is, such as we have described it, being both one and many andneither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is,sometimes partake of being and again, because one is not, sometimes notpartake of being? Yes, it must.

On the fifth question I already had my own view, but I discovered thatthe philosopher Syrianus proposed to divide up the other hypothesesand their sections, just as he had the second one, but having said that,he abandoned the division. So wemay suggest that Parmenides proposesthe six classes of souls in this passage.

credits Syrianus with wishing to divide the third hypothesis like thesecond and for identifying levels of the psychic realm, but laments thathe does not seem to have delivered on this promise. Regarding Syrianus’philosophy, this fragment is interesting as it indicates that Syrianus atleast envisaged multiple levels of Soul, even if he did not have the energyto pursue the matter.

ABBREVIATIONS OFWORKS FREQUENTLY CITED

i) Damascius

Dub. et Sol. Dubitationes et Solutiones in Platonis Parmenidem, ed.C.A. Ruelle, (Paris, )

In Parm. Commentaire du Parménide de Platon, ed. L.G. West-erink and J. Combès. vols. (Paris, )

PH Philosophical History, trans. P. Athanassiadi (Athens,)

ii) Iamblichus

Iamblichi Chalcidensis Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commen-tariorum Fragmenta, ed. J. Dillon (Leiden, )

iii) Plotinus

Enn. Enneads, trans. A.H. Armstrong, vols. (Cambridge,Mass, –)

iv) Proclus

In Alc. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, ed.L.G. Westerink. (Amsterdam. )

In Parm. Procli Commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem, inProcli Opera Inedita, ed. V. Cousin, pp. –Morrow-Dillon, Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’sParmenides, trans. G. Morrow and J. Dillon (Princeton,)

In Parm. VII Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem, pars ultimaadhuc inedita, interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeke, ed.R. Klibansky, L. Labowsky (London, )

In Tim. In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii, ed. E. Diehl. vols.(Leipzig, –)

ET Proclus, Elements of Theology. ed with translation andcommentary by E.R. Dodds (Oxford, )

PT Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, ed. H.-D. Saffrey andL.G. Westerink. vols. (Paris, –)

abbreviations of works frequently cited

v) Syrianus

In Met. In Metaphysica Commentaria (Commentaria inAristotelem Graeca, VI:), ed. W. Kroll (Berlin, )Syrianus, On Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ – and –(Ithaca, –) trans. Dominic O’Meara and JohnDillon (London, )

vi) Others

SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim. vols. (Leipzig, –)

OF Orphicorum Fragmenta, ed. O. Kern. (Berlin, )Or. Chald. Oracles chaldaïques. Avec un choix de commentaires

anciens, ed. É. Des Places (Paris, )

BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. Primary Sources

AlcinousThe Handbook of Platonism, translated with an introduction and commentary byJ. Dillon (Oxford, )

AnonymousAnonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, ed. G. Bechtle (Bern, )Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon, ed. L.G. Westerink (Paris, )

AtticusFragments, ed. E. Des Places (Paris, )

Chaldean OraclesOracles Chaldaïques avec un choix de commentaries anciens, trans. E. des Places,(Paris, )

CiceroTusculan Disputations, trans. J.E. King (London, )

DamasciusDamascii Dubitationes et Solutiones. De primis principiis In Parmenidem, ed.C.E. Ruelle, (Paris, )

Damascii vitae Isidori reliquiae, ed. C. Zinzen (Hildesheim, )Damascius: Commentaire de Parménide de Platon, trans. L.G.Westerink, J. Com-bès volumes, (Paris, –)

Damascius, Traité des premiers principes, volumes, trans. L.G. Westerink, J.Combès (Paris, –)

The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo II: Damascius, trans. L.G. Westerink(Amsterdam, )

Damascius,The Philosophical History, trans. P. Athanassiadi (Athens, )

Diogenes LaertiusLives, Teachings, and Sayings of Famous Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks (–)

EuclidThirteen Books of Euclid, trans. T. Heath (Cambridge, )

GalenDe Semine ed. P. De Lacy (Berlin, )Πρ�ς Γα�ρν περ τ� π�ς �μψυ��ται τ� �μ�ρυα K. Kalbfleisch, Abhandl.Der Königl. Preuß. Ak. Der Wiss. ()

bibliography

HermeiasHermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum scholia, ed. P. Couvreur (Paris,)

HesiodTheTheogony, trans. H.G. Evelyn-White (Cambridge, Mass., )

HippolytusRefutatio omnium haeresium, ed by Miroslav Marcovich. (Berlin, )

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INDEX OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS AND NAMES

Albinus, , , Amelius, , , , , , , ,, , ,

Atticus, , , , ,

Being (to on), , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, –, , , –beings, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,, , , , , ,, , , , , ,

Essential Living Being, , , ,,

Intelligible Living Being, , ,,

One-Being, , , , , ,–, , –, ,,

Chrysippus, , , ,

Deamons (daimones), , , ,,

Demiurge, –, , , , , ,, –, , , , , , ,, –, , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , –, , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , demiurges, , , ,

Embryo, –Eternity, , , , , , , ,, , , , –, ,, , , , , –

Evil, , , –,

Forms, , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , ,, , –, , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , ,

Gods, , , , , , , , ,, , , , –, , , ,, , , , –, , , ,, , , , , –,, , , –, , ,, , , , , , ,, , , anagogic gods, , connective gods, , encosmic gods, , , , ,, , , ,

generative gods, , , guardian class, , , ,

Henads, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , ,

Henomenon, , , , , , ,,

Hermias, , , , , hexad, , , , Homer, , , ,

Iamblichus, , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,

index of philosophical terms and names

Iamblichus (continued), , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , ,

Indirect speech, , intellective realm (Noeric), , , ,, , , , , , –,, , , , , , ,intellective gods, , , ,,

intellective-intellect, intelligible-intellective, , , ,, , , ,

intellective triad, , , , ,

intellectual hebdomad, , ,

intelligible realm (Noetic), , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , –, passim.Essential Living Being, , intelligible forms, , intelligible gods, , , , ,

Intelligible Living Being, , ,

intelligible triad, , , , ,,

Kronos, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,,

Limit (peras), , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , –,, ,

Matter, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , forms in mater, –, ,, , , ,

Mixing bowl (krater), –Moderatus, ,

Neopythagorean, , –, –, –, , ,

Nicomachus of Gerasa, , , Numenius, , , , , , ,

One, One and multiplicity, –

One and spatial extension, –,–

One and structure of the Par-menides, –One and Unified, –

One-Being, –One: wholes and parts, –Topic of the Parmenides, –Transcendent One, , –,–

Orphism, , , , , –, ,, , , , ,

Ouranos, , , , –

Paradigm, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, ,

Phanes, , , , , , Plotinus, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , ,

Plutarch of Athens, , , , Porphyry, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , ,

Pythagoras, , , , , ,

index of philosophical terms and names

Rhea, , , , , , , , ,, , ,

Soul, , , , , , , –,, , , –, , ,, , , –allotment of souls to bodies, ,, , , , ,

circles of Same and Other, –, –

circuits of the soul, –,–

Individual Souls, , , –,, , , , , , , ,, , , , , ,,

Procession (under soul)Return (under soul)Sameness (under soul)

Vehicle, –

Theurgy, –Time, , –, , , , –, –, , –, –, , –, –Day and night, , –Eternity (aeon), , , , , ,, , , , , –, , , , , ,, , , –

Unlimitedness (apeiria), , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,, , , , , ,

Zeus, , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , ,, , ,

INDEX OF PASSAGES FROM ANCIENT AUTHORS

AlcinuousDidask.

Atticus (ed. Des Places)Fr.

AugustineDe civ. Deiiii. x. ,

DamasciusDe princ. (ed. Weterink-Combès)I, , I, , , I, , I, I, , I, , II, , – II, ,

In Parmen.II, , Ruelle II, , – Ruelle

II, , Ruelle II, , Ruelle II, , – Ruelle

II, , –. Ruelle

II, , Ruelle II, , – Ruelle

II, , – Ruelle II, , Ruelle II, , Ruelle

II, , Ruelle II, , Ruelle II, , Ruelle II, , Ruelle II, , – Ruelle

In Phd.. . .

In Phil..– . , – , –

PH ,

HermeiasIn Phaedr.,–, , –, , –

HomerIl.VIII. XIV. XX.

Od.IX.

Iamblichusde myst. (ed. Des Places), , , , , ,

index of passages from ancient authors

Iamblichus, de myst (continued), , , , , , , , , , , , ,

in Nic. Arith. Intr., – , –

In Parmen. (ed. Dillon)Fr. Fr. , Fr. b Fr.

In Tim. (ed. Dillon)Fr. Fr. Fr. Fr. , Fr. Fr. Fr. , ,

Fr. Fr. , Fr. , Fr. , Fr. , Fr. Fr. Fr.

MarinusVit. Procl. ,

OlympiodorusIn Phaed. (ed. Westerink)..– ..

.. ..ff.

Or. Ch. (ed. Des Places).

Orph. Frag. (ed. O. Kern). –

PlatoEpin.BC

Leg.E B E , C E A

Parmen.A– A , A–B C , C– D– D– A– B B– C– A–B A– B– B–C C–D D–A C–E C– A–B B–B E– E–A E–D ,

index of passages from ancient authors

A– C–D E–C E–B ,

Phaed.E

Pol.E E A E– D

Resp.AB B AB C C ,

Tim.A DE AB C A , , C E A E– , A A AB , B A B , C , CD D D , DE E ,, E–A , D D A–E D E A

CD D E E– C–C

PlotinusEnn.I... – I.. I.. I..– II.. III.. III.. II.. , II.. II.. III.. III.. , , III..ff. IV.. IV.. IV.. IV.. IV.. IV.. IV.. IV..– V..ff. , V..ff. VI..ff. VI..

Porphyryde regr. An. (ed. Bidez) , ,

de abst.II. – II. II

Sent.xxix p. . , xxxi xxxvii

index of passages from ancient authors

Porphyry (continued)Fr. (Smith) F

ProclusEl. theol. (ed. Dodds) , , ,

, ,

in Eucl.. . . . . . .–

. .

In Parmen. (ed. Steel).ff. . –. .–. .–. .–. . . . . . . .–. .–. .–. .–. .– .–. . .–. .–. .–. .–.

in rem. Pub.I, . I, .– II, . II, . V, .– VI, . – VI, . – VI, . –

in Tim.I. . I. .–. I.. I. .– I. . I. . I. . I. .– I. . I. .– I. .– I. .–

index of passages from ancient authors

I. .–. I. .– I. .– I. .–. I. . I. .–. I. .– I. .–. I. .– II. . – II. , – II. .–. II. .– II., II. .–. II. .–. II. . II.. II. .–. II. .–. II. .– III. .–. III.. III., –

III..–. III..–. III..–. III. .– III.. III..–. III. .– III..–. III..–. III. .–. III. .–. III. .– III.. –

Theol. plat.I, , p. , –

I, , p. , – II, , p. , – II, , p. .–.

II, , p. , – II, , p. , II, , p. , –,

II, , p. , – III, , p. , III, , p. , – III, , p. IV, , p. – IV, , p. , –

V, , p. , –

V, , p. , –

SyrianusIn Met., , – , – , – , , –. , , –, , – , – , – , – , – , , ,