The Tea Party movement:Competing theoretical explanations

in the rise of a contemporaryconservative social movement.

Andrew Schons

Thesis submitted for the Master’s Programme in Politics and International StudiesDepartment of Government, Uppsala University

May 2011

AbstractThe central question addressed by this paper is how can we explain the success of the

Tea Party movement? By applying alternative theoretical frameworks to the case of

the Tea Party movement, we conclude that the Organizational-Entrepreneurial model

best accounts for the emergence of the “Tea Partiers” and their rapid ascension into

the national political field. In relation to the “grassroots” and ideological

foundations of competing social movement theories, the success of the movement is

found to be dependent on the efforts of professional social movement organizations

to efficiently manage and allocate the resources necessary for their growth. The

analysis does uncover weaknesses in the Organizational-Entrepreneurial model’s

applicability to the Tea Party movement, namely the ability of its “issue

entrepreneurs” to adequately address the varied points of reference which the

movement represents in order to maintain solidarity and its overall viability. We go

on to propose that the substantive characteristics and contributions of the

“ideological entrepreneur” may prove a suitable compliment to their “issue

entrepreneur” in uncovering how the Tea Party movement has been able to solicit

ongoing support and allegiance in spite of its broad aims and decentralized

organization.

AcknowledgementsI wish to thank my supervisor, Sten Widmalm, who has provided generous amountsof time and guidance throughout the completion of this thesis.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................1

PURPOSE AND AIM.....................................................................................................................................3LIMITATIONS .............................................................................................................................................4STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS ......................................................................................................................5

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD...................................................................................................6

DEFINING THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT....................................................................................................6THE SINGLE-CASE STUDY IN EXPLAINING SUCCESS OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT..............................8ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT..............................................................9MATERIALS..............................................................................................................................................11BIAS .........................................................................................................................................................12

EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS...................................................13

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY .......................................................................................................13Competing approaches within the RMT paradigm ..........................................................................14

THE PROCESSES OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS...........................................................................................15THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ............................................................................17“NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS” AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM.............................................................20THE TEA PARTY PHENOMENON ..............................................................................................................21

ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................................23

BACKGROUND .........................................................................................................................................23POLITICAL PROCESSES AND THE SOCIAL NETWORK...............................................................................23ORGANIZATIONS, ENTREPRENEURS, AND THEIR “ISSUES”.....................................................................30NEW CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY?............................................................................38

IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................43

OEM CENTRALITY..................................................................................................................................43OEM AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES .......................................................................................................45IDEOLOGUES AND “IDEOLOGICAL ENTREPRENEURIALSHIP”..................................................................47CONCLUSION: WE THE PEOPLE?..............................................................................................................50

REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................52

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1. Basic model of thesis. ...................................................................................................................7Figure 2. General dimensions of RMT and NSMT...................................................................................15Figure 3. Conceptual model of OEM.........................................................................................................18

Table 1. Competing theoretical properties of TPM...................................................................................43

1

IntroductionIn early February 2009, Mary Rakovich of Fort Myers, Florida, set out to

demonstrate against the Obama administration’s proposed national stimulus package, a

federal attempt to evade a looming global depression by buttressing segments of the

American economy with public funds. Mary picketed outside a rally in which President

Obama and Florida’s Republican Governor were promoting the proposed bill’s passage.

Despite the small turnout of the demonstration (3 people in total), conservative media

outlets latched onto her story, chronicling the recently laid-off autoworker’s flagship

experience in political activism. But something greater was happening.

Across the country in the liberal safe haven of Seattle, Washington, the

disjointed efforts of fellow, like-minded conservatives to display their opposition to the

$787 billion stimulus were under way. As in Florida, this public rally was an informal

occasion, where participants amassed through local means; family, friends, casual

mention by local radio hosts, local political candidates, and local conservative bloggers.

The purpose and form of the demonstrations were not revolutionary; they did not seek

to upend political processes and government institutions as much as they desired to

voice their frustrations and discontent with government action and political programs.

Yet these were the origins of what has become the Tea Party movement (TPM), a

nationwide association of conservatives screaming for fiscal, responsible government

spending and the revitalization of the “freedom” and “liberty” that have seemingly

dissolved in the decade leading to the founding protests of February 2009. While

conservative social movements are by no means a new phenomenon in the

contemporary United States political landscape, the TPM’s drive from an isolated

concept to national prominence is unprecedented.

The TPM’s ascension has not been without its controversies. Its loose

ideological structure, mixed political agenda, and lax organization have arguably aided

its goals as much as they have threatened its legitimacy amongst the American

population. Its affiliation with right-wing and militia groups have suggested racist and

conspiratorial underpinnings of the movement’s growing base of support, creating an air

of suspicion and skepticism among the American public and fueling critic’s claims of

the Tea Party supporter’s radicalization. This exhibits the movement’s loose

2

membership requirements and organizational structure, characteristics that initially

spurred accusations that the TPM en masse had evolved from the work of Republican

politics thereby diminishing its organic, non-partisan status.

This ambiguity surrounding centralized leadership in the TPM has also led to

increased attention towards an array of high-profile public figures that have become

identified with the TPM, as well as their positions on contentious social issues (e.g.

abortion rights) and United States national and international policy (e.g. immigration

reform). These controversial topics can easily stem the decline and possible dissolution

of conservative movements, posing another dilemma for the Tea Party movement in

achieving and maintaining both focus and solidarity. Despite the onset of internal

conflicts and factions, the perceived grassroots character of the TPM continues to be an

attractive feature to many Tea Partiers, producing an esteemed sense of authenticity,

independence, and solidarity amongst participants in their shared acts of concern and

disapproval.

These apparent contradictions in the evolution and development of the TPM are

mysterious in how the Tea Party diaspora has escaped collapse in the face of increased

pressure to clarify and detail its objections and the means in which it wishes to pursue

them. From the scattered animosity towards the Obama administration’s stimulus bill

has arisen an amalgamation of activists and sympathizers under the “Tea Party”

umbrella seeking the reinstatement of American values and the transformation of public

policy. The complexity of these tasks suggests complicated origins and complicated

explanations beyond the vague and inarticulate responses characteristic of local Tea

Party activists.

So we can then ask the question of how to explain the success of the Tea Party

movement. Research of contemporary social movements in capitalist societies has at

present divided into two opposing theoretical camps: Resource Mobilization theory and

New Social Movement theory. In the case of the Tea Party, neither is a comfortable fit,

indicating a unique and undetermined position for their collective efforts on this

strategy/instrumentalist – culture/identity civil society continuum. For example, while

interim leadership was introduced on a preliminary basis during the movement’s

formative stages as predicted by Resource Mobilization theory, the threat to traditional

3

identity and culture within the American diaspora was purported as the catalyst of the

movement’s drive and ambition, suggesting the discursive struggles and conflict

purported by New Social Movement theory. The theoretical divide between identity

and coordinated activity was expressed early on in the development of the Tea Party

movement through its organic features and advances through political strata, and has

continued to be stressed and explored as prominent figures in American politics and

society have offered their voice and consent to the Tea Party’s efforts.

Purpose and aim.The purpose of this paper is to explain the success of the Tea Party movement.

To accomplish this, we will employ the three dominant theories in contemporary social

movement research: the Political Process model (PPM), the Organizational-

Entrepreneurial model (OEM), and New Social Movement theory (NSMT). Each of

these three diverging approaches offers strengths and weaknesses in accounting for

growth and developments of the TPM, a controversial phenomenon in the contemporary

American social and political landscape. Its association with various fringe elements of

society has often overshadowed the gains and ambitions of the Tea Party banner, while

also forcing the group to address the complexity of its structure and political agenda.

As information regarding the origins, development, and demographics of the movement

has slowly surfaced, we can now begin to understand how the TPM progressed into a

solid entity from the isolated participants on which it is based.

While the Political Process model and the Organizational-Entrepreneurial model

represent competing perspectives within the RMT discipline, New Social Movement

theory looks at identity, culture, and symbolic meaning in explaining collective action.

By using available archival materials and published resources, we will track accounts

and empirics of the TPM’s emergence and activities through the lens of each of these

alternative theories in order to understand what elements were present or absent as the

TPM assembled to pursue its determined ends. While the TPM’s mixed agenda and

autonomous groups complicate the collection and evaluation of these materials, in

combining research strategies and materials we can begin to uncover how the Tea Party

has been able to engage in collective action.

4

LimitationsWhile this section does not represent an exhaustive list of weaknesses

encountered in the construction of this paper, it does address a few major issues and

concerns. We foremost need to recognize the hard truth that the youth of the Tea Party

phenomenon has yielded little analytical research. Vennesson partially quells these

concerns: “Case studies sometimes explore subjects about which little is previously

known or phenomena in need of an interpretation that sheds new light on known data,

and their descriptive aspect is invaluable.”1 Such an outlook greatly compliments the

explanatory framework from Graham Allison’s pioneering exercise in case study

research used in this study. In his attempt to explain the events and circumstance within

which the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 occurred, he expresses a desired interest to

“explore the influence of unrecognized assumption upon our thinking about events like

the missile crisis.”2 With this in mind, while great care has been taken to include

reliable and relevant information regarding the onset and growth of the Tea Party

movement, we recognize this study as part of a much broader discussion that exceeds

the limits of this paper.

There have also been diverging accounts of how to gauge and classify levels of

participation and involvement amongst individuals in the TPM. Indeed, one prominent

Tea Party organizer was quoted in their belief that the only limitation to joining in the

effort was a commitment to “individual freedom, fiscal restraint, and respect for our

Constitution.”3 In her comprehensive report on the Tea Party, Zernike (2010) has

provided two forms of membership in the movement in her polling: activist and

supporters. According to Zernike, activists represent the smaller subgroup of supporters

within the Tea Party “who attended the rallies and gave money to Tea Party

organizations.”4 Therefore, when mention is made of TP supporters, this inherently

includes “activists”, while the inverse relationship does not hold true. While these

categories may assume preferential treatment of a resourced based approach in

1 Vennesson 2272 Allison (1971) Preface, V3 Courser 54 Zernike 7

5

explaining the Tea Party movement, Zernike has also gone onto to show that both

activists and supporters share substantive immaterial qualities akin to NSMT, such as an

underlying suspicion of government and other institutions, and a shared sense that “the

country had moved away from the Constitution and that the Republican Party had

moved away from conservative values.”5

Structure of this thesisThe structure of this thesis is divided into several sections. The upcoming

section will discuss the materials used in this study as well as its research design,

including a short description of Allison’s conceptual modeling. In the section that

follows we briefly outline the characteristics and features of the competing theories

mentioned above. From there, we will analyze the explanatory value of the individual

theories in accounting for the Tea Party’s coordinated actions. A discussion on the

findings will then be presented, followed by concluding remarks.

5 Ibid 151-152

6

Research Design and MethodThis section deals with the methodological issues associated with a case study of

the Tea Party movement. We first look at how to define a successful social movement

and how these measurements are applicable to the TPM. This section also explains why

this paper uses a single case study and why the case of Tea Party movement was chosen

for examination. It describes Allison’s methodological approach invoked within this

project while explaining its value and application in analyzing developments

surrounding the Tea Party movement.

Defining the Tea Party movementWe should first recognize the Tea Party movement as a conservative social

movement. Under this pretense, we follow Blee & Creasap’s (2010) definition of

conservative social movements based on their historical analysis of conservative and

right-wing movements in the United States. Their study has assessed the varied

definitions applied to these categories while distinguishing fringe elements of society

from their mainstream counterparts. As a result, their definition of conservative

movements is defined as “movements that support patriotism, free enterprise capitalism,

and/or a traditional moral order and for which violence is not a frequent tactic or goal”.

In defining the TPM as a success, we apply the logic of Gamson’s (1975)

enduring study of 53 random social movements, a useful criterion in displaying the

preliminary gains of the TPM. His findings indicate two variables for measuring

success: the provision of tangible benefits that meet goals established by the movement

organizations, and the formal acceptance of the movement organization by its main

antagonist as a valid representative of a legitimate set of interests. While the theoretical

approaches outlined below have distinct visions of contemporary social movements,

each may be employed in assessing the achievements of the TPM. The following

model loosely guides this study, which will be examined in greater detail within the

following sections:

7

Figure 1. Basic model of thesis.

While admitting the loose agenda and goals established by the TPM and the

difficulty in fully documenting the series of events leading to the “tangible gains” and

“legitimacy” of the movement, assorted aims and victories can be documented at

varying levels of the movement’s activities with which we can attach available

empirical materials for analysis. For example, the purposefully chaotic and disruptive

tactics in local city hall meetings have gained local and national attention fostering

recruitment as well as jarring unsuspecting elected officials towards their ouster or

concession. The latter component of “acceptance” within their success is not as easy to

identify given the wide range of responses from society and the polity to the broad and

often unidentifiable scope of TP activities and objectives. However, targeted politicians

(both Democrat and Republican) have been forced to accommodate and at times

concede to the expanding participation, visibility, and influence this conservative

movement has had on their general constituencies in the proposal and formation of

public policy. For example, Tea Partiers have been able to engage public officials in

formal lobbying efforts indicating the movement’s eventual, formal recognition by

members of the political elite it seeks to convert. In this manner, disregarding their

status as a social movement underestimates the movement’s messages and strategic

tactics in gaining the numbers and credibility to pursue its goals. However, their ability

to establish specific goals and acquire institutional legitimacy demands greater inquiry.

8

The single-case study in explaining success of the Tea Party movementRegardless, the TPM can be considered an anomaly in its rapid ascent to

American social and political influence. The relevance of this particular case, however,

is not only based on recognizing and working upon the academic contributions to the

social sciences evolved within the United States; the TPM and its wide conservative

base has the potential to affect the “realpolitik” in their desire to propel a viable

presidential candidate into the White House as well as supporting a “Tea Party foreign

policy”.6 Linking academic contributions to ground-level phenomenon is then of the

utmost concern to active members in civil society; “it has real consequences for

movements that may leave them vulnerable to counterattacks.”7

This case study design has both enduring strengths and weaknesses. Yin (2003)

notes that “”how” and “why” questions are more explanatory and likely to encourage

the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as preferred research strategies. This

is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time,

rather than mere frequencies or incidence.”8 In this manner, we are able to examine

contemporary phenomenon within its “real-life” context, an especially useful technique

when the boundaries separating phenomenon and its context are not immediately

evident.

The single-case design of this project also facilitates this bridging of theoretical

and empirical knowledge. Certainly, contemporary social movement research has

placed uncontested value on comparative case studies.9 However, such research has

often returned to acknowledge the contextual agency pertinent to intently studying the

emergence and development of social movements. While also recognizing the common

criticism of lessened generalizability of the context specific, single-case research design

in our case study, we realize at this point that “the challenge is to acknowledge and

uncover its specific meaning, while extracting generalizable knowledge actually or

potentially related to other cases.”10 Under these circumstances we delimit any attempt

6 Vennesson 225; Lynch (2010); Mead 40-42; Paul (2011)7 Pichardo 4198 Yin 7, 139 McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 18-1910 Vennesson 226; Moses & Knutsen 139

9

to expand findings outside the empirical realm of the United States, while allowing

further discussion and analysis to retrieve, contrast, and modify any general

propositions.

Alternative explanations of the Tea Party movementThe conceptual modeling employed by Allison in his classic analysis of the

Cuban Missile crisis inspires the research design for this study. Within this framework,

he expands upon the traditional practice exercising one theoretical model in the

explanation of a particular case in order to "provide a base for improved explanation

and prediction."11 In his explanatory investigation of the U.S.-Cuba Missile Crisis of

1962, Allison employs three theoretical frameworks to uncover the varied dimensions

within which events unfolded. By introducing multiple frames of reference we can

weigh the benefits and deficits of competing perspectives while uncovering additional

insights of the fundamental yet often unnoticed choices among the categories and

assumptions that channel our thinking about problems like the Tea Party movement.

While the Resource Mobilization approach has been useful in social movement

research, there is strong evidence suggesting that it should be supplemented. Jenkins’

(1983) underscores this point in his argument that the basic model of RMT comprises

“rational actions oriented towards clearly defined, fixed goals with centralized

organizational control over resources and clearly demarcated outcomes that can be

evaluated in terms of tangible gains.”12 However, the Tea Party movement prides itself

on its decentralized tendencies, and its overarching objectives are often elusive and

highly uncertain.13 According to this perspective then, the assumed lapse in centralized

organization as well as the Tea Party movement’s diffuse, and at times incoherent

platform and goals interfere with these basic components of a social movement’s

pursuit of institutional change, stressing the need for an alternative evaluation of the

RMT strategy.

11 Allison (1969) 69012 Jenkins 52913 Rasmussen & Schoen 118

10

In the application of the first model, we try to explain how interpersonal

relations and networks affixed to this framework may account for the Tea Party's

expedited growth and subsequent influence in elections and public policy. Under this

model, actors mobilize locally and expand their network and lateral engagements

through the activities and involvement of third parties thereby increasing their political

efficacy and charges of political and social change. The second model focuses not on

these interpersonal ties but rather on the professional organization of the SM. The

success of a SM is dependent on its ability to acquire and organize its resources

effectively as it pursues its goals in a system built on competition and limited resources.

The third model seeks to uncover the common culture and identity attached to the Tea

Partiers that has ignited their multipronged efforts against "big government". In this

fashion, government activity has interfered with the collective control of culture and

meaning, thus overstepping its normally ascribed regulatory functions. By trespassing

into the realm of the civic sphere, identities are realized, thus creating the conditions for

collective action.

In all, the first model applied highlights the social processes indicative of the

Tea Party’s grassroots character. The second will uncover the importance of

organization in the TPM's ascendance from informal and isolated discussions to a

national figure. The third will illustrate the value of culture and identity underlying the

motivation of Tea Partiers.

This approach also replicates Allison's scheme in that "the sections that follow

simply sketch each conceptual model, articulate it as an analytic paradigm, and apply it

to produce an explanation."14 Space and time simply do not permit the full

development and support of a general argument from this case. However, by applying

these alternative models to the Tea Party movement we can begin to produce a more

cogent image of the movement and its underlying characteristics; we "set these ideas

down as the beginning, not the end, of an extended argument."15

14 Allison (1969) 69115 Allison (1971) 8

11

MaterialsThe information to interpret these frameworks will be accumulated from a

variety of documentary and archival sources on the topic of the emergence and

subsequent activities of the Tea Party movement. These include academic journals,

survey data, investigative texts, journalistic news coverage, organizational websites, and

statements by movement actors and elites. While case studies are especially suited to

utilize an array of sources, this triangulation of data and empirics ultimately attempts to

ensure the validity and scholarship of this paper.16

The youth of the TPM has resulted in a scarcity of materials in any one specific

field of literature, i.e. no one form or area of publication could alone provide enough

material to fulfill the requirements of this study. This may best be represented in the

abovementioned vagaries of Tea Party “membership” on which polling often relies,

calling for the need of additional resources in supporting any analytical claims. By

amassing available information from diverse sources on the conditions and qualities of

actors within the TPM we hope to better understand how this disassembled body came

to be.

As mentioned prior, we evaluate materials within the alternative explanatory

frameworks based on Gamson’s conditions for social movement success: tangible

benefits of meeting goals established by the movement organizations, and the formal

acceptance of the movement organization by its main antagonist as a valid

representative of a legitimate set of interests. These can be traced to the TPM in their

non-partisan ambitions to advance conservative politics through the installation of

conservative politicians and policy, and in the movements desire to convert political

figures and the general public into supporters and activists. While again we are forced

to recognize the decentralized nature of the TPM and its consequences in accounting for

the varied successes and failures of local and national Tea Party drives, we can pinpoint

certain activities and accounts within their short history to track the successful

progression from actor to collective action.

16 Yin 8, 99

12

BiasWhile the use of the media materials used in this study in particular have been

targeted as a source of bias in the interpretation and presentation of social movement

activities and research, the use of multiple sources of information can help combat

issues surrounding bias in findings.17 It should be noted that “bias also can enter into

the conduct of experiments (see Rosenthal, 1966) and the use of other research

strategies, such as designing questionnaires for surveys (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982)”.18

Without disregarding the sensitive nature of bias in social science research, it has been

our desire to address these concerns through the use of reputable media sources and a

strict adherence to theoretical guidelines.

17 Earl, et. al. 7418 Yin 10

13

Explanatory frameworks of social movementsThis section takes a closer look at the core characteristics of the three

explanatory theories. We first explain the general foundations of RMT, and then

specify the areas of divergence that create the unique perspectives of PPM and OEM in

social movement research. We then turn to NSMT’s understanding of social

movements and collective action as a consequence of the underlying cultural and

symbolic components of society. In doing so, we aim to clarify the empirical

assumptions of these frameworks in order to more accurately assess their explanatory

contributions.

Resource Mobilization TheoryResource Mobilization theory (RMT) evolved from traditional collective

behavior theory, which viewed collective action as non-institutional, irrational

responses by those displaced by rapid social change.19 Breaking away from this

tradition, RMT questioned the position and explanatory weight of relative deprivation

theory and collective behavior theory by suggesting that such grievances are present at

all levels of society and as a result should be considered a background factor in the

explanation of collective action.20 Scholars of RMT suggest that the ongoing presence

of aggrieved populations in society would allow grassroots movements to mobilize at

any point in time provided their effective organization and immediate or eventual access

to the power and resources of an established elite group.21 From this, RMT would

instead focus on certain “contextual processes” within environmental structures that

condition the potential of social movement activity, such as resource management,

organizational dynamics, and political change.22 Accordingly, RMT represents a shift

away from focusing on the sources of social cleavages and disequilibrium towards an

approach using the social movement itself as the unit of analysis.

The issues, actors, and structural constraints are considered as given within the

RMT approach, with analysis centered on how actors (individuals and organizations) 19 Jenkins 53020 Jenkins 528, 530; Buechler (1993)21 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 15122 McAdam, et. al. (1996) 3; Canel 205-206

14

interact with their environment and the strategies they employ in pursuit of their

interests.23 Individual actors in this regard were fashioned as rational actors whose

involvement in social movement activities was based on a calculus of the costs and

benefits of participation. These costs and benefits are calculated on available resources

and changes in opportunities for collective action.24 Although subject to debate, these

resources have commonly included time, labor, money, facilities, and legitimacy.25

“Political opportunity” structures are either facilitated or suppressed by conditions in

the political system, and ultimately determine the actor’s decision to move from

condition to action.26

Competing approaches within the RMT paradigmTwo diverging models have emerged from the basic foundations of RMT: the

Political Process model (PPM)27 and the Organizational-Entrepreneurial model

(OEM)28. Although these models vary on their point of departure, both adhere to three

broad factors akin to social movement research.29 These three components are

summarized as:

1. Political opportunities: Social movements are formed by the political

opportunities and constraints unique to the broader national contexts to

which they are embedded.

2. Mobilizing structures: “Collective vehicles”, both formal and

informal, through which actors mobilize and engage in collective action.

3. Framing processes: Efforts of groups of people to craft

understandings that legitimate and motivate collective action.

23 Canel 20624 Jenkins 52825 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 151-152, 154-15526 Canel, 207, 20827 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 556-557; Canel 20628 Canel 206; McCarthy & Zald (2002) 54529 McAdam, et. al. (1996) 2-7; McAdam, et. al. (2001) 41

15

Briefly put, PPM looks at the opportunities that surface based on broader historical or

longitudinal changes in society that spur mobilization. In contrast, OEM studies the

regulatory role of mobilization structures (i.e. social movement organizations)

permitting the recognition, assembly, and manifestation of aggrieved groups into a

collective force. Generally speaking, both these models within the RMT framework try

to explain the organization and strategies of social movements, when they would form,

and if they would succeed; they describe the formation and behavior of social

movements. In all, the roots of RMT “proposed that the passage from condition to

action was contingent upon the availability of resources and changes in the

opportunities for collective action.”30 We use the following figures to illustrate the

general dimensions of RMT as compared to those of NSMT:

Figure 2. General dimensions of NSMT and RMT.

The processes of contentious politicsPPM emphasized a track of research concerned chiefly with the gradual opening

and closing of “opportunities and threats” realized by actors in determining the choice

to participate in collective action.31 Such opportunities or threats can present

themselves from changes in regime structure, changes in potential coalitions, and

changes in the government agenda.32 Therefore this approach suggests that the state

30 Tilly 99; Jenkins (1983)31 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 43; McCarthy & Zald (2002) 557; Canel 206; Johnston & Noakes 2032 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 556; Jenkins 543

16

and political activities play a pivotal role establishing the costs and benefits of an

actor’s participation in collective action. Such changes in political opportunities

therefore are likely to alter perceptions of the risks and/or rewards of individual

involvement in collective action, either producing a sense of hope driving action or an

element of despair resulting in continued passivity or compliance. These opportunities

and threats are produced from issues of “contentious politics”, or the collective political

struggle, where a claim is collective and, if realized, would affect their objects’

interests. The privileged “polity members” and their “challengers”33 establish and

continually improve upon their respective “repertoires of contention”, that is, the

culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics.34 The

attribution of threat and opportunity requires both their visibility to potential

challengers and members as well as their perception as an opportunity prior to

collective action.35

PPM also has a distinct view of mobilizing structures, which can allow

sufficient amounts of organization and numbers in order to make coordinated activities

possible after an opportunity or threat is presented. According to PPM, while such

structures may already exist or are created during the course of contention, social

movements must appropriate them as vehicles of struggle. The process of

appropriation often involves harnessing local networks and institutions, a common

example being the American civil rights movement.36 In its formative stages, civil

rights activists utilized these networks while transforming local institutions in order to

propagate and implement the goals of the emerging struggle, emphasizing PPM’s

importance on interpersonal networks as a base of mobilization. Although this process

is not without conflicts, organizations can often be arenas for the ongoing interpretation

of environmental conditions thereby serving as advocates and hospitable hosts to the

well-established interests and the relatively stable collective identities to which the

goals of these organizations are tied.

33 “Polity members” consist of politically engaged actors which enjoy routine access togovernment agents and resources, while “challengers” are those that are lack such access.34 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 12-1635 Ibid 4336 Ibid 47-48

17

Accordingly, as these identities, interests, and movement goals are placed within

an expanded timeline during contestation, framing processes are viewed not as mere

strategic efforts but rather as overarching interpretive processes within which

challengers have been constituted. As a result, framing processes and political

opportunities are uniquely intertwined.37 Framing in this sense is an interpretive

process that is closely linked to the interaction between political contexts, media, and

cultural resources; it is the articulation of these collective efforts in a contentious

episode.38 From such interpretive processes, an important consequence is the

attribution of a new threat or opportunity and a reconceptualization of the legitimacy

associated with sites of social interaction and/or identities. In this light, efforts to

mobilize political identities are primarily based on interactive appeals to existing

identities, and while identities are subject to ongoing developments in contentious

politics, their mobilization depends strongly on a grounding of ties created by previous

contention and/or routine social life.39

The PPM model, in sum, concentrates on state action and policy and the

possibilities of influencing state action that facilitates or impedes social movement

action.40 This approach also stresses meso-level phenomenon (e.g. work environments,

neighborhoods,) in accounting for the successful mobilization of those operating outside

formal political channels. While some activists are privy to organizational structures

during the mobilization process, such deficits can be compensated for by appropriating

available local social spaces and collective identities in servicing the interpretive

processes inherent to the attribution of opportunity and threat and the manifestation of

collective action.

The professionalization of social movementsThe organizational and economic foundations of OEM and its emphasis on

mobilizing structures are highlighted in its conceptual structure. According to this

approach, social movements en masse are housed alongside other major enterprises (e.g.

37 Caniglia & Carmin 20438 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 4439 Ibid 5840 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 556

18

the manufacturing or agricultural sectors). This social movement sector (SMS) contains

all the assorted, more specific movements found within the national polity (e.g.

environmental activists, women’s rights, or peace movements), each of which is

referred to as a social movement industry (SMI). An SMI in turn contains all social

movement organizations (SMOs) that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest

preferences of a social movement (SM). According to McCarthy and Zald, SMs are

defined as “mobilized or activated (effective) demands (preferences) for change in

society.”41 While SMOs may cut across SMIs and SMs depending on how narrow or

broadly they define their goals, all SMOs establish and pursue target goals that

conceptually link them to particular SMs (or countermovements) and larger SMIs.42

The figure below provides a rough sketch of this conceptual framework:

Figure 3. Conceptual model of OEM.

According to OEM, resources are vital to the proliferation of an SM and the

origins and maintenance of SMOs. The importance of these resources in engaging in

social conflict requires a minimal level of organization for collective purposes. These

resource flows serve as the lifeline to the SMO, and, assuming a limited amount of

available resources, places an SMO in direct competition with other SMOs external to

41 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 53442 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 153, 154-155

19

its cause as well as non-political recreational or cultural activities accessible to those

with discretionary resources. As resource inflows increase, an SMO is likely to shift

from a classical form of SMO structuring (e.g. indigenous leadership, volunteer staff,

extensive membership, resources from direct beneficiaries, and actions based on mass

participation) to a professional SMO (e.g. routinized tasks, division of labor,

hierarchical decision-making processes, and definitive membership criteria).

The SMO’s “target goals” along with their solutions and strategies become its

communiqué for maintaining or expanding resource flows. Applying “supply and

demand” economic theory, these target goals become products which are “sold” to

differing groups and populations, from those neutral to the cause, to those

sympathizing, to those directly benefiting from the attainment of these goals. Demand

has traditionally been expanded through advertising and media, processes of

recruitment and resource appeals which were later developed upon by theories relating

to strategic framing, i.e. “how individuals develop metaphors and packages of related

cognitive elements to interpret the world they live in”.43

According to OEM, both mobilizing structures and framing processes ultimately

mediate political opportunities. For instance, “issue entrepreneurs” within an

organization can successfully seize upon major cleavages between elites and major

interests thereby redefining long-standing grievances in new terms.44 These

entrepreneurs “attempt to define the issues for specific and general audiences. If they

are successful, they enlarge and intensify the sentiment pool, that is, they increase the

number of people committed to a demand/preference for change and intensify the

commitment to the issue of those who already share that preference.”45 While Jenkins

(1983) has found that the mobilization potential of a group is largely determined by the

degree of preexisting group organization, these entrepreneurs are able to both initiate

and expand the reach of the social movement in order to ensure a steady supply of

resources into the SMO.

43 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 55744 Jenkins 53145 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 536

20

“New Social Movements” and social constructionism

Although also recognizing the rational nature of actors advocated by RMT, New

Social Movement theory (NSMT) represents an alternative perspective on the growth of

social movements. While RMT has explicitly studied the ability of social movements to

acquire and organize the requisite resources for mobilization, NSMT has shifted the

center of analysis onto the individual actor within the particular social movement; RMT

offers insight into “how” actors mobilize while NSMT stresses “why”. Not

surprisingly, in contrast to contests over the allocation of such goods and resources in

RMT’s political market, NSMT focuses instead on the cultural elements of social

movements and their struggles for control of the production of meaning and the

constitution of new collective identities.46 Consequently, the actor’s participation in a

social movement is defined in terms of their relation to the issue itself, with the social

movement being the manifestation of ideological and political processes.

According to NSMT, as the creation of meaning and interpretation of norms and

values occurs not at the state level but at the level of social integration, social conflicts

have shifted from the exclusivity of the political realm and into the civic and cultural

realm. NSMs occur based on the perceived intrusion of governance on autonomy and

identity formation, and “call into question the structures of representative democracies

that limit citizen input and participation in governance, instead advocating direct

democracy … and cooperative styles of social organization.”47

As opposed to RMT’s historical conditionalities, these actors become the center

of contemporary conflicts, raising new issues, carrying new values, operating in new

terrains, employing new modes of action, and taking on new organizational forms.

Arguably, these participants in new social movements are constantly questioning what

is being done.48 Although covering a broad range of topics, NSMT brings to public

discussion issues that had prior been considered private issues while promoting values

46 Canel 189-19047 Pichardo 41548 Ibid

21

advocating equality and participation, individual autonomy, democracy, plurality and

difference, and the rejection of manipulation, regulation, and bureaucratization.49

As noted, discrepancies between RMT and NSMT are found in the

organizational forms of new social movements, based on “loosely articulated networks

of participatory democratic organizations permitting multiple membership and part-time

or short-term participation and demanding personal involvement both inside and outside

the organization.”50 Overall, this open, decentralized, non-hierarchical structure is an

attempt to avoid the deradicalization, cooptation, and oligarchization of movements

past.51 Regardless of certain ambiguities in accounting for either the success or failure

of a NSMs impact (as its mere existence can be considered an accomplishment), NSMT

is utmost concerned with cultural issues, symbolic production, normative contestation,

and social integration.52 This leads to our mention of social constructionism, which

brings a symbolic interactionist approach to the micro-level study of collective action

by emphasizing the role of framing activities and cultural processes in social activism.53

Advocating these lifestyle and identity issues through expressive action is a distinct

feature of NSMT within social movement research.

The Tea Party phenomenon

Initially, the various foci of these theoretical models all seem to resonate with

the emergence and development of the Tea Party movement; the channeling of rhetoric

and symbolism tied to the U.S. Constitution and the American Revolution echoes the

expressive yet protective forms attached to the identity claims of NSMT; the

“grassroots” aims and localized networks of the movement’s activists in response to

liberal political policy suggest the bottom-up approach affixed to PPM; and the

expedited pace of nationwide coordinated activities stresses the resources and

organizational capacity espoused by OEM. However, neither appears fully capable to 49 Canel 199; Pichardo 41450 Canel 201; Pichardo 415-41651 Pichardo 41652 Canel 201, 21753 Buechler (1995) 441, 460

22

explain the dynamics which allowed the Tea Party to amass its support and exercise its

burgeoning influence; NSMT fails to account for the methods and modes of strategic

activity taken to achieve their goals; PPM is criticized for neglecting the relevance of

organization in exchange for its emphasis on political opportunities; and OEM’s

reliance on SMOs is weak in explaining a subject’s transition from condition to action.

By introducing alternative frameworks for analysis, we may be privileged a better

understanding of the mechanisms aiding the collective strength of the Tea Party

movement.

23

AnalysisOur analysis will begin with a brief summary of the Tea Party movement and

several points that have spurred an interest in placing this case under examination. The

basic components of each conceptual framework will then be discussed before delving

into the assessment and plausibility of their respective arguments in explaining the case

of the Tea Party movement. Their strengths and weaknesses will be noted, leading us

into a discussion on what we can take away from these divergent explanations and what

they may implicate for further areas of research.

BackgroundThe TPM represents a fragile coalition of concerned citizens and organizational

supports. Its origins purportedly stemmed from the passage of the Obama

administration’s economic stimulus package, an act representing a reckless government

usurping the Constitutional privileges its citizens were naturally bestowed. However, as

lateral ties and connections were slowly beginning to congeal between concerned

segments of the American population, organized interests and professional counterparts

entered onto the scene in support of the Tea Party movement, all the while claiming the

autonomy and strength of U.S. citizens and the independent political will and organic

foundations of this newly formed social movement. These relations have been the

subject of continued debate in understanding the emergence and mobilization of the Tea

Party movement, as public support has grown and the ability of the loose

conglomeration of conservatives has demonstrated the ability to impact the political

field. We will now turn to three prominent figures in social movement research in order

to locate possible explanations into how the Tea Party movement has arguably

flourished in the face of controversy and conflict.

Political Processes and the social networkAs mentioned above, PPM has moved towards a model stressing dynamism,

strategic interaction, and response to the political environment. This approach argues

that social movements stem from an atmosphere of contentious politics. Such an

24

environment “is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction

between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their

interests, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant.”54

PPM especially highlights the element of interaction: “We treat social

interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of

structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture, but as active sites of creation and

change. We have come to think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal

communication, and various forms of continuous negotiation - including the negotiation

of identities - as figuring centrally in the dynamics of contention.”55 Granovetter (1973)

has also shown how combinations of both strong and weak ties within society are useful

in supplementing social movements by providing trust and emotional support as well as

offering a diverse array of ideas and interests. Therefore, given the leaderless nature of

the TPM, we would expect that the Tea Party’s evolution (i.e. its ability to formulate

and execute objectives and ability to established itself as a legitimate firm) be based on

the progression of interpersonal ties and networks in identifying and responding to a

potential threat or opportunity in state activity.

Given the cultural dimension in which methods of contention are displayed (i.e.

the cultural codes contained within “repertoires of contention”), it is not surprising that

a common demographic has been shown to comprise the core of the Tea Party

movement.56 Evidence has also shown that membership is closely aligned with areas

that enjoyed rapid growth prior to the onset of the recession in 2001 and suffered

disproportionately in the housing crash that followed.57 These common identifications

and relational ties are a primary mobilization mechanism for this scheme.58

Furthermore, this in-group dynamic has also been shown to affect the transfer and

accumulation of information. Whereas 45% of Tea Party respondents were likely to

trust information received from other supporters, alternatively only 35% trust

information received from “Television/newspapers”, a mere 5% entrust both the former

54 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 555 Ibid 2256 Zernike 6-7, 158; Wright 757 Chinni 2010; Rasmussen & Schoen 161-16258 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 26

25

and the latter, and 7% neither the Tea Party nor the media. This echoes the bonding

social capital that has been located, if not required, in the success of bottom-up

movements.59

The political and social isolation of Tea Partiers may be connected to many

sources: the ongoing threat of fringe elements and liberal “infiltrators” into the

movement’s activities; the mainstream media’s relentless demonization of the Tea Party

movement; the pressure from social conservatives to address social policies; the

overarching desire of the Tea Party movement to remain apolitical while also

attempting to connect to and influence economic policy. Regardless, the TPM’s insular

qualities are quite real and have best been illustrated in a recent poll of supporters,

where 85% believed that the movement’s activities reflected the views of most

Americans, while only 25% of the general public believed the same.60 These

perceptions stand to be realized politically as well. While slightly over half of Tea

Party supporters have indicated dissatisfaction with the Republican Party,

dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party was a resounding 92%.61 Such sentiment also

took form in proposed healthcare reform legislation, which only heightened the

animosity and fervor amongst the participants of this budding conservative movement.62

However, the nationally coordinated, concerted activities of the TPM force us to

move beyond the isolation of bonding mechanisms and strong ties. According to PPM,

strong ties and weak ties are divided into two complimentary elements: diffusion and

brokerage.63 Weak ties are required in the growth of social movements in that the

“(c)ontention that spreads primarily through diffusion will almost always remain

narrower in its geographic and/or institutional scale than contention that spreads

through brokerage … (b)ecause it will not transcend the typically segmented lines of

interaction which characterize social life.”64 However, arguments have been made

suggesting that such social capital within the United States’ communities conducive to

weak ties have been on the decline, encouraging a general isolation of individuals from

59 Widmalm 2005; Oberschall (1973)60 Zernike 126; Rasmussen & Schoen 11261 Zernike 20662 Rasmussen & Schoen 122-12563 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 333-33464 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 333-334

26

public affairs.65 Accordingly, we would assume greater devices were at play than those

isolated to the TPM’s symbolic origins in Florida or Seattle.

There is ample room for examining the place of brokerage and brokers in the

Tea Party movement. Numerous organizations and figures, both at the national and

local level, have been associated with the movement from the outset and have continued

to be recognized as venues for creating “new boundaries and connections among

political actors.”66 In fact, the most controversial figure in steering the mobilization

and activities of the TPM, FreedomWorks, states that much of its activity have been

clueing its members to other protests in the area, so protesters could cooperate and

conglomerate their events.67 However, the issue with the author’s rendition of brokers

is problematic for the Tea Party movement in that these actors or organizations serve

the dual purpose of bridging individuals and organizations and “speak(ing) on their

behalf to the object of their claims”.68 The proclaimed grassroots, decentralized,

leaderless foundations of the TPM assumes that such a position is non-existent, or at

best the linkages procured through brokerage remain lateral as common identity and

activism are disseminated. In fact, it has been argued that in place of centralized

organization certain Constitutional provisions (particularly that securing State’s rights)

have become “a natural resource for the ‘leaderless’ Tea Party movement” encouraging

the independent structure of the movement that has appealed to many local activists.69

Not surprisingly, the horizontal dimension of the movement has been aided

greatly by online activities in support of their mobilization and coordinated activities.

The introduction of online communications technologies has fundamentally transformed

the American media landscape and the ability of conservative movements to capitalize

on political opportunities for social change.70 The “Tea Party Patriots” are the

technological darling of the Tea Party movement, originating as a hub for local activists

and developing into a broad, nationwide coalition linking hundreds of websites and

65 Putnam (2007); Edsall (2010)66 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 14367 Good (2009, April 13)68 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 142 (Italics added)69 Rasmussen & Schoen 119; Zernike 67-69; Blee & Creasap 27270 Rasmussen & Schoen 225; Harris (2010); Blee & Creasap 274

27

compiling an extensive database of email addresses.71 Such connections have allowed

interested groups and persons to tap into the sentiment and successes of demonstrators

from throughout the country. However, its organic expansion has been tainted by its

close cooperation with the larger, politically ambiguous national conservative

organization FreedomWorks, and it’s subsequent acquisition of the “Patriot” label and

talent.72

Additionally, the mainstream social media networks that have been championed

by Tea Party advocates as having “allowed a disparate group to quickly connect and

plan events” have been shown ambiguous in their outcome; 88% of polled supporters

have neither “gotten or shared information about the Tea Party movement” from these

sites.73 This poll data has also indicated the majority of supporters source their

information not from Tea Party websites but from television outlets and alternative

online media, indicating a potential divide amongst TP affiliates and a limited ability of

these mediums to substantially unite the overarching TPM.74 However, even if we

consider the propensity of Tea Party supporters to prefer the anti-Obama rhetoric of Fox

News Channel, the questionable level of trust granted to these outlets suggests a more

substantial component to their participation in the movement itself.75

This agency-structure tension also interferes with the Tea Party’s most notable

triumph: their ability to amass and exercise the bottom-up support necessary to elect

Republican Senator Scott Brown into office. Public claims suggest that collective Tea

Party member support was detrimental in driving the mass efforts and subsequent

election of this conservative Senator within a traditionally “blue” state.76 However,

other reports have indicated that FreedomWorks talent had already weighed the options

of participating in an election against an apathetic and disengaged opponent prior to

soliciting the assistance from the ranks of the Tea Party, with the more humble

conclusion “that the movement was capable of maturing, or at least of being

71 Rasmussen & Schoen 14972 Zernike 4373 Armey & Kibbe 28-29; Zernike 21974 Zernike 21975 Zernike 221; Pew Research Center (2009, April 22)76 Rasmussen & Schoen 180-182

28

practical.”77 The questionable ability of the TPM to establish legitimacy amongst

political agents has also been highlighted in their criticisms of Brown’s political

activities. While soliciting the TPM’s support during his election campaign, the Senator

would soon distance himself from the movement in the media as well as deviate from

the Tea Party’s policy prescriptions.78

What is most unclear about PPM’s discussion of external brokers and

entrepreneurs in relation to the TPM is if and how they are able to establish and

maintain coalition formation amongst actors in absence of formal organizational

structures especially given the Tea Partier’s suspicion of leaders and elites. It is also

unclear as to if this causal chain is wholly unidirectional. Do such entrepreneurs take

direction from challengers? Or is direction provided fully by the brokerage? How can

institutional roles influence the vertical and horizontal dimensions of brokerage? The

relevance of this is found in Zernike’s chronicling of the TPM. She had found that

many of its local supporters were weak in articulating a unified platform or cogent plan

of objectives and actions, while being quick to absorb those generally offered by larger

conservative organizations.79 If 90% of those most active in the Tea Party argue that

their decision for participation was “to stand up for (their) beliefs”, this lack of

clarification may confuse how and why the threat to belief structures initiating

collective action processes was perceived, transmitted, and demonstrated.80

Furthermore, given the episodic nature of PPM, it is unclear to which episode

this movement belongs and how it was actuated within the broad social changes

conditioning localized action. While initially affixed to the economic stimulus package,

Tea Partiers have since been connected to additional political activity; Obama’s

healthcare reform, the Bush administration’s spending and bailouts, remorse over the

Clinton-era budgetary surplus.81 Additionally, the Tea Party’s merits have been

conceptually linked to advances of the New Right birthed during the turmoil of the

1960s, or to the pioneer of conservative populism (and McCarthyism), Senator Joe

77 Zernike 86-9278 Stein (2010); McMorris-Santoro (2010, December 13); “Scott Brown To Skip Tea Party”(2010); Epstein (2011); Page (2011)79 Zernike 42, 52-5380 Rasmussen & Schoen 14281 Rasmussen & Schoen 117-118; Love 38

29

McCarthy.82 In fact, some have traced the origins of the Tea Party to the 1960s

libertarian movement of Senator Barry Goldwater, whose activities were a direct

response to the advances of Democrats and liberal developments in civil rights

legislation that the author’s of PPM thoroughly examine, suggesting the continuation of

an unresolved “contentious episode”.83 Indeed, “the sentiments underlying this

movement are not new.”84

Overall, this resembles what has been referred to as “opportunity spirals”, where

environmental changes, interpretations of that change, and action and counteraction

together result in increases and declines in available opportunities for mobilization and

collective action.85 However, if we are to consider the proposition of a strict adherence

to the American Constitution pursued by many Tea Party supporters, and the recovery

of “freedom” and “liberty” sought by their organizations and affiliates, these “spirals”

guide us into a historical abyss of ideological dormancy and activity leading to the

American Revolution and beyond.86

Even if we instead narrow our focus to the public demonstrations of early 2009,

a segmented timeline remains blurred due to the political affiliations and activities of

those actors associated with the firms that the Tea Party has come to be closely

associated. For example, Dick Armey, chairman of FreedomWorks, is directly tied to

Republican politics, pioneering and politically connected economic conservative

organizations of the 1980s, and the “exclusionary discourse” of 1990s Religious Right

moralism and neoliberal politics.87 These overlapping connections highlight an ongoing

discord within the political process scheme. Additionally, if we take into consideration

the accumulated experience and knowledge of past conservative movements that such

an organization represents, it should be no surprise that the present Tea Party has

espoused the tactics of prior successes in conservative movements, where “leaders

inspired grassroots action.”88

82 Rasmussen & Schoen 36, 115; Zernike 52, 56; Mayer (2010)83 Zernike 54-55; Flanders 984 Rasmussen & Schoen 27885 McAdam, et. al. (2001) 243-24486 Zernike 68-7387 Marie Smith 149-153; Zernike 35; Armey & Kibbe 15-16; Peace 9188 Blee & Creasap 272; Mayer (2010)

30

Organizations, entrepreneurs, and their “issues”This model is similar to PPM in recognizing that “movements may largely be

born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own

actions.”89 However, OEM developed in response to the growing presence of

professional SMOs, i.e. SMOs that had extended their traditional appeals for resources

beyond those individuals and organizations directly benefiting from social movement

activities.90 Proponents of this position have established such resources as a

prerequisite to social movement activity, in that they “must be controlled or mobilized

before action is possible.”91 These professional organizations with full-time, paid staff

are central to the mobilization, stability, and maturation of social movements, as prior

movements had chiefly been based on informal groups and associations centered on

contentious action.92 Indeed, “(c)entral to (OEM) is some notion of increasing or

decreasing demand for (social) movement activity and social change and some notion of

SMO stimulation of demand, organizational growth, decline, and adaptation as demand

increases or decreases.”93 Within the inherent competitiveness of the SMS, SMOs are

burdened with the responsibility of continually adapting to these changes, thus ensuring

the organizations activities, operations, and overall survival.

Organizational structuring and developments determining the success of the

TPM are difficult to assess. This is namely due to the Tea Party movement’s

decentralized character, which limits the recognition of hierarchical or bureaucratic

divisions. The result of this advocacy is noted as such:

“Organizationally, the Tea Party movement is a loose collection

of dozens, even hundreds of groups. Some … are well funded, but many

more are not; some are national in prominence, while many others

operate only locally. There are so many national, state, local, and county 89 McAdam, et. al. (1996) 15; Jenkins 54390 McAdam, et. al. (1996) 4; McCarthy & Zald (1987) 156; McCarthy & Zald (2002) 534;Caniglia & Carmin 20291 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 15592 Caniglia & Carmin 202; McCarthy & Zald (2002) 54593 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 535

31

organizations using “Tea Party” in their name that it’s all but impossible

to keep track of them all, and they cannot keep track of one another.”94

However, the breadth and depth of the TPM and its ability to coordinate within and

across state borders suggests a level of centralization and consensus that refuses to be

acknowledged. In fact, RMT theorists argue “that outside leaders will tend to play a

central role in mobilizing groups with low organization, power and resources”.95 Given

the primitive forms of organization which flagship demonstrations exercised (i.e.

mailing lists) and the limited efficacy their localized initiatives achieved

independently,96 we should expect to see external agency in defining the goals of the

TPM, expanding the legitimacy of the movement’s claims, and driving mobilization

efforts.

To a large extent, this has been commonplace within the Tea Party movement.

Among others, several well-renowned conservative organizations have been attributed

to the successful mobilization of the TPM: FreedomWorks has provided intellectual and

logistical support; its sister organization Americans for Prosperity has sponsored

numerous Tea Party activities, including the pivotal Tax Day protests of 2009 and

national tours against healthcare reform and carbon emissions caps; and the Our

Country Deserves Better PAC responsible for the nationwide Tea Party Express bus

tour event attempting “to unify, educate, and most importantly encourage Americans to

continue their opposition of deficit spending, government-run health care, and

irresponsible bailouts.”97 These connections have spurred great controversy and

criticisms from opposition while questioning the intentions and grassroots

characteristics of the movement as a whole.

At the heart of such claims is Koch Industries, a prominent American multi-

national corporation. The Koch brothers are longtime advocates and financiers of

94 Rasmussen & Schoen 165-16695 Canel 208; McCarthy & Zald (1987) 152; Jenkins 53196 Zernike 17-1997 Wright 3; Rasmussen & Schoen 146-150; Zernike 33-45; Good (2009, April 13); Good(2010, September 11); Flanders 6

32

libertarian causes, and have invested heavily in derailing the Obama administration.98

Their activist branch (Citizens for a Sound Economy) was born in the 1980s, with the

foundation formally splitting into the complimentary organizations Americans for

Prosperity and FreedomWorks in 2004. Working in tandem towards fiscally

conservative policy, these groups have advocated what has been referred to as

“grassroots” and “grasstops” strategies by encouraging citizen activism through

maintaining the organization of activists and supporters, communicating organization

activities and current events, and contacting high-profile public figures.99 While

FreedomWorks is not as vocal with its ambitions, it has a long history of prestigious,

professional political affiliations and has employed and promoted comparable two-

tiered approaches as those endorsed by its AFP brethren.100

The contributions of several conservative organizations have been noted in their

attachments to the growth of TPM’s “local” and “national” groups. As noted above,

previously established organizations have an advantage over the entrance of new

groups, as “(o)lder organizations have available higher degrees of professional

sophistication, existing ties to constituents, and experience in fund-raising

procedures.”101 Such benefits can instill a broad sense of institutional legitimacy and

authority while also allowing for expanded capabilities in amassing the requisite

resources for ongoing operations. In this manner, FreedomWorks has had a particularly

helpful role in establishing the TPM. While citizens were arguably discovering and

voicing their disagreement at kitchen tables throughout the US, Zernike writes how

FreedomWorks intervened to consolidate their scattered, frustrated emotions:

“FreedomWorks, in turn, gave people with inchoate anger something to

do about it - organize. While many groups on the right moved to seize the Tea

Party energy as it grew in the early months of 2009, it was FreedomWorks that

98 Mayer (2010); Zernike 35-37; Rasmussen & Schoen 150; Flanders 899 Mayer (2010)100 Berkowitz (2004)101 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 164

33

moved first and most aggressively. And very quickly, the FreedomWorks

ideology became the Tea Party ideology.”102

FreedomWorks staff experienced in organizing public demonstrations began

setting up platforms for communication and organized protest amongst American

conservatives.103 Of the 700-plus Tax Day Tea Party protests held nationwide in April

2009, FreedomWorks claims they provided resources to approximately 600 groups in

the successful execution of their flagship demonstrations.104 They have continued to

financially back the coordinated activities of the TPM, orchestrating the 2010 Taxpayer

March on Washington as “reflective of what we saw in the movement and what we

hoped to see in the movement.”105 In all, the sponsorship of the TPM by

FreedomWorks is best illustrated in the published efforts to organize local Tea Party

chapters “designed to achieve the goal and mission of FreedomWorks: lower taxes, less

government, and more freedom.”106 This identifies well with OEM’s federated SMO

structure in which participants are organized into small local units or chapters with the

effect of maintaining solidarity within the SMO and increasing appeals and flows of

resources107. However, while polls have indicated greater levels of income and

discretionary resources of Tea Party members allowing for their individual participation

under the OEM scheme, the root of such solidarity incentives and “selective benefits of

a nonmaterial sort” encouraging initial and continued involvement demand further

explanation.

The evolution of national TP groups has also not escaped the direct influence of

external organization. FreedomWorks absorbed the Tea Party Patriots brand,

introducing national coordinators responsible for communicating with state and local

volunteers and charging it into the Tea Party’s largest group, ultimately transforming it

into a broad-based “national grassroots coalition with more than 3,000 locally

102 Zernike 35, 43; Armey & Kibbe 123103 Zernike 40-42104 Good (2009, April 13)105 Vogel (2010, March 26)106 Armey & Kibbe 183107 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 160-162

34

organized chapters and more than 15 million supporters nationwide.”108

FreedomWorks’ ideology has also been incorporated into the Tea Party Patriot’s

recruitment scheme and their attempts to solicit those who “agree with our core

principles of fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government, and free

markets.”109 The Our Country Deserves Better PAC has sponsored the nationwide Tea

Party Express bus tours that have mobilized support throughout the US, overcoming

criticisms regarding its Republican ties to amass significant media attention and

resource appeals.110 These media and advertising campaigns are detrimental to

connecting the “isolated constituents” which comprise the diffuse Tea Party

movement.111 Such directed attempts have also proven successful with previous

conservative social movements by coursing “deep into mainstream America, bringing

new social groups into politics.”112 Yet again, this refers to the problematique in

identifying how participation and contributions were solicited from the burgeoning and

politically inexperienced TPM at the individual level and how they have been

maintained throughout the process of collective action.

According to OEM, the bridge linking the TPM to its current and expanding

membership is found in the strategic framing activities of “issue entrepreneurs”. These

issue entrepreneurs “attempt to define the issues for specific and general audiences. If

they are successful, they enlarge and intensify the sentiment pool, that is, they increase

the number of people committed to a demand/preference for change and intensify the

commitment to the issue of those who already share that preference.”113 To accomplish

these aims, issue entrepreneurs employ collective action frames, which “are action-

oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and

campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO).”114 Although the concept and

characteristics of entrepreneurs in social movements is arguably underdeveloped, they

108 Tea Party Patriots; Zernike 190109 McMorris-Santoro (2009, November 30)110 Good (2010, September 11)111 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 161112 Caniglia & Carmin 273113 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 536, 557114 Benford & Snow (2000) 614; Klandermans 80, 93; Johnston & Noakes 8

35

frequently draw upon two general sources for framing devices: prior or concurrent

social movements and the cultural symbols of the dominant group.115

These images and symbols are in abundance when it comes to expanding the

Tea Party movement’s appeal to a broader audience. Of especial concern is the well-

publicized “Santelli Rant” in February of 2009, which gave a name and identity to the

discontent displayed earlier by Rakovich’s and Carender’s demonstrations:116

“This is America! How many people want to pay for your neighbor’s

mortgages that have an extra bathroom and can’t pay their bills? Raise your

hand! President Obama, are you listening? You know Cuba used to have

mansions and a relatively decent economy. They moved from the individual to

collective. Now they’re driving ‘54 Chevy’s. It’s time for another Tea Party.

What we are doing in this country will make Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin

Franklin roll over in their graves. We’re thinking of having a Tea Party in July,

all you capitalists. I’m organizing.”

While numerous entrepreneurial agents may now be identified or proposed through

their affective competencies in the mobilization and collective activities of the TPM,

this landmark statement echoes the dual-tiered nature of framing in its reference to the

revolutionary efforts of America’s founders and the particular individualism marked of

U.S. culture.117 Similarly, the TPM’s ideological “adoption” of FreedomWorks’ “lower

taxes, less government, and more freedom” platform and “American Revolutionary

Model” of protest are considered a response to a government action that “cut to the core

of basic American values of individual choice and individual accountability.”118 In

return, organizational sponsorship of the TPM is reportedly based on the promise of a

“freedom-loving” American populace reintroduced “to their roots and a fundamental

tenet of our nation’s fabric.”119

115 Johnston & Noakes 7, 10; Minkoff & McCarthy 296116 Zernike 22; Rasmussen & Schoen 120-121; Armey & Kibbe 19-20117 Verba 3; Rasmussen & Schoen 225118 Zernike 104; Armey & Kibbe 29119 Armey & Kibbe 34

36

However, what would need better clarification is what exactly the issue is that

adheres to the concerns and demands of the TPM. Zernike’s 2010 NY Times poll

indicates an array of issues concerning TP supporters and list of responsible institutions

on which their grievances are based.120 By extolling a comprehensive platform of lower

taxes, less federal government, and Constitutional principles, they have potentially

aligned themselves with a wide range of constituents and sympathizers throughout the

United States under the “Tea Party” umbrella. Furthermore, their inclusion of

upholding the Constitution suggests their activities as in protection of the

abovementioned “basic American values” inherent of United States’ citizens. In fact, it

is argued that “(t)o the Tea Partiers, the Constitution made their movement more than a

protest, and more than a partisan argument. There was no arguing with the

Constitution.”121 In this light, the “issue” at hand for these entrepreneurs is the

Constitution itself. It would then be no surprise that the strategies provided and

endorsed by FreedomWorks to budding Tea Partiers draw immediate reference from the

sentiment and disruptive tactics employed by those inspiring the original American

Revolution (i.e. public demonstration, slogans, boycotts, and confrontational town hall

meetings).122

Such sentiment resonates with what Benford & Snow (2000) refer to as the

centrality of collective action frames, or how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas

associated with movement frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilization. Indeed,

Diani’s (1996) research has suggested that the current environment of traditional party

cleavages in the U.S. combined with a political system perceived as closed to

autonomous action favors mobilizations employing the anti-establishment frames akin

to the TPM. By channeling Constitutional values and principles within more pragmatic

concerns over irresponsible public spending and government overreach, issue

entrepreneurs have been able to complete the core framing tasks of diagnostic framing

(problem identification and attribution) and motivational framing (rationale for

engaging in ameliorative or collective action).

120 Zernike 202, 204-205121 Ibid 67122 Armey & Kibbe 30-31; Rasmussen & Schoen 124

37

However, the third core task of prognostic framing (articulation of a proposed

solution to the problem) remains far more elusive for the Tea Party. The movement and

its participants have produced a broad range of issues in which it could pursue, all

packaged within the general themes of fiscal conservatism and the preservation of

personal liberties. In an attempt to unite these scattered voices and concerns thereby

constructing a distinct yet inclusive set of demands, the resulting high level of

abstraction has lessened the movement’s ability to fruitfully engage in ameliorative

proceedings. While this has privileged Tea Partiers a particular independence in their

local operations and recruitment efforts to attain the participants, legitimacy, and

momentum of social change, it has also created disjuncture in the goals in which the

movement activists and supporters wish to accomplish under the rubric of strengthened

conservatism.

While defending Constitutional principles remains a central theme to the TPM

and its activities, the “originalist” perspective held by many of the Tea Partiers on the

document’s reading is riddled with subjectivity, inconsistency, and controversy.123 This

position has been reinforced by the political research firm Democracy Corps’ findings

that many conservatives believe that Tea Partiers, in regards to the movement’s

demands, “expressed a common refrain about returning the country to its founding

values as expressed in the Constitution - though they did not agree on what that

meant.”124 While conservative organizations have forged alliances with a range of

prominent conservative figures in order to mobilize and activate constituents under an

expanding Tea Party name (from the ultra-conservative politics of Sarah Palin and the

libertarian advocacy of Ron Paul to the social and political commentary of conservative

media pundit and religious zealot Glenn Beck), these ambiguities interestingly highlight

the potential for internal conflicts based on diverging values and interests within a

social movement, ultimately spurring the deterioration of its organizational unity and

political efficacy.125

In this sense, while OEM accounts for the ability of greater conservative

organizations to incorporate isolated individuals within its coordinated activities, 123 Liptak (2010); Lithwick (2011); Zernike 68124 Zernike 153125 McCarthy & Zald (1987) 163

38

thereby strengthening its support base, resource flows, and political efficacy, it fails to

address how the Tea Party movement has been able to produce an allegiance to the Tea

Party’s motif and the desire to pursue its individualistic aims within a collective setting.

This position offers a unique challenge to OEM’s “issue entrepreneur” in their task to

determine which issue is to be addressed while charting a unified course of corrective

measures towards a determined end.

New Conservative Social Movement Theory?New Social Movement theorists attempt to explain the occurrence of collective

action through the lens of politics, culture, ideology, and identity.126 As concern has

moved away from economic issues, focus has instead centered on the collective control

of the process of symbolic production and the redefinition of social roles (e.g. age,

gender, ethnicity, neighborhood, the environment and peace).127 Given the emphasis on

personal, non-class related issues, much of the conflict and struggle of NSMs has been

removed from the political sphere and placed in the arena of civic sphere.128 In fact,

“NSMs prefer to remain outside of normal political channels, employing disruptive

tactics and mobilizing public opinion to gain political leverage.”129 The combination of

this conscious avoidance or rejection of institutionalized politics, careful distancing

from established political parties, and ideological bonds arguably distinguishes NSMs

from its analytical predecessors.130 In reference to the “patriotism, free enterprise

capitalism, and/or a traditional moral order” inherent to conservative social movements,

we should be able to discern a common conservative ideology emerge from the Tea

Party’s ongoing activities.131

As mentioned above, the TPM comprises all three of these elements, however,

the issue of free enterprise has been channeled through the rubric of “patriotism” and

Constitutionalism, which are themselves subject to varied moral interpretations. Posner

and Ingersoll have elevated this discussion in reporting how many within the TPM 126 Buechler (1995); Canel 190-191; McCarthy & Zald (2002) 558; Pichardo 414127 Canel 190128 Ibid 199129 Pichardo 415130 Buechler (1995) 448131 Blee & Creasap 270

39

share the view that civil government should be reformed according to the dictates of

biblical law, indicating that Tea Party patriotism is sourced from endorsing and

institutionalizing Christian ethic.132 In this sense, it is not surprising that a religious

Christian doctrine has surfaced in the argumentation and philosophy of Tea Partiers and

Tea Party organs. For instance, opposition of federal climate change policy from Tea

Partiers has often centered on the biblical script that our Creator “made this earth for us

to utilize”, while prominent national Tea Party affiliates (including Tea Party Patriots)

have officially stated their pursuit of protecting Christian principles.133

Moreover, some researchers argue that it is this adherence to Christian traditions

of “moral purity” that likely accounts for the prominence of female activism in the Tea

Party movement:

“For many contemporary evangelical Christian women, the motivations

are similar. They want to enter the public sphere or even run for office to

eliminate abortion, protect marriage, contain sexual relations, oppose gay

marriage, and clean up the mess made by the sexual revolution. All this is part

of a long and recognizable female reform tradition in American history.”134

In addition to their strong presence in the media, some polls have also suggested that

this segment of women now represent over half of the Tea Party supporters

nationwide.135 While these factors overall combine to display the religious undertones

on which this movement is based, it would also stress the strong ideological

commitments characteristic of NSMs and NSM participants.136

Recent surveys from Pew Research Center have reiterated how Tea Party

supporters’ shared ideological commitments have translated into common beliefs and a

collective ability to affect social change and political policy. Foremost, is a national

survey highlighting their overwhelming belief that “the federal government is a major 132 Posner & Ingersoll 119133 Broder 1; Rasmussen & Schoen 148-149, 152; Armey & Kibbe 66-67; Tea Party PatriotsMission134 Rosen 216-217; Bruce (2010); Clement & Green (2011)135 Quinnipiac University Polling Institute (2010); Pew Research Center (2010, April 18); Rosin2010; McMorris-Santoro (2010, March 24); Vogel (2010, March 26)136 Pichardo 417

40

threat to their personal rights and freedoms.”137 According to NSMT, this perceived

government interference in the civic sphere (or “lifeworld”) indicates the struggles over

collective control of symbolic productions and definitions of social roles that can

articulate common identity and invite coordinated action.138

Referring back to the conservative values on which they are premised, Tea Party

supporters have also stated the importance of religion in their stance on more

contentious social issues.139 These beliefs have very real significance for the political

field, where Tea Party-backed candidates have been found to invoke “Christian

American history” and the “religion of the founders.”140 Courser (2010) has showcased

the potential of ideology on political outputs in his study of the 2010 mid-term

congressional elections. The results from these elections have shown that these Tea

Party-backed candidates found very strong success in Republican (i.e. conservative)-

leaning districts, while suffering overwhelming defeat in Democratic districts.141

Furthermore, after the swell of conservatives into congress, the amount of Tea Party

supporters “angry with the federal government” lessened, as their “trust in government”

increased142. From this, we can envision a more substantial yet definitive sense of unity

amidst the “anger”, “fear”, and “distrust” normally associated with this loose

conglomeration of concerned citizens expressing their frustration towards an intrusive

and unresponsive government.

However, if the TPM was and is an ideological response to these oppositional

government activities, there seems to be varying shades of conservative ideology

inherent of the Tea Party movement. For instance, while there seems to be a strong

correlation between agreement with Christian conservatism and the Tea Party

movement, the inverse relationship is weaker.143 This supposes the presence and

support of secular, fiscally responsible citizens bent on altering the political landscape

strictly through economic reforms. However, this platform is also contested within the

137 Pew Research Center (2010, April 18)138 Buechler (1995) 445; Pichardo 420; Canel 192-194139 Clement & Green 2011140 Ingersoll 141141 Courser 2142 Pew Research Center (2010, April 18); Pew Research Center (2011, March 3)143 Clement & Green 2011

41

TPM limiting its function as a viable alternative. Zernike (2010) states the dilemma and

inconsistencies of a more pragmatic TPM ideology:

“(I)t mostly reflected frustration. The country was awash in massive

problems, and it was easy to believe that the government was in the way of a

solution. The Tea Partiers who argued for fiscal responsibility didn’t focus on

the details - like the fact that any meaningful cuts in the deficit would require

deep cuts in programs that most Americans, and most Tea Partiers,

supported”.144

In all, these arguments underline a general struggle inherent of the TPM in determining

the size and role of the federal government that is accepted as Constitutionally

permissible. While many Tea Partiers remain confused about the scale and scope of

government, a minority of “angrier” Tea Party activists have supported “cutting Social

Security, Medicare, education, and defense spending”, highlighting a tension that has

plagued the movement and its participants.145

This discussion brings us to two central characteristics of NSMT that are also

related to the TPM: decentralized organization and a loose definition of who belongs to

the movement.146 The former component, although contested, is not without its

supporters inside and outside the movement. Rasmussen & Schoen (2010) illustrate

this position:

“Our view is that the movement’s decentralized nature is more a

strength than weakness. Its leaders may come and go, but the movement is

entrenched for the long haul - in whatever form it may eventually take. …

While some organizational streamlining may be inevitable in the future, the

Tea Party movement’s power lies in the way it mirrors the diversity,

nonconformity, and individuality of the American people.”147

144 Zernike 135145 Ibid 7, 151146 Canel 201; Pichardo 416; Buechler (1993)147 Rasmussen & Schoen 168

42

However, within their praise of the “American people”, they fail to address the

uncertainty, controversy, and divisiveness surrounding any particular rendition of the

Constitution and its provisions. In their research of conservative and right-wing

(extremist) groups, Blee & Creasap have noted that the motivations of patriotism and

religious beliefs often blur distinctions between these two divergent forms of social

movements.148 In reference to “originalist” interpretations of the Constitution, the TPM

has by design incorporated “far-right agitators who believe the federal government is

largely unconstitutional” and has “overreached the limits of its divinely ordained

authority”.149

These extremist elements have had especial resonance to the TPM and the

American public since the January 2011 shooting of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson,

Arizona, where reports have loosely linked particular conservative ideologies endorsed

by the movement to the shooter.150 This has to some extent exacerbated unfavorable

perceptions of the TPM amongst the general public, while overall discouraging Tea

Party-backed candidates from attending to an official Tea Party platform as they entered

office.151 In the end, while efforts to balance competing ideological distinctions have

taken form in the TPM’s wiki-style “Contract from America”, the inability of the

movement to fully contain and pacify these ideological contests has undermined its

capacity to gain the “political leverage” necessary to enact such legislation.152

148 Blee & Creasap 275; Flanders 11149 Posner & Ingersoll 119-122; Zernike 144; Brant-Zawadzki (2010); Rasmussen & Schoen194-195, 297150 Weisberg (2011)151 Jonsson (2011); Silver (2011)152 Contract from America; Wright 4, 10

43

Implications & conclusionsThe above analysis has offered a brief sketch of these three dominant figures in

social movement research and weighed their respective explanatory value in accounting

for the emergence and growth of the modern-day Tea Party movement. Although these

findings would be greatly complimented by a more in-depth analysis of Tea Party

supporters as well as of their opponents, this section will spell out some of the

implications stemming from these arguments and discuss the relations among the

models. Although these results ultimately center on the schematic laid out by OEM,

these models have been shown to produce quite different explanations and should

encourage greater care among future analysts in their examinations of the Tea Party

movement. Fortunately, this study hints at some potential avenues of research that may

aid in further clarifying the components of the Tea Party’s rise to national prominence.

OEM CentralityThis project shows that the contributions of OEM and its professional

associations trump theoretical perspectives more strongly linked to “grassroots”

developments and ideological ties in explaining the success of the Tea Party movement.

OEM has emphasized the organizational competencies required to amass and distribute

the resources demanded of the Tea Party’s diffuse character and relative lack of

expertise in the field of political activism. Consider the following table, which

illustrates the main descriptors within each respective theoretical approach as they apply

to the Tea Party movement:

Table 1. Competing theoretical properties of TPM.

PPM NSMT OEM

"Politicalopportunities" Yes Decentralized structure Yes Professional services Yes

Interpersonal networks Yes Common ideology No Division of labor Yes

Brokers No Non-hierarchical No Centralized resources Yes

44

While domestic liberal policy is presented as a viable political opportunity, the

gradual, organic development of network formations, resource appeals, and the

organization of this budding social movement stressed under PPM were interrupted by

larger organizations in a concerted attempt to channel these national anxieties and

disorganized energies into an expanded conservative outlook throughout the U.S.

populace. In this non-hostile takeover, these conservative organizations have captured a

growing and appreciably visible public anxiety through patriotic rhetoric and a call to

protect the fundamental values in which all citizens are rightfully bestowed, while

stifling the natural development of interpersonal ties and identifiable representation

within the movement. However, despite their injection of resources (namely finance

and intelligence) into the veins of the TPM, these organizations have had little success

in capitalizing on the supposed widespread public support enjoyed by the movement as

a whole to determinately enforce political policy.

This apparent lack of return could be indicative off NSMT’s decentralized

structuring amidst a population united by ideological convictions, masking the growing

support required to expand the movement’s claims and encourage social and political

change. However, the diversity of beliefs that have surfaced from within the movement

and the controversy and divisiveness these attitudes and interests have ignited would

disallow a credible account of events through this lens. In their celebration of American

conservatism and the traditional values it extols, the nondescript characteristics of the

Tea Party’s engagements have seemingly initiated a more substantive antagonism than

the globalization and liberal domestic policies from which their grievances have

arguably stemmed, deterring its abilities to accomplish the wider social change it

desires. In this context, Tea Party groups will struggle to maintain credible influence

beyond their immediate environments, limiting their capacity to pressure greater

institutions to engage in structural change.

Courser (2010) has also hinted at a dissonance between local Tea Party chapters

and its national groups in his research of the 2010 U.S. mid-term elections.153 In this

153 We may find useful Gramsci’s (2006) critique of the State and civil society in constructingan organizational sketch of the Tea Party movement. The author argues that hegemony is likelyto dictate relations between “political society” and “civil society”, resulting in a detachment ofthe top levels of society from mid and grassroots actors. See also Tocci 32.

45

study he found that while national affiliates were “undermining traditional Republican

candidates in a conventional, professional campaign to nominate conservative

candidates, these small groups were largely inert and confused when it came to how to

engage in the political process.”154 And although the efforts of national Tea Party

groups have had greater impact on the Tea Party movement’s drive to expand support

and contributions over those of local chapters, its ability to transcend into the realm of

political influence is at best uncertain. For instance, despite its heavy-handed approach

in spurring what came to be known as the modern American Tea Party movement,

financial contributions to the FreedomWorks’ PAC saw only a meager increase during

2009, while public favorability ratings of the TPM have overall remained flat.155 In this

light, the successful establishment of the “Tea Party Caucus” within the U.S. Congress,

along with its unspecified support, undetermined policy guidelines, and relatively short

track record, can presently only be considered a symbolic victory for the TPM.156

Altogether, this illustrates the fact that, while varying opinion in the appropriateness of

strategies and purposes of the Tea Party movement may create or expose divides

between counterparts, they ultimately have in common a shared dependence on the

resources of their conservative sponsorship.157

OEM and Collective IdentitiesOEM has historically been criticized for failing to address the functions of

culture and collective identity in its scheme, a consequence of its rational actor model

based on material or fiscal benefits and rewards from participation. In this manner, it is

said that OEM underestimates the immaterial (or nontangible) elements encouraging the

transition from condition to action in which NSMT and, to a far lesser extent, PPM

attempt to exercise. While authors of OEM do give lip-service to social networks and

“solidarity incentives” in explaining initial and ongoing support for a SM, of more

immediate significance for this particular discussion on the TPM are their arguments on

154 Courser 8155 Silver (2011); Weigel (2010, August 9)156 Courser 2; Allen & Sherman (2010); “Tea Party Cautious” (2010)157 Vogel (2010, August 9); Weigel (2010, September 9)

46

“sentiment pools”, ideology, and entrepreneurs.158 “Sentiment pools” are “reservoirs of

support” leading to ideologically structured action, which is “behavior shaped by

ideological charged beliefs, factual and evaluative, about both the ends of action and the

means of action. Ideology, in turn, is generated out of a complex process of cultural

and historical developments.”159 With all due respect to the overwhelming complexity

of cultural and historical processes in formulating such preferences, we would be remiss

in bypassing the potential contributions of ideology in explaining the rise of this

conservative social movement for the scholarly pragmatism inherent to OEM’s rational

actor model.

Regarding entrepreneurs and “sentiment pools”, while entrepreneurs are

commonly characterized as appendages of greater organizations, recent research has

begun to recognize their autonomy and value in facilitating the development of SMs

and SMO activities.160 Aldrich has gone on to reiterate the unique and undetermined

position of entrepreneurialship in the evolution of social movements:

“Outcomes of the founding process are highly uncertain. In many

cases, nascent entrepreneurs’ initial ideas are not realized, because their

intentions are misguided or they can not mobilize needed resources. Many also

cannot achieve the level of control necessary to gain mastery over

organizational boundaries. Thus, many organizing attempts fail. Foundings

that survive typically adopt the existing routines and competencies of the

population they join, but some may contribute new ones.”161

Entrepreneurs in this sense play a pivotal role in navigating between institutional

structures and the mass public, relying utmost on their deeper understanding of the

capacities and shortcomings of the population and environment in which they operate.

This is exampled in their modes of resource appeals, in which they employ both the

158 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 543, 549159 Ibid (2002) 549160 Minkoff & McCarthy (2010)161 Aldrich 79

47

psychological and symbolic benefits of “issue framing” and the contextually-bound

references of “stories and visions”.162

From here, we question the applicable value of OEM’s original concept of

“issue entrepreneur” as it generally relates to the TPM. The movement has offered a

generous program of fiscal conservatism and traditional moral values for its constituents

in place of the more stringent claims and measurements in goal attainment normally

associated and pursued within “issue entrepreneur” activities.163 This imbalance

towards the movement’s qualitative functions has been reiterated by Pease (2010) in his

discursive analysis of the Tea Party’s “fantasmatic construction” of the post-9/11 U.S.

Nation. According to the author, “Tea Party populism reshaped the traditional themes

of family and nation to respond to actual political anxieties, but within the frameworks

of already constituted social ideologies.”164 This heightened level of abstraction does

not fully lead us away from OEM, provided an inclusive account of these “social

ideologies” within the OEM scheme and, more importantly, how the Tea Party has been

able to craft “traditional themes of family and nation” to their advantage.

However, the alteration and development of these underlying attitudes, values,

and identities effecting collective action and social change is largely unaccounted for in

OEM. Underwriter’s of this model formally recognize this inadequacy: “Subsequent

research has stressed more strongly than we did that the social organization of sentiment

pools is as important as their size and intensity in understanding the likelihood of their

implicit aggregate social change demand resulting in collective action. … Such work,

however, has not typically developed accounts of the shifting nature of the sentiments

that cohere within social infrastructures.”165

Ideologues and “ideological entrepreneurialship”Much of this discussion has focused on the significance of “issue entrepreneurs”

in accounting for the success of the Tea Party movement while also recognizing the

ambiguity surrounding their mixed conservative agenda. By definition, this lack of

162 Ibid 99-101163 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 557164 Pease 91165 McCarthy & Zald (2002) 549

48

clarification interferes with their assigned responsibility “to define the issues, to define

what is wrong with the system, and what kinds of policies would rectify the

grievances.”166 In spite of this disadvantage, figures within the movement have

continued to expand and invigorate a committed base of conservative Tea Party activists

and supporters. While our research cannot fully account for the outstanding divide

between the “social organization” of sentiments within RMT and the “ideological

bonds” of NSMT, we may be able to narrow this analytical gap by developing upon the

strategic efforts and capabilities assigned to the “issue entrepreneur”.

Given the weight placed on entrepreneurial activity in this study of the TPM and

the overarching conservative ideologies representative of its movement, we propose

North’s (2005) “ideological entrepreneur” as a complement to OEM’s “issue

entrepreneur” in explaining how conservative organizations have been able to “seed”

the local activism on which the movement is reportedly based. Storr’s (2008-2009)

assessment of North’s accumulated work on the “ideology entrepreneur” shows a

symbiotic relationship between ideology and institutions, and argues the main purpose

of ideological entrepreneurs is to convince others that the ideological underpinnings of

the existing institutional structure are unjust.167 While “ideological entrepreneurialship”

is arguably under conceptual development and thus weak in empirical application, it

serves as a preliminary yet substantial offering in uncovering the inner dimensions and

subsequent manifestations viewed under the Tea Party movement outlined above.168

This concept happens to mesh well with the developing descriptions and

characteristics of social movement entrepreneurs provided in previous sections of this

paper. Referring back to Aldrich’s work on the psychological and contextual bonds of

successful entrepreneurs, the author has stressed that these actors will use “high levels

of abstraction, thus fostering a degree of ambiguity around their innovative ideas.”169

For example, in the claim that “(t)he principles of individual freedom, fiscal

responsibility, and constitutionally limited government are what define the Tea Party

ethos”, we can witness a staggered, overarching triumvirate of ambiguous politics and

166 Ibid 557167 Storr 100, 103168 Ibid 100-101, 1169 Aldrich 99

49

intent based on garnering support for independent conservative interpretations of

Constitutional provisions. In recognizing such conservative “(i)deologies (as) really

shared theories of the world”, the promotion of conservatism en masse would then help

facilitate the shared framing of messages which allow for the absorption or cooptation

of a social movement through institutional means, circumventing the decentralized and

seemingly protected autonomous status of Tea Party affiliates.170

Moreover, the concept of “ideological entrepreneur” highlights the social

movement entrepreneur as the least common denominator between the three

explanatory frameworks applied within this paper. Proposed theoretical models of the

“ideology entrepreneur” go so far as to forge an inclusive account of available

opportunity structures, networks, professionalized institutions, and “common cultural

background” fusing PPM, OEM, and NSMT. Under these conditions, an “ideological

entrepreneur would be alert to opportunities to advance an existing ideology that people

in a particular place want but do not yet know about (i.e., to engage in ideological

arbitrage). He would be alert to opportunities to sell a new ideology that better explains

the world than existing ideologies.”171 In light of preliminary research suggesting

increased levels of conservatism among the most active members of the Tea Party

demographic, and with consideration to the political absenteeism characteristic of Tea

Party supporters, we may argue that “ideological entrepreneurs” have played a central

role in capturing this sentiment and attempting to reshape and advance its properties

through patriotic discourse without full consideration or knowledge of such efforts.172

Within this context, we would view these entrepreneurs as competing for ideological

control of the “Tea Party” brand within a decentralized, exponentially compressed

hierarchical infrastructure, ultimately smothering the collective voice of those it would

wish to empower.

With due regard to the complexity and particularities underlying the formation

and acceptance of conservative ideology within a broad national infrastructure, the

introduction of the “ideology entrepreneur” is an attempt to address certain weaknesses

of OEM mentioned in this paper, thus deepening its explanatory value in the case of the 170 Gamson & Myers 284; Storr 102171 Storr 107-108172 Abramowitz (2010)

50

TPM. These actors have invited and “politicized” a loosely affiliated network of

individuals under a platform of traditional conservative values, emphasizing their

economic aims in order to avoid potentially contentious social issues and subsequent

intramovement dissent. Irrespective of speculated partisanship of the TPM, these

SMOs have channeled resources into the public sphere through “grasstops” initiatives in

their attempt to guide excited conservatives into local activism. In relation to the

responsibilities of the “issue entrepreneur”, these ideologues have identified various

affronts to conservative values, packaging prescriptions through the idioms of civic and

religious duty. While many Tea Partiers may symbolically respect the individualism

and independence proffered by these conservative organizations, as one moves up this

ladder of “Tea Party” abstraction, more substantive divisions become apparent.

In all, acceptable levels and forms of religious adherence, patriotism, and

conservative values have formally gone unaddressed within the movement thereby

limiting its transformative capabilities while also producing friction and animosity

within its ranks. Blee & Creasap have shown how past conservative movements have

actually capitalized on ideological division in goal-accomplishment, where their more

visible position in the social infrastructure had allowed them to identify “enemies”,

propagate “culture”, and efficiently and effectively organize “gender” norms in the

pursuit of social and institutional change.173 While the strong levels of female

participation and activism in the TPM may both replicate and champion this natural

outgrowth of traditional Christian conservatism, statements suggesting the location of

women in roles of influence as a strategic function in order to deter opposition, mitigate

internal conflict, and facilitate better communications threaten to relegate their position

to organizational “tokenism” and further debase the movement’s purported autonomous

character.174

Conclusion: We the people?Our findings show that the Organizational-Entrepreneurial model within the

RMT scheme best explains the emergence of the modern-day “Tea Party” and its

173 Blee & Creasap 173-175174 Vogel (2010, March 26); Bhatnagar 347-348; Traister 290

51

subsequent growth and influence. Natural developments proposed by the alternative

frameworks, while important, do not adequately address the strong reliance on resource

flows from professional SMOs into the national and local Tea Party groups that have

both guided and permitted their ongoing activities. From this, while the TPM has

exercised its collective potential for altering the course of conservative politics, its

dependence on external sponsorship in facilitating the movement’s broader agendas

suggests that the movement is still in a fledgling state with an uncertain future regarding

its composition and direction. Furthermore, the volatility of its professed conservative

ideologies threatens to limit its adaptive organizational capabilities in response to

external conditions at the risk of exposing more contentious and divisive issues.

Although we recognize the need for a more in-depth analysis of the movement and its

components to confirm or disprove these arguments, this discussion here has led us to

believe that SMOs and their leadership have been able to overcome concerns of

political partisanship and elitism in order to fan the conservatives flames amongst Tea

Party supporters.

Regardless, the nature of American politics has been dramatically revolutionized

by the Tea Party's ability to politicize people who were previously apolitical.175 While

recognizing that social movements are “rarely unified affairs” and often involve the

integration by diverse SMOs pursuing different goals and employing different tactics,

we turn our attention to the presence of the social movement entrepreneur (more

specifically, the “ideological entrepreneur”) in helping to account for this conversion,

and to aid in further explanations of how the Tea Party movement has been able to

achieve and maintain its momentum in the face of deeper ideological distinctions

amongst its supporters.176 As larger SMOs continue to emphasize their facilitative role

in the Tea Party movement as “seeding” grassroots conservative activism, one can’t

help but wonder who is tending the garden.

175 Harris 3176 Canel 212

52

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