G.R. No. 161803  February 4, 2008DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. vs. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTYFOREST, INC.

FACTS: Rogelio Ortiz, with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Butuan City, going to Surigao City. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.

The night before, the prime mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. The prime mover was not equipped with early warning device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the trailer.

To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of the incident. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against private respondents. The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on the national highway without an early warning device on the vehicle.The CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Ortiz in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.

ISSUE: Whether the negligence of Limbaga was the proximate cause of the collision.

RULING: Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. In the precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,  the Court discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:  

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected ; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

 The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as

authority for the proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or omission. Here, the Court agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. The skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988JOSE S. AMADORA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora went to San Jose-Recoletos to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation. While they were in the school auditorium he was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. Daffon was convicted by Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. Alfredo’s parents filed a civil case for damages under Article 2180 against Respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff but the appellate court reversed its action on the ground that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.

ISSUE: Whether respondents were liable under Article 2180.

RULING: NO. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxLastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.

As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades” should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”

But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student’s age.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves? This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

G.R. No. 155111 February 14, 2008CORNELIO LAMPESA and DARIO COPSIYAT vs. DR. JUAN DE VERA, JR., FELIX RAMOS and MODESTO TOLLAS

FACTS: De Vera, Jr. boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City driven by respondent Modesto Tollas. Upon reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to allow a truck, then being driven by Dario Copsiyat, to cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private parking lot on the right side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly along its path, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly started to slide back towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, Jr., who was seated in the front passenger seat, noticed his left middle finger was cut off as he was holding on to the handle of the right side of the jeepney. He asked Tollas to bring him immediately to the hospital. 

Lampesa offered P5,000 to De Vera, Jr. as a gesture of humanitarian support, but the latter demanded P1 million although this amount was later lowered to P75,000. The parties failed to settle amicably; thus, De Vera, Jr. filed an action for damages against petitioners.

The trial court found driver Copsiyat negligent in the operation of his truck and ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by De Vera, Jr. It also ruled that Lampesa did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver as required under Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners were liable for the injury sustained by De Vera, Jr.

RULING: YES. The Court explained that once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee.To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.

Lampesa claims he did his legal duty as an employer in the selection and supervision of Copsiyat. But the record is bare on this point. It lacks any showing that Lampesa did so. Admitting arguendo that Copsiyat did show his professional license when he applied for the job of truck driver, Lampesa should not have been satisfied by the mere possession of a professional drivers license by Copsiyat. As an employer, Lampesa was duty bound to do more. He should have carefully examined Copsiyats qualifications, experiences and record of service, if any. Lampesa must also show that he exercised due supervision over Copsiyat after his selection. But all he had shown on record were bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence. Having failed to exercise the due diligence required of him as employer, Lampesa cannot avoid solidary liability for the tortuous act committed by his driver, Copsiyat.