G.R. No. L-24170December 16, 1968

ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD BANTALLA,petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,respondent.

FERNANDO,J.:The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed epidemic proportions.

The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs officials on the high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..

Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to common sense and placing the law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of the case and the findings of facts as set forth in the decision now under review, of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the late Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.

His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Customs in Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo Seizure Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) decreeing the forfeiture of five (5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu Area Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes and rattan chairs for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code."1The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that on September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in question on the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu. After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181 cases of 'Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in the importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No. 426, otherwise known as the Import Control Law."2Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He was, as also already made known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.

The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the forfeiture of the vessels in question and their cargo. They would justify their stand thus: "In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein were apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the said vessels could not have touched any place or port in the Philippines, whether a port or place of entry or not, consequently, the said vessels could not have been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into any Philippine port or place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture under Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code."3Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met the repudiation that it deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners but considering the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the vessels in question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code should be applied to the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were heading towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic port within the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by Republic Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in importation into any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their intention not merely to skirt along the territorial boundary of the Philippines but to come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their prows were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but for the intervention of a customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than eager to accomplish its mission."4The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in rejecting such a plea deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the thought that these vessels were probably not bound for a Philippine port would be too much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is quite irrational for Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to British North Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable goods only to turn about upon reaching the brink of our territorial waters and head for another foreign port."51. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view were not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is now beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us, only questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former category, we lack the power of review.6Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our own discretion for that of the Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant facts and its appraisal of their significance. As we had occasion to state in a relatively recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, ..., there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority."72. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the above consideration.

It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points raised in the above two assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitioners-appellants, alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation of property without due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of Republic Act No. 426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for reversal of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the facts presented a situation less conclusive against the pretension of petitioners-appellants.

From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is without merit.

It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ...8The principle of law that sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.9Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart,10an 1804 decision, that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."

The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of the vessels in question and the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the affirmative.

4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such forfeiture and seizure. The argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the fact that the alleged offense imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not Section 1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws." The first subsection thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo unlawfully engaged in the importation of merchandise except a port of entry. Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the importation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law and all other merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector of Customs have been used are or were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or exportation of the former.

From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly that the due process question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the seizure was based were not unknown to petitioners-appellants. On those facts the liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the statute would appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in accordance with law.

How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the manner in which such seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have been unaware of what they were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a constitutional guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to lend itself as an instrument for escaping a liability arising from one's own nefarious acts.

5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No. 426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred thereunder. This argument raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive force. The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v. Commissioner of Customs11to the effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law "did not produce the effect of declaring legal the importation of goods which were illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void."

Roxas v. Sayoc12announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained his jurisdiction over the case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its final determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from the decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650. We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation of the cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words it could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which should stand until it is revoked by the appellate tribunal."

As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs,13we had occasion to reaffirm the doctrine in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period of effectivity of Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of Customs of the jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture pending before him, which are in the nature of proceedingin rem...."

It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to adhere faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach and a reflection on the law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal competence of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitioners-appellants. Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must not be hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.

[G.R. NO. 176380 : June 18, 2009]PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,Petitioner,v.COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,Respondent.

D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1filed by petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) questioning the Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78564. The CA decision set aside the resolutions3issued by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 6484, which in turn denied the respondent Commissioner of Customs' (respondent) Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Review Shell filed with the tax court. The CA decision effectively dismissed Shell's tax protest case.

BACKGROUND FACTSShell is a domestic corporation engaged, among others, in the importation of petroleum and its by-products into the country. For these importations, Shell was assessed and required to pay customs duties and internal revenue taxes.

In 1997 and 1998, Shell settled its liabilities for customs duties and internal revenue taxes using tax credit certificates (TCCs) that were transferred to it for value by several Board of Investment (BOI)-registered companies. The transfers of the TCCs to Shell were processed by the transferors-BOI-registered companies and were eventually approved by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (the Center). The Center is composed of the following government agencies: the Department of Finance (DOF), the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Bureau of Customs (BOC), and the BOI. On the belief the TCCs were actually good and valid, both the BIR and the BOC accepted and allowed Shell to use them to pay and settle its tax liabilities.

In a letter dated November 3, 1999 (Center's November 3 letter), the Center, through the Secretary of the DOF, informed Shell that it was cancelling the TCCs transferred to and used as payment by the oil company, pursuant to its EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99. The Center claimed that after conducting a post-audit investigation, it discovered that the TCCs had been fraudulently secured by the original grantees who thereafter transferred them to Shell; no categorical finding was made regarding Shell's participation in the fraud. In view of the cancellation, the Center required Shell to pay the BIR and BOC the amounts corresponding to the TCCs Shell had used to settle its liabilities.

Shell objected to the cancellation of the TCCs claiming that it had been denied due process. Apparently, Shell had sent a letter to the Center on November 3, 1999 (Shell's November 3 letter) adducing reasons why the TCCs should not be cancelled; Shell claimed that the Center's November 3 letter cancelling the TCCs was issued without considering its letter of the same date.

The Center did not act on Shell's November 3 letter; instead, the respondent sent a letter dated November 19, 1999 (respondent's November 19 letter) to Shell requiring it to replace the amount equivalent to the amount of the cancelled TCCs used by Shell to satisfy its customs duties and taxes. The pertinent portion of the respondent's November 19 letter states:

In view of such cancellation, it becomes apparent that the Customs Official Receipts previously issued to [Shell] with the applications of the [TCCs] cited in said lists becomes null and void ab initio. In view thereof, your corporation must have to replace amount ofP209,129,141.00 which is equivalent to the amount of the [TCCs] cancelled. The corresponding interest, surcharge and penalties thereof shall be relayed to you in due time after the recomputation.

Your immediate response to this demand letter shall be appreciated.

Shell submitted its reply letter dated December 23, 1999.4Shell maintained that the cancellation was improper since this was done without affording the corporation its right to due process. It further claimed that the existence of fraud in the issuance and transfer of the TCCs, or even Shell's participation in the alleged fraud, had not been sufficiently established.

Three years later, through letters dated February 15, February 20, and April 12, 2002 (respondent's collection letters), the respondent, through Atty. Gil Valera (Atty. Valera), Deputy Commissioner for Revenue Collections Monitoring Group, formally demanded from Shell payment of the amounts corresponding to the listed TCCs that the Center had previously cancelled. Except for the amount due, the respondent's collection letters were similarly worded, as follows:

In as much as the same [TCCs] were reported as having been utilized to pay your government obligations earlier, formal demand is hereby being made upon you to pay back the total amount of x x x within five (5) days from receipt thereof [sic]. Failure on your part to settle your obligation would constrain the Bureau of Customs to initiate legal action in the regular court.

Please consider this as our last and final demand.

As mentioned, all three letters were signed by Atty. Valera.

Shell replied to the respondent's February 15 and 20, 2002 collection letters via letters dated February 27 and March 4, 2002. Before it could reply to the respondent's April 12, 2002 collection letter, Shell received on April 23, 2002 the summons in one5of the three collection cases6filed by respondent against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In these collection cases, the respondent sought to recover the amounts covered by the cancelled TCCs; the complaints were all similarly worded except for the amount and TCCs involved, and were signed by Atty. Valera.

On May 23, 2002, Shell filed with the CTA a Petition for Review questioning the BOC collection efforts for lack of legal and factual basis. To quote the issues Shell submitted in its CTA petition:

1. Whether or not the TCCs subject of the instant petition for are genuine and authentic;

2. Whether or not petitioner's right to due process of law was violated by the issuance of the 1999 collection letter and/or the filing of the collection cases, both of which seek to enforce the Excom Resolution;

3. Whether or not attempts to collect unpaid duties and taxes, being based on the bare allegation that the TCCs were fraudulently issued and transferred, can be given any effect considering that fraud is never presumed but must be proven;

4. Assuming arguendo that fraud was present in the issuance of the original TCCs, whether or not such fraud can work to the prejudice of an innocent purchaser for value who is not a party to such fraud;

5. Whether or not the respondent and the DOF/Center are stopped from invalidating the TCCs and the transfers and utilizations thereof;

6. Whether or not the TCCs, having been utilized, are already functus officio and can no longer be cancelled.7The respondent filed a motion to dismiss Shell's Petition for Review on the ground of prescription. The respondent claimed that Shell's petition was filed beyond the 30-day period provided by law for appeals of decisions of the Commissioner of Customs to the CTA. The respondent also contended that this 30-day period should be counted from the time Shell received the respondent's collection letters.

Shell countered by invoking the case of Yabes v. Flojo,8where this Court ruled, under the circumstances of that case, that a complaint for collection filed in court may be considered a final decision or assessment of the Commissioner9that opened the way for an appeal to the CTA. Applying that principle, Shell contends the 30-day reglementary period should be counted from the date it received the summons for one of the collection cases filed by respondent or, specifically, on April 23, 2002, not from the date that it received the respondent's collection letters. The Petition for Review, having been filed on May 23, 2002, was thus instituted within the period provided by law.

The CTA found the respondent's contentions unmeritorious, and thus denied his motion to dismiss in a Resolution dated January 28, 2003.10The tax court noted that the collection letters were issued and signed only by Atty. Valera, not by the respondent, so that Shell was justified in not heeding the demand. The CTA consequently declared that it is the filing of the collection cases in court that should instead be considered as the final decision of the respondent, and only then should the 30-day period to appeal commence. The respondent elevated the CTA decision to the CA after the CTA denied its motion for reconsideration.11The appellate court annulled and set aside the CTA rulings in its decision dated May 3, 2006.12It found the collection letters written by Atty. Valera "indicative of [respondent's] final rulings on the assessments concerning the spurious TCCs xxx which were then already appealable to the respondent CTA. Each letter carried a clear demand to pay within five (5) days from receipt, and each also carried a warning that 'this [is] our last and final demand.' " On the authority of Atty. Valera to issue the collection letters, the appellate court pointed to Customs Memorandum Circular (CMC) No. 27-2001 that delegated the Commissioner's authority on matters relating to tax credit and transfers of tax credit to Atty. Valera, and to Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 40-2001 that delegated the authority to sign, file, and prosecute civil complaints likewise to Atty. Valera.

Shell's attempt to have the CA decision reconsidered proved unsuccessful; hence, this petition.

THE PETITIONShell insists, in this Petition for Review onCertiorari, that its Petition for Review with the CTA was filed within the 30-day reglementary period that, it posits, should be counted from the date it received the summons for the collection cases filed by respondent against it before the regular court. Shell cites this Court's ruling in Yabes v. Flojo.13On the assumption that the collection letters amounted to a decision on its protest, Shell submits that these are not "decision[s] of theCommissioner of Customs" appealable to the CTA under Section 7, Republic Act (RA) No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282.14It maintains that it is the Commissioner's decision on the taxpayer's liability for customs duties and taxes, not the decision of his subordinate, which is the proper subject of the appeal to the CTA, the delegation of authority under CMC No. 27-2001 and CMO No. 40-2001 notwithstanding. It additionally claims that Atty. Valera was prohibited from carrying out his delegated duties under the injunctive writ issued the RTC of Manila in its Order dated August 27, 2001, and the Temporary Restraining Order the CA issued on April 4, 2002.

THE COURT'S RULINGWe resolve to DENY Shell's petition; the present case does not involve a tax protest case within the jurisdiction of the CTA to resolve.

The parties argue over which act serves as the decision of the respondent that, under the law, can be the subject of an appeal before the CTA, and from which act the 30-day period to appeal shall be reckoned. Shell insists it should be the filing of the collection suits as this was indicative of the finality of the respondent's action. The respondent, on the other hand, claims, it should be the earlier act of sending the collection letters where the respondent finally indicated his resolve to collect the duties due and demandable from Shell.

Section 7 of RA No. 1125, as amended, states:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal xxx;

x x x

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention, or release or property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;

These decisions of the respondent involving customs duties specifically refer to his decisions onadministrative tax protest cases, as stated in Section 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP):

Section 2402. Review by Court of Tax Appeals. - The party aggrieved by a ruling of the Commissioner in any matter brought before him upon protest or by his action or ruling in any case of seizure may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, in the manner and within the period prescribed by law and regulations.

Unless an appeal is made to the Court of Tax Appeals in the manner and within the period prescribed by laws and regulations, the action or ruling of the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive. [Emphasis supplied.]

A tax protest case, under the TCCP, involves a protest of the liquidation of import entries. A liquidation is the final computation and ascertainment by the collector of the duties on imported merchandise, based on official reports as to the quantity, character, and value thereof, and the collector's own finding as to the applicable rate of duty; it is akin to an assessment of internal revenue taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code15where the tax liability of the taxpayer is definitely determined.

In the present case, the facts reveal that Shell received three sets of letters:

A. the Center's November 3 letter, signed by the Secretary of Finance, informing it of the cancellation of the TCCs;

b. the respondent's November 19 letter requiring it to replace the amount equivalent to the amount of the cancelled TCCs used by Shell; andcralawlibrary

c. the respondent's collection letters issued through Atty. Valera, formally demanding the amount covered by the cancelled TCCs.

None of these letters, however, can be considered as a liquidation or an assessment of Shell's import tax liabilities that can be the subject of an administrative tax protest proceeding before the respondent whose decision is appealable to the CTA. Shell's import tax liabilities had long been computed and ascertained in the original assessments,16and Shell paid these liabilities using the TCCs transferred to it as payment. It is even an error to consider the letters as a "reassessment" because they refer to the same tax liabilities on the same importations covered by the original assessments. The letters merelyreissuedthe original assessments that were previously settled by Shell with the use of the TCCs. However, on account of the cancellation of the TCCs, the tax liabilities of Shell under the original assessments were considered unpaid; hence, the letters and the actions for collection. When Shell went to the CTA, the issues it raised in its petition were all related to the fact and efficacy of the payments made, specifically the genuineness of the TCCs; the absence of due process in the enforcement of the decision to cancel the TCCs; the facts surrounding the fraud in originally securing the TCCs; and the application of estoppel. These are payment and collection issues, not tax protest issues within the CTA's jurisdiction to rule upon.rbl r l l lbrr

We note in this regard that Shell never protested the original assessments of its tax liabilities and in fact settled them using the TCCs. These original assessments, therefore, have become final, incontestable, and beyond any subsequent protest proceeding, administrative or judicial, to rule upon.

To be very precise, Shell's petition before the CTA principally questioned the validity of the cancellation of the TCCs - a decision that was made not by the respondent, but by the Center. As the CTA has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Center, Shell's remedy against the cancellation should have been acertioraripetition before the regular courts, not a tax protest case before the CTA. Records do not show that Shell ever availed of this remedy. Alternatively, as we held inShell v. Republic of the Philippines,17the appropriate forum for Shell under the circumstances of this case should be at the collection cases before the RTC where Shell can put up the fact of its payment as a defense.

Parenthetically, our conclusions are fully in step with what we held inShell v. Republic18that a case becomes ripe for filing with the RTC as a collection matter after the finality of the respondent's assessment. We hereby confirm that this assessment has long been final, and thisrecognitionof finality removes all perceived hindrances, based on this case, to the continuation of the collection suits. InDayrit v. Cruz,19we declared on the matter of collection that:

[A] suit for the collection of internal revenue taxes, where the assessment has already become final and executory, the action to collect is akin to an action to enforce the judgment. No inquiry can be made therein as to the merits of the original case or the justness of the judgment relied upon.

In light of our conclusion that the present case does not involve a decision of the respondent on a matter brought to him as a tax protest, Atty. Valera's lack of authority to issue the collection letters and to institute the collection suits is irrelevant. For this same reason, the injunction against Atty. Valera cannot be invoked to enjoin the collection of unpaid taxes due from Shell.

WHEREFORE, weDENYShell's Petition for Review onCertiorariandAFFIRMthe result of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 3, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78564, based on the principles and conclusion laid down in this Decision. Shell's Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals, docketed as CTA Case No. 6484, isDISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104604 October 6, 1995

NARCISO O. JAO and BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS; COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS; COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of Manila; Col. SINDULFO R. SEBASTIAN, Director, Enforcement and Security Services, Bureau of Customs; and Maj. JAIME MAGLIPON, Chief, Operations and Intelligence Staff, Enforcement and Security Services, Bureau of Customs,respondents.G.R. No. 111223 October 6, 1995

NARCISO O. JAO and BERNARDO M. EMPEYNADO,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and SINDULFO SEBASTIAN, JAIME MAGLIPON; JOSE YUCHONGCO; RICARDO CORONADO; VICTOR BARROS; DENNIS BANTIGUE; ROY LARA; BENJAMIN SANTOS; RODOLFO GONDA; ADONIS REJOSO; DANIEL PENAS; NICANOR BONES; ABUNDIO JUMAMOY; ARTEMIO CASTILLO; ANDRESITO ABAYON; RUBEN TAGUBA; JAIME JAVIER; HERBERT DOLLANO, all with the Bureau of Customs; JOVY GUTIERREZ of the Makati police, and 'JOHN DOES',respondents.

ROMERO,J.:G.R. No. 104604 is a petition forcertiorariof the decision1of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders issued by the respondent judge dated November 20, 1990, December 10, 1990, January 3, 1991 and all subsequent orders in the Civil Case No. 90-2382 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati are SET ASIDE. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the respondent judge is hereby enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382 and further, Case No. 90-2382 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111223 is a petition forcertiorariof the resolution of the Ombudsman2dismissing the case filed before it by herein petitioner.

The above-docketed cases were consolidated per resolution of the Court on August 26, 1993, as the facts in both cases were the same.

These facts are the following:

On August 10, 1990, the Office of the Director, Enforcement and Security Services (ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information regarding the presence of allegedly untaxed vehicles and parts in the premises owned by a certain Pat Hao located along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and Honduras St., Makati. After conducting a surveillance of the two places, respondent Major Jaime Maglipon, Chief of Operations and Intelligence of the ESS, recommended the issuance of warrants of seizure and detention against the articles stored in the premises.

On August 13, 1990, District Collector of Customs Titus Villanueva issued the warrants of seizure and detention.

On the same date, respondent Maglipon coordinated with the local police substations to assist them in the execution of the respective warrants of seizure and detention. Thereafter, the team searched the two premises.

In Makati, they were barred from entering the place, but some members of the team were able to force themselves inside. They were able to inspect the premises and noted that some articles were present which were not included in the list contained in the warrant.. Hence, on August 15, 1990, amended warrants of seizure and detention were issued by Villanueva.

On August 25, 1990, customs personnel started hauling the articles pursuant to the amended warrants. This prompted petitioners Narciso Jao and Bernardo Empeynado to file a case for Injunction and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-2382 with prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati Branch 56 on August 27, 1990 against respondents. On the same date, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

On September 7, 1990, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, claiming that it was the Bureau of Customs that had exclusive jurisdiction over it.

On November 20, 1990, the trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss.

On November 29, 1990, petitioners' application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction was granted conditioned upon the filing of a one million peso bond.

The Court also prohibited respondents from seizing, detaining, transporting and selling at public auction petitioners' vehicles, spare parts, accessories and other properties located at No. 2663 Honduras St., San Isidro, Makati and at No. 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Respondents were further prohibited from disturbing petitioners' constitutional and proprietary rights over their properties located at the aforesaid premises. Lastly, respondents were ordered to return the seized items and to render an accounting and inventory thereof.

On December 13, 1990, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds:

a) the lower court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, it has no recourse but to dismiss the same; and

(b) the lower court had no legal authority to issue an injunction therein.

On January 3, 1991 the motion for reconsideration was denied. Respondents then went to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss and in granting petitioners' application for preliminary injunction. They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, such jurisdiction being exclusively vested in the Bureau of Customs.

The Court of Appeals set aside the questioned orders of the trial court and enjoined it from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 90-2382. The appellate court also dismissed the said civil case.

On May 2, 1992, petitioners filed a petition with this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 104604.

As regards G.R. No. 111223, petitioners filed criminal charges against respondents, other officers and employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police before the Office of the Ombudsman for Robbery, Violation of Domicile and Violation of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-90-2027.

Respondent Ombudsman summarized the case before it as follows:

This is an affidavit-complaint filed by the complainants against the respondents, Officers and Employees of the Bureau of Customs and members of the Makati Police allegedly for violation of Domicile and Robbery defined and penalized under Articles 128, 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of R.A. 3019 committed as follows, to wit:

That on August 11, 1990, after receiving intelligence information of the presence of smuggled goods, some of the respondents headed by Jaime Maglipon posed themselves as Meralco inspectors and entered complainants' stockyards and residence located at 2663 Honduras Street, Makati, Metro Manila and at 240 Quirino Avenue, Tambo Paranaque for the purpose of searching smuggled goods found therein without the consent of the owner thereof;

That after the search, respondents on August 13, 1990 up to August 25, 1990, this time clothed with a Warrant of Seizure and Detention, with the aid of the Makati Police and several heavily armed men entered complainants stockyard located at 2663 Honduras St., Makati, Metro Manila, and pulled out therefrom several machineries and truck spare parts without issuing the corresponding receipts to the complainants to cover all the items taken.

Respondents claimed in their consolidated and verified comment that they are not liable for violation of domicile because the places entered and searched by them appear not to be the residences of the complainants but only their warehouses. As proof of this allegation, the respondents presented the pictures of said warehouses, which are attached to their comment as Annexes "6", "6-A" to "6-C" and the Sheriff's return likewise attached to their verified comments as Annex "7". According to the respondents, a charge for violation of domicile may apply only if the place entered into against the will of the owner is used exclusively for dwelling. In the case at bar, the place entered into was used more of a warehouse than a dwelling place.

Further respondents also claimed not liable for robbery (sic) because the complainants appear not to be the owners of the properties taken. Moreover, the respondents claimed that the taking is lawful because the same proceeded from a warrant of Seizures and Detention; there was no violence or intimidation of person committed and that there was no intent to gain on the part of the respondents, the purpose of the seizure of the subject goods being to collect customs duties and taxes due the government.

Lastly, the respondents disclaimed liability for a violation of R.A. 3019 because they deny having demanded from the complainants the sum of P100,000.00. Instead according to the respondents, it was the complainants who offered them P70,000.00 to delay the hauling of the seized goods as attested to in the joint affidavit of CPSGT, Ricardo Coronado and Dennis Bantequi.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and on May 31, 1991, another hearing was held to give the parties a chance to submit further evidence to support their respective claims.

On March 15, 1993 respondent Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending that the case be dismissed for lack of merit.

On May 17, 1993, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was denied on July 8, 1993.

Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 111223, which was filed on August 16, 1993.

In G.R. No. 111223, petitioners claim that respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case and in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

They allege that respondent Ombudsman ignored evidence incriminatory to the raiders; that the receipts did not tally with petitioners' receipts nor with the Commission on Audit's inventory; that the respondents are guilty of robbery and of violating petitioners' constitutional right against violation of domicile. For these reasons, petitioners pray that the Ombudsman's resolution be reversed and that the Court direct the Ombudsman to cause the filing of criminal charges as may be warranted against respondents.

We find the petition in G.R. No. 111223 devoid of merit.

The Court, recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and for reasons of practicality, declared, in anEn Bancresolution dated August 30, 1993, issued in G.R. Nos. 103446-473that the Court will not interfere nor pass upon findings of public respondent Ombudsman to avoid its being hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, and that it will not review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. The dismissal by the Ombudsman of petitioners' complaint, therefore, stands.

We will now discuss G.R. No. 104604.

Petitioners contend: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Collector of Customs could no longer order the seizure for the second time of items previously seized and released after amnesty payments of duties and taxes; (2) that the Bureau of Customs has lost jurisdiction to order the seizure of the items because the importation had ceased; (3) that the seizure of the items deprived the petitioners of their properties without due process of law; and (4) that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies.

We find no merit in petitioners' contentions.

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings4The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings hasexclusive jurisdictionto hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions ofcertiorari, prohibition ormandamus.5It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.

The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.6Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.

Respondents assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction between the existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the decisions the law has not seen fit to do so.7The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of the seizure should properly be ventilated before the Collector of Customs. We have had occasion to declare:

The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance. (Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 19 SCRA 10). The Collector of Customs of Sual-Dagupan in Seizure Identification No. 14-F-72 constituted itself as a tribunal to hear and determine among other things, the question of whether or not the M/V Lucky Star I was seized within the territorial waters of the Philippines. If the private respondents believe that the seizure was made outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, it should raise the same as a defense before the Collector of Customs and if not satisfied, follow the correct appellate procedures. A separate action before the Court of First Instance is not the remedy.8WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104604 and in G.R. No. 111223 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 82586. September 11, 1992.]

HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, Commissioner of Customs, and CARLOS L. RAZO, Collector of Customs of the Subport of Clark,Petitioners, v. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVIII, San Fernando, Pampanga, and CESAR SONNY CARLOS/CVC TRADING,Respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday & Tuason forPrivate Respondent.SYLLABUS1. TAXATION; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE RES SUBJECT OF THE WARRANT OF SEIZURE AND DETENTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The respondent Judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent Judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.

2. ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF SEIZURE AND DETENTION PRECLUDES INTERFERENCE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; ILLEGALITY OF THE WARRANT CANNOT JUSTIFY REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS INTERFERENCE; OWNERSHIP OF GOODS OR LEGALITY OF THEIR ACQUISITION CAN BE RAISED IN SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS. A warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty, the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in the said proceedings. That in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally registered in his name, having paid all the taxes and corresponding licenses incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confers upon the said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding; if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by law for seizure and forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught by scheming parties. Even the illegality of the warrant of seizure and detention cannot justify the trial courts interference with the Collectors jurisdiction. In the first place, there is a distinction between the existence of the Collectors power to issue it and the regularity of the proceeding taken under such power. In the second place, even if there be such an irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result therefrom.

D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition filed on 6 April 1988 to annul, for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the 26 February 1988 Resolution of respondent Judge denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 8109 pending before Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pampanga and granting private respondents motion therein for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding further in said case. It resurrects a long-settled issue of the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over actions involving articles subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In the Resolution of 18 April 1988, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the respondent Judge from further proceeding with the aforementioned Civil Case No. 8109 or from enforcing and/or carrying out his Resolution of 26 February 1988. 1

Private respondent subsequently filed his Comment 2 to the petition, to which petitioners filed a Reply. 3 Private respondent then filed a Rejoinder 4 to the latter.

This Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. 5 Both manifested that they have sufficiently expounded on the relevant issues in their respective Memoranda, which the Court noted and granted.

The factual antecedents disclosed in the petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a sworn letter 6 dated 7 February 1988 and addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, one Butch Martinez informed the former of the existence of both "assembled and disassembled" knocked-down vehicles, particularly Toyota Lite Aces, at the compound CVC Trading, which is owned by a certain Mr. Castro and located at St. Jude Avenue, St. Jude Village, San Fernando, Pampanga. Martinez requested for an immediate investigation thereon and prosecution for the violation of customs laws.

On the basis thereof, Gen. Benjamin C. Cruz, Acting Director of the National Customs Police, formed a team composed of National Customs Police (NCP) and Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division (CIID) members, issuing the same a Mission Order 7 on 11 February 1988. The team proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on the same day, giving due notice of their presence to the PC Region III Command and the PC-INP Station at San Fernando, Pampanga.

Upon arrival at the place pinpointed by Mr. Martinez at around 11:00 p.m., the team found a fenced area containing twenty (20) units of fully and partly assembled Toyota Lite Ace vans. It immediately took possession and control of the motor vehicles by cordoning off the enclosure. Thereafter, at about 11:30 p m., two (2) members of the team were designated to secure a warrant of seizure and detention from the Collector of Customs of the Subport of Clark, 8 herein petitioner Carlos L. Razo. The latter instituted seizure proceedings against the abovementioned vehicles (Seizure Identification No. CAB-01-88), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Twenty (20) units Toyota Lite-Ace, CVC Trading St. Jude Ave., Dolores Homesite, San Fernando, Pampanga, OWNER/CLAIMANT", for the violation of "Section 2530 (f) and (1)-1 & 5" of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank regulations. Accordingly, at about 8:00 a.m. on 12 February 1988, he issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention. 9

Since receipt of the warrant was refused by the owner/claimant or any of his representatives, the same was served by substituted service through the posting of a copy thereof on one of the subject motor vehicles found near the gate of the stockyard. An inventory of the vehicles was conducted and a copy thereof was attached to the return of the warrant made to the issuing authority.

At about 11:00 a.m. on 12 February 1988, when the team was about to haul the motor vehicles away, two (2) Regional Trial Court sheriffs arrived with a temporary restraining order issued on that date by the respondent Judge, as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga; the order was issued in connection with Civil Case No. 8109, entitled "Sonny Carlos, plaintiff, versus Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police from seizing or confiscating the vehicles until further ordered, and directed the defendants to attend the raffle of the case on 26 February 1988 at 9:00 oclock in the morning and show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them. It further required plaintiff to submit within twenty four (24) hours from that date the list of vehicles in question and "not to dispose any (sic) of them pending further order of the court." 10

In his Complaint 11 in the above-entitled case, private respondent alleges that he is the owner of several vehicles which are legally registered in his name and that he has paid all the taxes and "corresponding licenses" therefor; he further avers that elements of the defendant Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police have surrounded his residence threatening to take possession of the vehicles. He finally prays that the latter be enjoined from doing so and that they be ordered to pay damages in the sum of P50,000.00.

By virtue of the restraining order, the physical transfer of the vehicles was deferred, however, elements of the National Customs Police and the PC Regional Command remained deployed in the area to assert possession and control over the seized motor vehicles by the Bureau of Customs.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 16 February 1988, lawyers of the Bureau of Customs filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 Civil Case No. 8109 alleging therein (a) the lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject vehicles in view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases, and (b) the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies.

On 17 February 1988, the private respondent filed an Oppositions/Comment on the Motion to Dismiss 13 alleging, among others, that the Warrant of Seizure and Detention did not comply with the requirements for a valid search warrant under the Constitution, and that taxes for the vehicles have been paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

The Motion to Dismiss was heard on 19 February 1988 by the respondent Judge, to whose branch the case was raffled off. After said hearing, the private respondents motion and application for preliminary injunction were deemed submitted for resolution.

On 22 February 1988, private respondent filed an Amended Complaint 14 changing his name from "Sonny Carlos" to "CESAR SONNY CARLOS" and naming as defendants, in place of the "BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND/OR CUSTOMS POLICE", "ATTY. CARLOS L. RAZO, in his capacity as Collector of Customs; LOUIE ROMERO, BILLY BIBIT, their authorized deputies and JOHN DOES." In this Amended Complaint, private respondent assails the subject warrant for being patently "illegal and fatally defective" and void of any virtue; reiterates his willingness to post a bond "in an amount the Court may fix conditioned upon the damages that the defendants may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of the injunction;" and asks for P500,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

In the meantime, the hearing of Seizure Identification No. CAB-01-88 was set for 18 and 19 February 1988, per Notice of Hearing dated 15 February 1988 and issued by petitioner Collector of Customs. Since the owner/claimant CVC Trading refused to accept a copy of the said notice, a follow-up notice of hearing was transmitted to it thru a telegram; the latter replied also by telegram,15 declaring that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are the legal possessors/owners (sic) of the vehicles in our compound there can be no forfeiture since a case has been lodged before the civil courts hearing on Feb. 19, 1988 the courts have assumed jurisdiction to your exclusion.

Moreover elementary due process requires service of documents complaint. There can be no service of summons (sic) or notice of hearing thru telegrams."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the hearing on 18 February 1988, Attys. Napoleon Gatmaitan and Conrado Unlayao, CIID, Bureau of Customs, appeared for the Government. No appearance was entered for the owner/claimant. Thus, the Government was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

On 26 February 1988, petitioner Collector of Customs rendered a Decision 16 in the said seizure proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"WHEREOF, by authority of law vested in the undersigned, it is hereby ordered that the Twenty (20) Units Toyota Lite Ace covered by this seizure case be, as they are hereby, declared forfeited in favor of the Government to be disposed of in the manner provided for by law.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all parties and office (sic) concerned, with a copy thereof posted in the Bulletin Board of this Customhouse, for their information guidance and appropriate action."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the same date, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution 17 in Civil Case No. 8109 denying the motion to dismiss and granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent portions thereof read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. Resolution on the Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Lift Restraining Order

xxx

A reading of the complaint will show that it was alleged that the plaintiff is the owner of the subject vehicles. He is in actual and physical possession of the same. Plaintiff enjoys the presumption of ownership, to (sic) which he has to protect.

xxx

It is to be noted that the subject matter of the complaint is the legal ownership of the vehicles and damages being asked by plaintiff, thus, this Court can assume jurisdiction over the case. The mere allegation of the defendants that the subject vehicles were smuggled based on reliable information will not divest this Court of jurisdiction.

xxx

In this particular case, there is no showing that plaintiff is an importer who imported dutiable goods, in entering the port of Clark Air Base, imported thru that port. The goods are in private (sic) place owned by plaintiff, and not in the possession of the collector of customs.

xxx

The numerous Supreme Court decisions cited by movant in his motion to dismiss have very remote pertinence at the case at car. In the cited cases, dutiable imported goods or articles were seized while on vessels and/or customs zone (sic), and the alleged owners filed cases of replevin or recovery of personal properties.

II. Resolution in the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction

xxx

Having substantiated the said allegations, in his complaint with Annexes and considering the oral arguments of the parties, it is hereby ordered and directed that after the plaintiff filed (sic) the bond in the amount of P100,000.00 as fixed by this Court, all the defendants and any other persons acting under their command, or for (sic) in their behalf, to (sic) desist and refrain from guarding the area of the plaintiff and from seizing or confiscating the vehicles involved in this case pending termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. Thus, the defendants is (sic) hereby inhibited for the meantime to guard the area or commit trespass of plaintiffs premises in any manner restrain (sic) the movement of herein plaintiff and his representatives or employees, considering that there is standing (sic) of this Court that pending the termination of this case, the said vehicles should not be disposed of."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, this petition which We find to be meritorious. It should be granted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The court a quo jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The respondent Judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent Judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.

In the 1966 case of Pacis v. Averia, 18 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.P. Bengzon, held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases. [Section 2312, R.A. 1937] The Collectors decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs Section 2313, R.A. 1937] whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. [Section 2402, R.A. 1937, Sections 7 and 11, R.A. 1125]. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to this Court [Section 18, R.A. 1125; Rule 44, Rules of Court]. On the other hand, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 [As amended by R.A. 3828] lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely what took place in this case. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings against the M/B Bukang Liwayway before the Collector of Customs of Manila, was stifled by the issuance of a writ of replevin by the Court of First Instance of Cavite.

Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. or vice versa? In Our opinion, in this particular case, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute [Herman v. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 50 Phil. 490; Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Trinidad, 279 U.S. 211, 73 L. ed. 665]. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in his defense. This provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs."cralaw virtua1aw library

In De Joya v. Lantin, 19 this Court, speaking again through Mr. Justice J.P. Bengzon, declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant, to Republic Act 1937.

Said proceedings should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 29, 1966). From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

This rule was subsequently reiterated in Romualdez v. Arca, 20 De Joya v. David, 21 Diosamito v. Balanque, 22 Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs,23 Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, 24 Collector of Customs v. Torres, 25 Pacis v. Geronimo 26 and De la Fuente v. De Veyra. 27

The language of the foregoing rule is simple, clear and leaves no doubt as to the Regional Trial Courts lack of jurisdiction over the res which has already been made the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings. Frankly, this Court is unable to understand why the respondent Judge misread the same; perhaps, he simply chose to ignore it. At any rate, such behavior is highly condemnable.cralawnad

A warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty, 28 the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in the said proceedings. That in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally registered in his name, having paid all the taxes and corresponding licenses incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confers upon the said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding; 29 if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by law for seizure and forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught 30 by scheming parties. Even the illegality of the warrant of seizure and detention cannot justify the trial courts interference with the Collectors jurisdiction. In the first place, there is a distinction between the existence of the Collectors power to issue it and the regularity of the proceeding taken under such power. In the second place, even if there be such an irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result therefrom. In Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, 31 this Court had the occasion to state:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. Respondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling force of the above doctrines, would assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction, as earlier made mention of, between the existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent Judge of 26 February 1988 in Civil Case No. 8109 before Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, and all proceedings had therein, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 April 1988 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 134114.July 6, 2001]

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., (FORMERLY FILIPRO, INC.)petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DE LEON, JR.,J.:

Challenged in this petition for review oncertiorariis the Decision[1]in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43188[2]dated September 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[3]dated May 30, 1995 of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 4478[4]dismissing petitioners petition for review to compel the Commissioner of Customs to grant it a refund of allegedly overpaid import duties, on its various importations of milk and milk products, amounting to Five Million Eight Thousand and Twenty-Nine Pesos (P5,008,029.00).

Petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[5]dated June 9, 1998.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the importations of milk and milk products for processing, distribution and sale in the Philippines.Between July and November 1984, petitioner transacted sixteen (16) separate importations of milk and milk products from different countries.Petitioner was assessed customs duties and advance sales taxes by the Collector of Customs of Manila for each of these separate importations on the basis of the published Home Consumption Value (HCV) indicated in the Bureau of Customs Revision Orders. Petitioner paid the same but seasonably filed the corresponding protests before the said Collector of Customs from October 25 to December 5, 1984, uniformly alleging therein that the latter erroneously applied higher home consumption values in determining the dutiable value for each of these separate importations.In the said protests, petitioner claims for refund of both the alleged overpaid import duties amounting to Five Million Eight Thousand and Twenty-Nine Pesos (P5,008,029.00) and advance sales taxes aggregating to Four Million Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P4,564,179.30).

On October 14, 1986, petitioner formally filed a claim for refund of allegedly overpaid advance sales taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) amounting to Four Million Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P4,564,179.30) covering the same sixteen (16) importations of milk and milk products from different countries.Not long after, on October 15, 1986 and within the two-year prescriptive period provided for under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) for claiming a tax refund, petitioner filed the corresponding petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which was docketed therein as C.T.A. Case No. 4114.On January 3, 1994, the tax court ruled in favor of petitioner and forthwith ordered the BIR to refund to the petitioner the sum of Four Million Four Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Ninety-Four Centavos (P4,489,661.94) representing the overpaid Advance Sales Taxes on the aforesaid importations.

On the other hand, the sixteen (16) protest cases for refund of alleged overpaid customs duties amounting to Five Million Eight Thousand Twenty-Nine Pesos (P5,008,029.00) were left with the Collector of Customs of Manila.However, the said Collector of Customs failed to render his decision thereon after almost six (6) years since petitioner paid under protest the customs duties on the said sixteen (16) importations of milk and milk products and filed the corresponding protests.

Consequently, in order to prevent these claims from becoming stale on the ground of prescription, petitioner immediately filed a petition for reviewdocketed as C.T.A. Case No. 4478, with the Court of Tax Appeals on August 2, 1990 despite the absence of a ruling on its protests from both the Collector of Customs of Manila and the Commissioner of Customs.

On May 30, 1995, the CTA rendered judgment dismissing C.T.A. Case No. 4478 for want of jurisdiction.[6]The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on July 11, 1995 was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution[7]dated January 6, 1997.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed on February 10, 1999 the said judgment and resolution of the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 4478 to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.However, this appeal was later dismissed by the appellate court on September 23, 1997 for lack of merit.The Court of Appeals opined,inter alia, that the CTAs jurisdiction is not concurrent with the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs since there was no decision or ruling yet of the Collector of Customs of Manila on the matter; that the petition does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions on exhaustion of administrative remedies to justify petitioners immediate resort to the CTA; that the petitioner failed to move for the early resolution of its claims for refund nor was there any notice given that the said Collector of Customs continued inaction on its claims would be deemed a denial of its claims; and that petitioner also neglected to cite any law or jurisprudence which prescribes a period for filing an appeal in the CTA even if there was no action yet by the Commissioner of Customs.

On June 9, 1998, the appellate court issued a Resolution[8]denying petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner assigns the following as errors, to wit:

1.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE FILING OF PROTEST CASES BEFORE THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS HAD EFFECTIVELY INTERRUPTED THE RUNNING OF THE SIX-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD;

2.RESPONDENT COURTS COMMITTED FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETIONS IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, NOTWITHSTANDINGALMOST6YEARS OF PROCTRACTED HEARINGS OF THE 16 PROTEST CASES WITH THE CUSTOMS COLLECTOR, AND FILING OF THE PETITION ONLY WHEN THE SIX-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD WAS ABOUT TO EXPIRE TO AVOID NULLLIFICATION OF CLAIMS ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

3.THE RESPONDENT COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING ON SHEER TECHNICALITIES PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR THE REFUND OF P5,008,029.08 (SIC) OVERPAID DUTIES, WHEN THE FACTS OF OVERPAYMENTS HAD BEEN EARLIER RESOLVED IN CTA CASE NO. 4114, HOLDING THAT THE WRONG APPLICATION OF THE HIGHER HOME CONSUMPTION VALUES RESULTED IN THE OVERPAYMENTS OF DUTIES AND TAXES, AND UPON WHICH, IT ORDERED THE REFUND OF P4,489,661.94 IN OVERPAID TAXES.THERE IS NO VALID REASON THEREFORE WHY THE CORRESPONDING OVERPAYMENTS IN CUSTOMS DUTIES CAN NOT ALSO BE REFUNDED TO ITS RIGHTFUL OWNER, THE PETITIONER HEREIN.

In this petition, petitioner asserts that tax refunds are based on quasi-contract orsolutio indebiti, which under Article 1145[9]of the Civil Code, prescribes in six (6) years.Consequently, the pendency of its protest cases before the office of the Collector of Customs of Manila did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period under the aforesaid provision of law considering that it is only an administrative body performing only quasi-judicial function and not a regular court of justice.[10]Thus, in like manner the thirty-day period for appealing to the CTA must be made within the six-year prescriptive period.

Petitioner further contends that the fact of overpayment of customs duties has been duly established and resolved with finality by the Court of Tax Appeals on January 3, 1994 in C.T.A. Case No. 4114.[11]In that case, the tax court found that the Bureau of Customs erroneously used the wrong home consumption value in assessing the petitioner the Advance Sales Tax on its subject sixteen (16) importations.The tax court then ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the petitioner the sum of Four Million Four Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Ninety-Four Centavos (P4,489,661.94), representing overpaid advance sales tax covering the same sixteen (16) importations.It is also from the same 16 separate importations of milk and milk products that petitioner based itsclaims for refund of overpayment of customs duties.Thus, petitioner avers that its claims for refund of overpaid customs duties must likewise be granted and awarded in its favor.

In lieu of Comment,[12]the Solicitor General manifested that there is merit in petitioners argument considering that petitioners cause of action to recover a tax erroneously paid is based onsolutio indebitiwhich is expressly classified as a quasi-contract under the Civil Code; that petitioners cause of action would have prescribed on August 2, 1990 if it did not bring the matter before the CTA; and that the Collector of Customs has not even acted or resolved thepetitioners several protests it had filed before his office within six (6) years after it made the earliest payment of advance customs duties on its importations.

There was also no violation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case.This doctrine does not apply to the case at bar since its observance would only result in the nullification of the claim for refund being asserted nor would it provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances.This notwithstanding, however, the Solicitor Generalfurther opined that this case should be remanded to the CTA in order for the tax court to determine the veracity of petitioners claim.

On the other hand, respondent Commissioner of Customs, in his Comment[13]dated August 21, 2000, admitted with regret, their official inaction adverted to by the petitioner.Respondent Commissioner expressed the view that petitioners claim for refund of customs duties should not outrigthly be denied by virtue of the strict adherence to the rules to prevent grave injustice to hapless taxpayers; that this does not justify, however, an outright award of the refund of alleged overpayment of customs duties in favor of petitioner; and that there is no definite factual determination yet that the customs duties and taxes in questionwere overpaid and refundable, and if refundable how much is the refundable amount.The fact that the Collector of Customs of Manila failed to act or decide on the petitioners protest cases filed before his Office does not relieve the petitioner of its burden to prove that it is entitled to the refund sought for.Thus,respondent Commissioner of Customs, thru his special counsel, recommended that this case be remanded to the court of origin, namely, the CTA.

The recommendations of both the Solicitor General and the respondent Commissioner of Customs are well taken.After a meticulous consideration of this case, we find that the recommended remand of this case to the CTA is warranted for the proper verification anddetermination of thefactual basis and meritsof this petition and in order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play may be subserved.We are of the view that the said recommendation is in accord with the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code as hereinafter discussed.

The right to claim for refund of customs duties is specifically governed by Section 1708 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which provides that -

Sec. 1708.Claim for Refund of Duties and Taxes and Mode of Payment.All claims for refund of duties shall be made in writing and forwarded to the Collectorto whom such duties are paid,whoupon receiptof such claim,shallverify the same by the records of his Office, and if found to be correct and in accordance with law, shall certify the same to the Commissioner with his recommendation together with all necessary papers and documents.Upon receipt by the Commissioner of such certified claim he shall cause the same to be paid if found correct.

It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Tariff and Customs Code thatin all claims for refund ofcustoms duties, theCollectorto whom such customs duties are paid andupon receiptof such claim is mandated to verify the same by the records of his Office.If such claim is found correct and in accordance with law, the Collectorshall certifythe same to the Commissionerwith his recommendationtogether with all the necessary papers and documents.This is precisely one of the reasons why the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the case on the ground that the CTAs jurisdiction[14]under the Tariff and Customs Code is not concurrent with that of the respondent Commissioner of Customs due to the absence of any certification from the Collector of Customs of Manila.Accordingly, petitioners contention that its claims for refund of alleged overpayment of customs duties may be deemed established from the findings of the tax court in C.T.A. Case No. 4114 on the Advance Sales Tax is not necessarily correct in the light of the above-cited provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Customs duties is the name given totaxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country.[15]Any claim for refund of customs duties, therefore, take the nature of tax exemptions that must be construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the claimants and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.[16]This power of taxation being a high prerogative of sovereignty, its relinquishment is never presumed.Any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must be strictly construed, and the same must be couched in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied.[17]Thus, any outright award for the refund of allegedly overpaid customs duties in favor of petitioner on its subject sixteen (16) importations is not favored in this jurisdiction unless there is a direct and clear finding thereon.The fact alone that the tax court, in C.T.A. Case No. 4114, has awarded in favor of the petitioner the refund of overpaid Advance Sales Tax involving the same sixteen (16) importations does not in any way excuse the petitioner from proving its claims for refund of alleged overpayment of customs duties.We have scrutinized the decision rendered by the tax court in C.T.A. Case No. 4114 and found no clear indication therein that the tax court has ruled on petitioners claims for alleged overpayment of customs duties.

The petitioner is mistaken in its contention that its claims for refund of allegedly overpaid customs duties are governed by Article 2154[18]of the New Civil Code on quasi-contract, or the rule onsolutio indebiti,which prescribes in six (6) years pursuant to Article 1145 of the same Code.

Sections 2308 and 2309 of the Tariff and Customs Code provide that:

Sec. 2308.Protest and Payment upon Protest in Civil Matter. When a ruling or decision of the collector is made whereby liability for duties, taxes, fees, or other chargesare determined, except the fixing of fines in seizure cases,the party adversely affected may protest such rulingor decisionby presenting to the Collectorat the time when paymentof the amount claimed to be due the governmentis made, or within fifteen (15) days thereafter, a written protest setting forth his objection to the ruling or decision in question, together with the reasons therefor.No protest shall be considered unless payment of the amount due after final liquidation has first been made and the corresponding docket fee,as provided for in Section 3301.

Sec. 2309.Protest Exclusive Remedy in Protestable Case.In all cases subject to protest, the interested partywho desires to have the action of the collector reviewed,shallmake a protest, otherwise, the action of the collector shall be final and conclusive against him,x x x.

SEC. 2312.Decision or Action by the collector in Protest and Seizure Cases. -When a protest in a proper form is presented in a case where protest is required,the collectorshallissue anorder for hearing within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the protest and hear th