tc- amcc 05 · 2nd amity university madhya pradesh national moot court competition, 2018 1 memorial...

2nd AMITY UNIVERSITY MADHYA PRADESH NATIONAL MOOT COURT

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

TC- AMCC 05


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Before

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS

SLP No._ of 2018

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS

MASAB KHAN…………….……………………………………………. PETITIONER

VERSUS

UNION OF INDUS……………………………………………………...RESPONDENT

IN THE MATTER CONCERNING JURISDICTION OF INDUS COURT,

CONTRAVENTION OF VIENNA CONVENTION, RIGHT TO BAIL AND FAIR

TRIAL



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities………. ..……...…………………………………………………......4

Statement of Jurisdiction…………………………………………………………….…….8

Statement of Fact………………………………………………………………….……….9

Statement of Issues...….……………………………………………………...…...……...10

Summary of Pleadings ……………………………………………………………..…….11

Arguments Advance ..…………………………………………………………...……..13

[1] That the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in this Case ………………………. 13

[1.1] Miscarriage of justice done in this case ………………………………………….. 13

[1.2] Judgment by the lower court is arbitrary and unreasonable in nature ……………….13

[1.3] Supreme Court intervention required in this case ………………………………….14

[2] That the Court in Indus did not have the Jurisdiction to try the Panjiksistan National

apprehended from its territory …………………………………………………………...15

[2.1] Dispute is arising out of application or interpretation of the Convention as per the

Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory settlements of Disputes ……………… 16

[2.2] The denial of Consular access was not Justified by Indus …………………………17

[3] That not providing consular access is contravention of Vienna convention on Consular

relation …………………………………………………………………………………..18

[3.1] Agreement between the two states ………………………………………………… 18

[3.2] Contravention of the consular access as mentioned in Article 36(1) of Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations …………………………………………………….. 19

[4] That the arrest and detention by Indus Army was illegal in Nature …………………...21

[4.1] The arrest of the accused is illegal in Nature ………………………………………..21


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[4.2] The Detention Violates the Fundamental right of the Accused …………………….22

[4.3] Investigation done in this case is illegal and unconstitutional ……………………...22

[5] That the accused has right to be enlarged on Bail ……………………………………23

[5.1] Charge-sheet not filed within stipulated period of 90 days ………………………...23

[5.2] No extension taken under Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 ……………24

[5.3] Violation of Article 21 of the constitution of Indus in the given case ………….….24

[6] That the accused is entitled to get counsel from Panjiksistan ………………………25

[6.1] Obligation to Fundamental Right ……………………………….………………….25

[6.2] Ajmal Kasab Case …………………………………………………………………26

[6.3] Obligation to International Convention …………………………………………..26

[7] The principle of Fair Trial affect in this case …………………………………………27

[7.1] Adverse publicity in Media of the accused ………………………………………..27

[7.2] Violation of Fundamental right as the principle of Self-incrimination will apply …28

Prayer ……………………………………………………………………………………30


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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LIST OF CASES [INDIAN]

NO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION(s) PAGE

1. Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 856:

1967 (2) SCR 143

14

2. Ashish Chadha v. Asha Kumari AIR 2012 SC 431:

2012 (109) AIC 182:

(2012) 1 SCC 680

25

3. Asst. Collector of Central Excise v. Fibres

Foils (p) Ltd.

(2001) Cr LJ 748

(Kant)

28

4. Babu v. State of Karnataka 1998 Cri LJ 16

(Kant)

23

5. Baldota Bros. v. Libra Minning works AIR 1961 SC 100 14

6. Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1986 SC 494:

(1985) 4 SCC 677

22

7. C.C.E. v. Standard Motor products AIR 1989 SC 1298:

(1989) 2 SCC 303

13

8. Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1984 SC 1767:

(1984) 4 SCC 316

14

9. Dhakeswari cotton mills Ltd. v. CIT AIR 1955 SC 65:

1955 (1) SCR 941

13

10. In Re: P.C. Sen vs Unknown AIR 1970 SC 1821 28

11. Jagmalaram v. State of Rajasthan 1982 Cr LJ 2314 25

12. Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1994 SC 1349:

(1994) 4 SCC 260

26

13. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn) AIR 1988 SC 1883:

1988 SCC (Cri) 111:

1989 Cr LJ 1: (1988)

3 SC 609

29

14. Kunhayammed v. State of Orrisa AIR 2000 SC 2587,

2593: (2000) 6 SCC

359

15

15. M.P. Lohia v. State of West Bengal (2005) 2 SCC 686 28

16. M.V. Mahesh v. State of Karnataka 1996 Cr LJ 771

(Kant-DB): ILR 1995

Kar 2752

29


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17. Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 2001 SC 2503:

2001 (7) SCC 148:

2001 Cr LJ 3945

29

18. Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v.

State of Maharashtra

AIR 2012 SC 3565:

(2012) 9 SCC 1: 2012

(7) SCALE 553

26

19. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424:

1978 SCC (Cri.) 236

21

20. Netabar parida v. State of Orissa AIR 1975 SC 1465:

1975 Cri LJ 1212

23

21. Nimeon Sangma v. Govt. of Meghalaya AIR 1979 SC 1518:

(1980) 1 SCC 700

23

22. Prabhusan Burman v. State of West Bengal 1998 (4) Crimes 224

(Cal-DB)

28

23. Pradip Prasad v. State of Bihar (1995) 2 East Cri Cas

545 (Pat)

23

24. Prem Raj v. State of Rajasthan 1976 Cri LJ 455 23

25. Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516:

2012 (2) SCC (Cri)

481

24

26. Reliance Petrochemicals v. Proprietor of

Indian Express

1988(4) SCC 592 28

27. Sankhi Chiba v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh (2008) GLR 881:

2008 Cr LJ 1734

29

28. Santosh v. Mul singh AIR 1958 SC 321:

1958 SCR 1211

14

29. Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan v. State of

Maharashtra

2016 SC 1408 23

30. Sh. Lalhunpuria v. State of Mizoram 2004 (4) Crimes 545

(Gauh.)

29

31. Sidhartha Vashisht, Manu Sharma v. State

(Nct of Delhi)

2010 AIR (SC) 2357 27

32. State of Karnataka v. K.S. Ramdas 1976 Cr LJ 228 28

33. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam AIR 1966 SC 1910:

1966 Supp SCR 239

25

34. State Of U.P vs Laxmi Brahman & Anr. AIR 1983 SC 439:

(1983 Cri LJ 839)

23

35. Sudhir goyal v. State 1977 Cri LJ (NOC) 99 23

36. Syed yakoob v. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477:

1964 (5) SCR 64

14


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37. Thuru turi v. state 1986 Cr LJ 438 29

38. Union of India v. Era Educational trust (2000) 5 SCC 57:

AIR 2000 SC 1573

14

39. Ved Kumar Seth v. State of Assam 1975 Cri LJ 645 23

FOREIGN CASES

1. Attorney General v. BBC 1981 A.C. 303 (HL). 28

2. Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), Provisional Measures I.C.J. Reports 2017, p.

231 20

3. La Grand Case (Ger. V. U.S.) , ¶16

(Mar. 5, 1999), 17

4. United Mexican States v. United States of America (Mex. V. U.S.) ¶153

(2004) 15

BOOKS

1. Acharya D.D. Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India, Vol.5, 8th Edn. Lexis Nexis

Butterworth’s Wadhwa, 2009.

2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Vol.1, 6th Edn., Lexis Nexis, 2010.

3. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Vol.1, 8th Edn., Cambridge University Press,

2017.

4. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Handbook on Legal Instruments on International Human Rights,

Vol.1, 1st Edn., Lexis Nexis, 2014.

5. P.C. Banerjee, Criminal Trial and Investigation, Vol.2, 5th Edn., Orient Publishing

Company, 2013.

6. P.K. Das, International Law Documents, Vol., 2nd Edn., Universal Law Publishing,

2003.

7. Prabhakar Singh and Benoit Mayer, Critical International Law, Vol.1, 2nd Edn., Oxford,

2017.

8. PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, Vol.1, 13th Edn., Lexis Nexis, 2017.

9. R.V. Kelkar, Criminal Procedure, Vol.1, 6th Edn., EBC, 2016.

10. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure, Vol.1, 20th Edn., Lexis Nexis,

2016.


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11. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, Vol.1, 13th Edn., EBC, 2017.

LEXICONS

1. Black, Henry Campbell, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., Centennial Ed. (1891- 1991)

2. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn, Lexis Nexis Butterworth’s Wadhwa,

2009.

STATUTES

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860

2. Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984

3. Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946

4. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

5. The Constitution of India, 1950

6. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AGREEMENT

1. Agreement on Consular Access between the Government of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan and the Government of the Republic of India, 2008

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

3. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963

4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963


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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner humbly and respectfully approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court under

article 136 of the Constitution of Indus, that reads:

Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,

grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order

in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order

passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the

Armed Forces.


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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Indus, officially known as the republic of Indus, is located in south central Asia,

Panjiksistan got separated from Indus in 1947 and since then relations between these two

countries have been strained. In 1965, 1971 and 1999 Panjiksistan attacked Indus and

faced humiliating defeat. After tasting continuous defeat in conventional war, they

established launch pads to strike terror attack in Indus and harbouring and training

terrorists in occupied territory of state of Pammu and Pashmir.

2. On 23 Nov 2015, twelve terrorists, trained by Panjiksistan military and spy agency ISO

left Panjiksistan for trombay via sea, they entered three days later by hijacking a boat

owned by fisherman and killing them enroute and targeted high profile place. 180 people

including 20 police officers and 4 commandos killed and 410 severely injured. On 25 Sep

2016 terrorists trained in Panjiksistan entered military units by donning army uniforms

and killed soldiers.

3. The Indus Government could not take these anymore and in right of private defence as

enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter decided to destroy the launch pads and terrorist

hide outs and training areas in Panjiksistan and Panjiksistan occupied Pammu and

Pashmir. The surgical strike was carried out on 7 October 2016 in the Panjiksistan

occupied Pammu and Pashmir and destroyed launch pads and hideouts of terrorists and

caught one terrorist alive namely Masab Khan from Panjiksistan occupied Pammu and

Pashmir for getting operational intelligence and also to prove to the world that Panjiksistan

was sponsoring terrorism from the soil under its control.

4. The terrorists were in custody of army for 30 days, investigation also revealed that

apprehended was the one who had masterminded the terror attack in Indus and he also

made confessional statement to that effect before the magistrate of competent jurisdiction.

After the army handed over to ATS and the accused was in custody of ATS for 70 days,

during which the accused applied for bail. Aggrieved by the Surgical strike Panjiksistan

approached ICJ. In this suit accused claimed that the court of Indus has no jurisdiction, he

is entitled for bail as charge sheet not filed within 90 days, and requested counsel of his

choice from Panjiksistan and also mentioned about the Media trial. Accused filed Special

Leave Petition before the Apex Court as the lower courts rejected the accused contentions.


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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE ACCUSED IS

MAINTAINABLE?

ISSUE 2- WHETHER THE COURT IN INDUS HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO TRY

PANJIKSISTAN NATIONAL APPREHENDED FROM ITS TERRITORY?

ISSUE 3- WHETHER NOT GIVING CONSULAR ACCESS TO THE ACCUSED WOULD

CONTRAVENE THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS?

ISSUE 4- WHETHER THE ARREST AND DETENTION BY INDUS ARMY WAS ILLEGAL IN

NATURE?

ISSUE 5- WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAD A RIGHT TO BE ENLARGED ON BAIL AS THE

CHARGE-SHEET WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THE STATUTORY PERIOD OF 90 DAYS?

ISSUE 6- WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO GET COUNSEL FROM PANJIKSISTAN

FOR HIS DEFENCE?

ISSUE 7- WHETHER PRINCIPLE OF FAIR TRIAL AFFECT IN THIS CASE?


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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE ACCUSED IS

MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the special leave petition filed by the

accused is maintainable in this case as there is miscarriage of justice in the given case,

which means the lower courts act arbitrary and unreasonably. Also, in this case the

intervention of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is required.

ISSUE 2- WHETHER THE COURT IN INDUS HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO TRY PANJIKSISTAN

NATIONAL APPREHENDED FROM ITS TERRITORY?

The court in Indus doesn’t have the jurisdiction to try panjiksistan national apprehended

from its territory as in this the ICJ has prima facie compulsory jurisdiction, as per article 1

of optional protocol concerning the settlement of disputes. If the dispute on the

interpretation and applicability of Vienna Convention on consular relation arise, ICJ has

the jurisdiction.



The denial of consular access to the accused clearly contravene the right mentioned in the

vienna convention. As article 36(1)(a) and 36(1)(c), which states the right of the person

who is in detention or arrested to communicate with their respective national, and when we

inform the consular post, this is done without any delay. The above provision is being

violated in the present case.


NATURE?

The arrest and detention by Indus Army was illegal in nature as the army of Indus has no

power to arrest a Panjiksistan National from Panjiksistan occupied Pammu and Pashmir as

there is a procedure in the instant case which is not followed. Further the detention by the

Indus army to investigate the matter is illegal as they don’t have any power to investigate,

and it implies that army is aiding the investigation authority.


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The accused in the instant case has right to be enlarged on Bail as section 167(2) of CrPC

clearly states that if the charge-sheet is not filed within 90 days, the accused is entitled to

be released under bail. As in this case the accused has completed more than 90 days which

fulfill the essential of section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. as the charge-sheet is not filed yet. Further,

right of speedy disposal enshrined in fundamental right also violated in this case.


FOR HIS DEFENCE?

The accused is entitled to get the counsel of his choice i.e., the counsel from Panjiksistan

as stated in the constitution that the accused has right to be defend by a legal practitioner

of his choice, also in the kasab case, Indus allow the Panjiksistan national accused to be

defended by a counsel from Panjiksistan.

ISSUE 7- WHETHER THE ADVERSE PUBLICITY IN MEDIA AFFECT THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR

TRIAL?

Media completely overlooks the vital gap between an accused and a convict keeping at

stake the golden principles of ‘presumption of innocence until proven guilty’ and ‘guilt

beyond reasonable doubt’. The media trial in many case violates the principle of Natural

justice and fair trial includes an atmosphere of Judicial calm which cannot be provided here

because of the media trial. That’s why the principle of Fair trial violated in this case.


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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

[1] WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY THE ACCUSED IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the Special leave petition by the

accused is maintainable in this case because the judgment of the lower court is not as per

the sound judicial lines. The submission in this is three folded [1.1] Miscarriage of justice

done in this case [1.2] Judgment by the lower court is arbitrary and unreasonable in nature

[1.3] Supreme Court intervention required in this case.

[1.1] Miscarriage of justice done in this case

Article 136 is the residuary power of the Supreme court to do justice where the court is

satisfied that there is injustice.1 What however, the court has stated is that, it being a special

power it is to be exercised only in those cases where special circumstances shown to exist2,

and that whenever there is an injustice done to a party in proceeding before a court, or there

is a miscarriage of justice, or when a question of law of general public importance arises,

or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, this jurisdiction can always be invoked.

Masab Khan, a Panjiksistan national was apprehended from the Panjiksistan occupied

pammu and pashmir without complying with the international laws and treaties, apart from

that the illegal arrest and the detention by the Indus army doesn’t fulfill the procedural

regularity as per the law in Indus3. It is implied from the fact that the procedure of arrest is

not fulfilled in this case which is one of the important aspects of criminal trial, apart from

that lower courts also ignored many of the statutory provision as the Masab Khan was

denied to get legal practitioner of his choice and the provision of mandatory bail for not

filing the charge sheet within 90 days.

[1.2] Judgment by the lower court is arbitrary and unreasonable in nature

1 Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65: 1955 (1) SCR 941.

2 C.C.E. v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298: (1989) 2 SCC 303.

3 Page 3 ¶.2 Moot Proposition.


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Ordinarily, the Supreme court does not entertain an appeal against an exercise of its

discretion by the court below if it has been exercised along sound judicial lines. But if the

discretion is exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably, or is based on a misunderstanding of the

principles that govern its exercise, or the order has been passed without jurisdiction, or if

there is an erroneous interpretation of law by the High court, the Supreme court would

intervene if there has been a resultant failure of justice4 or without a proper appreciation of

material on record or the submission made interference under article 136 is warranted.

The lower courts in this case act arbitrary and unreasonably as it is clear from the facts that

the arrest and detention by Indus army was illegal in nature which automatically vitiate

proceedings, apart from that the court in Indus didn’t have jurisdiction to try Panjiksistan

national apprehended from its territory as it is clear contravention of Vienna convention on

consular relations. Further, the confession in this case is also not as per the procedure as

Masab Khan was in the custody of army and was not given proper time. Accused was

devoid of counsel during the confession which is mandatory and he was not informed about

his right to remain silent during the course of investigation.

[1.3] Supreme Court intervention required in this case

The exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any limitation as

to who may invoke it. Furthermore, when it appears prima facie that the order in question

cannot be justified by any judicial standard, the ends of justice and the need to maintain

judicial discipline require the Supreme court to intervene.5 The Supreme Court is not only

a court of Law but a court of equity as well.6 The Supreme Court has characterized its

power under Art.136 as “an untrammeled reservoir of power incapable of being confined

to definitional bounds; the discretion conferred on the Supreme Court being subjected to

only one limitation, that is, the wisdom and good sense of justice of the judges”.7 In the

4 Santosh v. Mul singh, AIR 1958 SC 321: 1958 SCR 1211; Baldota Bros. v. Libra Minning Works, AIR

1961 SC 100; Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477: 1964 (5) SCR 64; Ajit Singh v. State of

Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 856: 1967 (2) SCR 143.

5 Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000) 5 SCC 57: AIR 2000 SC 1573.

6 Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 1767: (1984) 4 SCC 316.

7 Kunhayammed v. State of Orrisa, AIR 2000 SC 2587, 2593: (2000) 6 SCC 359.


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present case also there are many question that need to be answered by the supreme court

that whether a court of Indus has jurisdiction in this case, whether the confession to the

Magistrate in the army custody is admissible, where army has right to investigation,

whether the illegal arrest and detention in this case is vitiating the proceedings apart from

that the mandatory right of bail can be denied to any accused and many more question need

to answered by this Hon’ble Supreme court to maintain faith in the criminal justice system.

ISSUE 2- WHETHER THE COURT IN INDUS HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO TRY

PANJIKSISTAN NATIONAL APPREHENDED FROM ITS TERRITORY?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the court in Indus did not have

jurisdiction to try the Panjiksistan national apprehended from its territory. Court in Indus

can’t exercise its jurisdiction in trying the alleged terrorist. The submission in this issue is

two folded. [2.1] Dispute is arising out of application or interpretation of the Convention

as per the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory settlements of Disputes [2.2] The

denial of Consular access was not Justified by Indus.

[2.1] Dispute is arising out of application or interpretation of the Convention as per

the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory settlements of Disputes

Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within

the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be

brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party

to the present Protocol8. In the case of United Mexican States v. United States of America9

the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to article 1 of the Optional Protocol Concerning the

Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The

denial of the consular access by Indus to the accused in the present case is creating a dispute

in the interpretation and the application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in

prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his

legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State

8 Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art.1, April 24,1963, 596 UNTS 487.

9 Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S), Judgment, ¶153, (Mar. 31, 2004)


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who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.

Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who

is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action10. The accused had

the right of getting the consular access as per the abovementioned article of the Vienna

Convention and the arising of the dispute in the application of the Convention gives the

prima facie jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. In the Kulbhushan Jadhav

case11 Indus also emphasizes that it only seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article

I of the Optional Protocol, and not on the declarations made by the Parties under Article

36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. Indus is of the view that where treaties or conventions

especially provide for the jurisdiction of the Court, such declarations, including any

reservations they may contain, are not applicable. It becomes irrelevant to consider the

objections to other possible bases of jurisdiction12. Any reservations contained in the

declarations made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute cannot

impede the Court’s jurisdiction specially provided for in the Optional Protocol. Thus, the

Court need not examine these reservations further13. It is clearly evident from the above

cases that any other basis of jurisdiction needs not to be looked upon if the Article 1 of the

Optional Protocol is invoked.

[2.2] The denial of Consular access was not Justified by Indus

The severance of diplomatic relations shall not ipso facto involve the severance of consular

relations14. The government of Indus denied the consular access to the accused but they

can’t defend their act merely by stating that the diplomatic relations between Indus and

Panjiksistan have been bitter in the present time as there have been many wars between

two countries and terrorist attacks have been made in Indus. The Court also notes that the

Vienna Convention does not contain express provisions excluding from its scope persons

10 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(c), (April 22, 1963), 500 U.N.T.S.93

11 Jadhav (Ind. v. Pak.), Provisional Measures, 2017 I.C.J. Reports, ¶26 (May 18).

12 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972,

p. 60, ¶25.

13 Supra note 4

14 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.


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suspected of espionage or terrorism. At this stage, it cannot be concluded that Article 36 of

the Vienna Convention cannot apply in the case of Mr. Jadhav so as to exclude on a prima

facie basis the Court’s jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol15. It is clearly stated in the

above case that the case of terrorism does not excludes the prima facie jurisdiction of the

court as per article 1 of Optional Protocol. In the La Grand Case16 Germany bases the

jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and on

Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,

which accompanies the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“the Optional

Protocol”) and the Court finds that in the light of the requests submitted by Germany in its

Application and of the submissions made therein, there exists prima facie a dispute with

regard to the application of the Convention within the meaning of Article I of the Optional

Protocol; and that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction under Article I of the aforesaid Optional

Protocol to decide the dispute between Germany and the United States. The statement

stated by the court in the above ruling also applies to the present case as in the present case

the accused was deprived of his consular access rights as mentioned in article 36 of the

Vienna Convention on Consular access and this consequently creates dispute in the

interpretation and application of the Convention. The establishment of consular relations

between States takes place by mutual consent17. As per the above article an agreement on

consular access between the Government of Islamic Republic of Panjiksistan and

Government of Republic of Indus was made. In case of arrest, detention or sentence made

on political or security grounds each side may examine the case on its merits18. As per the

above clause giving of the consular access can be examined by the merits of the case if the

arrest is detention is made on the security ground but the court in respect of the 2008

Agreement, the Court does not need to decide at this stage of the proceedings whether

Article 73 of the Vienna Convention would permit a bilateral agreement to limit the rights

15 Supra note 4.

16 La Grand Case (Ger. v. U.S), Summary of Order, ¶16 (Mar. 5, 1999), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-

related/104/7728.pdf

17 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 2(1), April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.

18 Agreement on consular access, between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the

Government of the Republic of India, 21 May 2008, 54471.


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contained in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. It is sufficient at this point to note that

the provisions of the 2008 Agreement do not impose expressly such a limitation. Therefore,

the Court considers that there is no sufficient basis to conclude at this stage that the 2008

Agreement prevents it from exercising its jurisdiction under Article I of the Optional

Protocol over disputes relating to the interpretation or the application of Article 36 of the

Vienna Convention19.The above Jadhav case applies to the present context also as the

agreement itself can’t restrict the rights of the accused and the clause 6 of the agreement

can’t prevent the prima facie jurisdiction arising due to the dispute in the interpretation and

application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963.



It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the denial of the consular access to

the accused is a clear contravention of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Consular access is a right given to the national of the state so that person could take aid

from the representative of his State. The submission is two folded. [3.1] Agreement

between the two states. [3.2] Contravention of the consular access as mentioned in Article

36(1) of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

[3.1] Agreement between the two states

For the consular relations to establish between the two states an agreement should be made

between the two states. The establishment of consular relations between States takes place

by mutual consent20. The consent given to the establishment of diplomatic relations

between two States implies, unless otherwise stated, consent to the establishment of

consular relations21. For establishment of the consular relations between states to occur, an

agreement on consular access between the Government of Islamic Republic of Panjiksistan

19 Supra note 4

20 Supra Note 17.

21 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art.2(2), April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.


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and the Government of Republic of Indus has been made on 21 May 2008 and consequently

both these countries were eligible for giving and demanding the consular access.

[3.2] Contravention of the consular access as mentioned in Article 36(1) of Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides the consular access to the individuals.

Consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in

prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his

legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State

who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.

Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who

is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action22. The person who is

detention or custody shall be visited by the consular officers and legal representation can

be arranged for the person. Consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals

of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have

the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of

the sending State23. The above rights of communication have been given to the consular

officers and the national of the sending State but the above mentioned rights have been

denied to the individuals by Indus to the accused and it is in the contravention of Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations. In the La Grand case24, application of the Germany in

the International Court of Justice stated t in 1982 the authorities of the State of Arizona

detained two German nationals, Karl and Walter La Grand; it is maintained that these

individuals were tried and sentenced to death without having been informed, as is required

under Article 36, subparagraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, of their rights under that

provision. The Court considers in this respect that if the United States, notwithstanding its

commitment referred to above, should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the

detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals

22 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art.36(1)(c), April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.

23 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(a), April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.

24 La Grand Case (Ger. v. U.S), Summary of Order, ¶16 (Mar. 5, 1999), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-

related/104/7728.pdf.


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concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe

penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the

United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by

taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can

be carried out in various ways. From the above case it is clear that if Article 36(1) is

violated then the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is contravened and the state

contravening the provision would have to reconsider on the decision made and in the

present case also court of Indus has to reconsider its decision as Indus has violated the

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In the Kulbhushan Jadhav case25 under the

present circumstances, it is appropriate for the Court to order that Panjiksistan shall take

all measures at its disposal to ensure that Mr. Jadhav is not executed pending the final

decision in these proceedings and shall inform the Court of all the measures taken in

implementation of the present Order. The order in the above case applies to the present

situation also as the ICJ ordered the stay on execution of Kulbhushan Jadhav made by court

of Panjiksistan on the basis of denial of the consular access which contravened the Vienna

Convention on Consular Relations and in the present case also Indus has denied the

consular access to Masab Khan and hence it violated the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations.

The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with

the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the

said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the

rights accorded under this Article are intended26. Even if the country of Indus pleads on the

ground of the above article that rights should be in conformity of laws and regulations of

the state but the proviso of the above article states that said laws should be enabled to give

purpose to those rights and hence the country pleading will not be admissible in the court.

25 Jadhav (Ind. v. Pak.), Provisional Measures, 2017, I.C.J. Reports, ¶25 (May18).

26 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(2), April 22, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S.93.


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NATURE?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the entire proceeding

including arrest, detention and investigation is illegal and unconstitutional in nature. The

contention in this is three folded [4.1] The arrest of the accused is illegal in Nature [4.2]

The Detention Violates the Fundamental right of the Accused [4.3] Investigation done in

this case is illegal and unconstitutional.

[4.1] The arrest of the accused is illegal in Nature

The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the method it uses in the

enforcement of criminal law. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights,

liberties and privileges on the one hand and individual duties, obligations and

responsibilities on the other27. As per the above ruling rights & the privileges of individual

should be looked upon but in the present scenario the accused Masab Khan was arrested

from Panjiksistan occupied Pammu and Pashmir without complying with the procedure

established in Indus.

As according to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of Indus in the case of

extradition there is a set of procedure needed to be follow and mandatory in nature.

Initially, the procedure include request for provisional arrest which may be transmitted

through diplomatic channels through CPV Division of Ministry of External Affairs. The

facilities of International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO- INTERPOL) may also be

used to transmit such a request through National Central Bureau of Indus, CBI, New Delhi.

Further each extradition treaty specifies the documents required for a provisional arrest

request and specify the means by which a provisional arrest request must be made. The

Police/Law Enforcement Agency concerned in Indus, prepares the request for a provisional

arrest and sends it to the MEA, which in turn forwards the same to the concerned authority

of the foreign country through diplomatic channels. But in the instant case no such

procedure is followed.

27 Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424: 1978 SCC (Cri.) 236.


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As according to the facts, in surgical strike, army was successful in destroying terrorist

hide outs and launch pads and caught one terrorist alive namely Masab Khan from

Panjiksistan occupied Pammu and Pashmir for getting operational intelligence and also to

prove to the world that Panjiksistan was sponsoring terrorism from the soil under its

control28. The facts clearly proved the army of Indus ignored all the laws and procedure

and violates the international laws & treaties and arrest a Panjiksistan national. Even as per

the fact they don’t even know that the arrested person was the mastermind, this clearly

implies that there was no reason to arrest him at that moment of time. Further in the instant

case the state of Indus violated Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

which states that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

[4.2] The Detention Violates the Fundamental right of the Accused

Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest

magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest29. It thus ensures that a

judicial mind is applied immediately to the legal authority of the person making the arrest

and regularity of the procedure adopted by him30,but no such procedure was adopted by

them which clearly shows that the Indus army was working in illegal way and ultra vires

of the constitution and the detention in this case is violation of the fundamental right

mentioned in Article 22.

[4.3] Investigation done in this case is illegal and unconstitutional

In the landmark case of, Joyanta Barbora v. State of Assam,31 the court stated that, Remand

of accused to army custody for investigation is illegal and ultravires of the constitution.

Even the armed forces have no powers of investigation, interrogation while coming to the

aid of the civil authority.

The terrorist was under the custody of the Army for 30 days, during which Army gathered

vital information like who provided financial aid to these terrorists etc. Investigation also


29 INDIA CONST. art. 22, cl. 2.

30 Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1986 SC 494: (1985) 4 SCC 677.

31 1992 Cr LJ 2147 (Gau).


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revealed that the apprehended terrorist was the one who had masterminded the terrorist

attack in Indus on 26 November 201532.

In the instant case the entire investigation was done by the army of Indus and they don’t

have any power to investigate in this case as we know that the armed forces have no power

of investigation or even interrogation while coming to aid the civil authority as in this case

the army of Indus worked ultra vires and unconstitutionally to harass the accused.



It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the accused has right to be enlarged

on bail as the charge-sheet was not filed within the statutory period of 90 days. The

submission in this is three folded [5.1] Charge-sheet not filed within stipulated period of

90 days [5.2] No extension taken under Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [5.3]

Violation of Article 21 of the constitution of Indus in the given case.

[5.1] Charge-sheet not filed within stipulated period of 90 days

Where the charge sheet is not received by the court within 90 days of arrest the accused

can pray for release on bail even subsequent to filing of charge sheet.33 Considering the

language of proviso (a) of section 167(2) it is mandatory that if the investigation is not

completed within 90 days, on the expiry of the said period, the accused person shall be

released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail.34

The criminal procedure code in Ss. 167 has emphasized the importance of expeditious,

disposal of cases including investigation or trial. The government will do well to comply

with the spirit of this section35. As per the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal


33 Pradip Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1995) 2 East Cri Cas 545 (Pat); Babu v. State of Karnataka, 1998 Cri LJ

16 (Kant).

34 Ved Kumar Seth v. State of Assam, 1975 Cri LJ 645; Netabar Parida v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 1465:

1975 Cri LJ 1212; Prem Raj v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 Cri LJ 455; Sudhir Goyal v. State, 1977 Cri LJ

(NOC) 99.

35 Nimeon Sangma v. Govt. of Meghalaya, AIR 1979 SC 1518: (1980) 1 SCC 700.


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Procedure (Cr.P.C) maximum period during which the investigation has to be completed

is 90 days36.

A careful consideration of the provisions of S. 167 and the law laid down by the Supreme

Court in Lakshmi Brahman's case37 and the decisions of the Full Benches of Gujarat, Patna

and Rajasthan High Courts makes it clear that an accused is entitled as of right to bail under

the proviso to S. 167(2) only if the charge-sheet is not filed within 90 days or 60 days as

per the case.

As per the fact the accused was in the custody from 100 days which is more than the

stipulated period time mentioned in section 167(2) of the code, even if the computation of

the period starts from the remand and not from the arrest then it is assumed that the accused

was present before the Magistrate of the competent jurisdiction within 24 hours or as early

as possible, so even after that the custody period is more than 90 days in this case. Hence

the accused has the right under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. of mandatory bail and, petitioner’s

release under section 167(2) on bail will be valid.

[5.2] No extension taken under Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said

period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor

indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the

accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred

and eighty days38.

As per the above provision, the public prosecutor needs to submit a report for the extension

of the custody beyond the said period of ninety days but in the present case no such report

is submitted by the public prosecutor for the extension which clearly implies that the

accused has a right to be released on bail as per the procedure established by law.

[5.3] Violation of Article 21 of the constitution of Indus in the given case

36 Saquib Abdul Hamid Nachan v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SC 1408.

37 AIR 1983 SC 439: (1983 Cri LJ 839).

38 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No.31 of 1972, § 43D(b) (1967).


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Speedy trial has been recognized as an inherent and implicit aspect in the spectrum of

article 21 of the constitution. The whole purpose of speedy trial is intended to avoid

oppression and prevent delay. It is a sacrosanct obligation of all concerned with the justice

dispensation system to see that the administration of criminal justice becomes effective,

vibrant and meaningful. The concept of speedy trial cannot be allowed to remain a mere

formality39.

The issue can also be looked upon from the perspective of personal liberty. The basic

legislative intent of completing investigations within ninety days and also within an

otherwise time bound period remains unchanged, even though that period has been

extended over the years. This is an indication that in addition to giving adequate time to

complete investigations, the legislature has also and always put a premium on personal

liberty and has always felt that it would be unfair to an accused to remain in custody for a

prolonged or indefinite period. It is for this reason and also to hold the investigating agency

accountable the time limit has been laid down by the legislature. The need to expeditiously

conclude investigations has been discussed from time to time over the years and the view

has been that as far as practicable. The entire issue must also be looked at from the point

of view of expeditious conclusion of investigations and from the angle of personal liberty

and not from a purely dictionary or textual perspective.


FOR HIS DEFENCE?

It is humbly and respectfully contended before this Hon’ble court that the accused should

be entitled to get a counsel of his choice from Panjiksistan to prevent the prejudice in

preparation of his defence. The submission in this is three folded [6.1] Obligation to

Fundamental Right [6.2] Ajmal Kasab Case [6.3] Obligation to International Convention

[6.1] Obligation to Fundamental Right

Article 22(2) postulates that there is an accusation against the person arrested against which

he should be enabled to defend himself by engaging a legal practitioner of his choice. This

39 Rattiram v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 516: 2012 (2) SCC (Cri) 481.


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is mandatory40. The court must give an opportunity to the accused to exercise his right to

be represented by a lawyer of his choice41.

The Supreme Court has observed that the accused has a right, to defend with a lawyer of

his choice. These rights are inherent in Article 21 and 22(2) of the constitution. The court

has directed that these rights of the accused be “recognized and scrupulously protected’’.42

In the instant case Masab Khan as a accused has the right to be defended by a legal

practitioner of his choice from Panjiksistan to protect the right of the accused and to prepare

his defence in a better way.

[6.2] Ajmal Kasab Case

In the Ajmal Kasab case, Ajmal Kasab the accused demanded that he wanted a legal

practitioner from Panjiksistan and not from Indus and wrote a letter in Urdu demanding the

same. On December 29, 2008, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 37th Court,

Esplanade, Mumbai, directly forward the accused letter to the “Hon’ble Ambassador,

Panjiksistan”, with a covering letter under his seal and signature. Unfortunately, in the

Kasab case Panjiksistan was in the stage of complete denial by stating that the accused is

not the Panjiksistan National43.

As in the instant case, the Islamic republic of Panjiksistan already stating that the accused

is his national citizen so the unfortunate condition like in the case of Kasab will not arise.

Also forwarding the letter in Kasab case clearly indicates that to promote fair trial and to

protect the right of accused, this can be done. So also in the instant case the accused Masab

khan is entitled for the counsel from his own national territory i.e., Panjiksistan.

[6.3] Obligation to International Convention

40 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam, AIR 1966 SC 1910: 1966 Supp SCR 239; Ashish Chadha v. Asha

Kumari, AIR 2012 SC 431: 2012 (109) AIC 182: (2012) 1 SCC 680.

41 Jagmalaram v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cr LJ 2314.

42 Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 1349: (1994) 4 SCC 260.

43 Mohammad Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3565: (2012) 9 SCC

1: 2012 (7) SCALE 553.


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As in the instant case the counsel from the Panjiksistan was not provided to the accused

after being demanded by accused and instead of that a counsel from Indus was provided to

him, this will violate the article 36(1)(c) of Vienna convention on Consular Relations 1963.

Having in mind the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations concerning

the sovereign equality of state, maintenance of international peace and security and the

promotion of friendly relation among two different nations such convention is introduced

but here it is violated by the Indus. In this case the accused had not even provided the

consular officer who have a right to visit a national of sending state who is in prison,

custody or detention and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation.

Furthermore, as per article 14(3)(D) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

which states that the accused must defend himself in person or through legal assistance of

his own choosing also article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states about

fair trial. So both these International provision support the accused contention to be defend

by a legal practitioner of his own choice i.e., from Panjiksistan.

ISSUE 7- WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR TRIAL AFFECT IN THIS CASE?

It is humbly submitted that the principle of Fair trial is violated in this case as the media is

ignoring the principle of criminal justice system. Apart from that there is also some

procedural irregularity in the case which is affecting the fair trial. The submission in this

is two folded. [7.1] Adverse publicity in Media of the accused [7.2] Violation of

Fundamental right as the principle of Self-incrimination will apply.

[7.1] Adverse publicity in Media of the accused

Media has now reincarnated itself into a ‘public Court’ and has started interfering into

Court proceedings so much so that it pronounces its own verdict even before the Court

does. It completely overlooks the vital gap between an accused and a convict keeping at

stake the golden principles of ‘presumption of innocence until proven guilty’ and ‘guilt

beyond reasonable doubt’.

The Apex Court observed that the freedom of speech has to be carefully and cautiously

used to avoid interference in the administration of justice. If trial by media hampers fair


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investigation and prejudices the right of defence of the accused, it would amount to travesty

of justice. The Court remarked that the media should not act as an agency of the Court. The

Court, commented “Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and

should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial and that

too when the investigation is pending.”44

In M.P. Lohia v. State of West Bengal45 the Supreme Court strongly deprecated the media

for interfering with the administration of justice by publishing one-sided articles touching

on merits of cases pending in the Courts.

If one carefully analyses the judgment in Reliance Petrochemicals v. Proprietor of Indian

Express46 in the light of the judgment of In Re: P.C. Sen vs Unknown47 , it can be inferred

that the Supreme Court has accepted that Judges are likely to be “subconsciously

influenced” by the media publicity. The same view has been held by Justice Frankfurter of

U.S. Supreme Court and Lord Scarman and Lord Dilhorne in the House of Lords.48 As we

know that there is no guidelines or regulation for the media in Indus which affect the

principle of fair trial mentioned in the constitution of Indus and also in the instant case the

adverse publicity by the media already made the accused guilty and these scenario may

influence the judgment and affect the principle of criminal justice system.

[7.2] Violation of Fundamental right as the principle of Self-incrimination will apply

The privilege against self –incrimination thus enables the maintenance of human privacy

and observance of civilized standards in the enforcement of criminal justice. The supreme

court has ruled that the confession has to voluntary, a confession made under threat,

inducement or compulsion is violation of Fundamental right. As in the instant case, the

44 Sidhartha Vashisht, Manu Sharma v. State (Nct of Delhi), 2010 AIR (SC) 2357.

45 (2005) 2 SCC 686.

46 1988(4) SCC 592.

47 AIR 1970 SC 1821.

48 Attorney General v. BBC, 1981 A.C. 303 (HL).


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confession was as not taken as per the provision of Cr.P.C. because the statutory obligations

were not fulfilled49.

Failure to give warning to accused before recording a confession takes away much of the

value of such statements and the court cannot act on it50. But no such warning given by the

magistrate about the confession, even he was also not informed about the right to silence

as enshrined in the constitution of Indus.

Furthermore, where no time at all was given to the accused to think whether he should

make such statement, the mandatory provisions of S.164 were held not complied with and

the statement could not be taken as confession51. Where the confessional statement neither

points out the warning against making of the confession, nor does it show that the

confession was made voluntarily nor sufficient time was given to the person making the

confession to have a cool reflection, the confessional statement is liable to be rejected52.

As in the instant case the accused was in the custody of army initially for 30 days then he

was in the custody of ATS and in between the both custody the confessional statement took

which implied there is no time gap between the two. This means that accused during the

confessional statement was in the influence of army as Masab Khan was in army custody

at that moment of time. Hence the confession in this case clearly violates the fundamental

right of the accused.

49 Sh. Lalhunpuria v. State of Mizoram, 2004 (4) Crimes 545 (Gauh.).

50 State of Karnataka v. K.S. Ramdas, 1976 Cr LJ 228; Asst. Collector of Central Excise v. Fibres Foils (p)

Ltd., (2001) Cr LJ 748 (Kant); Prabhusan Burman v. State of West Bengal, 1998 (4) Crimes 224 (Cal-DB).

51 M.V. Mahesh v. State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 771 (Kant-DB): ILR 1995 Kar 2752.

52 Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1988 SC 1883: 1988 SCC (Cri) 111: 1989 Cr LJ 1: (1988) 3 SC

609; Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2001 SC 2503: 2001 (7) SCC 148: 2001 Cr LJ 3945; Thuru

turi v. State, 1986 Cr LJ 438; Sankhi Chiba v. State of Arunanchal Pradesh, (2008) GLR 881: 2008 Cr LJ

1734.


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PRAYER

Wherefore in the lights of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is

humbly prayed that this Honorable Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

I. The special leave petition filed by the accused is maintainable.

II. The court in Indus didn’t have the jurisdiction to try Panjiksistan national

apprehended from its territory.

III. Indus has contravened vienna convention on consular relations.

IV. The nature of arrest and detention by Indus army is illegal in nature.

V. The accused has right to be enlarged on Bail.

VI. The accused is entitled to legal practitioner from Panjiksistan.

VII. The media is affecting the principle of fair trial by adverse publicity.

AND/OR

Pass any other writ/order/direction which the court may deem fit in the interest of equity,

justice, expediency and good conscience in favour of the Petitioner. All of which is most

respectfully affirmed and submitted.

Sd /-

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONER