task force in lebanon 1959

7/29/2019 Task Force in Lebanon 1959

1/119

DS07.U82

.

.NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

1 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED$;

CONTROL No. GC 89-64 HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

.


2/119

.

RECENT MONOGRAPHS ND SPECIAL STUDIES PREPARED BYTHE 03 DIVISION, USAREUR

A. U.S. Ocaupation of Germany1. The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953(UNCLASSIFIED)2. The U.S. Army Deutaohe Mark Construction Program (in twovolumes); 1950-1953 (SECRET) and 1953.1957 (UNX.JEXIFIED)3. The U.S. Armed Foroes German Youth Aotivitles Program,1945-1955 (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. U.S. Partloipation in Western Defense1. The Line of Communications Through Franoe (in threevolumes): 1950.51, 1952-53, and 1954-55 (SECRET NoFORN)2. Offshore Proaurement (in three volumes)t 1951-52, 1952-53,and 1953-55 (SECRET HOFORN)3. USAREUR Training Assistanoe to the West German Army (intwo volumes)t Planning (SECRET EOFORN) and Training( CO~JI?IDENTIAL)

0. Implementation of Specific3 Programs1. of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army,ntegrationEurope, 1952-54 (CONFIDENTIAL)2. Operation Gyroscope in the U.S. Army, Europe (SECRET NOFORN)3. The Dependents Schools Program of the U.S. Army, Europe,1946-56 (UNCLA~K~IFIED)

This monograph, "The U.S. Army TaskForce in Lebanon (U)," was preparedby 03 Division, Hq USAREUR.
http:///reader/full/1950.51http:///reader/full/1950.51


3/119

U.S.kmy MilitaryHistorynsti&i.jr;CLASSIFIED

TBE U.S. ARMY TASK FORCEIN LEBANON

Reproduction of thia document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office or higher authority.

Except J&@ By authority of


4/119

UNCLASSIFIED

Foreword

On 18 July 1958, the day before the first Bnay troops landed inLebanon, authority was requested to dispatoh one military historydetaahment to the Xiddle East. With in one week the 11th MilitaryHistory Detachment, composed of one officer and one enlisted man,was airlifted to Beirut, where it stayed from 27 July to 5 Outober1958. While stationed in Lebanon, the detaohment assisted in thepreparation of oommsnd and after-aotion reports and oolleatedsouroe material for a definitive history.of the U.S. Army TaskForce that had been instrumental in pacifying the Middle East.The resulting historical monograph traces developments fromthe over-all plans and politioal evolution to the implementationof plans and troop movements from Europe to the Middle East. There;

follows a detailed recount of the experienoes of the U.S. Army troopsIn Lebanon, including an analysis of the problema encountered andtheir possible oauses. Finally, the study desoribes the withdrawaland summarizes the lessons learned.Prepared by the staff of the Current History Branoh of theUSABEUB Historical Division, the monograph is based on U.S. Armyreoords transferred to USABEUR headquarters after the evacuation ofLebanon, the after-a&ion and oommand reports prepared by all majorheadquarters in Lebsnon, and the source material found in the filesof USAEEUR staff divisions. A bibliography of the sourues used is.ttached as Appendix 'B.Instead of using the system of indicating security olassifi -oation by paragraph as described in paragraph 590, AR 380-5, thismonograph is classified by the footnotea. That portion of thetext from one footnote referenoe to the next footnote refereneecarries the same olassification as the souroe docuunent noted inthe footnote, unless otherwise indioated. Using this system, onefootnote may, and does in many oases, indicate classification forseveral paragraphs, and similarly, one paragraph, documented bytwo or more footnotes, may.oarry two or more security alassifications.

-i-UNCLASSIFIED COPYP of 290 copiesPage e i of V- Pages


5/119

Contentspage

FOREWORD......................... 1 Part I: Background

CHAPTER 1: THE POLIT&L SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1. The Middle East Doatrine . . . . . . 1 2. The Crisis in Lebanon . . . 2 3. Lebanon's Appeal to the Unitid* '.* '

NatiOnS . . . . i . . . . . . . . . 6 CHAPTER 2: PLANS TO INVOKE THEMIDDLE EAST DOCTRINE . . . 8

4. Joint Planning . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. USAREUR's Responsibilities . . . . . 10 6. Specifiti Planning . . . . . . . . . . 11

Part IIt The Lebanon OperationCHAPTER 3: THE UNITED STATES INTERVENES . . . . . . . . . 13

7. Implementation of Plans . . . . . 13 8. Immediate Reactions to the lJ:S: Intervention 19 9. ATF 201Moves to'Ldbz&' : : : : : :10. L8nding and Deployment of Forces pi11. The Lebanese Reaction to the Land&' of U.S. Forces . ; . . . . . . . . 32 CHAPTER 4; ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS N THE OBJECTIVE AREA 36

12. Political Developments After the Presidential Election . . F . . . 36 13. Joint Command Problema 37 14. Supplementary Plans Deveiobi ;n'&e'Objective Area. . . . . . . . . . .Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . g i65: Training . 45 17. Military T;a&i ~s~i'&n~e*t~ ihi Lebanese Army . . . 94 . . . . . . . 47 18. Communications. . . . i . . . . . . . 19, Logistical Support . . . . . . . . . ;20 20. Civil Affaira . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 21. Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 22. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Efforts . . . . . . . . . . 75 - ii -


6/119

Contents-(Continued)Part III: Mission Accomdisherj

CR4PTEElSt OFFORCES :.RE WITRDRAWAL . . . . . . . . . .23. Emly Considerations l bbbbbb24, Planning for the Withdkwsl . . . . .25. Political Developments26. Security During the Uith&kl'P&&:27. The Phase-Out of Logistical Support .28. Troop Movements . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER6: PROBLEW . . . . . . . .UNDINGAND PERSONNEL29. Funding ............... 30. Personnel Mexiagement ........

CHAPTIB7r SUMMARYANDEVAI.JJATION............. 31. Adequacy of Plans b.bbbbb...32. USAREUR1sole in Rnergenoies . . . .

AppendicesAPPENDIX~-&t&tiOn List of USAREJJR to Lebanon. . 104-106ni%s SentL-Bibliography . . . . . . l . 107 bbb.e.0

C-Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108409.Tables

Table l--The k!ithdr&Wd by Se8 . . . . . . . . . ...*..2-The Withdrawal of the Airborne Brigade bebbbb

Map l-General Reference Map ................ 2--Eastern Mediterranean Area ............. >-Beirut&Vicinity ..................


7/119

UNCMSSIFIEDContents--(Continued)

IllustrationsView of Beirut. . . ................. 16 3d kledium Tank Battalion Motor Pool at Beirut Airborne Equipment Temporarily Stored Off Amway ... Tank in Partial Defilade near Beirut Beaoh ...... :;

View of the Port of Beirut .. 1 ........... Looal Tradesman Serving Paratrooper ......... ;; Bivouac Area in the Olive Groves ........... Joint Helicopter-Amphibious Exercise at JIBail Airborne Troops Dug into Xi11 on the Outskirt6 of Loading l/&ton Truck Aboard C-130 Aircraft for Move to Germany from Beirut, Lebanon, aa

Arrival of Force ALPHA at the Beirut Airport ..... 22 Airport ...................... 22

Patrol Vehioles Prior to Departure .......... 43 40~mmSelf-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun in Defensive Position at Roadblook DENVER ............ M-48 Tank Position at Roadblock CHICAGO ....... :; Tank Crews Receive Training Instructions ....... 49

Beach near Byblos, Lebanon ............. 73 Beirut Airport ................... 85 Troops Stand by to Load .............. 92

Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

- iv -UNCLASSIFIED


8/119

oCHATEAUROUXLA PILLICE

FRANCE

TURKEY


9/119

UNCLASSIFIED

Part I: BackgroundCHAPTER 1

The Political Situation

1. The Middle East DoctrineActing in response to a personal appeal made in January 1957by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States Congress adopteda resolution early in March 1957 that promised both economic and mil-itary aid to Middle East n8tions to assist in the fight agsinst Com-munism. This so-called Middle East Doctrine pledged the United Statesto use military forces if the President deemed it necessary to aid anyMiddle East country requesting assistance in its,efforts to resistovert armed aggression by Communist forces.The Middle East was then, and continued to be, the scene ofboth open political strife and potential armed conflict, but overa year passed before the Eiddle East Doctrine was put to te&t.During the spring of 1958 there was increased unrest in theMiddle East area. On 14 July a bloody revolt in Iraq brought thedownfall of the monarchy with the assassination of King Feisal andthe prime minister. To bolster the shaky government of the JordsnianKing Hussein--the cousin of the assassinated I&aqi king--the UnitedKingdom sent troops and aircraft to Jordan. At the same time Presi-

dent Eisenhower requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. SecurityCouncil to consider the Middle East problem.

-1.UNCLASSIFIED

COPYB of 290 CopiesPage - 1 of 111 Pages


10/119

In the face of these developments , and claiming Syrian interferencein its internal affairs, the Lebanese Government requested aid from theUnited States. On 15 July President Eisenhower announced;In response to (an) appeal from the Government ofLebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingentof United States forces to Lebanon to protect Americanlives and by their presence there to encourage theLebanese Cover ent in defense of Lebanese sovereigntyand integrity. p">

2. The Crisis in LebanonAfter centuries of control by outsiders, Lebanon became a republicin 1920. However, it was still a French mandate until 1943 and becametotally independent only in 1946, when the last French troops leftthe country. The country had suddenly come of age politica lly with-out having had time for a gradual social adjuetment.2

Actually, a feudal system still existed in Lebanon. The rem- 'nants of past tribal rule still could be seen in the popularity ofsuch men as former Prime Minister Raschid Karami, who in 1958 led theTripoli rebels in the first outward signs of a near-revolution. TheKarami name was Well known. Raschid was considered a traitor anddeserter by the loyalist followers of President Charnoun. Yet, hecommanded a large following among the Sunni Moslems, who constitutedabout one-fifth of the Lebanese population. Another tribal leaderwas Kamal Jumblatt, whose family had commanded Druze tribes for centuries.Both the Syrian Druze and the Jebel Druze would answer to his call.The political Tstability of Lebanon was dependent on agreementamong various factions who followed leaders, not because of their

political principles but because of their family names, A man withthe proper background of feudal leadership could by the same tokenbecome a political power and even a mili arily important figure,since the country had only a small army. 5Religion was also a primary factor in Lebanese politics. Before1952, the year of President Charnoun's inauguration, the balance ofChristian-Moslem influence had been fairly even, but thereafter ithad tipped slightly in favor of the latter, with a population 45percent Christian and 55 percent Moslem.

1The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 16 Jul 58. UNCLAS.'Appendix II, to Hq 201st Log Comd Hist & Comd Rept (hereaftercited as Log Comd Rept), 13 Ott-50 Nov 58. CONF (info used OFLUSE).3Ibid., p. 2. CONF (info used OFLUSE). -2-

UNCLASSIFIED


11/119

Since 1949 there had been a sharp division between pro-western andpan-Arabic influences in Lebanon. Syria, which borders the country,wanted to annex Lebanon because of its seaports and because the coun-tries were once united. (See Map 2.) m Lebanese supported unionwith Syria because of hoped-for advantages to both countries. In 1956;moreover, the Suez crisis had helped forge the chain of events of twoyears later by forcing Lebanese factions to take definite sides. Afterthe crisis had passed, President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought Lebanon as a%aturalw addition to his United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). Support forthe United Arab Republic mounted, both among the politiual opposition-ists to Charnoun's regime and among those Christians who thought ofthemselves as Arabs first of all.Early in 1958 Chamounattempted to bring about a change in theLebanese Constitution that would have allowed him to seek a second termin OffiC8. The move, apparently prompted by fear of U.A.R. earpansionas well as personsl ambition,4 aroused all factions of the oppositionbut not sufficiently to unite them. Intense reli ious differencesexisted in both opposition and loyalist ,factions. s In addition, exceptfor the Shiite tribes under El Assad in southern Lebanon, the opposi-tion had be8n infiltrated by strong contingents of Syrians and Egyptiansand had received military and financial assistance from U.A.R. sources.As a result, the opposition leaders were no longer free agents, andU.A.R. nationals constituted strong fifth columns within the country,prepared to exploit any situation that developed.During this period of threatened violence, Lebanon had six rebelleaders: Karsmi in Tripoli, Salaam in Beirut, Jumblatt in the out-lying Chouf district, El Assad in southern Lebanon, Saad in Sidon, andHsmade n the Bekka valley. All the major cities in Lebanon had barri-caded sections in which the rebels held positions that tEe loyalistsecurity forces could not penetrate. In Beirut the section was calledthe Basta; it remained barricaded until President Fuad Chehab tookoffice on 23 Septernber.6wports April 1958 the Lebanese situationfrom Lebanon mentioned the decline hof ad becomePresident explosive.7Chamoun's Rb'

41bid., pp. 2, 4. CONF info used OFLUSE).5Hq AMLANFORfter Act Rept (hereafter cited as AMLANFORept),Part III, Commander's NotesAp. 1, SECRET. Special handling requir-ed; n;t releasable to foreign nationals (info used UNCLAS).Appendix II to Log ComdRept, 13 Oct.30 Nov 58, pp* 1, /$, CONF(info7used OFIJJSE~.

DF, USAREKJR2 to CinC, 10 Apr 58, subj: Current Situation inthe Middle East (U). AEAGEIP (STRAT) 274Jm.3. SECRET(info ~8~3UNCLAS). -


12/119

0 10 20 30 40 50 11MAP 2 1NCLASSIFIEDMILES

blSKENbERUN

J S YRlATRIPOLI7


13/119

UNCLASSlFlED popularity and forewnrncd of di.sorXsrs in the presidential campaign inJuly. The assassination on 8 Flay of a proninvnt left-wing newspapereditor, Nasib Matni, who had been highly crLti.cal of Chamounadded tothe unrest.8

On 9 May the first visible sicnn of the revolution appeared whena United States Information Service (USIS) library was burned in thecity of Tripoli--as was one in Beirut three dsys later. On 1.2 Mayrebel factions called strike, and on the same day rioting,pneralegan in Bsirut, Opposition leaders handed the Chamounadministrationa resign-immediately ultimatum, but the President's aides refused evento pass the note on to him. Throughout that+ day the Cairo and Damascusradio stations called on the Lebanese to "revolt against the forces ofagents,ltmperialism and its urging them to go into the streets tofight the Chamoun egime, By that afternoon Lebanese Army troops ap-peared to be in control of the situation. A curfew forbidding citizensto be on the streets between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m. was put into effect.The Government was apparently prqxaring to ask Parliament for emergencypowers, Including those of martial law.9On 13 by the Lebanese Governmen-t formally accused Egypt snd Syriaof massive interference., Conflicting reports asserted that areas ofthe country were under the control of rebel forces.10 Still no officalmove was made by President Chamoun o seek American aid under the Mid-dle East Doctrine or to ask for United States intervention. On theSyrian frontier, Lebanese guards fwht two engagements against infil-trators, which resulted in 13 dead. Several hundred Lebanese youthsmarched on the American Embassy in Beirut but were turned back bytroops. The next night an official U.S. announcemsnt stated that po-lice equipment, including ammunition and tear gas, would be airliftadin an effort to h&p the Lebanese Government maintain security.11On 15 Msy a lull began that was to last nearly two weeks beforemore righting broke out in Tripoli. The general strike continued,for the rebels had no intention of ceasing their opposition to P&i-dent Charnoun. Apparently he was trying to bsrg,ain with them duringthis time, but they were not willing to accept anything short of his

8(1) Appendix II to Log ComdRept 13 Ott-30 Nov 58 p. 3.CONF info used OFLUSEj. (2) The Stars'and Stripes (Eur.'ed.), May-Jun 58, passim. UNCLAS.9The S_tars__sn.dn 'Des (Eur. ed.), May 58, passim. UNCLAS.

10DF, USAREURG2 to CofS, 15 May 58, subj: Situation in Lebanon,France, and Algeria (C). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 27uH5.2 GB. SECRET infoused UNCLAS).'lTheStars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), Msy 58, pass& UNCLAS.

UNCLASSIFIED


14/119

UNCLASSIFIED ccrpy~stepping down from the Presidency. At the same time there was a possibility that U.S. intervention in the Lebanon crisis would bring on a religious war,12 3. Lebanon's Appeal to the United Nations

On 21 lay Lebanon protested to the Arab League Council againstforeign interference in its internal politics. The next day Lebanonturned to the U.R. Security Council for help, charging the UnitedArab Republic with suoh interference.l3 While the Lebanese Govern-ment took diplomatic action, apathetic Government forces were regroupingin the face of continuous harassment by the rebels. Soviet propagandabegan to show more interest in the situation, and U.A.R. broadcastsfomented religious dissension.l4President Chamoun persisted in his intention to seek a secondterm, but his position was considered untenable, since it was apparentthat he would have to leave office before a lasting settlement couldbe achieved. During this precarious period of threatened out-and-out j

revolution, the Lebanese Army's chief of staff, General Fuad Chehab, iwho was eventually elected President in July, was recognised as themost desirable potential oandidate for the Presidency. He was knownto be pro-Western, and, as an Army officer, he maintained a detachmentfrom politics. Although he sincerely did not wish to be President, he-was known to oppose Chamoun's bid for a second term. Above all, he wasrespected and trusted by the Lebanese, both Christian and Moslem, as aman of impeccable character, high ideals, honesty, and fairness. Insharp contrast, it seemed most unlikely that the rebels could uniteunder any one of their leaders.l5In executing the U.N. Security Counoil resolution of 11 June anobserver team was aent to Lebanon. The heaviest fighting of the revolt

occurred on 14 June, when the Presidential palace was attacked whileChamoun was holding a cabinet meeting. The Government charged thatthe attaoking rebels were led by Syrian and Palestinian commandoee.

12(1) DF, USAREUR C2 to CofS, 15 May 58 v cited abovei SECRET(info used UNCLAS). (2) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Ott-30 Nov58, P* 2. CONF (info used OFLUSE).13The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May 58, passim. UNCLAS14DF, USAREUR 02 to CinC, 20 May 58, subjr Situation in Lebanon'in Of 20 M 1958 (u). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274b5.3 GB. CONF (info7sed TJNCLAS ."(1) DF, same to same, n.d. Bl May 58 , subj: Lebanese Political Situation (U). Same file. CONF ? info used UNCLAS). (2) Ltr, Lt Gen P. D. Adams, CC V Corps, to Maj Gen R. M. Osborne, USARFUR SCofS G2, 19 Aug 59. SECRET. V Corps log nr 2531/59.

-6-CerpI-UNCLASSIFIED


15/119

UNCLASSlFlED who had infiltrated into Beirut. The Army repulsed the rebels, butattacks on Beirut's central prison by successive assault waves, usingmachine guns and grenades , gave evidence of thorough military train-ing and organization.

Ambassador Robert S. EcClintock offered to evacuate fsmilies ofU.S. employees.16

An interim report of the U.N. observer team stated that theLebanese Army apparently controlled only a small section of the fron-tier with Syria and asked the Security Council to provide more observ-ers. The rebel leaders' attitude was hostile to the activities of theUnited Nations. On 21 June, for example, a white U.N. eep carryingobservers was fired on along the northeastern frontier. 17 Since U.N.observers alone could not solve the problem of U.A.R. aid to the rebels,the Lebanese Government requested that a U.N. emergency force be sentto seal off Lebanon's borders with Syria. This force, if sent, wouldbe given a fair chance to seal off the borders before the LebaneseGovernment asked for outside military aid.l* Even though Syrians werediscovered among the rebels captured by the Lebanese Army, theU.N. observers denied that there was any evidence of massive infil-tration. At the same time, the observers were unable to gain access to thelybel-held border areas where infiltration was most likely to occur*

On 9 July President Chamoun announced that he would leave officeat the end of his term on 23 September. The rebels, however, were notsatisfied, declaring that they would continue their opposition untilhe left office.20

16(1) The St ars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 16 Jun 58. (2) Sup-plement to Foreign Polioy Briefs, Dept of State, 25'Jul 58, pp. 3, 4.Cy in USAREUR Hist Div Doau Sec. Both UNCLAS.17(1) The St ars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), Jun 58, passim. (2) Deptof State Supp, cited above, p. 4. Both UNCLAS.l*(l) Dept of State Supp, cited above, p. 4. INCLAS. (2) DF,USAREUR 62 to Cinch, 21 Jun 58, subjr Current Situ:%tion in the MiddleEast (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3 GB. CONF (info used UNCLAS).19(1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 4 Jul 58, p. 1. UNCLAS.(2) Appendix II, to Log Comd Rept, 13 Ott-30 Nov 58, p. 5. CONF (infoused OFLUSE). (3) Dept of State Supp, cited abole, p* 4. UNCLAS.20The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 10 3ul 58, p. 1. WNCUS. Seealso, cmt 2, USAREUR G2 to Hist Div, 4 Jun 59, subjr Review of DraftMonograph "The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon." AEAGB-Cl (SADS)274/T GB. UNCLAS.

UNCLASSIFIED


16/119

Plans to Invoke the Middle East Doctrine

After World War II9 and except for a temporary buildup duringthe Korean conflict, the United States Army had to assume everincreasing global commitments in support of national polioy, with aconstantly decreasing force. Contingency planning at the Departmentof the Army level, therefore, was predicated primarily on the "firebrigade" ooncept, under which half of the recently created StrategicArmy Corpa (STRAC) force of 140,000 could be deployed from the UnitedStates to an emergency spot anywhere in the world within 30 days, andthe other half within 60 dayo. Thq difficulty wa:': that this plan didnot have the approval of the Join: dhiefs of Staff (JCS) necess toassure the strategic lift capabilities of the other two aervicea. "9In contrast, contingenoy planning at the overseaa theater levelwas a JCS-directed, theater-wide, triservice effort: The, the U,S.Com-mander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), had developed a joint operationsplan for the support of a JCS apeoified command in the Middle Eaet(SPECOMME) whioh involved the joint efforta of the U.S. Sixth,Fleet,the United States Marine Corpe, the United States Air Foroes in Europe(USAFE), the Military Sea and Air Traneportation Selvicea (MSTS andEATS), and the United States Army, Europe (USABEUR). The USAREUR con-tribution to this planning effort wae its Emergency Plan (EP) 201,governing the movement of Army Task Force (ATF) 201 from Europe to the

$. B. Yoshpe & J. Bykofsky, Lebanon, A Test o f Army ContingencyPlanning (U), (Off of CofT, Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 5-7, 14, 36.SECRET. A detailed discussion of STRACts role in the planning for theLebanon orisis and the problems involved may be found in this-work.


17/119

> EDMiddle East. This plan was coordinated with CINCSPECOMME nd CINC-USAFE and approved by USCINCEUR and the Department of the Army.24. Joint Planning

According to the Widdle East Doctrine, the interests of peace andU.S. national policy would require military action in the event ofArab-Israeli hostilities or Communist-inspired aggression againstfriendly Middle East countries. Under such a contingenoy the Depart- --..._ment of the Army, if required by the situation, would deploy bothcombat and support elements and furnish logistica l support for themfrom the United States. In addition, the Department would assumeresupply responsibility for the USAREURATF 201 after El30 if thatforce was deployed to the Middle East.The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic andMediterranean (CINCNELM), aa the JCS specified commander, would exer-cise operational control over all U.S. forcea deployed to the Middle

East. In his role as naval commander, he would deploy the Sixth Fleet,including an amphibious task force with Marine Corps battalion land-ing teams, to the trouble area. In support of this operation, the2d Marine Air-Ground Task Force would deploy forces from the UnitedStates.CINCUSAFE would organize and deploy an air task force and pro-vide the airlift required for the operation, to include attendantlogistical and administrative support. Similarly, MSTS would pro-vide sealift as requested, and MATS would provide airlift a enta-tion to CINCUSAFE as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. YAs early as September 1957 the commanding general of ATF 201

had established contact with CINCNELM through a visi t to the Londonheadquarters of Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr. This visit wasfollowed in November by a conference of Army, Navy, and Air Forcerepresentatives called by CINCNELM to develop a plan for possibleairborne operations in the Middle East. The conferees establishedclose working relations. For the first time, moreover, USAFErepresentatives made a firm commitment of theater airlsft capability,consisting of 110 C-119's, or equivalent, to support the projectedoperation.4

2(1) Ibid., ppe 16, 37. (2) USAREUR ltr, 26 Feb 58, subjrUSARXUR Emescy Plan 201 (Revision of 1 Feb 58) (U). AEAGC-PL250/m GC USAREUR Regis Nr AG 314f3. Both SECRET,

'USAREUR EP 201, pp. l-3. SECRET.$3q, Prov Abn Bde, ATF 201, Comd Rept (hereafter cited as AbnBde Rept), 15-31 Jul 58. CONF,


18/119

In early'ilecember 1957 a 34ey war game held at 11th AirborneD&vision headquarters was attended by representatives of all principalagencies involved in the contingency planning, The purpose of the wargame was to examine all aspects of an airborne operation designed toseize an airport end the adjacent populated area, For the first timethe logisticsl requirsments to support such an operation were closelyWJ$Wd. At the conclusion of the war game the planners drew up alist of requirements to.be implemented by the designated agencieshaving primary interest. From the standpoint of the ATF 201 staff, thiswar gsme did more than snything else to place Middle East contingencyplanning on a firm and practical basic*

Early in 1958, as the situation in the Middle East became increas-ingly critical, an additional contingency plan to support or restore afriendly government was developed in outline form by the CINCNELM taff.This plan was accepted by the ATF 201 commanderwith only minor changes,since 13y his time, as a result of the joint planning conferences andwar gaming, the CINCNEXMtaff was well versed in the principles ofairborne operations.55. USAFtEURfsResmnsibilities

Under the February 1958 revision of EP 201, USARHIRrsprimarymission in a Middle East emergency would be to provide the Army TaskForce 201, consisting of two airborne battle groups re or&f withminimum essential combat and service-support elements. r The task forcewas to be so organized as to permit its deployment either in whole or inpart, depmding on the situation. Its combat strength was to be atleast sufficient to permit limited operations for app&ncimately oneweek, its capability for deployment by air was to be immediate, and itsfollow-up forces were to pennit effective limited operations for anindefinite length of time. Thus, it was to be divided into five basicechelons.Force ALP& composed of 1 reinforced airborne battfs group andthe task force commandgroup (1,720 personnel), was to be prepared tomove from the departure airfield on 12 hours' notice.

Force BRAVO,comprising the second airborne battle group and theadvance headquarters of the taskforce (1,723 personnel), was to movefrom the departure airfield on 24 hours' notice.

%SAREUREP 201, p. 3. SECRET.- 10 -


19/119

Force CBAHLIE was to move by sea or air, depending on the situa-tion. In either case, movement to the port of embarkation or from the departure airfield would begin within 120 hours' notice. This force contained the main headquarters, the task force artillery--consisting of 2 airborne batteries of 105-mm howitzers, 1 section of a 762-1~1 rocket battery, and the headquarters element--an airborne reconnais-aance troop, an engineer construction company, the advance party of the task force support command, an evacuation hospital unit, elements of an airborne support group, and an Army Seourity Agency detachment.

Force DELTA was to move by sea, departing from home stations for the ports on 120 hours' notice. It comprised the eeatail of the air-borne battle groups, including 2 light truck companies, a section of a 762~mm rocket battery, an engineer construction battalion (-), an antiaircraft artillery (AW) battery, technical-service support units, and a military police unit. Force ECHO, a 90-m gun tank battalion, was to move by sea; it was to initinte movement to the port on 98 hours' notice or remain

at its home station prepared to move on 48 hours' notice, as directed.7 Another USAREUR mission would be to furnish logistical supportto the task force until resupply from the United States was estab-lished--presumably at F&O--and to continue to furnish emergenoyresupply and personnel replacements until the Department of the Armywas able to furnish such support. The joint staff of CINCSPECOHMEwas to be furnished 10 officers and 1 enlisted man from USAREURgeneraland special staff divisions.8

6. Specifio Planninga. Responsibilities of USAREUR Subordinate Commands. The U.S.Seventh Army and the U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe (USACOMZEUR),were to organize and move the elements of ATF 201, to provide themwith organic equipment and supplies, and to furnish them logisticalsupport until their departure from Western Europe. They were alsoto stage all units, personnel, and supplies departing through portsor airfields in their areas of responsibility.Similarly, the 7th Engineer Brigade was to organize and move theengineer units assigned to the task force; the U.S. Army Port of

7Annex B, Concept of Operations, to USAREUREP 201, pp. l-4.SECRET.'(1) USAREUR EP 201, p. 3. SECRET. (2) Appendix 2, CINC-SPECOMMEStaff Augmentation, to Annex E, Personnel, to USAREUR EP 201.SECRET (info used COIJF).


20/119

Embarkation, Bremerhaven (USAPER), was to stage and move all unitsdeparting through the port; and the area commands were to assist inprocessing, dispatching, and transporting elements o f the task forceproceeding through their areas of responsibi lity enroute to departureairfields or ports.All units comprising the task force were to maintain a state of preparednees consistent with the movement timetable outlined above.9 b. Over-all Command Functions. The general commanding the task force was to assume command of his units when they closed into the marshaling camps, staging areas, departure airfields, or ports of embarkation in Western Europe. The foroe would pass to the direct command of CINCUSAREURupon departure from the aerial and sea ports of embarkation, and to the operational control of CINCSPECOMME pon arrival in the designated staging area in the Middle East--tentatively identified as Adana end/or Iskenderun, Turkey.lO c* Operation Plan GRANDIOS. Specific responsibility for provid-

ing the oombat elements of ATF 201 was delegated to the 24th Infant&Division--formerly the 11th Airborne Division. This division, in turn,developed Operation Plan GRADIOS, which governed its preparations anda&ions in case of an emergency in the Middle Upon notifica-ast.ion, the division was to be organized into four functional for&eta task force equivalent to a reinforced airborne brigade and com-manded by the assistant division commander; a support force underthe division artillery commander; division trains; and the remainderof the division. The task force--oompoased of the 187th and 50'JdInfantry combat teams, Troop C of the 9th Cavalry Regiment, andassigned artillery units --was to be on call for employment in anemergency area. The support force was merely to assume reaponsibil-ity for operations and coordination of the marshalIn& and departureactivities attendant upon the movement of the task force. The dlvi-sion trains and the remaining units of the division were to providevarious types of support to facilitate the movement of the taskforoe.ll

9USANEUR EP 201, pp. 4-7. SECRET.-_"Ibid ., p. 9. SECRET...-"(1) After Action Rept, 24th Inf Div, 5 Nov 58, subj: Opera-tion GRANDIOS, 15-31 July 1953 (U). COXF. In USAREUR G3 Ops BrEp 201 file. (2) 24th Inf D'V OPLAN GRANDIOS, 1 Jul 58. CONF.


21/119

--

Part II: The Lebanofl mtion.---*-. --.I.CHAP'tXR3

The United States Intervenesof. Imolementatlon -,,-' Plans

a. Prepara.tions. With the worsen:lng of the Middle East crisistoward the middle part of May 1958, USAREURmplemented .Operation PlanGRANDIOS in &I. its phases except fo r the actual dispatch of loadedaircraft to the objective *area. After the slert was lifted, intensifiedrehearsals of marshalSn3 end outloading activities were conducted, andthe plan was refined.1 Generally, these and other activities revealedthat USAE@XJR's the support of CINCSP%OWEWASsound. Never-P 201 fortheless, at a critique held early in June for the purpose of improvingthe plan2 seversl areas of possible improvement were noted. Forexample, the plan called for Force ALPHAof ATF 202 to deploy at NO-percent strength, while the other elements of the'taslc force, whichhad to be maintained at loo-percent strength, would deploy at "presentfor duty" strength, which would never fell below 85 percent under theUSAREURass and leave policy. However, personnel wtth criticalspecialties would have to deploy at lOO-percent strength so as not toimp&r the combat effectiveness of the force, snd this could be accom-plished only if overstrengths were authorized. In reply to a USAREURinquiry on this subject, the Department of the Amf authorized an

1Opn GRANDIOS fter Act Rept, cited abovs. CGNF. 2DF, ~JSAREURCofS G3 to CofS, 23 Jun 58, subj: USAREURP 201Critique (U). AE4GC-=?L50/18 GC. SECRU"r,

- 13 - I-


22/119

,.-. ., ^

overstrength in the: 11th Airtwrne--later 24th Infantry--Division solong aa the over'-a ll USARrXH st,rc?ngth ceilings were not exceeded.Another deficiency uncovered in the plan was that personnel reporting to the tauk force from non-11th Airborne Divis ion units

during the May-June pre-alert readiness state were often not fully prepared or equipped. Moreover, uertain provisional units that would be assigned to the task force were not then in e+atenoe.3 A constant handicap during the preparatory phase was the unduly rerestrictive interpretation of the need-to-know regulatitiii, which pre-vented the ATF 201 staff from coordinating fully with assigned non-divisional units, and was later to have an adverse effect upoh theexecuting of the plan.4b. Timing. Long before the President announced .the U.S. inter-vention, preparations had been made for such an even%u@ity. Inaddition to the preplt:atory steps taken by the Army,.'the U.S. SixthFleet, with embarked Marines, was getting ready for action in theMediterranean. Thus, in the mid-afternoon of 14 July CINCNELM directedthe Sixth Fleet Task Force 61 (TF 61) to operate east of 30 degreeseast longitude (roughly the position of Alexandria, Egypt, or halfwayfrom Crete to Cyprus), with 1 amphibious squadron remaining within 12hours' sailing time of Lebanon.5At 2350 hours on the same night the Marines of TN. 61 were orderedto land at Beirut at 1500 hours the following afternoon. They landedon schedule and, encountering no opposition, secured the Beirut Inter-nat;lonal Airport within little more than an hour. 16 July additionalMarines landed to secure the Beirut port facilities, ,?..,. (See Mati 3.).Meanwhile, at 0530 hours on 15 July, USCINCEUA h&I directed

USAREUR and USAFE to prepare one battle group and the 'necessary airliftfor deployment to Beirut. Whereas USARLVR had a$ready!alerted ForceALPHA two hours earlier, CINCUSAFN direoted the 322d Air Divis ion tosupport the opera.tion. The first aircraft arrived at Fuerstenfeldbruckat 1430 hours 15 July, only one half hour later than expected, andarrivals continued at a rate of some 5 aircraft per hour for the -next6 hours.7 Flight operations were hampered by thunders'torms, which had

3Ibid. SECRET.4Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF (info used UNCLAS).5Hq 2d Frov Marine Force Comd Diary (hereafter cited ag Marine

Diary), 1-31 Jul 58. SECKET.6Ibid, SECW;T."-'Tab E, to memo, Co1 G. hl. McBaney, C/USAREUR G3 Ops Br, to Co1D. C, Clayman, Dapt ACofS G3, 6 Aug 58, subjr Airlift Cpcrntions, TF 2121.&AC-X- P 278/6 GC. SZCmT. - 14 -
mailto:even%u@itymailto:even%u@ity


23/119

UNCLASSIFiED x_(I BEIRUT 4 VICINITY I(

A r xx JAMLANFOR 1 _ A . .a -

QQQQOOPf?EEN BEAY QQOP?OO??QPQQQOQQQQQQQQQPQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ QORJ EL BRAJNI c?QQ,9QQQQQQ a chk/t;*\\QQQQOQOQOPQQQQQQQQQQQ?QREt ?QQQ?QQQQQ000000 OUADI CHAHROUR99995OPQOQoQ00 -QQQQQQOQ @- 1i3wQQPQQQQQQ / KAFER CHIMA@a QQQQQQP QQQQQ~

??QQ9 ECH CHOUEIFATE Z if 999999 G-v -GE QQQQQQQQQQQQQQI QQQQ ,Q.91~. zq- _-- , .. . _^ ._^ _. _^A'iLI,*-3Y-,JUNCLASSIFIED - I5 -


24/119


25/119

delayed the departure of aircrafi:.8On 16 July USAREUR declared a state of "increased vigilance"'throughout the command, While this did not constitute's formal USAREUR

alert, the readiness of forces to execute alert and operational plansif 80 ordered was increased. To this end, alert procedures and cur-rent operational plans were reviewed and command posts were maintainedon a 240hour basis by all headquarters down to the battalion level.These actions were taken covertly to avoid alarming dependents andindigenous populations.9 (These provisions were not lifted until2 August, by which time the situation had become relatively stable.)lOBy 16 July Force BRAVO was placed on a 12.hour a status ingarrison.11 On the next day the airlift of Force CHARLIE began, andForces DELTA and ECHO assembled and prepared to move to the ports ofembarkation.12 On 8 August, when it became clear that a combat eitua-tion would not develop, Force BRAVO was placed on a de-hour alert, which

was lifted one week 1ater.l3c* Stateside Support. In the meantime, stateside support of theoperation also moved forward. Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, directedMATS to deploy 36 C-124 aircraft to Europe to augment the airlift forthe movement of troops to the Middle East. They arrived on 17 July:Fifty percent of the ATF 201 resupply stocks of all types had alreadybeen positioned at east coast ports, and instructions were now j.ssuedto move the remaining 50 percent to the ports,lJ The Department ofthe Army also announced that, effective at E{35--with 17 July as E-day--it would assume individual personnel replauement support of the deployed

'Cable SX-5240, USAREUR to USCINCEUR, 15 Jul 58. SECRET. Specialhandling required; not releasable to foreign nationals..9Cable SX-5278, USAREUR to subor comds, 16 Jul 58. SECRET. 10 Cable SX-5829, same to same, 2 Aug 58. SECRET."Cable ~~-5269, USAREUR to DA for DCSOPS, 16 Jul 58. SECRET.For details of the movement of forces, see par 9.12Cable DA-945015, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Jul 58. SECRET.Special handling required: not releasable to foreign nationals. On thesame date 2,000 British airborne troops moved into Jordan to bolster

that oountry's government.13 Cables SX-5954 & SX-6126, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 8 & 15 Bug58. SECRET.14Cablee DA-944832 & D&944945, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, et al.,16 & 17 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable toforeign nationals.

-17-mUNCLASSIFIED


26/119

elements of ATF 201.15 Furthermore, although a final decision had notyet been made,,the Department of the Army was considering plans to re-place ATF 201 with two battle groups that would be deployed from theUnited States to Europe.16d. Security. In order to guarantee the security of the EP 201operations, Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR units,ounterintelligence aswell as the 66th CIC Group, conducted security checks. Weaknesses werefound in only two areas-some insecure telephone lines were used totransmit operational orders, end at first the U.S. and German securityforces at the F'uerstenfeldbruck airbase were not coordinated-butthese deficiencies were corrected early in the operation. Public andpress comment consisted mainly of officially released information,with added inaccuracies based on rumor and speculation. The initiallack of accurate press information on troop strengths, units involved,routing, and final deetinatfons indicated the over-all effectivenessof security measures.17Continuing surveillance revealed no decrease in the efficacy of%S%EURts security measures, although unfriendly agents tried to pene-trate USAREURargets to obtain information. Soviet mission vehicles~far example, cruised the Munich-Augsburg area daily, and as early as19 July East German intelligence agents, presumably at the directionof the Soviets, were assigned the task of learning the answers to.thesequestions:

(1) Had a general alert been declared?(2) Were troops confined to their bases?(3) Were staff personnel working around the clock?(4) Were there any large troop movements into orout of Bremerhaven?(53 Were there any incoming or outgoing shipments ofatomic or rocket weapons?(6) Were there any shipments of heavy weapons intoor out of Bremerhaven?

l'(l) Cable DA-945124, DA from to 19 Jul. 58.CSPER CINCUSAREUR,(2) Incl, to ltr, USAREURo distr, 19 Jul 58, subj: G4 JournalExtracts, EP 201. AEAGD-PL 50/X3 GD. Both SECRET.Y-6Cable DA-945108, DA from DCSOPSo USCINCEUR, 8 Jul. 58. SECRET.17DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAF?.EUR,1 Jul 58, dbj: Security Statusof EP 201 (c), AEAGB-CI (SAIS) 274/7 GB, SECRET.


27/119

---By ihe &>d of July, which is ,to:s&'.t&,+ghout the critical period,no significant lapses of security ,h@ b&n noted.18.:'

8. Immediate Reactions&the U.$.&&rv e&ion I.. ,'Needless to scsy, the Soviet U#&tooked upon the U.S. interven-tion in Lebanon unfavorably as did acri&'-M' the Arab nations. Exceptfor complaints about unauthorized &xier$ap use of airspace,19 Westerngovernments and t?le non-Communist mSs.'generally approved the move.'.In West Germany, for example, .t@Chsncellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer,immediately expressed approval of th6U.s; action. On 18 July, how-ever, the G&man Government's press chief indicated disappointment overthe American failure to give the NATOAllies prior knowledge of thelanding. The German press genex%lly-echoed this .sentiment and alsovoiced some concern over possible Russian counter moves. Nevertheless,the German official attitude remained favorable. The Foreign Officesought information from USAPMR so that it might show the press thatthe German Government was being kept~fully,informed by the United )States. However, the necessity for c&e.ars.nco rom Washington beforereleasing information --the result of the high security classificationattached to the opextinn- delayed the p&ss#.ng of information to theGermans fo3 a f+ul.l week. It was considered desirable that such delaysbe avoided in any similar operat;ion ia the ,rUture.20.,In Frcance ->he reaction was still m&t? favorable. The Government,the non-ComKtist press, and the peop1.e .in general approved and sup-ported the U.S. action. Moreover, the F&&h were highly impressed bythe swiftness of the opration, expressing only disappointment thatthe United States had not taken a similak,cou.rse during the Suez crisis.On the other hand, the Communist--a &row,and legal'party in France-=-intensified their anti-American campai The Communist dominatedConf'&d&ation G&&ale du Travtil-I- (CGTP,. one of France's largest laborunions, demanded that the French natiQnr3 iailwws stop shipments in-.. _'

"(1) Cable SX-5626, USARiEUR die&r & $ul 58. (2) DF ACoBoG2 to CIn'CUSARE'JR,8 Jul. 58, subj: S&Q Status of EP 201 iC).AEAGB-CI (SAIS) 274/7 GB. Both SECBBT.19For details, see par. 9b. .I . .Jul ~~~l)Un;;;;c USAREURSK IIt 564., U&&A Bonn to DA for ACSI, 18. (2) DF, G2 to CINCUSAMJR, 19 3&l 58, subj: Re-actions to Employment of U.S. Forces in the Middle East. AEAGB-CI(SAA) 274/47 CB, Cl ;;F, (3) Cable S&5502, USAREURrom Polit Ad toAm Bonn, 22 Jul. 58. SECRET. (4) CaIrJ.e.tSX-5626, USAREURo distr, 25Jul. 58. SECRZT. (5) Intvw, Mr. B. H. Siamon SeMr. R. Sher, USAREURHist Div, with Jlr. D. A, Flinn, USRREUBPo15t Ad, 3 Nov 58. UNCLAS.- 19 - 1+3R-


28/119

support of the Middle East operation. Wlon the CGT proposed a general8 trike, the non-Communist labor unions voted egainst it. The Communiststhreatened sabot:,ge if their demands Were not met ,but both French andU.S. security force s vlere alerted to prevent it.21The situetion in Itoly %;as similar to that in France. The Govern-ment and non-Cormnuniot press supported the U.S. action, and the Premier,Amintore Fanfani, expressed full support of the American landings inLebanon. The Italitin Communist party and the entire left-wing press,attaoked the United States vehemently. In defiance of a Government banon all public gathorirqg, street rallies snd demonstration8 were inati-gated by Communists in Rome, Naples, Bologna, and Leghorn. A generalstrike and a number of shorter, temporary work stoppages were alsocalled by the Communist labor unions in the Leghorn area. No suchincidents, however, cccurred at Verona and Vicenza, the two otherareas with major U.S. troop concentrations in Italy.22Apparently the Russians had directed the Italian Communist partyto activate military sabotage cells, with POL supplies and military;'afroraft flying out 0f Italy to the Middle Fast as their principaltarg*ts;23 no cases of sabotage were reported.

9. ATF 201 Xoves to-Lebanona. Organization, Rouies, and Wethods.

(I) Force ALPHA. Force ALPHA, composed of the 1st AirborneBattle Group, 187th InfaGtry, and elements of the task force head- ..quertera,.begq movement to the Fuerstenfeldbruck airbase on 15 Julyat 1400 hours, closing there by 1900 hours.24 'Nith Support ForceSpeidel providing marshaling and departure airfie ld. support, thesetasks proceeded generally ae planned. Outloading of Force ALPHA beganQt 1700 and continued as planned for the first 18 airoraft. Loadingplans for sub8equen* ti aircraft were revised to provide for balanced

2l(l) DF, G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58, cited above(2) Cable AEAZAID-C-58-218, USACCXZEURAdv Seo to USA Gin rp%Kaiserslautern, et al., 23 Jul 58. CONF, (5) Cable ~~-5626, citedabove. SECRET. ToTcts of sabotage were known to have taken place.22(1) DF, G:? to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 58, cited above.(2) Cable 5X-5626, cited above. SECFiET. (3) Cable P-OBO~~&SETAFfrom AESE-NBI-CI to CINCUZXREUR for G2, 24 Jul 58. CONF.23 Cable USARSUR SI;IC 1s 7490, CIRCUSAFE ADVCN to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jul

93, SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreignnationals.24 For a complete station list of ATF 201 forces, the composition ofunits, and their home stations, see Appendix- A.


29/119

orossloading, Since Force ALPHAhad to be prepared for airdrop as wel$as 'airlanding operations, the loading plans were based on airdrop re- : "quirements.The outloading of Force ALPRAwas completed on 16 July at 0801,hours. Due to bad weather the takeoff of the first aircraft for A&mwas delayed until 0817 hours. The commandgroup departed at O%& udall elements of the force cleared by 2248 hours on 16 July. AI~Q@&&uQ60 aircraft were required-11 C-124, 30 C-130, and 19 C-119-&o o&3.--1,517 personnel and 354.45 short tons of cargo.The first aircraft, a C-119, arrived at Adana on 17 July at whours, and 16 hours later the entire force had closed at that ?&w&A stopover at Adsna was required because the situation in &etive srea was obscure, and essential elements of informatiOn mthe airfield and nearby area at Beirut were lacking. Accor&W&,early on 18 July an advance planning group left for Beirut, whm ib

members established contact with the Lebanese authorities. When nfarcmation from U.S. forces and State Department officials indicated thatan air1 ding was feasible and operationally safe,25 it began Wly adl19 J4 and proceeded smoothly and without incident. Nineteen haur8'later Force ALPHAhad closed at Beirut International Airport utili#&g '.65 aircraft.27 ,IIAccording to directive, operations at the BeirutINCSPECOM031sairfield were to be coordinated by the Commander,American Air Forced(COMAMAIRFOR),ho was to establish contact with local officials forthis purpose. Upon arrival at Beirut the Army troops were to oonsti-'tute SPECOMME'seserve and were to deploy southeast of the airfieldin an assembly area having a 2-mile radius.28(2) Force BRAVO. This force remtied on 12-hour alert forairlift to destination upon request from CINCSPECOMME.29 portionof its equipment was in hangar at Fuerstenfeldbruck .and rigged for

25 Incl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15931Jul 58. CONF. 26Cable SX-5455, USAREURo DA for DCSOPSor Pacbler, 20 Jul $8.SECRET.27Memo, Lt Co1 J. D. Bird, Trans Div Tfc Br, to Brig Gen F. D,Atkinson, USAREXJRTram Off , 30 Sep 58, CONF. In Trens Div Tfc Br.28Cable USAREUR MC N 5440, CINCSPECOMME COWIRFOR, & a&,o18 Jul 58. SECRET.29Cable DA-945190, DA from DCSOPSo CINCUSARFZR2.1 Jul. 58.SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals,

2


30/119

Arrival of Forre Alpha ;~t the Beirut Airport

:


31/119

heavy dro in case the force was called to execute an airborne8assault.3 In the operation Force BRAVO was held in reserve. Itwould have required airlift of 1,606 personnel, 584*4 short tons ofequipment, and 86.5 short tons of heavy drop equipment. If liftedby C-130 aircraft--each capable of carrying 24,000 pounds allowablecargo load as used for Force ALPHA--80 such planes would have beenneeded for the airdrop and 67 additional for airlanding operations. 31headquarti;i (Force CHARLIE. Force CHARLIE, including the task force-) and elements of brigade troops, moved to Fuerstenfe ld-bruck on the afternoon of 17 July. Not only was its marshaling dis-rupted by a violen t thunderstorm, but outloading operations proceededvery slowly because of a shortage of aircraft and because cargo air-lift was given a higher priority. In addition, changes in movementorders for the several units of the force caused modifications inloading plans. The first aircraft did not depart for Adana until0600 hours on 19 July. Elements of the force were also outloadedfrom the Rhein-Main, Chateauroux, and Evreux airbases, Since ForceCHARLIE was to be airlanded, maximum use was made of available airliftcapacity.32 According to an eyewitness report of 21 July, the loadingproceeded smoothly under the supervis ion of Support Force Speidel, thetiming being governed only by the turnaround of aircraft. CHARLIEelements bivouacked near the airstrip , preparing vehicles and equip-ment for air movement. Aircraft arriving at Fuerstenfeldbruck spentabout one hour on the ground for loading and checking.33 By middayon 22 July, 63 aircraft had departed; 25 additional ones left withinthe next 17 hours.34 Of the 1,690 men outloaded, 1,028 left fromFuerstenfeldbruck, 615 from Rhein-Main, and 47 from the 2 airfieldsin France. The total cargo airlifted was 2,136.d tons, with l,224.2outloaded at Fuerstenfeldbruck, 828.2 at Rhein-Main, and smalltonnages at the other fields.

All aircraft carrying Force CHARLIE flew a circuitous route,generally from Augsburg via Stuttgart to Marseilles (refueling stop),parallel to the southwest coast of Italy, aaross Sicily , and northof Crete to Adana, with a total elapsed time of 12 hours. Altogether,110 aircraft were sent to Adana, and the rest of the force, less sea

3%emo, Co1 K. Conner, C/USAREUR G3 Plans & Plcy Br, to ACofS G3,24 Jul 58, subjr Report of Liaison Visit to Beirut, Lebanon, by Co1Karl Conner, G3 Div, Hq USAREUR (U) ( ). WAGC-PL. SECRET.31Tabs A & B, to memo, Co1 McHaney to Co1 Clayman, 6 Aug 58,cited above. SECRET.32Incl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.33Memo, Co1 Conner, 24 Jul 58, cited above. SECRET.3% emo, Co1 Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.

- 23 -


32/119

lift, closed at Beirut--in both cases without incident. A small detach-ment of vehicles and guard personnel was sent to Bremerhaven for move-ment to Beirut by sea, beginning 23 July.35Movement of Force CHARLIE from Adana to Beirut was initiated on20 July. By the evening of that day 22 percent of the cargo and 16

percent of the troop packets were estimated to have unloaded at Beirut.The resupply of both the ALPHA and CHARLIE forces, requiring a totalof 198 aircraft, moved simultaneously. Except for 10 C-119's and 3C-lZ4's, which were retained at Adana for shut le operations to Beirutand any other contingencies that might arise,? 4, all aircraft that hadmoved Force ALPHA returned to Europe to shuttle Force CHARLIE and theresupply. Force CHARLIE closed at Beirut on the evening of 24 July.37(4) Force DELTA. Force DELTA shipped out in several incre-ments. It consisted principally of units stationed in Germany, whichleft through the Bremerhaven port of embarkation on 26 July; 900 addi-tional troops stationed in France were shipped from La Pallioe on 27July. The force debarked at Beirut from 3 to 5 August.s8(5) Force ECHO. This force moved to Bremerhaven on 19 July,olosing there two days later. It consisted of the 3d Medium TankBattalion (Patton), 35th Armor, which had been conducting its annualtraining teat at Baumholder when it was alerted on 16 July. Returningto its home station the next day, it moved to Bremerhaven in 2 incre-ments, oompriaing 4 rail movements of tracklaying equipment and 1 roadmovement of wheeled vehioles.39

On 21 July, while the battalion closed at the Bremerhaven stagingarea, CINCUSAREUR received a cable from Beirut asking that only onetank company of Force ECHO be shipped and that the rest of the battal-ion be held at Bremerhaven.4 o Force ECHO was already loading accord-ing to plan. Moreover, the suggested change would disrupt the tacticalintegrity of the battalion, since the effectiveness of both the elementremaining in Germany and that departing for the objective area would begreatly reduced. The units remaining in Germany would be unable to

351ncl 4, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF.36Cable DA-945148, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Jul 58,SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.37Mt?*0 t Co1 Bird to Gen Atkinson, cited above. CONF.38Cable DA-945600, DA from DCSOPS to USCONARC, et al., 28 Jul 58.-SECRET.39Incl 11, to Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF (info used UNCLAS).40Cable USAREUR SEIC IN 6131, CINCSPECO?IE to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58.SECRET.

- 24 -


33/119

mainta in their equipment properly since the battalion's maintenanoecapability would have to move ai.th the company proceeding to Beirut.When the remainder of the battalion equipment and personnel was calledforward, a delay of 72 hours would be required for loading it. After26 July water transport, with a 72-hour delay, could be guaranteed forcargo only8 personnel would have to be moved by water or air, dependingon availability at the time of the forward call. Finally, the Bremer-haven port of embarkation had no facilities for holding the remainderof the battalion for more than a few days. In view of these considor-ations, USAREUR recommended that the entire battalion be shipped accord-ing to the original plan and that, if necessary, elements of thebattalion not required for immediate employment in the objective areabe maintained aboard ship as a floating reserveed Pending CINCSPE-COXXE's ansner to the above recommendations, the loading of ForceECHO 7793 tanporarily suspended, but if no answer was forthcoming by1800 hours on 2242Ju:Ly, one reinforced ,tsnk company was to be loadedand dispatched.

The outcome was that on 22 July Force ECHO was restored to itsoriginal Bias, and the entire tank battalion began to embark.45

Personnel departed on 23 July, while thz vehicles loaded aboardthe USl?S Comet left one day later. Equipment to accompany troops(TAT) and small-arms ammunition accompanied the personnel. Theaggragate strength of the battalion was 7170-38 officers, 4 warrantofficers, and 675 enlisted men. 44 It arrived at Beirut on 3 August1958.45(6) The Honest-.- John Battery According to EP 201, anHonest John bakery with 2 latinchars &d 8 rocket motors xas to bepart of Force CHARLIE. However, on 22 July the battery was deletedfrom C!BA!ILIE and added to DELTX.d6 P days it was decidedour later

that Political considerations would make the unloading of the HonestJohn battery in the objective area inadvisable.47 By that time the

"Cnb3.e SS-5491, USAREDR to CINCSPECOIME, 21 Jul 58. SECRE'P.42Cable SX-5497, some to same, 22 Jul 58. SECRET. 41-Cable CSARXJR SK IN 7093, CINCSPECOXMEto CNO pass JCS, 22 Jul 50. c OIiF .44 Cable SX-5577, USARXUR to DA for DCSOPS for Pschler, 24 Jul 50.COW.45Cable (DTG Oyqjlz), CINCSPECOIixE t0 CNO, 3 kg 50. CCXG?.46Cable DA-945261, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSARXJR, 22 Jul 58.SECR!


34/119

personnel of the battery xere enroute to Beirut, but the equipment wasunloaded4O and held at the Bremcrhaven port of embarkation. The per-sonnel debarked at Beirut on 3 August e.nd returned to Germany by C-124aircraft on the following day. However, the '24th Infantry DivisionRas given the mission of maintaining one launcher plstoon on 12-houralert Ytstus for movement by air or wa.ter,43b. Ovcrflighi; and Landing Problem>. A time lag in securingpermission to fly over or land in certtiin countries caused difficulties.

(I) Sw~tacrland. The unauthorized overflight of two U,S.-I__-C-124 aircraft enroute from Sembach, Germany, to Athens, Greece, on16 July resulted in a formal protest .to Washington by the Swiss Govern-ment, on the ground that such flights jeopardized that countrytsnsutrality status. Thereafter, requests for overflight clearancewould have to be submitted at least four days in advance o f the pro-posed flight, The same was true of landings in Switzerland proper.Emergency flights carrying medl.cal sup lies or evacuating sick wouldstill be authorized on shorter notice, 8C(2) Austria. On 18 July the Austrian Government indicatedthat, until fu?%&"";~otice, no diplomatic clearance for overflight ofits territory by military aircraft woul~d be grAnted. This informationwas disseminated to all units.51 Effective the next day, the AustrianDefense Ministry declared the airspace over Austria west of 13 degreeaeast longitude to be closed above 5,000 meters and restricted belowthat altitude. Only ochoduled airliners were allowed overflight afterhaving obtained clearance from the Austrian Ministry of Defense.52(31 It&f. On 1R July the U.S. Ambassador in Rome wasinformed that current plans called for no troops from the U.S. ArmySou-them Europecan Task Force (USASETAP) to be sent to the Hiddle East,but that certain supplies and aircraft would move through Italy. Thisinformation was to be transmitted to the Italian Government with an

4RCable SX-5654, USRRXUR to USAPE:B, 27 Jul 58. SECRTT.49(1) Dl?, USARZJR G3 to CofS, 1 Aug 58, subj: D Battery, 34thArtillery, w/cmt 2, SC5 to Gj, 4 Aug 5s. AEAGC-OP 250/34 GC, SECRET.(2) Cable X-3-9-10, CC!XNdLANFORo CIWUSAREUR, 3 Aug 58. UNCLAS..sC,zSIC? C-32, USAIRA Bern to CINCUSAFR ADVON personal for GenEverest, 17 Jul 58. COMF.51Cable u-421, USAIXA Vienna to USCINCEUR, et al-., 18 Jul 58. UNCLAs.52Cable USAREUR SMC IN 5745, USAIRA Vienna to USAFE, et al., 19 Jul


35/119

expression of appreciation for its cooperat-ion in expediting customsclearamen and other formalities,53

(4) Am estLq,xted .imeof arriv,d at Adana, Turkey,p?c.or C-121, and C-130 aircraft haI1 to be moved back two hours becauseGreece would not permit them to fly over its territory.54 However, on19 July the Greek Government apparently changed its otand on overflightrights made two days earlier. If landings could be made with thegreatest discretion, without publicity, and preferably by night, theGovernment was willing to grant urgent requests for clearance, but atleast one day's notice would be necessary for any cle,arancc requested.55

(5) SYri.f.f. Before the initial task force element (ALPHA)moved from Adana to Beirut, the ATP 201 at&Y, at the direction ofAdmSral Holloway, restudied the possibilities of making an airborneassault on the Tripoli airfield. This plran was drop;& because ofdifficulties ant.icipa?ed by the rJ.8. Air Force in avoiding overfli htof Syrian territory, which was 0111-y hree miles from the airfield. ?6(6) harks. 'l%e 'I blackish Foreig Office complained on X,August that its Gomx:nrocx~~. -IT?not been given any advance notice ofU.S. intentions to land l.:iO engineer troops and supplies at Islcenderun,a restricted militnr~ ar17a.57 This incident, Hoover, was quicklyrssolved, and a week later the Turkish Government authorized the land-ing of add:itional eng.inei?r and t:raLloportabi.on personnel a\: Iskenderunto establish a supply depot to support An7qy troops in Lebanon.58To~n.rd the end of Ju& the Turki& Foreign Office had acre& to anextension of the Adann f,acilitic:: to permit stockpiling of ammunitionand moderate quantities of other military cqr.LpmonC, such as tranks,artill cry, and aircraft. No im:nedinte action was b&on to prepo9i-

tion a lO-dsy supply reserve at Adana, however. the required suppliesware shipped directly from USASETAF to Beirut. 49

53Cable SX-5386, CINCUSAIWJR to USASETAF for Fischer, 18 Jul 58.SECRET.54Memo, Cal K. Conner, 16 Jul 58, subj: Tolecon, 1210 hours,15 Jul. 5s (U) (sh). AXAGC-PL. SECRET.55Cable EC-9-3788, USCLFCEUR o USAFE, 20 Jul. 58. SI'CJWY,56Nemo, Co1 Conner, 2/, Jul 58, cited above. SEC!1 .,.57 Cable 72, Am Bmb Ankara to Beirut for Adm Hollowly, 4 Aug 38.

SECRET,58Cable D!~~-"'.~~?88, DA from DCSOPS o CIKCTJSAREUR, t a., 11 Aug5% SECRET.59Cable EC-9-3M?, 26 Jut 58, SECl?~2T.


36/119

--c. IkIk,y~ in Arrival r,t t?i$: ~~ct,;.vk Arca.-- .-_. I - ---_l_l-

(1) Air Twffic ProhI;?!, l'l!~c!n CIMC~PXNdI+ll~ requested thatresupply and Force CHARLIE: move to thr: objective arer~ in accordancewith the timing ir; US,QXUR EP ?r?l 9 USAE'E rc!T)lied that 6 C-124s load-ing at Fut?rstonfel~hruck alld 4 C-l.?d' :; lcr+dcd at Rhejn-Eiiain could notbe dispatched boceuve of air tr"',,ffic Tjroblf?ms in the objective area.No additional aircraft could tit: d~spntched from any departure air-field, with either resupply or Force CFIARLIE: personnel aboard, untilCINCSPlXCXMX could! i~?sure, that all' traffic conditions at arrivalfields had improved,"0 CIliCCS~COYJ~E ?~reupon requested that ForceCHARLIE: be held at Adana until ALPHA had closed at Beirut. There-after, CHARLIE: could CO~~~~AMAIRE'OH'iscretion. 61ove ut s

The slow rate of the air deplcyment of' Force CHARLIE was notpaused by any failure on th3 p:rrt of tire Air Force. As previouslymentioneC, P. large part of F'orcc C!lhRLTE; w:n; supposed to have beenlifted from Europe cn t-~rrlaroutd ;lircr:ift of Force ALPHA, but onorder of CIXCSPIXOMX these aircraft YI~I'P held at Adnna, with ForceALPHA, for two days v:hile Force+ CTIARLIE; stood by at departure air-fields. CINCSPZCOiQX t-k en ordered forceasin,~.1l.t.or~F?Oti!~ly both intoBeirut--ALPHA from Adana and CF!AKI,Iil; from I


37/119

superimposition of military on civilian operations. 65Moreover, USAF73considered the alrport's only all-weather runwayto be unsafe and chose not to use it because of the possibility ofcollision with the rigged heavy-drop equipment that was stored on it.There was no more appropriate place to store this equipment than near

the airfield. However, the weather remained excellent throughout theoperation--as could be expected during the summer months in that area--and neither civil nor military air traffic was seriously hampered.Military and civi l air traffic on the remaining runway often inter-fered with each other, and frequent military pedestrian and vehiculartraffic interfered with both. Early in August, after an alternateroad by-paesing the runway had been constructed, the use of the run-way for vehicular and pedestrian traffic wae halted.66(3) Lack of Storage Facilities. During July the unloadingof cargo at the port of Beirut was hampored by the lack of storagefacilities.67(4) Insufficient Military Vehicles at Objective Area. In an operation of the Lebanon type it would have been desirable forequipment to arrive with personnel. Initially there were not suffi-oient military vehicles to offload both the personnel and equipmentarriving by aeab Civilian trucks and buses were therefore rentedfor this purpose.68

d. Sea and Airlift Deficiencies.(1) The Importance of Advance Information. While bothsea- and airlift were considered as excellent in general, the deploy-ment of the USAREUR force8 could have been facilitated if firm

65(1) Cable CC-X-2-8-3, COMAMLANFORo CO&IRFOR, 2 Aug 50.CONF. (2) AMLANFORRept, Part I, Chronology. SECRET. Specialhandling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.66(1) Memo, CINCSPECOMME54 to diatr, 11 Sep 58, subjr LogisticConference to be held 22 September (project recap), Proposed AgendaItems for (sic). SECRET (info used UNCLAS). In USAREUR AC Hq AMLANFORfiles, docuT 1466. (2) Intvw, Dr. E. F. Fisher, USAREUR Hist Div,with Capt C. F. Hockeborn, CO, 11th Mil Hiat Det, 2 Feb 59. UNCLAS.(3) Cmt 2, USAREURG4 to Hist Div, 11 Jun 59, subjr Review of DraftMonograph "The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon'! (U), AEACD-PS 250/17CD. CONF (info used UNCLAS).67Cable DA-945237, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul 58. SECRET.Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.68Ltr, AMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 15 Ott 58, subjr Experience DataPertaining to Sea and Air Movements. ALFJD 28O/U5.2. CONF. In USAREURAC Hq AMLANFOR file. - 29 -


38/119

Airborne khuipment Temflorarily Stored off Runway AGL (1) 6-59-150-7192- 30 -


39/119

information as to the number, type, and load limits of aircraft had become available during the planning phase. Such information would have made possible the preparation of firm movement and loading tables. Moreover, advance information on aircraft turnaround times would have permitted efficient scheduling and movement of units to departure airfields. (2) Type8 of Airoraft. If more C-130 aircraft had been used, the deployment of the ground force8 would have been expedited. (3) Flexibility of Loading Plans and Schedules. The plans and echedules for outloading troops by air should have been flexib le enough to compensate for unpredictable flying sahedules and aircraft load variations.@

10. Landing and Deployment of Forcesa. The Marines. On the afternoon of 13 July the first wave ofa Marine battalion ladning team (BLT) went ashore at BED Beach (Nap 13).Encountering no resistance, the Marines moved quickly inland and by1600 hour8 had secured the Beirut International Airport. Commercialair traffio wa8 halted during the initia l phase of the landing butwas resumed by 1820 hours. On the next day a second BLT landed overBED Beach, moved to the airport, and relieved the first landing team,which was then relocated to the port area, where it assumed respon-sibility for the port facilities and nearby beaohes.TOOn 18 July the first elements of a third BLT came ashore atYELLOW Beaoh. This unit secured the northeast flank of the 2d Pro-visional Marine Force, including the northern approaches to the oity,and the defense of YELLOW Beach. On the same day the first elementsof the fourth landing team, which was airlifted from the UnitedStates, began arriving at Beirut International Airport. These troopswere transferred to temporary billete on the U.S,.S. Chilton, lying atanchor off YELLCW Beach, where they constituted a reserve force andaugmented the shore party at YELLOW Beach until the unloading opera-tions were completed on 24 July. On that day the fourth BLT dis-embarked and moved into an assembly area two mile8 east of the city.By 26 July the Marine forces deployed in and around Beirut consistedof four battalion landing teams and a logistical support group,totaling 5,670 officer8 and men.Tl

69Ltr, USABEUR CofS to DCSOPS, 21 Nov 58, subjr Lessons Learnedfrom the Lebanon Operation (U). AEAGC-PL 250/18 GC. SECRET (infoused CONF).7% arine Diary, 1-31 Jul, 1-31 Aug 58. SECRET.711.bid, SECRET.


40/119

b. Army Task Force 201. Upon their arrival on 19 July, theparachutists of Force ALPHA--consisting of the task foroe headquar-ters element and the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry--left their heavy equipment, still rigged for possible airborne opera-tions, on one of the two runways and moved into the nearby olivemove, where they established their bivouac area. Force CHARLIE--composed of the main headquarters, the task foroe artillery, recon-naissanee and engineer elements, and an evacuation hospital-- hadvirtually completed offloading operations by 25 July. Its personneljoined Force ALPHA in the olive grove and formed the nuoleus of the201sf Logistical Command, which began to function on a limited besis.T2

In early August Forces DELTA and ECHO debarked and moved tobivouac areas near the airport. They were composed of the service-support element8 and the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, respectively,and totaled 5,111 officers and men. Including these 2 forces, theArmy elements in Lebanon.totaled 8,509 officers and men, out of atotal ground forces strength of 13,'740.7311. The Lebanese Reaction to the Landing of U.S. Forces

President Chamoun and hi8 cabinet had issued a unanimous callfor U.S. intervention, but the attitude of the Lebanese Army to 'the.landing of U.S. troops was not known. General Chehab had opposedsuch intervention, indicating that he would not be responsible forthe conduct.of the Lebanese security forces. He and hi8 officerswere not willing to admit that the situation required the landingof U.S. forces, and it was learned later that they were bitterbecause they had been given no advance notice. On 16 July, whenGeneral Chehab learned that the landing8 were under way, he requestedthat U.S. forces not occupy the port area, but he was overruled byPresident Chamoun.74On the day of the American landings, Lebanese tanks deployed atthe head of the street leading from the airfield to the harbor area,

72(1) AKLANFOR Rept, Part I. SECRET. Spec ial handling required;not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cable DA-945300, DCSOPS todistr, 23 Jul 58. CONF. (3) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 8622, CINCSPECO!IZMEto CNO, 25 Jul 58. CONY.cI-2"(1) AMLANFORRept, Part I. SECRET. Speicial handling required;not releasable to foreign nationals. (2) Cmt 12, G4 to Hist Div.11 Jun 59, cited above. CONF., 74(1) Cable USAREUR SMC 18 5736, CINCUSAFE to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasable to foreignhationals. (2) Cable CX-258, USARMA Beirut to DA for ACSI, 24 Jul 58.CONF. - 32 -


41/119

apparently without orders from General Chehab. Admiral. Holloway metAmbassador McClintock ashore, end the.two persuaded General Chehab toaccompany them, in the Ambassador's car, to lead the column of Marinespast the tanks, After General Chehab dispatched a Lebanese officer.toescort the Marines, the car, followed by the Marine column, passed thetanks without--I incident. General Chehab departed, and Admiral Hollowaypersonally led the column to the harbor area for deployment accordingto the operation plan. This action had a persuasive effect upon theLebanese, who then left the scene under the direction of the seniorstaff officers believed responsible for the deployment of tanks.75 TheBritish military attache in Beirut later reported that five LebaneseAir Force Vampire jets had refused Arvq orders to oppose the landingsbecause the orders had not been issued by their own command. Relationsbetween th Lebanese AT and U.S. Marines were satisfactory butstrained.7 IfAfter the landing President Chamounordered the Lebanese Army togive the U.S. forces complete cooperation and to allow them free circu-lation throughout Beirut. However, General Chehab and his staff con-tinued to prepare criteria for the regulation of American troop movementssnd positions. The U.S. forces were cheered repeatedly & the Lebanesepeople, and finally General Chehab remarked that the events of the firstdsy had promoted U.S. and Lebanese friendship and military cooperation.77The prompt U.S. landing apparently averted a coup d 'etat directedby several colonels who, not expecting the U.S. forces to arrive before16 or 17 July, had plannal to arrest President Chamoun and install Gen-eral Chehab as President on the 15th. The outlying area commanders hadbeen opposed to such action and willing to move against the staff toprevent it. After the U.S. forces had landed, General Chehab agreed touse his influence to prevent the me Thus, the speedy employment ofthe U.S. forces in overwhelming stre th caused the internal factionsto pause and reconsider their plans.7Yi

'l%able USAREUR CINCSPECOI44E CNO, 16 Jul. 58. SECRET.MC N 4954, to76Gable CX-248, USARMA eirut to DA for ACSI, 18 Jul 58, CONF,77Cable SMC IN 4954, cited above. SEXXW.78(l) Cable CX-245, USARMA to J 58. (2)eirut DA fo ! ACSI, 16 JulCable IAI-P&P-156C& CINCUSAFEADVONo CINCUSARmR,17 Jul. 58. BothSECRET. (3) Cable DA-94190, DA from DCSOPSo CINOUSAREUR,21 Jul.58, SECRET. Special handling rqulretd; not releasable to foreignnationals,


42/119

General Chehab believed that an undercurrent of defeetian thabmight break out at any time permeated his Army, but that he &WI&hold it together if the U.S. forces were ccnfined to ema1I We&$*79President Chamoun doubted the loyalty of the Army to him iuit&$certain disloyal officers were removed from office. He belieV@$ Q-if&b

the reduotion of the Basta quarter in Beirut and the emplcy%ienb GiU.S. foroee along the Syrian border would eliminate the reb@liljt~&,and he told the U.S. Ambassador that he had requested Gene& (th@h@bto clear out the Basta area.60Aooording to Colonel Salem, removing the rebels f;clgm th@ BWbaarea would be not only very diffioul t for his limited ftmor buunwise, beoause countless babies and old women would be kilIeB, 81General Chehab, in turn, considered President Charnouns requeab a subterfuge to bring about a purge of the officer oorpo* Herefused to olean out the rebel strongholds or to dismiss the offi-oers. Thue, hio relationship with the President during Whir pesiodwas a form of polite but studied ineubordination,82 He premise8 I

that hia Army would cooperate, but he remained reluotsnt to b&a decisive military action. His reluctance was understandable, rinarhe would need opposition support in the coming presidential rleo-tion. He seemed willing to cooperate with the U.S. foram odq 4~long aa they did not become involved in what he coneidered to bothe Lebanese Armys miesion. 83 Ae a result, U.S. forces wererestricted in their movement and uee of weapons.84

7gCable CX-246, USARMABeirut to DA, 17 Jul 58. CONF80( 1) Cable SX-5479, USAREUR 02 to USACOMZEUR, 21 Jul 58.SECRET. (2) Cable DA-945288, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jul58. SECRET. Special handling required! not releaaable to foreignnationals. (3) Cable DA-945300, cited above. SECRET.81 Cable CX-258, cited above. CONF.82(1) Cable DA-945375, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jul 58.SECRET. Special hsndling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.(2) DF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Bug 58, subj: Probable Develop-ments in Lebanon (U) . AEAGB-IP ( GB 88-0031) 274/H5. SECRET. ( 3)i Appendix II, to Log Comd Rapt, 13 Ott-30 Nov 3q. CONF (info used

OFLUSE) .3Cable USAREUR SMC IN 6923, CINCSPECOMME o ONI, 22 ful 58.SECRET.84Cable DA-943224, DA from ACSI to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jul 58. SECRET.Special handling required; not releasable to foreign nationals.


43/119

UVCLASWIED

-35- -UNCLASStFtEG


44/119

CHAPTER 4Activities and Problems in the Objective Area

12. Political Developments After the Presidential ElectionOn 31 July General Chehab was elected President by the LebanonChamber of Deputies with a substantial second-ballot majority.President Chamoun had boycotted the election, but, s ince he refusedto resign, the rebels continued their activities. It then becameapparent that Chamoun and his followers would not cooperate withGeneral Chehab's administration when it took off1ce.l During AugustGeneral Chehab conferred with the opposition leaders,often. BothPresident Chamoun and he felt that the U.S. forces could now be

reduced because the situation had improved. However, General Chehabwas in no hurry to press for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, s ncehe wanted to use the issue as a bargaining point with the rebels. 9On 22 August an American soldier was shot by a rebel whileunarmed and on pass, A Lebanese soldier on duty nearby took noaction against the rebel. ,Upon receiving a formal U.S. protest,General Chehab promised that the rebel would be arrested and thatthe roadblock from which he had fired would be destroyed.3 Thatafternoon Lebanese tanks knocked down the roadblock without1 IDF, ACofS G2 to CINCUSAREUR, 1 dug 58, cited above. SECRET.2(l) Cable DA-946464, DA from DCSOPS to CIlVCUSAREUB, 12 Aug 58.(2) DF, G2 to CIMCUSAREUR, 15 Bug 58, subj: Situation in the MiddleEast (U). AEAGB-IP (STRAT) 274/H5.3 GB. Both SECRET.3Cable ALFCG-X-24-8-4, COMAhWNFOR o CIBCUSAREUR, 24 Bug 58.SECRF,T. - 36 -


45/119

encountering any rebel opposition. As soon as they left the scene acrowd of civilians gathered, and the roadblock was rebuilt within thehour.Acts of terrorism, violent loyalist-opposition battles in the

Akkar and Bekka districts, and intermittent firing in various districtsof Beirut continued during August. Members of the Majjada Party,Syrians, and security force defectors wanted to continue the revoltbecause they were dedicated to Nasser and Arab nationalism. Therebel leaders, moreover, talked themselves into such irrevocablepositions regarding President Chamoun's tenure of office that theycould not find a way to cease opposition without loss of prestige.Jumblatt and Salaam wanted to maintain the closed areas and quiettheir followers without disbanding them, but they were having diffi-culty.4 Salaam, fearing that the Basta would be reduced if therebels provoked the U.S. forces, ordered his men not to fire withoutprior approval.5On 1 September Jumblatt, Karamij and Salaam discussed the can-didates for the new cabine . Their only decision.was that Karamishould be the new premier. B Meanwhile, U.A.R. elements had begunto evacuate Lebanon. In a significant move, on the night of ,2 September 240 Syrian military personnel departed from the Bastaarea for Syria under the protection of the Lebanese Am.7

13. Joint Cor,mandProblems_a. &&ial CommandOrganization. The first elements of ATF201to arrive in Lebanon were placed in the CINCSPECOMMEeserve.On 19 July Brig. Gen. Sidney S. Wade, who commanded he 2d Provi-sional Marine Force, was designated as Commander, Am&&can LandForces (COMA??NFOR),while Brig. Cen. David W. Gray, commandinggeneral of ATF 201, was designated Commander, United States ArmyTroops Assigned (coMuSATA). General Wade's headquarters was aboardthe U.S.S. Pocono, while General Gray's staff operated out of BeirutInternational Airport; they were to coordinate their operations.USAREURP 201 had not provided for a joint land forces headquarters.However, as the U.S. Army task force elements began to arrive,administrative and logistical responsibilities taxed the ATF 201

h able DA-946375, DA from DCSOPSo CINCUSAREUR,Aug 58. CONF.'Cable CX-283, USARMABeirut to DA, 2 Aug 58. SECRET.6Cable ALFJB-X-4-9-1, OR to 4 Sep 58. CONF.OM4MLANF CINCSPECOMME, 7Cable m-94?661, DA from DCSOPSo CIWTSAREUR,6 Sep 58. SECRET.

- 37 ---NCLASSIF~~-_


46/119

headquarters -gessentially a tactical staff organization--beyond itscapabilities.b. Establishment of AMLANFORHeadquarters. To meet this sit-uation CINCSPECOXME ecommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that ajoint land forces headquarters, commanded by a senior general officer,

be established ashore in Lebanon. This reaommendation was approved,and Maj.Gen. Paul D. Adams, then commander of Northern Area Command inthe U.S. zone of responsibility in Germany, was designated COMAMLANFOR.CINCSPECOMME etained over-all command, as well as the responsibilityfor military and policy decisions, while COMAMLANFORwas charged with.all joint and combined aspects of land forces operation's and supportplanning in the area. General Wade became Commander, U.S. MarineCorps Troops Assigned (COMUSMARCORTA),under the operational oontrolof COM.&MLANFOR.9General Adams, accompanied only by his personal staff, proceededto Lebanon without delay. He arrived at Beirut on 24 July and twodays later assumed command of the American Land Forces, with head- !

quarters at the American Sohool in Beirut. Advance elements of COM-'AMAIRJFORmoved concurrently from Adana, Turkey, to the immediatevicinity of the new headquarters in Beirut. Since there was no timeto obtain additional personnel from Germany or the United States,General Adams decided that his staff would have to be composed ofpersonnel already in Lebanon. The simplest solution would have beento merge the ATF 201 staff with that of AMLANFOR. This plan, however,was rejected for administrative reasons and because an operationalstaff would be required to control the Army combat elements in theevent of hostilities. By having two staffs, the identity of eachheadquarters was retained, with commander and staff serving in dualcapacities, depending upon the nature of the functions that were tobe performed. AMLANFORwas a command headquarters that formulatedpolicy and conducted operations by decentralizing exeoution to itsthree subordinate commands: the 24th Airborne Brigade, the provisionalMarine brigade and the 201st Logistical Command.' Technical and admin-istrative staff advice and assistance when needed were obtained throughthe assignment of appropriate personnel from technioal and administra-tive branches to the J-l and J-4 Sections respectively. The personnelinvolved were organic to the sections to which they were assigned;

8(1) AXLANFOR Rept, Parts I & III. SJXRET. Special handlingrequired; not releasable to foreign nationals. 1 (2) Ltr, USAREURCofS to DCSOPS, 21Nov 58, cited above. SECRET.'Cables DA-945322 & DA-945593, DA from DCSOPS to CINCUSAREUR,23 & 27 Jul 58. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasableto foreign nationals.

- 38 -


47/119

they provided staff advice on branch material matters relatin totheir respective branches and were action officers otherwise. 40o. Composition of the Joint Staff. The 31 officers and 108enlisted men transferred from the ATF 201 headquarters formed thenucleus of the AiiLANFOR staff, while the remaining 15 officers and

42 enlisted men of the ATF 201 staff were assigned to the 24th Air-borne Brigade headquarters. 11 General Adams wanted proportionaterepresentation of Army and Marine officers on his staff, but theMarine oontribution--eight officers and some clerical personnel--was below the actual troop strength ratio. To satisfy'Genera1 Adams'desire to obtain a thoroughly integrated joint staff, the Marineelement provided an officer as hi8 chief of staff.12To fill the specialization requirements that his subordinate.commands were unable to meet, General Adams requested that USAREURprovide personnel for some of the special staff divisions. In oaseswhere technical or administrative advice was needed in excess ofthat available in the joint staff, the 201st Logistical Command pro+

vided appropriate assistance. This 'procedure worked well and per-mitted a significant saving of technical and administrativemanpower.13d. Liaison with the Lebanese Army. On 21 July Generals Wadeand Gray had agreed with General Chehab to exohange liaison officersand to establish joint Lebanese-American patrols in Beirut. TheAmericana would also move platoon-size units through the city inorder to accustom the population to the U.S. troops. However, Gen-eral Chehab refused to accept American assistance in dealing withthe rebel8 in the Basta quarter.14

"(1) Abn Bde Rept, 15-31 Jul 58. CONF. (2) AMZ,ANFORRept,Parts I & III. SECRET. Special handling required; not releasableto foreign nationals. (3) Ltr, Gen Adams to Gen Osborne, 19 Aug59, cited above. SECRET.%able X-30-7-8, COI&WLANFOR o CINCUSAREUR, 30 Jul 58. SECRET.12AMLANFOR Rept, Part III. SECRET. Special handling required;not releasable to foreign nationals.l'(1) Cable USAREUR SMC IN 8554, CObMMLANFORrom Adams toCINCUSARXJR for Hodes, 28 Jul 58. (2) Ltr, Gen Adams to GenOsborne, 19 Aug 59, cited above. Both SECRET.'

Partl~!l)SE;~;ne Diary, 1-31 Jul 58. SECRET. (2) AMLANFOR Rept,. Special handling required; not releasable toforeign nationals.- 39 -UNCLASSlFIED,U++w

1


48/119

---

AXLANF'ORheadquarters also a""oumed the liaison responsibilitybetween CINCSPECOD@ and the Lcbenese Army. General Chehab assignedColonel Yusuf Simaan, a 1958 graduate of the U,S. Army Command andStaff College, to CO>K%AXFOR for that p~rpos@.~5e, P.&gu~o f Command Arr:~m&n~. USAREURfs responsibilityfor the Army units transferred to the operational control of CINC-SPECOMMZwas often in doubt. During tho early phase of the operation,in particular, many questions 1z1.d o be referred to higher head-quarters. For instance, U?;AP,WR1a responsibility for furnishing cer-tain supply items to CINCSPECOlW3was not clear. Such questions wouldnot have arisen if the Middle Eatit plans had specifica lly delineatedUSAREXJR'sauthority and commitncnts,16

l& $3uwplementa~.PJ~ns Develo~&..&...&e Ob.iect.ive Areaa. Close Air %n~~ort, In the early phase of the Lebanon.-l.-----LL.*L

task force in lebanon 1959

Documents