TARRIF CASESCHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC.,            G.R. No. 178759

Petitioner,           - v e r s u s -                                                

 COMMISSIONER OF THEBUREAU OF CUSTOMS,                             Respondent.                    “ENTRY” IN SECTIONS 1301 AND 1801 OF THE TCC REFERS TO  BOTH THE  IED AND IEIRD           

Under Section 1301 of the TCC, imported articles must be entered within a non-extendible period of 30 days from the date of discharge of the last package from a vessel.  Otherwise, the BOC will deem the imported goods impliedly abandoned under Section 1801.  Thus:      

Section 1301.  Persons Authorized to Make Import Entry. -  Imported articles must be entered in the customhouse at the port of entry within thirty (30) days, which shall not be extendible from date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft either  (a) by the importer, being holder of the bill of lading,  (b) by a duly licensed customs broker acting under authority from a holder of the bill or  (c) by a person duly empowered to act as agent or attorney-in-fact for each holder:  Provided, That where the entry is filed by a

party other than the importer, said importer shall himself be required to declare under oath and under the penalties of falsification or perjury that the declarations and statements contained in the entry are true and correct:  Provided, further, That such statements under oath shall constitute prima facie evidence of knowledge and consent of the importer of violation against applicable provisions of this Code when the importation is found to be unlawful.   (Emphasis supplied)

           Section 1801.  Abandonment, Kinds and Effect of. -  An imported article is deemed abandoned under any of the following circumstances: 

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

 b. When the owner,

importer, consignee or interested party after due notice, fails to file an entry within thirty (30) days, which shall not be extendible, from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft, or having filed such entry, fails to claim his importation within fifteen (15) days, which shall not likewise be extendible, from the date of posting of the notice to claim such importation.  (Emphasis supplied)

  

          Petitioner argues that the IED is an entry contemplated by these sections.

According to it, the congressional deliberations on RA 7651 which amended the TCC to provide a non-extendible 30-day period show the legislative intent to expedite the procedure for declaring importations as abandoned.  Filing an entry serves as notice to the BOC of the importer’s willingness to complete the importation and to pay the proper taxes, duties and fees. Conversely, the non-filing of the entry within the period connotes the importer’s disinterest and enables the BOC to consider the goods as abandoned.  Since the IED is a BOC form that serves as basis for payment of advance duties on importation as required under PD 1853,[20] it suffices as an entry under Sections 1301 and 1801 of the TCC.[21]

 We disagree.  The term “entry” in customs law

has a triple meaning.  It means (1) the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the documents and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the customs house.[22]

The IED serves as basis for the payment of advance duties on importations whereas the IEIRD evidences the final payment of duties and taxes.   The question is: was the filing of the IED sufficient to constitute “entry” under the TCC?

 The law itself, in Section 205,

defines the meaning of the technical term “entered” as used in the TCC:

 Section 205.  Entry,

or Withdrawal from Warehouse, for Consumption. -  Imported articles shall be deemed “entered” in the Philippines for consumption when the specified entry form is properly filed and accepted, together with any related documents regained by the provisions of this Code and/or

regulations to be filed with such form at the time of entry, at the port or station by the customs official designated to receive such entry papers and any duties, taxes, fees and/or other lawful charges required to be paid at the time of making such entry have been paid or secured to be paid with the customs official designated to receive such monies, provided that the article has previously arrived within the limits of the port of entry.                         xxx                               xxx                               xxx       (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the operative act that

constitutes “entry” of the imported articles at the port of entry is the filing and acceptance of the “specified entry form” together with the other documents required by law and regulations.  There is no dispute that the “specified entry form” refers to the IEIRD.  Section 205 defines the precise moment when the imported articles are deemed “entered.”

Moreover, in the old case of Go Ho Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs,[23] we ruled that the word “entry” refers to the regular consumption entry (which, in our current terminology, is the IEIRD) and not the provisional entry (the IED):

 It is disputed by the

parties whether the application for the special permit. Exhibit A, containing the misdeclared weight of the 800 cases of eggs, comes within the meaning of the word "entry" used in section 1290 of the Revised Administrative Code, or said word "entry" means only the "original entry and importer's declaration." The court below reversed the decision of the Insular

Collector of Customs on the ground that the provisions of section 1290 of the Revised Administrative Code refer to the regular consumption entry and not to a provisional declaration made in an application for a special permit, as the one filed by the appellee, to remove the cases of eggs from the customhouse. 

This court is of the opinion that certainly the application, Exhibit A, cannot be considered as a final regular entry of the weight of the 800 cases of eggs imported by the appellee, taking into account the fact that said application sought the delivery of said 800 cases of eggs "from the pier after examination," and the special permit granted, Exhibit E, provided for "delivery to be made after examination by the appraiser." All the foregoing, together with the circumstance that the appellee had to file the regular consumption entry which he bound himself to do, as shown by the application, Exhibit A, logically lead to the conclusion that the declaration of the weight of the 800 cases of eggs made in said application, is merely a provisional entry, and as it is subject to verification by the customhouse examiner, it cannot be considered fraudulent for the purpose of imposing a surcharge of customs duties upon the importer.[24]  (Emphasis supplied) 

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManila SECOND DIVISION COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC,                                          Petitioners,             - versus -   HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION,                                        Respondent.

G.R. No. 179579 Present: 

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

  BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES,  JJ.

 Promulgated:         

    February 1, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.

Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification.  For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies

equally to all members of the same class.[22]

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.

It is also not clear how the regulation intends to “monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification.” A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the packages designated for

examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.

          The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.  

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.[23]     

In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.          SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24348           July 30, 1968FELIClDAD VIERNEZA, petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.Juan T. David for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.REYES, J.B.L., J.:

All three assigned errors are untenable.1. Petitioner argues that the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who has "jurisdiction over all matters arising from the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his collection district", as provided for in Section 703 of the Tariff and Customs Code, is exclusively authorized to proceed against the cigarettes in question inasmuch as the smuggling was allegedly perpetrated in his collection district. Hence, petitioner concludes that the seizure and forfeiture thereof by the

Collector of Customs of Cebu is irregular and illegal for lack of jurisdiction.We do not agree. First, because Section 703, on which petitioner's conclusion is premised, is legally non-existent, the same having been vetoed by the President.1 Secondly, the Tariff and Customs Code clearly empowers the Bureau of Customs to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the Customs [Sec. 602 (b)] over all seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines and over all coasts, ports, airports, harbors, bays, rivers and inland waters navigable from the sea and, in case of "hot pursuit", even beyond the maritime zone (Sec. 603). For the due enforcement of this function, a Collector, among others, is authorized to search and seize (Sec. 2203), at any place within the jurisdiction of the said Bureau (Sec. 2204, sec. par.), any vessel, aircraft, cargo, article, animal or other movable property when the same is subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws (Sec. 2205). It is of no moment where the introduction of the property subject to forfeiture took place. For, to our mind, "(i)t is the right of an officer of the customs to seize goods which are suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation of the revenue laws not only in his own district, but also in any other district than his own". [Taylor vs. U.S., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 11 L. ed. 559]. Any other construction of the Tariff and Customs Code, such as the one proposed by petitioner, would virtually place the Collector of Customs in a straitjacket and render inutile his police power of search and seizure, thereby frustrating effective enforcement of the measures provided in the Code to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the Customs. This we can not sanction by subscribing to petitioner's conclusion. The Code, as a revenue law, is to be construed to carry out the intention of Congress in enacting it and as would most effectually accomplish its objects (15 Am. Jur. 304).Petitioner also attacks the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs of Cebu on the ground that the forfeiture of the cigarettes is not in accordance with Section 2531 of the Code, as the same were, at the time of

seizure, no longer in the custody and control of the Bureau of Customs nor in the hands, or subject to control, of the importer, original owner, consignee, agent or person with knowledge that the same were imported contrary to law.Again, we disagree. The forfeiture is effected precisely in accordance with Section 2531 afore-cited, which plainly provides "that forfeiture shall be effected when and while the article is in the custody or within the jurisdiction of the customs authority ... or in the hands or subject to the control of ... some person who shall receive, conceal, buy, sell or transport the same ... with knowledge that the article was imported ... contrary to law" (Emphasis supplied). There can be no question that the cigarettes involved were seized and forfeited at the port of Cebu which is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and, as will be shown later, while the cigarettes were subject to the control of petitioner, who bought, concealed, and transported the same aboard the M/V "Legaspi" with knowledge that they were imported contrary to law. Besides, it is a settled jurisprudence that forfeiture proceedings are in the nature of proceedings in rem wherein the jurisdiction to proceed against the res is vested in the court of the district where the same is found or seized (25 C.J.S. 572). Therefore, the Collector of Customs of Cebu, who has the authority under the Tariff and Customs Code to institute forfeiture proceedings, lawfully assumed jurisdiction to forfeit, in favor of the Government, the smuggled cigarettes found and seized within his collection district.2. Petitioner next argues that the cigarettes in question are not merchandise of prohibited importation inasmuch as she had purchased the same in the open market in Jolo; which goes to show that she is not the importer, original owner, consignee, agent or person who effected the importation thereof; and that in the absence of evidence that she bought the same with knowledge that they were imported contrary to law in accordance with Section 2531, as the lack of internal revenue stamps is not evidence of illegal importation much less her knowledge

thereof, the said cigarettes are not subject to forfeiture under Section 2530 (f) of the Code.This is not the first time that this question has been posed before us. In the case of Gigare vs. Commissioner of Customs (G.R. No. L-21376, August 29, 1966, 17 S.C.R.A. 1001), we disposed of the same by holding that "(s)ince, admittedly, the internal revenue tax on the cigarettes indispute has not been paid, it is clear that said cigarettes fall within the category of "merchandise of prohibited importation," the importation of which is contrary to law and may justify its forfeiture, as provided in Sections 1363 (f) and 1364 of the Revised Administrative Code," which correspond to Sections 2530 (f) and 2531, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code. "Moreover, the blue seals affixed on said commodities prove satisfactorily that they are foreign products. Again, the importation thereof into the Philippines is attested by the presence of said products within our jurisdiction" (Ibid.) And concerning petitioner's knowledge of these facts, the following disquisition by the Court of Tax Appeals, lengthily quoted in the Gigare case, finds significant application in the case at bar:

Were the cigarettes in question illegally imported into the Philippines? We are of the opinion that, the Commissioner of Customs should be sustained in his finding that the cigarettes in question were imported illegally. The absence of Philippine internal revenue strip stamps on cigarettes indicates that they are either manufactured clandestinely within the Philippines or imported illegally into the country. In the case at bar, concomitant circumstances militate against the clandestine manufacture within the Philippines of the cigarettes. The affixture of blue seals on the packs of the cigarettes, the wrappers, the purchase of the cigarettes in the open market of Jolo, a place where American and other foreign made cigarettes are, of common knowledge, frequently smuggled

from Borneo ... and the failure of petitioner to show that the cigarettes in question were locally manufactured rule out the possibility that the cigarettes in question were manufactured in the Philippines. Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that these cigarettes were foreign (American) made. They were merchandise of prohibited importation, the importation of which was contrary to law, and should be forfeited under Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code.x x x           x x x           x x xThe fact that petitioner is merely a buyer of the cigarettes in the open market of Jolo does not render the cigarrettes immune from the penalty of forfeiture. This is so because forfeiture proceedings are instituted against the res (cigarettes) ... and, by express provision of Section 1364 of the Revised Administrative Code, the forfeiture shall occur while the merchandise is in the hands or subject to control of some person who shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or transport the same with knowledge that the merchandise was imported contrary to law. Petitioner cannot but be charged with the knowledge that the cigarettes in question were imported contrary to law, for if it were otherwise, why were these cigarettes concealed on board the vessel ... ? Why did she deny ownership over said cigarettes? For what plausible reason was she afraid of detention? What impelled her to believe that she would be detained by the customs authorities? To uphold the claim of petitioner and forego the forfeiture would be giving a chance to accessories after the fact of smugglers of foreign cigarettes to ply their trade with impunity and with sanction of the courts. What the executive department could not curb, that is rampant

smuggling of foreign cigarettes, the courts should not tolerate ...

3. Petitioner finally contends that the decision of the Commissioner of Customs libeling and forfeiting the cigarettes involved in the present case for violation of Section 2530 (m-1) of the Tariff and Customs Code is unconstitutional, in view of the fact that she was allegedly not afforded an opportunity to defend the cigarettes against such charge, said section not being one of the original grounds cited by the Collector of Customs of Cebu in forfeiting the same.The contention has no merit. Certainly, the appellate power of the Commissioner of Customs to review seizure and protest cases is not limited to a review of the issues raised on appeal. He may affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the Collector (Section 2313) on other questions provided that his findings and conclusions are, as in the case at bar, supported by evidence. It is of no consequence whatsoever what were the original grounds of the seizure and forfeiture if, in point of fact, the goods are by law subject to forfeiture [Wood vs. U.S., 16 Pet. (U.S.) 342, 10 L. ed. 987]. As there is evidence on record showing that the cigarettes in question were imported and introduced into the country without passing through a customs house, the same may be forfeited under said Section 2530 (m-1) of the Code, notwithstanding that it is not one of the original charges. As we held in Que Po Lay vs. Central Bank, et al. (104 Phil. 853), what counts is not the designation of the particular section of the law that has been violated but the description of the violation in the seizure report.2

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. 1äwphï1.ñët

FELICISIMO RIETA,                                     G.R. No. 147817

  Vs.People 

DECISION 

 

Petitioner’s contention is untenable.  Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are presumed to be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.[29]  The burden of proof is thus shifted to them.  To rebut this presumption, it is not enough for petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful source of the cigarettes.  He should have presented evidence to support his claim and to convince the court of his non-complicity. 

 In the case adverted to

earlier, Rimorin  v. People, we held thus: “In his discussion of

a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a criminal law authority explained thus: 

‘In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation under the foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise must have been fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the defendant, if he is not the importer himself, must have received, concealed, bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of the merchandise; and (3) that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge that the merchandise had been illegally imported.  If the defendant, however, is shown to have had possession of the illegally imported merchandise, without satisfactory explanation, such possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction.’”[30] (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the explanation given by petitioner was found to be unacceptable and incredible by both the RTC and the CA, which said:

         “Now on the

explanations of Police Sgt.

Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat. Rieta of Kawit Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by ‘Boy.’  Their claim that they did not have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is not given credence by the court.  They tried to show lack of knowledge by claiming that along the way, ‘Boy’ and Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain point for snacks and picked them up later after the cargo had been loaded.  The Court cannot see its way through how two policemen, joining ‘Boy’ in the dead of the night, explicitly to give him and his goods some protection, which service would be paid, yet would not know what they are out to protect.  And neither could the Court see reason in ‘Boy’s’ leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and load the blue seal cigarettes.  ‘Boy’ knew the risks.  He wanted them for protection, so why will he discard them?  How so unnatural and so contrary to reason.”[31]

   Being contrary to human

experience, his version of the facts is too pat and stereotyped to be accepted at face value.  Evidence, to be believed, not only must proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must also be credible in itself, as when it conforms to common experience and observation of humankind.[32] 

 The absence of any suspicious

reaction on the part of petitioner was not in accordance with human nature.  The involvement or participation he and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the

goods was confirmed by their lack of proper and reasonable justification for the fact that they had been found inside the cargo truck, seated in front, when it was intercepted by the authorities.  Despite his protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the strange nature of the transaction, and that he was willing to do his part in furtherance thereof.  The evidence presented by the prosecution established his work of guarding and escorting the contraband to facilitate its transportation from the Port Area to Malabon, an act punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.

 Under the Tariff and Customs Code,

a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.[38]  

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM                   G.R. No. 161953CORPORATION,                                    Petitioner          - v e r s u s -                                                 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by the BUREAU OFCUSTOMS,                                                                           Respondent.                  Promulgated:                                                                    March 6, 2008  

D E C I S I O N            Assessments inform taxpayers of their tax liabilities.[36] Under the TCCP, the assessment is in the form of a liquidation made on the face of the import entry return and approved by the Collector of Customs.[37] Liquidation is the final computation and ascertainment by the Collector of Customs of the duties due on imported merchandise based on official reports as to the quantity, character and value thereof, and the Collector of Customs' own finding as to the applicable rate of duty.[38] A liquidation is considered to have been made when the entry is officially stamped “liquidated.”[39]

           Petitioner claims that it paid the duties due on its importations. Section 1603 of the old TCCP stated:

 Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free of duty or final adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of duty or settlement of duties will, after the expiration of one year from the date of the final payment of duties, in the absence of fraud or protest, be final and conclusive upon all parties, unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative.[40]

 An assessment or liquidation by the

BoC attains finality and conclusiveness one year from the date of the final payment of duties except when: 

(a)    there was fraud;(b)     there is a pending protest

or(c)      the liquidation of import

entry was merely tentative.

  

          None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. There was no fraud as petitioner claimed (and was presumed) to be in good faith. Respondent does not dispute this. Moreover, records show that petitioner paid those duties without protest using its TCCs.  Finally, the liquidation was not a tentative one as the assessment had long become final and incontestable. Consequently, pursuant to Yabes[41] and because of the cancellation of the TCCs, respondent had the right to file a collection case.

 Section 1204 of the TCCP provides: Section 1204. Liability of Importer for Duties. ― Unless relieved by laws or regulations, the liability for duties, taxes, fees and other charges attaching on importation constitutes a personal debt due from the importer to the government which can be discharged only by payment in full of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing. It also constitutes a lien upon the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in the custody or subject to the control of the government. (emphasis supplied)  

Under this provision, import duties constitute a personal debt of the importer that must be paid in full. The importer’s liability therefore constitutes a lien on the article which the government may choose to enforce while the imported articles are either in its custody or under its control.           When respondent released petitioner's goods, its (respondent’s) lien over the imported goods was extinguished. Consequently, respondent could only enforce the payment of

petitioner's import duties in full by filing a case for collection against petitioner.[42]

 

          Respondent filed its complaint for collection on April 3, 2002. The governing law at that time was RA[43] 1125 or the old CTA Law. Section 7 thereof stated:

          Section 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided ―             (1)        Decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessment, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;              (2)        Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines and forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under Customs Law or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and             (3) Decisions of the provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the

assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.[44] (emphasis supplied)

           Inasmuch as the present case did not involve a decision of the Commissioner of Customs in any of the instances enumerated in Section 7(2) of RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. It was the RTC that had jurisdiction under Section 19(6) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended:[45]

             Section 19.       Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. ― Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

 xxx                   xxx                   xxx

             (6)        In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions,      xxx.

           In view of the foregoing, the RTC should forthwith proceed with Civil Case No. 02-103191 and determine the extent of petitioner's liability. 

 We are not unmindful of

petitioner's pending petition for review in the CTA where it is questioning the validity of the cancellation of the TCCs. However, respondent cannot and should not await the resolution of that case before it collects petitioner's outstanding customs duties and taxes for such delay will unduly restrain the performance of its functions.[46] Moreover, if the ultimate outcome of the CTA case turns out to be favorable to petitioner, the law affords it the adequate remedy of seeking a refund. 

G.R. No. 180597             November 7, 2008RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and ROGER A. BASADRE, petitioners vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The Court's RulingThe petition is meritorious. Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge.The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the container vans nor effected seizure and arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker Amolata, The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and seizing the three container vans on July 27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable for these acts. It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vans was done on the night of July 27, 2004. The act of flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans is not punishable under the said law.

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.21

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.22 In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioners committed the acts prohibited by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is no such evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that identifies petitioners as responsible for the alleged illegal search. Hence, acquittal is in order.As regards the second issue, there is no conflict between the aforequoted provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and RA 6975, as amended. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs duties. Should the PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written authority from the Collector of Customs in order to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. Coordination is emphasized in the laws. While it is an admitted fact that there was no such coordination initiated by the PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners cannot be convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no evidence that they did actually search the container vans.