Target Controls Introduction

Linda R. ConeyGroup Leader – Target Safety and Controls

Jülich Meetingwww.europeanspallationsource.se

17 August 2015

2

Outline

• Controls at ESS – ICS & Target Divisions– Division of responsibility for the different control systems– Personnel– Scope of controls systems

• Target Safety System (TSS) – Target Division– Description & plan for development– Requirements determination – Hazard Analysis

• Target Controls – Integrated Control System Division – Process Controls– MPS (Machine Protection System)– PSS (Personnel Safety System)

3

The ESS Organisation

H. Carling

Top Level Requirements for Controls

• Provide the following to ESS:– Control system framework for monitoring and

control of accelerator, target, instruments and conventional facilities

– Timing service for generating events, synchronization of devices andtime stamping (in the ns range)

– Control system services and applicationsto perform commissioning and operations

– IOC and Integration Support to stakeholders– Machine Protection (MPS) and Personnel Safety

systems (PSS)– Control Room(s)

• Constraining requirements– High reliability and availability (>95%)!

5

ICS OrganisationHenrik Carling

Head of Division

SOFTWARE AND SERVICESGroup Leader - vacant

Leandro FernandezRichard Fearn

Ricardo FernandesEmanuele LafaceKarin RathsmanJaka Bobnar (C)

Jakob Battellino (C)Miha Vitorovič (C)

Jure Krašna (C)Marko Kolar (C)

Miroslav Pavleski (C)

HARDWARE AND INTEGRATIONDaniel Piso Fernandez - GL

Lead Integrator, Accelerator (vacant)

Target Lead Integrator vacant – Benedetto Gallese

Javier Cerejo Garcia Nick Levchenko

Klemen Strniša (C)Urša Rojec (C)

Niklas Claesson (C) Alexander Söderqvist (C)

Žiga Kroflič (C)Rok Štefanič (C)Gregor Cijan (C)

PROTECTION SYSTEMSAnnika Nordt – GLManuel Zaera-Sanz

Angel Montera MartinezStuart BirchDenis PaulicM. MansouriR. Andersson

INFRASTRUCTURERemy Mudingay (1/2015)

(Infrastructure Technology)

Deputy Head of Division (vacant)

Timo Korhonen – Chief EngineerDeputy Project Manager - vacant

Thilo Friedrich – Systems & Standardization Eng, PhDIñigo Alonso - Intern

Solveig Aas – Team Assistant

6

ESS Control Systems – Objectives

• TSS - Limit transfer of radioactive contamination to the public, workers, and environment

• PSS - Suppress radiologic hazards by switching off the proton beam

– Control access to restricted areas during operations

• MPS – Protect investment from damage due to beam losses and malfunctioning equipment

– Optimize integrated machine performance

– Stop beam – Beam Interlock System

• Process Control – operational control & monitoring of systems

TSS – Independent safety-qualified system g Not tied into other I&C systems

Personnel Safety System

Process Control

7

TSS – Purpose

• TSS is a safety critical system designed to protect the public and environment from radioactive release

• Active control and monitoring system– It is likely that the TSS will need to be able to shut down

the proton beam – Actions not necessarily limited to beam shut down

• Safety-certified system– Essential to the certification process for the ESS– Working closely with the ES&H group on requirements

8

TSS – Preliminary Top Level Requirements

• Single failure criterion:– Redundancy, physical separation adapted to different aggressors (zoning)– Independence, electrical isolation

• Fail-safe principle– Safe state must be clearly identified– Loss of power g actuators default to safe position– Actuator commands ‘de-energize to trip’

• Emergency power supply coverage

• Qualified for extreme operating conditions g seismic classification for a subset of functions

• No requirement on post-trip machine availability– Contrasts with MPS (Machine Protection System) – non-safety system designed to monitor

machine parameters, shut down beam, and allow quick turn-around

9

TSS – Requirements Determination

• Perform Hazard Analyses on all Target Station systems• Use this tool to:

– Understand potential hazardous scenarios– Define necessary mitigations – includes possible TSS actions

• Qualitative Hazard Analysis procedure– Define the system under analysis – include drawings, schematics, etc.– Identify hazards – Radioactivity, stored energy, explosion, impact (load drop) – Identify initiating events and top events – circumstances lead to hazardous situation– Describe unmitigated consequences – Estimate probability and severity g unmitigated risk ranking– Define applicable mitigations – Reassess severity g mitigated risk ranking

• Includes confinement & safety barriers and associated triggers for active safety system

• Accident Analysis/Quantitative Hazard Analysis– Technical analysis to determine contamination path(s) and accident progression– Inventory and release factors – Calculate dose to public and/or workers– Determine appropriate mitigation – safety classified equipment and systems

10

Pilot TSS

• Hazard analysis process is on-going & long term• Move forward with TSS design work – create Pilot TSS

– Make assumptions based on events most likely to require mitigation

– Recognize that requirements on TSS may change if need identified in Hazard Analyses

• Chosen events 1. Target wheel stops2. Target wheel loss of helium cooling (high temp or low

flow)

11

Pilot TSS – Design Concepts

• Monitor target systems• Target cooling system – He flow, He temperature or pressure• Target wheel – shaft speed, drive load, wheel motion (monitoring plug?)• Defining optimal detection methods & interfaces with system owners

• Two shutdown mechanisms to stop beam• Ion source and possibly RFQ• Direct access/priority to shutdown mechanisms• Defining interfaces with accelerator and MPS/PSS

• Use safety-rated PLCs• Two separate TSS rooms in Target building –

• Identified in CF plan• Independent paths to each beam shut-off system

• Defining cable paths with CF• Separate from ICS controls – cable-trays, UPS, shutdown mechanisms• Satisfy requirements & protect public with as-simple-as-possible system

12

ICS Control Systems for Target

• Process Controls– Operational monitoring and control for Target equipment– No safety related to radiation within process controls

• Machine Protection System (MPS)– Optimize operational efficiency, machine availability, & reliability– Requirements

• Stop the proton beam in case of failures• Prevent damage to elements in the accelerator & target• Provide tools for failure-tracing throughout machine

– Objectives• Protect the machine• Protect the beam – avoid unnecessary beam-stops

• Personnel Safety System (PSS)– Protect personnel against unnecessary exposure to hazards from the machine, including

radioactivity, electromagnetic radiation, oxygen deprivation hazards– Support multiple operational modes of facility– Primarily access control & radiation monitoring and alarm systems

13

Target – ICS Interfaces

• Systems necessary for control, monitoring, and operations of Target equipment– Yellow = Target owned, Blue = ICS owned– Green hashed = Building area, not Target equipment– Lines/arrows indicate flow of information/data

Target wheel

systems

Monolith systems

Fluid systems

Remote Handling Systems

Control Box EPICSTarget PSS

Timing systemPSS global Human machine

interface (HMI)

Target MPS

MPS global

Target Instrum-entation

TSS

Accelerator

Utility Rooms

Beam Dump

Active Cells Facility

Target building areas

ICS and Target responsibility

EPICS Domain

Target responsibility

ICS responsibility(EPICS integration)

EPICS = Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System

Specific to each case

Target subsystem

documentation

Target subsystem

documentation

Procedure of work ICS – Target

Internal target subsystem intro

meeting

ICS (Benedetto) - Target subsystem

intro meeting

Target subsystem document update if

needed

Introduce ICS design team

Weekly meetingsICS design team – target subsystem

PDR CDR

Target subsystem

documentation

ICS subsystem design

specification

Personnel Safety System

Controls – Protection and Safety Systems

ICS

MPS PSS

TSSTarget

17

MPS (Machine Protection System) – Target

• Beam Interlock System (BIS)– Terminates beam production when failure detected– Establishes a global BEAM PERMIT– Determines permissible operational modes

• Machine configuration + beam parameters • Fast response-time system – 10 msec• Sensors – BLMs, BCMs, BPMs

– Response for slower time-scale sensors & systems < 70 msec

• BIS for Target– Time scale of response ~100msec– Ongoing Risk Analyses will provide

information on input• Ex. Movement of target wheel – position

synchronized with proton beam arrival– Preliminary example:

• Input signals for Target Slave as part of Beam Interlock System

• Beam Permit given if all conditions met

18

PSS (Personnel Safety System) – Target

• Under development now– Preliminary requirements/design discussions under way

• Controlled access systems for rooms next to target station (red) on all floors– Beam-off triggered

• Remote Handling galleries/Maintenance cell area require access control tied to radiation monitoring– Not tied to accelerator operations or beam interlock

19

Conclusion

• Shown brief overview of controls for Target systems• Contacts for each system:

– Integrated Controls Systems Division• In-kind contact – Henrick Carling• Responsible for standard control & monitoring for Target

– Acting Target Lead Integrator – Benedetto Gallese• Responsible for Machine Protection System (MPS)

– Annika Nordt• Responsible for Personnel Safety System (PSS)

– Stuart Birch• Responsible for Global Timing System

– Timo Korhonen

– Target• Responsible for Target Safety System (TSS) – Linda Coney

20