tantric argument: the transfiguration of philosophical discourse in the pratyabhijñā system of...

8/12/2019 Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhij System of Utpaladeva and Ab

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Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhij Systemof Utpaladeva and AbhinavaguptaAuthor(s): David LawrenceSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 165-204Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399403 .Accessed: 23/05/2013 06:00

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TANTRIC ARGUMENT: THE TRANSFIGURATION OFPHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE IN THE PRATYABHIJNASYSTEM OF UTPALADEVA AND ABHINAVAGUPTA

IntroductionThe Enlightenment dichotomy between the detached, universally

intelligible and cogent discourse of science and philosophy on the onehand and the devout, reasonless, emotional or mystical discourse ofreligion on the other has greatly influenced Western understandings fIndian and other non-Western philosophies. Wilhelm Halbfass hasobserved that Indian philosophy was excluded until recently from mostWestern histories of philosophy because of its religious nature (i.e., itscommon purpose of facilitating he pursuit of salvation) as well as its sit-uation outside the European historical development of Greek thought.The former has been viewed to contradict a twofold concept of free-dom definitive of philosophy:

1. a freedom rom practical nterests-from oteriological otives nd fromordinary tilitarian nterests; .e., a purely heoretical ttitude n whichknowledge s sought or tsown sake.2. a freedom rom he grip of dogma, from myth, and from religious and othertraditions; .e., the freedom o criticize, o think rationally, nd to think oroneself.1

This criterion has operated equally in the exclusion from serious consid-eration of other

non-Western philosophies.Though for some time abjured by most scholars of non-Westernphilosophies, the religion-philosophy ichotomy has continued to havean insidious influence in a polarization between religious-historicist ndphilosophical research methodologies.2 The historicist approach osten-sibly overcomes the dichotomy by interpreting n terms of holistic cul-tural contexts, usually reducing philosophy to the broadly religious cat-egories of world view and ritual-ethical practice. This unification isachieved, however, at the expense of the rationalist project of philoso-phy-philosophy reduced to religion as myth or ritual s no longer seenas philosophy. 3 On the other hand, a lot of the best

philosophicalwork on non-Western philosophies has tended to abstract discussions ofproblems of language, epistemology, and ontology from their functionswithin religious systems in comparing hem to analogous discussions inthe West.4

I believe that the modern philosophy-religion dichotomy may bebetter overcome by a historically sensitive revision of the project ofphilosophical rationalism han by a relativist or postmodern destructionof philosophy. Looking back, before the prejudices of the Enlightenment,

David Lawrence

Division of Humanities,Hong Kong Universityof Science andTechnology

Philosophy East & WestVolume 46, Number 2April 1996165-204

? 1996by University fHawai'i Press

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a more synergistic onception of the relation of philosophical rationalityto religion s found in our own paradigmatic Greek philosophies. As PierreHadot has shown, most of these were conceived as systems of spiritualexercises, in that they aimed at the conversion (epistrophe and meta-noia) of the student o a redemptive understanding f self and universe.5

Throughout he long history of Christian philosophy and natural heol-ogy, there have been attempts o use reason to determine religious ruthsindependently of the assumptions of the Christian evelation, as an in-strument f religious conversion, or under rubrics uch as faith seekingunderstanding. 6 n the still-developing pluralism of the contemporaryacademy, there has been a steady increase of efforts o create dialoguebetween Western and non-Western, between religious and nonreligiousphilosophies-frankly attempting he mediation of religious claims.7

This essay will examine the strong synergism between a hard-headed concern with philosophical justification and intelligibility on

the one hand and soteriology on the other, in the Pratyabhijfi works ofthe tenth- and eleventh-century Kashmiri hinkers Utpaladeva and Abhi-navagupta.8 Building on the initiative of Utpala's teacher Somananda,these two thinkers reated a new, philosophical nstrument f conversionfor the Trika radition of monistic Saivism, to which I have given thename tantric argument. Though he method of this essay is exegetical,I hope it can contribute o constructive philosophical as well as historicalunderstandings f the relation of philosophy and religion.9

I will first present the originating project of the Pratyabhijna ystemas the thinkers' effort to lead all humanity o salvation. Then I will ex-

plain some key features of the Pratyabhijna methodology. Concerned oachieve greater intelligibility or their tradition n order to accomplishtheir redemptive program, the Saivas appropriate some of the mostwidely accepted justificatory rocedures of the medieval Sanskrit philo-sophical academy. At the same time, however, they resituate heir phil-osophical discourse within the traditional Saiva worldview and homolo-gize it to tantric praxis. Finally, I will sample some of the actualphilosophical arguments mplementing his method, in which the Saivasrefute heir Buddhist opponents and demonstrate heir central theory ofthe Lord's elf-recognition.

Originating Project of the Pratyabhijna ystemThe creation of the Pratyabhijin ystem is said to ensue from the

experience of salvation in the Trika radition by Utpaladeva. Its explicitpurpose is to lead all humanity o the same soteriological realization.Utpaladeva explains in the first verse of the corpus:

Having omehow been caused o obtain ervitude dasya] o the Great Lordand desiring he benefit upakara] f humanity, am establishing he recog-

Philosophy ast&West nition pratyabhijna]f f Him, which s the cause of obtaining ll prosperity.10

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Servitude dasya) s a widespread Saiva term for a state of high spiritualrealization. Abhinavagupta nterprets his word as indicating Utpalade-va's realization of identity (tanmayata) with the Supreme Lord. 1 Heexplains this realization in a characteristically antric manner as com-prising he attainment f the Lord's Self-enjoyment svatmopabhoga), nd

the freedom (svatantrya) o obtain whatever s desired.12 The recognition(pratyabhijfn) hat Utpaladeva wishes to convey is the very same real-ization of identity with Siva, which might be expressed Indeed I amthat very Lord. 13 This again includes the Lord's omnipotence andbliss.14 Its designation as recognition articulates he Saivas' actual philo-sophical theory, which will be taken up later.

The word humanity jana) addresses he sastraic question of eligi-bility for studying the system. Abhinavagupta nterprets he term asindicating those who are afflicted by incessant birth and death andwho as objects of compassion, should be helped. 15 He explains that

Utpaladeva's general reference means that there is no restriction regard-ing those who are eligible, not even of caste.16 It is unlikely that Utpa-ladeva and Abhinavagupta eally believed that all humanity would readthese texts composed in the elite language of Sanskrit. Nevertheless,I believe that we should extend the hermeneutic charity of taking theSaivas seriously as intending heir work to be of benefit to people out-side their tradition.'7 This intention s crucial to the discursive method-ology that they develop.

The Pratyabhijha Methodology

Because the Pratyabhijia astra attempts o bring about salvation, itis in numerous places described as a spiritual means or path (upaya,marga, patha). Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijha s a specificallyTrika method, as a means for the goal of the Person who is the Witness,who is none other than Anuttara. 18 nuttara, not having a superior', sone of the important Trika designations or Ultimate Reality. Utpaladevarefers o the means taught by Somananda and himself as a new, easypath. Abhinava's explanation of the path's novelty is interesting. Hestates that [the word] new signifies that it is contained in all thesacred texts but not well known because of concealment. 19 Abhinava shere

givingthe common hermeneutic device of

grounding nnovation nthe implicit or potential significance of a tradition a distinctively antriccharacter of secrecy. In various places the Pratyabhijia is describedspecifically as a means working through knowledge (jnanopaya).20

The Pratyabhijfa hinkers' understanding f the manner in whichthis means works is remarkably omplex. They appropriate proceduresof philosophical justification rom outside their tradition while at thesame time reinterpreting hem with their own symbolic and practicalresources.21 In this section I will first present theological and meta- David Lawrence

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physical considerations adduced by them that in the highest perspectivecontrovert he possibility of any methodology regarding he SupremeLord. Then I will turn o the Saivas' appropriation f the classic justifica-tory methods of Nyaya. I will show how, at the same time they utilizethese methods of detached rational discourse, they homologize them

with procedures of tantric praxis.

Negations of Methodology. The Saiva formulations of procedure areimmediately nterrupted by reflections upon what I would describe-with our own terminology-as a fundamental religious problematic. Iwould describe this problematic most broadly as the possibility or utilityof any finite human behavior, whether linguistic, aesthetic, theological,devotional, ritual, and so on, for expressing, affecting, or attaining areligious Ultimate Reality.22 For the Pratyabhijna his human-Ultimate

structural ssue has two aspects-coming from its nature as both atheistic and a

fullymonistic

system.First, Siva is the omnipotent deity, responsible for everything thatoccurs.23 How can a limited human being bring about identification withHim? Abhinavagupta discusses the familiar questions of divine will,grace, and finite human action in several of his works. He acknowledgesthat one may consider he most favorable conditions or, or actions of, anaspirant or salvation. At the same time, he states emphatically hat in theultimate perspective salvation is entirely accomplished by the divinewill. The favorable conditions do not in any way cause the grace ofSiva.24

Abhinava makes the same argument at various places in the Pra-tyabhijna exts, although not at length. Thus he takes this issue up whenexplaining he use of the causative n the gerund having been caused toattain (asadya) n Utpaladeva's ntroductory erse quoted above. Abhi-nava explains that the Lord does everything. His grace is thereforeunattainable ven by means of hundreds of wishes. It is because of theobfuscation of its real nature hat actual causation by the Lord appears asordinary observed causal relationships, such as the relation betweenmeans and goal (upayopeyabhava), ccomplisher and accomplished(nispadyanispadakabhava), nd that which makes known and thatwhich is made known (jnapyajfnpakabhava). ccording to Abhinava,the unconditioned nature of the Lord's grace is indicated by the adverb

somehow (kathamcit) modifying having been caused to attain. 25It is to the second aspect of the human-Ultimate tructural ension

that the Pratyabhijna hinkers devote most of their reflection. At the sametime that the Ultimate Reality s understood n super- personal erms asthe deity Siva, rather han as an impersonal principle, t is understood ocontain all reality n a pure unity. If the Ultimate Reality s nondual, the

Philosophy ast&West structure and cognitive presumptiveness f its realization must be fun-

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damentally different rom ordinary xperience, which comprises dichot-omies between subject and object, and between different ubjects andobjects, and takes place as a process in time. It would be impossiblefor Him to be a mere cognitive object (prameya) stablished by sastraicdiscourse.

The Saivas develop the Advaita Vedantin concept of self-luminosity(svaprakaSatva) o explain how Siva always already has a nondual real-ization of Himself.26 Putting heir convoluted discussions of this conceptin a more linear ashion, the thinkers deny that (1) any cognizer (pramatr)(2) by any means (pram.ana) ould have (3) any cognition (prama, pra-miti) or proof (siddhi)-of which the object (prameya) s the SupremeLord. Like Advaita, hey explain the operation of the sastra negatively asonly removing the ignorance of this self-luminosity.27 The followingexplanation by Abhinavagupta brings together this point with the othernegation of methodology in terms of divine omnipotence; it is the Lord

who both creates and removes His self-concealment:Nothing new is accomplished. or is what is really not shining aprakasa-mana] lluminated prakagyate]. Rather] he supposition abhimanana] hatwhat s shining s not shining s removed. or iberation, hich s the attain-ment of the state of the Supreme ord, s nothing ut he removal f that falsesupposition]. he cycle of suffering n rebirth samsara] s nothing but thenonremoval f that. Both of these [conditions f liberation nd rebirth] re nessence only supposition. And both are manifested by the Blessed One.28

The Pratyabhijna hinkers' denials of the efficacy of human thoughtand action, like other such qualifications n the world's religions, do notprevent them from engaging in elaborate positive discussions of meth-odology. These negative formulations may accordingly be taken as

dialectically complicating their more positive descriptions. What isimportant or us is that in delimiting heir new philosophical proceduresfrom the point of view of Ultimate Reality, he thinkers are from the startcarefully preserving their intratraditional integrity. Though the Saivasoteriological realization will be entered into the game of methodologi-cally detached interreligious ebate, it is already he winner.

Positive Formulations f Methodology: a) The Pursuit f Universal ntel-ligibility: The

MethodologicalStandards f

Nyaya.It is the

Pratyabhijinathinkers' goal of sharing he Trika piritual vision with all humanity hatmotivates their development of a philosophical method. For, in orderthat those outside their tradition may accept it, its validity must be intel-ligible to them. The Saiva effort n this respect has its parallel n the morerationalistic train of Western philosophical theology and philosophy ofreligion.

The Catholic theologian David Tracy has analyzed the discourse ofphilosophical heology, which he calls fundamental theology, in a man- David Lawrence

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ner addressing problems of cross-cultural/interreligious nterpretationand rationality. Philosophical heology is primarily ddressed o, followsthe standards, and addresses the substantive concerns of the academy.Thus, although t may argue on behalf of a particular eligious radition, tis methodologically detached from the religious and ethical commit-

ments and presumptions egarding ruth of other forms of theology (sys-tematic and practical):

In terms of modes of argument, undamental heologies will be concernedprincipally o provide rguments hat all reasonable ersons, whether reli-giously nvolved r not, can recognize s reasonable. tassumes, herefore,the most usual meaning f public discourse: hat discourse vailable inprin-ciple) o all persons nd explicated y appeals o one's experience, ntelli-gence, rationality nd responsibility, nd formulated n arguments hereclaims are stated with appropriate arrants, ackings nd rebuttal roce-dures.29

We may say that in the broad sastraic academy, here also devel-oped a philosophy division, analogous to those in the West and othercultures. In this sphere, the diverse schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, ndJainism have attempted o argue for their positions not simply by citingscriptural authority but by using reasoning (yukti, tarka, etc.).30 Eachschool maintained ts own intratraditional oint of view about what itwas doing, whether it was apologetics to convert, means to allay thedoubts of their own followers, or spiritual xercise.

Though differences always remained, there emerged a number ofconvergences about methods and experiential and rational criteria or

philosophical ustification panning he various Indian chools. The mostwidely accepted argumentative tandards n India were those developedby the Nyaya-Vaisesika radition. Gautama summarized hese standardsin sixteen categories pertaining o philosophical discussion at Nyaya Su-tra 1.1, and these were elaborated with ever greater sophistication nlater commentaries.31

Though n the truest perspective he Pratyabhijha ystem does not doanything, when it comes to positive discussions of philosophical meth-odology, Abhinavagupta sserts hat it adheres o the standards f Nyaya:

There s the correctness only of the method of the Naiyayikas n the

condition of Maya. 32 He explains the very power of the system to con-vince others on the basis of its addressing he Nyaya categories:The ultimate urpose n that [9astra] s nothing ut [explanation n terms f]the sixteen categories, uch as the means of cognition pramana], nd soon.... When he sixteen ategories re articulated niropyamanesu], notheris made o understand ompletely hat which s to be understood.33

The sixteen Nyaya categories enumerate a variety of concerns whichPhilosophy ast&West must be addressed in philosophical discussions. They refer to items

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of different orders and are somewhat overlapping n their significance,including he broad topics of means of knowledge (pramarna) nd objectsof knowledge (prameya), roughly corresponding o our fields of epis-temology and ontology; a classification of types of philosophical debatesand of the criteria operative n this classification; nd an enumeration of

the formal requirements f a well-rounded philosophical discussion.34Within the Naiyayikas' own soteriological project, the categories areoriented toward the comprehension of particular bjects of knowledge(prameya). Knowledge of and the elimination of error regarding rele-vant objects of knowledge, particularly s pertaining o what is and isnot the true self, leads to detachment and liberation rom suffering nrebirth.35

The Nyaya categories are in various ways explicitly and implicitlyaddressed in the Pratyabhijna ystem. However, two categories receivethe greatest emphasis in the construction of the Pratyabhijna hilosoph-

ical method. We will now examine how these categories are appro-priated. will devote the greatest attention o the most important f these,the schema for argument avayava). Then I will more briefly explain theSaivas' reatment f the Nyaya category of doubt (samsaya). n taking upeach category, we will first consider how it is utilized in the Pratyabhijnaeffort o achieve more universal intelligibility. Then we will observe howthe employment of each in the Pratyabhijna s given its deepest sig-nificance as spiritual exercise, by its homologization both with earlierpatterns of tantric praxis and with a particular lassification of praxisdeveloped by Abhinava. In each case I will present only the minimumsubstance of the

Pratyabhijna rguments necessaryo

geta

programmaticunderstanding f their method; I will give an idea of the actual argumentsin the last section.

Positive Formulations f Methodology: b) Philosophical Rationalizationwith the Nyaya Schema for Argument: nference or the Sake of Others.The Nyaya category most emphasized by Abhinavagupta s the schemafor argument (avayava). This schema presents the steps of the Nyaya'inference or the sake of others' (pararthanumana). n Indian philosophythere is a distinction between two types of inference, hat for the sake ofoneself (svarthanumana) nd that for the sake of others. The latter is

given a rigorously xplicit formulation n order to make logical justifica-tion from experiential and conceptual evidence assessable by any crit-ical person. Abhinava explains that sastra has the nature of an inferencefor the sake of others (parararthanumana). 36 ts intelligibility resultsdirectly rom its being constructed according to the Nyaya category:

What s the purpose with respect o the other? This [work] s for compre-hension by the other. And there s that from he inference or the sake ofothers.... It has been explained by the founder f Nyaya, Aksapada, hat David Lawrence

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every academic text [sastra] apart rom scripture eally consists of the infer-ence for the sake of others, and [thus] brings about complete comprehensionby the other.37

I will first outline the Nyaya inference for the sake of others, using

the common example of the inference of fire from smoke. This inferencehas five steps and five terms.38 n the following, the numbered tems arethe steps; the other expressions given are the terms.39 1) Thesis (pra-tijna): There is fire on the hill. The hill is the subject (paksa) of theinference. The fire is that which is to be established (sadhya) ertaining oit. (2) Reason (hetu): Because there is smoke. The smoke itself, like theinferential step that invokes it, is also designated with the word 'reason'(hetu). It is a property ound in the subject, and known to be concomi-tant with that which is to be established. As such it is the justification orthe inference. (3) General principle with exemplification (udaharana):Where there is smoke there is fire, like in the kitchen and unlike on thelake. This step explains the concomitance underlying he reason. Thekitchen is the positive example illustrating he concomitance (sapaksa).The lake is the negative example (vipaksa), howing that the propertydoes not have concomitance with a class wider than that which is to beestablished. This erm is usually not cited by the Saivas.) 4) Application(upanaya): The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it. This stepexplicitly asserts hat the subject falls within concomitance shown by theprevious step. (5) Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore here is fire on thehill. This repeats he thesis as established.

We must now get a programmatic nderstanding f the Pratyabhijhaversion of this inference abstracted rom the technical details of the the-ories which actually articulate t. The proposition which the Pratyabhijiainference demonstrates s that of the soteriological recognition, hat is,that one is identical with the Lord.40 he subject (paksa) of the thesis isthe person, and what is to be established (sadhya) s that he or she is theLord.

The justification or the connection between the subject and whatis to be established s made by the reason step in the inference. This stepis supposed to identify a quality the reason term) n the subject, which isknown to be invariably oncomitant with that which is to be established.The most distinctive act known about Siva is expressed in the cosmo-gonic myth. That is, Siva emanates the universe hrough His power andconsort Sakti, whose identity with Himself s described as sexual union.The reason in the Pratyabhijia nference s precisely hat the individual sthe actor in the cosmogonic myth of emanation.

The Saivas articulate his reason, that the individual s emanator ofthe universe, through their actual technical philosophical discussions.

Philosophy ast&West They also describe it with a variety of ad hoc figurative expressions,

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some of which will be seen below. However, in programmatic iscus-sions of Pratyabhijha methodology, they give it two chief expressions,which we will take up presently. The first expression of the inferentialreason is simply that the individual possesses Sakti. As Utpaladeva tatesin the second verse of the sastra:

This recognition f Him, who though xperienced s not noticed due to theforce of delusion, s made o be experienced hrough he revealing f [His]Sakti Saktyaviskarana].41

In this formulation, Sakti Herself s the reason as constituent erm of thereason step.42

In technical philosophical discussions, Sakti is often divided intospecial modalities hat designate Siva's emanatory power as operative nthe respective spheres of explanation. The two most encompassing ormsof Sakti are the Cognition jfnana) akti and the Action (kriyj) Sakti, which

are invoked in the fields roughly corresponding o epistemology andontology.43 These two are further divided into a number of Saktis per-taining to subsidiary opics.44

Speaking abstractly, he demonstration hat the individual possessesthe emanatory Sakti operative in a particular phere is made by an ide-alistic reduction of all its features o modalities of his or her subjectivity.This is brought out in a concise formulation by Utpaladeva:

There s the establishment pratistha] f insentient ntities as grounded nliving beings [jTvadasraya]. he life of living beings s maintained o be the[Saktis f] Cognition nd Action.45

Abhinavagupta xplains that by living beings Utpaladeva means sub-jects (pramatr). These include all apparently limited subjects, from aworm to the gods Brahma and Sadasiva. The system demonstrates hatthe very existence of objects is the subject's exercise of cognition andaction over them.46

The conception that one is the emanator of the universe, whichforms he inferential eason, is also described as a special kind of insightcalled Pure Wisdom (Suddhavidya). ure Wisdom is the awareness thatone is the source emanating all objective reality as identical with oneself.This awareness s given the typical linguistic xpression Iam this (ahamidam).47 According o Abhinava, he following statement by Utpaladevaexplains why this wisdom (vidya) s pure:

Things which have allen o the level of objects of cognition nd are under-stood n the condition f this reessentially onsciousness bodha]; nd are[through Pure Wisdom] seen as they really are.48

Such knowledge is pure because it is an awareness of the ostensibleessential nature of objects as one's emanation.49 David Lawrence

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The third step of the inference states the concomitance of Siva withHis character as emanator, that is, Sakti, and so on, and gives examplesdemonstrating this concomitance. The fourth explicitly asserts that theindividual falls within this concomitance. The conclusion reiterates thethesis that the individual is actually the Lord. The entire inference will be

further clarified by the presentation and explication of some informalsummaries of it by Abhinavagupta.

In our first summary, the reason is formulated directly in terms of the

Cognition and Action modalities of Sakti. Two supporting examples arementioned: the Lord Siva Himself, as known in sacred literature, and the

king, who like the Lord Siva, knows and acts over all his subjects. Abhi-nava explains:

The subject [pramatr], ecause he is endowed with the Cognition and ActionSaktis, s to be understood vyavahartavyal as the Lord, ike the Lord who iswell known in the Puranas, criptures, and so on. Even if He is not wellknown [from such texts], Lordship s established to have the nature of thepossession of the Cognition and Action Saktis over all objects. For [Lordship]is invariably ssociated with nothing but these [two Saktis]. Thus the logicalconcomitance is understood in the case of one such as a king, who isregarded as Lord. Like he king, one is the Lord over so much as one is thecognizer and doer. It is contradictory o the nature of one who is not the Lordto be a cognizer and a doer. And the Self is cognizer and doer with regard oeverything. Thus recognition pratyabhijfna] s established.50

This may be put formally as follows: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2)Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Saktis. (3) Whoever has

Cognition and Action Saktis is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Puranasand scriptures, and like the king. (4) The subject, since he/she has them,is the Lord. (5) The subject is the Lord.

The following example is similar to that just given but describes the

relationship of individual and universe in terms of dependence: He whois depended on somewhere is the Lord, like a king over his domain. Sodoes the universe [depend on] you. 51 Formally: (1) You are the Lord. (2)Because the universe depends on you. (3) He/she who is depended onsomewhere is the Lord. Like the king over his domain. (4) You, on whomthe universe depends, are the Lord. (5) Therefore, you are the Lord.

Several expressions by Abhinavagupta do not even mention the Lordas the inferential predicate but establish that the individual has divinestatus in other ways. Thus the following demonstrates that one is the

pervader of the universe because he/she contains it:

That in which something manifests s the pervader [vyapakah] f so much,like a casket regarding ewels. The universe, beginning with the earth andending with Sadasiva, as has been explained by the sastra, manifests] n you

Philosophy East & West who have the nature of consciousness.52

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We analyze: (1) You are the pervader of the universe. 2) Because in youthere is the manifestation f the universe. (3) That in which somethingmanifests s the pervader of so much. Like a casket regarding ewels. (4)You, in whom the universe manifests, are the pervader of the universe.(5) Therefore, you are the pervader of the universe, beginning with the

earth and ending with Sadasiva.I hope these examples have given a sufficient general view of the

Pratyabhijfn methodological program as structured by the Nyaya infer-ence for the sake of others.53 By submitting heir soteriological visionto this academic regimen, the Saivas are in a sense suspending theirassumptions of its validity in order to demonstrate ts cogency on extra-traditional grounds.54

Positive Formulations f Methodology: (c) The Encompassment of theInference or the Sake of Others within Tantric Praxis. At the same time,the Pratyabhijina hinkers understand what they are doing with thisinference in intratraditional erms. From this perspective, the Pra-tyabhijna ormulation f the Nyaya inference gets its deepest significanceas following the patterns of earlier and contemporaneous antric praxis.

To proceed, the approach o Siva through Sakti or other representa-tions of His emanatory power is an ancient and pervasive tradition.55Some of the most important xpressions of this approach are found inKrama antrism, where a number of rituals and contemplations aim togive the aspirant he realization of himself as the Lord over circles ofSaktis in the form of Kalis (gakticakra). here was also a later develop-ment of approaches o Siva through His emanation in the form of 'crea-tive vibration' spanda).56

I will cite two examples of an approach to Siva through his ema-nation prescribed n the scripture Vijnana Bhairava, which vividly pre-sent the traditional background o the Pratyabhijna nference:

There is always nondifference between Sakti and the possessor of Sakti [i.e.,Siva]. Since She is thus the possessor of His qualities, She is the Supreme[para] Sakti of the Supreme Self [paratman]. Similarly] he burning power[sakti] of fire is not considered to be different rom fire. There is this [theanalysis of power and possessor of power] only as a beginning n entering ntothe state of knowledge. If one who has entered into the condition of Saktiwould meditate on their nondifference, he would come to have the nature ofSiva. Siva's consort [Saivi] s explained here to be the door. Dear, just as dif-ferent places, and so on, are cognized by means of the light of a lamp and therays of the sun, so is Siva [cognized] by means of Sakti.57

The second passage is even more interesting. This passage refers toSiva's character of emanating the world without using the word Sakti.However, it mentions the two fundamental modalities of Sakti, Cognitionand Action, which organize the Pratyabhijna texts: David Lawrence

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One can become Siva from the firm conviction: The Supreme Lord s all-cognizer [sarvajfia], ll-doer [sarvakartr], nd pervasive. I, who have thequalities [dharma] f Siva, am none but He. Just as the waves belong to thewater, the flames belong to a fire, and light belongs to the sun, these waves58of the universe belong to Bhairava, who is none but me. 59

This contemplation is remarkably similar to the later Pratyabhijna in-ference. One understands oneself as Siva because of having his distinc-tive character of emanation.60 The use of the Nyaya category has onlyelucidated the rationality already contained in a traditional practice.The post-Abhinavagupta commentator Sivopadhyaya, looking backwards

through the philosophical interpretation, explicitly identifies this passageas describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijna.61

The spiritual significance of the Pratyabhijna inference is not limitedto its reenactment of earlier tantric practices. This inference fits withinone of the classifications of spiritual means, systematized by Abhinava-

gupta in his Tantraloka and Tantrasara, called the sakta upaya.62 As Ihave just observed, the commentator Sivopadhyaya identifies the last-

quoted passage of the Vijnana Bhairava as describing the contemplationof Pratyabhijna. In the same explanation, he also classifies this con-

templation within the sakta upaya.63The two programmatic formulations of the conception that is the

reason step in the Pratyabhijna inference, the revealing of Sakti and Pure

Wisdom, are in fact the most definitive methodological themes of thesakta upaya. Thus the special importance of the revealing of Sakti in this

upaya is indicated by its very name.64 As Navjivan Rastogi has explained:

The element of Sakti permeates all these three in varying measures and ischaracterized ariously as gross, subtle, ultimate, tc., as the case may be. Butit is the superabundance of Sakti because of which this Upaya is calledSakta.65

It is in the chapters of the Tantraloka and Tantrasara presenting the sakta

upaya that Abhinavagupta develops a Trika appropriation of the Krama

procedure of meditating on one's Lordship over circles of Saktis.66Abhinava describes the revealing of Sakti in the sakta upaya in termsof the same modalities of Cognition and Action that are the foci of the

Pratyabhijna arguments:

There is the condition of conceptual constructions n the sakta [means]. Inthat [state], [the Saktis of] acting and cognizing are evident. However,according to the previous reasoning, here is a contraction of them. To theone occupied with destroying ll of this contraction, here is revealed blazingSakti, which brings about the desired internal llumination.67

Perhaps more distinctive than the revealing of Sakti per se is Abhi-

Philosophy East & West navagupta's consolidation in the sakta upaya of developing understand-

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ings of the religious unction of intellectual activity.68 The sakta upaya sthe classification of the means based upon knowledge (jfnanopaya).69 Wehave already observed that the Pratyabhijna ystem is described as ameans of knowledge by both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.

Abhinavagupta hus describes the modus operandi of the sakta

upaya gnoseologically as the 'purification f conceptualization' vikalpa-samskara). The quintessential tool of the purification f conceptualiza-tion, and thereby of the sakta upaya, is good or true reasoning (sat-tarka).70 Reasoning was increasingly seen as a spiritual means inscriptures before Abhinavagupta. Of the greatest mportance or Abhina-vagupta were the assessments of reasoning in his most revered Trikascripture, he MalinTvijaya antra. This scripture tself tantricizes Indianacademic traditions n explaining the soteriological role of reasoning asthe discrimination which encourages he movement rom hat which is tobe abandoned (heya) o that which is to be pursued (upadeya).7

In his sakta upaya, Abhinavagupta dentifies these two categories,respectively, with the impure and pure kinds of conceptualization. Now,the distinguishing haracteristic which makes one pure rather han theother is whether or not there is apprehended the absorption of the ob-jective universe nto the emanatory ubject:

The mpurity alled supreme s the idea which distinguishes rom Siva hese[things] hich really have Him as their nature. urity s the destruction f thisidea... 72

As the goal of this process, Abhinava posits a principle found in anumber of Saiva cosmological schemes. This is none other than theconception with which we are already amiliar, Pure Wisdom, that is, theawareness of emanation expressed I am this [universe]. 73

Abhinava also identifies this goal of Pure Wisdom with the toolleading toward it, good reasoning: Good reasoning s nothing but PureWisdom.... 74Pure Wisdom may thus be understood as the insight hatinforms, and leads toward itself, the purification of conceptualization.The following passage gives an idea of the overall process:

The multitude of things appear clearly in that jewel [the Self/Lord], who ispure, and has omnipotent reedom [svatantra]. hat [conceptual construction]is said to be benighted [and is impure] which comprehends differentiationbetween those hings] nd the Self. However there s also conceptual on-struction] aving he nature f Pure Wisdom, which comprehends he Selfascontaining all objects [as is expressed]: I am all this. This conceptual con-struction has the nature of Pure Wisdom and is clearly manifest; t destroys hemayic conceptual construction which causes differentiation.75

Thus we see that both formulations of the Pratyabhijna nferentialrationale are also the central practical hemes of the sakta upaya. I do notwish to claim, however, that the upaya is nothing but the inference. The David Lawrence

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two methodological hemes in the sakta upaya nclude a variety of otherpractices, including nonphilosophical studies of sacred scriptures anddiscussions of them with gurus, and elaborate meditations on mandalas.Abhinava formulates he upaya to encompass the Pratyabhijna rgu-mentation along with these other practices.76

Positive Formulations f Methodology: d) The Philosophical and TantricEncounter with Doubt. We may now more briefly consider the Pra-tyabhijna hinkers' appropriation f one other Nyaya category, that ofdoubt (samsaya). According o Nyaya, philosophy proceeds by first con-sidering doubt or indecision regarding a view. It then utilizes the infer-ence for the sake of others and other procedures of debate to reach ajustified decision (nirnaya).77

Most Indian philosophical texts are structured as a series of state-ments, questions, and answers expressing he views of opponents (pur-

vapaksa-the 'prima facie') in confrontation with the position beingestablished (siddhanta-the 'established conclusion'). In the IPK and itscommentaries, he whole second chapter is devoted to an initial pre-sentation of the views of opponents. The discussions are developedfurther as the proponents argue their response in the remainder of thebook.

The Nyaya requirement or the consideration of doubt may be takenas coming from the cognizance of the integrality f otherness o phil-osophical rationality. The effort to justify one's views, or to make theirostensible validity more universally ntelligible, requires an awarenessof alternative

possibilities. Abhinavagupta againis

explicitabout the

intelligibility ccomplished through he effort of answering doubt:

The nature f Ultimate Reality ere [in this system] s explained hrough heconsideration f the views of opponents s doubts nd he refutation f them;it is thus very clearly manifested.78

Given the Saivas' redemptive-apologetic project, it should not besurprising hat they do not understand alternative views as truly viableoptions. They attempt to reencompass the otherness of philosophicalopposition within their traditional ategories. This is illustrated by Abhi-navagupta's benedictory verse to the chapter presenting he views of theopponents:

We pay obeisance o Siva, who manifests he differentiated niverse asthe prima acie argument, nd then leads t back o unity as the establishedconclusion.79

Here Abhinava s interpreting he process of philosophical debate withthe mythical understanding hat the Lord produces both delusion and

Philosophy ast&West revelation for humanity. Shortly after this benediction, Abhinavagupta

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quotes for support a statement rom a devotional work, the Stavacinta-mani of Bhatta Narayana, which more generally describes these acts:

Homage to God [deva] who creating the delusion of the deluded who arewithin worldly existence, destroys it; and concealing the transoppositionalbliss of cognition, uncovers t.80

We know that Siva ultimately does everything. Nevertheless, corre-

sponding to the mythical dentification, he elimination of philosophicalopposition is also encompassed within tantric practice. Thus in Abhina-va's discussions of the sakta upaya, he polemically makes opponentdoctrines an object of the purification of conceptualization. He statesthat the path to be abandoned [heya] is the means to liberation taught byother systems. 81 Among those whom Abhinava mentions are Buddhists,Jains, Vaisnavas, Vaidikas, and Sanmkyas.82 linded by maya, theseschools lack good reasoning and do not understand he purification of

conceptualization vikalpasamskara).83 owever, through purifying heirreasoning, hose who follow other schools can be saved:

Even one who [because of karma] has developed within those [wrong sys-tems] can come to be discriminating bout his rising udgments paramarsa].Due to the excellence of Pure Wisdom, he is purified by the descent of Sakti[saktipata, way of describing mystical grace], and ascends the good path,from which the obstacles have been removed.84

In one of his final comments in the IPV, Abhinava asserts that thePratyabhijna astra makes the views of various other systems help bringabout the recognition of the Self, as the sun unites the essences (rasa) ofearth and water for the nourishment f grains.85 From he Saivas' point ofview, they are purifying onceptualizations o reflect their tantric meta-physics. This self-understanding lso has a rhetorical onsequence. As willbe illustrated n the next section, the Saivas' arguments attempt thor-oughly to subvert he views of their opponents in establishing heir own.

The Implementation f Tantric ArgumentThe explanation of the Pratyabhijin methodology hat has just been

given has been confined to formulations of a programmatic ature. Tounderstand t more deeply, we must turn o their technical philosophical

discussions. It is not possible to present a detailed analysis of such dis-cussions here. I will only give an overview of the chief implementation fthe Saiva method in the arena of epistemology, hat is, the philosophy ofthe recognition of the Lord.86

The Challenge of the Buddhist Logicians. Following protocol, we mustfirst turn to the challenge of the Saivas' opponents. Though they dealwith various rivals, he Saivas' chief opponents are the school now oftencalled Buddhist logic, which was founded by Dignaga and most David Lawrence

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Philosophy East & West

influentially nterpreted by Dharmakirti.87 uddhist logic develops twosoteriological emphases of early Buddhism-on the transitoriness f allthings and on the dangers inherent n speculation-into a critical phi-losophy that has often been compared with the phenomenalism of DavidHume.

Buddhist logic formulates radical distinction nd disaccord between(1) a series of evanescent flashes of direct perception lacking all con-ceptualization (nirvikalpakajnana)-of evanescent svalaksanas, 'self-characterized', unique particulars', r 'point instants' and (2) cognition,which includes vikalpa (i.e., savikalpakajnanna), hat is, all imaginative,conceptual, and linguistic interpretation, hich synthesizes the uniqueparticulars nto ostensible objects characterized by universals (sama-nyalaksana). Now, while the Buddhists acknowledge that this inter-pretation has a kind of provisional validity for ordinary behavior in theworld, they contend that it is ultimately unfounded n immediate expe-

rience and is invalid.88In polemics spanning several centuries before the Pratyabhijfi sas-

tra, he Buddhist ogicians attempted o refute or deconstruct s invalid

generalizations of evanescent experiences many of the commonsensicaland religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schools-external objects, ordinary s well as ritual action, an enduring Self, God,the sacred language of revelation, and so forth. A particular evelopmentin the debates was crucial in defining the immediate ntellectual prob-lematics which the Pratyabhijfin hinkers attempted o resolve in theirphilosophical theology. The entire process of interpreting xperience

came to be viewed by both Buddhists and Hindus to be epitomized inthe experience of recognition pratyabhijfin).Recognition n ordinary ife is understood as the realization hat an

object of a present experience is the same as an object of a past experi-ence, as retained n the memory. It has the typical expression This isthat. The same process actually occurs in all applications of inter-

pretation o experience. In our memory are stored the semantic con-ventions (samketa) egarding he words that we use in interpretation. We

apply interpretations o experience when the relevant mnemonic im-pressions (samskara) re activated. Thus, all applications of interpreta-

tion,which in

contemporaryWestern

philosophyare described as

seeing as, came to be understood as comprising the This is thatstructure f a very general sort of recognition.89

The Buddhists claimed that this process of recognition is invalid.

They argued that memory has no epistemic relevance to present directexperience. Their most energetic Hindu opponents, the realist schoolsof Nyaya-Vaisesika and Purva MTmamsa, rgued that our recognitiveseeing-as is grounded in, and elucidates, a world of genuinely inde-pendent objects possessing intrinsic qualities.90

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Now it is possible to appreciate why the Saivas formulate he soter-iological realization hat they wish to convey as a kind of recognition.They deliberately set it up as having the recognitive structure of inter-pretation that has been problematized by the Buddhists. n this regard,I must also point out that in Indian philosophy inference itself, as an

interpretation, was understood o operate through a kind of recognitivejudgment (lihgaparamarsa, ratisamdhana). nference s the applicationof the knowledge-or memory-of a concomitance to a case presentlyat hand.91 For he Pratyabhijna, e have a memory rom scriptures ndother sources of the Lord Siva as causing the emanation of the universe,possessing Sakti, and so on. One applies this memory to the directexperience of one's own self, as is expressed in the statement Indeed Iam that very Lord. 92

The Saivas' interpretation f the challenge of the Buddhists o theirsoteriological recognition is oriented toward the structure of the Pra-

tyabhijna inference for the sake of others.93 The Buddhists attack theoverarching recognition by attacking he recognitions of the inference'skey terms along with their entailments: Self; Cognition as a faculty,which it must be to be a Sakti; Action as enduring process, again which itmust be to be a Sakti; and the very possibility of relation, which Cogni-tion and Action would have to have with the Self in order to be Saktis.The Buddhist ontention is that, as there are no grounds or recognizingthese categories n the flux of unique particulars, here are no grounds orthe Saiva soteriological recognition.94

The SaivaResponse

to the Buddhists. How do the Saivas answer thissweeping doubt, metaphysically subvert Buddhist logic, and establishthe inference leading to the soteriological recognition? Their responsemay be understood as a highly creative development of the thought ofthe fourth-to-sixth-century inguistic philosopher Bhartrhari.95 artrharihad interpreted he Vedic revelation metaphysically as the Word Abso-lute (sabdabrahman) r Supreme Speech (paravak).96 his principle is asuperlinguistic plenum containing language and reality in a unity andemanating nto the universe of separated words and objects. Bhartrhari'spostulation of this principle as the source makes the entire universeof experience inherently linguistic, and thus provides the ground forthe re-connection of words and objects in conventional linguistic ref-erence.97 His basic position is diametrically opposed to that of theBuddhists.98

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta nterpret Supreme Speech as Siva'svery self-recognition ahampratyavamarsa).99 xtending Bhartrhari's p-proach to the new problematics, hey explain their cosmogonic myth ofSiva emanating the universe through Sakti as this process of His self-recognition. As Abhinavagupta uts it: David Lawrence

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The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness, makes His own Self intoan object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, becausethe Cognizer is unitary.... As He recognitively apprehends paramrsati] isSelf, so, because everything s contained within Him, He appears as blue, andso on.100

The emanation of the recognitions of discrete objects such as blue isunderstood as a kind of fragmentation f the Lord's self-recognition. nthis process, there is first the pure monistic self-recognition I. Thenthere is a recognition involving a partial differentiation f objectivityfrom subjectivity, having the structure we know as Pure Wisdom, that is,

I am this. Finally, here is the loss of the awareness of the I in therecognition of apparently separate objects as This, or, more fully,

This s that, This s blue, and so on.101Siva's self-recognition s, of course, the very realization hat the Sai-

vas aim to convey to humanity. The Pratyabhijna hinkers' scription of a

primordial, osmogonicstatus to it is of

great importn their

argumentswith the Buddhists. They are thereby able to argue hat their system's goalconstitutes he very facts that the Buddhists ay preclude it. As the Saivas'speculation alleges the necessity of the Lord's self-recognition as theunderlying reality of the basic epistemological and ontological facts, itmay be classified as a highly ambitious orm of transcendental nquiry.'02

According o the Saivas, just as the Lord's elf-recognition manatesinto the recognitions of apparently discrete objects, it emanates into dif-ferent types of experiences of such objects. The chief among these areperceptual cognition, memory, and conceptual exclusion (apohana). Intheir treatment f

epistemology, Utpaladevaand

Abhinavagupta ttemptto reduce these processes as well as their ostensible objects to modalitiesof Siva's self-recognition.103

Here it will be possible to give a brief summary of the Saivas' treat-ment of only one topic of epistemology, which, I believe, is most repre-sentative: perceptual cognition. The Saivas' arguments on perceptualcognition may be roughly divided into those centered on the term pra-kasa and those centered on the term vimarsa and its cognates such aspratyavamarsa, aramarsa, nd so on. Though contemporary cholarshiphas given much attention o these terms, I do not believe there has beena basic appreciation f the way the discussions employing them functionto articulate he Saivas' argumentative nd redemptive agendas of lead-ing students o the soteriological recognition.104

Prakaga, light, illumination' or 'awareness', has the philosophicalsignificance, preliminary o the Saivas' arguments about it, of a kind ofsubjective awareness that validates each cognition, so that one knowsthat one knows.'05 The thrust of the arguments about prakasa s ideal-istic.106The Saivas contend that, as no object is known without this val-

Philosophy ast& West idating ubjective awareness, his awareness constitutes all objects:

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If the object did not have the nature of awareness [prakasa], t would bewithout illumination aprakasa], as it was before [its appearance]. Awareness

[prakasa] cannot be different than the object]. Awareness [prakasata] s theessential nature of the object.107

Nor can objects external to awareness be inferred as the causes of the

diversity of awareness. For inference can only be made regarding thingswhich have already been experienced, and not objects which by defi-nition can never have been experienced.'08

Furthermore, the Saivas contend that one could never experienceanother subject outside one's own awareness. However, their conclu-sion is not solipsism as usually understood in the West, but a conceptionof a universal awareness:

Even the cognition of others is nothing but one's own Self. Otherness isentirely due to accidental attributes upadhi] such as the body, and so on.And that

[anaccidental attribute uch as the

body]has been determined not

to be other [than awareness]. Thus everything alls under the category of thesubject. The subject is really unitary. And He alone exists.... Therefore,beginning with Bhagavan Sadasiva cognizes and ending with The wormcognizes -there is only one subject. Consequently, all cognitions [by ap-parently different ubjects really] belong to that [one] subject.109

The term vimarsa and its cognates have the significance of a judg-ment with a recognitive structure.110 The arguments centering on theseterms develop earlier considerations of Bhartrhari n the linguisticality of

experience. They refute the Buddhist contention that recognition is just a

contingent reaction to direct experience, by claiming that it is integral ortranscendental to it. As Utpala explains:

They attest that recognitive judgment [vimarsa] s the essential nature ofawareness [avabhasa]. Otherwise, awareness [prakasa], even though colored[upararakta] y the object, would be like that which is insentient, uch as acrystal, and so on.111

Among the considerations the Saivas adduce for this thesis are: thatchildren must build upon a subtle form of linguistic judgment in their

learning of conventional language; that there must be a recognitiveordering of our most basic experiences of situations and movements inorder to account for our ability to perform rapid behaviors; and that somekind of subtle application of language in all experiences is necessary inorder to account for our ability to remember them.'12

The Saivas further elaborate their position on the transcendentalnature of recognition against the Buddhists by inverting the latters' pointof view on the epistemic statuses of universals and particulars. The Sai-vas make the recognition of universals primary, and hold that particularsare constructed at a secondary level through the synthesis of these syn- David Lawrence

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theses. As Abhinava puts it briefly in the course of discussing anotherissue:

It has been explained here [in the Pratyabhijia] hat objects are nothing butmanifestations. They are sometimes mixed, through he unification of recog-nitive judgment paramarsa], hen they have the form of the particular. Andsometimes they are recognitively udged [paramnrsyante] s unmixed, whenthey have the form of the universal.113

In this explanation, the Saivas attempt to achieve a double victory. The

perceptions of both sorts of entities are claimed to depend intimately on

conceptualization, especially that alleged by the Buddhists to be of themost basic and discrete sense data.

Now, neither the arguments about prakda nor those about vimarsaand its cognates are meant to stand alone. The idealistic prakiaa argu-ments make the recognition shown by the vimarsa arguments to be

integral to all epistemic processes, constitutive of them and their objects.The following statement places vimarsa in the idealistic algebra:

Here, as the multiplicity f things are recognitively pprehended vimrsyate],so they exist [asti]. This is so because Being [astitva] epends upon awareness

[prakasa]. That is, there is the manifestation f Being as depending on the

recognitive udgment [vimarsa] egarding what is brought about through hisawareness [prakasa].... Therefore, omething exists as much and in whatever

way it is recognitively pprehended vimrrsyate] nd unsublated.114

Several points must now be spelled out. Since according to the pra-kasa arguments all experience belongs to one subject, this recognition

must be His self-recognition. And, inasmuch as this self-recognition isthe means by which Siva causes the emanation of the universe, it is noneother than His Sakti. This identity of self-recognition and Sakti is stated

very frequently:

The Sakti which is Creatorhood kartrtva], hich has the nature of Lordship,contains all the Saktis. That [Sakti] has the nature of recognitive udgment[vimarsa]. Therefore t is proper hat only it is predominant.... As He recog-nitively apprehends paramrsatf] is Self, so, because everything s containedwithin Him, He appears as [objects such as] blue, and so on.115

Sakti is, of course, also the reason term in the Saiva inference. In thefollowing passage, Utpala thus places the two chief Saktis of Cognitionand Action, interpreted in terms of recognition, in the position of infer-ential reason:

He [the subject] is the Great Lord since it is necessarily the case that heis recognitively judging [vimarsattvena iyatena], and since that very re-

cognitive judgment [vimarsa] s the pure Cognition and Action of GodPhilosophy East & West [deva]. 6

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We are led to the startling ealization hat self-recognition, he thesis-goalof the Saiva's inferential-ritual methodology, s identical with the reasonthat justifies t. That s, one is inferentially ed to the recognition hat oneis the Lord, because everything s one's self-recognition.

This may be put another way. The Pratyabhijna reatments of per-

ceptual cognition along with other topics of epistemology may be under-stood as a recovery or reintegration f the Lord's elf-recognition, whichhas been fragmented nto the recognitions constituting ordinary experi-ence. The following terse statement by Abhinavagupta lucidates as suchboth key formulations of the inferential rationale and the sakta upayamodus operandi, hat is, the revealing of Sakti and the operation of PureWisdom/Good Reasoning n purifying onceptualization:

The ascertainment adhyavasa] udges [paramrSantT 7word and object, char-acterized by name and form, as one, in the form This s that. [That scertain-ment] s the Sakti of the Supreme Lord, who has the nature of recognitive udg-

ment [vimarsa]. t appears only as the Self, that is, nonseparately rom I.However, t never appears as this, hat is, as separate [from he Self].118

The recognition of an objective This / This s that is really the ema-natory self-recognition I. This fact may be expressed either as 'This'is Sakti or with the expression of Pure Wisdom I am this. '19 The pri-mordial status accorded to self-recognition n the interpretation f Saivaemanationism has defined the radical conclusion of it's transcendentalinquiry. It is the fact that the Pratyabhijna heory of recognition so fullyencodes the Saiva myth that makes the inquiries that disclose it intotantric ritual hat bestows salvation.

Our discovery of the identity of the reason and conclusion of thePratyabhijna nference brings us back to the overarching theologicalnegations we considered at the beginning of the discussion of method-ology. I there explained the Saivas' understanding f the Lord's ultimatenonobjectifiability n terms of their conceptions of grace and self-lumi-nosity. Abhinava gives these ideas another important rticulation n hisworks on practical heology. Above his threefold cheme of increasinglysubtle and internal means, he postulates what he calls the nonmeans(anupaya). This is a final stage of immediate realization involving noeffort or very slight effort.

Some of Abhinava's remarks n his discussion of this nonmeans aredirectly pertinent o our present consideration of the steps of the Pra-tyabhijin inference. More fundamental than but homologous to theidentity of inferential eason and conclusion is Abhinavagupta's enialhere of the ultimate validity of any relation between a distinct spiritualmeans (upaya) and goal (upeya):

The relation f means [upaya] nd goal [upeya] s an illusion of grossness f cog-nition. t s the Action Sakti which is the cause of both bondage and liberation.120 David Lawrence

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What use is there with reasonings regarding he self-luminous principle ofconsciousness [samvittattva]?... All means [upaya], external and internal,depend upon it. How could they be means [upaya] regarding t? .. [Objectsof different kinds of experience, such as] blue, yellow, and pleasure are onlyawareness [prakaa], that is, Siva. Since there is [really only] this supremenonduality which has the nature of awareness [prakasa], what relation ofmeans [upaya] and goal [upeya] could there be which is other han it? For hat[relation f means and goal] is only awareness [prakasa].121

It is the Lord's omnipotence and self-luminous unity that preclude all

relationships of distinct means and the goal. This general conception of

practical theology is exemplified in the identity of reason and conclusionin the Pratyabhijna inference.

From a philosophical point of view, the identity of reason and con-clusion in the Pratyabhijna inference may seem to admit a vitiating cir-

cularity. Though this essay is not strictly philosophical, even its exegeticproject requires that I say that I do not believe this is so. For, in the Pra-

tyabhijna, the soteriology is not presumed but is supposed to be dis-covered in inquiries into common problems and following commonrules of Sanskrit philosophical discourse. The Saivas' development ofthese inquiries required an enormous amount of creative interpretationand hard methodologically detached thinking. In effect, all these

inquiries that they have developed constitute reasons for the reasonthat is emanation/self-recognition. From our extratraditional perspective,the circularity of the inference is thus transformed into a cognitively ad-

vancing hermeneutic circularity.It is only within the intratraditional perspective that the elaborate

argumentation of Pratyabhijna sastra does not do anything. We mustrecur to the monistic mythical dynamics of emanation and return. Utpa-ladeva describes the soteriological reintegration of self-recognitionthrough the Pratyabhijna system as a sort of telos of the phenomena of

ordinary experience:

The accomplishment of the purpose [krtarthata] f the separated recognitivejudgment [vimarsa] this -is the recognitive judgment [vimarsa] of rest[visranti] n its own essential nature expressed] I am He. 122

The progress of phenomena toward self-recognition is nothing but a

clarification of their nature as self-recognition. Cosmogony and teleologyare the same. Thus Abhinavagupta compares the recognition constitutingordinary experience to a point of rest in a paradoxical journey betweenthe identical origin and goal of Siva's self-recognition.

That which is called recognitive udgment [paramarsa] s the absolutely inaland true [paryantikam va paramarthikam] lace of rest [visrantisthanam];and it only has the form I. In traveling o a village, the intermediate oint of

Philosophy East & West rest [madhyavisrantipadam], t the root of a tree, is explained o be created as

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expectant of that [final point of rest].... Thus also blue, and so on, existing nthe intermediate recognitive judgment [paramarsa] s This is blue, areestablished to consist of the Self. For they rest upon the root recognitivejudgment [paramarsa] 1. 123

The new Saiva philosophy, with all of its technical procedure of justi-fication, is a path of return in a circular journey that never reallydeparts.124

NOTES

This essay develops one of the themes in my Argument nd the Rec-ognition of Siva: The Philosophical Theology of Utpaladeva and Abhi-navagupta Ph.D. diss., University f Chicago, 1992). An earlier version

of this essay was presented n the session Encoding and Overcoding inthe Tantras at the 22d Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison,1993.

The following abbreviations re used in the text or the notes:

BIPV Bhaskar, by Bhaskarakantha, ommentary on IPV.IPK Isvarapratyabhijnakarika, y Utpaladeva.IPKV Igvarapratyabhijfinkarikavrtti, y Utpaladeva, ommentary n IPK.IPV 1svarapratyabhijfnavimarsinT, y Abhinavagupta, ommentary on

IPK.IPW

IgvarapratyabhijnafvivrtivimarsinT, y Abhinavagupta, ommentaryon Utpaladeva's svarapratyabhijnavivrtti.SD Sivadrsti y Somananda.TA Tantraloka, y Abhinavagupta.TAV Tantralokaviveka, y Jayaratha, ommentary on TA.TS Tantrasara, y Abhinavagupta.

1 - Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay n Understanding(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 157.

2 - There was an effort o create a bridge between these approachesat the University of Chicago Conferences on Religions in Cul-ture and History, 1986-1989, and the resulting SUNY series,Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religion. For examples ofseveral approaches, see Francisa Cho Bantly, ed., Deconstructing/Reconstructing he Philosophy of Religion: Summary Reports romthe Conferences on Religions in Culture and History 1986-1989(Chicago: University of Chicago Divinity School, 1990); and seeFrank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, eds., Myth and Philosophy(Albany: State University f New York Press, 1990), Discourse and David Lawrence

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Practice (Albany State University of New York Press, 1992), andReligion and Practical Reason: New Essays in the ComparativePhilosophy of Religion (Albany State University of New YorkPress, 1994).

3 - The relativist Howard Eilberg Schwartz thus attempts o destroy

the universality and normativity f philosophical rationality pre-cisely by reducing t to myth. See Myth, Inference and the Rela-tivism of Reason: An Argument rom the History of Judaism, nReynolds and Tracy, Myth and Philosophy, pp. 247-285.

4 - One of the greatest pioneers of comparative philosophy, BimalKrishna Matilal, did do some interpretation f religion, particularlyin his later years. However, most of his work has the form de-scribed. Thus, see his most important tudy, Perception: An Essayon Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1986). One of the most outspoken advocates of the seri-ousness of Indian philosophies, Daya Krishna, has claimed thattheir expressed religious objectives are an excuse to legitimateintellectual peculations.

5 - See Pierre Hadot, Exercices pirituels t philosophie antique Paris:Etudes Augustiniennes, 1981).

6 - David Tracy is an heir to the tradition of Christian philosophicaltheology who has made great efforts o develop it to address con-temporary problems of interpretation nd rationality. ee his anal-ysis of the different ypes of philosophical and nonphilosophical

theological discourse in The Analogical Imagination: ChristianTheology and the Culture of Pluralism New York: Crossroad Pub-lishing Co., 1975), pp. 47-98. I will refer o this analysis in inter-preting he Pratyabhijha hilosophy below. Also see David Tracy,

The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic TheologicalMethod, Modernity, and Post-Modernity, heological Studies 50(1989): 548-570.

7 - Scholars making such efforts are as diverse as Bimal KrishnaMatilal, Michael Hayes, Paul Griffiths, Robert Neville, and TuWei-ming.

8 - The main textual focus of this essay will be Utpaladeva's igvar-apratyabhijiakarika IPK) and Abhinavagupta's gvarapratyabhij-navimarsinT IPV). For these texts I will use the edition [gvar-apratyabhijfnavimarsinT f Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of DivineRecognition: Sanskrit Text with Bhaskar, 2 vols., ed. K. A. Su-bramania yer and K.C. Pandey reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1986). I will sometimes refer to the eighteenth-century com-

Philosophy ast& West mentary on the IPV, Bhdskari, y Bhaskara BIPV). lso within the

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essay's scope are: Utpaladeva, SiddhitrayT nd the Isvarapratya-bhijnakarikavrtti, d. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Seriesof Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap SteamPress, 1921), and Abhinavagupta, svarapratyabhijiavivrtivimar-sinm, vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of

Texts and Studies (reprint, Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 987).The gSvarapratyabhfinakarikavrtti nd ISvarapratyabhijfnavivrtivi-marsinT will henceforth be referred to as IPKV and IPVV,respectively.

This essay will for the most part reat he Pratyabhijiia heoriesof Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta as an integral whole. As isusual in foundational verse and aphorism exts, Utpaladeva's IPKis densely written and is intended o be expounded in subordinatecommentaries. However, there is presently available only theshorter of Utpaladeva's commentaries, centered on the IPK-theIPKV-which is

mostlyconcerned with

clarifyingthe basic

meaning of the verses. Abhinavagupta's ommentaries have thequality of deep and original thought, but it is most often impos-sible to distinguish arguments which had direct precedent inUtpaladeva from those which either further or depart from hisdiscussions. It is also in accordance with the intentions of theIndian genre of text and commentary o treat them as presentingone system.

9 - I am working on a constructive philosophical nterpretation f thePratyabhijna ystem in transforming my Argument nd the Rec-

ognition of Siva into a book, and in an article.10 - IPK 1.1, benedictory verse, 1 :18.

11 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :17.

12 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :28-29.

13 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :37-38.

14 - There are numerous discussions of the soteriological significanceof the recognition which the Pratyabhijin ystem aims to convey.See IPV 1.1, on IPK, enedictory verse, 1 :33-34, and on this BIPV,

33-34;IPV

1.1,on

IPK, benedictory verse,1

:38-39;IPV

1.1,on

IPK,benedictory verse, 1 :41-42; IPK nd IPV3.2.11-12, 2 :256-259; IPKand PV4.1.15, 2:308; IPK4.1.18, 2:315-316; and alsothe discussions of the practical causal efficacy (arthakriya) f rec-ognition at IPV1.1.2, 1 :58-59; IPK nd IPV4.1.17, 2:312-315.

15 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :32.

16 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :29-30; BIPVon IPV 1.1, onIPK, benedictory verse, 1 : 30; IPV 4.1.18, 2 :316. David Lawrence

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17 - On hermeneutic charity, see Paul Griffiths, An Apology for Apol-ogetics (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 20-21.

18 - IPV 1.1, introductory erse, 3, 1 :8.

19 - IPV4.1.16, 2:309.

20 - See IPVV, 1.1, 1 :16. Cf. IPV and BIPV 1.1.4, 1:78; and Utpala-deva in The Sivadrsti of Srisomanandanatha with the Vritti byUtpaladeva, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series ofTexts and Studies, no. 54 (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1934), 3.16,105. Somananda's ext will henceforth be abbreviated s SD.

21 - In this way, the Pratyabhijha llustrates what Alexis Sanderson hascalled the overcoding by which the various Kashmiri aiva tra-ditions have appropriated he symbolism and praxis of other tra-ditions. Brian Smith has interpreted his pattern of appropriation nthe Vedic and larger South Asian contexts as encompassmenton the basis of a presumed hierarchical esemblance. See BrianK. Smith, Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 46-49, 186-189. Ibelieve that the pattern s actually a reflection of the hermeneuticcircle, necessary o all acts of interpretation.

22 - Mircea Eliade conceptualized this issue in terms of history and thetranscendence of history, as the dialectic of the Sacred.

23 - In Saivism generally, He is said to perform ive cosmic acts: thecreation of the universe, he preservation f it, the destruction f it,

the creation of human delusion (which is the cause of suffering nrebirth), nd the bestowal of salvific grace.

24 - See the discussion of sections from the Tantraloka, antrasara, ndMalinTvijayavarttika, n Debabrata Sen Sharma, The Philosophy ofSadhana: With Special Reference to Trika Philosophy of KgamTra(Karnal, Haryana: Natraj Publishing House, 1983), pp. 88 ff.

25 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :24-28. Cf. Sivadrsti .1, 2.

26 - The Advaita Vedantin theory itself interprets discussions in theUpanisads, and was also influenced by the MTmamsaka octrine

of the 'self-established-ness' svatahpramanya) f the means ofcognition (pramanas), s well as the Buddhist ogicians' notionof the 'validating self-awareness' (svasamvedana) nherent in allexperiences.

27- The two chief sections where Utpaladeva and Abhinavaguptafocus on the issue of self-luminosity re IPK nd IPV 1.1.1, 1: 47-56, and 2.3.15-16, 2:134-139. (Abhinavagupta oints out the

Philosophy ast&West connection between these discussions, n IPV2.3.15-16, 134.) Cf.

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IPV 1.1, on IPK,benedictory verse, 1 :38. On ignorance/illusion nthe context of self-luminosity, also see IPK and IPV 1.1.2, 1 :57-59; IPKand IPV2.3.17, 2:141-143.

28 - IPV2.3.17, 2:143-144.

29 - Tracy, Analogical Imagination, p. 57. See the analysis of the dif-ferences between fundamental, ystematic, and practical theolo-gies in terms of five rubrics, bid., pp. 54-58. Also see the dis-cussion focusing on fundamental heology, in ibid., pp. 62-64.Tracy acknowledges that, because it is produced in particularhistorical situations, the effort of fundamental heology is intrin-sically problematic, uncertain, and only partly history-transcending. ee his Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralismin Theology Minneapolis: Winston-Seabury ress, 1975), pp. 64-87, and his Uneasy Alliance Reconceived, pp. 557-559, 567-568. Cf. Paul J. Griffiths' description of philosophy in its ideal-typical character of transcending the limitations of historicalcontext, as denaturalized discourse, in Denaturalizing Dis-course: Abhidharmikas, Propositionalists, nd the ComparativePhilosophy of Religion, in Tracy and Reynolds, Myth and

Philosophy, p. 66.

30 - I emphasize that not all sastraic discourse is philosophical in thesense that I have given the term here. According o this criterion,even the well-known Advaita Vedantin hinker Sahkara, or whomreason is subordinated o the process of exegesis of scripture, s a

philosopher onlyon

exceptionaloccasions. He would more

accurately be described as a systematic and practical heologianor Brahmalogian.

31 -The list is given at Nyayadarsanam: With Vatsyayana's Bhasya,Uddyotakara's Varttika, Vacaspati Migra's Tatparya.tka nd Vigva-natha's Vrtti, d. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha nd Amarendramo-han Tarkatirtha, ith introd. by Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha(Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985), p. 28. The paradigmaticrole of the Nyaya standards s demonstrated n the studies of Ma-tilal. See particularly The Nature of Philosophical Argument,

chap. in Matilal, Perception, pp. 69-93.32 - IPV 1.1, on IPK, benedictory verse, 1 :43. Abhinava states here

that he is explaining the view of Utpaladeva. I note that we mustrely on explanations of Abhinavagupta n considering he relationof the Pratyabhijfi method to the Nyaya standards of philosoph-ical argument. Utpaladeva does not seem directly o treat his issuein his available writings. Certainly he classic philosophical stan-dards are in many ways implied in his speculation, and Abhina- David Lawrence

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va's

tantric argument: the transfiguration of philosophical discourse in the pratyabhijñā system of...

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