G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner, vs.RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

DIGESTED CASE

FACTS: Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional provision:

1. Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

2. Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

3. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The SNIT contained changes in the tax schedules and different treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the aforestated provision of the constitution.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

1. Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as

(a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act,

(b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and

(c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation.

The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.

2. Article VI, Section 28(1)

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371).

Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as:

(1) The standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,(2) The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,(3) The law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and(4) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).

What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

3. Article III, Section 1

Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy before us.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident to us.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994

RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner, vs.RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

G.R. No. 109446 October 3, 1994

CARAG, CABALLES, JAMORA AND SOMERA LAW OFFICES, CARLO A. CARAG, MANUELITO O. CABALLES, ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. and BENJAMIN A. SOMERA, JR., petitioners, vs.RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF FINANCE and JOSE U. ONG, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Rufino R. Tan for and in his own behalf.

Carag, Caballes, Jamora & Zomera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. 109446.

 VITUG, J.:

These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and, inG.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation.

In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of Republic ActNo. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, argue that public respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships.

The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

The Court has given due course to both petitions. The parties, in compliance with the Court's directive, have filed their respective memoranda.

G.R. No. 109289

Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employedand Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289).

The full text of the title actually reads:

An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.

The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National Internal Revenue Code, as now amended, provide:

Sec. 21. Tax on citizens or residents. —

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Simplified Net Income Tax for the Self-Employed and/or Professionals Engaged in the Practice of Profession. — A tax is hereby imposed upon the taxable net income as determined in Section 27 received during each taxable year from all sources, other than income covered by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section by every individual whethera citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in the Philippines who is self-employed or practices his profession herein, determined in accordance with the following schedule:

Not over P10,000 3%

Over P10,000 P300 + 9%but not over P30,000 of excess over P10,000

Over P30,000 P2,100 + 15%but not over P120,00 of excess over P30,000

Over P120,000 P15,600 + 20%but not over P350,000 of excess over P120,000

Over P350,000 P61,600 + 30%of excess over P350,000

Sec. 29. Deductions from gross income. — In computing taxable income subject to tax under Sections 21(a), 24(a), (b) and (c); and 25 (a)(1), there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this section: Provided, however, That in computing taxable income subject to tax under Section 21 (f) in the case of individuals engaged in business or practice of profession, only the following direct costs shall be allowed as deductions:

(a) Raw materials, supplies and direct labor;

(b) Salaries of employees directly engaged in activities in the course of or pursuant to the business or practice of their profession;

(c) Telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water;

(d) Business rentals;

(e) Depreciation;

(f) Contributions made to the Government and accredited relief organizations for the rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas declared by the President; and

(g) Interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on loans contracted from accredited financial institutions which must be proven to have been incurred in connection with the conduct of a taxpayer's profession, trade or business.

For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult to determine, a maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross receipts shall be allowed as deductions to answer for business or professional expenses as the case may be.

On the basis of the above language of the law, it would be difficult to accept petitioner's view that the amendatory law should be considered as having now adopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The allowance for deductible items, it is true, may have significantly been reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment; limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept. The fact of the matter is still that various deductions, which are by no means inconsequential, continue to be well provided under the new law.

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna

Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).

What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach 2 in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment 3 on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy before us.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident to us.

G.R. No. 109446

The several propositions advanced by petitioners revolve around the question of whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in promulgating Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496.

The questioned regulation reads:

Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership — The general professional partnership (GPP) and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by R. A. No. 7496. Thus, in determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct costs mentioned in said law are to be deducted from partnership income. Also, the expenses paid or incurred by partners in their individual capacities in the practice of their profession which are not reimbursed or paid by the partnership but are not considered as direct cost, are not deductible from his gross income.

The real objection of petitioners is focused on the administrative interpretation of public respondents that would apply SNIT to partners in general professional partnerships. Petitioners cite the pertinent deliberations in Congress during its enactment of Republic Act No. 7496, also quoted by the Honorable Hernando B. Perez, minority floor leader of the House of Representatives, in the latter's privilege speech by way of commenting on the questioned implementing regulation of public respondents following the effectivity of the law, thusly:

MR. ALBANO, Now Mr. Speaker, I would like to get the correct impression of this bill. Do we speak here of individuals who are earning, I mean, who earn through business enterprises and therefore, should file an income tax return?

MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. This does not apply to corporations. It applies only to individuals.

(See Deliberations on H. B. No. 34314, August 6, 1991, 6:15 P.M.; Emphasis ours).

Other deliberations support this position, to wit:

MR. ABAYA . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, did I hear the Gentleman from Batangas say that this bill is intended to increase collections as far as individuals are concerned and to make collection of taxes equitable?

MR. PEREZ. That is correct, Mr. Speaker.

(Id. at 6:40 P.M.; Emphasis ours).

In fact, in the sponsorship speech of Senator Mamintal Tamano on the Senate version of the SNITS, it is categorically stated, thus:

This bill, Mr. President, is not applicable to business corporations or to partnerships; it is only with respect to individuals and professionals. (Emphasis ours)

The Court, first of all, should like to correct the apparent misconception that general professional partnerships are subject to the payment of income tax or that there is a difference in the tax treatment between individuals engaged in business or in the practice of their respective professions and partners in general professional partnerships. The fact of the matter is that a general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as a corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. Section 23 of the Tax Code, which has not been amended at all by Republic Act 7496, is explicit:

Sec. 23. Tax liability of members of general professional partnerships. — (a) Persons exercising a common profession in general partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and the share in the net profits of the general professional partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled whether distributed or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid in accordance with the provisions of this Title.

(b) In determining his distributive share in the net income of the partnership, each partner —

(1) Shall take into account separately his distributive share of the partnership's income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit to the extent provided by the pertinent provisions of this Code, and

(2) Shall be deemed to have elected the itemized deductions, unless he declares his distributive share of the gross income undiminished by his share of the deductions.

There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership (whether registered or not) with others in the exercise of a common profession. Indeed, outside of the gross compensation income tax

and the final tax on passive investment income, under the present income tax system all individuals deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the same manner and under a common set of rules.

We can well appreciate the concern taken by petitioners if perhaps we were to consider Republic Act No. 7496 as an entirely independent, not merely as an amendatory, piece of legislation. The view can easily become myopic, however, when the law is understood, as it should be, as only forming part of, and subject to, the whole income tax concept and precepts long obtaining under the National Internal Revenue Code. To elaborate a little, the phrase "income taxpayers" is an all embracing term used in the Tax Code, and it practically covers all persons who derive taxable income. The law, in levying the tax, adopts the most comprehensive tax situs of nationality and residence of the taxpayer (that renders citizens, regardless of residence, and resident aliens subject to income tax liability on their income from all sources) and of the generally accepted and internationally recognized income taxable base (that can subject non-resident aliens and foreign corporations to income tax on their income from Philippine sources). In the process, the Code classifies taxpayers into four main groups, namely: (1) Individuals, (2) Corporations, (3) Estates under Judicial Settlement and (4) Irrevocable Trusts (irrevocable both as to corpus and as to income).

Partnerships are, under the Code, either "taxable partnerships" or "exempt partnerships." Ordinarily, partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are subject to income tax (and thus alluded to as "taxable partnerships") which, for purposes of the above categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so legally contemplated as, corporations. Except for few variances, such as in the application of the "constructive receipt rule" in the derivation of income, the income tax approach is alike to both juridical persons. Obviously, SNIT is not intended or envisioned, as so correctly pointed out in the discussions in Congress during its deliberations on Republic Act 7496, aforequoted, to cover corporations and partnerships which are independently subject to the payment of income tax.

"Exempt partnerships," upon the other hand, are not similarly identified as corporations nor even considered as independent taxable entities for income tax purposes. A general professional partnership is such an example. 4Here, the partners themselves, not the partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income tax return [mainly for administration and data]), are liable for the payment of income tax in their individual capacity computed on their respective and distributive shares of profits. In the determination of the tax liability, a partner does so as an individual, and there is no choice on the matter. In fine, under the Tax Code on income taxation, the general professional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation of income by, and the ultimate distribution of such income to, respectively, each of the individual partners.

Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by Republic ActNo. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004]

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, respondents.

D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the Decision dated July 17, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57014 which affirmed the decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals holding that the lot owned by the petitioner and its hospital building constructed thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of real property tax.

THE ANTECEDENTSThe petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on

January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. It is the registered owner of a parcel of land, particularly described as Lot No. RP-3-B-3A-1-B-1, SWO-04-000495, located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square meters and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. Accordingly, Tax Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-021-01231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the land and the hospital building, respectively. On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner’s request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.

The QC-LBAA’s decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity) which ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real property tax exemption under the constitution and the law.

The petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment affirming the decision of the CBAA.

Undaunted, the petitioner filed its petition in this Court contending that:

A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER AS NOT ENTITLED TO REALTY TAX EXEMPTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT ITS LAND, BUILDING AND

IMPROVEMENTS, SUBJECT OF ASSESSMENT, ARE NOT ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

B.C. WHILE PETITIONER IS NOT DECLARED AS REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPT UNDER

ITS CHARTER, PD 1823, SAID EXEMPTION MAY NEVERTHELESS BE EXTENDED UPON PROPER APPLICATION.

The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income to be used for operational expenses.

The petitioner points out that for the years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the hospital’s 282-bed capacity, 60% thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable institution. It contends that the “exclusivity” required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean “solely.” Hence, even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to private individuals from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a charitable institution, and its exemption from the payment of real estate taxes on its real property.

The petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v. QC-BAA to bolster its pose. The petitioner further contends that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the 1987 Constitution.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner is not a charitable entity. The petitioner’s real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate taxes under P.D. No. 1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

The respondents noted that in a newspaper report, it appears that graft charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the director of the petitioner, its administrative officer, and Zenaida Rivera, the proprietress of the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center, for entering into a lease contract over 7,663.13 square meters of the property in 1990 for only P20,000 a month, when the monthly rental should be P357,000 a month as determined by the Commission on Audit; and that instead of complying with the directive of the COA for the cancellation of the contract for being grossly prejudicial to the government, the petitioner renewed the same on March 13, 1995 for a monthly rental of only P24,000. They assert that the petitioner uses the subsidies granted by the government for charity patients and uses the rest of its income from the property for the benefit of paying patients, among other purposes. They aver that the petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in the hospital are reserved for indigent patients. The respondents further assert, thus:

13. That the claims/allegations of the Petitioner LCP do not speak well of its record of service. That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression is that it is pay-patient and required to pay a certain amount as deposit. That even if a patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with high hospital bills. And, without these bills being first settled, the poor patient cannot be allowed to leave the hospital or be discharged without first paying the hospital bills or issue a promissory note guaranteed and indorsed by an influential agency or person known only to the Center; that even the remains of deceased poor patients suffered the same fate. Moreover, before a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one must undergo a series of interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by the Center, usually accompanied by endorsement by an influential agency or person known only to the Center. These facts were heard and admitted by the Petitioner LCP during the hearings before the Honorable QC-BAA and Honorable CBAA. These are the reasons of indigent patients, instead of seeking treatment with the Center, they prefer to be treated at the Quezon Institute. Can such practice by the Center be called charitable?

THE ISSUES

The issues for resolution are the following:

(a) whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and

(b) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.

THE COURT’S RULING

THE PETITION IS PARTIALLY GRANTED.

On the first issue, we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties.

In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of government. It may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. It embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of man. The word “charitable” is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test of a charity and a charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.

Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. The raison d’etre for the creation of the petitioner is stated in the decree, viz:

Whereas, for decades, respiratory diseases have been a priority concern, having been the leading cause of illness and death in the Philippines, comprising more than 45% of the total annual deaths from all causes, thus, exacting a tremendous toll on human resources, which ailments are likely to increase and degenerate into serious lung diseases on account of unabated pollution, industrialization and unchecked cigarette smoking in the country;

Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and curable with early and adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and intensive prevention and health education programs;

Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs, strategies and efforts at preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung diseases, and to undertake research and training on the cure and prevention of lung diseases, through a Lung Center which will house and nurture the above and related activities and provide tertiary-level care for more difficult and problematical cases;

Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and financial support towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation,

thus:SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated

medical institution which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or relief of lung and allied diseases in line with the concern of the government to assist and provide material and financial support in the establishment and maintenance of a lung center primarily to benefit the people of the Philippines and in pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing them specialized health and medical services and by minimizing the incidence of lung diseases in the country and elsewhere.

2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the prevention of lung or pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including the holding of a series of relevant congresses, conventions, seminars and conferences;

3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the biological, demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of lung or pulmonary diseases and their control; and to collect and publish the findings of such research for public consumption;

4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on lung consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and reporting facilities for and in aid of the general purposes or objects aforesaid, especially in human lung requirements, general health and physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields;

5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and medical and technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of services to lung patients;

6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung diseases, to encourage advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields and to support educational programs of value to general health;

7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or city and local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the purpose of achieving a more effective programmatic approach on the common problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein;

8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local foundations and organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given to the organization;

9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public and, in general, to promote and protect the health of the masses of our people, which has long been recognized as an economic asset and a social blessing;

10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and maladies of the people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and needy, all without regard to or discrimination, because of race, creed, color or political belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain treatment when such disorders occur;

11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried on to promote the general health of the community;

12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment, educational materials and supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to dispose of and distribute the same in such manner, and, on such basis as the Center shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the particular circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and objectives;

13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose of properties, whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned; and

14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the accomplishment of any of the powers herein set forth and to do every other act and thing incidental thereto or connected therewith.

Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all, any person, the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a subject of charity.

As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the

hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. In Congregational Sunday School, etc. v. Board of Review, the State Supreme Court of Illinois held, thus:

… [A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption from taxation, by reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so, where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received are applied in furthering its charitable purposes, and those benefits are refused to none on account of inability to pay therefor. The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.

As aptly stated by the State Supreme Court of South Dakota in Lutheran Hospital Association of South Dakota v. Baker:

… [T]he fact that paying patients are taken, the profits derived from attendance upon these patients being exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the charity, seems rather to enhance the usefulness of the institution to the poor; for it is a matter of common observation amongst those who have gone about at all amongst the suffering classes, that the deserving poor can with difficulty be persuaded to enter an asylum of any kind confined to the reception of objects of charity; and that their honest pride is much less wounded by being placed in an institution in which paying patients are also received. The fact of receiving money from some of the patients does not, we think, at all impair the character of the charity, so long as the money thus received is devoted altogether to the charitable object which the institution is intended to further.The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public

trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit.

Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government. As held by the State Supreme Court of Utah in Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County:

Second, the … government subsidy payments are provided to the project. Thus, those payments are like a gift or donation of any other kind except they come from the government. In both Intermountain Health Care and the present case, the crux is the presence or absence of material reciprocity. It is entirely irrelevant to this analysis that the government, rather than a private benefactor, chose to make up the deficit resulting from the exchange between St. Mark’s Tower and the tenants by making a contribution to the landlord, just as it would have been irrelevant in Intermountain Health Care if the patients’ income supplements had come from private individuals rather than the government.

Therefore, the fact that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is by the government rather than private charitable contributions does not dictate the denial of a charitable exemption if the facts otherwise support such an exemption, as they do here.

In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.

Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue, that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn:

An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing power of the

state will never be implied from language which will admit of any other reasonable construction. Such an intention must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms, or must appear by necessary implication from the language used, for it is a well settled principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is claimed under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be construed strictly against the property owner and in favor of the public. This principle applies with peculiar force to a claim of exemption from taxation . …Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides that the

petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation

organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption

privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2:

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

...The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of

restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon one’s own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be intended beyond what was meant.

Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. As Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained: “. . . what is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.”

Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:

...(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.We note that under the 1935 Constitution, “... all lands, buildings, and improvements used

‘exclusively’ for … charitable … purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” However, under the 1973 and the present Constitutions, for “lands, buildings, and improvements” of the charitable institution to be considered exempt, the same should not only be “exclusively” used for charitable purposes; it is required that such property be used “actually” and “directly” for such purposes.

In light of the foregoing substantial changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot rely on our ruling in Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was promulgated on September 30, 1961 before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took effect. As this Court held in Province of Abra v. Hernando:

… Under the 1935 Constitution: “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” The present Constitution added “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries” and required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words “actually” as well as “directly” not added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. …Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the

exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and “exclusively” is defined, “in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.” If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name “Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.” Indeed, the petitioner’s evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.

Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City [GR No. 144104 June 29, 2004]

FACTS:Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected. A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The claim for exemption was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which denied the same. On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local board’s decision, finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution and that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Hence, the present petition for review with averments that the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution under Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution, notwithstanding that it accepts paying patients and rents out portions of the hospital building to private individuals and enterprises.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.

2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:

1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.

The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?

C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

1. §1

2. § 4

3. § 5

4. § 10

B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas andnays entered in the Journal.

It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills 1 were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

It was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."

The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.

First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, 2 it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power 3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives." 4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate 5 has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. 7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the

"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. 11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent. 12

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks

of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. 13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the meetings. 14

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . . . 15

The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. 16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 17 If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18

Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:

Rules of the Senate

Rule XII:

§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houseswhich shall meet within ten days after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.

(Emphasis added)

Rules of the House of Representatives

Rule XIV:

§ 85. Conference Committee Reports. — In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.

(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that "If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson's Manual." The following is then quoted from the Jefferson's Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them. . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson's Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson's Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that "Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. . . ."

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a "detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure." The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal

Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern." 19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by "taking into consideration" the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases 20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained 21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill 22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case 23 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE- ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

. . . .

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory. Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all "other taxes . . . now or in the near future," in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

. . . .

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:

AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIR-TRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed. 24

It is further contended that amendment of petitioner's franchise may only be made by special law, in view of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:

This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is a contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v.Rafferty, 25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL's franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL's exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under § § 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.

The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretary's power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members 26 and (2) the Secretary's duty is to execute the law.

§ 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously granted exemption were:

(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of advertisements.

Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the "circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others." The exemption of "circulation income" has left income from advertisements still subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI's contention that even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.

To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It has been held:

The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . 27

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 28 the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing on them "a tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." 29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to destroy.

In the other case 30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal property" by eliminating the residents' incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The

law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." 31 The discriminatory purpose was thus very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 32 it was held that a law which taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became "entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."

These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates 33 is without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press along but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that "owners of newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation." The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was "one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of thepress." 34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star acknowledged that "The First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems." 35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, although of general applicability, nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles and other religious literature. This Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect's right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the license fee "restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise." 

But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on

sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education, science and technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.

 B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairmentof Contracts

There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible "chilling effect" which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court's power of review.

There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: "[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause.

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.

Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." 42Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled "VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports" by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that "VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will be regressive." Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper 43 of the Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA

study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in society harder than it will the "rich," as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress' withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in choosing the subject of taxation.

Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.

Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran should have laid to rest the questions now raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be "hearsay and [without] evidentiary value." As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 

In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. 47 Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that

public actions by "non-Hohfeldian" or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a "special function" of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality 49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases — to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. 50

Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51

This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in severalcases 52 of this Court following Angara.

It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.

_______________________________

In the preceeding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes — beyond those prescribed by the Constitution — have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

Bidin, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners, vs.THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.

Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

 PADILLA, J.:p

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.

The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:

14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:

(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E.

Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...

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(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint.

(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in

order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;

(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);

(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

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On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3

March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, which the Court granted in the resolution of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment thereon.

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.

The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court held:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government...

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But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

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The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.

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In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.

I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:

"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work."

Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:

"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."

The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.

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Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."

Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:

12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue.

Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious statements.

Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:

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WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers;

WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of

Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, it was held that:

Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'."

In another case —

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. This right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. thus —

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumstance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not Allowed

FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 169777*             April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners, vs.EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other

Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –

(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;

Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri. NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464, prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Meanwhile, by letter dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear

before the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana, and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez and Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.

After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 169660 and G.R. No. 169777 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in G.R. No. 169667 and G.R. No. 169834 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.

Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:

Art. VI, Sec. 21Art. VI, Sec. 22Art. VI, Sec. 1Art. XI, Sec. 1Art. III, Sec. 7Art. III, Sec. 4Art. XIII, Sec. 16Art. II, Sec. 28

Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.

Standing

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had

been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.

Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.

The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate

withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or

complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative

power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena.

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is

fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters." The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers," by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted

to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in

the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves there from is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under the rule of

ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:

In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied)

The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.

Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.

Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the

message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:

The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (Underscoring supplied)

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege. (Underscoring supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown – nor even alleged – that those who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise and certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."

Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America amplifies, thus:

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is

no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102

We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee [,and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S. declares:

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly

motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was

decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

SO ORDERED.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERMITA

495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.  In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.  The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.  While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.  One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other

pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.  Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.  When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.  They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.  Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.   It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.   The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.  For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.  Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

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G.R. No. 146738      March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1

The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the

other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30

"20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31

"Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36

On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House

of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41

On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the

respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.

The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:

I

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II

Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III

Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

I

Whether or not the cases

At bar involve a political question

Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.

We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:

"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve thelegitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.1âwphi1.nêt

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise ofpeople power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 TheMalolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society."70In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.

II

Whether or not the petitionerResigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.

The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x."

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a

high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

"x x x

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:

"Opposition's deal

7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:

'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

Our deal

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:

'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President (Macapagal).

'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.

'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General

Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90

"xxx

11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.

Agreement.

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

x x x

The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority – Vice President.

'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities.

'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement.

11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.

'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.

Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.

I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The President is too stunned for words:

Final meal

12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.

1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacañang.

The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!"'

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

"Sir.

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the

Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

III

Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.

We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;

2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;

3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS

CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENOSecretary General"

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENOSecretary General"

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:

"RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBOSecretary of the Senate"

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:

"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officioand has been terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBOSecretary of the Senate"

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:

" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief

executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."

The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.

I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110

"xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114

Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's

Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

V

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner

Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:

"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive

publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:

"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

xxx

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was

xxx

a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738,  March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and

other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On

November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings

were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada

were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,

succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was

thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned

after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA

Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local

elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that

the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo

took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family

later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought

to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him

not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and

incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his

office.

ISSUE(S):

1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions-  "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people

in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of the people power of

revolution which overthrew the

whole government.

exercise of people power of

freedom of speech and

freedom of assemblyto petition

the government for redress of

grievances which only affected the

office of the President.

extra constitutional and the

legitimacy of the new government

that resulted from it cannot be the

subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the

resignation of the sitting President

that it caused and the succession

of the Vice President as President

are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the

proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,

and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on

the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of

petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present

when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant

issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving

Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing

process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to

reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt

referring to the past opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the

country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and

solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after

January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the

nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed  HR No. 83 declaring the

Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of

Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the

inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to

Congress by constitutional fiat.  In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot

successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern

temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,

president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and

corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death

penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any

decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure

immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the

officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our

justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened

individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not

present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render

the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing

preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge

and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.