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Tami Fawcett GS 335 Dr. Bhatti December 18, 2013
Laicism, Neoliberalism and the Headscarf in Turkey and France
Few, if any, parts of the human body have been more politicized than Muslim
women’s hair. It has been at the center of discourses on secularism and modernity in the
Middle East and beyond since the late nineteenth century. It has been a focus of feminist
liberation and when covered, has even been deemed a threat to democracy. In recent years,
there have been laws and policies enacted to forbid women in countries such as Germany,
France, Canada and Turkey from wearing the veil in certain public institutions. Despite the
fact that both Christian and Jewish women from various sects may cover their hair (with a
nun’s habit, for example), Muslim women have been the focus of these polarizing narratives
and legislation aimed at defining and reifying secularism and neoliberal citizenship. Several
important questions can be raised regarding the imbroglio over the headscarf: What are
the current international implications of the veil debate? In what ways does this debate
indicate new relations between the government, the secular state and its citizens? What
impact have supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU) or the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had on what have traditionally been considered national
affairs and how has this changed over time?
I will examine two cases of secular states, Turkey and France, which have become
entangled in the headscarf debate. These two states are particularly important in this
research because: (a.) Turkey is a majority Muslim state, with over 99% of its population
calling themselves Muslim, and (b.) France has the highest population of Muslims out of
any western European nation. The decisions that are made in each of these nations
regarding the veil issue will set a precedent for future policies and socio-political
frameworks. The headscarf debate intersects several different fields, such as gender,
human rights, religion, politics, and liberal identity, to name a few. There has been excellent
scholarship written concerning these fields in relation to the headscarf debate. It is
important to note that this debate is a complex issue, therefore it is important to avoid a
reductionist approach in attributing the source of debate to one particular aspect or
another. However, this paper will focus particularly on the political economy of secularism
in Turkey and France and the meaning of the veil within the context of neoliberalism and
globalization in the modern world.
Secularism and Laicism
Before examining the cases of Turkey and France, it is important to trace the origins
of secularism and understand its meaning and evolution. Secularism is a political ideology
that has its roots in early liberalism and the Enlightenment. It emphasizes universality,
rationality and individual autonomy (Asad 2003; Yavuz and Esposito 2003). The
fundamental principle behind secularism is separation of the public and private realms,
especially the state and its institutions and religious influences (Casanova 1994). The core
of secularism lies in the premise that public realms and institutions must be neutral, or free
of ‘particularisms’ such as religion and ethnic allegiances (Taylor 1998). Those who adhere
to secularism are particularly focused on the strict separation of church and state in order
to ensure democracy and liberal society.
Secularism is often thought of as what is left once religion fades away (Calhoun
2010). It is the exclusion of religion from the public realm. However, secularism, as a
principle, is often seen as neutral and unbiased. Calhoun argues that “we need to see
secularism as a presence” and that it is not a neutral ideology (2010). He also asserts that
working under the assumptions of the false dichotomy of religious versus secular is
problematic because it clouds the ways that we understand how religious people engage in
our world, it prevents us from seeing the ways in which the sacred can have a secular
orientation and how secular perspectives shape religion into a category from without, not
from within (2010). Calhoun is not the only scholar to touch upon secularism as a presence,
rather than an absence. Gokariksel and Mitchell invoke Foucault in explaining how
secularism is not only a political ideology, but is also associated with more utilitarian aims
related to state formation and economic development (2005). These scholars apply
Foucault’s concepts of discipline and regulation to secularism as an effort to cultivate
neoliberalism and modern state subjects. Neoliberal, as defined in this sense by these
scholars indicates “an active achievement of a laissez-faire economic system,” though they
do acknowledge that it plays out differently in different historical and geographical
contexts (2005). It is generally characterized by certain processes, such as privatization
and deregulation of publicly held institutions and resources, the extension of free trade
agreements and the discrediting of government ‘aid’ (2005). Secularism, in this sense, is
used as a means to control actors existing outside the cultural boundaries of the nation,
such as in wearing the headscarf, to shape and reify the neoliberal subject.
Both France and Turkey adhere to a particular type of secularism known as laicism.
Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, was inspired by the French system of
government and political ideology, and therefore modeled many of his secular reforms
after French laïcité. Though many scholars translate laïcité to mean “secularism” in English,
laïcité has many more “anti-clerical, even anti-religious, connotations” (Movesian 2010).
Seyla Benhabib also notes that laïcité goes beyond a separation of church and state and can
best be understood as “the public and manifest neutrality of the state toward all kinds of
religious practices, institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious
symbols, signs, icons and items of clothing from the official public sphere” (2010).
Originally, the concept of laicism was a way to separate the church from the state. Today,
laicism is accepted as the foundation of the republic (in both Turkey and France) and
serves to create a national identity by unifying citizens as enlightened, rational members of
a liberal society. Some scholars argue that laicism, like secularism, is not, in fact, neutral in
practice and operates under not only ideological, but also utilitarian premises (Gokariksel
and Mitchell 2005). As stated above, this becomes especially visible when we examine the
creation of government policies inspired by laicism, such as the headscarf bans in Turkey
and France. Today, the principal of laicism has produced a polarization of society in both
France and Turkey, particularly when taking into account the headscarf bans and policies.
Laïcité in France
It is important to understand the history of laïcité in France, as well as in Turkey.
For centuries prior to the French Revolution, France had a special relationship with the
Catholic Church and was even known as the “eldest daughter” of the Church (Kuru 2009).
The monarchy was closely tied to the Catholic Church and monarchical authority had to be
approved by the Church in order to be considered legitimate. Two groups enjoyed a
privileged position within French society—the nobility and the clergy. The clergy held the
most privileged position due to both its sacred character and its role as state administrator.
Laicism was originally a militant ideology that was strongly at odds with French
Catholicism, particularly during the time of the French Revolution (Movesian 2010). It was
ultimately imposed from the top down and often with much opposition (Yildirim 2012). It
was particularly imposed upon the public school system in an effort to create a certain type
of citizen—a modern, liberal, enlightened citizen (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005; Hashmi
2010).
During the French Revolution, revolutionaries challenged not only the hegemony of
the clergy, but also the legitimacy of the divine right doctrine, the clergy’s primary source
of legitimizing its power. Religion was seen as the cause of the decline of the kingdom and
the revolutionaries sought to maneuver religion out of the public sphere (Vojdik 2010).
Therefore, in establishing the new French state, the leadership saw religion as something to
protect the public sphere against. Religion was relegated to the private sphere in an effort
to keep the public sphere “neutral.” The revolutionaries asserted that sovereignty was not
derived from God, but from the people themselves, and thus, the idea of popular
sovereignty was born. Popular sovereignty is a nationalist concept that does not allow for
privileged clergy or divine rule. The concept of popular sovereignty is the reason why
laicism cannot be separated from the debate on national unity and identity in France.
There were two formative periods for laïcité in France, the first between 1789 and
1805, the second between 1879 and 1905 (Gunn 2004). The first time period was
characterized by a rather intense hostility toward religion and enacted strong state control
over the church. It was believed that one could not be both genuinely Catholic and
genuinely French (2004). Revolutionaries tried to sever ties between Catholicism and
French identity by defining a new type of citizenship and nationhood. This new type of
citizenship—Republican citizenship, was seen as universal, all-inclusive and secular.
Because of the way in which the French nation is conceived, ethnic, cultural and religious
differences cannot function as exclusionary mechanisms. Yet, the very creation of this new
type of national identity and the establishment of laicism as a political doctrine was
enacted via exclusionary measures. Exclusion played a significant role in unifying and
mobilizing the nation against the royalists, the clergy and others, and perpetrated the
imprisonment and repression of these groups. The revolutionaries justified their
exclusionary policies as necessary to protect the unity of the nation. For the
revolutionaries, any communitarian belief or loyalty would threaten national unity. In
1905, the law known as the Separation Act gave meaning to French laicism. It “remains the
base of all relations between religions and state in France, the rule of all principle activity
of French laicization” (Bauberot 2007). Laïcité was not established by consensus, but
instead was a product of legal and political processes and shaped by conflict between
Republicans and clericals (2007). This conflict persists today as a confrontation about
national identity. In recent times, however, laïcité has been used as a justification for the
headscarf bans in public education institutions in France as geopolitical shifts have moved
from the threat of the Catholic Church to Islam.
Laiklik in Turkey
Laicism, or laiklik, in Turkey has its roots in the early Turkish Republic after the fall
of the Ottoman Empire. Like in France, laiklik was implemented from the top down in
response to the “backwards” ways of the Ottoman Empire’s Muslim sultanate. Due to the
economic and military defeats of the Ottoman Empire, in its final days, the Ottoman elite
moved to transform the state structure and created a hybrid system of both secular and
religious institutions. For example, the Tanzimat, a secular, mixed commercial court was
established alongside the Sharia courts (Kuru 2009).
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic,
Ataturk, was heavily influenced by French laicism and adopted it to fit a modernizing and
westernizing Turkey. He, and other elites such as The Young Turks, attributed Islamic
institutions as obstacles to modernization. As in France, this new ruling elite attacked the
Islamic clerics and pursued policies that weakened their power in state affairs. It is
important to note, however, that Ataturk and his followers were not against Islam (Tarhan
2011). They simply wanted to eradicate Islam from the public sphere, which included
education, government and politics, in an effort to create a liberal citizenry in the footsteps
of their European counterparts, like France.
Ataturk and his followers, known as Kemalists, sought to exclude religion from
Turkish national identity, much like the revolutionaries did in France. However, despite
their attempts and the overall secularization of the Turkish state, national identity in
Turkey largely remains tied to Islam (Tarhan 2011). It is in this area where laiklik diverges
from laïcité. In Turkey, the state is still not completely separate from Islam. Instead of a
theocratic religious authority, the state has political religious authority. Islamic cleric
appointments and the administration of mosques are handled by the state department,
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (DIB). The aim of the DIB is to create national solidarity through
religion. This shows that religion (particularly Islam) is recognized as a tool to facilitate
national identity and unity in Turkey. It is important to note, however, that this
endorsement of Islam by the state refers only to a particular type of Sunni Islam which is
considered to be more ‘modern’ and more ‘civilized.’
Education, as a tool for controlling religion, has played a huge role in modernizing
and nationalizing Turkey. For example, the Imam Hotep Schools were funded by the
Turkish state to train officials for the performance of religious services. This ensured a
Republican, Muslim cleric class that supported the modernization objectives of the
Kemalists. It is in this way that laicism in Turkey has come to mean the control of religion
by the state, rather than the separation of religion and state.
The Headscarf Debate and Neoliberalism
There is much overlap in the root causes of the hijab bans in France and Turkey. For
example, many scholars attribute the politicization of the veil to its association with being
backwards, or “pre-modern” (Hashmi 2010; McRobbie 2011; Yildirim 2012). Both France
and Turkey have created national identities that depend upon the concept of the modern,
liberal republic. The veil is seen as a threat to the progress made by each of these nations.
Yildirim invokes Edward Said to argue that the founders of the Turkish Republic bought
into the European view of “The Orient” and worked to create Turkey in the image of
Western Europe (2012). It then becomes essential for Turkey to ban the hijab as a visual
reminder of its modernity and liberalism. Turkey attempts to move as far away as it can
from its “backward and uncivilized” Ottoman past, whereas France tries to move as far
away from its memory of the failed ”civilizing mission” in Algeria and the bloody war that
resulted (Hashmi 2012).
Another common theme in the headscarf debate shared by both Turkey and France
is the women’s liberation argument. Many scholars, particularly Western feminist scholars,
argue that the veil is a sign of patriarchy and female submissiveness. Therefore, unveiling is
equivalent to the liberation of women. These scholars assert that women are coerced or
forced into wearing the hijab by men in their families and this represents control over
women and their bodies (Yildirim 2012; McRobbie 2011; Hashmi 2010; Vojdik 2010). This
ties into the last point regarding modernity, as well, because female liberation and equality
are seen as markers of a modern society. However, there is also critical scholarship that
calls into question the validity of the women’s liberation cause of the headscarf bans in
Turkey and France. This is particularly interesting because it questions the ways in which
laws have been passed and court proceedings handled. For example, the exclusion of
testimony from actual women who choose to wear veils in school and the failure to
understand the various motivations for wearing a veil and how they differ between women
are called into question (Vojdik 2010).
A wide range of literature exists that focuses particularly on the politics of the
headscarf bans in Turkey and France. Most literature cites politics, such as laïcité, and the
history of modernity in Turkey and France as the reasons for the headscarf bans. Other
literature focuses on feminism and masculinity and their relationships to the liberation of
women and the use of women’s bodies as political battlegrounds. However, while these
factors play a significant role in how the debate is framed and understood, there is a hole in
this scholarship in relation to the political economies of both France and Turkey and the
influence of neoliberalism and globalization.
Drawing upon Foucault’s theories on discipline, power and governmentality in
modernity, the headscarf bans in both Turkey and France can be seen as a way to
constitute a certain modern, neoliberal subject who will further the aims of and be a
productive member of the secular, modern, and neoliberal state. Secularism, and especially
laicism, represent a particular narrative of modernity and progress which wields power
over the “wayward bodies of those defined as existing outside the cultural boundaries of
the nation, particularly women and immigrants” (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). These
groups are seen to interfere with the progress, particularly the economic progress, of the
nation. The rhetoric of secularism is strategically manipulated to imply that religiosity, as
exemplified by veil-wearing women, is pre-modern or anti-modern. These women are seen
as “overly” religious and are framed as obstacles to progress, particularly economic
development, and are seen as threats to the influence of the nation in the regional and
global marketplace due to the visible representation of difference. The neoliberal individual
must not look “different” or show any particularistic ties that would prevent her from
competing effectively in the globalized market. It is in this way that globalization (and in
turn, neoliberalism) is seen not in the frame of tolerance for different cultures or as a way
to bring people together, but instead as a homogenizing process aimed to create a certain
type of neoliberal consumer.
Another interesting component in the creation of the neoliberal subject through
secularism is the triangulation of the state, economics and women’s autonomy. Veiled
women are often linked by those in power to the anti-liberal retardation of democracy,
economic development and women’s equality. This strategic trio serves a few main
purposes in the creation and reification of the neoliberal state. The first being the
construction of urban, cosmopolitan men as the ideal neoliberal subject in the globally
connected liberal nation. The second being the concept of the liberal state as the only
institution that can grant women protection and autonomy. It is through this state
protection and autonomy that women, like men, can also become individuated, neoliberal
subjects and finally assume their “rightful place as productive modern citizens” (2005).
This is especially true in Turkey, where the ideal secular, modern woman was not only
educated, professional and politically active, but also did not wear a veil. She became a
defeminized and asexualized subject, devoted completely to the economic progress of her
nation. It is also in this way that the veil has come to be associated with low class status and
provinciality, antitheses to the modernizing, neoliberal process.
Transnational Implications
It is important to note the involvement of supranational institutions in the headscarf
debate. There are two primary institutions that have become embroiled in this debate, the
EU and the ECHR. While there are other important implications, such as human rights and
gender equality concerns, I will focus particularly on the political economy of the situation.
Since the 1990s, several cases have been brought before the ECHR concerning Turkey and
France’s headscarf policies. The ECHR has ruled in favor of both Turkey and France on
several occasions, citing the maintenance of public order and democracy as main reasons
for upholding the bans on headscarves over the individual rights of the women involved.
The history of the EU and the admittance of Turkey to its member ranks is also of particular
interest, given that Turkey has been awaiting membership for almost fifteen years, longer
than any other country.
The most telling aspect of this issue, in terms of political economy, is the framing of
the rights of these Muslim women in each of these countries. Some opponents of the
ECHR’s rulings, such as non-governmental organizations and human rights advocates,
argue that since these women are tax-paying citizens in their respective countries, they
have a right to wear the headscarf as an assertion of their full rights of citizenship granted
to those who pay taxes to the government (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). These women
are effectively painted as consumers of the public spaces and services that they pay for
through taxes, and thus, have a right to equal access of those spaces and services, just like
their non-veiled tax-paying counterparts. It is through this assertion that we see not only
the state implementing a neoliberal framework for arguing against the donning of the
headscarf, but also by the opponents of such policies.
Turkey’s admittance to the EU is also another intersection of the neoliberal project
and veiled women. The motivations for Turkey joining the EU are primarily economic.
Membership would grant Turkey’s emerging economy a likely boost and solidify its place in
regional and global trade networks. Yet, the EU is easily seen as a ‘Christian club,’ given its
member states. Therefore, liberal political groups in Turkey are even more motivated to
adapt and enforce certain policies that show its neoliberal and secular qualities in an effort
to gain the admission to this exclusive alliance. Policymakers in Turkey, over the years,
have generally adopted and implemented laws and policies that concede to the commonly
held Western European belief of Islam as backwards and pre-modern. Although, the most
recent Islamist regime in Turkey has struggled to lessen the prevalence of this anti-Islamic
rhetoric. It remains to be seen what path the EU will take with Turkey or if Turkey will turn
away from its neoliberal regarding the headscarf, given the re-election of the current
Islamist regime.
Conclusion
Although the debates surrounding the headscarf have different origins in Turkey
and France, there are a certain threads of commonality, such as the narrative of
neoliberalism employed in defense of secularism, and in particular laicism. The concept of
laicism has been important to not only the political development of both Turkey and
France, but also to their economic development. In the modern era, laicism has also been
employed as a means of constituting the ideal, unattached neoliberal subject who is a
productive consumer in neoliberal society. This subject is disciplined and molded by the
liberal state through its policies regarding the “other,” such as veil wearing Muslim women,
and also by the policies of supranational institutions. Overall, the perpetual attention paid
to Muslim women’s headscarves in Turkey, France and throughout the world reflects the
fragility of (neo)liberalism and secularism. This becomes evident by not only the policies
adapted by each respective nation, but also the policies and rulings of transnational actors,
such as the ECHR and EU. Islam, as played out by the global headscarf debate in this
instance, has taken over the role that communism once held as a perceived threat to the
neoliberal global order.
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