Taiwan's role in Pacific tuna fisheries: Ensuring sustainable fisheries

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Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organisation that acts to change attiudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace.

Authors:Sari TolvanenDuncan Currie

Acknowledgements:Professor Allen C. ChenEnvironmental & Animal Society of Taiwan

greenpeace.org

Printed on 100% recycled paper using soy ink

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Executive summaryTuna is one of the world’s favourite fish. It provides a critical part of the diet for millions of poor people, as well as being at the core of the world’s luxury sashimi markets. But global tuna stocks are under threat. Many tuna species are now listed as either endangered or critically endangered.

How did we get to this point? It is not a complicated story. Over the last few decades, the world’s voracious appetite for tuna has spurred a surge in the number and capacity of tuna-fishing vessels. Industrial tuna fleets, fishing far from their home ports in Japan, the EU, Taiwan, Korea, the United States and increasingly China and the Philippines, are squeezing the last remaining financial benefits out of the planet’s tuna stocks. Even tuna fisheries that were considered healthy just a few years ago - such as those of the Western Pacific Ocean - have joined the global trend towards depletion.

Tuna are highly migratory. They travel vast distances over their life cycles, crossing the high seas and darting in and out of the waters of many coastal States on their migratory routes to breed and feed. A large percent of the global tuna fishing takes place in the high seas, far away from shore, in waters where no one country is in charge of the enforcement and monitoring, control and surveillance. This leads to a situation where very little regulation exists of fishing fleets and their activities. In order to fish all year round, industrial tuna fishing fleets pursue these ever-mobile stocks into the waters of coastal States. As well as fishing legally, many of the distant water fishing fleets also engage in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in pursuit of this valuable fish, leaving the marine environment battered, hindering scientific assessments of the fisheries, ignoring management measures and robbing the coastal states of much needed income and food.

This briefing outlines the role of Taiwan as a distant water fishing nation (DWFN) fishing for tuna especially in the Western and Central Pacific. Taiwan, through its flagged vessels and its people operating under the flags of other countries a very significant tuna fishing State, accounting for over half a million tons per year. This briefing also highlights the existing loopholes in regulations in Taiwan that contribute to high levels of IUU fishing by its fleets and its people and how they are exploited to continue the unsustainable overfishing of tunas in the Pacific.Recommendations are made for Taiwan to support management and conservation measures in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) to ensure sustainability of these fisheries and for Taiwan to fill its ambitions of achiving sustainable fishing industry.

The key recommendations in relation to Pacific tuna fisheries are:1. To support the permanent closure of all four Pacific high seas enclaves to all fishing.

2. To be firmly guided by the precautionary approach and account for the high levels of unknown and uncertainties in fishing data due to the high level of IUU fishing in the region by supporting and adopting a 50% reduction in tuna fishing effort across the entire WCPO sector based on the average 2001-2004 levels.

3. To support a ban all at-sea transhipments.

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Our Planet’s Rapidly Shrinking Tuna StocksThere are five main commercially harvested tuna species: skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, albacore and bluefin tuna. The most prolific in catch volume terms is skipjack, a species fished mostly by industrial seiners destined primarily for canning. In 2004, over two million metric tonnes of skipjack were landed, about 55% of the world’s total combined landed volume of all tuna species1. The WCPO and the Indian Ocean supply most of the world’s skipjack tuna2, the bulk (approximately 60% of the world supply) coming from the WCPO. In turn most of the WCPO’s skipjack comes from the waters of small island states where it is fished primarily by distant water seine fleets under access agreements3. The second most important tuna species in volume terms – 35% of world catch – is yellowfin, a much more commercially valuable species than skipjack. Although some yellowfin is canned, most is destined for the higher value sashimi trade. Albacore and big-eye, the latter being a very valuable species for sashimi, make up most of the rest of the world’s tuna catch.

Divided into Pacific, Atlantic and Southern stock groups, the majestic bluefin tuna only represents 1.5 % of the world’s landed volume of tuna but its dollar value is astronomical. In 2001, a single bluefin tuna weighing in at over 200kg set an all-time record when it sold for $173,600 (US) at Tokyo’s main fish market4.

All Southern bluefin tuna, the Western Atlantic stock of Northern bluefin, South Atlantic stock of albacore, Pacific bigeye, and Eastern Atlantic bluefin are now listed as critically endangered or endangered on the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Redlist5, meaning they are at high risk of extinction in the near future6. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) now considers bigeye stocks either fully or over-exploited in all the world’s oceans and yellowfin as fully exploited in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and moderately to fully exploited in the Indian Ocean. The areas with the highest proportions (46-60%) of overexploited, depleted and recovering stocks of tuna and tuna-like species are the Southeast Atlantic, the Southeast Pacific, and the Northeast Atlantic, as well as the high seas, particularly those areas in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

© Greenpeace / Alex HoffordA crew member of a fishing vessel holds up a frozen Yellowfin tuna fish from the hold.

© Greenpeace / Paul HiltonYellowfin Tuna at a Tuna Processing Plant. Yellowfin tuna is among the species that are seriously threatened due to overfishing.

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flags of non-compliance17. About 300 small tuna vessels and 100 large tuna vessels are registered in countries such as the Honduras, Belize, Equatorial Guinea, Cambodia, Georgia, Philippines, Indonesia, Vanuatu, Seychelles and Saint Vincent, about 30 purse seine vessels are registered in Pacific Islands, and about 50 large tuna vessels are even unclear about origins of their registrations18.

The Taiwanese government attempts to control and monitor the number of fishing vessel by setting limits to the amount of vessels built in its ship yards. However, the number of FOC vessels operated by Taiwanese fishermen has been increasing rapidly in recent years. The total number of vessels, with Taiwanese vessels and FOC vessels was estimated to be 2,800 in 200819. This is a very large number and as a result overfishing by Taiwanese and other international fleets is causing serious threat to the sustainable use of our ocean resources.

1.2. Major issues with the distant water fishing industry of TaiwanWhile Taiwan has a large tuna fishing fleet, the government has failed to effectively manage the industry due to the lack of a distant water fishery management strategy, limited legislation and monitoring, control and surveillance capacity of its fleet’s activities. Very rapidly after the development of the distant water industry Taiwan has been accused internationally of over-expanding the fishing capacity of the Taiwanese fleet.

1. Introduction to Taiwan’s tuna fishing fleets

Taiwan’s distant water fishery industry includes tuna, trawl fisheries and squid fisheries (together with

pacific saury /mackerel pike fisheries). Annual catch of tuna by Taiwanese fleets is reported at around 520 thousand tons. This represents a value of around 40 billion NT dollars, 70% and 90% respectively of the total far seas fishery output and output value7. Tuna fisheries catch is mostly exported with Japan being the biggest market. The export value of all seafood per year is around NT$ 30 billions, or about US$ 923 million8. For tuna this export value is around NT$18.5 billion9 The fishing industry also drives auxiliary industries such as marine communications, marine supply, boat repairing and other relevant industries, amounting to an output of 13 billion dollars and approximately providing job opportunities for some 20 thousand people10.

1.1. Taiwan’s Tuna fishing fleetThe number of Taiwanese tuna fishing vessels and fishing capacity increased considerably in past couple of decades due to the development of “exploitative fisheries”. In 2005, approximately 2,300 Taiwanese tuna vessels were operating in the far seas fishery industry, within which 614 were large tuna longliners and 34 large purse seine vessels. The remaining 1,700 were medium to small-sized vessels11. Under pressure from regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), States and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the number of distant water fishing vessels has been cut to 2200 in 2009, including 428 large scale longliners, 34 large purse seine vessel and around 1400 small and medium scale longliners12. But the Taiwanese tuna fleet is still the biggest in the world13. According to the latest figures released by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 246,187 tons of tuna was caught by the Taiwanese fishing fleet in 2008 in the Western and Central Pacific (WCPO) alone, which accounts for 10% of the total tuna catch from the WCPO in that year14.

In October 2009, Taiwan had 1911 active longliners registered with the WCPFC. 697 vessels are so called large scale tuna longliners with length of over 24 metres, while 1180 are less than that and considered smallscale tuna vessels15,16.

Beside the Taiwanese flagged vessels, at least 480 tuna fisheries vessels are operated by Taiwanese fishermen, but are flagged to other countries: a practice known as flying a flag of convenience (FOC) or, all too often,

© Greenpeace / Paul HiltonGreenpeace activists are talking to the crew members of the Taiwanese Longliner Ho Tsai Fa 18.

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The involvement of Taiwanese with FOC vessels and the lack of management of fishing vessels operating in international waters and in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states has also been highlighted as major concerns20. In addition, Taiwan has been slow to respond to calls for further cuts on the amount of fishing at the international level to ensure sustainability or to limit the impacts of its fishing fleets and fishing techniques to other marine life.

The Taiwan Fisheries Agency admitted in its “Proposal for far seas fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring”21 that “…illegal over-fishing is still common in exceedingly large fleet, in addition to the illegal and overt catch of FOC vessels, the Taiwanese government has to be responsible for all the accusations.” There are several reported cases of IUU fishing among both Taiwan and FOC flagged vessels.

Hence, the Taiwanese government is under pressure internationally, and has been urged to enhance the fisheries management in order to stop any illegal activities by Taiwanese vessels and its people and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the oceans. This briefing explores these issues further.

© Greenpeace / Paul HiltonThe Japanese purse seiner Fukuichi Maru is scooping up tuna in a pocket of international waters attached to a fish aggregating device (FAD).

2. Introduction to Pacific tuna fisheries and issues

Pacific Island Countries (PICs) depend on tuna, both as a source of income and as a key source of

protein. Foreign fleets that have depleted fishing grounds closer to home have moved into the area in search of what might have been the planet’s last abundant tuna. In 2007 more than 65% of the tuna caught in the Pacific was taken by fishing fleets from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, China, USA, Philippines and the EU22. These countries pay money to PICs in order to fish in their EEZs and these fishing fleets take many times the amount of tuna taken by locally operated vessels.

The Pacific provides over 60% of the world's canned tuna, and each year foreign fishing fleets take over US$2.5 billion from the sale of Pacific's tuna to markets in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Europe and the USA. In 2008, the total annual tuna catch from the WCPFC area was estimated to be 2,426,195 metric tons - the highest catch recorded to date in the region23. Unsurprisingly, most of the principal tuna species harvested in the Pacific region are under threat from overfishing. It is estimated that since the 1960s, populations of North Pacific albacore,

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Pacific bigeye, Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) yellowfin and WCPO yellowfin have all dropped to levels less than half of what they should be expected to be. Only WCPO skipjack and EPO skipjack population are estimated to be around 75% of their expected totals. PICs have been vocal about their aspirations to develop their fisheries, as well as in their increasing recognition that capacity needed to match the fishing levels necessary to meet mounting concerns over unsustainable fishing24.

2.1. Pacific tuna fisheries; unsustainable and inequitable It is not just the overall volume of these tuna stocks that has declined. More ominously, the spawning stocks of both adult bigeye and yellowfin are also in a very poor state. Since 2001, fisheries scientists have warned of the urgent need for adequate measures to constrain these fisheries and to conserve stocks. A greater part of the problem speeding the decline of yellowfin and bigeye stocks is the low-value / high-volume skipjack fishery that supplies the global tuna-canning industry. Skipjack is caught almost exclusively by industrial purse seine vessels, which have increased their efficiency enormously in the last decade through a variety of technological innovations. One of the most effective means of locating and catching skipjack is through the use of Fish Aggregation Devices (FADs), used extensively in the Pacific. FADs are anchored or floating platforms that seine fleets place on the ocean surface and to which tuna are instinctively drawn. In targeting skipjack schooling under FADs, seiners also catch large amounts of immature bigeye and yellowfin, who school together with skipjack. The volume of this bycatch is significant given the smaller size and vulnerability of the bigeye and yellowfin stocks. The low-value / high volume skipjack fishery, therefore, is undermining the more valuable, vulnerable and less resilient bigeye and yellowfin stocks.

For two consecutive years, the West and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the regional body charged with the management and conservation of the highly migratory fish stocks in the WCPO region, has been unable to implement the 10% effort reduction on yellowfin and 30% effort reduction on bigeye tuna initially agreed by members and recommended by its Scientific Committee25. The recommendation for effort reduction for bigeye was raised to 50% in 2009 at its 5th Scientific Committee meeting. This failure to control continued over fishing is due significantly to the stalling tactics of DWFN's such as Taiwan, Japan, Korea and China. These countries

with large fleets decimating the Pacific fisheries have prevented agreements being made on key measures, and they refuse to follow the scientific advice given.

In addition, the Pacific nations are only receiving approximately a notional 5-6% of the value of the catch taken by foreign vessels in their national waters26. This is because of the unfair and unsustainable agreements negotiated by foreign companies and countries to acquire the right to fish for tuna in the waters of the Pacific Island States. The term ‘notional’ is important. It often does not account for increased catches by vessels following negotiations of fisheries access agreements and does not account for fish stolen through IUU fishing, either by the licensed vessels or by others.

2.2. Plundered by the piratesIUU fishing is also rampant in the Pacific. Above and beyond the recorded annual tuna catch in the region, approximately a further 34% is estimated as being taken by pirate fishers27. This unrecorded amount is worth more than the combined amount the PICs receive for granting access to foreign fleets to their EEZs, and further undermines the sustainability of the fisheries. The high seas areas and especially the pockets of international waters that lie between the EEZs of PICs, the so-called donut holes (see map 1) are especially used by pirates to catch and transfer their unreported and illegal catches. As elsewhere in the world, it is clearly documented that the practice of transshipping catches from one vessel to another at sea away from the watchful eye of the authorities is a major facilitating factor of IUU fishing. This has also been observed at first hand by Greenpeace during its ship expeditions in the WCPO in 200628, 200829 and 200930.

© Greenpeace / Paul HiltonKFEM and Greenpeace activists on an inflatable, hold a banner reading 'Enough is enough' after painting the words 'Sea pirate?' on the side of the DongWon vessel. The activists are protesting against the vessel's overfishing practices of Pacific bigeye and yellowfin tuna.

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2.3. Key measures proposed by the Pacific Island Countires to ensure sustainability of Pacific tuna fisheriesDue to the ongoing failure of the WCPO to halt the overfishing of the regions valuable tuna stocks the Pacific Islands Countries stepped up the conservation and management measures in the region in 2008. As a result the two high seas pockets in the WCPO which are entirely bounded by the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the surrounding island nations marked ‘1’ and ‘2’ in the map below were agreed to be closed to all fishing by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)31 in the Third Implementing Arrangement (3-IA)32 in 2008 and endorsed by the Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC) and the Pacific Islands Forum33 in 2009. This means that any fishing vessels wishing to fish in the waters of the PNA has to agree not to fish in the two high seas pockets from

January 2010 onwards. Following this move the WCPFC, including Taiwan, agreed to close the areas to purse seine fishing from January 2010 onwards34. All the four high seas enclaves have high biological and ecological importance35, and being in the high seas, are vulnerable to overfishing, IUU activities and other activities outside the jurisdiction of States. On 21 October 2009, the Bikenibeu Declaration by Ministers for Fisheries of PNA countries expressed concern that the high seas continues to provide a safe haven for IUU fishing and agreed that further work will be taken to ensure the closure of additional two smaller high seas pockets (map 3 & 4).

Map 1: The highlighted areas 1, 2 and 3 and 4 are the high seas pockets. Number 1 and number 2 are closed to fishing from 2010 as per PNA 3rd implementing arrangement and purse seine fishing as per WCPFC decision in December 2008. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement in late October 2009 agreed to extend the full protection to Areas 3 and 4.

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3. Taiwan’s efforts to regulate its fishing industryIn 1999, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adopted the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Fishing Capacity)36 which called for a global reduction of large-scale tuna longline fishing vessels (LSTLV) by 20% to 30%.37 The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the RFMO for Atlantic tuna, in 2005 passed resolution 05-02 38, imposing a temporary reduction of Taiwan's tuna catch limit, demanding scrapping of large (over 24 metre) longliners, as well as improving fleet management, against non-discriminatory trade restrictive measures, or the cancellation of Taiwan's status as Cooperating Non-Contracting Party under an earlier 2003 resolution 03-1539. Resolution 05-02 demanded a reduction of 160 vessels over 24 meters in length by December 31, 2006. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, or WCPFC, also passed resolution 2005-0240 in December 2005, demanding that Taiwan tackles and reduces overcapacity in purse seine vessels beneficially owned by the Taiwanese.

Taiwan’s response to the international pressure included a six year plan. Its Proposal for far seas fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring noted that the output of ocean fishing industry of Taiwan had already reached 770 thousand tonnes. The Plan sets out a programme spanning 6 years from 2006 to 201141. Its stated objective is to “master the development trend of international fisheries industry, to develop sustainable operation of distant water fisheries based on the established enterprises in Taiwan, construction of safe and sustainable environment for sustainable fisheries, and improving international fisheries cooperation”42 and to strive to adjust the size of the distant water fishing industries so as to match the sustainable catch limits. The intent is to “develop fishing industry for the whole population of Taiwan, observing the priority of quality, sustainable and safe ecosystem, while providing the people of Taiwan source of quality protein, creating source of income, and building up positive image of national fisheries industry. Taking advantage of Taiwan's distant water fishing development, building up diplomatic relations and strengthening the strategic objective of national security.”43 However, as will be discussed below, this strategy is fundamentally flawed as it relies upon reflagging the fleet whilst controlling activities of Taiwanese nationals to a limited extent. Capacity is still

on the water, there is no assurance of compliance with internationally agreed conservation measures and IUU fishing is still insufficiently constrained. Instead, Taiwan needs to agree to specific conservation measures, such as significant effort and catch reductions and closing off high seas pockets used by IUU fishing vessels.

3.1. The Foreign Fishing OrdinanceIn 2008 Taiwan’s Ordinance to Govern Investment into the Operation of Foreign Flag Fishing Vessels came into force. The law was passed specifically to respond to the above mentioned pressure to reduce Taiwan’s fishing capacity. It is a rather unusual law. It was specifically enacted to regulate Taiwanese nationals who operate foreign flagged fishing vessels. The 6 Year Plan had observed that “[t]here are already reported cases of IUU fishing among the above mentioned FOC vessels, hence the Taiwan government has been urged to be responsible for these IUU fishing activities. However, illegal fishing activities committed in foreign-flagged vessels are out of the jurisdiction of the present laws and regulations, the present one is not able to regulate them nor keep track of the capital flow. In order to put them under the management framework, new laws have to be enacted.”44 So whereas normally countries regulate vessels flying their own flags, this law goes further and specifically regulates Taiwanese citizens operating on foreign flagged vessels.

No Taiwanese national may engage in the business of fishery in areas beyond Taiwan’s waters, including the high seas and EEZs of other countries45, by investing in or operating foreign flag fishing vessels, without the prior authorization of the Competent Authority, being the Council of Agriculture of the Executive Yuan46. Regular reports are to be made47. All fishing activities must comply with regulations established by the Competent Authority, taking into account the conservation measures adopted by international fisheries organizations such as RFMOs48. These regulations may also put in place management measures relating to authorization to fish, permitted fishing areas, fishing periods, vessel position reporting, fishing gears, fishing methods, catch quota and other compliance measures49.

Enforcement is to be carried out by the competent authority50, and the Ordinance provides for potential penalties of 3 years imprisonment, either for fish laundering or for fishing contrary to regulations51, including confiscation of vehicles52 and fines53 and

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revocation of fishing licenses54, it is difficult to see how Taiwan is going to identify and prosecute irregularities committed by foreign flagged vessels fishing on far shores and in the high seas.

3.2. Loopholes in the current legislationWhile the Ordinance is innovative, in the sense that it regulates the activities of citizens, rather than of flagged vessels, there are good reasons to doubt it will achieve much in practice.

Firstly, it is very open-ended and leaves all the key rules to be defined in further regulations by the Competent Authority. For example, Article 6 states that the Competent Authority, in establishing its regulations for Taiwanese citizens operating FOC vessels, shall “[take] into account the conservation measures adopted by international fisheries organizations”. It is thus left to the Competent Authority to decide whether it is actually going to require Taiwanese to fully comply with these conservation measures, subject to credible sanctions; or whether the Taiwanese will merely be required, for example, to file a periodic report on their compliance or educate their captains.

Secondly, and more crucially, it is highly questionable whether the Competent Authority - the Council of Agriculture of the Executive Yuan - would be able to enforce conservation measures against Taiwanese citizens effectively, even if it had the genuine desire to do so. It is difficult to see how it will identify and prosecute irregularities taking place on foreign-flagged vessels fishing far away on the high seas. The 6 Year Plan is quite honest about the limitations of enforcement even against vessels flying the Taiwanese flag. It observes that “[w]ith respect to the limited manpower and budget, the management efforts of the Fisheries Agency are limited to area such as licensing and written certification instead of anything more substantial. As a result, there is not much the Fisheries Agency can do about fish laundry cases such as over-fishing, falsely declaring the catch as from other local vessels or foreign-flagged vessels, falsely declaring the catch of a particular zone as catch from other zones”. Quite apart from the obvious failings of Taiwan as a flag State to enforce these matters, as is required by international law, this observation underlines the weakness in the strategy of flagging out the vessels and then attempting to control the actions of citizens. The enforcement problems, be they caused lack of capacity

or of willingness, are not solved; they are simply passed on. As the 6 Year Plan had observed, it has become “a normal practice to ship the catch directly to foreign bases or simply transship the catch for sales in other countries. As a result, activities such as supply, repairing and even the replenishment of vessel crew will all be happening in foreign base port or even in the sea – areas where the on-site checking and monitoring services of Taiwan government are yet capable of covering.”55 The Ordinance does not change this practical problem, or manpower or other resource constraints.

Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be relied upon to ensure that foreign flagged vessels owned and/or operated by the Taiwanese citizens comply with conservation and management measures agreed and implemented by RFMOs or coastal States. Therefore it cannot be relied upon to ensure that essential measures to ensure sustainability in the oceans are complied with, such as reduction in fishing effort, bans on fishing aggregation devices (FADs) and transhipment, national and international restrictions on shark fishing and finning activities, bans on other destructive fishing practices, prohibitions of fishing in restricted areas, such as the four high seas enclaves, or ‘donut holes’, closed to purse seine fishing by the WCPFC. Or indeed, compliance with effort catch and other controls to protect fish stocks, marine biodiversity and the ocean environment.

Fundamentally, envisaging, as it does, the reflagging and operation of Taiwanese controlled vessels to other flags, the measure in itself runs against the expressed need to restrict fishing capacity. That capacity is still on the water, whatever flag fishing boats are flying. In terms of what happens in the ocean, fish will continue to be caught, and the ability to control illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing relies not on modern monitoring, control, surveillance, compliance and enforcement (MCSCE) mechanisms but on nationally promulgated regulations, with no absolute requirement of compliance with international law or guidelines, or with conservation and management measures agreed and implemented by RFMOs. In the absence of MCSCE mechanisms such as international observers, VMS, and the prohibition of transshipment, the ordinance cannot be relied upon to control the activities of vessels owned and/or operated by Taiwanese citizens.

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4. Continued tuna plunder by Taiwan flagged vessels

As well as loopholes in relation to control of its citizens fishing under FOCs, the sheer number of Taiwan fishing vessels and the continued IUU record of these fleets poses a continuous threat to sustainability of Pacific

fisheries. Taiwan claims to have scrapped or planned to scrap 101 vessels by October, 2006 and a further 300 small fishery vessels by 2008 57. This will still leave especially a significant number of small-scale tuna longline vessels (SSTLVs) on the water. Greenpeace expeditions58 have exposed that the high seas pockets are particularly frequently used as a fishing ground by these smaller Taiwanese fishing vessels. Reports of IUU fishing by these smaller vessels around the world are particularly frequent and also observed by Greenpeace expeditions59.The fact that these fleets also transship their catches at sea poses a serious question over the accurate reporting of the catches taken in these areas under so little control. Furthermore Greenpeace’s conversations with fishing masters at sea also show that vessels often do not hold valid licenses to fish in the EEZs of coastal states and hence reporting from Taiwan is the only way of achieving catch figures. Yet in the 6 year plan Taiwan admits that accurate data collection of fishing figures currently is not possible. Given that there is almost nonexistent monitoring control and surveillance capacity in the high seas of the world, as well as in the enclaves of the Pacific the high number and presence of these vessels in these areas poses serious concerns over accurate data collection, scientific assessments and sustainability of especially the Pacific bigeye and yellowfin stocks as the vessels mainly target bigeye and yellowfin tunas (areas 1 & 2) as well as albacore (areas 3 & 4). Despite the 6 year plan it remains largely unclear how Taiwan intends to regulate these fleets better and ensure that they do not contribute to the very large amount of IUU fishing at 36% taking place in the WCPO region60.

Case study 1Small-scale longliners Her Hae and Jia Yu Fa, caught illegally transshipping in a pocket of high seas in the Pacific

Jia Yu Fa and Her Hae, two Taiwanese flagged so-called small-scale longliners (less than 24m), were documented by the helicopter of the Greenpeace ship Esperanza during the Defending Our Pacific tour on the 2nd of September 2009. Jia Yu Fa was transferring fish to the vessel Her Hae in the high seas south of the waters of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Jia Yu Fa holds a fishing license from the Federated States of Micronesia, and a condition of that license prohibits the transfer of fish at sea. Her Hae does not appear on the FFA Good Standing List or hold a valid fishing license from any Pacific Island country. Upon Greenpeace documenting the illegal transfer by helicopter, the two vessels parted and fled in different directions.

Greenpeace pursued the Jia Yu Fa, and questioned them about their transfer of fish in breach of the conditions of their FSM fishing license. The captain of the vessel claimed to have a broken freezer and said that he had permission for the transshipment from the authorities in Taiwan and FSM. Greenpeace sought verification from the FSM Department of Justice, National Police Maritime Surveillance Division, who stated that no permission had been given for the transshipment, and that they had received a request to transship only after Greenpeace had already informed them of the transfer occurring.

Given that the Jia Yu Fa was prohibited from transshipping at sea, this transshipment was illegal. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2001) (IPOA-IUU) specifies that flag States should ensure that their vessels do not engage in transshipping fish to or from IUU vessels. This indicates that it is the responsibility of both vessels engaged in any transshipment to ensure that the other vessel is also operating legally and that Taiwan as the flag state has the ultimate responsibility to control its fishing fleets and ensure that they fish responsibly.

© Greenpeace / Paul HiltonTaiwanese longline vessels Her Hae (left) and Jia Yu Fa (right) were caught on camera by Greenpeace illegally transfering fish and shark fins in the high seas pockets of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean September 2009.

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© Greenpeace / Alex HoffordFrozen tuna in the hold of the legal Japanese purse-seiner 'Wakaba Maru No8' at sea in Micronesian waters near Kapingamarangi Atoll.

Case Study 2Taiwanese owned long-line fishing vessel switched VMS off to illegally fish in the EEZ of France in the Indian Ocean.

The Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA) reported to the French fisheries authority of Reunion the incursion of the Taiwan-owned, Seychelles-flagged long-liner Shuenn Man 232, into the French exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Reunion Islands . On August 8 2009, the Shuenn Man 232 failed to send its vessel monitoring system (VMS) location data to the SFA but from that date reported its daily position manually, as per agreed protocol. However, on September 10 the SFA started to receive the boats VMS signal and was surprised to pinpoint it in the EEZ of the French territory while it was transmitting manual positions on the high seas 300 nautical miles south of its true position. The boat was also declaring its catch in the false position. Immediately, the SFA reported the incursion into the French EEZ and asked the French authorities to mobilize a patrol to intercept the long-liner. While a patrol vessel was steaming to reach the area, the Seychellois and French fisheries monitoring centres were tracking the movements of the Shuenn Man 232. The Shuenn Man 232 was intercepted on September 20 2009 by the French patrol vessel in the Mozambican channel, 100 nautical miles south-west and inside the Europa Island EEZ. Its cargo comprised tuna as well as shark and fins from various species of shark. Although the inspection did not show any infringement of French law, suspected breaches of Seychelles regulations were communicated to the SFA by the French authorities. The Shuenn Man 232 was then ordered by the SFA to come to Port Victoria, where a further investigation was carried out. Its owner and the captain were later fined R1,050,000 (USD 104,000) for supplying false information to the SFA with regard to the position of its fishing operation, for not recording the position of all its fishing in its logbook and for fishing in places not specified in the fishing authorization.

The above report is unfortunately all too familiar to Greenpeace. During our recent expedition to the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Greenpeace encountered the Japanese-flagged Koyo Maru 3 vessel fishing in the EEZ of Cooks Islands without a valid license. The vessel usually fishes in the high seas area north of Cook Islands but given the limited monitoring and control capacity of this coastal state it has ignored Cook Island’s and international laws whilst chasing precious tuna resources on the expense of this small island nation. The license holder of the vessel is Taiwanese. For more information see http://blacklist.greenpeace.org/

Case study 3 Taiwanese small-scale long-liner Jinn Feng Tsair illegal transshipment at sea On April 14 2007 in FSM waters near Yap, but outside of the 12 mile zone, FSM National Police officers from the FSS Micronesia boarded the Jinn Feng Tsair 1, a longliner steaming under Taiwanese flag with a valid license to fish in FSM waters issued on January 22, 2007 and valid for a year. According to the vessels log book the longliner had been fishing in FSM waters since January 31, 2007 with their crew of 2 Taiwanese and 9 Indonesian citizens. Officers examined the catch as compared with the logbook and found serious discrepancies there. In the ship’s refrigerated compartments they found only 6 tuna. The logbook showed they had caught 100 fish. When the Captain of the vessel was confronted on the discrepancy he admitted that they had transshipped 42 albacore, 104 bigeye tuna, 84 marlins, 29 swordfish, some sharks and other fish. He told the officers they had a problem with their refrigeration units. Upon examination the officers found all units to be in working condition. The FSS Micronesia was on its way to another operation in Palau and according to Chief Pius Chotailug, was late for their assignment. The passports of all crew members were confiscated. The Captain of the Jinn Feng Tsair 1 was asked to sign a document agreeing to steam to the harbor in Yap unaccompanied and to report to law enforcement officers there.

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Case study 4Taiwanese long-liner Feng Rong Shen accidently fished in New Caledonia thinking it was in Vanuatu

The Feng Rong Sheng was found fishing illegally in New Caledonia's EEZ in January 2004. The vessel was spotted by a routine EEZ surveillance flight and intercepted by the French Navy about 180 kilometres Southeast off Nouméa, close to the Isle of Pines. The skipper did not respond to initial summons by French authorities, but was finally boarded by crew of the military patrol boat La Glorieuse. The ship's skipper claimed he had a fishing licence allowing him to operate in Vanuatu, but that he had encountered engine problems that caused the ship to drift into New Caledonia's EEZ. Police found up to forty tonnes of shark fins and fresh fish onboard the seized vessel.

For more information see http://blacklist.greenpeace.org/

© Greenpeace / Dmitri SharomovGreenpeace and KFEM (Korean Federation for Environmental Movement) activists display a huge human banner across the beach in Busan reading SOS TUNA. Busan was the venue of the WCPFC annual meeting in 2008.

5. Recommendations

Globally it is recognised that capacity reductions in the region of 50% are needed in order to reduce the

amount of fishing vessels closer to what is sustainable and economical in the long-term61. It also appears that overcapacity within the Taiwan fleets as well as internationally continues to hurt the viability of Taiwanese fisheries as fishermen regularly rely on subsidies to make their operations profitable. Taiwan’s shipyards continue to be a source of overcapacity in the world’s tuna fishing fleets. Most recently, new purse seine vessels were built in Taiwan and introduced into the fishery under the US

flag under 49% Taiwanese ownership. Some of these vessels entered the fishery as late as in 2008. It is clear more needs to be done urgently to halt this continued overcapacity. Overcapacity on the oceans is overcapacity, whatever country the vessels are flagged to. In Taiwan’s case, a strategy has been adopted to reflag its vessels, and while its Ordinance intends to control those reflagged vessels which are still owned or operated by Taiwanese, this is a manifestly inadequate strategy for the reasons discussed in this briefing. The Ordinance does not even require the vessels to comply with regional fisheries management measures, and monitoring, control,

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surveillance and enforcement by Taiwanese authorities is still also manifestly inadequate.

Taiwan urgently needs to join the international consensus to regulate tuna fisheries, follow precautionary and ecosystem based approaches to the management of fish stocks in national, regional and international fora and ensure that the international regulatory framework is able to curb legal and illegal overfishing and protect the marine environment. In order to meet the ambitions recognised for sustainable distant water fisheries by Taiwan in its Proposal for far seas fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring and to meet the obligations of the UN FAO code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the UN 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement62, it is essential that Taiwan recognises that there are still serious shortcomings in the measures it has taken to address the negative impact its fishing fleets and its people have on the tuna stocks worldwide and especially in the Pacific.

Tuna RFMOs including the WCPFC usually make decisions by consensus. As a full member of the WCPFC, Taiwan must support proposed conservation and management measures in order for them to be adopted. The next WCPFC annual meeting is taking place in Tahiti in French Polynesia December 7-13th 2009. The Commission needs to agree on several urgent issues in order to reverse the decline of the region’s tuna stocks and to step up its performance to what is required of it under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.

These include agreeing to 50% effort cuts across the tuna fisheries, which Greenpeace briefing papers63 have shown to be essential. Taiwan also needs to agree to the closing of all four high seas pockets to all fishing activities, including longlining, as proposed by the Pacific Island Countries to avoid those enclaves from being used by IUU vessels to evade essential sustainability measures implemented by the WCPFC and by coastal States. In addition, Taiwan needs to agree to a full ban on at-sea transshipments by all vessels in order to ensure that the loopholes for laundering IUU caught fish are closed as per Taiwan’s ambitions set out in the 6 year plan.

Only by supporting effective conservation and management measures internationally can Taiwan demonstrate that it is a good international citizen and that it is serious about filling the ambitions set in its 6 year plan to achieve sustainable fisheries for now and for the future.

© Greenpeace / Gavin NewmanA Greenpeace banner held by an Octopus reads "Marine reserves Now!". Greenpeace is calling for 40% of the worlds oceans to be designated as no-take marine reserves.

© Greenpeace / Paul Hilton© Pole and line fishing is a selective and therefore more sustainable way to catch tuna. There is little unwater species caught and tuna are caught one by one , leaving juveniles to grow to spawning age and replenish the stock in the future.

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1 All the data from this section is taken from Maguire, J. J., Sissenwine, M., Csirke, J., and Grainger, R. The state of the world highly migratory, straddling and other high seas fish stocks and associated species: FAO, Issue Paper 495, Rome 2006, unless otherwise indicated.

2 83% of all skipjack landings came from the WCPO and Indian oceans in 2004.3 Barclay, K. and Cartwright, I., 2005. Capturing Wealth from Tuna. Key Issues for Pacific Island Countries. Discussion draft, December 2005.4 Ellis, R. 2003. End of the Line, Eating Tuna Out of Existence. The Ecologist, October 2003.5 The IUCN assessments are now over 10 years old and thus out of date but in general the state of these stocks is not know to have improved

since the last assessment was done.6 Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Deep Waters and High Seas: UNEP Regional Seas Report and Studies No 178: Almost 60% of tuna stocks are

in need of population rebuilding and/or reduction of fishing pressure.7 2008, para. 1, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan8 Taiwan Fisheries Yearbook 2007 Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, R. O. C. http://www.fa.gov.tw/eng/statistics/yearbooks/2007/96tab23e.xls9 http://www.fa.gov.tw/eng/statistics/yearbooks/2007/96tab11_2_3e.xls10 2008, para. 1, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan11 2008, para. 2.1, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan12 2008, para. 6.2, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan13 Harry N. Scheiber, Kathryn J. Mengerink, and Yann-huei Song (2008) Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation;

Japanese Policies and the overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum. University of Hawai’I Law Review / Vol 30:9714 WCPFC the 5th Scientific Committee meeting, Regular session 10-21 August 2009 Port Vila, Vanuatu. http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2009/5th-regular-session-0 15 The 24 metre length is used by some RFMOs as a minimum length for their registries. The Taiwan fishing vessel registry assigns each vessel

with their own code. CT7-**** and CT6-**** are considered the largest longliners with their own deep freezing capacity. According to the latest WCPFC data there are 106 of these vessels active in the Pacific.

16 http://intra.wcpfc.int/Lists/Vessels/Stats.aspx17 International Transport Workers Federation. 2009.What are flags of convenience? http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm18 2008, para. 2.2, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan19 2008, para. 2.5, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan20 Harry N. Scheiber, Kathryn J. Mengerink, and Yann-huei Song (2008) Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation;

Japanese Policies and the overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum. University of Hawai’I Law Review / Vol 30:97.21 Amended and Promulgated by Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan,on December 30, 97 (0970060166), concrete measures, major project

items and budget of Fishing Capacity Adjustment Programme between year 98 and 100 have been modified. (“6 Year Proposal”). The proposal spans 2006-2011. Its stated objective is master the development trend of international fisheries industry, to develop sustainable operation of far seas fishery based on the established enterprise in Taiwan, construction of safe and sustainable environment for sustainable fisheries, and improving international fisheries corporation. 6 year Proposal, para 3.1.1.

22 WCPFC Yearbook 2007, table 97. At http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tuna-fishery-yearbook-2007 23 Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Fifth Regular

Session, 8-12 December 2008, Busan, Korea. See Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: Conservation and Management Measure 2008-01.

24 Harry N. Scheiber, Kathryn J. Mengerink, and Yann-huei Song (2008) Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation; Japanese Policies

and the overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum. University of Hawai’I Law Review / Vol 30:97.

25 The 4th meeting of the scientific committee in 2008 increased the recommendation for effort reduction on big-eye to 30%26 5-6% is the average for the money paid by the Asian fleets. Money paid by the EU and the US is significantly higher averaging around 12-30%.27 MRAG and Fisheries Ecosystems Restoration Centre, British Columbia University.(2008). The global estimate of illegal fishing.28 Plundering the Pacific 2006 case study: http://oceans.greenpeace.org/en/documents-reports/plundering-pacific.29 Defending our Pacific 2008 Summary Findings: http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/resources/reports/overfishing/defending-our-pacific-2008-su30 Defending our Pacific 2009 Summary Findings: www.greenpeace.org/defending-our-pacific2009-summaryreport31 PNA countries are Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.32 Parties to the PNA include Palau; PNG; Solomon Islands; FSM; RMI; Kiribati; Tuvalu; and Nauru.. The text of the Third Implementing Agreement is

available in the Summary Report to WCPFC-5, Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Fifth Regular Session, 8-12 December 2008, at Busan, Korea, attachment R, Appendix A, at http://www.wcpfc.int/wcpfc5/pdf/WCPFC5%20(Summary%2Report%20-%20Final).pdf.

33 This agreement ensures that vessels are prevented from fishing in the named high seas pockets, enforced by conditions attached to fishing licenses granted by PNA states.

34 This 3IA was welcomed by Leaders at the Pacific Island Forum 1 in Niue.35 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/pacific-enclaves

6. References

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36 At http://www.fao.org/fishery/org/ipoa_capacity/. 37 IPOA-Fishing Capacity, para. 40 and footnote 9.38 ICCAT Recommendation 5-02, Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Control of Chinese Taipei´s Atlantic Bigeye Tuna Fishery, at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2005-02-e.pdf. 39 ICCAT resolution 03-15, Resolution by ICCAT Concerning Trade Measures, at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2003-15-e.pdf40 WCPFC resolution 2005-02, Resolution on Reduction of Overcapacity, at http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/resolution-2005-02/resolution-reduction-overcapacity.41 2008, para. 3.1.1., Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan.42 2008, para. 3.1.1, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan.43 2008, para. 3.1.1, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan44 2008, para, 2.2, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan45 Ordinance, Art. 3.46 Ordinance, Arts. 2 and 3.47 Ordinance, Art. 5. Reports are to be prescribed by the Competent Authority. 48 Ordinance, Art. 6.49 Ordinance, Art. 6.50 Ordinance, Art. 6.51 Ordinance, Arts. 8 and 9.52 Ordinance, Art. 11.53 Ordinance, Art. 12. Fines are for 2-10 million New Taiwan Dollars. 54 Ordinance, Art. 13.55 2008, para. 2.3, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan56 2008, para, 6.2.2.8, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council

of Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan57 2008, para. 7.2.2, Proposal for Distant Water Fishery Management and Industrial Restructuring (Ratified version), Fisheries Agency, Council of

Agriculture Executive Yuen, Taiwan58 2006 expedition findings at http://oceans.greenpeace.org/en/documents-reports/plundering-pacific. 2008 findings at http://www.greenpeace.

org/australia/resources/reports/overfishing/defending-our-pacific-2008-su and 2009 findings at www.greenpeace.org/defending-our-pacific2009-summaryreport

59 http://blacklist.greenpeace.org/60 MRAG and Fisheries Ecosystems Restoration Centre, British Columbia University.(2008). The global estimate of illegal fishing.61 The World Bank and the FAO (2008). The Sunken Billions, The Ecomic Justification for Fisheries Reform (October 2008).62 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to

the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks63 Greenpeace (2006). Making sure our tuna will be there. http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/resources/reports/overfishing/tuna-science-report-

2006

Taiwan's role in Pacific tuna fisheries: Ensuring sustainable fisheries

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Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organisation that acts to change attiudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace.

Authors:Sari TolvanenDuncan Currie

Acknowledgements:Professor Allen C. ChenEnvironmental & Animal Society of Taiwan

greenpeace.org

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