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TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY REGIMENT



Document Title : Tactics of the Soviet Army Regiment.

AD Number: ADA076180

Subject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT

LEAVENWORTH KS

Title: Tactics of the Soviet Army Regiment.

Descriptive Note: Final rept.,

Personal Authors: Conroy,Bruce ;

Report Date: 14 MAY 1979

Pages: 144 PAGES

Supplementary Note: Master's thesis.Descriptors: *MILITARY TACTICS, USSR, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN),

MILITARY DOCTRINE, THESES, WAR GAMES, TACTICAL ANALYSIS, ARMY

OPERATIONS, TACTICAL WARFARE, REGIMENT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS.

Abstract: This research project is designed to facilitate an understanding of Soviet tactics

at the regimental level and below and to draw attention to material available for

additional study of Soviet tactics. This paper is the result of analyzing numerous primary

and secondary sources to ascertain which forms of tactics the Soviets use and which

forms we, as US authors, say they use. A review of recent Soviet tactical exercises was

used to confirm their implementation of espoused tactical doctrine. The meeting

engagement, the offense, the defense, and the withdrawal are the forms of tactics. A

chapter is devoted to each form and possible implementation under given circumstancesif postulated. Organization for combat and necessary support elements are included to

serve as an aid to wargamers. (Author)

Limitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Source Code: 037260



, . , I , . . ._. , ; . , e m b e r , i o n s u i t i n ( ? :s.cult:'

T h e o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x pr e ss e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e c ?

t h e i n di . vi d ua 1 s t u d e n t a u t h c r a n d d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r el :r e-s e n t t h e v ie ws o f e i t h e r t h e US Army Corr,;r,and and .G en era lZ.:af? T c l l e p e o r r t r y o.ti:er ; : , o v e r n r e r t a l w - e x : , ' .' to t t i s s t u d y s ! i o u l d i n c l u d e t k e foreroir :? ; s t a t e m e n t . )

( : ? e f e r e n c e e

i i



ABSTRACT

TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY REGIMENT, by Bruce Conroy, Major,USA, 14) pages.

This research project is designed to fac i l i ta te an

understanding of Soviet tac tics at the regimental level

and below and to draw attention to material available

fo r add iti onal study of Soviet tactics. This paper is

the resul t of ana lyz ing numerous primary and secondary

sources to ascertain which forms of tact ics the Soviets

use and which forms we, as US authors, say they use. A

review of recent Soviet tac t ical exercises was used to

confirm thei r implementation of espoused tactical doctrine.

The meeting engagement, the offense, the defense,

and the withdrawal are the forms of tac t ics . A chapter

is devoted to (lach form and possible implementation under

given circumstances i f postulated. Organization for com-

bat and necessary support elements are included to serve

as an aid to wargamers.

iii



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The a u t h o r is i n d e b t ed t o p e r s o n n e l fro m b ot h t h e

T h r e a t s D i v i s i o n , CACDA, and t h e Command and G e n e r a l

s taff C o l l e g e L i b r a r y f o r t h e i r h e l p i n o b t a i n i n g s o u r ce

m a t e r i a l and p r o v i d i n g g u i d a n c e f o r t h i s p r o j e c t .

g e s t i o n s , comments , and recommended cha nge s t o t h i s pub-

l i c a t i o n a r e s o l i c i t e d and may be made t o t

Sug-

CommanderUSACACDAATTNI ATZLCA-DLTF o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , KS 66027

o rI

Autovon 68~-34~/4472

i v



TAN25 01. CONTENTS

T I T L E P A G E . 0 * a s * s e a s . .

T H E S I S APPROVAL PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A S S T R A C T . a I . a . a a 0 a

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . s e a . . s . e a

TAiiLE O? CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .L l S T Or" FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CXAFTER

1 INTRCDUCTICN

1-1 ~ J ~ C K G R O U N D . . . . . . . . . . . .1-2 PURPOSE - a n - * . . * * e

1-3 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 . SOVIET TACTICS - ANOTHER VIEW

2-1 TACTICS DEFINED - a a s * * * s

2 - 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . .2-3 THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT . . . . . . .2 - 4 THE WITHDRAWAL * . - - * - . e * e

2-5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .2-6 ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. ZCXELONS AijOVE REGIMENT

3-1 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 - 2 2'RONT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-3 A R M Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1-4

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3-4 DIVISION . . . . . . .3-5 DEFINITIONS a o 1

3-6 ENDNOTES . . m . .4 TEE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

4-1 GENERAL . . . .4-2 CONDUCT . . . . . . .4-3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT .

4-4 SPECIAL TROOFS SUPDORT

4-5 DEFINITIONS . . a .

4-6 ENDNOTES . . . . . . .5 . TI-iE OFFENSE

5-1 GENERAL . . e e .5-2 C O N D U C T . . . . . . .

From the March . . .From Direct C o n t a c t

Breakthrough . . . .F u r s u i t

. . . . . .5-3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT .5-4 SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT

5-5 DEFINITIONS . . . . .5-6 ENDNOTES . . . . . . .

6. TIHE DEFENSE

6-1 GENERAL . . . . . . .6-2 C O N D U C T . . . . . . .

Has ty . . . . . . .D e l i b e r a t e . . . . .

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6-3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT . . .6-4 SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT 0

6-5 DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . .6-6 ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . .

7. THE WITHDRAWAL

7-1 GENERAL s * * . e 0 1

7-2 CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . .7-3 ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . .

8. CONCLUSIONS

8-1 TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS . .8-2 TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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APPENDIX

A . Bib l iog r aphy

US Government Documents . . . . . . . . . A - 1

Manuals. Circulars. and Tra ining Texts . A-1

T r a n s l a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A - 3

I n t e l l i g e n c e R e po rt s. . . . . . . . . .

A - 7

BOOkS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A - 9

P e r i o d i c a l s a n d Art ic les . . . . . . . . . 12-9

Other References . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 1 4

B . I n i t i a l D i s t r i b u t i o n L i s t . . . . . . . . . 3-1

v i



L I S T OF XGURES

Figure

1 Fr on t

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 S e l e c t e d Elements of Group o f S o v i e t

Forces Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Tank Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 N ot or iz ed R i f l e C i v i s i o n . . . . . . . . . . .6 Notor ized R i f l e Regiment . . . . . . . . . . .

7 Tank Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Regimental iviarch Column . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Regimental Organ izat ion f o r Combat . . . . . .

Page

3-43-9

3-10

3-14

3-15

4-5

4-64-11

4-12

v i i i



C H A F T E R 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1 3ACKGROUND.

There has been a formal ized s t r u c t u r e f o r Thre a t

Development wi thin the US Army Tra in ing and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) s i n c e 19 J u l y 1976, when TRADOC f i r s t issued Regu-

l a t i o n 381-1. T h i s r e g u l a t i o n r e q u i r e d s u b o r d i n a t e s c h o o ls

t o p r e p a r e a Threat Appendix i n support of each combat or

t r a i n i ng devel opme nt s s t udy . The Threat Appendix was t o b e

prepared under t h e s upe rv i s i on of t h e s c hoo l ' s Thre a t Nanager .

I n i t i a t i o n o f a Threa t Appendix s t a r t e d w i t h a review of a l l

app roved f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e documents; i n t e l l i g e n c e ga ps

were i d e n t i f i e d and means t a ke n t o r e s o l v e them; and t he n t he

Threat Manager began t o assemble t h e c ompre he ns ive i n s t ru -

ment. Each Threat Appendix had t o stand on i t s own and be

va l ida t ed th rough ap pro pr ia t e channe l s . Meanwhile, i f t h e

s tu dy re qu i re d manual wargaming o r force -on- force s imu la t i on ,

t h e proponent had begun these e f f o r t s w it ho ut t h e b a s i s of

having a v a l i d a t e d Threat . Although each TRADOC s c h o o l pre-

pared i t s s e p ar a t e s p e c i f i c Threa t Appendixes , there was a

common denominator, Soviet t ac t i c s and t a b l e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n

and equipment. Thus, throug hout TRADOC t h e r e h a s been con-

s i d e r a b l e d u p l i c a t i o n of e f f o r t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of numerous

T h r e a t Appendixes. The need f o r a common, non-specific Threat

Appendix t o a i d i n t h e i n i t i a l ph ase s of s t u d i e s h a s been

1-1



r e c o g n i z e d a t v i r t u a l l y e ve ry l e v e l w i t h i n TRADOC. T h i s

paper i s i n t e n d e d t o serve as t h e basis f o r s u c h a non-

s p e c i f i c Threat .

m e n t s A c t i v i t y (CACDA) has made p l a n s t o au gm en t t h i s e f f o r t

w i t h a d d i t i o n a l c l a s s i f i ed vo lumes conc e rn ing equ ipmen t

charac te r i s t i c s and per formance da ta , TOES, and s y s t e m

spec i f i c Threats. A l l o f these w r i t i n g s w i l l be upda ted on

a p e r i o d i c basis . T hi s p o r t i o n o f t h e s tu d y e f f o r t has been

kept u n c l a s s i f i e d t o a l l o w t h e w i d e s t p o s s i b l e d i s se m i n a t io n .

The US A r m y Combined A r m s Combat Develop-

I

W i t h i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s there has been a s i g n i f i c a n t

e f f o r t by t h e D e f en s e I n t e l l i g e n c e A gency (DIA) and t h e

Office o f t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief o f Staf f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e

( O A C S I ) t o p r o v id e u n c l a s s i f i e d l i t e r a t u r e c o n ce rn in g

S o v i e t t a c t i c s t o a i d i n wargaming and service s c h o o l in-

s t r u c t i o n . Many o f these documents have been reviewed and

p o r t i o n s i n c l u de d i n t h i s paper. T h i s e f f o r t i s d e s i g n e d

n o t t o replace these documents , b u t t o s y n t h es i z e them and

c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o s p e c i f i c p u b l i c a t i o n s which c a n p r o v i d e

a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . I n o t h e r w o rd s, view t h i s t r e a t i s e

as a base upon w h i c h one can b u i l d r a t h e r t h a n a f i n a l p rod-

uct u n t o i t s e l f . I t has b ee n w r i t t e n t o p r ov i de a c c e s s t o

t h o s e u n c l a s s i f i e d d o c u m e n t s already available and encourage

p e r s o n n e l t o seek a d d i t i o n a l i n f o rm a t i o n from p e r t i n e n t

documents . I t would be presumptuous t o a s sume t h i s a n a l y s i s

h a s reviewed a l l u n c l a s s i f i e d d oc um en ts a v a i l a b l e , and T h r e a t

M a n a g e r s s h o u l d t a k e n o t e o f a d d i t i o n a l primary and second-

a r y source mater ial which c a n h e l p them.

1-2



1-2. PURPOSE.

T h i s document i s intended t o provide Thr eat Managers

wi th a s t a r t i n g p oi nt i n th e p rep ara t io n of T hreat Appen-

dixes p e r t a i n i n g t o r eg im en ta l s i z e S o v ie t t ank and motor-

i z ed r i f l e u n i t s . T h i s paper i s designed to a i d i n combat

and t r a i n i ng developments s tud i es r equ i r ing Threa t inp u t

and may be used t o assist e i t h e r s e r v i c e sc h oo l i n s t r u c t o r s

o r t a c t i c a l u n i t i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s . T h i s assessment has

been prepared t o ser ve as a s t a r t i n g p oi nt and should not

be in te rp re ted as t h e f i n a l e f fo r t by i t s e l f . Because of

the unc lass i . fi ed form th e re a r e c e r t a in r e f inemen ts which

must be added prior t o use i n formulat ing a s p e c i f i c T hr ea t

r e l e v a n t t o combat and tr ai n in g developments st udy e f f o r t s .

The thes is i s su f f ic ie n t ly complete t o enable wargamers and

i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r so n ne l t o c o n s t ru c t u n c l a s s i fi e d p o r t r a y a l s

of Soviet units dur in g var ious phases o f t ac t i ca l opera t ions .

h r t h e r m o r e , t h i s paper is designed t o c l a r i f y c e r t a i n

aspec t s of Sov ie t t ac t i c s , spe c i f i ca l ly whe ther the mee ting

engagement and t h e w i t h d r a w a l a r e t o be considered as sepa-

r a t e c a t eg o r ie s of t a c t i c s . T rad i t iona l ly , most US au tho r s

have includod t h e meeting engagement as part of an of fens ive ,

whi le i n c l u d i ng t h e w i t h d ra w a l as a form of defense.

t h i s s tudy th e meeting engagement has been placed i n t o a

ca tegory by i t s e l f . Although pr imar i ly of fen s ive i n na tu re ,

t h e meeting engagement can be planned f o r and u t i l i z e d d u r -

i n g a l l phases of t a c t i c a l opera t ions . Withdrawal has a l so

been p laced i n t o a separa te ca tegory .

Within

1-3



1-3. SCOPE.

The p re p on d er an c e o f T h r e a t a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t s i n

s u p p o r t o f s c h o o l s t u d i e s h a s f o c u s e d o n t h e r e g i m e n t a l

l e v e l o r l ow er . T h u s , t h i s s t u d y h a s s u r v e y e d e c h e l o n s

above regiment and p l a c e d t h e m a i n t h r u s t o n r e g i m e n t a l

o p e r a t i o n s .

W i t h i n t h e s o u rc e m a t e r i a l t h e r e are s e v e r a l in ter -

c h an g ea b le te rm s u sed t o d e s c r i b e v a r i o u s f a c e t s o f S o v i e t

t a c t i c s .

c a te d t o d e f i n i n g p e r t i n e n t t e rm s t o p ro v id e c l a r i t y . O th er

s e c t i o n s w i t h i n a p p r o p r i a t e c h a p t e r s d e s c r i b e t y p i c a l o p er -

a t i o n a l and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o rt f o r t h a t phase of oper -

a t i o n s .

A p o r t i o n of e ac h r e l e v a n t c h a p t e r h a s b e e n d e d i -

No i n f o r m a t i o n i s of v a l u e u n l e s s i t c a n be r e a d i l y

T h u s c o m p l e t e i d e n t i f y i n gb t a i n e d b y a p o t e n t i a l user.

d a t a has b e e n p r o v i d e d f o r a l l r e fe r e n c e s l i s t e d i n t h e

b i b l i o g r a p h y .

r e c o g n i z e t here i s an a bu nd an ce o f a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e mate-

r i a l from which f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n c a n b e o b t a in e d . R e ad er s

a r e e nc ou ra ge d t o p r o v i d e full i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l

s o u r c e m a t e r i a l t o CACDA. The i n fo r m a t i o n c u t o f f d a t e f o r

r e f e r e n c e material i s 1 F e b r u a r y 1979.

P e r s o n s reading t h i s s t u d y w i l l r e a d i l y

A l l r e f e r e n c e s used i n t h i s r e s e a rc h e f f o r t a r e un-

c l a s s i f i e d . Where p o s s i b l e , p r i m a r y s o u r c e material, t h a t

w r i t t e n by S o v i e t a u t h o r s , was u se d f o r a n a l y s i s . S e co n da ry

s o u r c e m a t e r i a l , p r e p a r ed by US, i l r i t i s h , A u s t r i a n , G e r m a n ,

1-4



a n d C a n a d i a n a u t h o r s , was s t u d i e d t o f i l l g a p s or t o c o rr ob -

o r a t e S o v i e t w o rk s. The seco nd c h a p t e r d e f i n e s t a c t i c s and

e s t a b l i s h e s t h e p r ec e d en t f o r separate d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e

meet ing engagement and the withdrawal. T h e n e x t c h a p t e r

surveys e c h e l o n s a b o v e r e g i m e n t and s u g g e s t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

when o r g a n i z i n g u n i t s f o r c om b at. C h a p t e r s 4, 5, 6, and 7

d i s c u s s t h e m e e ti n g e ng ag em e nt, o f f e n s e , d e f e n s e , and w i t h -

drawal, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The c o n d u ct o f e a ch p h as e o f t a c t i c a l

o p e r a t i o n s i s d i s c u s s e d , t y p i c a l r e in f o r c em e n t s are s u g g e s t e d

and a p p r o p r i a t e t e rm s a r e d e f in e d w i t h i n e ac h c h a p t e r . The

c o nc lu d in g c h a p t e r r e f l e c t s on p o t e n t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l andt e c h n o l o g i c a l c ha n ge s w h ich might im p ac t on S o v i e t t a c t i c a l

d o c t r i n e , and p r o v i d e s r e l e v a n t c o n c l u s i o n s .

W i th in q u o t a t i o n s f ro m t r a n s l a t i o n s t h e r e a r e some

a p p a r e n t p u n c t u a t i o n a nd g r am m a t ic a l errors.

d o c u m e n t s w e r e n o t a l w a y s available t o a s c e r t a i n what t h e

a u t h o r had a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n . T h e re f or e , a l t h o u gh a l i t t l e

awkward a t t im e s , t h e . q u o t e s a pp e a r a s t h e y a r e l i s t e d i n

t h e a p p l i c a b le t r a n s l a t i o n .

T h e o r i g i n a l

I n i t i a l l y , one o f t h e d r iv i n g f a c t o r s f o r t h i s p a p e r

was t o e x p l a i n t h e e f f e c t of s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , s u ch as

d e s e r t o r m o un ta in en v i r o n m e n t s, o n c om b at o p e r a t i o n s . A f t e r

c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n and e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h i t has been

d e c i d e d n o t t o i n c l u d e t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . R i v e r c r o s s i n g s

a r e r e a l l y n o t c o n s id e re d s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s and a r e p lan ned

f o r whenever t h e s i t u a t i o n so d i c t a t e s . A l s o m i l i t a r y

1-5



o p e r a t i o n s on u r ba n t e r r a i n , c a l l e d WOUT i n US p a r l a n c e ,

a r e planned for w h e n n e c e s s a r y , rather t h a n c o n s id e r ed

s e p a r a t e l y . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t e x tr em e c o l d , h e a t

and m o u nt ain s h av e e f f e c t s on o p e r a t i o n s , b u t these are

r a r e l y g a i n e d as t h e y a r e n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e n t i r e .

s p e c tr u m o f t a c t i c s . S ho uld y ou d e c i d e t o c o n d u c t a wargame

where M O U T , r iver c r o s s i n g s , or n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s are d r i v i n g

f a c t o r s , t h e r e a r e several a pp ro ve d s o u r c e s w h ic h d e s c r i b e

t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s i n g r e a t d e t a i l . Also, t h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s

S o v i e t d ocu men ts which d e s c r i b e t h e e f f e c t s of e x t r e m e c o l d ,

heat and mounta ins on t h e c o n d u c t o f t a c t i c a l o p e ra t i o n s .

Al though ha rd t o gam e, a i r b o r n e f o r c e 8 bo t h a i r dropped

and a i r l a n d e d s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d for employment wi th in

any s c e n a r i o . A i rb o rn e f o r c e s u t i l i z a t i o n s ho u ld be of

p ri m ar y i n t e r e s t w i t h i n an y s t u d y don e t o s u pp o r t US combat

s e r v i c e suppor t . O u r t r a i n s , DISCOMS and COSCQMs w i l l o f f e r

l u c r a t i v e ta rge ts for S o v i e t a i r b o r n e f o r c e s . F u r t h e r ,

t h e r e a r e num erous ap pro ve d s t u d i e s a nd S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e

a v a i l a b l e t o a i d i n wargam ing s uc h s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s and

t h i s paper w i l l n o t a d d r e s s t h e m .

1-6



CHAPTER 2

SOVIET TACTICS - A N O T F I E R VIEW

2 - 1 . TACTICSDEFINED.

TAKTIKA ( V O Y E N N A Y A ) ( m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s ) - A

s p e c i a l f i e l d i n t h e t heory and p ra c t i c e o f m i l i -

t a r y a r t which s t u d i e s t h e o b j e c t i v e laws of com-b a t and develops methods of pr ep ar i ng f o r combata n d conduc t i ng i t , on l a n d , a t sea , and i n t h ea i r . M i l i t a r y t a c t i c s occupies a s u b o r d i a n t ep o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o o p e r a t i o n al a r t ands t r a t e g y , a c t i ng i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and s e r v i n gt o a c h ie v e t h e g o a l s s e t f o r i t by t h e opera-t i o n a l a r t . Each Service and branch, by v i r t u e o f

it:; i n t r i n s i c p e c u l i a r i t i e s , ha s i t s own theoryand prac t ice f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and conduct o fcombat and, consequently, i t s ow n t ac t i c s t o o ,w h i c h a r f cal led S e r v i c e t a c t i c s o r b ranch (arms)t a c t i c s .

The S o v i e t s c l e a r l y d e f i n e t h e i r d evelopmen t of d o c t r i n e

as a sc i enc e which h a s t h r e e p h as es : s t r a t e g y , o p e r a t i o n a l

a r t , and t a c t i c s . The s t u d y of f o r e i g n and d o m e s t i c pub-

l i c a t i o n s shows t h e t h r u s t of t a c t i c s t o be c en te re d a t

d i v i s i o n l e v e l and below. An i n t e r e s t i n g i ssue i s t h e

apparent discrepancy between American and Soviet authors

as t o t h e number of t ypes o f t a c t i c a l ope ra t i on s conduc ted

by t h e S o v i e t s .

2-2. KETFICDCLCGJ.

The purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t o r e s o lv e t h i s d i s c r e p -

ancy by e xpla in in g how t he So vi e t s sa y they w i l l conduct

t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s , and c ompare t h i s w i t h how we s a y t h e

S o v i e t s w i l l c on du ct t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s . I n most US

2- 1



d o c u m e n t s d e a l i n g w i t h S o v i e t t a c t i c s we c r e d i t them w i t h

c o n d u c t i n g o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , and r e t r o g r a d e o p e r a t i o n s .

T h i s s e c t i o n sh o u l d p r ov e t h e S o v i e t s c o n d u c t m e e t i ng e n-

g ag em e nt s , o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , and w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s ,

P e rh a p s t h e d i f f e r e n c e s might b e m i n o r , b u t t h e y s h o u l d

place t h e m e e t i n g e n ga g em e n t i n i t s p r o p e r r o l e , t h a t o f

t h e p re d om i n an t f o rm o f S o v i e t c om b at o n t h e m o dern b a t t l e -

f i e l d .

2 - 3 . TYE WEETISG ENGAGEMENT.

"The S o v i e t s p e r c e i v e t h r e e m aj or t y p e s o f o f f e n s i v e

a c t i o n : t h e m e e t i ng e ng ag em e nt w h i c h i n c l u d e s ad v an c e t o

c o n t a c t t h e b r e a k t h r o ug h I and t h e p u r s u i t . 'I 2 T h i s t h e m e

sh o w s t h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t t o be i n c l u d e d as a f o r m o f

o f f e n s i v e c o m b a t . "T h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t i s p e r c e i v e d as

t h e m o st common o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n o n t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e -

f i e l d . ' I 3 One c a n h a r d l y q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e m ee t-

in g e n g a g e m e n t as a common form of combat when t h e r a p i d i t y

of c ha n ge an d a n t i c i p a t e d f l u i d i t y o f m odern c om ba t are

c o n s i d e r e d . S o v i e t A r m y O p e ra t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o v i e t

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as t h e m e e t i n g e n g ag e m e nt , a t t a c k o f

a d e f e n d i n g e n e m y , and p u r s u i t . '

b r e a k s t h e o f f e n s e i n t o t h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t, e n g a g e m e n t

o f d e f e n s e , and p u r s u i t . 5

t y p i f i e s t h e o f f e n s e as i n c l u d i n g t h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t ,

d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k a g a i n s t a d e f e n d i n g f o r c e , and p u r s u i t .

'I . . . t h e meeting e n g a g e m e n t . . . i n c l u d e s a dv an c e t o

US Army ?ield Manual 30-40

A n ot h er s e r v i c e s c h o o l p u b l i c a t i o n

6

2 - 2



contactr engagement of defense and breakthrough1 and the

p~rsuit."~

ation appeared in an earlier booklet from the same school.

The most recent handbook on the Soviet Army contains the

following definition of the offensive: "The Soviets classify

offensive actions into three major types8 the breakthrough,

the meeting engagement, and the pursuit. ''

dealing with small unit tactics have also included the meet-

ing engagement as a form of the ~ f f e n s e . ~

port dealing with tank battalion tactics does treat the

meeting engagement as a separate form of combat action.

T h e Soviets consider the meeting engagement to be the m os t

important battalion operation and it frequently is the focus

This definition of phases of an offensive oper-

Even manuals

Xowever, one re-

of training exercises. 110

Perhaps we should change our terminology for this

operation to the encounter battle, to align ourselves with

the British, Canadians, and the Soviets.

VSTRECSNOYE SRAZHENIYE (BOY) (encounterbattle) - A clash between opposing sides when theyare simultaneously striving to fulfill assignedmissions by means of offensive actions. An en-counter battle may occur during a march (maneuver)or in the course of an attack mounted to repelenemy counterattacks or counterblows, and also whenreserves or second echelons move up to counter-attack or to inflict counterblows when in defense.An encounter battle is characterized by obscurityof the situation and by abrupt changes in it, bythe rapid movement to contact of the two sides andby the decisiveness and dynamic nature of theirencounter, by rapid changes in march, approach-march and combat formations, by the swift build-upof effort from depth, by an intense struggle to

2-3



gain t ime and t o se iz e and hold the i n i t i a t i v e ,and by th e presence of open f l an ks , and f r e e maneu-ver. Resent-d ay se a and a i r batt les arelpredom-i n a n tl y i n t h e encounter ba t t l e ca tegory.

Although the offensive i s a necessary ingredient once the

meeting engagement has begun, i t may be conducted during

of fens ive o r de fens ive ope ra t ions .

e r s ' opin ions of t h e meeting engagement i s i n o rd er .

A review of Soviet w r i t -

The Soviets draw heavily upon t h e i r experiences i n "The

Grea t Pa t r io t i c War," t h a t portion of the Second World War

fought by them.

The defending s i de , s e t t i n g up powerful f i r e means,

and a l s o mobile and deep re se rv es and second eche-lon s, int roduced them fo r execut ing cou nter at tac ksand f o r i n f l i c t i n g counterblows w i t h de c i s i vegoa l s . A s a r e s u l t of such act i on s, meeting en-gagements began t o appear i n both of fen siv e anddefens ive opera t ions a t a l l stages and under themost h igh ly va ri ed condi t i ons of a s i t u a t i o n a l2

The author cont inues to describe lessons learned from enemy

combat I

I n th e o ff en si ve , meeting engagements appeared

when re pul si ng enemy cou nt er at ta ck s and cou nte r-blows and when overcoming th e t a c t i c a l zone of h i sdefense (t ro op of fen siv e of th e South-Westernfr on t i n t he d i r ec t i on of Kharkov i n Kay o f 1942) ;during the development of succes8 in a s t r a t e g i cdepth (meeting engagement and combat of t h e Voronezhfr on t i n t h e Belgorod-Kharkov oper at io n i n August,1943, and t h e fo ur th guards tank army i n th eSandomirsk-Sllesian op era tio n i n January, 1945, andoth ers) ; dur ing pu rs ui t (meeting engagements of t h e38th and 3 r d tank armies i n November, 1943, towardZ h i t o m i r and Kazatin); i n repelling enemy attemptst o b r e a k t h e i n t e r n a l o r e x t e rna l f r o n t o f an en-

circlement (meeting engagements of large Cormationsof t h e 2nd and 6th t a n k armies i n t h e Morsun'-Shevchenko operation, the r i f t h guards tank armi si n t h e Eastern-Frussian operat ion, and o t h e r s ) .13

2-4



3 e f u r t h e r e x p l a i n s t h e n eed f o r t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e m e et i n g

e n ga ge m e nt t o m e e t e x i g e n c i e s of t h e m odern b a t t l e f i e l d .

T h e m o s t f r e q u e n t time t h i s f o r m o f c o m b a t w i l l o c c u r i s

a f t e r i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n o f a d e f e n s e h a s o c c u r r e d a n d manu-

v e r i n g r e s e r v e s w i l l be e n c o u n t e r e d . T h e meeting e n g a g e m e n t

i s a p p l i c a b l e t o b o th n u c l e a r and n o n -n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d s .

" I n d e f e n s e , as e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e l a s t war s h o w s , m e e t -

i n g e ng ag em e n ts c a n o c c u r c h i e f l y d u r i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and

c o u n t e r b l o w s o n a d v a n c i n g enem y g r o u p s . '"'

w i l l n o t b e t h e o n l y time f o r an e n c o u n te r b a t t l e d u r i n g

t h e d e f e n s e .

: i o w e v e r , t h i s

I n c o n te m p o ra ry c o n d i t i o n s , m e e t in g e ng ag e-m e n ts i n d e f e n s e c a n o c c u r n o t o n l y d u r i n g c o u n t e r -a t t acks a g a i n s t a p e n e t r a t i n g enem y, b u t a l s o whene n c o u n t e r i n g a n a d v a n c i n g e nem y w i t h s u b u n i t s w h i c hh a ve a d v an ce d t o s h u t of f b r e a c h e s and b r e a k s w h ic hh a v e f o r m e d t h e c o m b at d e p l oy m e n t o f t r o o s, a n d t oc o v e r i m p o r ta n t p o s i t i o n s and d i r e c t i o n s .5i

:le g o e s on f u r t h e r t o s t a t e l

The v a r i e t y o f c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e a p p e a r a n c e

o f m e e t i n g e n g a ge m e n ts d e p e n ds n o t o n l y o n t h e f o r mof c o m b a t a c t i o n i n which t h e y a p p e a r , b u t a l s o o nt h e l o c a t i o n o f u n i t s and s u b u n i t s i n t h e c o m b a tc o n s t r u c t i o n o f t r o o p s , whi ch w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h eg r o u p i n g of f o r c e s a nd e q u ip m e n t, t h e p r e p a r a t i o nf o r co m b at a c t i o n , and t h e a r a c t e r of d e p l o y -m ent a nd e n t r y i n t o co m b at . %

T h e m e e t in g e ng a ge m en t a p p e a r s t o b e a f l e x i b l e f o r m o f com-

b a t w i t h great h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s , and r e a d i l y a d a p t a b l e

t o m o de rn c o m b a t .

Small u n i t t a c t i c s a l s o e m p h a s i z e t h e m e e t i n g e n g a g e -

ment as a separa te a n d u n i q u e f o rm o f c o m b a t .

2 - 5



Meeting engagements, th er ef or e, can occu r d u r i n gan offens ive , as w e l l as a defens ive , opera t ion.They also are possible when our troops are w i t h -drawing, i n which case t h e b a t t a l i o n w i l l havet o a c t as t h e r e a r gu ard, and of t e n may be forcedt o at tack a purs uing enemy i n o rd er t o delay h i ma t a c e r t a i n l i n e and ga i n time.17

S ov ie t t a c t i c i a ns a l s o r ec ogn i ze t h a t t h e meeting engagement

w i l l be a r a p i d l y developing i f not somewhat confusing situ-

a t ion . "The b a t t a l io n ' s d i s p o s i t i o n o f t e n w i l l not be t h a t

requ i red fo r t h e concept of a meeting engagement, and re -

d i s pos i t i on w i l l take time t h a t may not always be ava i l ab l e . ,,I8

The defense al s o of f er s unique problems f o r t h e defender.

"T h e s pe c i a l f e a t u r e s o f t h e meeting engagement f o r t h e de-

fense can inc lude t h e enemy usu al l y having su pe ri or i t y i n

forces and weapons, as w e l l as t he i n i t i a t i v e i n c hoosing

t h e place and time of the a t t ack . 't19

emphasize the multi-faced approach to the meeting engagement

f o r small u n i t s , a g a i n w i t h emphasis on lessons learned i n

t h e i r l a s t w a r . "Experience gained i n t h e Second World War

i nd i c a t e s t h a t t h e encounter b a t t l e i s not only an offens ive

ac t ive . Although offens ive ac t ion w i l l be involved even-

t u a l l y , t h e encounter can take place dur ing defens ive oper-

at io ns. "An enc ounte r b a t t l e can occur i n t h e course of a

defen sive b a t t l e when the re serv es and t h e second echelon

a r e moving up f o r a cou nte rat tac k, and al s o when air bo rne

and sea landings are being engaged. lVz1

Soviet primary source materia l was publ i shed pr io r t o t h e

advent of a i rmobi le opera t ions of t h e t ype which can b e

O t h e r a u t ho r s a l s o

blost ava i l ab l e

2-6



e n vi s io n e d i n a modern war. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n c ou nt er in g

a h e l i b o r n e as sau l t , w hi l e occupy i ng de fens i ve pos i t i ons ,

cannot be precluded. The t r a d i t i o n a l use o f p a r a c h u t e f o r c e s

a l s o o f f e r s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e n co un te rs .

COL V. Ye. Savkin, a l e a d i n g S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n , a l s o

i n c l u d e s t h e e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e as a s e p a r a t e form o f a c t i o n

i n combat i

The given p r i n c i p l e of o p e r a t i o n a l a r t andt a c t i c s f i nd s i t s e x p r e s s i o n i n p r a c t i c e i n co n s ta n ti n f l u e n c e on the enemy with an u n i n t e r r u p t e d b u i l d -up of t h e fo rce of a t tacks , i n a n t i c ip a t i ng t h eenemy i n d e s t r u c t i o n by f i r e , i n d e l i v e r i ng a t t a c k sand e x e c u t i n g maneuver, and i n making use of favor-

a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r impo singone 's w i l l on th e enemy i n a l l forms of combata c t i o n s . I n examining t h i s p r i n c i p l e i t i s i m -p o r t a n t t o d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n p r i ma ri ly on i t sa p p l i c a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t forms of combat ac t ions- i n t h e offense , defense , and meet ing engage-ment ( o r b a t t l e ) . 2 2

I n A r t i l l e r y I n Suecia1 Condi t i ons , COL S. N . Dudarev

i s c a r e fu l t o make d i s t i n c t i o n b etween s u p p o r t i n g t h e en -

c o u n t e r b a t t l e , as o ppo sed t o o f f e n s i v e o r d e f e n s i v e o p er -

a t i o n s , when o p e r a t i n g i n m ou nt ai ns , i n t h e d e s e r t , and i n

n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s . So, bes ides t h e Soviet maneuver commanders

p l an n in g f o r s e p a r a t e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e s u p p o r t i ng arms make

p l a n s t o s u p p o r t e n c ou n te r b a t t l e s as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y .

Thus , Sovie t t ac t i c i ans p la n f o r t h e conduct of the

meeting engagement during a l l p ha se s of t a c t i c a l o p e r at i o n s .

T h e preponderance of encounter b a t t l e s w i l l probably t ake

pl ac e dur i n g t h e o f f en s i v e , bu t mee ti ng engagements du r i ng

t h e de fense are viewed as a d i s t i n c t p r o b a b i l i t y by t h e

2 - 7



Sovi e ts . i ie l iborne for ces , parachute t roop s , and naval

assaul t s a l so o f f e r add i t iona l chances f o r encoun ter s du r ing

a l l phases of t a c t i c a l op er at io ns . The meeting engagement

i s viewed by th e Sov ie ts as the preponderance o f combat i n

a f u t u r e war. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a US publ i ca t io n has the

fo l lowing observat ion :

The Soviets def ine t h e meeting engagementas combat between opposing columns rapidly advanc-in g towards each ot he r. They pr ed ic t i t w i l loccur

a. A t t h e outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s when theenemy h a s been surprised and i s a t t empt ing todeploy i n t o forward def ensi ve area s.

b . During a breakthrough when the enemy's

t a c t i c a l r es er ve i s dep loy ing f o r a counter-a t t a c k o r t o ' pl u g a gap.c . I n th e depth of t he defense where the

enemy's reserve i s deploying to b locking posi -t i o n s .

d . During an enemy w i t h d r a w a l when he i sf lanked .

e . I n a de fe ns iv e o pe ra ti on when th e enemyaxes of advance ar e i de nt if ie d o r when a counter-at tack i s launched.23

I

2-4. THE WITHDRAWAL.

T h i s se c t i o n p r e se n t s US and S ov ie t views concern ing

th e w i t h d r a w a l . Some U S pub l ica t ions inc lude i t as a por-

t i o n of t h e defense, while t h e Sovie ts a lso v iew i t as a

s e pa ra te form of combat.

OTKHOD ( w i t h d r a w a l ) - An ob li ga to ry typ e ofcombat operat ion, associated w i t h leaving occu-pied re g i on s ( l i n e s , p o s i t i o n s ) . A w i t h d r a w a li s ca r r i ed ou t fo r the pu rpose of e x t r i ca t i ngt roops f r o m s t r i k e s by superior enemy forces,pe rm it ti ng them t o occupy po si ti on s more advan-tageous fo r subsequent o f f ens i ve oper a t ion s ,sav ing time f o r concen t r a t ion of fo rce s i n ag iv en s e c t o r , sh o r t e n i ng t h e f r o n t , e t c . A



withdrawa l may be made on ly w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o no f t h e s e n i o r c om m an de r.2 4

J u s t f ro m t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l o n e , i t i s o b v i o u s t h e

S o v i e t s view t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a f l e x i b l e fo rm of t a c t i c a l

o p e r a t i o n s . H ow ever, n o t a l l o f US a n a l y s t s t a k e t h e same

v i e w . "Three t y p e s o f d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a r e em ploy ed i n

r e t r o g r a d e m ov em en ts . T h ey are t h e d e l a y i n g a c t i o n , t h e

w i t h d r a w a l , a n d t h e ret i rement . T h i s f i r s t e f f o r t a t

w i d e s t p o s s i b l e u n c l a s s i f i e d d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f S o v i e t t a c t i c s

s e e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a f or m o f t h e d e f e n s e . H ow ev er, t h i s

v i e w i s m o di f i e d s l i g h t l y 1

L o c a l w i t h d r a w a l s are n o r m a l t o a n area d e f e n s eand a r e o mployed t o r e d u c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o n u c l e a rf i r e s , t o c a n a l i z e t h e enem y, and t o r e g ro u p d e -f e n s i v e f o r c e s . The S o v i e t r a r e l y e x e c u t e s ag e n e r a l withdrawa l , p r e f e r r i n g t o c o n d u c t d e l a y i n ga c t i o n s . 2%

An e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n d i s c u s s e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a n i n t e g r a l

p o r t i o n o f t h e d e f e n s e 1

S o v i e t d o c t r i n e s t resses s u d d e n d i s e n g a g e m e n t ,

p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A r e a r g ua rd c o v e r sw i t h d r a w a l of t h e main f o r c e . E i t h e r a c o u n t e r -a t t a c k o r massed f i r e s may be used t o b r e a k c on -t a c t , w i t h wi thdrawal t o r e v i o u s l y p re p a re dp o s i t i o n s when p o s s i b l e . 2?

A s e r v i c e s c h o o l p am p h le t m i r r o r s t h e sam e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 1

d e f e n s e . Enemy d o c t r i n e s t r e s ses s u d d e n d i s e n -g ag em e nt , p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A rea rg u a r d c o v e r s w i t h d r a w a l of t h e m ain f o r c e . E i -t h e r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k o r m assed f i r e s may b e us ed

t o b r e a k c o n t a c t t o a l l o w a w i t h d r a w a l t o r e -

h l a t e r p u b l i c a t i o n f ro m t h e same s c h o o l d e a l i n g w i t h t h e

S o v i e t c on d u c t of t h e d e f e n s e c o n t a i n s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e s am e

v i e w I

W i t h d r a w a l p l a n s a r e made w h e n p l a n n i n g t h e

v i o u s l y :p re pa re d p o s i t i o n s , w hen p o s s i b l e . 38

2 -9



The Sov ie t s v iew t h e wi thdrawal as a defen-s i v e m easure t o g a i n t im e t o p r e p a r e f o r aco unt e ra t t a ck . Whenever po ss i b l e , wi thdrawalbegins d u r i n g t h e hours o f da rknes s o r reducedv i s i b i l i t y . C o n t a c t i s broken, a c o v e r i n g f o r c eand r ea r guard are e s t a b l i s h e d , and the mainbody occup i e s new de fens i ve po s i t i on s i n t h er ea r . The Soviets employ defens ive f i r e s andsmoke and use armor f o r c e s t o c on fu se and d e l a ythe enemy as much as p o s s i b l e . A counterattackcan be expected as s o o n as t h e main bod has time

dowever, not a l l US p u b l i c a t i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h S o v i e t

t o o r g a n i z e and c o n s o l i d a t e i t s f o r c e s . 3-9

t a c t i c s p la ce t h e w i t h d r a w a l as p u r e l y a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n .

“While t h e w i t h d r a w a l i s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e d e f e n s e ,

i t i s a l s o used when s h i f t i n g f o r c e s f o r t h e o f f e n s e t o

a n o t h e r sec t o r o r t o s t r e n g t h e n a no t he r s e c t o r w hich i s

cons ide red e s pe c i a l l y dange rous. w~~

e s p e c i a l l y t h o se d e a l i n g w i t h small u n i t t a c t i c s , a l s o t r e a t

t he w i thdrawa l as a separate form of combat :

O t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s ,

Before a s u c c e s s f u l w i t h d r a w a l can be made,disengagement f rom contact w i t h the enemy i sr equ i r ed . The S o v i e t s w ithd raw on ly on o rd e r sof a senior commander. The purposes of a w i t h -

d ra w a l by a t a n k b a t t a l i o n a r e aa . To occupy more advantageous terra in.b . To auoid enemy nu c le ar o r conv ent i ona l

f i r e s .c . To adjus t a p o s i t i o n t o s e c u r e a n ex-

pos ed f l a nk dur ing a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e .d . To regroup a f t e r a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c lu s i on

of a meeting engagement o r a f t e r s tub bo rn enemyr e s i s t a n c e .

e . To avoid encirclement.f . To s h o r t e n l i n e s o f communication.g. To f r e e men and equ ipment f o r o t he r

o p e r a t i o n s .

The tenor o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g on t h e w i t h d r a w a l

o p e r a t i o n i s t h a t i t is a u s ef u l t a c t i c t o f r e e a f o r c e f o r

a new mission but i s n o t t o be dicta ted by enemy pressure . 31

2-10



T h e a u t h o r e n v i s i o n s a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n

o r d e r t o a c c o m p li sh t h e w i t h d r a w a l 8

The t a c t i c s em ployed by t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o ni n w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s show t h a t t h e S o v i e t s ,t ho u gh n o r m a l l y p r e f e r r i n g t o m a ne uv er as o n eu n i t , are t r a i n e d t o m ove b y b o u nd s o f c o m p an ie s

o r e v e n p l a t o o n s w hen t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o nr e q u i r e s . 32

Com pany l e v e l t ac t i cs a re also e s p o u s e d as u s i n g t h e

w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e fo rm o f c om b at :

S o v i e t c o n c e p ts a l l o w w i t h d r a w a l t o a v o i de n e m y n u c l e a r s t r i k e s o r t o o cc up y a more advan-t a g e o u s p o s i t i o n . I n t h e d e f e n s e t h e o p e r a t i o ni s c a r r i e d o u t t o r e p o s i t i o n a u n i t ' s f r o n tt o w a r d s a f l a n k i n r e s p o n s e t o enemy a c t i o n o rt o r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h o f a t h r e a te n e d s u p p ly l i n e .During a dv an ce t o c o n t a c t , a w i t h d r a w a l c a n b eo r d e r e d w hen s t u b b o r n enem y o p p o s i t i o n i s met o ra t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f a n u n s u c c e s s f u l m e e t i n ge n g a g e m e n t . 33

T h e a p p r o v a l o f a h i g h e r c o m m a n d e r i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n d u c t

a w i t h d r a w a l , and t h e e n e m y s h o u l d n o t f o r c e t h e o p e r a t i o n 8

"A w i t h d ra w a l i s u s u a l l y c a r r i e d o u t i n f a c e o f e nemy a c t i o n

I t i s i m p l i e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e enemy w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d

t o d i c t a t e a w i t h d r a w a l . A n o th e r c om p a ny -l ev el t a c t i c s

m a nu al a l s o t 3 t r e s s e s t h e m u l t i p l e f a c e t s and c o m p l i c a te d

n a t u r e o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l 1

Withdrawal o p e r a t i o n s a r e c o nd uc te d f o rp u r p o s e s o f r e g r o u p i n g , o c c u p y in g m ore f a v o r a b l et e r r a i n , o r d u e t o enem y p r e s s u r e . T he m i s s i o no f a withdrawing u n i t i s t o p r e s e r v e i t s i n t e g r i t y ,t o c o n d uc t an o r d e r l y w i t h d r a w a l t o a d e s i g n a t e da r e a , a nd t o be r e a d y t o e x e c u t e o f f e n a i v e m i s s i o n s .

The S o v i e t s r e c o g n i z e t h e c o m p l ic a t ed n a t u r e o ft h i s o p e r a t i o n and p r e f e r t o w i t h d r a w o n m u l t i p l er o u t e s w i t h o u t o c c u p y in g i n t e r m e d i a t e p h a s e l i n e s .W henever p o s s i b l e , t h e S o v i e t s w i l l withd raw a tn i g h t or d u n g o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s of l i m i t e dv i s i b i l i t y . 3 i

2-11



Another US paper assesses the meeting engagement as

another a rea i n which t h e w i t h d r a w a l may be conducted by

the Sovie t s :

The meeting engagement ends when one opponentadopts a new t a c t i c such as , e s t a b l i s h i ng a defen-s i v e p o s i t io n o r w i t h d r a w i n g . According t o thet a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n th e S ov ie ts i n i t i a t e a e l i b -

Although some o f t he e a r l i e r pub l i ca t ions t ended t o place

the w i t h d r a w a l a s a f o r m of re t rograde opera t ions o r w i t h i n

the conduct of t he de fense, t he re h a s been a tre nd t o con-

s i d e r t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a separate form o f combat act ivi ty.

A l og i ca l ex t ens ion i s t o examine how t h e So vi et s view t h econduct of w i t h d r a w a l ope ra t ions .

e r a t e a t t a c k , a pur s u i t , o r a w i t h d r a w a l . 3

The withdrawal has hi s to r i ca l p recedence wi th in t he

minds of So vie t ta ct ic i an s . "On th e broad and mobile fr on ts

of the Ci vi l War, the enemy, a f t e r t h e f i r s t defea ts , could

withdraw h i s t roops and reorganize a defense o r even o ffen se. ,,37

Kowever, t h i s lesson learned by the i3olsheviks was appa ren t ly

ignored during t he period p ri or t o The Great Pa t r io t ic War:

I n pr inc ipl e , our prewar theory al lowed f o r thefo r c e d r e t r e a t of the t roops i n i s o l a t e d s e c t o r s .!lowever, the problem o f w i t h d ra w a l of l a rg e fo rcesf r o m under enemy strikes was n t developed, e i ther

The a u tho r f u r t he r c i t e s e xper ie nc e i n t he i r l a s t war and t h e

need t o be prepared t o conduct w i t h d ra w a l ope ra t ions :

t i o n may a r i s e i n which f or ce s can be saved fromi ne v i t a b l e de f e a t on ly a t the c o s t of g ivi ng upconquered te r r i tory by means o f a temporary v B -d r a w a l . Troops may be fo rced t o withdraw a s a

t h e o r e t i c a l l y o r p r a c t i c a l l y . 3 8

During the war i n i nd i v idua l s e c t o r s a s i t u a -

2 - 1 2



r e s u l t o f an u n s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e o r a nu np ro vi ded f o r o f f en s i v e by i n d i v i d u a l g rou p s .Sometimes t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be premedi ta ted s ot h a t t h e t r o o p s c a n g a i n a more advantageous posi-t i o n f o r s u b s e q u e n t a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . W i t h -drawal h a s always b e e n n e gl e c te d i n a l l armies.i iowever , h i s to ry h a s t au g h t t h a t armed forcedwhich have not mastered t h e organized w i t h d r a w a l

cannot be cons idered as b a t t l e - r e a d y , s i n c e s u cht r o o p s a re most o f t e n d e f e a t e d . The Russian armyi n t h e p as t h as s u f f e red mo s t o f i t s l o s s e s d u r i ngwithdrawal . Lenin t au g h t t h a t : I . . . one whoknows how t o advance and h as no t le a rn ed how i nc e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t c ir cu ms ta nc es t o a d a p t t o i t ,t o withdraw, w i l l l o s e t h e war. Wars w h i c h havebegun ar id ended w i t h a v i c t o r i o u s o f f e n s i v e a r eno t ev id en t f rom wor ld h i s t o r y o r i f t h e y haveo c c ur r e d, a r e e x c ep t i o n s . ' 3 9

As i s ,the c a s e w i t h mo s t So v i e t mi l i t a ry t h eo ry b o o k s a

cons iderab le emphas i s i s p la ce d o n h i s t o r i c a l l e s s o n s l e a rn e

and t he need t o be prepared f o r t h e f u t u r e . O th er S o v i e t

m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s v i e w t h e wi th d rawa l i n R similar v e i n .

And f i n a l l y , about wi thdrawal . I n makinga w i t h d r a w a l a c t i v e ne s s a l s o f i n d s w i d e a p p l i c a -t i o n . I n t h e o p p o s i t e i n s t a n c e , w i t h d r a w a l i stransformed i n t o a panicky f l i g h t w i t h a l l t h econsequences s temming therefrom. In di vi du alco u n t e ra t t ack s , t h e p l acemen t of f i r e b a r r i e r s

on t h e p a t h s of t h e a t t a c k e r o r t h e pursu ingenemy, t h e f i rm hold ing o f consecu t ive ly occup iedl i n e s b y r e a r gua rds , l e a d i n g t h e enemy astray byd i v e r s i o n s , s e t t i n g u p a mbus he s, o b s t a c l e s , andd e s t r u c t i o n on t h e axes o f t h e enemy a t t ack -a l l these are f or ms i n which t h e a c t i v e n e s s oft ro o p s is man ife s ted i n a withdrawal .40

Withdrawal must be conducted i n an o rgan ized manner w i t h t h e

a pp ro va l o r d i r e c t i o n o f h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y and f o r a s p e c i f i c

purpose.

an ad hoc w i t h d r a w a l .

%he So v i e t s a re p a i n fu l l y aware o f t h e r e s u l t s o f

2-13



General-Major V. G . Reznichenko, a n o t h e r l e ad i ng Sov i e t

t a c t i c i a n , ha s similar views on the purpose and conduct o f

t h e withdrawal:

Withdrawal i s a f o r m o f combat act ion appliedf o r t h e purpose o f regrouping, occupying mores u i t a b l e p o s it i on s , o r withdrawing one’s own t r oopsfrom u n d e r poss i b l e a t t acks o f t h e enemy. Usually,t h e n e c e s s i t y o f w i t h d r a w a l appears i n t h e courseo f d e f e n s iv e a c t i o n s , when only by the temporaryl eav i ng of p a r t o f t h e t e r r i t o r y i s i t p o s s i b l et o withdraw one‘s troops f rom under i t s at tacko f supe r i o r forces of t h e enemy, and s e t themi n more p r o f i t a b l e p o s i t i o n . The necessi ty ofwithdrawal can appear w i t h t h e unsuccessful o u t -come o f meeting engagement and t o ge t out of anenci rc lement .41

Although withdrawal appearst o

b e most predominant during

defensive ope ra t i ons , t he au t hor op i nes t h a t offens ive oper -

a t i o n s may have t o be included i n th e withdrawal. However,

speed o f t h e opera t ion and i f p oss ib le a breaking o f t h e

contact of fe r advant ages .

During a ct iv e ope rat i on of th e enemy t h ewithdrawing troops are fo rced t o coun t e rac t h i mw i t h p a r t and sometimes a l l of t h e fo rces , con-

d u c t p e r s i s t e n t b a t t l e on s u i t a b l e l i n e s t odelay the advance o f t h e enemy, i n f l i c t l os s e s onh i m , ga i n time, and c r ea t e p r o f i t a b l e cond i t i onsf o r g o in g i n t o t h e designated area. Althoughac t iv e , dec i s iv e combat ac t ion s by withdrawingt roops i s t h e basis of such a w i t h d r a w a l , t h i smethod i s l e s s p r o f i t a b l e. i t i s consideredmore expedient t o accomplish w i t h d r a w a l withoutoccupat ion o f intermediate l i n e s and on as manyr o u t e s as p o s s i b l e, i n o r d e r t o re du c e t h edepths of co lumns and the time for accompl i shingt h e withdrawal .42

Proponents o f a book f o r b a t t a l i o n - l e v e l t a c t i c s have t h e i r

views of the w i t h d r a w a l : “A withdrawal may b e undertaken

f o r t h e purpose o f occupying more sui table l ines o r ‘to

2-14



r e m o v e o n e ' s s u b - u n i t s f r o m u n d e r a p o s s i b l e e n e m y a t tack ,

e s p e c i a l l y on e i n f l i c t e d o n t h e f l a n k and i n t h e r e a r of

o u r s u b - u n i t s . 1143 Again, e m p h a s i s i s p l a c e d o n a p p r o v a l

f r o m hi.gher e c h e l o n s a n d t h e f a c t i t may be c o n d u ct e d i n a

v a r i e t y o f c i r c u m s t an c e s .

I n an a t t ack , i t i s c a r r i e d o u t when t h e enemyo f f e r s s t u b b o r n r e s i s t a n c e i n on e s e c t o r , w h i l ei n a n o t h e r s e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s are f a v o u r a b l ef o r d e v e l o p in g t h e at tack o r c o m p l e t i n g n ew lya r i s i n g m i s s i o n s . A w i t h d ra w a l may a l so beu n d e r t a k e n w h e n t h e o u t me o f a n e n c o u n t e rb a t t l e i s u n s u c c e s s f u l . $8

The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o h a s a p p l i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e :

I n c a r r y i n g o u t a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n , t h en e c e s s i t y f o r a w i t h d r a w a l may a r i s e when movingt h e b a t t a l i o n f ro m o ne s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r t h r e a t -e n e d s e c t o r , f o r c o v e r i n g gaps fo rm ed i n t h ed e f e n c e as a r e s u l t o f enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , o rt o s e c u r e o pe n f l a n k s . 4 5

The w i t h d r a w a l has o t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n s w h ic h h a v e b o t h

o f f e n s i v e an d d e f e n s i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s .

a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n d u r i n g a n e n c i r c l e m e n t b a t t l e . I n t h i s

c a s e , t h e w i t h d r a w a l i s c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e aim o f r e i n -

f o r c i n g t h e d e f e n c e i n a t h r e a t e n e d s e c t o r , o r t o b re a k

t h r o u g h t h e e n v e l o p i n g f r o n t . " 46

p la c e d o n t h e p r e p l a nn ed u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e w i t h d r a w a l t o

e f f e c t f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e t a c t i c a l commander .

" I n a num ber o f s i t u a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e d e f e n c e , w i t h -

d r a w a l may be car r ied o u t d e l i b e r a t e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f

" A w i t h d r a w a l may

E m ph as is c o n t i n u e s t o be

s h o r t e n i n g t h e f r o n t , and t o r e l e a s e f o r c e s and w ea po ns . ,,47

I t a p p e a r s t h e S o v i e t s f e e l t h e w i t h d r a w a l c a n be c o n d u c t e d

2-15



d u r in g a l l p has es o f t a c t i c a l opera t ions , a l though t h e

preponderance o f cases should occur dur ing the defens ive .

2-5. CCNCLUSIONS.

The meeting engagement i s viewed by th e So v ie ts as a

s e p a r a t e form of combat w h i c h can t ake p l ace dur i ng o f f ens i ve

and de fens iv e oper a t ions . We should rea l ign o u r t h i nk i ng

a n d r e l evan t pub l i ca t i ons and take t h e same view as t h e

Sovi e t s . The meeting engagement or encounter bat t le can

take place under t h e fo l lowing c i rcumstances :

. A t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s when the enemy is

moving i n to d efe nsi ve pos i t io ns .

. A f t e r a rup t u re o f i n i t i a l p o si t i on s h as occurred

and re ser ves ar e being redeployed.

, Agains t ha s t i l y prepared po s i t ion s i n t h e depths

of a defense.

. Against reserves moving to ass i s t pursued forces.

, I n th e def ense when a co unt era t tac k h a s been

i n i t i a t e d .

, N i t h t he i n t roduc t i on of he l i born e , pa rachu t e , o r

sea- landed for ces in to the b a t t l e f i e l d .

The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o has app l i ca t i on as a sepa ra t e f o r m

o f combat and i s viewed as s u c h by t h e Sovi e t s . M o s t times

t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be conducted i n a defensive mode, b u t

it d e f i n i t e l y h a s app l i c a t i on dur i ng t he o f f ens i ve and meet-

i n g engagement. We s h o u l d take the same view and c o r r e c t

2-16



o u r d o c t r i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s . The w i th d r aw a l c a n o c c u r

when I

. C o n d u c t i n g eco no my o f f o r c e m e a s u r e s .

. To g a i n t i m e .

. To r e a l i g n o r " t i d y - u p " t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

. To make a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o t h e

f r a y i n o t h e r areas.

. To o c cu p y m ore f a v o r a b l e t e r r a in .

. T o a v o i d c o n t a c t w i t h a v a s t l y s u p e r i o r f o r c e .

, To s h o r t e n l i n e s o f c o mm u nic at io n o r f r o n t a g e s .

. To t e r m i n a t e a m e e t i n g e n g a g e m e n t .

. To r e o r g a n i z e o r r eg r o u p f o r c e s .

. To a v o i d e n c i r c l e m e n t .

2-6. ENDNOTES..

T e rm s , T r a n s l a t e d by t h e D C I S h l u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n ,T r a n s l a t i o n u u r e a u , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e D e pa r t m en t , Ottawa,C a na da , a nd p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e USA?'.

( W a s h i n g t o n 1 GPO, 1 9 7 6 ) , . 218. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r a s

' A . I . R a d z i y e v s k i y , e d . , D i c t i o n a r y of a a s i c M i l i t a xI

Rad z iy e v s k i , D i c t i o n a r y . P2 > l i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s of t h e S o v i e t A r m y (LIOSA) .

( A r l i n g t o n i USAI'TAD, 1 9 7 6 ) , p . 13 . ( C i t ed h e r e a f t e r asa.

' S o v i e t Army O p e r a t i o n s ( S A O ) . ( A r l i n g t o n 1 U S A I T A C ,A p r i l 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 3-7. ( C i t e d - h e r e a f t e r as S&.)

5 'i an d b o ok o n S o v i e t Gro un d F o r c e s ( ? I ; 30-40). (Wash-

' S o v i e t T a c t i c s i n t h e G f f e n s e (PT 100-3, 'JCL 1'1).

i n g t o n r G P 0 , 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 5 - 7 . ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as 1 % 30-40.)

( 7 o r t L e av en w o rth i U S A C G X , J u l y 1 9 7 8 ) , p p . 2 , 7 , and 4 . C .

2-17



7T1:?e Enemy Torte (RB 30-1 > . Tort Leavenworth:USJACGLC, 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 2 -7 . (C i t e d h e re a f t e r as R3 30-1.)

%andbook on t h e So vi e t h r m e d F o r c e s i i l ~ ~ - 2 6 8 0 - 4 0 - 7 8 ) .(Nashington: D I A , r 'ebruary 1978) , p. 8-15.

'Sovie t Tank Company T a c t i c s (DDI-1120-129-76). ( W a s h -

i n g t o n : Din, Liay 19761, p. 31, and The Soviet ivlotorizedR i f l e Company (001- l lOC-77-76) . (Washington: D i A , OctoTer19761 , p . 5 . ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DCi-1120-129-76 and D D I -1100-77-76.)

"Sovie t Tank Ba t t a l io n Tact ics (DDi-1120-1C-77).(Washington: DIA, August 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 11. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r asDDi-1120-10-77.)

"Radziyevskiy , Di c t io na ry , p . 51.

I 2 V . G . Reznichenko, e d . , T a c t i c s . T r a n s l a t e d b y t h eUSAL:. ( W i g h t - P a t t e r s o n U B : 1967),-. 130. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r

as Reznichenko, Tact ics . )

l 3 I b i d .

"Tbidt P * 1 3 2 .

1 5 1 b i d .I_

1 6 i 5 i d .

I 7 G . I . Garbuz, D . F. Loza, a n d I . F . Sazonov, .-- h eMotorized R i f l e Z a t t a l i o n i n B a t t l e , 2d e d . Trans la ted byOffice o f t h e Assistant Chief OP S t a f f f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e .

(Washington: 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 5 5 .

'%bid' 9 p . 57.

l9U.,. 5 8 .

2oF. I . Itonoplya and M. A . Maykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o ni n Combat, Chapters 3 , 4, 5 . T r a n s l a t e d b y h e Mult i l ingua lSe rv i d e s D i v i s i o n , T ra n s l a t i o n Bu re au , D e pa rt men t o f t h eS e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , C a n a d a . (Ottawa; October 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 32.( C i t e d he re a f t e r as Konoplyn, y," i p 3. 4, 5 . )

2 l w . , p , 3 4 .

22V. Ye. Savkin, T h e B a s i c F r i n c i p l e s of O p e r a t i o n a lArt and T a c t i c s . T ra n s l a t e d and p u b li s h e d un d er t h e a u s p i c e sof the USJW. ( l a s h i n g t o n : SFO, 1976) , p . 249 . (C i ted he re -a f t e r as S a v k i n , P r i n c i p l e s . )

2-18



23:;oviet Tactics I T h e Meeting EnPagement (DDI-1100-143-76). (Washington: D I A , December 1 9 7 6 ) , pa 1. ( C i t e d he re -a f t e r as DDI-1100-143-76,)

24Radz iyevskiy , Dic t ionarx , p . 150.

2 5 ~ ~ ~ ~9 P. 2 5 .

261b i d I

27FK 30-40, p . 5-19.

28RB 30-1, p . 2-17.

29Sovie t Tact i cs i n t h e Defense ( F T 100-3, VOL V ) .( F o r t Leav enwo rthi USBCGSC, Ju ly 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 28.

3OsA0, p. 4-18,

31DDI-1120-10-77, p. 45.

3 2 w . , p . 48.

33~DI-1120-129-76, p . 53 .

341bid .

3 5 ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 C 0 - 7 7 - 7 6 ,. 10.

36DDI-1100-143-76, p . 9 .

37V. D . S ok ol ov sk iy , e d . , S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y ,3d ed. Trans la t ion, commentary and a n a l y s i s by H a r r i e t

F a s t S c o t t . (New Yorkt Crane, Russak and Co., Inc . , 1 9 7 5 ) ,p. 1 2 3 .

38w.,. 133.

391b i d’ 9 p . 296.

“ S a vk i n , P r i nc i p l e s , p . 251.

41Reznichenchko, Tactics , p . 242.

“].bid.-“3,. 1 . Konoplya and N. A . hlaykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o n

i n Combat, Chap ters 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 . Tra ns l a t e d by t he K u l t i -l i n g u a l S e r v i c e s D i v i s i on , T r a n s l a t i o n du re a u , De a r trnen to f S t a t e , Ca na da . (Ottawa; October 1974; , p . 7 9 . ?Citedh e r e a f t e r as Konoplya, m, , 7 , 8 , 9 . )

2-19



2-20



CHAPTER 3

ECHELONS ABOVE REGIMENT

3-1 GENERAL

A review of units l a r g e r t h a n r e g i m e n t a l s i z e i s

e s s e n t i a l i n o r de r t o p o s t u l at e what regiments may be do-

ing i n spe c i f ied s i t ua t i on s . Sovie t commanders weight

main at ta ck s and pr imary defensiv e se ct or s w i t h opera t iona l ,

and s pe c i a l t roops suppor t . T h u s , one must examine the

s t r u c t u r eo f

l a r g e ru n i t s i n

order to de termine what is

a v a i l a b l e for apportionment t o lower u n i t s . The Front

commander w i l l determine what support he w i l l provide to

h i s var ious armies . I n t u r n , t h e Army commander must con-

s i d e r what support he h a s received, examine h i s organic

a s s e t s , a n d then provide support among h i s divisions. Then,

th e Div isi on Commander must c r i t i c a l l y look a t the suppor t

he h a s r ece ived , a l s o balance t h i s aga ins t h i s i n t r i n s i c

f o r c e s , and then make necessary a l loc a t i ons t o t he reg iments .

A f a c t o r t o b ea r i n mind i s the Sov ie t s do no t p rac t i ce c ross

attachment as we sense the term, ra th e r they provide rei n-

forcements. So, a So vi et commander does no t have t o g iv e

up a por t ion o f h i s for ces i n ord er t o ga in a complementary

arm. Let u s es tab l i sh the p remise t h a t t h e So v i e t s p r a c t i c e

and preach combined a r m s warfare.

p repa red a f t e r - ac t ion r epo r t s o f f ig h t i ng i n the 1973 Yom

Kippur W a r .

Sov ie t and US fo rces

3-1



3-2. FRONT.-RONT (F ron t ) - (1 ) The h ighes t s t r a t eg i c

format ion of armed forces.format ions, and major f i e ld fo rces o r s t r a t e g i cformat ions o f ground troops, a i r forces, and some-tim esleven n a v al f o r c e s ( r i v e r f l o t i l l a s , e t c . ) ;

American E d i to r ' s Note on So v ie t Nomenclatureand Terms. A number of Soviet terms have no exactEngl ish equiv alent . The terms l i s t e d below a r ethose used fre que nt l y i n t h i s d i c t i ona ry .

Fron t - Highes t l eve l of an ob"yedineniye. A

f r o n t may be formed from major f i e ro rc es(s t r a t eg ic format ions, soyedineniyi : and u n i t sfrom the var i ous Service s o f the armed forces) .'F ro nt ' may al s o be used as an adjective whenr e f e r r i n g t o u n i t s orga ni c t o a f r on t .

I t may include u n i t s ,

. . .

. . .

0b"yedinenive - Major Field Forces o r S t r a t e g i cTormation. An o-o era tional and o ra an iz at io nal en-t i t y i n the d i f f e r en t Serv ices of- the armed forc es ,an ob"yedineniue i s formed from v a r i o u s s e rv i c ebranches (or arms) f o r the purpose of conduct ingm i l i t a ry ope ra t ions .

Soyedineniye - Formation. The hi gh es t l e v e l ofmi l i t a r y organiza t ion1 Corps , Divis ion, or 3r igadel e ve l e qu iva le n t. I t may be formed from a s i n g l ebranch of vario us branches and Se rv ice s, in clu di ngnavalZsquadronst

A Front i s a wartime o rg an iz ati on witho ut a fixed

s t ruc ture and w i l l be comprised of va ri ou s op er at io na l a n d

s pe c i a l t r oops s uppor t un i t s . A preponderance of what we

would c a l l combat se rv ic e suppor t troo ps w i l l have t o be

ac t iva t ed f r o m th e res erv es. The bes t equ iva len t peace-

time unit would be a group of S ovi et fo rc es , such as Group

o f Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), o r one of t h e 16 m i l i t a r y

d i s t r i c t s w i th i n t h e Union of Sovie t Soc ia l i s t Republ i c s

(USSR).

. . .

3-2



U n i t s f ro m o t h e r m em bers o f t h e Warsaw P a c t c ou ld a l s o

be i n c l u d ed i n a F r o n t .

F r o n t - l e v e l s t a f f s a re p l a n n e d o n l y f o rt h e S o v i e t Army. U n t i l 1968, t h e H e a d q u a r -t e r s f o r t h e S o u t h w e st F r o n t was t o h av eb e e n formed f ro m p a r t s o f MOD P r a g u e and

t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f Mi l i t a ry Di s t r i c t T a b o r .S i n c e th e n , p l a n s are t o f o r m t h i s head-q u a r t e r s s t r i c t l y f ro m CGF assets . I n 1971/1972, h o w e v e r , Czech o f f i c e r s were a g a i na s s i g n e d t o t h e S o u t h w e s t F r o n t S t a f f , p r o b -ably f o r p s y c h o lo g i c a l r e a so n s . 3

T h u s , t h e a d d i t i o n of n on -S ov ie t f o r c e s i n t o F r o n t s would

have t o be c o n s i d e re d i n f o r m u l a t in g f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s .

T he N o r t h e r n G r o up o f F o r c e s ( N G F ) , C e n t r a l G roup of F o r c e s

( CG F ), f r o m P o l a n d , C z e c h o s l o v a k i a an d H u n ga r y , c o u l d be

F r o n t s as w e l l as GSFG. So a t l e as t f o u r F r o n t s w o u l d be

i m m e d ia te ly a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n o f a Thea te r

a t t a c k against N A T O , and t h e th ree m o s t w e s t e r n m i l i t a r y

d i s t r i c t s o f t h e USSR ( a a l t i c , B e l o r u s s i a n , and C a r p a t h i a n )

c o u l d a e r v e as t h e Theater 's s ec o nd e c h e l o n F r o n t s .

F i g u r e 1 i s a d i a g r a m o f a " T y p e " F r o n t . 3ear i n mind

e a ch F r o n t c o u l d be o rg a n i z e d d i f f e r e n t l y , and many s u p p o r t

units w o ul d h a v e t o be a c t i v a t e d f r o m t h e reserves p r i o r

t o t h e i r com mitm ent i n t o b a t t l e . The m a i n p o i n t i s t h e

a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r , a i r d e f e n s e , s i g n a l ,

c h e m ic a l , and o t h e r u n i t s t o r e i n f o r c e t h e s u b o r d i n a t e

Armies. Also, t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a i r b o r n e u n i . t s , o r g a n i c

3-3



FRONT F I

Airborne SSMD i v i s i o n

L r i d g i n g F e r r yU n i t s U n i t s

Medical TransportU n i t s U n i t s

I n t e lU n i t s

T a c t i ca1

Signa l b ia in tU n i t s U n i t s

I I G U R E 1

3-4



h i g h performance and r o t a r y wing a i r c r a f t must be t a k e n

i n t o con s id era t i on when organ i z ing t h e Armies f o r combat.

Approved sc en ar io s should be used f o r gaming t o

a s c e r t a i n w h ic h Fr on t i s t o be p layed , and w h a t asse ts t hey

have f o r a l l oc a t i on t o t h e Armies. ;or example, GSFG ha s

an a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i on w h i c h suppor t s i t as a matter of

rou t ine ,and t h e same i s t r u e w i t h t h e 1 6 t h Tact ical A i r

Army, which prov ides r econnaissance , f i g h t e r , f i g h t e r -

bomber, and bomber a i r c r a f t . A r ev iew of t he mis s ions

assigned t o s u b or d i na t e Armies shou ld prov ide a bas is f o r

reinforcement; of t h e Armies w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e s u p p o r t .

N i s s i o n and t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s s ho ul d h e l p de t er mi n e t h e

number o f s o r t i e s a l l o c a t e d t o t h e Armies f rom Fron t ' s

Tact ica l A i r Army. I t would not be unusual t o r e i n f o r c e

the main s t r i k e Army, o r Army i n t h e pr imary defens ive

s e c t o r , w i t h one- th i rd t o one-hal f of t h e a v a i l a b l e F ro nt

a r t i l l e r y . Yhe same p r o p o r ti o n c ou ld h o ld t r u e f o r a i r

d ef en se a r t i l l e r y , e ng in ee rs and chemical suppor t . Engi -

neer suppor t a l l oc a t io n woiild have t o be based upon the

miss ion and especia l ly on t h e t e r r a i n f a c i n g t h e Army.

Suppor t ing Armies o f t h e F r o n t w o u l d r e c e i v e smaller

p o r t i o n s o f app r op r i a t e r e in f o r cemen t s .

Most s t andar d s cen a r io s have a l r e ady a l loc a t e d suppo rt

t o Armies from t h e Fr on t. Care must 3e taken, however , to

avo id us ing 3. "Cookie Cu tt er " approac!] . I n ot h er words,

d o n ' t t a k e a v a i l a b l e a s s e t s and s im pl y a p po r t i o n them

3-5



e q u a l ly t o s u b o r d in a t e u n i t s . The S o v i e t s take i n t o c o n s i d er -

a t i o n t h e same f a c t o r s we do when p l a n n i n g c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s ,

i e : M iss ion , Enemy , Te r r a in , T i m e , and Troops (METTT) avail-

able. Thus i t i s i m p e r a t i v e t o a n a l y ze t h e m i s s i o n and per-

form a t e r r a i n a n a ly s i s p r i o r t o a l l o c a t i n g s up p o r t t o s ub -

o r d i n a t e elements. T h i s same p r o c e d u r e h o l d s t r u e for t h e

r e i n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e s s down t o com pany l e v e l . What i s b e s t

f o r on e u n i t may n o t be t h e best f o r a n adjacent u n i t .

because one Army receives a n e n t i r e a r t i l l e r y r e gim e n t do es

not mean t h a t each Army should receive a r e g i m e n t .

n o t f o r g e t t o include specia l t r o o p s s u p p o r t w i t h t h e o p e r -

a t i o n a l t r o o ps s u p po r t . Repair, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , POL and

ammuni t ion are j u s t as i m p o r t a n t t o t h e S o v i e t s as t h ey a r e

t o u s . Again, a n a l y s i s m u s t be p erfo rm ed p r i o r t o a s s ig n m e n t

o f a u g m e n ta t io n t o l o w er l e v e l s . As a n e xa mp le , a d d i t i o n a l

a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t might e n t a i l a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

s u p p o r t i n o r d e r t o h a u l t h e r e q u i r e d a m o u n t of ammuni t ion .

The m i s s i o n of t h e a r t i l l e r y an d t h e amounts o f ammuni t ion

t o be expended i n p r e p l a n n e d a r t i l l e r y f i r e s w i l l d r i v e t h e

ammuni t ion haul ing r e q u i r e m e n t m o r e t h a n j u s t t h e number

of a r t i l l e r y t u be s . I n o t h e r w ord s, d ev e lo p a t ho rough

o p e r a t i o n w h i l e o r g a n i z i n g a u n i t €or combat .

J u s t

A l s o , d o

A F r o n t i s capable of i n de p en d e n t o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n

t h e t hea t e r of o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h e F r o n t s w i l l p r o b a b l ywork i n c o n ju n c t i o n t o s a t i s f y t h e s t r a t eg ic m i s s i o n

a s s i g n e d t o t h e thea te r . To repeat , m i s s i o n s w i l l v a r y

3-6



from circumstance to circumstance. Don't fall into the

trap of always assigning the same missions to the same type

units. Bear in mind that Front objectives will be both

immediate and followup. The immediate objective for the

Front will be the followup objective for the Army. This

step down process holds true through battalion level.

Another major consideration is whether the planned

battle will be nuclear or non-nuclear. This has a tremendous

impact on the missions and widths of zones of attack assigned

to Armies. There also is a strong impact on the width and

depth of assigned defensive sectors.Also, the play of electronic warfare will have an

impact on organizing the forces for combat. The same con-

siderations for other force allocations are valid for the

distribution of radio-technical troop assets to lower

levels. The integration of jamming with the physical

destruction of' facilities by artillery is called radio-

electronic combat. The Soviets plan to neutralize our

command and control communications by jamming one-quarter

to one-third of o u r critical nets and destroying an addi-

tional one-quarter to one-third of our command and control

facilities. Thus, if they can incapacitate fifty percent

of o u r necessary communication8 links, they feel they have

effectively destroyed o u r command and control capabilities.

The integration of radio-electronic combat into all war-

games is an essential task. This is another area which

3- 7



must be ca re fu ll y planned when making al lo c at io n s t o sub-

o rd i na t e un i t s .

3 - 3 . ARMY.

ARMIYR (army) - (1 ) An op er at io na l groupin go f one or another Serv ice of th e armed fo rc es ,con s i s t ing of s ever a l formations of var iou sbranches and sp ec ia l tro op s, and intended f o rthe conduct of opera t ions (combat ac t iv i t i es ) ;(2) ground t roops (forces); (3 ) sometimesthe word army i s used t o des ign ate t h e armedforces o f a t a t e , e. g., th e Red Army o r th e

Ground Armies within the Front can be of two t ypes ,

Soviet Army.8

e i ther Tank or Combined A r m s . A s i s t he ca se w i t h Front ,

t h e r e is no f ixed s t ruc tu re for an Army and some special

tro op s su pp or t must be mobilized from th e re se rv es . An

Army w i l l usually have from three t o f i v e Div i siona , a long

w i t h appropr ia te opera t iona l and spec ia l t roops suppor t .

A type Army i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig ur e 2. The Tac t i ca l A i r

Army w i l l not be discussed i n t h i s paper.

A T a n k Army may have from two t o f ou r t ank d i v i s i ons ,

and a t l e a s t one motorized r i f l e d iv i s ion . A Combined A r m s

Army has a r e v e r s e r a t i o , w i t h two t o fou r motorized r i f l e

divi s ions , and usua l ly a t ank d iv i s io n . The l i s t i n g o f

u n i t s a t Figure 3 shows th e d i f f er e n t combinations of

d iv i s ions wi th in CSFG.

The des igna t ions , ' G u a r d s A r m x , ' 'GuardsTank A r m ? , ' and 'S:ock Armg' have only h i s -t o r i ca l honor i f ic s ig ni f i can ce , and have

3 -8



. ' iGURE 2

3-9



Se le ct ed Elements of Group of S ov ie t Forc es Germany

1st Guards T'ank Army6 t h Guards T a n k D i v i s i o n7th Guards T a n k D i v i s i o n9 t h T a n k D i v i s i o n

1 1 t h Guards T a n k D i v i s i o n27th Guards Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n

1 6 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n21st b lo tor ized R i f l e D i v i s i o n25th T a n k D i v i s i o n94 th G u a r d s Niotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n

1 0 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n1 2 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n47th Guards Tank Division

207th Guards iv iotor ized R i f l e D iv i s io n

20th Guards Motorized R i f l e g i v i s i o n39th Guards Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n5 7 t h Guards Xotor ized R i f l e D i v i s i o n7 9 t h G u a r d s Tank Div i s ion

6 t h Guards Motori zed R i f l e Di v i s ion1 4 t h G u a r d s Xoior ized R i f l e D i v i s i o n3 5 t h M ot or ized R i f l e D i v i s i o n

2d G u a r d s Army

3d Shock Army

8 t h Guards Army

20th Guards A r m y

( E x t r a c t e d from page 62, The 'iiarsaw --'I ac t Armies '

T I C U R E 3

3-10



nothing t o d o w i t h t he o rgan iza t ion o r func-t i o n of t h e armies. The term 'Guards' doesnot r e f e r t o a n e l i t e u n i t w i t h s p e c i a ltr a in i n g and equipment. The de sig na tio n i sg iv en t o u n i t s f o r t r a d i t i o n a l r ea so n s orf o r s p e c i a l r e c o g ni ti o n o f acheivement i nt r a i n i n g or p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . 5

The preponderance of So vi et u n it s earned t h e i r " G u a r d s "

des ig nat io n du rin g "The Great Pa tr io ti c War." I t was used

as a morale bu i lde r and fr equ ent l y i n conjun ct ion w i t h

l a r g e numbers of the un i t becoming members of the Communist

Par ty , t o ensure loya l ty t o "Mother Russ ia. "

An Army i s capable of independent operat ions, but

most of the t ime it w i l l opera te as p a r t of a designated

Front. H is to ri ca ll y, th e So vi ets used an "Army Corps,"

which was a combined arms u n i t o f a t l e a s t two d i v i s i ons ,

which could operate as a subordina te un i t o f an Army, or

perform independent missions. I t could be formed w i t h

a p p r o p r i a t e opera t io na l and sp ec i a l t roops suppor t , t o

c a r ry ou t s pe c i a l missions i n a pa r t i c u l a r s e c t o r . There

i s no known Army Corps i n exis tenc e today, and i t s use in

a f u t u r e war i s ques t ionable .

iviost approved scenarios have already designated which

Army w i l l be played, what i t s mission w i l l be, and provided

t he a pprop r i at e s l i c e of opera t io na l end s pe c i a l t roops

support . The s t ep s i n a l l oca t ing suppor t t o d iv i s ions a re

th e same as a ll o ca ti n g t o th e Army. aeware of t h e "Cookie

Cut ter" 1 Remember, th e followup obj ec ti ve f o r the Army is

3-11



t h e Fron t ' s immedia te ob j ec t iv e , w h i l e a Divis ion ' s fo l low-

up ob jec t ive i s t h e Army's immediate ob je c ti ve .

Usually, Combined A r m s Armies l ead a Front a t t a c k , w i t h

t h e Tank Army o r Armies i n t h e Front 's second echelon as an

e x p l o i t a t i o n force . T he same gen era l ar r a y may hold t r u e

f o r t h e def ense as w e l l , due t o second echelon Armies being

used as t h e F ro n t ' s c o u n t e r a t t a c k force . Do not, however,

get hung up w i t h "Always." 3e f l ex ib l e , and p l an acco rd ing

t o t h e f a c t o r s of METTT. Within a Combined Arms Army t he

forward element i s u s u a l l y a mo to riz ed r i f l e d i v i s i o n , w i t h

a t a n k d i v i s i o n r et a i ne d a s an e x p l o i t a t i o n o r c o u n t e r -a t t a c k force . Again, t h i s i s no t a h a r d and f a s t r u l e and

each spec i f i c s i t u a t i o n will have t o be judged on i t s own

merit .

Cons ide r a t ion must b e given t o the formation o f an

Army Artillery Group ( A A G ) .

is t o p ro v id e c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y assets f o r

a sp ec i f i c pur pose o r period of t ime . Long r ange a r t i l l e r y

p ieces such as mult ip le rocket launchers and i%-46 l 3 O m m

Field Guns would be i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r such a g rouping .

The pr obab le in t r oduc t ion of r o c k e t a s s i s t e d p r o j e c t i l e s

( R A P ) w i l l m ak e a l m o s t a n y a r t i l l e r y piece s u i t a b l e f o r

t h i s mission. The d e c i s i o n t o f o r m an AA G may be specified

i n t h e s c e n a r i o, o r made by the gamer.

The purpose o f such a group

3-12



3-4. D I V I S I O N , .

D I V I Z I Y A ( d i v i s i o n ) - The basic t a c t i c a lf o r ma t ion of t h e va r ious s e r v i c e b r anches (arms) ,c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l units and subun i t s . I nforeign armies, a ground f o r c es d i v i s i on con-s i s t s of' br i gad es , combat g roups , in d i v i du alb a t t a l i o n s , and o t h e r u n i t s and su bu i t s of

S o v i e t Army Divis ions inc l ude Tank , Motorized Ri f l e ,

va r ious b ranches and sp ec ia l t r oops . 8

and Airborne . Th is s tu dy w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e use of Tank

and Motorized R i f l e D iv i s ions . A lthough th e r e a r e a l o t

o f mechanized in f a n t r y c a r r i e r s i n th e So vi et Army, the

preponderance of t h e i r armored personnel ca r r i e r s a re

wheeled veh i c l e s . The o f f i c i a l s ce na r io shou ld p r ov ide

t h e TOE of t he un i t be ing p layed and th e app r op r i a t e

v e h i c l e s t o be gamed. A s a r u l e of thumb, pl an f o r GSFG

u n i t s t o have one reg iment equ ipped w i t h i n f a n t r y combat

v e h i c l e s (IjbIPs) i n e ac h mot ori ze d r i f l e d i v i s i o n , w i t h t h e

other two motorized r i f l e regi ment s having armored perso nnel

c a r r i e r s ( b T R s ) . The Tank Divis ions w i t h i n GSFG have JMP

equipped t r oop s wi th in t h e mo tori ze d r i f l e r e gi me n t. S o v i e t

un i t s o u t s i d e GSr'G may have ol de r APCs and t h e above r a t i o

may n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e . The approved scenar io o r t h e D I A

Organizat ion Guide must be used t o determine e xa ct amounts

of equipment, by typ e, t o be used. For infor mati on purposes ,

Z igures 4 and 5 a r e t ype Tank and Motor ized R i f l e Div is i ons .

Numbers of t a n k s , A P C s or Armored In fa nt ry Fi gh t i ng Vehicles

(AlFVs), and numbers and t y p es of a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s w i l l vary

widely throughout the Warsaw Fac t . S t i c k t o appr oved sou r ces

3-13



t

TANK

D I V I S I O N

IDivKQ

11CnsnOpJ l-II-1ontrol Co

F I G U RE 4

3-14



IOTORIZEDRIFLEI 3I'lISIO?I

l ' r a l f i cC o n t r o l Co

[ Regt 1

Eng i nee r

T r a n s p o r t Chem Def

1I aakery I

FI.GURE 5

3-15



f o r de ter min ing typ es and numbers of combat veh ic le s t o be

gamed. As an example, t h e type and q u a n t i t y of a r t i l l e r y

pieces w i l l vary between T a n k and Motorized i t i fl o Di vis ion s.

Usually, s tan da rd, approved sc ena rio s provide t h e gamer

w i t h t h e div is i on organiz a t ion and the po r t io n of Front and

Army re in fo rc em en ts t o be gamed. T h e c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n

then i s t o f u r t h e r a l l o c a t e t h e assets received from higher

headquar te rs and d isp ers e organic e lements to organize the

d i v i s i o n f o r combat. The f a c t o r s o f METTT a r e j u s t as

app l i c ab le t o t h i s process as they were t o pr evious con-

s i d e r a t i o n s . The zone of action f o r t h e d i v i s i o n , o r

s e c t o r i n t h e defense, i s usua l ly g iven i n t h e scenar io ,

and t h e gamer must as s ign bounda ri e s, c a l l ed d iv id ing l i n e s ,

f o r t h e regiments .

A prime considera t ion a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l i s whether o r

not t o form a Divis ion Art i l l e ry Group ( D A G ) . Long range

a r t i l l e r y from Fron t and Army, as well as organic mul t ip le

rocke t l aunchers , are i d e a l l y s u it e d f o r t h i s mission. I f

you form a DAG mix t h e a r t i l l e r y c a l i b e r s t o a void p re -

s e n t i n g a unique sig na tur e. The FROG b a t t a l i o n i s u s u a l l y

con t ro l l ed sepa ra t e ly by t h e division commander, due t o

i t s long range nuc lea r ca pa bi l i ty . T h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e

Sov ie t s t o mass t h e i r a r t i l l e r y f i r e s a llow s f o r d is p er s io n

o f f i r i n g e lements throughout t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . M o s t com-

pu te r a s s i s t e d wargames have l i m i t e d t e r r a i n a v ai la b le ,

a l though t h i s problem i s be ing correc ted . T h e format ion

3-16



o f a DAG may e t o p a l o t of a r t i l l e r y f i r e from z oi ng i n t o

t h e t e r r a i n be in g gamed, but t h i s i s a c c e p t a b l e , as l o n g as

proper miss ions have been ass igned t o t h e DAG, and regimental

a r t i l l e r y a s s e t s a r e a v a i l a b le t o p rovide i n d i r e c t f i r e sup-

p o r t . A l s o , a r t i l l e r y f rom second e c he l on d i v i s i o n s of t h e

Army might be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e d i v i s i o n commander f o r

his employment during a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d .

The fol lowing i s a s h o r t l i s t i n g o f d i v i s i o n op e ra t io n al

c a p a b i l i t i e s 1

T a n k D i v i s i o n

Offense. A t t a c k as a f i r s t e ch el on d i v i s i o n of aT a n k Army t o p en et ra te enemy def en s i vep o s i t i o n s .

. Opera te as t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n f o r c e o f aCombined A r m s o r Tank Army t o ex p l o i tgaps i n enemy fo rmat i ons .

. Attack as a f i r s t e c he l on d i v i s i o n of aCombined A r m s Army whenever the enemy i sweak and good terrain i s a v a i l a b l e .

. Conduct pursu i t opera t ions , whenever theenemy i s w it hd ra wi ng , t o d e s t r o y t h eenemy and s e c u r e Army ob j e c t i v e s .

Defense

. Conduc t m ob il e coun t e r a t t ack ope r a t i o nsfr om p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n o r b eh in d t h eArmy's second echelon.

. Defend i n p l a c e t o g a i n t ime t o massf o r c e s f o r c o n t i nu i n g a n a t t ack .7

Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n

O f 1:ense

. A t t ack as a f i r s t e c h e l o n d i v i s i o n o fa Combined A r m s o r Tank Army t o p en e tr at eo p p o s i n g d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

3-17



. Attack as a second echelon di vi si on ofa Combined Arms Army t o m ai nt ai n t h emomentum and engage enemy reserves.

. Operate independently f o r b r i e f p e r i o d sagainst weak o r i so la ted enemy ta rge t s .

.Operate as Front Reserve.

Defense

. Defend a zone i n t h e main defense bel to f the Combined A r m s Army t o d e s t r o andc a n a l i z e t h e a t t ack ing enemy force.

B o t h types o f ground div i s ions have a suf f i c ient mix

o f oper a t iona l suppor t and s pe c ia l t roops suppor t t o en-

ab l e them t o undertake independent o pera t i ons f o r l imi ted

per iods of time. Usually, however, they op er ate as an

i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a Tank o r Combined A r m s Army. I f a

d i v i s i o n were t o be assigned a n independent mission f o r

a sus ta in ed per iod, ad di t io na l re info rceme nts would have

t o be provided from e i t h e r F r o n t o r Army assets.

irlithin T a n k Divis ions ass igned t o SSFG, each Tank

Xegiment h a s an organic hotorized Rifle Company. T h i s

may be increased t o a b a t t a l i o n s i z e u n i t , o r i t could be

a spec i a l mi ss i on un i t . ae s u r e t o check approved TOES

pr i o r t o o rgan i z i ng your f o r c e f o r t h e game. Tank Divis ions

tend t o be u s e d f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n and coun t e ra t t ack fo rces ,

a l though t h i s i s not a hard and f a s t r u l e , K ot or ized R i f l e

Div isi ons p oss ess more f i r e power than Tank Di vi si on s,

e spec i a l l y i n d i r e c t means, and a re i d ea l l y su i t e d f o r l ead-

in g a t t a c ks o r t o be t h e f i r s t eche lo n i n Army de fens i ve

3-it3



posit ions. : !owever, T a n k u n i t s a re c a pa b l e o f de fe nd i ng .

Whenever organizing a fo rc e f o r combat , th ink combined

arms 1

The fol lowing i s a s eque nc e f o r p l a nn i ng and o r g a n i z i n g

t h e force for combat which i s not a l l i n c l u s i v e , b u t m i g h t

prove u s e f u l i n p re p ar i ng f o r t h e wargamei

a . Miss ion Ana lys i s .

(1 ) Determine miss ion.

( 2 ) D et ermi ne t roop s a va i l a b l e .

( a ) Organic .

( ' 3 ) F r o n t .

( c ) Army.

( d ) Other .

b . A na l yz e t e r r a i n .

(1 ) I n t h e O ff en se .

( a ) Determine a t l e a s t two routes of advancef o r t h e D iv i si o n, p r e f er a b ly t h r e e o rf o u r .

( b ) A D i v i s i o n w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a ne n t i r e z o n e o f a c t i o n , b u t need notoccupy t h e e n t i r e zone .

enemy's:

.-1. Covering ?orce?

-. :>lain 3 a t t l e Area?

2. Command and Control?

-. L og is t i c s f a c i l i t i e s ?

5 . A r t i l l e r y ?

-. Reserves?

( c ) Where a re l i k e l y l o c a t i on s f o r t h e

3-19



Gbstacles?

Cover and concealed withdrawalr o u t e s ?

L i k el y p o i n t s f o r c o u n t e r at t a c ks ?

K i l l i n g z o n e s ?Key a x i a l and l a t e r a l routes '?

L ines o f Communication?

>o u n d a r i e s?

St rongpoints '?

j a t t l e a r e a s / p o s i t i o n s ?

Overwatch posi t ions?

Al te rna te / supp lementa l pos i t ions?

Nuclear de l ivery means?

EIJ asse t s?

A i r f i e l d s ?

?orward Observers'?

Any ot h er known l o c a t i o n s orexp lo i t ab le weaknesses?

A s ce r ta i n c a n a l i z i n g t e r r a i n .

Determine natural /manmade ob st ac le s t omovement.

Analyze r ive rs / s t r eams which w i l l havet o be c r os s ed , i n o rd e r t o assess e n g i n e e rsu p p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s .

Choose key t e r ra in .

Analyze road and r a i l networks t o d e t e r -

mine l o g i c a l c h ok e po i nt s f o r l i n e s o fcommunication.

Determine areas where you w i l l oevu lne r ab le t o f l a n k a t t a c ks and/orambushes.

3-20



( j ) A scer t a in t e r r a i n w h i c h olYers inaskingf o r fr i e n d l y and enemy employment 0:'

a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s .

( 2 ) I n t h e D ef en se .

( a ) Determine enemy routes o f advance, ave-nues of approach, i n t o your defe ns iv e

se c t or . F igure two l e v e l s down, i f youa r e th e d i v i s i on commander, l o o k f o rb a t t a l i o n s i z e ave nu es of a pp ro ac h.

enemy's I

- . O bjec t ives?

- . Locat ions?

( b ) 'dhere a re l i k e l y l o c a t i o n s :or t h e

- Command and C on t r o l- L og i st i cs f a c i l i t i e s- A r t i l l e r y

- Nuclear del ivery means- EW a s s e t s-, A i r f i e l d s- Assembly areas- Forward observers- Overwatch posi t ions- Other , as s u i t a b l e

( c ) L o o k a t t h e t e r r a i n f rom a X u e p oi nt o fview. I n o t he r words , look a t t h et e r r a i n as i f you h a d t o a t t ack i n t oyour own posit ions. T h i s w i l l a i d i n

determining where t o p l a c e o b s t a c l e s ,m i n e f i e l d s , e t c .

and concealed observance of avenues ofapp roach in t o you r pos i t i ons .

( e ) Choose t e r r a i n which can suppo r t b a t t a l i ons i z e s t r o n g p o i nt s .

( f ) Look f o r s ub se qu en t t e r r a i n f o r a n i n -dep th de f ense .

( g ) A s ce r ta i n l o c a t i o n s f o r p la t oo n s i z eambushes along avenues of approach.

( h ) D eter mine o t he r l o ca t i on s neces sa r y f o rbu i ld ing an a l l - a r ound de f ense .

( d ) D eter mine t e r r a i n which a f f o r d s covered

3-21



c . Determine enemy strength.

(1 ) I n t h e o f f e n s e t h i s w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t oknow i n o r de r t o de te rmine th e necessa ryf o r c e s t o a t t a c k A u e p o s i t i o n s .

I n t h e d e f e n s e t h i s w i l l a l l o w you t o a d j u s tyour o rg an i za t io n f o r combat and f o r ce d i s -p o s i t i o n , i n o r de r t o meet a n a n t i c i p a t e da t t ack . I t w i l l also a i d i n t h e s t r u c t u r i n go f r e s e r v e f o r c e s .

( 2 )

d . Assign o b j e c t i v e s and d iv id ing l i n e s . for t h eo f fe n se , d i v i d i n g l i n e s i n t h e d e f e n se .

e . 9 ased on y o ur a s se s sm e n t , o r g a n i z e t h e d i v i s i o nf o r c om ba t a n d a l l o c a t e n ec es s ar y f o r c e s t o t h ereg iment s .

f . Based o n your or gan iza t io n f o r combat and miss ions

a s s ig n ed t o s u b o r d i n a t e s , p r e p ar e a su p p o r t i n ga r t i l l e r y p l a n . Don't f o r g e t t o u s e smoke, wherea p p r o p r i a t e .

Oe t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n o n what might c o n s t i t u t e t y p i c a l

o r t y p e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t o r e gi m en t s w i l l be provided i n

t h e f o l l o wi n g c h a p t e r s .

3-5. DE.?IAI%IONS. A l l d e f i n i t i o n s are t aken f rom Dic t iona rxof Yasic X i l i t a r y Terms, by A . I.

Radziuevskiy . The number o r i o r t o t hed e f i n i t i o n E e fe rs t o t h e e h t r y i t em w i t h -i n t h e d i c t i o n a r y .

48 AVTGMOdIL'NYYE VGYSKA ( m o t o r t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s ) - S p e c i a lt r o o p s i n t e n d e d t o t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s and m i sc e ll a ne o usmaterial by motor ve hi c l e . Liotor t r an s p or t t roo ps areo r ga n iz e d i n u n i t s and subuni ts .

72 ARNEYSKAYA ARTILLERISDAYA GRUPFA (army a r t i l l e r y g roup) -An a r t i l l e r y g r o up d i r e c t l y su b o r d i n a t e t o a n army c ommander,and in tended t o perform f i r e m is si ons i n t h e i n t e r e s t oft h e army opera t ion as a whole.

73 ARIViE~SIUYA ARTILLERIA (army a r t i l l e r y ) - Organic armya r t i l l e r y , d i r e c t l y subord ina te t o t h e army commander.

86 ARTILLERIYSKAYA GRUPPA ( a r t i l l e r y group) - A temporaryg r o u p i n g c o n s i s t i n g o f severa l a r t i l l e r y u n i t s o r s u bu n i ts

3-22



under one command f o r t h e purpose of ex ecut ing mis s ions i ncombat. The composi t ion o f a n a r t i l l e r y g roup i s determinedi n each case oy t h e s i t u a t i o n .

158 BLIZXAYSEAYA ZADACHA (immediate o b j e c t i v e ) - T h a t p a r to f t h e o v e r a l l combat m is s io n of t r o o p s i n a n o f f e n s i v eop er at io n which must be accomplished f i r s t . Depending ont h e s i t u a t i o n , a n i n i t i a l o b j e c t i ve may be t o a n n i h i l a t e

t h e enemy's means of nu cl ea r a t t a c k , break u p h i s basicgroup i ng , o r t o t a k e p o s s es s i on o f r e g i o n s, l i n e s , o rp o s i t i o n s , t h e capture of which w i l l e n s u r e s u c c e s s f u le x e c u t i o n o f a f u t u r e ( t h e n e x t ) m i ss io n.

242 VVGD V 50Y (commitment t o combat) - An organized move-ment forward, deployment and engagement o f u n i t s of t h esecond eche lon and combined-arms r es e r v e i n o r d e r t o i n -c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t a lo ng a g i ve n a x i s , t o d e v el o p t h e s u c c e s sachieved by t h e f i r s t e ch el on , t o r e pl a c e t h e tr o op s o f t h ef i r s t ech elo n when t h e l a t t e r h a s l o s t i t s c omba t e f f e c t i ve -ne s s as a r e s u l t o f enemy nuc lea r a t t a c k , and a l s o t o f u l -fill

new combat missions.243 V V G D V SRAZSENIYE (commitment t o b a t t l e ) - An organizedadvance of a for mat i on of t h e second echelon (combined-armsr e s e r v e ) o f a f r o n t ( a r m y ) i n t o t h e f i r s t e c he l on , a nd t he i rdep loymen t i n t h e c ou r s e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n t o i n c r e a s e t h ee f f o r t a l on g t h e ax is o f t h e main a t t a c k , t o d ev e lo p t h es u c c e s s a c h i e v e d by the f i r s t e c he lon , t o t a k e pos s e s s i onof impor tan t areas , o r t o c a r r y o u t o t h e r m is si on s.

344 V O Z D U S X N Y Y DESANT ( a i r bo r n e a s s a u l t ) - T r o o p s a i r l i f t e dt o t h e enemy rear t o c on du ct c ombat a c t i v i t i e s t h e r e . Accord-i n g t o i t s s c a l e , a n a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t may b e t a c t i c a l , oper-

a t i o n a l , o r s t r a t e g i c . The a s s a u l t may be e f f e c t e d e i t h e rby parachute o r from l an de d a i r c r a f t , o r by a combinat ionof both.

376 V T O R O Y ES:!ELGN (second echelon) - The pa r t o f a n oper -a t i o n a l f or ma ti on o r c o m b a t format i on of t ro ops which i sn ot d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n engagement ( b a t t l e ) a t agiven moment, b u t which i s i n t e nde d t o be use d t o bu i l d UFt h e f o r c e of a s t r i k e d ur in g a n o f f e ns i v e , t o i n c re a s e t h es t a b i l i t y and a g g r e s s i v e n es s o f d e f e n s e , and t o r e p l a c et roops of t h e f i r s t e c he l on i n t h e e ve nt t h a t t h e l a t t e rs u s t a i n s h eavy l o s s e s . The e x i s t e n c e o f a second echelonc r e a t e s f a v o ra b l e c o n d i t i on s f o r b u i l d i n g up s t r e n g t h ,

c a r r y i n g o u t a maneuver, o r r a p i d l y t r a n s f e r r i n g e f 3 o r t fromone s e c t o r t o a n ot h er du r in g an o pe r a t io n ( b a t t l e ) . i n con-t r a s t t o a combined-arms r es er v e, combat miss ions f o r asecond echelon a re ass igned a t the same time as t h o s e f o rt h e f i r s t eche lon .

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436 GLAVNYY UDAR (main s t r i k e ) - The a ggr e ga t e of nuc l e a rs t r i k e s and co o rd in a te d s t r i k e s d e a l t by main elements ofn a va l f o r c e s i n t h e s e c t o r o r r e g i o n of d e c i s i v e i mp or ta nc efor p u t t i n g t h e enemy t o r o u t and complet ing t h e combatmiss ion. T h e main s t r i k e i s d e l i v e r e d i n a c co rd an ce w i t ht h e purpose of t h e o p e r a t i o n o r b a t t l e and t h e s p e c i f i cc o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n .

469 DAL'NEYSXAYA (POSLEDUVUS!-'CiIAYA) Z A D A C F A ( f ollowupo b j e c t i v e ) - The por t ion of th e ov e r a l l combat m i s s ion i nan of f e ns i ve ope r a t i on ( o r c om ba t) ca r r i ed o u t on complet iono f t h e i n i t i a l m is si on . Env isa ged i n t h e fo l lowup miss iona r e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f any f u r t h e r n u c l e ar a t t ack capa-b i l i t y mani fes ted by t h e enemy, t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of h i sr e s e r v e s , a n d a t t a i n m e n t o f t h e g o a l of t h e o p e r a t i o n(combat ) .470 D A L'N O X Y N A Y A ARTILLBRlk'A ( lo ng -r an &e a r t i l l e r y ) -A r t i l l e r y w i t h a g r e a t f i r i n g ra n g e , p re d om in a nt l y guna r t i l l e r y , used t o n e u t r a l i z e and d e s t r o y i mp o rt a nt t a rge t slocated beyond t h e range o f h o wi t z er a r t i l l e r y and m o rt a rs .

507 DLVIZIOrdNAYA ARl i ' ILLERiYSKAYA GRUPPA ( D A G ) ( d i v i s i o na r t i l l e r y g roup) - A r t i l l e r y a t t h e d i r e c t d i s p o s a l o f t h edi v i s i on commander, co ns i s t i ng of more than one b a t t a l i o n ,c r e a t e d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of combat t o f u l f i l l m iss ion s onb e h a l f of t he d i v i s io n , and un i t e d by a common command. Ad i v i s io n a r t i l l e r y group i s made up o f d i v i s io n a r t i l l e r yand a t t ached a r t i l l e r y , and be ar s t h e d iv i s ion ' s num be r .The main purpose of a d i v i s i on a r t i l l e r y group i s t os uppor t r e g im en t s w i t h f i r e , a n d t o engage t h e enemy'st a c t i c a l w e a p o n s , a r t i l l e r y , and mor ta r s .

574 ZAXYSEL OPERATSII ( 3 O Y A ) ( c on c ep t o f a n o p e r a t i o n ( o rb a t t l e ) ) - T h e i d e a e x p r e s s i n g t h e b a s i c thought and con-t e n t o f t h e de ci si on of t h e commanding ge ne ra l ( o r command-e r ) . T h e concept o f a n o p e ra t i on ( o r b a t t l e ) i n c l u de s !t h e o b j e c t i v e t o b e a t t a i ned i n t he f o r thc om ing ope r a t i on( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e method o f a t t a i n i n g i t ; t h e zone ( o rsec t o r ) o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h e m a i n e f f o r t s of t h e t r oopsand t he g r oup ing of f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s by s e c t o r1 apo ss i b l e maneuver o f fo r ce s and weapons i n th e cour s e oft h e c o m b a t a c t i v i t i e s , a n d t h e measures n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r et im e ly c om ple t i on o f t he ope r a t i ona l ( o r combat) mission.

742 ISONTRATAKA (countera t tack) - An a t t a c k under taken byde f e nd ing t r oops a ga ins t a n a t t a c k ing e ne m y f o r t he pu r pos eo f p u t t i n g him t o r o u t ( o r d e s t r oy i n g h i m ) and achievingcomple te o r p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n l o s t byt h e de f e nd ing t r oops . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k i s usually mountedr;y t h e second echelons and reserves 0. C un i t s and f o r m a t ions ,and a l s o by pa r t o f t he f o r c e s o f t h e f i r s t eche lon f roms e c t o r s n o t u n d e r a t t a c k .

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810 LETSYY RESLJRS ( so r t i e r a t e ) - T h e num ber o f s o r t i e s o fa s t r a t e g i c f o r m a t i o n ( f o r m a t i o n , u n i t ) w hic h may b e p l a n n e df o r ( o r assigned t o ) a n o p e r a t i o n o r co mb at m i s s io n , ex-p r e s s e d i n arm y s o r t i e s , d i v i s i o n s o r t i e s , r e g i m e n t a l s o r t i e so r i n d i v i d u a l a i r c r a f t s o r t i e s .

9 5 2 OSESPECHENIYE OFERATSII (:3OYA) ( s u p p o r t of a n o p e r a t i o n( o r b a t t l e ) )

-The a g g r e g a t e o f m u t u a l l y - c o o r d i n a t e d meas-

u r e s t a k e n b y t h e command, s t a f f s , and t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s )f o r t h e p u r po s e o f c r e a t i n g t h e m os t f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n sf o r co mb at o p e r a t i o n s , b o th i n t h e p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e a ndi n t h e c o u r s e of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . T he n a t u r e o fs u c h measures i s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and byt h e m i s s i o n s a s s i g n e d t o t h e t r o o p s . T h e basic t y p e s o fo p e r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t , a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l s e r v i c e s , a re :r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i p r o t e c t i o n o f t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s ) and r e a ri n s t a l l a t i o n s f ro m w eap on s o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n 1 e n g i n e e r i n gs u p p o r t ; ca m o uf la ge 1 r a d i o - e l e c t r o n i c c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ; andt o p o g e o d e s i c , h y d r o m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , a n d r ea r s u p p o r t .

1016 OPERASIVNYYE REZERVY ( o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s ) - Combined-arms f o r m a t i o n s , and a l s o f o r m a t io n s ( o r u n i t s ) o f v a r i o u ss e r v i c e branches ( o r f o r c e s ) , u s e d t o c a r r y o u t m i s s io n sw hic h a r i s e s u d d e n l y i n t h e c o u r s e o f a n o p e r a t i o n . O pe r-a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s a r e p a r t o f an o p e r a t i o n a l o r d e r o f b a t t l eo f m a jo r f i e l d f o r c e s .

1027 O P O R N Y Y PUNKT ( s t r o n g p o i n t ) - T h a t p a r t o f a d e f e n s i v ep o s i t i o n w h i c h i s m ost f o r t i f i e d , c o n t a i n s t h e m os t w ea po ns ,and i s m o s t r e i n f o r c e d w i t h o b s t a c l e s , a nd w h ic h i s e q u i p p e df o r a l l - r o u n d d e f e n s e , p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t t a n k s . A s t r o n gp o i n t i s t h e m ain d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n , an d i s o r g a n i z e d i nt h e m ost p r o b a b l e s e c t o r o f enemy a t tack . S t r o n g p o i n t s

a re e q u i p p e d w i t h t r e n c h e s , c o mm u n ic at io n t r e n c h e s , s h e l t e r s ,and o t h e r d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e s . T hey m us t h e w e l l cam ou-f l a g e d , an d c o n n e ct e d t o e a c h o t h e r f r o n t a l l y and i n d e p t hby a u n i f i e d f i r e and o b s t a c l e p l a n .

1029 G R G A N I Z A T S I Y A O G N Y A ( o r g a n i z a t i o n o f f i r e ) - I m p l e m e n -t a t i o n of m e a su r es e n s u r i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f f i r e m i s s i o n s i na c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) ,i n c l u d i n g t h e a s s ig n m e n t o f f o r c e s a nd w ea p on s t o d e l i v e rf i r e ; c o o r d i n a t i o n of' f i r e w i t h t r o o p o p e r a t i o n s a s r e g a r d sm i s s i o n , p l a c e , and t im e r a l l - r o u n d s u p p o r t o f t h e c o n d u c tof f i r e 1 and a l s o e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a p r o c e d u r e g o v e r n i n zc a l l s f o r f i r e , o p e n i n g f i r e , a nd c e s s a t i o n o f f i r e .

1076 PERWY ESEELON ( f i r s t e c h e l o n ) - T h a t p a r t o f a no p e r a t i o n a l o r d e r o f b a t t l e o r co m ba t o r d e r o f t r o o p s w hic his i n t h e f i r s t l i n e o r i n c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy,and i s u s e d t o c a r r y o u t s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s .

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1 1 0 2 ~LJW FERATSII ( o p e r a t i o n p l a n ) - An opera t iona ld o c u m e n t f o r m u l a t e d b y t h e s t a f f 0. P a m a j o r f i e l d r o r c ej o i n t l y w i t h t h e c h i e f s of se rv i ce b r a n c h e s , s p e c i a l t r o o p s ,an d s e r v i c e s , o n t h e b a s i s of a d e c i s i o n b y , a nd o n t h ei n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e com manding g e n e r a l . I n d i c a t e d i n a no p e r a t i o n p l a n a re t h e g r o u p i n g o f enem y I ' o r c e s and l a c i l -i t i e s , a n d t h e p o s s i b l e n a t u r e o f h i s a c t i v i t i e s , t h e i n i t i a la nd s u b s e q u e n t m i s s i o n s o f t h e m a j o r f i e l d f o r c e , t h e i rd e p t h , t h e t ime limits I 'o r t h e i r c o m p l e t i o n , and t h e . r a t eof a d v a n c e : t h e se c t o r s of t h e m a i n , and o t h e r , t h r u s t s ;th e objec t ives t o b e d e s t r o y e d by n u c l e a r w ea po ns a t t h eo u t s e t an d i n t h e c o u r s e o f t he o p e r a t i o n ! t h e o p e r a t i o n a ls t r u c t u r e , t h e m i s s i o n s o f t h e t r o o p s , a n d t h e d i v i d i n gl i n e s b et w ee n them! a d j a c e n t u n i t s an d t h e i r m i s s i o n s : t h ed i s p o s i t i o n of t h e c o n t r o l p o s t s . Also d e t e rm i n e d i n a no p e r a t i o n a l p l a n a r e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f n u c l e a r m u n i t i o n s ,of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d a i r s u p p o r t , t h e r a t i o s of f o r c e sand w e a p o n s , a n d a l s o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a t e r i e l r e s o u r c e s .

1135 i'ODCERZ:.IIVIYUS.iC%AYA ARTiLLERZYA ( s u p p o r t i n g a r til-

l e r y ) - ; i r t i l l e r y w h i c h , w h i l e r e m a i n i n g s u b o r d i n a t e d t ot h e s e n i o r a r t i l l e r y co m m an d er , c a r r i e s o u t f i r e m i s s i o n sa s s i g n e d b y t h e commander o f t h e c o m b i n e d - a r m s f ' o r m a t i o n( o r u n i t ) 5 e i n g s u p p o r t e d . A r t i l l e r y t e m p o r a r i l y d ra w n i'roms ec on d e c h e l o n s t o s u p p o r t c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s 0.: u n i t s o rf o r m a t i o n s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n i s a l s o rega rded as s u p p o r t -i n g a r t i l l e r y i n r e l a t i o n t o s u c h u n i t s o r f o r m a t i o n s .

1 2 8 7 RilDIOTElil-I:IIC~iESKI"9 VCY:ii:.,i ( r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s ) -S p e c i a l t r o o p s i n t e n d e d t o c o n d u c t r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l r e c o n -n a i s s a n c e o f the l a n d , sea , an d a i r enem y, t o c r e a t e i n t e r -f e r e n c e w i t h h i s r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l f a c i l i t i e s , a n d t o e n s u r er a d i o remote c o n t r o l o f wea po ns and a i r b o r n e v e h i c l e s .

R a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s c o n s i s t oE u n i . t s ( o r s u b u n i t s ) , andc o n s t i t u t e p a r t o f t h e v a r i o u s Serv ice s , se rv ice b r a n c h e s ,and s p e c i a l t r o o p s .

1312 RXZGRANIC'<ITEL'NYYZ L 1 ; S I i ( d i v i d i n c l i n e s ) - . ' y p o t h e t i c a ll i n e s o n t h e t e r r a i n , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e nt h e z o n e s ( o r a reas ) of a c t i o n o f a d j a c e n t m a j o r f i e l d f o r c e so r s t r a t e g i c f o r m a t i o n s ( o r f o r m a t i o n s , u n i t s , s u b u n i t s ) .3 i v i d i n g l i n e s a r e d e f i n e d ( o r c h a n g ed ) up on a ss i y n m e n t ofm i s s i o n s .

1344 REZERVNYYE V O Y S K A ( reserve t r o o p s ) - X i l i t a r y e c h e l o n sn o t i n c l u d e d i n the c o m p o s i t i o n 03 f r o n t s , f l e e t s , m a j o r

f i e l d f o r m a t i o n s o r s t r a t e g i c f o r m a t io n s o f n a t i o n a l a i rd e f e n s e f o r c e s , o r s t r a t e g i c mi ss i l e f o r c e s . U n de r m o de rnc o n d i t i o n s , t h e r o l e and i m p o r t a n c e o f r e s e r v e t r o o p s h a si n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n co m p ar is on w i t h t h e p a s t .

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1345 RLZERVY ( r e s e r v e s ) - (1 ) .-iuman a n d material r e s o u r c e swhich may o e used i n a viar as a whole, o r i n a n o p er a t io n( o r b a t t 1 e ) i ( 2 ) p a r t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n al s t r u c t u r e of amajor f i e l d f o r c e o r s t r a t e g i c f or ma ti on , o r p a r t o f t h ecombat order of a f or ma ti on ( o r u n i t ) .

1356 RODA SUK'-;OPUTNYK-IVCYSK (branches of t h e ground fo rc e s )

-Components of th e ground f or ce s , d i f f e r i n g from one an-

o t h e r i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n , armament, a nd r o l e i n combat.i n each b r a n c h , s u b u n i t s , u n i t s , and f o r m a t i on s have t h esame basic armament, and t h e ap pr opr ia t e org an iza t io n andt a c t i c s . T h e branches a re missile t r o o p s and a r t i l l e r ya i r d e f e ns e t r o o p s , motor r i f l e t r o o p s , t a n k t r o o p s , anda i r - a s s a u l t t r oop s . L je si de s t h e b ra nc he s , t h e ground forcesa l s o i nc l ude s p e c i a l t r o ops , namely: e ng i ne e r , c he mic a l ,communica tions, ra d i o and rad i o- t ec9n ica1 , moto r - t rans por t ,highway, and others .

1443 SREDSTVA USILENIYA ( r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ) - A s u b un i t , u n i t ,o r f or m a t io n , n o t o r g a ni c t o a u n i t , f o r m a ti o n , o r majo r

f i e l d f o r ce o r s t r a t e g i c f or ma ti on , r e s p e c t i v e l y , b u ta t t a c h e d t o i t by 'n ighe r a u t h o r i t y f o r a c e r t a i n t i m e t or e i n f o r c e it q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y , t he re byens uri ng more s uc ce ss fu l accompl ishment of mi s si ons i na n o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) .

1521 TEATR VCYENNYK:-! DEYSTVIY ( t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s ) - A

p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y , t o ge th e r w i t h t h e a s s o c i a t e d a i rspace and sea a re a s , i n c l ud i n g i s l a n d s ( a r c h i p e l a g o s ) ,w i t n i n whose l imi ts a known p a r t of t h e armed .Forces oft n e c o u n t r y (or c o a l i t i o n ) o p e r a t e s i n w ar ti me , engagedi n s t r a t e g i c m is si on s w h ic h ensue f rom th e war pla n. Xt h e a t e r of o pe ra t i on s may be ground, mari t im e, or i n t e r -

c on t i n e n t a l . A cc ordi ng t o t h e i r m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l a n deconomi.c importance , t h e a t e r s of ope ra t i on s a re c l a s s i f i e das main or secondary .

1522 TEATR v O Y N Y ( t h e a t e r o f war) - T h e t e r r i t o r y of anyone c o n t i n e n t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s e a areas a d j o i n i n g i tand the a i r space above i t , on w h i c h h o s t i l i t i e s may d e-v e l o p ( f o r example , th e European t h e a t e r o f war). At h ea t e r of war u s u a l l y i n c l ud e s s e v e r a l t h e a t e r s o f o p er -a t i o n s .

1610 !iSEL' OPERATSII ( . j O Y A ) ( g o a l of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o rb a t t l e ) ) - T h e e n d r e s u l t w h i c h must be a t t a i ne d i n a g i ve n

s p e c i f i c o e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . ':?le g o a l o.f an o p e r a t i o n( o r b a t t l e 7 i s t h e u t t e r d e f e a t of the enemy main opposinegrouping . To t h i s may be added , i n the c a s e of a n o l f e n -s i v e , t h e t ak i n g of a n i m po r ta n t a r e a o r l i n e , t h u s e n-s u r i n g f u r t h e r development of t h e o f f e n s i v e ; and i n d e f e n s e ,

3-27



frustrating the enemy attack, holding occupied areas, andcreating conditions for going over to the offensive.

1635 ESHELONIROVANIYE VOYSK (SIL I SREDSTV) (echeloningof troops (forces and facilities)) - Deployment of units,formations, and major field forces or strategic formationsin depth (in the case of aviation, also by altitude), in

accordance with the concept of the plan f o r the impendingcombat operations or maneuver.

3-6. ENDNOTES.

‘Radziyevskiy, Dictionarx, p. 230.

‘Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. v.

3William J. Lewis and ?riedrich Wiener, The WarsawPact Armies. (Vienna: Carl Uberreuter Publishers, nm,p. 62. (Cited hereafter as Lewis and Wiener, WF Armies.)

4Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 10-11.

5Lewis and Wiener, WP Armies, p. 60-61.

6Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 68-69.

3-28



CHAPTER 4

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

4-1. GENERAL.

Chapter 2 establishes the basis for considering the

meeting engagement as a separate form of combat.

Soviets view the meeting engagement as the predominant

form of combat on the modern battlefield. "Therefore, the

encounter battle is the most frequently used form of combat,

particularly for tank sub-units."'in a rapidly changing combat environment will facilitate

meeting engagements at various stages of the overall battle.

In a nuclear environment the meeting engagement takes on

additional importance due to the large number of gape which

will probably be created in defensive positions. Chapter 2

also describes various conditions under which the Soviets

feel a meeting engagement can be anticipated. In antici-

pation of a meeting engagement, the Soviet6 will array their

forces in such a manner to be able to take advantage of the

situation.

The

Widely dispersed forces

A reduction of the organization time fordestroying an enemy in the meeting engagement canbe achieved by the decision of a number of questionsahead of time. Thus, when organizing a march in

the expectation of a meeting engagement, the com-mander, on the basis of available data about thesituation, can determine possible points of en-counter with enemy and conditions for troop maneu-ver during deployment and in the course of the

4- 1



f i g h t , a n d , p r o c e e d i n g fr om t h i s , o u t l i n e a c t i o nd u r i n g t h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e enemy a t o n e p o i n tor a n o t h e r a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g f o r m a t i o n o f t h emarch o r d e r . 2

D e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g i s u s u a l l y n o t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f

t h e meet ing engagement . T h e S o v i e t s f e e l t h a t s u rp r i s e

and speed are e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t s f o r v i c t o r y i n t h e

engagement , r a th e r t h a n l e n g t h y p l a n s . "T hu s, t h e n a t u r e o f

t h e e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e demands s k i l l t o a n a ly z e t h e combat

m i s s i o n q u i c k l y and co r r ec t l y unde r any circumstances, and

t h e a b i l i t y t o d et e rm in e t h e b a t t a l i o n ' s r o l e i n t h e exe-

c u t i o n o f t h e o v e r a l l u n i t m i ss io n .1 s 3 A l s o, t h e f l u i d s i t u -

a t i o n w o u l d preclude u s i n g a n y p l a n w h ic h t r i e d t o c o v er a l l

p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s . The engagement w i l l b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d

by r ap id changes i n t h e s i t u a t i o n and speed t r u l y b e c o m e s t h e

essence of maneuver , as seconds and minu te s become impor t an t

i n g r e d i e n t s i n t h e m i x t u r e o f b a t t l e . T h e S o v i e t s a l s o f e e l

a u n i t c a n i n i t i a t e a meeting engagement when outnumbered

and w in . " S a t i s f a c t i o n o f a l l these r e q u i r e m e n t s will per-m i t a c h i e v in g s u c ce s s i n a meet ing engagement and o f t e n m a y

l ead t o t h e u t t e r d e f e a t n o t o n l y o f e q u a l f o r c e s b u t even

o f s u p e r i o r f o r c e s . " 4

h i g h l y t r a i n e d f o r c e c a n ov erco me a much l a rg e r f o r c e . I t

w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n ta in a n exact p i c t u r e o f what i s

t a k i n g place on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d as t h e meet ing engagement

u n f o l d s . T h e r e f o r e , a u n i t which i s w e l l - t r a in e d t o c on d uc t

t h e meet ing engagement w i l l h a v e a n a d v a n t a g e .

Rapid, v i o l e n t e x e c u t i o n by a smaller,

4- 2



Chapter 2 de a l s w i t h only one f o r m of the meeting

engagement; i n ac t ua l i t y t he re a re t h ree f o r m s . The d i f -

fe rence i s i n t he l e ve l o f o rga n iz a t ion f o r e xec ut ion.

Regiments and Divisions conduct meeting engagements a t the

t a c t i c a l le ve l . Armies conduct meeting encounters a t the

op era tio na l leve1,and Fronts conduct encounte rs a t the

s t r a t e g i c l e v e l . T h i s chapter w i l l concent r a te on th e

t a c t i c a l e xe cu ti on of the meeting engagement by a r e g i -

menta l s i z e force .

The essence of the meeting engagement i s when two

opposing forces are t ry ing s imul taneous ly t o f u l f i l l t h e i rown obj ect iv es and e nte r in to ba t t l e w i t h each ot h er . The

meeting engagement ends, from t h e So vi et pe rs pe ct iv e, when

one of the opposing forces assumes another form o f combat,

such as defending o r withdrawing. I f t h e i r opponent does

t h i s t he Sovie t s w i l l t hen execu te an a t t ack , a pur s u i t , o r

a withdrawal. The ir ac ti on w i l l be based on th e pr evi ou sly

mentioned factors of METTT.

The outcome of the f i g h t f o r t he i n i t i a t i v ed eter min es t h e f i n a l r e s u l t of t h e e n t i r e b a t t l e .As soon as one enemy giv es up th e i n i t i a t i v e andchanges t o defense o r begins t o w i t h d r a w , the meet-ing engagement immediately losee i t s s p e c i f i cc ha ra c t e r and grows into other forms of combatac t ion - i n to de fense fo r one s id e and of fenseaga ins t the defending t roops f o r t he o t he r , o r in -t o w i hdrawal for one and p u r s u i t f o r t h e o t he rs i d e . 3

4-2. C O N D U C T .

T h e e xac t f orma ti on of t r oops a t t he i n i t i a t i on o f

the meeting engagement w i l l vary f rom s i tua t ion t o s i t u a t i o n .

4-3



To try and capture the meaning and execution of the meeting

engagement, a short scenario will be used.

A Motorized Rifle Regiment of a Motorized Rifle Di-

vision has been assigned the mission of being an advance

guard for the division in an advance to contact.

the regimental commander in the execution of his mission

the division commander reinforced the regiment with a tank

battalion from the division's tank regiment, one battalion

of self-propelled l52mm howitzers, one battery of SA-6 air

defense artillery SAMs, one bridging company from Army

assets, one engineer company, one motor transport company,

and one chemical defense company.

To assist

Figure 6 is a diagram of a Motorized Rifle Regiment.

l.'igure 7 is a diagram of a Tank Regiment, which is also

capable of conducting the same mission, but would have to

be reinforced with motorized rifle assets. Be sure to

check approved TOEs in the scenario to ensure the proper

unit organization and equipment are portrayed in the wargame

The following listing of equipment is considered to be rep-

resentative of several Warsaw Pact armies.

The regimental commander received copies of the divi-

sion's operation and reconnaissance plans. He gathered his

staff together and posted the division's boundaries on the

map and plotted the reconnaissance zones and routes planned

for the division's reconnaissance battalion. He noted the

reconnaissance battalion was going to eotablish three

4-4



I.OT'GR1 ZEDRIPLE

IR E G I X E N ?r

F I G U R E 6

4- 5



4-6



r e c o n n a i s s a n c e detachments, each r e i n f o r c e d w i t h e n g i n e e r s

and chemical r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n ts , t o p ro ce ed a l o n g t h r e e

m ain r o u t e s i n t h e d i v i s i o n ' s z on e o f a c t i o n . A lo ng e ac h

r e c o n n ai s sa n c e r o u t e t h e r e were points of i n t e r e s t which

would have t o be r e c o n n o i t e r e d by r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l s

from t h e r e s p e c t i v e d e t a c h m e n t s .

The o p e r a t i o n p l a n i nd i ca t ed a su r p r i s e at tack a c r o s s

t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b oun dary a t H-hour, D-day. The i n t e l l i -

gence s i t u a t i o n was vague,and t h e exact l o c a t i o n of t h e

enemy's main b a t t l e area c o u l d n o t be d e t e r m i n e d . The

regimental commander hoped he c o u l d p r o c e e d r a p i d l y t h r o u g h

t h e e ne my 's c o v e r i n g f o r c e area b e f o r e t hey could occupy

b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s and b a t t l e areas.

c o n c u r re d i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h ree m a j o r r o u t e s w i t h i n t h e

d i v i s i o n ' s zo ne o f a c t i o n , b u t was c o n c e r n e d o v e r areas

be tween t h e r e c o n n ai s sa n c e r o u t e s which o f f e r e d many su i t -

ab le l o c a t i o n s f o r p l a t o o n and company s i z e b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s .

He a l s o no te d s e v e r a l areas which could impede t h e i r p r o g r e s s

i f t h e areas were r e i n f o r c e d w i t h o b s t a c l e s . O f s p e c i a l

i n t e r e s t were t h e numerous small v i l l a g e s a n d many b r i d g e s

a c r o s s m i n o r and majo r w a terw ays. P r op e r l y cove red by f i r e

and w i t h t h e br idges d e s t r o y e d h i s m iss ion w ould no t be an

e a s y o n e . H e a l s o n ote d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n p l a n t h e d i v i s i o n

was c o n d u c t i n g a s e c o n d a r y attack i n s u p p o r t o f t h e Army,

which had been designated t h e main at tack f o r c e f o r t h e

F r o n t . The assigned d i v i s i o n z o n e of a c t i o n v a r i e d f rom

The reg imenta l commander

4-7



22 t o 26 k i l o m e t e r s i n w i d t h . He a l s o no t ed t h e d i v i s i o n

on t h e l e f t f l a n k , w h i c h w as conduc t ing t h e Army's main

a t t a ck , had a z on e of a c t i o n fr om 1 2 t o 14 k i l om e t e r s i n

w i d t h . The r i g h t f l a n k d i v i s i o n o f t h e Army, a lso con-

d u c t i n g a s e c o n d a r y a t tack , had a zon e o f a c t i o n s i m i l a r

t o h i s own.

He checked t h e o f f e n s i v e f i r e p l a n and noted t h e d i v i -

s ion commander had formed a D A G t o f i r e p r e pa r a t o r y f i r e s

an d p r o v i d e l o n g range f i r e s t o s up p o r t h i s r e g i m e n t . He

n o t e d t h e D A G i n c l u d e d t w o b a t t a l i o n s o f 122mm MRL, one

b a t t a l i o n o f l 3 O m m M-46 f i e l d g u n s , and tw o b a t t a l i o n s o f

152mm h o w i t z e r s . He a l s o n ote d h e ha d r e c e i v e d s e c o n d

p r i o r i t y f o r at tack h e l i c o p t e r s , w i t h f i r s t p r i o r i t y g oi n g

t o the Army's main a t t ack d i v i s i o n . The d i v i s i o n had re-

ceived f o u r r ec o n n ai ss a nc e s o r t i e s a nd e i g h t f i g h t e r - b o m b e r

s o r t i e s f o r t h e f i r s t d a y of combat .

had i n s t r u c t e d h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e s taff t o make p l a n s f o r

t a r g e t i n g s u i t a b l e items f o r d e s t r u c t i o n b y t h e f i g h t e r -

bombers . He espec i a l ly w a n te d t o d e s t r o y a n y enemy n u c l e a r

de l ive ry means or s t o c k p i l e s of n u c l e a r m u n i t i o n s . He a l s o

w a n t e d key b r i d g e s o v e r major w a t e r w a y s r e c o n n o i t e r e d t o

e n s u r e t he y would be s t a n d i n g when c r i t i c a l c r o s s i n g s had

t o be made.

The d iv i s ion commande r

The r eg imen ta l commande r was d i s ap p o i n te d i n t h e l a c k

o f k n o w l e d g e c o n c e r n i n g e n e m y d i s p o s i t i o n s , b u t he f e l t t h e

value of surpr i se i n c o n d u c t i n g t he a t t a ck outweighed t h e

4-8



lack of intelligence.

tactical reconnaissance and march security for all elements.

He then called on his reconnaissance company commander and

informed him of his plans for the company to conduct a zone

reconnaissance with emphasis on locating any enemy units

between routes reconnoitered by division elements. He also

told the reconnaissance chief he would receive an engineer

platoon and a chemical reconnaissance platoon to aid in

accomplishing his mission.

he might be operating out of range of supporting artillery

a nd would not be under an air defense umbrella, 8 0 stealth

would have to be employed in gathering terrain reconnaissance.

He told the company commander to organize his forces for

the mission and to operate no more than twenty to thirty

minutes in front of the regiment’s leading elements. He

was to maintain contact with division reconnaissance ele-

ments and stay about 10 to 20 kilometers behind them.

He would have to ensure thorough

He informed the company commander

The reconnaissance leader annotated his map and decided

to establish one reconnaissance detachment and one recon-

naissance patrol. He constructed the elements as shown below:

Reconnaislrance Patrol Reconnaissance Detachment1-BMP-R1-BRDM-2

1-BRDM-2U (Command)2-BMP-R

1-Motorcycle 2-BRDM- 21-BRDM-Rkh (Chemical 2-Motorcycles

Recon) 2-i3RDM-Rkh

1-6TR-152 (Engineer) 2-BTR-152

The reconnaissance company commander then briefed his

subordinate officers on the concept of the operation and

4- 9



began p repa ra t ion o f h i s reconna i ssance p l a n . Ye in st ru c t ed

h i s s u bo r di n at e s t o f u l l y arm and f u e l a l l v e h i c l e s and t o

await f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . He n ot ed t h e r e would be a

twen ty minu te a r t i l l e r y p rep a ra t i on on known and suspec ted

l o c a t i o n s , s o h e wanted t o ensure h i s e l ement s would not be

n e a r a ny p re pl an ne d f i r e s .

The regi ment a l commander the n ca l l ed i n h i s a r t i l l e r y

ch ie f , b a t t a l io n commanders, and t h e rema in in g members of

t h e reg imenta l s t a f f . He briefed them a l l on h i s concept

o f t h e o p e r at i o n , a v a i l a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e , and d e s i g n a t e d

t h e 1st b a t t a l i o n t o b e t h e reg imenta l advance gua rd. :Ie

wanted t h e advance guard t o send forward an advance pa r t y

a n d a combat reconnai ssance p a t r o l . !.e i ns t r uc te d th e

2d ba t t a l io n commander t o d i s pa t ch two f l an k s ec u r i ty de -

t achments t o p r o t ec t th e main body. He a l s o in s t ru c t ed th e

3 r d ba t t a l i on commander t o de s ig na te a r e a r guard t o pro-

t e c t t h e main body. He pic t u red th e reg imenta l march

column t o l o o k l i k e F i g u r e 8. Ee p ro vi de d a p p r o p r i a t e r e i n -

fo rcement s t o t h e b a t t a l i o n s and h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s shown

a t Fi g u r e 9 . He i n s t r u c t e d t h e 1st b a t t a l i o n commander t o

have t h e combat r e c o n n a i s sa nc e p a t r o l a b ou t f i v e t o t e n

k i l o m e t e r s ahead of t h e advance par ty . He a l s o wanted t he

advance party not more than 10 ki lometers ahead of the ad -

vance guar d. He a l s o wanted t h e advance guard t o be no moret h a n 1 5 ki lometers ahead of t h e regimental main body a n d t h e

r e a r guard t o be no more tha n f i v e ki lo mete rs behind t he

4-10



:.lanks e c u r i t y

o f ka rch

IReconnaissance

-~Regimental

Iombat

Rec o rinaissanc eI S a t r o l

I Ad vanc e I1 F a r t y 1

I Advance II Guard 1

b e c u r i yOetachment



REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR COM3AT

Combat Reconnaissance Patrol1-Motorized Rifle Platoon2-Tanks

1-Xotorixed Rifle Company (minus one platoon)1-Tank Platoon (minus two tanks)1-Engineer Squad1-Chemical Reconnaissance Squad1-Mortar Battery1-SP Artillery dattery (with observers)1-Antitank Platoon1-Air Defense Section (2-ZSU-23-4)

1-Motorized Rifle aattalion (minus one company)1-Tank Company (minus one platoon)

1-Engineer Platoon (minus one squad)1-Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon (minus one squad)1-SP Artillery Battalion (minus one battery)1-Antitank ijattery (minus one platoon)1-Air Defense Platoon (minus one section)1-aridging Company1-Transportation Platoon1-hiaintenance PlatoonI-Medical Platoon

Remaining elements of regiment

Advance Party

Advance Guard

Main Body

(minus Flank Security Detachments and

Rear Guard)

?lank Security Detachment (two)1-Motorized Rifle Platoon2-Tanks

1-Motorized Rifle PlatoonRear Guard

FIGURE 9

4-12



regimental main body.

a d v a n t ag e s of m oving a l o n g m u l t i p l e r o u t e s i n a broad advance

t o c o n t a c t , b u t decided t h e c e n t e r r o u t e i n t h e d i v i s i o n

z o n e o f f e r e d t h e bes t c o v e r , c o n c ea l m e nt , and p o t e n t i a l f o r

a r a p i d r a t e of advance . He c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n

commander,and it was decided t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d s o f t h e f o l l o w -

i n g two moto r i zed r i f l e r eg imen t s w ou ld be on t h e ex t r eme

t w o r o u t e s , whi le th e d i v i s i o n r e s e r v e w ould f o l l o w on t h e

c e n t e r r o u t e . I n t h i s manner, the d iv i s ion commande r cou ld

r a p i d l y reac t t o t h e s i t u a t i o n as i t deve loped . He d i s m i s s e d

t h e c o n f e r e n c e a n d asked i t be resu med i n tw o h o u r s a f t e r

a l l p r e l i m i n a r y p l a n s had b e en f o r m u l a t e d . I n less t h a n

t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s t he r e g i m e n t w o u l d c r o s s t h e b o r d e r .

He weighed t h e a d v a n t a g e s and d i s -

The reg imenta l commander looked a t h i s p l a n n i n g map

and no ted he had r e i n f o r c e d each of t h e t w o m o t o r i z e d r i f l e

b a t t a l i o n s i n t h e main body w i t h a tank company.

g o i n g t o s a v e the t a n k b a t t a l i o n he r e c e i v e d from d i v i s i o n

as a n e x p l o i t a t i o n fo r c e . He had d e c id e d t o u ae h i s a v a i l -

able a r t i l l e r y as accom pan yin g a r t i l l e r y and prov ided one

b a t t a l i o n for t h e advance guard and would l e ap f r o g t h e re-

m a i n i n g b a t t a l i o n a l o n g t h e r e g i m e n t a l march r o u t e i n o r d e r

t o p r o v i d e co n ti nu o ua i n d i r e c t f i r e c ov er ag e f o r t h e regiment.

He had h i s br idge assets wel l f o rw a r d i n t h e main body t o

r a p i d l y assist elements which would need their h e l p . He had

decided t o mix h i s SA-9s w i t h the SA-6s p r o v i d e d by t h e

d i v i s i o n i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e i n - d e p t h , c om p le m en ta ry c o v er a g e

He was

4-13



a l o n g t h e m arch r o u t e . He had t h e ZSU-22-49 w e l l f o r w a r d

i n t h e colum n t o p r o v id e l e a d i n g e l e m e n t s as much a i r de-

f e n s e c o v e r a g e as p o s s i b l e . 3 e a l s o had p r o v i d e d s u p p l y ,

m a in te n an c e, m e d ic al and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s u p p o r t t o l e a d i n g

e lements . He was sa t i s f i ed w i t h h i s p lan and looked a t t h e

l a t e s t w ea th er f o r e c a s t . T he f o l l o w i n g m or nin g sh o u ld s e e

e x t e n s i v e f o g , e s p e c i a l l y i n low l y i n g aream, f o r a t l e a s t

t h e f i r s t t h r e e ho ur s a f t e r t h e B e g i n n i n g o f M o r n i n g N a u t i c a l

T w i l i g h t ( B M N T ) . I f t h e f o r e c a s t he ld t r u e i t would help

him i n h i s m iss io n . The su b o rd in a t e commanders and s t a f f

r e t u r n e d a n d b r i e f e d him on t h e i r p l a n s t o i mp lem en t t h e

o p e r a t i o n . H e was p l e a s e d w i t h t h e i r p l an s and t o l d t h e

4 t h b a t t a l i o n com mander t o accom pany him w i t h other command

p o s t u n i t s t o a d v i s e and a s s i s t him, as a l l o f t h e t a n k

b a t t a l i o n had b ee n used t o r e i n f o r c e t h e t h r e e m o to riz ed

r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s . The i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r p ro vid ed some

i n d i c a t i o n s of e n e m y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e l o c a t i o n s a n d t h e c o m -

m a n d e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e a r t i l l e r y c h ie f t o t a r g e t t h e s e l o -

c a t i o n s . 3 e i n s t r u c t e d t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e com pany com mander

t o c r o s s t h e b o r d er t h r e e h o ur s p r i o r t o BMNT. T h e a r t i l l e r y

p re pa ra t i o n w ould be from 20 minu te s p r i o r t o BMNT u n t i l

BMNT. A t t h e c o n cl u si o n o f t h e p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s t h e r e g i -

ment would be moving and c r o s s t h e bo rd er . He ad vis ed th e

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c h i e f o f two l o c a t i o n s w h er e long r a n g e p a t r o l s

fro m d i v i s i o n had enemy b a t t a l i o n s u n d er o b s e r v a t i o n . He

an no unced t h e s i g n and c o u n t e r s i g n f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and

d i s m i s s e d h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s .

4-14



Six hours p r io r t o BMNT t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissance

elements crossed t h e border and began t h e i r work.

ventured almost 1 2 ki lomete rs west before they loca ted the

f i r s t enemy cavalry units. The l o c a t i o n s were noted and

p l o t t e d as t a rge t s by the d iv i s ion ' s Chief o f Rocket Troops

and Art i l l e ry .

noted t h e locations and informed h i s subordinates . Three

hours p r io r t o B M N T t h e regimental reconnaissance elements

began their w e s t w a r d tr ek . They cle ar ed t h e f i r s t t e n

ki lometers i n about two and one h a l f hours and reported

t h e i r f i nd ings to t h e regimental commander.

They

T h e regimental reconnaissance commander

The a r t i l l e r y p re pa ra ti on s ta r ted on time and l a s t e d

for exactly twenty minutes. The regiment began t o move

dur ing t h e prepara t ion and crossed t h e border a t t h e

appointed time. Ths regimenta l reconnaissance c h i e f had

s p o t t e d an enemy platoon a s t r i d e t h e regimenta l march r o u t e

which had been emplaced since t h e passage of t h e d i v i s i o n a l

reconnaissance elements. T h e l o c a t i o n was noted, passed

t o t h e a r t i l l e r y p er so nn el f o r t a r g e t i n g and a n ob s er v at i on

pos t detached from t h e regimental reconnaissance detachment

to keep t h e enemy under observation.

The advance guard commander had heard t h e t ransmiss ion

from t h e reconnaissance detachment and alerted t h e advance

p a r ty commander t o t h e enemy's location. The advance party

commander instructed h i s a r t i l l e r y b a t te r y commander t o

prepare t o f i r e i n s up po rt o f an a t t a c k from t h e march. He

4-15



f e l t he had s u f f i c i e n t combat power t o ra pi dl y overwhelm

t h e enemy force . About twenty minutes l a t e r t h e a r t i l l e r y

began to impact on the enemy platoon,and t h e advance party

swept over the l oc at io n lo si ng two ta nks and one BMP.

had destroyed one enemy tank and one enemy APC. lie called

t h e resu l t s of t h e i r f i r s t s k i r m i s h back t o t h e advance

guard commander. The regimental commander monitored t h e

t ransmission and annotated h i s map.

They

A motorcycle r i d e r appeared from t h e dense fog and

passed a message t o th e regimental commander. The d i v i s i o n ' s

Radio Reconnaissance Company had in tercep ted a message in-di ca t i ng an enemy bat ta l i on was moving towards t h e regiment 's

march rou te . T h i s information had been confirmed by t h e

long range reconnaissance patrol observing t h e enemy force.

The regimental commander a l e r t ed h i s fo rces t o t h e possi-

b i l i t y of a n ot he r s k i r m i s h .

The combat reconnaissance patrol reported t he y had

found an estimated company s i z e enemy u n i t i n p os it io n

a s t r i d e the regimental march r o u t e , and i t could not be

bypassed. The advance guard commander d e c i d e d t h e advance

p a r t y was not s tr ong enough t o ta ck le t h i s f o r c e , so he

in s t ruc ted h i s le ad in g commander t o assume po s it i on s t o t h e

f r o n t o f t h e enemy and provide a base o f f i r e w h i l e h e l e d

h i s forces i n from t h e c'outhern flank t o c l e a r t h e posi t ion .Appropriate coordinat ion was made w i t h the accompanying

a r t i l l e r y commander and w i t h DAG. About t h i r t y minutes

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l a t e r t h e b a t t l e s ta r t ed ,a n d t h e advance guard was s u c c e s s -

f u l . H ow ever, t he y had t a k e n heav y c a s u a l t i e s and had l o s t

1 0 t a n k s a n d 13 BMPs. He e s t i m a t e d t h e enemy c a s u a l t i e s

t o be 4 t anka and 2 APCs.

w hen t h e r e g i m e n t a l com mander i n s t r u c t e d t h e 2d b a t t a l i o n

commander t o assume th e m iss ion as t h e a d v a n c e guard f o r

t h e regiment. I t t oo k a b o u t t h i r t y m i n ut es f o r t h e new

ad van ce g uard t o r e a c h t h e b a t t l e s i t e . D urin g t h i s t i m e ,

t h e r e g i m e n t a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e com mander c a l l e d b a ck a nd

s t a t e d t h e y had been bypa ssed by an enemy f o r c e . He d i d

n o t know t h e s i z e , b u t e s t i m a t e d it t o be a t l e a s t a b a t t a l -

i o n .

The advance guard was r e g r o u p i n g

The r e g im e n t s t a r t e d t o move again, and the commander

informed a l l s u b o r d i n a t e s a b o u t t h e a p p r o a c h in g enemy f o r c e .

S u d d e n l y , t h e c o m b a t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l c o m m a n d e r c a l l e d

t o say he had b ee n ta k e n u n de r f i r e by an enemy force,and

he had l o a t h a l f of h i s e lem ent . He cou ld s e e enemy reco n-

na i s sance e l emen t s mov ing tow ards h i s l o c a t i o n , b u t he no

l o n g e r had any l o n g ra n g e d i r e c t f i r e w eapons s y s te m s t o

e ng ag e them . The a r t i l l e r y u n i t s t o o k n o t i c e , b eg an t h e i r

p l a nn ing s equence , and t h e mor ta r s r e sponded w i t h smoke t o

p r o t e c t t h e r em n an ts o f t h e p a t r o l . The advance gua rd com-

m ander t o l d t h e a d va n ce p a r t y t o go of f of t h e march rou t e

and a t te m p t t o f i n d o u t t h e d e p th and w i d t h of t h e approach-

ing enemy force . The r e g i m e n t a l com mander a sk e d d i v i s i o n f o r

a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s , b u t t h e f o g was s t i l l t o o t h i c k f o r t h e i r

4-17



employment. Meanwhile, both d i v i s i o n and reg im en ta l reco n-

naissance e lements had been taken under f i r e and suf fered

losses amounting to about one h a l f of t h e i r v e hi cl e s. A

d iv is io n al reconna issa nce detachment had radioed back they

had found two enemy battalions i n prepared posi t ions blocking

the regimenta l march route about 22 kilo meter s west of th e

border. I t appeared the main b a t t l e a r ea had been found.

About twenty minutes a f t e r the p at ro l had reported con-

t a c t , th e advance pa r ty passed t o t h e i r south and began t o

re co nn oi te r th e enemy fo rc e. They had seen two enemy APCs

which were qu ic kl y des tro yed . They assumed posi t ions on a

h i l l t o t h e s o u th of t h e march route and began to observe

enemy a c t i v i t y . The advance p a rt y commander determined t h er e

were a t l e a s t t h r e e enemy companies moving t o w a r d s t h e e a s t .

The re gi me nt al commander decided t o l ea ve t h e advance party

on the h i l l , r e i n f o r c e t h e p a t r o l w i t h the advance guard,

a n d send h i s remaining re inforced motorized r i f l e ba t t a l io n

t o t h e no r th t o h i t the enemy force on t h e f l an k . I n t h i s

manner he would have fl an ki ng f i r e from th e advance pa rt y,

a base of f i r e from the advance guard, and a flank maneuver

by h i s ot he r ba t t a l i on .

About t h i r t y minutes l a t e r the advance guard commander

repor ted they had been engaged by t h e attacking enemy force

a n d he was being supported by the advance pa rty . A r t i l le r y

ha d begun t o f a l l on the enemy and the 3d ba t t a l i o n was

about 45 minutes away from th e fr ay . The enemy fo r ce ha lt ed

4-18



f o r a few minutes due t o th e effect ive f l a n ki n g f i r e and

began t o maneuver t o es cape t h e w i th e ri n g f i r e .

enemy company hnd moved towards t h e nor th to t r y and bypass

t h e advance gua rd . Suddenly, the enemy company was taken

under f i r e by t h e 3d b a t t a l i o n which had reached t h e b a t t l e

s i t e . Now, both t h e advance guard and t h e 3d b a t t a l i o n

from t h e main body were r a p i d l y a t t a c k i n g t h e enemy force.

The remainder of t h e ba t t l e l a s t e d about twenty minutes and

the enemy began t o wi t hd raw. The regiment had been success-

f u l , but had take n heavy c a su a lt ie s . The re gim en tal com-

mander began t o ponder h i s next move.

A fol lowing

4-3. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.

I n t h e sc en ar io above, t he commander provided f o r re-

connaissance , se cu ri ty , engineer support and rear suppor t ,

Had t h e scen ario been port rayed i n a Nuclear , Biological , or

Chemical ( N B C ) environment, t h e commander would have t o con-

s i de r measures for protection from weapons of maes deatruc-

t i o n . He d i d , however, provide chemical reconnaissance

elements t o a l e r t him t o any change i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . He

a l so took t h e av ai l ab le forc es and organized them into com-

bined arms elements t o accomplish t h e mission.

Not covered i n t h e scenar io , but a c r u c i a l p a r t of

any operation, i s t he use o f camouflage by a l l elements.

Some Soviet vehicles have been seen w i t h camouflage pa in t

pa t te rns , and t h e y w i l l make a l l attempts to maximize the

use of l o c a l veg eta tio n. Camouflage ne ts w i l l a l s o be used

4-19



f o r h a l te d u n i t s , e sp e c i a l l y a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g s i t e s , command

pos t s , a n d r e a r u n i ts .

The scenario w i l l have t o be ca re fu ll y evaluated and

measures take n t o ensure t h a t mutually supportive measures

a r e t a ke n t o p l an f o r a successfu l opera t ion .

what w i l l be done is l imited by the type of support avai l-

ab le and t he time av a il ab l e t o conduct th e wargame. The pre-

v ious scenar io i s only il l u s t r a t i v e and by no means t he only

way of ensuring support f o r an opera t ion .

A lot of

4-4. SPECIAL TROOPS SUPP

Again, the u t i l i z a t i o n o f spec ia l t roops w i l l vary

from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n . I n t h i s case a t y p e u t i l i -

za ti on of chemical, eng ine er, motor t r a n s p o r t , and radio-

technica l t roops was' shown.

have t o be formulated and t he t r a f f i c cont rol e lements from

wi thi n the di vi si on and regiment would be ut il iz ed exten-

sively . The use of t r a f f i c con t ro l t roops and march planning

i s deta i led i n rea d i l y avai l ab le publ ica t ions . Highway t roops

would only be used by elements higher t han regiment and w i l l

not be included i n t h i s paper . Communication tr oo ps could

a l s o be played and t h e i r use must be considered i n planning

the ope ra t ion .

A detailed march plan would

4-5. DEFINITIONS. All def in i t io ns a re t aken f rom Dic tiona rxo f a a s i c M i l i t a r y Terms, by A . I .Radziyevskiy. The number prior to thed e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e e n t ry it em w i t h -i n t h e d i c ti o na r y .

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1 AVANGNiD (advanced g u a r d ) - A d e t a c h m e n t p r e c e e d i n g a t a

f i x ed d i s t a n c e ahead of t he main body of a marching f o r -m ation ( u n i t ) i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t th e t r o o p s m a k i n g t h emarch, t o safeguard them f r o m s u r p r i s e a t t a c k by h o s t i l eground f o r c e s , and t o e n s u re s u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h emain body t o d e p l o y and e n t e r t h e b a t t l e .

95 AFt'YERGARD ( r e a r g u a r d ) - March p r o t e c t i o n element, i n -

t en d e d t o s a f e g u a r d t r o o p s m ov ing fr om t h e f r o n t t o t h er e a r . The s t r e n g t h , c o m p o s i t i o n , m i s s i o n s a n d distance o fa rear guard ( f rom the main body) w i l l depend on t h e s i z eof t h e main body co lumn be ing guarded and on t h e s i t u a t i o n .

99 ATAKA ( a t t a c k ) - The m ost i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t i n t h e t a c t i -ca l a c t i v i t i e s o f a i r , n a v a l and gro un d f o r c e s , c o n s t i t u t i n ga c o m b i n a t i o n of s w i f t maneuver and f i r e ( s t r i k e ) aimed a tenemy pe rs on ne l and weapons f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e i r a n n i h i -l a t i o n . An at tack b y g r o u n d f o r c e s is car r ied o u t immed-i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons s t r i k e s ,and i s c u l m i n a t e d b y t h e u t t e r defeat of t h e enemy and bycapture o f h i s d e f e n s i v e areas a n d s t r u c t u r e s .

a t t ack i s a r a p i d a c t i o n by a i rc ra f t a g a i n s t t h e enemy f o rt h e p u r p o s e o f f i r i n g or s t r i k i n g a t c l o s e r a n g e . A n ni hi -l a t i o n of h o s t i l e a i r c r a f t i n t h e a i r d u r i n g a n a i r a t t acki s accompl i shed by f i g h t e r a v i a t i o n . A t o r p e d o ( m i s s i l e )at tack i s t h e maneuvering of a w a r s h i p ( a i r c r a f t ) f o r t h epu rpose o f a s suming a f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n and f i r i n g t o r -pedoes (missi1es)at t h e t a r g e t .

832 MANEVR (maneuver ) - A t ransfer of t r o o p s or n a v a l f o r c e s ,o r a r e d i r e c t i o n of w eapons ( r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f material andtechnical f a c i l i t i e s ) , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f g a i n i n g a n a d va n -tage o v e r the enemy un d e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r c o n d u c t i n g m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t o f a maneuver , a f a v o r a b l e g ro up -

i n g of men and equipm ent i s created in a g i v e n s e c t o r orthea ter o f o p e r a t i o n s . A c c or di ng t o i t s scale , a maneuvermay be s t ra tegic , o p e r a t i o n a l , o r t a c t i c a l .

954 OBESPECHENIYE FLANGOV (STYKOV) ( s e c u r i t y o f f l a n k s (orof l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) ) - O p e r a t i o n a l (or t ac t i ca l ) measurest o f o r e s t a l l s u r p r i s e s t r i k e s by the enemy on open f lanks( o r l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) , and t o e n s ur e s u c c e s s f u l repulse ofthese s t r i k e s i n t h e c o u r s e o f a c c o m p l i s h in g t h e mainm i s s i o n . P l a n k s e c u r i t y i s ach ieved by c o n d u c t i n g u n i n -t e r r u p t e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , and b y m a i n t a i n i n g t h e f o r c e sand weapons assigned f o r t h i s p u r po s e i n a c o n s t a n t s t a t eo f r e a d i n e s s .

1047 OTRYAD ((I.) & (2) d e t a c h m e n t ; (3) f l i g h t ) - (1 ) A tem-p o r a ry u n i f i c a t i o n o f g ro un d t ro o p ( o r n a v a l ) u n i t s o r sub-u n i t s ( so m etim e s ev en i n d i v i d u a l s e r v ic e m e n ) f o r c o m p l e ti o n

An a i r

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of a p a r t i c u l a r o r sp e c i a l mi ss io n ( s e c u r i t y , s e i z u r e of abeachhead o r bridgehead, reconnaissance , se t t i ng obstac les ,e t c . ) ; (2) n f r o n t i e r t r oo ps , a m i l i t a r y u n i t ; ( 3 ) i n t h ea i r fo rce , a t a c t i c a l s ub un it .

1050 OTRYAD OSESPECHENIYA DVIZHENIYA (OOD) movement-supportdetachment) - A temporarily-created roup of engin eer sub-u n i t s (mostly road engineer subu nit s7, together w i t h chem-i c a l and radiological reconnaissance subunits , assigned bya combined-arms formation or u n i t t o s uppor t t h e movemento f t roops. A movement-supported detachment c a r r i e s ou treconnaissance, removes obsta cle s from th e ro ut e t o be used,org ani zes by-passes around de br is and obs ta cl es , marks t h eroute , a n d also does a limited amount of road repair work.

1060 O M R A N E N I Y E ( s e c u r i t y ) - A type o f support for combatopera t ions o f t roops (o r naval fo rce s ) , e f f ec ted i n o rde rto f o r e s t a l l su rp r i se enemy at ta ck s, and t o prevent enemyreconnaissance from penetrating areas occupied by f r i e n d l yt roops (o r nava l fo r ces ) . Secu r i ty a l s o ensures f r i end l ytr oo ps time and advantageous con di ti on s f o r deployment andenter ing ba t t le . Secu r i ty on the march, a t the h a l t , andi n b a t t l e , a r e ca ll ed : "march security, I' "bivouac security, "

and "combat security, 'I respect ive ly .

1087 PEREDOVOY OTRYAD (forward detachment) - (1 ) A detach-ment of troops cons i s t ing o f a t a n k (or motorized infantry)subun i t (o r u n i t ) , re inforced by subuni ts of spe c ia l t roops .In offensive combat, a forward detachment i s put out aheadof a combined-arms u n i t ( o r formation) t o s ei ze and holdimpor tan t l ines and object ives, major road junct ions,mountain passe s, bridgeheads on th e op po si te bank of ar i ve r , pending a r r i va l of t h e main body. In defensive

combat, a forward detachment is s e n t o u t t o conduct de-f ens ive ac t ions i n t h e securi ty zone. ( 2 ) Pa rt of anamphibious a ss a ul t f or ce used t o s e i z e a beachhead on theenemy coast and t o support th e cont inu ing landing . Theforward detachment of an amphibious assault f o r c e i s usua l lysubdivided i n t o the f or ce s making th e f i r s t assau l t andt h e main body o f the forward detachment.

1104 PLAN RAZVEJ IK I ( reconnaissance plan ) - A staff workingdocument, setting o u t th e organiz at ion of reconnaissancefor a d e f i n i t e p e ri od of time. A reconnaissance plan i sa component part of a n opera t ion (o r b a t t l e ) p lan , and i ss e t o u t i n w r i t i n g o r g r a ph i c al l y (on a map). Reflected

i n a reconnaissance plan a r e th e goal and missions ofreconnaissance, who i s t o c a r ry i t out, and time limitsf o r completion of t he missions, the de adl ine s and proceduresfo r r ender ing r econnai ssance r epo r t s ( the da ta ob ta ined) ,and the reserve of reconnaissance forces and f a c i l i t i e s .

4-22



When nece ssary, re connai ss an ce p l a n s i n d i c a t e t h e methodst o be used t o complete reconn aiss ance miss ions , and th eprocedure f o r prep aring reconnaissance elements and support-ing t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s .

1169 POLOSA R A Z V E D K I (reconnaissance zone) - A zone oft e r r a i n a t th e disp osa l of th e enemy, bounded t o t he r i g h tand t o the l e f t by hypothet ica l demarca tion l i ne s wi th in

which reconnaissance must be conducted by the forces andf a c i l i t i e s of a major f ie ld fo rce ( format ion, un i t ) . I ti s usual ly t o ass ign a reconnaissance zone which i s widerthan the zone of act ion of t h e en t i r e major f i e ld fo rce(formation, unit) , and no less deep than the depth of th eopera t ional (or combat) mission of t he major f i e l d fo rc e( format ion , un i t ) .

1185 POICHODNAYA ZASSTAVA (march secur i ty pa t ro l ) - An elementof m arch se cur i ty . The march se cu ri ty pa tr ol i s de ta i l edfrom the advance guard, or di re c t ly from subuni ts ( o r u n i t s )f o r which secur . i ty i s provided.may be i n th e forward or f lank ca tegory .

1186 POKHODNOYE OKHRANENIYE ( ( 1 ) march security! ( 2 ) screen-ing of sh ip s i n passage) - (1 ) The safegua rding of tro opson t h e march, t h i s being accomplished by advance guards,r e a r guards, detachments, ou tpos ts , and pa tr ol s . ( 2 ) Thescreening of shi ps during passage by sea, e i t he r s i ngl y o ri n formation , such pro tec t ion be ing organized t o inc ludet imely de tec t ion of enemy presence! ap p ro pr ia te warning ofthe escor ted s h i p s 1 repulsing enemy attacks1 and the use ofreconnaissance counter-measures, The sc reen ing fo rc e i sa component p a r t of t h e cr ui s in g forma tio n and may c o n s i s tof sev era l screens1 an outer one, f o r warning, and in te r-ference w i t h enemy fo rc ee l and an inne r one, f o r re pu ls in gat tacks by enemy for ce s which have pen et ra te d t h e ou te rscreen.

1187 POKHODNYY PORYADOK ( ( 1 ) march formation! ( 2 ) t a c t i c a lformation (of warships)) - (1 ) A t roop formation, co nsis t-in g of columns, f o r use on a march. I t must ensure thefollo wingi high speed of advance and maneuver! r a p i d de-ployment f o r combat; t h e l e a s t p o ssi b l e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t ot h e effects of enemy weapons of mass dest ruc t ion i con-se rv at io n of st re ng th of personnel and vehi cle el and easeof t roop con t ro l . ( 2 ) The mutual positioning o f w a r s h i p si n passage , as a group, by sea , ensuring t h e i r saf et y ,

ra pi d reformini: i n t o a b a t t l e formation, and ease i n con-t r o l l i n g f or c es .

1297 RAZVEDKA (VOYSKOVAYA) ( t roop-unit reconnaissance) -The acq uis i t i on of in t e l l ige nce in format ion concern ing the

A march se cu ri ty pa tr ol

4-23



location, grouping, composition, numbering, armament, com-bat capability, and intentions of the enemy, as well asthe nature of his activities with respect to an operation(or battle).

1299 R A Z V E D K A U R S H R U T O V (route reconnaissance) - Keasurestaken to study the roads (cross-country routes) in a zoneo f impending action, and to determine their state, traffic

capacity, vulnerable sectors, comouflage conditions, de-gree of demolition and contamination, and the availabilityof materials for road and bridge repair, so as to ensurethe movement of troops, and combat and other materiel.

1300 RAZVEDKA MESTNOSTI (terrain reconnaissance and intelli-gence) - Measures taken f o r the collection and refinementof information on the character and peculiarities of therelief, hydrography, built-up areas, roads, soil, and plantcover, and the degree to which these conditions affect thearrangement and combat operations of friendly and enemytroops; on the presence and character of natural cover andobstacles; on the protective features and passability of

the terrain; on conditions for orientation, camouflage,and observation; etc.

1304 RAZVEDYVATEL'NAYA GRUPPA (reconnaissance group) - Anelement of troop reconnaissance sent out by formations orunits to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain inmobile types of combat, on the march, and in a defensivesituation when there is no contact with the enemy.

1308 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY DOZOR (reconnaissance patrol) - A

reconnaissance element which is sent out from a reconnais-sance detachment to the front, to the flanks, or to therear, for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance of the

enemy and the terrain.

1309 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY OTRYN) (reconnaissance detachment) -An element of troop-unit reconnaissance sent out by for-mations and major field forces or strategic formations toconduct reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain inmobile types of combat, on the march, and also in defence.A reconnaissance detachment is made up of reconnaissancesubunits or motor rifle (or tank) subunits, from companyto battalion strength, and reinforced by artillery, tanks,field engineer subunits, and chemical subunits. A recon-naissance detachment is assigned a reconnaissance zone oraxis.

1512 TAKTICKESKAYA RAZVEDKA (tactical reconnaissance) - Acomponent part of military reconnaissance. It obtains suchinformation about the enemy, terrain, weather, and the

4- 24



area o f i m p e n d i n g a c t i o n as i s needed t o s u p p o r t t h e com-bat o p e r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s . Tact ica l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i so r g a n i z e d by t h e commanders and s t a f f s o f f o r m a t i o n s , u n i t s ,( s u b u n i t s ) of a l l s e r v i c e b ra n ch e s t o t h e d e p t h o f t h e i rown com bat missl.o n, o r t o t h e d e p t h o f t h e e n t i r e d i s p o s i t i o nof enemy combat format ions .

4-6. ENDNOTES,

' I<onoplya, m, , 4 , 5, p. 33.

2Rezn i chenko , Tactics, p. 1 3 9 .

3Konoplya, --B I C , 3, 4, 5, p. 39 .

4G. I . Garbuz . D . F. Loza. and I . 1. Sazonov. T h eMotor ized R i f l e a a t t a l i o n i n M odern C om bat. T r a n s i a t z byT r a n s l a t i o n C o n s u l t a n t s L t d . , f o r R e d st on e A r s e n a l a nd t h e? o r e i g n S c i e n c e and T ec hn olo gy C e n t e r . ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e r1 9 7 2 ) s Ps 18.

5Reznichenko, Tact ics , p . 133.

4-25



CHAPTER 5

THE OFFENSE

KASTUPLENIYE ( o f f e n s i v e ) - A b a s i c t y p e o fc o m b a t o p e r a t i o n , o f d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e i na t t a in in g v i c t o r y o v e r t h e enemy. An o f f e n s i v ei s c o n d uc te d i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e p r o m p t an du t t e r de fea t o f a n enem y o c c u p y i n g de fens ivep o s i t i o n s , and i n o r d e r t o t a k e i m p o r t a n t areas( o r o b j e c t i v e s ) . T h i s i s a c h i e v e d b y b r e a k i n gu p e n e m y m a i n g r o u p i n g s a n d w e a p o n s o f massd e s t r u c t i o n 5 y u s i n g n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a lw e a p o n s , e n e r g e t i c a t t a c k s b y g r o u n d f o r c e s w i t hh i g h s p e e d a n d t o grea t d e p t h , c o o r d i n a t e d w i t ha v i a t i o n and a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s , b o ld move-ment b y t h e l a t t e r o n t o e n e m y f l a n k s a n d r e a r ,a n d d e s t r o y i n g h i m p i e c e b y p iece . 1

5-1 GEMERAL.

K o s t w r i t e r s o f S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e claim t h e

o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y way t o a c h i e v e a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y .

COL A . A . S i d o r e n k o s t a t es1 “ T h e o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y t y p e

of c o m b a t a c t i o n s o f t h e t r o o p s , t h e em plo ym en t of w h i c h

a t t a i n s t h e c o m p le te r o u t o f t h e enemy and t h e se i zure o f

i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i v e s and areas.*I2

f e n s e m a y be u s e d when i t i s a d v a n t a g eo u s , b u t t h e o f f e n s i v e

a s s u r e s a r a p i d and t h o ro u g h d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enem y.

I n o t h e r w o rd s, t h e d e -

i d e a l l y , i.n a n o f f e n s i v e , t h e a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s w i l l by-

p a s s h e a v i l y d e fe n d e d areas and seek g a p s b e t w e e n e n e m y u n i t s

o r c o n d u c t a t t a c k s f r o m t h e m arch a g a i n s t w e a k l y d e fe n d e d

p o s i t i o n s t o p ro ce e d i n t o t h e enemy rea r . 2 o w e v e r , t h e

S o v i e t c o m m a n d e r m a y be f o r c e d i n t o c o n d u c t in g a b r e a k t h r o u g h .



I n many pub l i ca t i on s t he word brea kthrough i s synonymous

w i t h a ru p tu re o f enemy po s i t i o ns . I n th e r emainder o f

t h i s c h a p te r t h e w o r d breakthrough w i l l be u s e d o n l y t o

connote a sp ec i f i c t ype o f o f f ens ive opera t ion . The break-

in g through of enemy po si t i on s by a t t acks f rom the march

w i l l be re fe r red t o as a ru pt ur e of enemy def ens es .

The breakthrough i s t h e most d iscu ssed form of So vi et

o f f e n s e w i t h i n US Army d o c t r i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s , b u t i t i s

probably t h e l e a s t understood fo rm o f Sov i e t t a c t i c s . The

c l a s s i c S o v i e t b re ak th ro ug h c o n j u r e s up v i s i o n s o f massed

a r t i l l e r y , t a n k s , and APCs i n o rd er t o l i t e r a l l y overwhelm

t h e defender . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n u c l ea r weapons a l t e r e d

t h e S o v i e t p hi lo s op h y f o r t h e conduct of t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h .

I t i s t h e l e a s t p r e f e rr e d of S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e o pe r a t i o ns

d ue t o t h e massive coo rd i na t ion p roblems, p lu s t h e vu lner -

a b i l i t y o f massed ground f o r c e s t o d e s t r u c t i o n by n u c l e a r

weapons. Ferhaps COL S i d o r e n k o s t a t e s t h i s changed phi los-

ophy t h e b e s t s

i n t h e p er io d of World War iI, e s s e n t i a l l yt h e only method f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e e f f o r t s o ft h e f i r s t eche lon was t h e commitment and engage-ment of r i f l e and armored c h a s t i and s o ed i n en i a

maneuver o f t roops f rom o ther axes suppor ted bya r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n . T h is a t t a i n e d t h e c r e a-t i o n of h i g h d e n s i t i e s , a n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t yover t h e enemy i n men and mater i e l , and success -f u l development o.f the a t t a c k i n t o t h e d ep th .

Under modern con di t i on s nu cl ea r weapons a r e t h ech i e f means o f de s t ru c t io n . The means f o r t h e i rd e l i v e r y p o s s es s wide c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r maneuverand can d e l i v e r pow er ful s t r i k e s where and wheni t i s necessary and adv i sab le . dy employing

o f t h e s econd ech e l o ns o r r e s e r v es , o r--%I+-y

5-2



nu cl ea r weapons one can i n a short t ime achievethe e f f e c t i ve des t ruc t ion of t h e enemy and rap-i d l y change t h e r a t i o o f men and materiel , thuschanging t h e s i t u a t i o n i n o ne 's f a vo r . T hi s w i l lensure t h e su cc es sf ul development of t h e a t t a c kby t h e f i r s t echelon a t h igher r a t e s . Moreover,the de l iv ery of nuclear s t r ik es permits one t oavoid a dangerous co nc en tr at io n of t ro ops and an

inevitable compacting of c o m b a t formations in-volved w i t h t h e commitment of f r e s h forces fromt h e d e p t h and t h e i r e xe cu ti on of maneuver underd i f f i c u l t c o nd it i on s of t h e ground si tuat ion.3

Soyedineniye - Formation. The hi ghe st l e v e lo f mi li ta ry organizat ion1 Corps, Divis ion, o rJ r i g a d e l eve l equ iva len t . I t may be formed froma s i n g l e branch of variousqbranches and Se rv ic es ,inc ludi ng naval squadrons.

Chas t ' - Unit. Any adm ini str ati ve, l i n e ,or housekeeping uni t of regimental s i z e o r small-

e r t h a t i s admini strat ively self -contained andhas i t s own designation, number, and banner. I ti s t h e basic t a c t i c a l (combat) and independentorganiza t ional un i t up to , and inc lud ing theregiment. Each c o n s i s t s o f subuni ts .5

Thus, d u r i n g t h e conduct of a breakthrough, the maneuver

fo rce s e x p l o i t t h e success of t h e f i r e s up po rt . T h i s maxim

i e appl icab le i n ei th er nuclear o r non-nuclear warfare.

The pursu i t i s t h e f i n a l form of offens ive ac t io n and

has one goal, t h e u l t ima te des t ruc t ion of t h e enemy force.

The remainder of t h i s chapter i s an explanat ion of t h e var-

ious phases of of fens ive opera t ions . To again place t h e

breakthrough i n i t s proper perspect ive a f i n a l quote from

COL Sidorenko i s offered1

Troops a t ta cki ng i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i l lovercome t h e enemy's defense, not by "gnawing

through" on narrow sectors and solid front, aswas the case in past wars, but simultaneouslyacross a broad f ron t , a long axes , f r o m themarch, a t h i g h tempos, r i g h t a f t e r nuclear

5-3



s t r i k e s , t a k i n g advantage of breaches, intervals ,and gaps i n the enemy's comb t deployment, and bywide employment of maneuver.8

5-2. CONDUCT.

There are two methods o f t r a n s f e r t o t h e o f f e ns i ve ,

e i the r f rom t h e march o r from a p o s i t i o n i n con tac t w i t h t h e

enemy. I f these methods f a i l t o rup ture the enemy's posi-

t i o n s , o r i f the enemy has constr ucted a formidable , in-

depth defen se which cannot be r ea di ly bypassed, a break-

through must be conducted t o fo rc e a gap i n the enemy's

forma tion. Suc ce ssf ul ly breaki ng through the enemy's de-

fense s may le ad t o a pu rs ui t . Assuming th e defen se as p a r t

of an offens ive i s a v i a b l e t a c t i c a n d i s usua l ly re fe r red

t o as t he ha s ty de fense . T h i s por t ion of defensive combat

w i l l be covered i n the next c hap ter .

a. 3rom the March.

An advance t o co n ta c t i s conducted i n march column and

may r e s u l t i n a meeting engagement o r an a t tack f rom the

march. A typical regimental march formation was discussed

i n th e previous chap ter . The composi t ion o f the march

column w i l l vary depending upon the mission and the t roops

av ai la bl e . Xowever, th e previo usly discussed regimenta l

march column i s considered t o be represe nta t ive .

The scena r io wi th in the l a s t chap ter de sc r ibe s a r e g i -

ment which made t w o a t t a c k s f r o m the march p r i o r to conduct-

ing a meeting engagement. An enemy l o c a t i o n i s chosen f o r

5-4



an a t t ack e i t h e r p r i o r t o o r d u r i n g t h e m a r c h .

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e nt s a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e enemy f o r c e s a n d

bypass s t r o n g p o i n t s o f enem y r e s i s t a n c e . When a p o s i t i o n

is f o u n d which c a n n o t be r e a d i l y b yp as se d t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

e l e m e n ts t r y t o a s c e r t a i n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e f o r c e and t h e

w i d t h a n d d e p t h of t h e p o s i t i o n . T h e y may a l s o be used t o

o b s e r v e t h e p o s i t i o n t o r e p o r t a n y changes i n s t a t u s . The

a d v a n c e guard miry be u s e d t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g d i r e c t f i r e s

f r om t h e f r o n t of t h e p o s i t i o n t o f i x t h e enem y, w h i l e a

p a r t o r a l l of t h e r e g i m e n t a l m a in bo dy m a n eu v er s t o t h e

f l a n k s o r r e a r , o r b o th , of t h e p o s i t i o n t o c on du ct a n

a s s a u l t . T h e y w i l l a t t e m p t t o r u p t u r e t h e p o s i t i o n and p ro -

c e e d i n t o t h e e n e m y r e a r .

T h e l e a d i n g

A t a p r ed e te rm i ne d d i s t a n c e fro m t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e

r e g i m e n t a l march c o l um n w i l l b re ak i n t o b a t t a l i o n march

c o l um n s , t h e n com pa ny m ar ch c o l um ns , then p l a t o o n march

c o l u m n s and f i n a l l y i n t o an a s s a u l t l i n e . The r e g i m e n t a l

S o r c e s w i l l assaul t t h e o b j e c t i v e u s i n g t h e maximum a m ou nt

o f d i r e c t f i r e . The a s s a u l t p o s i t i o n l i n e f r o m w hic h t h e

r e g i m e n t ' s s u b o r d i n a t e e le m e nt s a s s a u l t t h e o b j e c t i v e i s

u s u a l l y no more t h a n o ne t o two k i l o m e t e r s f r om t h e o b j e c t i v e

and i t nor m a l l j r w i l l be t h e l a s t c o v e r e d and c o n c e a l e d a r e a

n e a r e s t t h e o b j e c t i v e . I n w id e o pe n t e r r a i n sm oke w i l l be

u s ed t o mask m an eu ve rs i n t o t h e a s s a u l t f o r m a t i o n .S m a l l u n i t f o r m a t io n s f o r t h e a s s a u l t , a nd d i s t a n c e s

b e t w e e n t a n k s a n d BMPs a r e w e l l d e s c r ib e d i n DIA m a nua l s

5-5



c o v e r in g b a t t a l i o n and com pany t a c t i c s . A r t i l l e r y o r g a n i -

z a t i o n and s e q u e n c i n g o f f i r e s a r e w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d i n

s e v e r a l a pp ro ve d f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e d oc um en ts . '?he S o v i e t s

have a l s o wri t t en n u m e r o u s b o o k s which c o v e r t h e s e d e t a i l s

i n d e p t h . V o y e n n i Vestnik, ( ; ; i l i t a r y : I e r a l d ) f r e q u e n t l y

d e s c r i b e s f i e l d p ro b le m s and o n o c c a s i o n p o s e s a p r o b l e m

f o r t h e r e a d e r s t o s o l v e . W ork ing t h e s e p ro b le m s and check-

i n g t h e answer i n f o l lo w i n g i s s u e s is a g o o d w a y o f v a l i d a t i n g

k no wled ge of S o v i e t t a c t i c s . -o v i e t X i l i t a r y R e v i e x , i s

a n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l w hic h f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e s f i e l d p r o b l e m s

an d s h o w s t h e means appl ied by S o v i e t c o m m a n d e r s t o s o l v e

t r a i n i n g p ro b le m s. The m a g a z i n e i s w r i t t e n f o r u s e by p e r s o n s

o u t s i d e t h e U S S R , and was n o t p u b l i sh e d i n R u s s i a n u n t i l t h e

f i r s t i s s u e of 1978. I t c o n t a i n s c o n s i d e r a b l y more p ro p a -

g a n d a than d o e s V o y e n n i V e s t n i k .

T he S o v i e t s e m plo y tw o t y p e s o f r e s e r v e s , c o m b i n e d arms

and s p e c i a l i z e d . E xa mp le s of t h e l a t t e r m i g h t be a n e n g i n e e r

r e s e r v e o r an a n t i t a n k reserve. Th e s i z e o f a r e s e r v e v a r i e s

w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n , b u t a com bined arms r e s e r v e o f a p l a t o o n

f o r a b a t t a l i o n , a c om p an y f o r a r e g i m e n t , and a b a t t a l i o n

f o r a d i v i s i o n might b e g oo d p l a n n i n g f a c t o r s . The m o t or -

i z e d r i f l e d i v i s i o n h a s a n o r g a n i c i n d e p e nd e n t t a n k b a t t a l i o n

w n i c h m a k e s a n e x c e l l e n t c o m b i n e d arms r e s e r v e f o r t h a t d i v i -

s i o n . i;v'ithin m o t o r i z e d r i f l e u n i t s , t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t a l i o n

a t d i v i s i o n , t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t e r y a t r e g i m e n t , an d i n 3TR

e qu ip pe d u n i t s t h e a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n a t b a t t a l i o n l e v e l , a re



well s u i t e d f o r a n t i t a n k r e s e r v e s . I n t h e s c e n a r i o :For t h e

meeting e n g a g e m e n t w i t h i n C h a p t e r 4, t h e r e g i m e n t ' s a n t i -

t a n k b a t t e r y was d e p l o y e d wel l f o r w a r d t o meet c o n t i n g e n c i e s .

T h i s u n i t p o s s e s se s a c c u r a t e l o n g r a n g e f i r e s , i s h i g h l y

m o b i l e , a n d c a n be e m pl oye d unde r many d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m -

stances.

i i a t t a l i o n j.s t h e l o w e s t l e v e l w hi ch may r e t a i n a r e s e r v e

o r a t t a c k w i t h t wo e c h e l o n s . C om pany and p l a t o o n a t t acks

a r e a l m o s t a l w ay s c o n du c te d w i t h o u t a r e s e r v e . biore t h a n

o n e l i n e may be u se d i n t h e company a t t a c k s , b u t t h e c l o u e -

n e s s of t h e l i n e s i s v i e w e d as add ing d e p t h , r a t h e r t h a n t h e

u s e of a s e c o n d e c h e l o n . The d i f f e r e n c e b etw ee n a s e c ond

e c h e l o n a n d a r e s e r v e i s t h e se co n d e c h e l o n has b e e n i n c l u d e d

i n t h e o p e r a t i o n p l a n w i t h an a s s ig n e d m i s s i o n , w h i l e t h e

r e s e r v e w i l l be em plo yed t o r e s o l v e u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

A r e g i m e n t a l z on e o f a c t i o n , i n d i c a t e d b y b o u n d a r i e s ,

c a n v a r y f r o m f i v e t o e igh t k i l o m e t e r s i n a m a i n a t t a c k t o

1 0 t o 15 k i l o m e t e r s i n a s e c o n d a ry a t t a c k . The r e g i m e n t

w i l l h a v e a t l e a s t o n e march r o u t e w i t h i n t h e z o n e , b u t tw o

march r o u t e s a r e p r e f e r r e d , e s p e c i a l l y un d e r NBC c o n d i t i o n s .

W he t he r t h e r e g i m e n t e v e n t u a l l y at tacks w i t h t h r e e r e i n -

f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n s abreast , o r tw o u p an d o n e b a c k , d e p e n d s

o n t h e w i d t h of t h e a s s i g n e d z o n e , t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e a t t ack -

i n g and d e f e n d in g u n i t s , and i f t h e commander d e s i r e s d e p t ht o h i s a t t a c k . A g ai n, n u c l e a r w a r f a r e w i l l s t r e t c h t h e s e

f r o n t a g e s t o a vo id l o s i n g m ore t h a n o ne b a t t a l i o n t o a s i n g l e

5-7



s t r i k e . Also, the regimental ant i tank battery or accompany-

ing a r t i l l e r y may be used to p rov ide a base of f i r e , o r i n

US terminology to provide ovenvatch. BhWs may a l s o be

assigned a similar mission.

The formation of a r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y g r o u p ( R A G ) i s

based on t h e amount of a r t i l l e r y made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r e g i -

mental commander, o r upon d i r e c t i o n o f the division commander.

Esual ly a RAG w i l l be formed f r o m two t o f o u r b a t t a l i o n s o f

a r t i l l e r y t o pr ov id e c e n t ra l i z e d c o n t r o l f o r a s p e c if i e d

period o r to perform a s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n , then the RAG w i l l

be diss olve d and un i t s returned t o th e i r normal headquar te rs .

Kotor ized r i f l e r egiments have a n o rg an ic a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n

and each subordinate motor ized r i f l e ba t t a l i on has a mortar

b a t t e r y . Tank regiments do not have t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , b u t

they have a unique use f o r t h e i r t a nk g u ns.

percen t of t he Sov ie t t ank 's un i t o f f i r e c on si s t s of high

explosi ve f ragmentat ion rounds .7

taught and p r a c t i c e i n d i r e c t f i r e gunnery.

i n d i r e c t mode, th e smoothbore guns o f today ' s Sovie t t a n k s

a r e n o t as accu r a t e as the olde r r i f l e d guns. ifowever, a

t ank un i t possesses t he cap ab i l i t y t o p r ov ide supp res s ive

f i r e w i t h their main guns. T h i s i n d i re c t f i r e , o r f i r e from

beyond the maximum ef fe ct iv e range f o r d i r e c t f i r e , i s not

ac cu rat e enough f o r p inpo int engagement o f hard ta rge ts ,

bu t can provide an impressive volume of f i r e t o suppress

ATGM gunners o r dismounted tro ops .

About f i f t y

Sov ie t t a n k gunners are

When f i r e d i n an



S ov ie t d oc tr in e c a l l s f o r d i r e c t f i r e of a r t i l l e r y

whenever fe as ib le . By d i r e c t l y observing the impact o r t h e

rounds an a r e a t a r g e t c an be n e u t r a l i z ed f a s t e r , w i t h l e s s

expendi ture of rounds, th an can unobserved or t ra je c to ry

f i r e . Also, S o v ie t a r t i l l e r y p ie c es p o ss es s a n a n t i t a n k

c a p a b i l i t y f o r s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n . ' Most of th es e an ti ta nk

a r t i l l e r y rounds a r e HEAT.

The amount of a r t i l l e r y rounds t o be placed on a ta r g e t

i s sub j ec t t o t he fo ll owi ng cons i de ra t i ons :

1 . The gun/howitzer c a li b e r .

2 . The gun-target range.

3 . The type o f t a r g e t .

4.

5. The degr ee .of damage d e s ir e d .

The size o f t h e t a r g e t .

The Soviets have charts which l i s t how many rounds of w h a t

type have t o be! f i r e d i n t o e a c h h e c t a r e o f t h e t a r g e t t o

ach i eve spec i f i ed r e su l t s .

t o conduct a r t i l l e r y f i r e and some of t h e p e r t i n e n t d e f i n i -

t i o n s a re included a t the end of t h i s chap t e r . So, an

a n a l y s i s of t h e t a r g e t and t h e av a i l a b le a r t i l l e r y i s nec-

e s s ar y p r i o r t o f i r i n g a t a t a r g e t .

There a r e many d i f f e r e n t ways

The Sovie ' ts see the at tack from the march t o be the

predominant form o f o f fen s iv e combat. The march column is

ap pr op ri ate f o r th e meeting engagement, a t t ac k from th e march,

pursui t , and perhaps w i t h i n other forms o f combat.

5- 9



b. i:rom Direct C o n t a c t .

T h i s s i t u a t i o n c a n t a k e p l a c e w h e n a n a t tack h a s b e e n

s t a l l e d and t h e o f f e n s i v e i s being r e s u m e d , o r w hen a b a t t l e

s t a r t e d i n a d e f e n s i v e m o d e and t h e d e c i s i o n h a s been made

t o assume a n o f f e n s i v e p o s t u r e . ‘ I t w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n t o

r u p t u r e t h e en em y’s f o r m a t i o n and e n t e r h i s r ea r a r e a . I t

p r o b a b l y w i l l be a c c o m p a n i e d by a s h o r t a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n

and t h e i n i t i a l f o r m a t io n s w i l l d ep en d on t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s

p r i o r t o beginning t h e a t t a c k . T h e a t t a c k c o u l d b e s t a r t e d

by a se co nd e c h e l o n f o r c e p a s s i n g t h r ou g h o r n e a r t h e d e f e n d -

i n g t r o o p s . U s u a l l y , t h e a t t a c k i s i n i t i a t e d b y f o r c e s f ro m

behind o r a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n i t i a l d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s . T ro o p s

f ro m w i t h i n t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s c a n s u p p o r t t h e a t t a c k e r s

w i t h d i r e c t f i r e . The a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s a r e m a r s h ale d i n

a t t a c k p o s i t i o n s near t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n . The a t t a c k

p o s i t i o n s s h o u ld p r o v i d e c o v e r a nd p r e c l u d e enemy o b s e r v a -

t i o n t o r e t a i n t h e element of s u r p r i s e . The a s s a u l t w i l l b e

s imi la r i n fo rm t o t h e a t t a c k f ro m t h e m arc h d e s c r i b e d a b o v e .

T he r e a r e o t h e r f a c t o r s w h i c h m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d w h e n

p l a n n i n g a n a t t a c k , p r i m a r i l y w h e th er o r n o t t h e i n f a n t r y

will r e m a in m ou nted . S i n c e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e 9PW

t h e r e has been c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e rn i n g t h e c o n-

d u c t o f an assault by i n fan t ry a c c o m p a n i e d by t a n k s . C i s -

m o un tin g t h e i n f a n t r y slows t h e a t t a c k , l e a v e s t h e i n f a n t r y

v u l n e r a b l e t o a r t i l l e r y f i r e , and t h e t a n k s c o u ld outrut?

L Inem. 30, t h e p r e f e r r e d m ethod of c o n d u c t i n g an i r C a n t r y

5-10



a s s a u l t i s t o remain mounted t o cont inue th e speed oL' t h e

off ens ive . The fo l low ing l i s t p r es en t s s o me s i t u a t i o n s

when a dismounted a t t a c k m i gh t prove bene.Cicialr

1. i i h en t h e r e a r e o b s t ac l e s which canno t be c l eared

by mechanical means.

2 . ifhen the enemy po si t i on ' s a n t i t a n k weapons have

n ot be en s u f f i c i e n t l y n e u t r a li z e d by i n d i r e c t f i r e .

3 . :Tien t he re a r e en t rencned enemy i nf a nt ry on th e

object ive vrn ich must b e c l ea r ed .

4. ':lhen th e po si t i on must be co ns ol id at ed o r h e l d f o r

a f o ll o wi n g f o r c e .

5 . When t h e r e i s a des i re t o max imize f i r epower such

as t h e u s e or hand grenades and flamethrowers.

Another c on si de ra t io n when p lanning t h e a t t a c k i s what

t y p es o f maneuver tn e a t t a ck i n g r 'o rce w i l l use . At t h e

t a c t i c a l l e v e l t h e ways t o con duc t t h e a t t a c k a r e , f r o n t a l l y ,

from t h e f l a n k , o r by use of an envelopment. l h e f l a n k

a t t a c k and envelopment can b e combined t o make a f o u r t h

form o f maneuver. 'The f r o n t a l a t ta c k i s r a r e l y u sed du e

t o i t s in he re nt dis adv ant age s. xiowever, i t should not be

t o t a l l y exc lu dcd fro m co n s i d e r a t i o n as the enemy force could

be vulnerable ?ram t h e f r o n t .

c . j r eak th rough .

'The concept or' the breakthrough h a s changed s in c e th e

i n t r o d u c t i o n O C nu cl ea r weapons. The adva ntage o f u s i n g a

s i n g l e weapon t o c r e a t e a gap i n an enemy's defe nse is q u i t e

5-11



o b v i ou s . H ow ev er, t h e c l a s s i c b r e a k t h r o u g h had u n i t s mass-

ing o n l i m i t e d f r o n t a g e s wh ic h would l e a v e t h e a t t a c k e r

v u l n e r a b l e t o a n u c l e a r s t r i k e .

A b r e a k t h r o u g h i s an o p e r a t i o n a l f o r m o f com ba t and i s

c o n t r o l l e d by Army e l e m e n t s o r h i g h e r . T h e d i v i s i o n s a n d

r e g im e n t s e x e c u t e p o r t i o n s of t h e b r e a k th r o u g h , b u t i t is

p l a n n e d by t h e Army s t a f f . T h er e w ould b e s u f f i c i e n t a r t i l -

l e r y a v a i l a b l e f o r a n Army t o s u p p o r t o ne b r e a k th r o u g h i n

i t s z on e. I d e a l l y , t h e S o v i e t s w ould l i k e t o h av e a n a r t i l -

l e r y d e n s i t y o f a t l e a s t 60 t u b e s p e r k i l o m e t e r o f b r ea k -

t h r o u g h area. The d i v i s i o n c o n d u c t in g t h e b r ea k th r ou g hw o u l d n a r r o w i t s f r o n t a g e t o a b o u t f o u r k i l o m e t e r s and u s e

a t l e a s t t w o - t h i r d s o f i t s c o m b a t p o w er i n t h a t n a r r o w e d

area. The remainder o f t h e d i v i s i o n w ou ld c o n d u c t econom y

of f o r c e m e as ur es i n t h e r e s t o f t h e z o n e . The at tack ing

f o r c e s w ould n o t s t a y massed f o r p r o lo n g e d p e r i o d s , b u t

would assemble i n d i s p e r s e d s t a g i n g areas. O n c e t h e a r t i l -

l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n had b e g u n t h e u n i t s wo uld b e g i n t o c on ce n-

t r a t e i n t h e b r e a k th r o ug h a r e a . The u n i t s w o u l d be e c h e l o n e d

i n d e p t h and three ec h e l o n s would n o t be uncomm on. Once t h e

f o r c e s ha d succeeded i n b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h the e n e m y ' s d e f e n s e

a n d i n t o h i s r e a r a r e a t h o u g h t s w ould b e g i v e n t o c om mencing

p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s .

C r e a t i n g a s u f f i c i e n t d e n s i t y o f a r t i l l e r y f o r break-

t h r o u g h o p e r a t i o n s i s a r e l a t i v e l y easy t a s k . A l l m o r t a r s

w i t h i n m ot o r i z e d r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r ed a r t i l l e r y

5-12



and they would be used i n p r e p a t o r y f i r e s . T h is p ar ag ra ph

w i . 1 1 d i s c u s s a m o t o r i z e d r i f l e d i v i s i o n of a combined arms

army. The army c o n s i s t s of th re e motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s

in t h e f i r s t echelon and a t a n k d i v i s i o n i n t h e second eche-

lon . Wi th in t h e d i v i s i o n the re would be 54 120mm m o r t a r s

a v a i l a b l e .

howi t z e r s and 18 152mm howi tz e r s . The t h r e e m ot or iz ed r i f l e

r eg iments have im a d d i t i o n a l 54 122mm howitzers.

commander would provide a minimum of 54 a d di t io n al a r t i l l e r y

p i e c e s , p r oba b ly 36 l 3 O m m f i e l d guns and 18 l52mm howitzers.

The Army commander could add 18 l 3 O m m guns and 18 l52mm

howi tze r s f rom h i s a r t i l l e r y r eg iment , or a d d i t i o n a l p i e ce s

i f more than one regiment was ava i l ab le . The Army commander

c ould a l s o p r ov ide 72 122mm howitzers from t h e second echelon

t a n k d i v i s i o n , 54 from t h e a r t i l l e r y r eg im en t and 1 8 from

the motor ized r i f l e regiment, a n d a d d i t i o n a l mortars. Mor-

t a rs from t h e t a n k d i v i s i o n w i l l n o t be c ou nt ed i n t h i s case.

T hus, t he r e a r e a t o t a l of 3 24 a r t i l l e r y p ie ce s t o f i r e i n t o

a f ou r k i l om e te r b r e a k th r ough area w i t h a d e n s i t y o f o v er

80 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s p e r k i l o me t e r. T h is d e n s i t y c ou ld be

inc r e a s e d by a d di n g a d d i t i o n a l F r o n t o r Army a r t i l l e r y . T h e

a r t i l l e r y would remain dispersed and would mass t h e i r f i r e s

in to t he b r e a k th r ough area. I d e a l l y , w h e n t h e a s s a u l t b e g a n

th e a re a would be devoidof

an t i t a nk weapons and i n f an t r ypersonnel would not have recovered from t h e f i r e p r e pa r at i o n.

This may not occur, so t h e a t t a c k i n g f o r c e w i l l r a p i d l y

The o r ga n i c a r t i l l e r y r e gi m en t h a s 36 122mm

The Front

5-13



converge in to the designated are a , arrayed i n depth t o sus-

t a i n t he momentum, and proceed w i t h t h e a s s a u l t .

Once the breakthrough has met w i t h i n i t i a l s u c c e s s ,

u n i t s w i l l hold th e shoulders of t h e penetration and each

fo l low ing u n i t w i l l attempt t o widen th e gap. The le ad in g

units w i l l des tro y the enemy's res erv es and l o g i s t i c a l a re as .

The pene t r a t i ng un i t w i l l probably go into a march formation

to be prepared f o r a meeting engagement w i t h enemy reserves

moving t o w a r d s t h e a r e a of th e breakthrough. If the enemy

w i t hd raw s p u r s u i t opera t ions m ust al so be considered.

Remember, th e re i s a l o t o f planning t h a t mus t take

place for a breakthroug h. Tremendous amounts of ammunition

are requi red f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and f i r e p la nn in g i t -

s e l f w i l l take a long time. I t i s t h e l e a s t p r e fe r re d of a l l

of fens ive opera t ions and w i l l be undertaken only when other

means have f a i le d t o cre at e a rupture i n the defense , and

when t h e enemy's de fe ns e h a s created a l inear e lement which

cannot be bypassed. I t i s the worst case f o r u s , b u t w i l l

not occur t h a t of ten .

d . Pursui t .

Once a rup tur e has been effec ted i n the enemy's defen se,

or a successful breakthrough has been accomplished, the

a t t ack i ng units w i l l cont inue t h e a t t ack in to the enemy rear ,

If the enemy starts t o w i t h d r a w , e i t h e r v o l u n ta r i l y o r a s

a r e s u l t o f combat action, the time i s r i g h t t o s t a r t a pur-

s u i t . A p u r s u i t i s a viable opt ion i f .the enemy w i t h d r a w s

5-14.



a t the end of a meeting engagement. The remainder of t h i s

sec t i on w i l l address t a c t i c a l pursui t opera t ions conducted

by a regiment.

There are three f o r m s of pursui t - f r o n t a l , p a r a l l e l ,

and combined. The f r o n t a l pu rs ui t i s f requent ly ca l l ed t h e

d i r e c t p u r s u i t , and constant pressure i s kept on t h e r e a r

of withdrawing enemy fo rc es . F a r a l l e l p u r s u i t means t h e

pursuing force t rave l s on routes para l l e l to the wi thdrawing

enemy force, outdistances pa r t of h i s f o r c e s , c u t s o f f a

por t i on of the force f rom the f lank and defeats i t i n d e t a i l .

Combined pursuit i s no more tha n us ing a p or ti on o f the p u r -

suing force t o maintain pressure on the rear o f the w i t h -

drawing enemy, while a l a rg er por t ion of the for ce conducts

a p a r a l l e l p u r s u i t.

Sp ec ia l org an iza tio ns may be formed f o r the p u r s u i t t o

ensure the enemy w i t h d r a w a l i s slowed, as speed o r execution

i s v i t a l f o r the pur suer . Nuclear weapons, ext ens ive use of

a r t i l l e r y , attack he l i cop t e r s , c l ose a i r suppor t , and a i r -borne operat ions are a l l id ea l l y sui t ed t o s low down o r

i s o l a t e a withdrawing enemy. Attack s ag ai n s t is o la te d enemy

forc es ar e usua l ly conducted from t h e march.

Planning pl ay s a key p a r t i n purs ui t opera t ions . Care-

f u l cons idera t ion must be given t o proper route se lec t ion

and providing s u ff ic ie n t and appr opri a te un i t s t o the p u r -

s u i n g fo rc e. The purs uers must always be on t he a l e r t f o r

a potential meeting engagement and reconnaissance and

5-15



s e c u r i t y f o r c e s p l a y a k e y r o l e .

a l e r t f o r p o t e n t i a l enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s .

P u r s u i n g f o r c e s m ust b e

T h e p u r s u i t s ho u ld b e s topped w hen o n e o r m ore o f t h e

f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s a p p l y :

1. D e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enemy i s c o m p l e t e d .

2 . The enemy ha s r e c o n s t i t u t e d a s t r o n g d e f e n s e .

3 . The p u r s u e r s ha ve o u t d i s t a n c e d essen t ia l s u p p o r t .

4. The p u r su i n g f o r c e has p e n e t r a t e d q u i t e d e e p l y

and h a s become v u l n e r a b l e t o d e s t r u c t i o n .

5 . Any o t h e r s i t u a t i o n w he re i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t h e

p u r s u e r s p o s s e s s a m a r k e d a d v a n t a g e .

T h e a u t h o r i t y t o s t o p a p u r s u i t m u st com e from h i g h e r

h e a d q u a r t e r s , b u t t h e pursuing commander may recommend

t e r m i n a t i o n a t any time.

5-3. OPERATI ONAL SUPPORT.

P l a n n i n g f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s c e n t e r s ar ou nd o r ga n-

i z i n g e f f e c t i v e com bined arms u n i t s r e i n f o r c e d w i t h com-

p l e m e n t a r y f o r c e s t o m a x i m i z e t h e i r c o m b a t e f f e c t i v e n e s s .

W i t h i n a m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t i t i s t y p i c a l prac t i c e

t o p r ov i d e a t a n k c o m p a n y t o e ac h m o t o ri z ed r i f l e b a t t a l i o n

i n t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n of t h e r e g i m e n t . T h e r e m a i n i n g tank

company cou ld be a r e s e r v e f o r c e , o r u se d t o r e i n f o r c e t h e

t h i r d m o t o r i z e d r i f l e b a t t a l i o n . If a d d i t i o n a l t a n k s a r e

p ro v id e d f ro m d i v i s i o n a l as se t s , t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e

t h i r d b a t t a l i o n w ould be a l m o n t a u t o m a t i c . The m o t o r i z e d



r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s u s u a l l y p ro v id e a tank p l a t o o n t o e ac h r i r s t

e c h e l o n c om p an y , a n d c a n k e e p t h e t h i r d t ank p l a t o o n as a

r e s e r v e , o r r e i n f o r c e t h e t h i r d com pany. 3 a t t a l i o n s p e r -

f o rm i n g e s s e n t i a l m i s s i o n s may be g i v e n an a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l -

i o n t o a i d i n the a cc om p li sh m en t o f t h e i r m i s s i o n .

An a t t a c k f r o m t h e m arch has t h e same s u p p o r t p r o b l e m s

as d i s c u s s e d f o r t h e m e e t i n g e ng ag em e nt . A t t a c k a g a i n s t a

f o r c e i n c o n t a c t r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l p l a n n i n g and s e l e c t i o n o f

a t t a c k p o s i t i o n : ; : . S e l e c t i o n of r o u t e s o f a d v a n ce t h ro u g h

or a ro un d d e f e n d i n g f o r c e s i s a lso c r i t i c a l . E x t r a e n g i n e e r s

mag be n e c e s s a r y t o o v erco m e f r i e n d l y o b s t a c l e s .

I n t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h i t i s c r i t i c a l t o p r o v i d e e n o u g h

a r t i l l e r y a nd a m m un it io n t o a c c o m pl is h t h e j o b . Assem bly

areas and r o u t e s i n t o t h e b r e ak th ro u g h a r e a must b e c a r e -

f u l l y s e l e c t e d t o a v o id c om p ro m is in g t h e o p e r a t i o n .

F u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s ha ve t o b e p la nn ed c a r e f u l l y and

t h e p u r s u i n g f o r c e s must b e p ro v id e d e s s e n t i a l s u p p o r t . I t

might be m o r e a d v a n t a g e o u s t o e q u i p a s ec o nd e c h e l o n f o r c e

f o r t h e p u r s u i , t and a l l o w t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n t o r e g ro u p .

5-4. SPECiAL TROOPS SUPPORT.

E ach f a c e t of t h e o f f e n s i v e has u n i qu e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r

s u p p o r t . A l l p h a s e s o f t h e o f f e n s i v e w i l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h

e n s u r i n g t h e p r o p e r a m o u n t s oi PCL a nd a m m u n i t i o n a r e m ade

a v a i l a b l e . The b r ea k th r o ug h w ould c a u s e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

u n i t s t o c a r r y m ore a m mu n it i on t h a n POL, w h i l e t h e r e v e r s e

5-17



would be t r ue du ri ng a p u r s u i t .

the p u r s u i t would need extra signal support to ensure commu-

nicat ion over extended ranges . Tra f f i c con trol t roops ar e

es se nt ia l fo r any march formation to avoid t r a f f i c jams and

t o ensur e the march plan proceeded accor ding to s che dul e.

The radio- t echnic al t roops can provide in t el l i ge nc e t o

a s s i s t th e commander, and chemical tr oop s can be i nva lu ab le

i n an NBC environment. A l l of t hese f a c t o r s must be con-

s i d e r e d when organizing the force for combat.

A f a s t moving regiment i n

5-5. DEFINITIONS. A l l def in i t i ons a r e t aken f r om D ic t ionaq

of Easic M i l i t a r T e r m s , by A . I .i e r r i o r t o thed e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e e n t r y ite m w i t h -i n t he d i c t ionar y .

188 BOYEVOY KOMPLEKT ( u n i t of f i r e ) - The supply-and-account-ing unit adopted for operat i onal and t a c t i c a l p lanning w i t hregard to mat eri el and te chn ica l support require d by troops( a v i a t i o n ) i n o rd e r t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r combat mission maybe accomplished.

689 ISKHODNYY R A Y O N ( a t t a c k p o s i t i o n ) - An a rea o f t e r r a i nall oca ted t o troops f o r occupation by them pr io r t o goingover t o the a t t ac k from a pos i t io n of c lose con tac t w i t h

th e enemy. An a t t a c k po si ti on i s prepared i n accordancew i t h the concept of the opera t ion (o r ba t t l e ) and th eoperat ional formation ( o r or de r of ba t t l e ) o f t h e a t t ack ingtroops, and i s organized i n the engineer ing sense so as t oconceal their presence, t o f a c i l i t a t e th e i r deployment andt r a n s i t i o n t o t h e attack, and t o protect them f r o m a l l theweapons a t th e enemy's di sp os al .

690 I S K F I O D N Y Y RUBEZH ( a s s a u l t l i n e ; l i n e of d e p a rt u re ) - A

prearranged line from which a u n i t o r formation proceeds tof u l f i l l a combat mission ( a march, an at ta ck , et c . ) . Ana s s a u l t l i n e o r l i n e o f d e pa r tu r e i s defined by c l e a r l yv i s i b l e landmarks (on the te r r a i n o r on a map).

853 MASSIROVANNYY O G O N ' ARTiLLERII (massed a r t i l l e r y f i r e )- l i r e f r o m a l l , o r t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f , t he a r t i l l e r y ofa combined-arms forma tion, de li ve red sim ult ane ous ly ag ai ns t

.- .

5-18



t h e m ost i m p o r t a n t enemy g ro u p i n g o r o b j e c t i v e f o r t h epurpoee of i n f l h t i n g cons ide rab l e damage upon t h e enemyi n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s ib l e t im e .

866 METODICHESKIY O G O N ' ( d e l i b e r a t e f i r e ) - P i r e c o n d u c t e dw i t h a c o n s t a n t t i m e i n t e r v a l b etw ee n r o u n d s . The p u rp o seo f d e l i b e r a t e f i r e i s t o h o ld t h e t a r g e t i n a s u p p r e s s e ds ta te betw een f i r e o n s l a u g h t s , o r t o m a in t a i n t h e n e c e s s ar y

smoke c o n c e n t r a t i o n a f t e r f i r e o n s l a u g h t s when f i r i n g smokep r o j e c t i l e s . D e l i b e r a t e f i r e may a l s o be c on du cte d in de pe n-d e n t l y f o r t h e p u rp os e o f e x h a u s t i n g t h e enem y.

927 NASTUPATEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA ( o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ) - Thea g g r e g a te of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , c o or d in a te d and i n t e r r e l a t e dw i t h r e ga r d t o , t a r g e t , t im e , and p l a c e , and t h e v i g o r o u s ,o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s o f t h e t r o o p s of a f r o n t ( o r a n a r m y ) ,a cc o m p li sh e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a u n i f i e d c on ce pt f o r t h ea t ta i n m e n t o f o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c g o a l s . The g e n e r a lp u rp o se of a n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is t o d e s t ro y enemy meanso f n u c l e a r a t tack , break up enemy main g r o u p i n g s , a n d s e i z er e g i o n s o f o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c i m p or ta n ce . A cc ord in gt o i t s s c a l e a n d t h e f o r c e s and w eapons i nvo lved , an o f f e n -s i v e o p e r a t i o n may b e a n army o p e r a t i o n o r a f r o n t o p e ra t io n ,b u t i n e i t h e r c a s e it will be conduc t ed by g round t r oo ps i nc o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r S e r v i c e s .

967 OB KHOD (deep enve lopmen t ) - A t r o o p m an eu ve r i n d e p t hwhich is performed in t a c t i c a l ( o r o p e r a t i o n a l ) co o r di na te da c t i o n w i t h t r o o p s a d v a n c i n g f ro m t h e f r o n t . D eep e n v el o p -ment i0 used f o r t h e pu rp ose of i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e , a u r -p r i s e s t r i k e s o n enemy f l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .

976 OGNEVAYA PODGOTOVKA ( ( 1 ) p r e p a r a t i o n f i r e ( s o f t e n i n gu p ) I ( 2 ) w e a p o n s t r a i n i n g ) - (1 ) P o w er fu l p r ep a re d s t r i k e sw i t h a r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n d e l i v e r e d p r i o r t o th e starto f a n attack, f o r t h e p urp os e of n e u t r a l i z i n g and d e a t r o y -i n g t h e m ost i m p o r t a n t enemy i n s t a l l a t i o n e w hich a r e n o tt o be d e s t r o y e d by n u c l e a r w e ap on s, and f o r t h e p u r po s e o fr e n d e r i n g t h e enemy incapable o f o f f e r i n g o rg a ni ze d r e -s i s t a n c e t o t h e a dv an cin g t r o o p s ; ( 2 ) a s u b j e c t i n t h et ra ining c u rr ic u lu m f o r p e r s o n n e l of s u b u n i t a and u n i t sof t h e arm ed f o r c e s .

980 OGNEVOYE NABLYUDENIYE ( n e u t r a l i z a t i o n f i r e ) - F i r e b ys i n g l e ro un ds o r b u r a t s a t w i l l , c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g t h e i n t e r -v a l s b etw ee n c o n c e n t ra t e d f i r e a g a i n s t t h e same t a r g e t , b u tw i t h c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s d e n s i t y . The p ur po se of f i r e o bs e r -v a t i o n i s t o k eep t h e t a r g e t n e u t r a l i z e d .

981 OGNEVOY VA:L ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e ) - A method of a r t i l l e r ys u p p or t f o r t ro o p s on t h e o f f e n s i v e , c o n s i s t i n g o f s u c c e s -s i v e s h i f t s o f h i gh -d en s i t y f i r e from one f i r i n g l i n e t o

5-19



a n o t h e r , a he ad o f t h e co mb at f o r m a t i o n s o f a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s .A r o l l i n g barrage ma y b e s in g le or d o u b l e .

982 OGNEVOY NALET ( c o n ce n tr a t ed f i r e ) - Method of conduc t inga r t i l l e r y f i r e f o r t h e p urp os e o f d e s t r o y i n g enemy p e r so n n e l,weapons, and combat materiel, e n v i s a g i n g a h i g h d e n s i t y off i r e d u r i n g a s h o r t i n t e r v a l o f t im e . A s a r u l e , c o n c e n t r a t -

ed f i r e be g in s w i th f i r e f rom more than one weapon , w i t h as ub se qu en t t r a n s i t i o n t o d e l i b e r a t e f i r e , r e ck o n e d o n t h ebasis of e x p e n d in g th e a s s ig n e d a mou nt o f a mmu n i t io n i n ap r e d e t e r m i n e d p e r i o d o f t i m e .

1058 OKHVAT ( c l o s e e n ve lo p m e nt ) - A t roop maneuver accom-p l i sh e d i n t a c t i c a l a n d f i r e c o o r d in a t i o n w i t h t h e t r o o p sacting f ro m t h e f r o n t . C l o s e e nv el op m en t i s used f o r t h ep ur po se o f i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e and s u dd en s t r i k e s on enemyf l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .

1156 POLKOVAYA ARTILLERIYSKAYA GRUPPA ( P A G ) ( r e g i m e n t a la r t i l l e r y g ro up ) - A r t i l l e r y c o n s i s t i n g o f m ore t h a n one

a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l io n , a t t h e d i r e c t d i s p o sa l o f a r e g i m e n t a lcommander , ass igned a t t h e t i m e of a b a t t l e t o c a r r y o u tm i s s i o n s o n b e h a l f of t h e r e g im e n t , and u n i f i e d b y a commoncommand.

1200 PRESLEDOVANIYE ( p u r s u i t ) - An a t tack on a w i t h d r a w i n genemy, under taken i n t h e c o u rs e o f an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e )f o r t h e p u rp os e of f i n a l l y d e s t ro y i n g o r c a p tu r i n g h i sf o r c e s . D e s t r u c t i o n o f a withdrawing enemy i s a c h i e v e d b yh i t t i n g h i s main body w i t h s t r i k e s f r o m m i s s i l e u n i t s a n da i r c r a f t ; b y a r t i l l e r y f i r e r by r e l e n t l e s s and e n e r g e t i cp a r a l l e l o r f r o n t a l p u r s u i t 1 by s t r a d d l i n g h i s withdrawalr o u t e 8 and by t h e p u r su i n g t r o o p s a t t a c k i n g h i s f l a n k a n d

r e a r . P u r s u i t i s c o n d u c te d i n march o r approach-marchf o r m a t i o n (or i n com bat f o r m a t i o n ) . F o r d e e p p e n e t r a t i o ni n t o th e enemy's w i t h d r a w a l r o u t e , tank t r o o p s a r e used i nt h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , b u t a i r b o rn e a s s a u l t f o r c e s may a l s o beemployed.

1212 PRORYV ( b r e a k t h r o u g h ) - A m ethod o f o f f e n s i v e a c t i o nused when conducting; an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) ,d i r e c t e d t o w a r d p e n e t r a t i n g a c o n t i n u o u s f r o n t , which i sp r e pa r ed i n t h e e n g i n e e r i n g s e n s e , e c h e l o n e d , and o c cu p i edby e n e my d e fe n se t ro o p s , b y ma k in g b re a c h e s (gaps) i n i tf o r t h e p u r po s e o f s u b s e q u e n t m an eu ver i n t o t h e d e p t h orto w ard t h e f l a n k s .

1336 RASKHOD BOYEPRIPASOV ( am m u n it io n e x p e n d i t u r e ) - Then u m b e r o f p r o j e c t i l e s (or bombe, m or ta r ro un ds , b u l l e t s )a l l o t t e d f o r , or a c t u a l l y ex pe nd ed o n, t h e fu l f i l lment ofa p a r t i c u l a r f i r e m i ss io n . H ow ever, f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e

5-20



number of f i r e missio ns performed du ri ng a spec i f i ed p e r i o dof time ( f o r example, i n t he cour se of an a i r bombardment,i n pr ep ar ato ry f i r e , i n a day of combat), ammunition ex-pendi ture i s expressed i n units o f f i r e .

1358 RUBEZH ATAKI (assault p o s i ti o n l i n e ) - A sec tor oft e r r a i n des i gna t ed by t h e commander of a format ion (uni t ,subuni t ! , from which t h e t r oops beg i n t he i r a t t ack on t he

enemy.1364 RUBEZH RAZVERTYVANIYA (deployment l i n e ) - The sectorof t e r r a i n on which troops deploy from march formation, orapproach-march form ation , i n t o combat form ation .

1365 RUBEZHI REGULIROVANIYA ( c o n tr o l l i n e s ) - T e r r a i n l i n e s ,designated i n advance by the senior commander, which thet roops must reach o r go through a t a ce r t a i n time and i n ace r t a i n formation.

1581 X A N G O V Y Y UDAR ( f l ank a t t ack) - An at ta ck dir ect ed a tthe f l an k of an opera t iona l (or combat) or march formation

o f t roops . A flank attack is one of t h e typ es (methods) ofmaneuver.

5-6 ENDNOTES.

'Radziyekakiy, Di ct io na ry , p. 132.

2 A . A. Sidorenko, The Offeneive. Tra ns late d by th eUnited States A i r Force. (Washington1 GPO 1976) , p . 1.(Ci ted hereaf te r as Sidorenko, Offensive.

31bid* * p. 148-149.

4Radziyevskiy, Dict ionax, p. V.

51bid .

6Sidorenko, Offensive, p. 221.

7DDI-1120-129-76, p. 8.

'A. N . Latukhin, Modern Artillerx. Translated by theAssi stant Chief of Sta ff f o r In te l l ig en ce , Department ofthe Army, for the r 'oreign Science a n d Technology Center.(Cha r l o t t e sv i l l e l PSTC, l g ' l l ) , p. 16 and p. 111.

5-21



C H A P T E R 6

THE D E F E N S E

OBORON ( d e f e n s e )-

A t y p e o f c o e - a t o p e r-a t i o n c o n d u c t e d for the p u r p o s e of r e p u l s i n g a nattack m ounted by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , c a u s i n gheavy c a s u a l t i e s , r e t a i n i n g i m p o rt a nt r e g i o n s oft h e t e r r a i n , and c r e a t i n g f a v o r a b le c o n d i t i o n s f o rg o in g o v e r t o a d e c i s i v e o f f e n s i v e . Defense i sbased on s t r i k e s b y n u c l e a r and a l l o t h e r t y p e s o fw eapons ; on ex t ens ive maneuve r w i t h f i r e , f o r c e sand weapons ; o n c o u n t e r a t t a c k a (or c o u n t e r s t r i k e a fw i t h s i m u l ta n e o u s s t u b b o r n r e t e n t i o n of i m p o r ta n tr e g i o n s whi.ch i n t e r c e p t the enemy d i r e c t i o n o fa d v a n c e ; a nd a l s o o n t h e e x t e n s i v e u s e o f v a r i o u so b s t a c l e s . D e f en s e m akes i t p o s s ib l e t o g a i n time

and to e f f e c t an economy i n forces and weapons i nsome s e c t o r s , t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s for a no f f e n s i v e i n o t h e r s .

6-1. G E N E R A L .

The de fense may be assumed by t h e S o v i e t s a t any time

i t would be a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r them, o r t h ey may be f o r c e d

i n t o i t a s a r e s u l t of

o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n .

l o s i n g a meet ing engagement or a n

The p u rp o s e o f d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s i s t o r e p e lt h e attack of s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , t o i n f l i c tc o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s e s o n t h e enemy, t o ho ld occu p iedp o s i t i o n s and t o c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a n s i t i o nt o t h e o f f e n s i v e - derived from the f a c t o r o f i n -e q u a l i t y o f f o r c e s . The defendere t r y t o make upfor a l a c k o f f o r c e s and m eans b y s e l e c t i n g 2 t a c -t i c a l l y s u i t a b l e t e r r a in and f o r t i f y i n g i t .

The tw o forms of t h e d e f e n se t o be d i s c u s s e d a r e the h a s t y

d e f e n s e , as p a r t o f t h e offense , and t h e d e l i b e r a t e or pre-

p la n ne d d e f e n s e . S o v i e t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y i s r ep l e t e w i t h

6-1



examples of c la ss i c defensive opera t ion s. The ba t t l es of

Kursk, Leningrad, and St ali ngr ad ar e used today as examples

of tenacious defense.

Any form of defense should be viewed as an expedient

u n t i l offen sive opera t ions can be resumed.

Recognizing the a tt ac k t o be t he ba sic anddecisive form o f armed co nf li ct , Lenin al so devot-ed much at t e n t i o n to th e defens e, but he viewedi t no t as a goal i n i t s e l f , bu t a8 temporaryact i ons forced by the s i tu a t io n and sub jec t t ot h e o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s o f d e fe a t of the enemy.

M . V. Prunze noted t h a t on ly the one whof inds wi th in himsel f the r e so lve t o a t t ack w i l lwin. A s i d e which only defends i s inev i t ab lydoomed t o de fea t .

. . .A t the same time,

Frunze recognized the pos s i b i l i ty , under ce r t a i ncondi t ions , o f sh i f t i ng to the defense, andsometimes t o a withdrawal , viewing i t as one

. . .

o f t h e aspects o f a f u t u r e a t t a c k . 3

A defensive opera t ion should not b e viewed as a l e t h a r g i c

e f f o r t d esigned so l e l y t o s t o p an invading force. I t i s a

dynamic ope rat io n f i l l e d w i t h counterblows, counterattacks,

and c ou nt er pr ep ar at io n a r t i l l e r y f i r e s .

Here th e combat si t u a t i o n can change even moreo f ten a n d more ab rup t ly than e a r l i e r i n f avo rof now one, and now th e ot he r si d e . A s a re -s u l t , none of them a r e guaranteed t h a t theyw i l l not be forced no t on ly to e xplo i t b u tal so t o conso l ida te 8uccess , no t on ly t o in -f l i c t blows, b u t also to parry the enemy'sb l o w s . And t h i s presupposes, depending onthe s i tu a t io n , the use of var ious types ofcombat op era tio ns, swit ching from one t o theo the r , f o r example, from t e of fens ive to the

All u n i t s w i t h a second echelon or res erv e plan f o r the

conduct of c ou nt er at ta ck s, which may be executed w i t h the

permission o f t h e next higher headquarters .

defen sive , and vice versa . 12

6-2



A f i rs t e c h e l o n b a t t a l i o n may r e c e i v e a s i n g l em i s s i o n - t o h old t h e area o f d e f e n s e ; a seconde c h e l o n t a n k b a t t a l i o n , h ow e ve r, may be a s s i g n e do t h e r t a s k a , i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s basic m i s s i o nf o r t h e d e f e n c e of a p o s i t i o n i n d e p t h , s u c h ast h e p r e p a r a t i o n of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s i n two o r t h rees e c t o r s , i n c o o p e ra t io n w i t h a d j a c e n t u n i t s , f o rt he p u r p o s e of d e f e a t i n g e nemy f o r c e s t h a t havepenetrated i n t o t h e d e f e n c e , and t h e p r e p a r a t i o nof one o r two f i r i n g l i n e s f o r t h e r e p u l s e o f ana t t ack by i n f i l t r a t i n g enemy t a n k s . 5

The defense can be s t ra tegic , o p e r a t i o n a l , o r t a c t i c a l

i n nature. This paper w i l l , as has been done i n p r e v i o u s

chapters, c o n c e n t r a t e o n a r e g im e n t a l s i z e f o r c e c o n du c ti ng

a t ac t ica l d e f e n s e .*

6-2. C O N D U C T .

a. H a s t y .

If a c o m b a t a c t i o n has e n d e d u n f a v o r a b l y , there are

two c h o i c e s f o r t h e commander, e i t h e r t o defend o r t o w i t h -

draw. I n an o f f e n s i v e t h e r e may be t h e e when i t is advan-

t a g e o u s t o t e m p o r a r i l y a s s u m e t h e defense. A few of t h e s e

s i t u a t i o n s are a8 f o l l o w s :

1. To d e e t r o y c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s fro m i mp or-

t a n t t e r r a i n p o s i t i o n s .

2 . T o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r o t h e r f o r c e s , s u c h as

a t r i v e r c r o s s h g s o r t o c l ea r o b s t a c l e s .

3. T o g a i n time.

4. T o h o l d p o s i t i o n s .

*The D I A m a nu als c o n c e r n i n g b a t t a l i o n a nd c om pany l e v e l

t a c t i c s a r e e x c e l l e n t s o u r c e s for a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n .

6 - 3



5 . To s e c u r e c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r a b l e f o r a d e c i s i v e

o f f e n s i v e ,

6. To re g ro u p a f t e r r e c e i v i n g e f f e c t i v e N Y C ,

a r t i l l e r y , o r a i r s t r i k e s .

If t h e d e f e n s e has been assumed as a n a d ve rs e r e s u l t

o f e i t h e r an o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n o r a mee t ing engagemen t t he

f or m o f t h e d e f e n s e c a n n o t b e p r e d i c t e d . T r oo p s w ould d i s -

mount t h e i r i n f a n t r y carr iers and p r o v i d e c o v e r f o r t h e w i t h -

drawal o f t h e i r v e h i c l e s t o d e f i l a d e p o s i t i o n s . T anks would

move i n t o d e f i l a d e p o s i t i o n s and p r o v i de p r o t e c t i v e f i r e .

The i n i t i a l p o r t i o n s o f s uc h a d e f e n s e w ould b e c o n f u s i n g a tb e s t . The com mander w ould t r y t o a s s e s s t h e s i t u a t i o n as

b e s t h e c o u ld and a t t e m p t t o b r i n g some c o h e si o n t o t h e

d e f e n s e . The 1 o n g e r . t h e u n i t s t a y e d i n t h e d e f e n s i v e mode

t h e m ore t h e p o s i t i o n w ould r e s e m b l e a d e l i b e r a t e d e f e n s e .

The d i f f e r e n c e b e tw e en t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s o f a h a s t y d e f e n s e

and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a d e l i b e r a t e d e fe n se i s a m a t t e r of

d e g r e e , r a t he r t h a n d e s i g n .

f e nd e r s , t h e more o b s t a c l e s and mines w ou ld be emp laced .

G iv en s u f f i c i e n t ti m e t h e t r o o p s would be d u g - i n a n d v e h i c l e s

p rov ided w i t h c o v e r a n d camouf l age .

structure o f a has t y de fe ns e would be t h e amount o f t im e

g iv e n t o t h e u n i t t o p r e p a r e i t s p o s i t i o n s . A no th er f a c t o r

w ould b e t h e am ou nt o f s u p p o r t made a v a i l a b l e t o c o n s t r u c tt h e d e f e n s iv e p o s i t i o n s .

The m ore t i m e g i v e n t o t h e d e-

The key f a c t o r i n t h e

6-4



Assuming a defense as pa rt of an offens ive w i l l be

characteri .zed by pr i or planning and a cohesive s tr uc tu re ,

Infan t ry t roops w i l l be i n t re nc he s o r bunkers i n f ron t o f

t h e i r c a r r i e r s and t an ks w i l l be i n t eg r a te d i n t o t h e a n t i -

tank defense, f i r i n g from concealed posi t ions . Based on the

amount of a r t i l l e r y made available and a need f o r increased

anti t ank f i r e s , accompanying a r t i l l e r y may be dug i n and used

i n a d i r e c t f i r e a nt i ta nk r ol e .

A T G M s w i l l be i n covered posi t ions and used t o d e s t ro y t h e

enemy a t long ranges . Defensive a r t i l l e r y bar rages and

counterpreparatj.ons w i l l be planned t o a i d the defenders.

Obst acles and minef iel ds w i l l be emplaced, both by engineers

and the troops themselves.

Ant it ank a r t i l l e r y and

Engineers p1ay.a k e y r o l e i n t he defense. Sovie t d iv i -

sions have both mechanical minelayers and t re nc hi ng machines

t o a i d i n creat . lng the defensive posi t ions . Severa l Sovie t

b o o k s ar e avai lab le which go in t o grea t d e t a i l on how t o

prepare ind ivi dua l and u n i t pos iti ons f o r the defense. Cam-

ouflage and deception play an important ro l e i n the defense

and engineers may be called upon t o a id these e f fo r t s . The

Sov ie t s , g iven su f f i c i e n t t ime, w i l l c r e a t e dummy def en si ve

po si ti on s t o confuse the enemy.

A s ec u ri t y zone may or may not be e st ab li sh ed i n fr on t

of the defensive posi t ions . I f esta bl is hed, platoon and

company s i z e combat ou tp os ts w i l l be established by f i r s t

echelon bat tal ions of f i r s t echelon regiments. These a r e

6-5



d e si gn e d t o d e c e i v e and c o n f u s e t h e e n e m y f o r c e . Also,

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e d e t a c h m e n t s and p a t r o l s may b e us ed t o p ro -

v i d e e a r l i e r w arn in g a n d d e t e c t t h e e nem y's m ain t h r u s t .

Ambush p o s i t i o n s c o n s i s t i n g o f p l a t o o n s i z e a n t i t a n k e le m en ts

may be u se d t h r o u g h o u t t h e s e c u r i t y z on e t o c o n f u s e t h e e n -

emy a n d kill him. A b o u t t h r e e t o f i v e k i l o m e te r s i n f r o n t o f

t h e main d e f e n s e b e l t , f o rw a r d p o s i t i o n s w i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d .

These w i l l be p la to o n and company s i ze p o s i t i o n s d es ig ne d t o

c o n fu se th e e n e my as t o t h e a c t u a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e d e f e n s e ,

c a u s e him t o d ep lo y p re m a tu r el y , t o d e t e c t t h e m ain e f f o r t

o f t h e en emy, t o k i l l h i m , and t o e l i m i n a t e a ny r e c o n n a i s s a n c ei n f o r c e . T hese p o s i t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y s e c o n d

e c h el o n b a t t a l i o n s from t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n r e g i m e n t s . The

s e c u r i t y zone may e q te n d o u t as f a r as 30 k i l o m e t e r s i n

f r o n t of t h e m ain d e f e n s e b e l t .

The m ain d e f e n s e b e l t is occupied by f i r s t e c h e l o n

d i v i s i o n s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n a r m i e s a nd c a n be u p to 15

k i l o m e t e r s i n d e p th . U s u a l l y , a d i v i s i o n d ef en ds w i t h tw o

r e i n f o r c e d r eg im e n ts i n t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n , e a c h h a v i n g a

s e c t o r o f 1 0 t o 15 k i l o m e t e r s i n w i d t h , an d a r e i n f o r c e d

r e gi m e n t i n t h e s ec on d e c h e l o n o cc up yi ng d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s

a c r o s s t h e w i d t h of t h e d i v i s i o n ' s a s s i g n e d s e c t o r . Based

on t h e w i d t h of t h e s e c t o r , t h e t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e , and t h e

t e r r a i n , a f i r s t e c h e l o n r e g i m e n t c o u l d d ef en d i n a s i n g l e

e c h e l o n . R e gi m en t m akes p r o v i s i o n s f o r co mb in ed a r m 8 and

a n t i t a n k r e s e r v e s . A ssum ing t h e d e f e n s e a s p a r t o f a n

6-6



o f f e n s i v e i s n o t as e l a b o r a t e as a d e l i b e r a t e or p r e p l a n n e d

d e f e n s e a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e f a c t o r s d r i v i n g t h e p r e p a r a t io n

an d s t r u c t u r e o f t h e d e f e n s e a r e t h e t im e and s u p p o r t a v a i l -

a b l e t o c o n s t ru c t t h e p o s i t i o n s .

b. D e l i b e r a t e .

A d e l i b e r a t e d e fe n se i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by e x t e n s i v e

p l a n n i n g and e n g i n e e r p r e p a r a t i o n . T he e a a e n c e o f a u c h a

d e f e n s e i s a s e r i e s o f m u t u a ll y s u p p o r t i n g , p r e p a r e d , de -

f e n s iv e p o s i t i o n s . The m ore t im e a nd m a t e r i e l d e v ot e d t o

t h e p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e more d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l b e t o o v erco me

t h e d e f e n s e . The S o v i e t s f e e l an o u t n u m b e r e d f o r c e , g i v e n

s u f f i c i e n t t im e t o p r ep a re i t s p o s i t i o n s , c an d e f e a t a v a s t l y

s u p e r i o r a t t a c k i n g f o r c e . The ar ray of such a d e f e n s e i s

t h e s a m e as d e s cr ib e d i n t h e p r e v io u s s e c t i o n .

More t i m e i s u s u a l l y a l l o c a t e d t o t h e p r e p a r a t io n o f

a d e l i b e r a t e d e f e n se than is a l l o c a t e d t o a ss um in g a de-

f e n s e a s p a r t o f a n o f f e n s i v e . S uch a d e f e n s e w i l l be well

s t r u c t u r e d and s i g n i f i c a n t num bers of a n t i t a n k and a n t i -p e r s o n n e l o b s t a c l e s w i l l b e e n c o u n t e r e d . T he S o v i e t s w i l l

c o v e r t h e i r o b t 3 t a c l e s w i t h d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e s . They

w i l l t r y t o c r e a t e f i r e p o c k e t s or f i r e s a c k s w i t h i n t h e

c o n t e x t o f t h e d e f e n s e . T he se a r e a s w i l l be gaps or s a l i e n t s

i n t o wh ic h t h e r e w i l l be plan ne d e x t e n s i v e a r t i l l e r y and

a n t i t a n k f i r e s . A good way of s e t t i n g u p s uc h a p o c k e t or

s a c k i s t o p o r t r a y a l i n e a r d e f e n s e and u s e a dummy p o s i t i o n

i n t h e m i dd le . The t h i r d u n i t i s p o s i t i o n e d b eh in d o r on



t h e fl an k of t h e dummy po si ti on .

t r y t o c a na l i ze t h e a t t a c k er i n t o t h e k i l l i n g a re a .

The defen ding un i t w i l l

T h e ba t t a l ion de fensive pos i t i on i s a s e r i e s of m a l l e r

company and plat oon s i z e po si ti on s. Gaps between u n i t s are

common and minef ields and o t h e r ob st acl e s may be found i n

t h e gaps. The gaps will a l so be covered by d i r e c t and i n -

d i r e c t f i r e s . Each posi t io n must be capable of f i r i n g onto

and i n suppor t of adjac ent pos i t i ons .

The mis sion of t h e f i r s t echelon ba t ta l ions of the reg i -

ment is t o h a l t any enemy force, and i f neces sa ry t o r e s to r e

pos i t i ons w i t h a counterblow. The second echelon b a t t a l i o n

of th e regiment i s t o con ta in any penet ra t ion and b y i t s e l f ,

o r i n conjunc t ion w i t h the rese rves , t o e j e c t any enemy

penet ra t ion and res to re the con t inu i t y o f the defense.

Remember, t h e de fe ns e is a temporary measure t o be used

only u n t i l an offe nsi ve can be mounted. Hence, plans t o

assume an offensive w i l l be updated con st an tl y by a l l com-

manders and s t a f f s . The tempo of combat w i l l vary from

s e c t o r t o s e c to r , w i t h some uni t s conduct ing countera t tacks ,

whil e ot he rs a r e condu cting counterblows. Also, ambushes may

be s e t up by t a n k pla toons ad jacen t t o r ou tes i n to the de -

fens ive pos i t ions . S o , an a tt ac ke r may be subje cte d t o

f r o n t a l and f l ank ing f i r e from a number of d i f f e r e n t p os i-

t ions . Attack he l ic op ter s w i l l be used t o de st ro y enemy

f o r c e s , and may b e employed i n conj un ct io n w i t h tank am-

bushes.

6 -8



6 - 3 . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.

The s e l e c t i o n o f t e r r a i n f o r t h e d e f en se i s of ex t reme

imp o r t a n c e t o th e d e fe n d e r . Commanders a nd s t a f f s w i l l

ma k e e x te n s iv e use of map and p e r s o n a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t o

p i c k t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e l o c a t i o n fro m w hich t o d e f e nd .

t a n k weapons may be s i t e d i n d i v id u a l l y , b u t as a n i n t e g r a l

p a r t o f t h e a n t i t a n k d e fe n s e . T a n k s may b e s i t e d i n d i v i d -

u a l l y w i t h i n t h e s c h e me of t h e d e fe n s e o r a8 small u n i t s t o

p r o vi d e f l a n k i n g o r ambush f i r e s .

o r f i r e sacks w i l l b e c o v e r e d b y d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t f i r e .

The d e f e n d e r s w i l l need ex te n s i v e amounts o f am muni t ion and

a l o t of i t may b e p r e -s t oc k e d n e a r d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

H ig h ly mo b i l e a n t i t a n k an d co mbin ed arms r e s e r v e s m u s t b e

l o c a t e d i n a r e a s w here t h e y c an p ro ce ed r a p i d l y t o p o t e n t i a l

areas of employment.

A n t i -

G aps and f i r e p o c k e t s

The e n g i n e e r s a r e ke y t o t h e SUCCBBB of t h e o p e r a t i o n

and may ne ed a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r e m pl ac em e nt o f mines

and o t h e r o b s t a c l e s m a t e r i e l . I n d i v i d u a l u n i t s w i l l per form

a l o t of e n g i n e e r p r e p a r a t i o n t h em s e l v es , b u t m e ch a ni ca l

a i d s s h o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e w h e r e ve r p o s s i b l e t o sp e e d u p

t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e d e f e n s e . F orw a rd e l e m e n t s w i l l be

p r e p a r e d f i r s t and t h e n s ec o nd e c h e l o n e l e m e n t s . When t im e

p e r m i t s , a l t e r n a t e and s w i t c h p o s i t i o n s w i l l b e p r e p a r e d t o

a i d i n a s s i s t i n g t h e c o n du c t of c ou n t er bl ow s and c o u n t e r -

attacks.

6 -9



6-4. SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT.

As d i scussed i n the p rev ious sec t io n , j ud ic ious u s e

must be made of av ai la bl e t ra ns po rt at io n t o ensure a l l need-

ed materiel can be made available t o t h e d e fen di n g f o r ces .

The i mpo r tan t r o l e o f the engineers has been discussed pre-

v i o u s l y . E x t e n s i v e use w i l l be made of wire communications

f o r s e c u r i t y and con t inu i ty r easons . The rad io - t e chn ica l

t roops can a i d the commander i f they can determine the area

of the enemy’s main e f f o r t o r di s r u p t t he enemy’s command

and c o n tr o l by jamming. Ra di o- el ec tr on ic combat can be

e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i n t he defense .

6 - 5 . DETINITIONS. A l l d e f i n i t i o n s a r e t ak en f r o m D i c t i o n a r yof Basic Mi l i ta ry Terms, by A . I .Radziyevskiy. The number p r i o r t o t h ed e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e en t r y it em w i t h -i n t h e d i c t i o n a r y .

562 ZAGRADITEL’NYY OGON’ ( ba rr ag e f i r e ) - A t yp e of a r t i l l e r yf i r e c o n s is t in g i n l a y i n g a f i r e b ar ra ge ( f r o n t a l o r f l a n k)on a p r e s e l e c t e d l i n e ( o r l i n e s ) i n o r d e r t o i n t e r d i c t move-ment by enemy in fa nt ry o r tanks. Barrage f i r e i s arrangedbeforehand, and i s conducted a t a d e f i n i t e r a t e f o r a c e r t a i n

period of time.

585 ZASTAVA ( o u t p o s t ) - ( 1 ) The means o f guarding t roops ontine march (march se cu r i t y det achment ) and i n s t a t i c d e p l o y -ment (guard ou tp os t) . ( 2 ) A subun i t o f border t roops(company o f border t roops ) guarding a s p e c i f i c s e c t o r of t h es t a t e f r o n t i e r .

742 K O N T R A T A K A ( co u n t e r a t t ack ) - An at tack under taken bydefending t roops agains t an a t tacking enemy f o r the purposeof pu t t i ng h i m t o r o u t ( o r d e s t ro y i n g him) and ach iev ingc om ple te o r p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n l o s t by t h edefending t roops . A co u n t e r a t t ack i s usually mounted byt h e second echelons and reserves of un it s and formations ,and a l so by pa r t of t he for ce s of the S i r s t echelon froms ec t o r s n o t u nd er a t t ack .

751 KONTRPODGOTOVKA ( co u n t e r p r ep a r a t i o n ) - A pre-planned,b r i e f , power fu l , su rp r i se b u r s t o f f i r e del ivered by adef end er ag ai ns t enemy groupings which are prepar ing f o r an

6 -10



o f f e n s i v e and, in p a r t i c u l a r , against e n e m y m i s s i l e l a u n c h -i n g p o s i t i o n s , r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l f a c i l i t i e s , f u e l and ammu-n i t i o n dum ps.

752 K O N T R U D A R ( c o u n t e r b l o w ) - A blow i n f l i c t e d by t r o o p s f o rt h e p u r p os e of d e s t r o y i n g a n a t t ack i ng e n e m y , r e a t o r i n g al o s t p o s i t i o n , and c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r g oin g over t o t h ea t t a c k . A c o u n te rb lo w i s t h e m ost i m p o r t a n t a c t of d e f e n s i v ee ng ag em e nt, e x p r e s s i n g t h e a c t i v e and m o b il e c h a r a c t e r o fp r e s e n t - d a y d e f e n s e . D u r i ng a d e f e n s i v e e ng ag em e nt , s e v e r a lc o n s e c u t i v e c o u n t e r b lo w s may b e d e l i v e r e d i n o ne o r mores e c t o r s .

823 L O Z H N Y Y R A Y O N O B O R O N Y (dummy defense reg ion) - An a r e aof t e r r a i n p a r t i a l l y equ ipped w i t h dummy d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e s ,b u t n o t o c c u p i e d b y t r o o p s .

960 OBORONITEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA ( d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ) - Thea g g r eg a te of b a t t l e s f o u g h t i n i n d i v id u a l s e c t o r s f o r t h ep u r p o s e o f d i s r u p t i n g an e n e my o f f e n s iv e s t i l l i n p r e p ar -a t i o n o r already b eg un , a nd a l s o f o r t h e p ur po a e o f g a i n i n gtime, and c r e a t i n g f a v o ra b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r g o in g ov er t o t h eat tack. A c on te m po ra ry d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is b a a e d o n th eu s e of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s and s t r i k e s w i t h a l l o t h e r t y p e s o fW e ap on s, o n t h e e x te n s iv e u s e o f ma n eu ve r w i t h f i r e , f o r c e sand w ea po na , a nd o n c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , i m p a r t i n g a n a g g r e a s i v eand d e c i s i v e c h a r a c t e r t o t h e d e fe n se .

s e c t o r of t e r r a i n i n te n de d f o r c on d uc t i ng a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l eb y mo to r i z e d r i f l e and t a n k s u b u n i t s ( o r u n i t s ) . D e fe ns iv ep o s i t i o n 6 have s t r o n g p o i n t s p r ep a re d by e n g i n e e r s , d i s p o s e da t i n t e r v a l s of 1-1.5 k i l o m e t e r s , w i t h f i r i n g l i nes for t a n ks u b u n i t s and a n t i t a n k w ea po ns, t r e n c h e s f o r v a r i o u s w ea po ns ,

s h e l t e r s f o r p e r so n n e l , and w i t h o t h e r d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e s .V a r i o u s o b s t a c l e s and dummy ob je c ts may a l s o be s e t up a td e f e n s iv e p o s i t i o n s .

1084 PEREDOVAYA POZITSIYA ( f o r w a r d p o s i t i o n ) - A p o s i t i o nt h a t i s s e t up i n f r o n t of t h e forward edge i n i n d i v i d u a ls e c t o r s f o r t h e p u rp o se o f m i s l e a d i n g t h e enemy c o n c e r n in gt h e t r u e l o c a t i o n o f t h e f orw ar d e dg e o f t h e d e f e n s e , t os a f e g u a x d u n i t s ( o r a u b u n i t s ) o f t h e f i r s t e c h e lo n f ro ms u r p r i s e a t t a c k , t o r e p u l s e enemy r e c on n a is s a nc e i n f o r c e ,and compel him t o d ep lo y h i s ma in b o d y p re ma tu re ly . Sub-u n i t s fro m r e g i m e n t s o f t h e f i r s t e c he lo n a r e u s u a l l ya s s i g n ed t o d ef en d f or w ar d p o s i t i o n s .

1121 PODVIZHNYY ZAGRADITEL'NYY O G O N ' ( P Z O ) ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e )- A t yp e of a r t i l l e r y f i r e used i n d e f en se . A r o l l i n gb a r ra g e c o n s i s t s i n s u c c e s s iv e s h i f t s o f a p o w e r f u l c u r t a i n

961 OBORONTIEL'NAYA POZITSIYA ( d e f e n s iv e p o s i t i o n ) - A

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o f f i r e fro m one p r e s e l e c t e d , o bse rv ed l i n e t o a n o t h e r ,d u r i n g a n enemy t a n k a t t a c k .

1134 PODGOTOVLENNAYA O B O R O N A ( p re p ar ed d e f e n s e p o s i t i o n ) -A d e f e n s e f u l l y p r e p ar e d i n t h e e n g i n e e r i n g s e n s e , andoc c up i e d by t r o o p s . I t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e f o l l o w i n gf e a t u r e s 1 a n o rg a ni ze d f i r e p l a n , b ased o n n u c l e a r - m i s s i l e

s t r i k e s , s u p p l e m e n t e d b y a i r s t r i k e s and a r t i l l e r y f i r e 1t h o r o u g h l y - o r g a n i z e d c o o r d i n a t i o n b e tw e en f o r c e s and w e ap o n s;an d s t a b l e c o n t ro l .

1144 POZITSIYA ( p o s i t i o n ) - A s e c t o r of t e r r a i n e i t h e ro r g a n i z e d o r n o t - i n t h e e n g in e e r in g s e n s e - f o r o c c u p a t i o nby t r o o p s .f o r w a r d , p r i m a r y , s w i t c h , a s s e m b l y , l a u n c h i n g , f i r i n g ,t e m p o r ar y , a l t e r n a t e , dummy, e t c .

1164 POLOSA OBESPECHENIYA ( s e c u r i t y z o n e) - A z o n e c r e a t e da hea d o f t h e f o r w a r d e dge of d e f e n d i n g t r o o p s . A s e c u r i t yzone i s c r e a t e d w h e n t h e r e i s no c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e

enem y, a nd u s u a l l y c o n s i s t s o f s e v e r a l p o s i t i o n s , c ov er edby o b s t a c l e s a n d d e f e n d e d by t h e t r oo p s i n a c t i o n i n t h es e c u r i t y z o ne . The d e p t h of a s e c u r i t y z o n e d e p e n d s o nt h e c o n ce p t of t h e d e f en s e , t h e n a t u r e of t h e t e r r a i n , andt h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of t i m e f o r i t s p r e p a r a t i o n .

1182 POSPESHNO ZANYATAYA ObORONA (has ty d e f e n s e ) - A d e f e n s ec r e a t e d by t r o o p s i n t h e c o u r s e of c om bat o p e r a t i o n s . A tt h e b e g i n n i n g o f i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , s u c h a d e f e n s e i s c h a r -a c t e r i z e d by8 i n c o m p l e t e r e a d i n e s s and c o n s e q u e n t r e d u ce ds t a b i l i t y ; an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y de ve lo pe d and o r g a n i ze d f i r eplant h u r r ie d l y -o r g a n iz e d c o o r d i n a t i o n 1 i n s u f f i c i e n t d e ve lo p -m ent o f t h e s y st em o f e n g i n e e r s t r u c t u r e s ; weak e x p l o i t a t i o nof t h e t e r r a i n ; and i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e c o n t r o l . A h a s t yt r a n s i t i o n t o d e f e n s e , u n d e r modern c o n d i t i o n s , may s temfro m t h e need t o r e p u l s e c o u n t e r s t r i k e s by s upe r io r e ne m yf o r c e s i n t h e c a u r ~ e f o f fe n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as a r e s u l to f a n u n s u c c e s s f u l m e e ti n g e n ga ge m en t ( o r b a t t l e ) t h ee f f o r t s o f a d e f e n d e r t o h a l t , w i t h h i s r e s e r v e s , f u r t h e radvance of enemy t roops which have broken through an somei n t e r m e d ia t e l i n e ; and a l s o , i n a w i t h d r a w a l , when ther e t r e a t i n g s i d e , d e fe n de d by r e ar - g u ar d e l em e n t s o n a ni n t e r m e d ia t e l i n s , t r i e s t o e x t r i c a t e t h e m ain body u n de ra t t a c k .

1184 FOSTROYENIYE O B O R O N Y ( s t r u c t u r e of a d e f e n s e ) - A t r o o ps t r u c t u r e , a f i r e p l an , and e n g i n e e r o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e

t e r r a i n . The s t r u c t u r e of a d e f e n s e mus t be i n a c co r d w i t ht h e c o nc e pt of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e p l an o fc o n d u c t i n g i t .e c he lon e d , e n s u r in g w ide m aneuve r o f forces a n d f a c i l i t i e s ,

P o s i t i o n s o c cu r i n t h e f o l lo w i n g c a te g o r i e s :

The o r g a n i z a t i o n of a d e f e n s e must b e d e e p l y

6-12



both fr o n ta l l y arid i n depth, ens uring concentrated andef f ec t ive use of nu c lear miss i l es and other weapons againstth e most importa nt groupings of th e at ta ck in g enemy, anddel iv ery of co un ter st r ike s (or conduct of co unte rat ta cks)by second echelons and reserves.

1225 PROTIVOPEKHOTNYYE Z A G R A Z H D E N I Y A (ant i -personnel obsta-c l e s ) - A r t i f i c i a l o b s t ac l es e re c te d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d ,mainly i n sec tor s of t h e t e r r a i n w h i c h a r e no t t r a v e r s i b l eby tanks , f o r th e purpose of impeding movement by enemyinfan t ry , and in f l i c t i n g cas ua l t i e s . Anti -personne l obs ta -cl es inc lude mine f i e l d s , barbed-wire , hidden ob sta cle s ,conc er t in a wire , lo g obstacle s inter twined wi th barbed-wire ,and strengthened w i t h land mines, etc.

1231 PROTIVOTANKOVAYA O S O R O N A ( P T O ) (ant i - t ank defense) -The sum t o t a l o f measures used t o e nsu re suc cess i n combat-i ng t anks , i nc l ud i ng a f i r e p lan conducted by ant i - t ankweapons, used i n conjun ction w i t h obstac les for the purposeof re pe l l i ng enemy tank at t ac ks i n a defense. Anti-tankdefense i s organized throughout th e e n t i r e depth of an

ope ra t i onal defense , p r i mar i ly i n t he sec t o r s of probabletan k approach. An an ti -t an k pl an in cl ud es company s tr o n gpo int s c on tain ing ant i- t ank weapons1 tank ambushes! f i r i n gl ines prepared f o r occupation by tank troops and by anti-tankrese rves1 t a n k s of second echelons and of re se rv es , (a n ti -t an k r e s e r v e s ) ; a r t i l l e r y l o ca t e d i n s e c t o r s of p ro ba bl et a n k approach; and antitank obstacles.

1233 PROTIVOTANKOVYYE Z A G R A Z H D E N I Y A ( an t i - t ank obs t ac l e s ) -A r t i f i c i a l o b s ta c le s s e t up on th e b a t t l e f i e l d f o r t h e pur -pose o f s topping o r slowing an advance by enemy tanks, andre nd er in g them un ser vic eab le. Anti-tank o bs ta cl es make i teas ie r t o i nf l i . c t s t r i k es on enemy tanks w i t h a r t i l l e r y

f i r e and o t h e r ant i - tank weapons. The main types o f a n t i -t a n k obstac les are t h e mine f i e l d and th e fougasse . Alsoused a re di t che s, escarpments , counter-scarps, (s teel -beam)post obs tac les , abat i s , landsl ides, and flooded o r marshyte rr ai n s and i n winte rtime , bes ide s, snow banks and ic ys lopes . A s a ru le , ant i - t ank obs tac les a re covered bya r t i l l e r y , mortar, and machine-gun f i r e .

1397 SISTEMA Z A G R A Z H D E N I Y (obs tac le p lan) - The aggregate ofvar ious engineer ing obs tacles (mine f i e l d s , mined se ct or s ofroads , individua l obje c t s prepared fo r demol i t ion , obs tac leconcen t r a ti ons , obs tac l e zones , e t c . ) , c r ea t ed f o r t he pur-pose of hi nd er in g enemy advance, de la yi ng him whi le rep ul s ing

h i s c o u n t e r s t ri k e , i n f l i c t i n g l o s s e s on him, and creat ingcond i t i ons fo r de fea t i ng h i s t roops w i t h nucl ear and o the rweapons.

6-13



1401 SISTEMA O G N Y A V OSORONE ( d e f e n s iv e f i r e plan) - A com-b i n a t i o n o f p re -a r ran ge d f i r e s t r i k e s on t h e a p p r o a c h e s t aa d e f e n s e , and t h e c r e a t i o n o f z on es o f c o n t i n u o u s m u l t i-t i e r e d f i r e of a l l t y p e s a he ad o f t h e f o rw a r d e d g e , o n t h ef l a n k s , a n d i n t h e d e p t h , of t h e d e f e n s e , and a l s o c o n c e n -t r a t i o n o f f i r e , i n b r i e f p e r i o d s of time, on any t h r e a t e n e da x i s o r s e c t o r . A d e fe n s iv e f i r e plan is f o r m u l at e d i n

a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) ,t a k i n g i n t o a c co u nt n u c l e a r a n d c h e m i c a l a t t a cks , and en-v i s a g i n g c l o s e c o o r d i n a t io n of f i r e f r o m a l l t y p e s o f wea-pons and a i r s u p p o r t , i n c o n ju n c ti o n w i t h o b s t a c l e p l a n s ,and n a t u r a l . b a r r i e r s .

1508 TAKTICHESKAYA GLUBINA O a O R O N Y ( t a c t i c a l d ep th of ad e f e n s e ) - The s t r i p o f t e r r a i n w hich i s occupied and de -f e nde d by d i v i s i o n s o f t h e f i r s t e c he lon o f a n a r m y .

6-6. ENDNOTES.

‘ R a d z i y e v s k i y , D i c t i o n a r y , p. 135.

2Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 207.

3 S a v k i n , P r i n c i p l e s , p. 241-242.

‘V, M . P e d u l o v , a n d V. V. T u rc h en k o, D e f e n s i v e O p e r a t i o n sD ur inP An O f f e ns ive . T r a n s l a t e d by Leo K an ner A s s o c i a t e s f o rThe r ’ o re i n S c i e n c e and T ec h no lo g y C e n t e r . ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e :?STCe 197t )I o 13.

6-14



CHAPTER 7

THE WITIiDRAWAL

7-1 GENERAL.

Chapter 2 es t ab l i shes t he withdrawal as a separate

form of combat which i s appl icab le wi thin th e meeting en-

gagement, the offens ive, o r the defense. Sovi et m i l i t a r y

his tor y cont ains many referen ces t o t h e advantage of con-

duc t i ng a well organized withdrawal. COL Savkin borrows a

phrase from Generalissimo A . V. Suvorov, which i l lust ra tes

the h i s to r i c s igni f i cance of the wi thdrawal :

Suvorov wrote t o Baron Kray t h a t " there i s noshame t o concede a pos t t o an enemy sup eri or i nnumbers. On th e con tra ry, he rei n l i e s the m i l i -t a r y art of withdrawing i n t ime without lo ss es .A stubborn re si st an ce t o hold any pos t wouldco s t dear ly , while subsequent ly i t would s t i l lhave t o be giv en up t o a superior enemy. A p o s twhich has been conceded c a n be occupied again,whi le the loss i n personnel i s i r r e v e r s i b l e .Oftenlone man i s more cost ly than the post i t -

s e l f .

COL Sidorenko st re ss es the mul t i- faceted n ature of t h e

withdrawal l

I t j.s believed t h a t withdrawal opera t ionsmay be conducted for various purposes: t o exhaustattacking enemy troops and i n f l i c t l os se s on themit o avoid combat under unfavorable co nd iti on s andplace t h e enemy i n a disadvantageous posi t ioni t ocr ea te th e opportuni ty t o take advantage of one'sown for ce s o r a por tio n of them on other sec tors

of t h e f r o n t ! t o win t ime f o r br ingi ng up addi-t i o n a l f o rc e s f r o m th e depth, organize defensiveposi t ions i n the re ar , regroup t roops , and prepare



an att ack 1 and t o draw the enemy into certainar ea s where he can be destroy ed by nuc le ar wea-

The withdrawal a n d the has ty defense are t h e only forms of

combat which may be used a f t e r an unsuccessful meeting en-

gagement. Deception op er at io ns could in co rpo ra te a w i t h -

drawal t o mask u n i t l o c at i o ns o r t o disguise f r iendly combat

opera t ions .

pons and counterattacks. 2

US Army an al yt ic al e f fo rt s seldom use a withdrawal by

Sovie t fo rces wi th in a s imulat ion scena r io . Therefore, a

de ta il ed exp lan ati on on how t o conduct a withdrawal has not

been included i n t h i s paper. The followi ng se ct io n provides

genera l concepts f o r the conduct o f the withdrawal.

7-2 . coNnucT.

"Organization of a withdrawal beg ins on ly a f t e r r ec e ip t

of an or de r from th e su pe ri or commander. 8'3

may be made when i n o r out o f contac t w i t h the enemy. When

n ot i n c on t ac t w i t h the enemy i t may be viewed as another

t a c t i c a l march and conducted according ly. Conduct o f a w i t h -

drawal when i n con ta ct w i t h the enemy becomes a much more

d i f f i c u l t t a s k . T h e f i r s t s t e p , a f t e r o rgan iz ing the f o r ce

f o r t he w i t h d r a w a l , i s t o break contact w i t h the enemy.

The withdrawal

Contact w i t h the enemy s h o u l d be broken d u r i n g per iods

of l imi t ed v i s i b i l i t y t o minimize de t ec t ion o f the w i t h -

drawal. #hen breaking con tac t ar t i l l e r y f i r e and smoke mayb e used t o preclude observat ion of t h e f r i e nd l y un i t s . Sev-

e r a l covered and concealed ro ut es should be used t o al lo w

7-



the uni t s breaking contac t to conduct a r a p i d and s i m u l -

taneous egress.

Securi ty e lements are key to the successful conduct of

a withdrawal. Flank s ec u ri ty detachments and r e a r guards

w i l l be formed t o pr ot ec t t h e withdrawing fo rc e. A com-

prehensive plan must b e prepared t o ensure a l l un i t s under-

stand the sequence of th e opera t ion. Mutual pro tec t io n

between security elements and withdrawing forces i s e s s e n t i a l

t o a succ essfu l wi thdrawal.

7- 3 . ENDNOTES.

l Savk i n , z r i nc i u l e s , p. 245.

2Sidorenko, Offensive, p . 167.

3Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 242 a

7-3



CHAPTER a

CONCLUSIONS

8-1. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Sov iet ta c t i c a l doc t r ine includes fo ur forms of combat

ac t i on - the meeting engagement, the offense , the defense ,

and the w i t h d r a w a l . The meeting engagement or the w i t h -

d r a w a l may occur dur in g po rt io ns of off ens ive and defens ive

operat ions. The withdrawal may be used t o te rm in at e an

un su cce ss ful meeting engagement.

The Sovie t s cons ider the evolut ion of t a c t i c s t o be a

dynamic and s c i a n t i f i c proc ess. The refinement of So vi et

t a c t i c s i s a cont inual procedure, as described by COL Savkint

The pr i nc i p l e s of ope ra t i ona l a r t and t a c t i c sbear a h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r . A change i n obje ct iver e a l i t y , p ri ma ri ly i n th e material basis of b a t t l eo r ope ra t i on , l eads t o a change i n pr in c ip le s , to ldiscarding outmoded ones and devel op ing new ones .

Thus, t he s tud y of Soviet ta c t i c s should be an ac t i ve

and continuou s proce ss t o keep pace w i t h t h e i r e vo lv in g t a c t i -

c a l d o c t ri n e .

8-2. TECHNOLOGI.CAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The advent of the nuclear age had an immense impact on

the development of Sovi e t t a c t i c a l doc t r i ne . The i n t ro -

duc t i on of nuc:Lear weapons altered Soviet concepts f o r con-

duc tin g combat op era t io ns . The fi el d in g of technological ly

8-1



sup er io r weapons by any army could impact on t h e evolu t ion

of S ov ie t t a c t i c s .

Changes i n technology have also impacted on Soviet

Army or ga ni za ti on al st r uc t u re . The dismounted infantr yman

was t he base of th e So vi et Army du ri ng World W a r 11. Today,

the Soviet Army i s a highly mechanized force capable of con-

duct ing armored warfare i n se vera l p a r t s o f the world.

Improved technology h a s caused changes i n Soviet t a c t i c s

i n t he past , as s ta ted by General-Major Reznichenko:

Examination o f bas ic p r inc ip les of contem-

I n t h e development of

po r a r y t ac t i c s shows t h a t t he y d i f f e r from t a c t i c sof past wars, i n cl u di n g t a c t i c s of the per iod ofthe Great P a t r i o t i c War.t a c t i c s , j u s t as i n o p er a ti o na l a r t and strategy,the r e has indeed occurred a r evo lu t ion which wascaused by th e wide ap pl ic at io n of nuclear weaponsand means of t h e i r del ivery and al so by the uae ofother of t h e l a t e s t achievements i n sci enc e andtechnology i n mil i t a r y a f fa i r s .2

Thus, one must s t a y attun ed t o developments i n mil i t a r y

weaponry which impact on the evolut ion o f Sovie t t ac t ics .

8 - 3 - ENDNOTES.

'Savkin, Principles, p. 278.

'Reznichenko, Ta ct ic s, p. 252 .

8-2



APPENDIX A

31 L I O G R A P X Y

US G O V E R N M E N T DOCUMENTS

A . Ma n u a l s , Circulars an d T r a i n i n g T e x t s

A p p e nd i xe s t o N o t es o n t h e S o v i e t G rou nd l o r c e s . (SupR 6 9 7 2 0 )US Army I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r an d S c h o o l , D e p ar tm e n t o ft h e A r m y . IJSAINTS, 7 e b r u a r y 1 9 7 6 .

H an db oo k o n S o v i e t G ro un d F o r c e s . (ZM 30-40) Headquarters,D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army. D A , 30 Ju n e 1 9 7 5 .

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airyukov, G . and Malnikov, G . An ti ta nk Warfare. Moscow:Progress Publ i shers , 1973.

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Grove, Eric. W l d War I1 Tanks. New Yorkl Excali bur Books,

Yooks, Inc . , 1976.

Secaucus.1 C h a r t w e l l 3ooks, Inc. , 1975.

1976

Jones, David R . , ed. Sov ie t Armed Forces Review Annual. Gulfdreeze: Academic I nt er na t i on al Pre ss, 1 9 7 7 .

Lewis, William J . , and Wiener, Friedrich. The Warsaw PactArmies. Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publ ishers , 1977 .

Lisov, I . Airborne Troops o f t he Sov i e t A r m . Moscow:

Novosti Pr es s Agency P ub li sh in g House, f 9 7 4 .

P a r r i s h , Michael.. Sov ie t Armed Force s Books i n Eng li sh1950-1967. 5 i t a n i i O .

Sokolovskiy, V. D . , .ed. Sovi e t M i l i t a r y S t r a t e a , 3d ed.Tr an sl at io n, commentary and a na ly si s by Hari et F a s tS c o t t . New Yorkc Crane, Ruseak and Co., 1975.

Weeks, John. Men Against Tanks. New York: Mason/Charter,

1 9 7 5 -

Wiener, Friedrich. The Armies of t h e Warsaw Pact Nations.

Translated by William J . Lewis. Vienna8 Carl UeberreuterFub l i she r s , 1976.

Windrow, Martin, ed. The Soviet Arq. New York: HippocreneJooks, Inc. , 1973.

Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power andmore and Londoni The Johns

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Averyanov, 2 . "Defence I n M o u n t a i n s . '' S o v i e t M i l i t a ry Re-I_iew, December 1978, pp. 25-26 .

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pp. 238-242.

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Erickson, John. "Soviet Mi l i t ary Postu re and Pol ic y i nEurope." Arlingto n1 Sta nfor d Research I n s t i t u t e , 1974 ,38 pages.

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E r i c k s o n , J o h n . "The S o v i e t M i l i t a r y , S o v i e t P o l ic y a n d

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M i l i t a r y Doctr ine - P a r t One." M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c eOctober-December.1977, pp. 7-12.

Karber. P h i l l i p A . "The Tact ical Revolut ion i n S o v i e tM i i i t a r y Doctrine - P a r t Two. I' M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e ,January-March 1978, pp. 28-41.

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Xikha i lov , L. "T a n k S a t t a l i o n ?orces Water aa r r i e r . I'

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APPENDIX a

I K I T I A L D I S T R I B U T I O N L I S T

C D R , T R A D O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C D R , P O R S C O M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C D R , C A C D A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1C ? I L T C Yoagland

C D T , C G S C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2C F I LT C G r i c i f e

MAJ Robison

C D R , V US Corps

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

C F I C O L Temperley

DIR, T iCKG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

D I R , T R A S A N A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

D i R , M S A A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C F I Ms. arunsel

C D R , 1s t C a v Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C D R , U S A A V N C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C F : C O L Yurne t t

C F I KAJ A l b r i g h tKAJ a r i n k l e yIviAJ Rosenberg

C D R , U S A A R M C . e . . a a e . a 3

P M , X i Y i - l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1C F I Mr. C a r s o n

C F I MAJ Ferris

C?: K A J S h i n a e k i

C F I ivlAJ L i b e r t i

C D R , 2 d A C R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C D R , 3 r d A C R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C D R , 1 1 t h liCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

S A J X h i t e

3-1



A G E N C Y COPIES

D I R , D I A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

'O A CS i , DA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CF: NAJ F r a s c h e

C F I L?'C Hope

C F I NAJ S i e b e r t

Totall 22 Copies

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