Table of Contents 

Table of Contents 1

Welcome Letter from the Directors 2

Introduction to DISEC 3

Security in the Age of Modern Technology 4

Introduction to the Topic 4

Past UN Action 5

Discussion 7

The Threat of Biological and Toxin Weapons 7

3D Printed Weapons 9

Bloc Positions 11

Countries at the forefront of new technologies 11

Developing countries 13

Points a Resolution Must Address 14

Further Reading 15

References 16

1

Welcome Letter from the Directors 

Welcome to the DISEC delegates! For some of you, this might be just

another stop in your MUN journey, for others it might be your very first

taste of MUN. No matter what applies to you, our job is to make it

memorable! Time in London, one of the world’s most iconic cities, is

almost always something to look back to, but we hope that LIMUN:HS will

make things even more special. All of us at LIMUN:HS we are very proud

in our big cousin, the London International Model United Nations (LIMUN),

is the biggest university-level MUN conference in Europe. We hope that

your experience at LIMUN:HS will inspire you, and that someday, you will

return to London to attend LIMUN itself!

In any case, you should always remember that MUN is all about learning

how to work with others. You will discuss with your fellow delegates, you

will often disagree with each other, and then everyone will try to find

room for compromise. We can promise you that will use our experience

(rest assured, conference experience runs into double figures for both of

us!), to help each and every one of you get something out of this 2-day

event. We recognise that the complexity of parliamentary procedure

might seem daunting but making things simpler is a major reason for us

taking part in the conference. Therefore, should there be any questions,

please do not hesitate to talk to us! Ultimately, our goal is to see every

single delegate in this committee enjoy LIMUN:HS. There are few greater

feelings than to walk out of your committee room on the final day

knowing that you’ve had a good time and that you’ve made some great

new friends.

Looking forward to meeting all of you in November,

The awesome DISEC Directors

Chris and Camille

2

Introduction to DISEC 

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is

the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. It considers

matters that range from non-proliferation, arms control to weapon

technology and illicit drug trade.

Although DISEC cannot impose any sanctions, authorize peacekeeping

missions or armed interventions, and pass binding resolutions, it can,

however, under article 11 of Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter,

make recommendations to the Security Council and UN Member States. 1

Some important documents like the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) in 1968, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in

1975, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992 or the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 were produced upon

recommendation by the First Committee. 2

This committee meets every year in October for a four-week session and

all 193 nations that are UN member states are allowed to attend. Each

and every nation is hence given the opportunity to make their voices

heard in finding solutions to the challenges of global peace and security.

Furthermore, DISEC works closely with the United Nations Disarmament

Commission and is, interestingly, the only Main Committee of the United

Nations General Assembly entitled to verbatim record coverage.

At last, since the mandate of DISEC covers both disarmament and

international security issues, any resolution passed by the committee will

certainly help us move one step closer to a safer world.

 

1 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.

2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, 12 June 1968, INFCIRC/140. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 10 April 1972. Organisation for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 3 September 1992.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 10 September 1996.

3

Security in the Age of Modern Technology 

Introduction to the Topic

With the incredible advancements in technology the world is witnessing

today, it is fairly reasonable that a conversation should be had on the

effects of these technologies on global and local security and how to

address those effects. Since the dawn of history, scientific discoveries

have been used for military and security purposes. One of the most

catastrophic events in history, the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima

and Nagasaki in 1945, shows exactly how detrimental scientific

discoveries can be if not regulated and controlled. There is also a lesson

to be learnt in the response the world had to the atrocious acts. It took

almost 15 years before safeguards began being enforced. 3

Thankfully, nuclear non-proliferation is underway; however, there are a

lot of emerging technologies that threaten the security of every State.

Pages upon pages have been written discussing the security threats posed

by our modern technologies, and discussing policy regarding all of them

would take more time than we have. Modern technologies include

everything from cybersecurity to smart bullets. Thus, instead of trying to

partially cover this wide range, our hope is to fully discuss two

contentious issues, bioweapons and 3D printed weapons, the likes of

which were unimaginable even 50 years ago. Our focus is on how these

technologies affect security, what can be done to minimise if not

completely stop their effect, and how to respond to any action taken by

these technologies.

3 United Nations, 2015

4

Past UN Action

1925 - Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological

Methods of Warfare: This Treaty prohibits the use of chemical and

biological weapons in war and has been ratified by eighty-four nations,

including all the great military powers in the world, with the notable

exception of the United States. It was signed in June 1925 under the 4

auspices of the League of Nations. Since then, the United Nations General

Assembly has renewed its call on states to observe the principles and

objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (see: resolution 2162 B (XXI) of

1966, 2454 A (XXIII) of 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 1969 and 2662 (XXV) of

1970). 5

1975 - Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC): This

Convention was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an

entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, state parties

agreed “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or

otherwise acquire or retain” biological agents and toxins or weapons and

equipment “designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or

in armed conflict”. The convention is considered to be an important step

towards achieving general and complete disarmament. However, it does

not ban biodefense programs. Review conferences are held every five

years to look at the progress being made and ensure that the

Convention’s provisions are being through. 6

1986 - Second Review Conference on the Biological Weapons

Convention: State Parties undertook to implement some confidence

building measures (CBM) in order to improve international cooperation

and reassure the international community about issues of compliance. The

4 R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal, “Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925”,

The American Journal of International Law (1970), Vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 853-879. 5 Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts -a collection of

conventions, resolutions and other documents (Dordrecht: Nijhoff: Lancaster: Kluwer

Academicdistributor, 1988), p. 13. 6 United Nations Office at Geneva, “The Biological Weapons Convention”. Available at:

https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C12571800

04B1B2F?OpenDocument

5

CBMs were enhanced and considerably broadened by the Third Review

Conference in 1991.

2001 - UN Programme of Action (PoA): Adopted by all UN member

states in 2001, it was designed to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit

trade in small arms and light weapons. It requires governments to put in

place laws and regulations to “exercise effective control over the

production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of

jurisdiction”. There is no reason that the provisions in the PoA should not

also apply to weapons produced by 3D printers and other AM techniques. 7

2014 - Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): This is a landmark treaty regulating

the international trade in conventional weapons and which seeks to

reduce illicit arms trade. Today, 104 states have ratified the treaty and a

total of 130 signed it. Whilst 3D printing of firearms does fall within the

legal scope of the treaty, CAD design files and 3D models, on the other

hand, do not: the international community has not yet made the effort to

address this. 8

2015 - Second Meeting of Governmental Experts: As part of the

Programme of Action launched in 2001, the United Nations held the

Second Meeting of Governmental Experts (MG2E) in June 2015 to discuss

the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons at a global, regional and

national level. The debate was mainly focused on the 3D printing of

firearms, as many states raised their concerns about the recent

technological advances in the field and their implication. 9

7 Benjamin King and Glenn McDonald, “Behind the Curve: New Technologies, New

Control Challenges”, Small Arms Survey (2015), p. 59. 8 UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, “The United

Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons”. Available at:

http://unrcpd.org/conventional-weapons/poa/ 9 Brian Krassenstein, “United Nations’ Second Meeting of Governmental Experts Discuss

Dangers of 3D Printable Firearms”, 3DPrint.Com (22 July 2015). Available at:

https://3dprint.com/83422/united-nations-mge2/

6

Discussion

The Threat of Biological and Toxin Weapons 

With the recent advances in biotechnology and particularly in

genome editing, the concern over the risks of biological attack is more

present than ever. Indeed, biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox,

plague, tularemia, botulinum toxin and viral hemorrhagic fevers, are

amenable to weaponization. The working definition of a biological agent is

a “microorganism (or a toxin derived from it) which causes disease in

man, plants or animals or causes deterioration of material”. 10

Biological weapons have been a long history of use. The first account

dates back to 600 B.C. when Assyrians poisoned their enemy’s wells with

rye ergot, an infectious substance which causes convulsions when it is

consumed. Similarly during the Second World War, members of Unit 11

731, the notorious research branch of the imperial Japanese army,

poisoned the water supply in Chinese villages to study cholera and typhus

outbreaks. One of the most notorious biological attacks occurred shortly 12

after 9/11 in the United States: letters laced with anthrax were sent to

media companies and governmental officials, resulting in 22 victims. Five

Americans were killed and 17 became ill. Today, developments such as

CRISPR or Clustered Regularly Interspersed Short Palindromic Repeats,

presents new risks to international security. CRISPR is a type of

gene-editing technology that allows scientists to ‘cut and paste’ genes

into DNA more easily and accurately than in the past. In July 2017, John 13

Sotos, of Intel Health & Life Sciences stated that gene editing research

could “open up the potential for bioweapons of unimaginable destructive

potential”. Even though CRISPR-based biological weapons require 14

10 J.K. Smart in Textbook of Military Medicine, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological

Warfare by F.R. Sidell, E.T. Takafuji and D.R. Franz (Office of the Surgeon General,

Washington D.C, 1997). 11

Judith Miller, “Biological Weapons, Literally Older Than Methuselah”, The New York

Times (19 September 1998). Accessible at:

https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/19/arts/biological-weapons-literally-older-than-meth

uselah.html 12

Friedrich Frischknecht, “The history of biological warfare”, EMBO Reports (June 2003),

Vol. 4. 13

James Revill, “Could CRISPR be used as a biological weapon?”, Phys.org (31 August

2017). Available at: https://phys.org/news/2017-08-crispr-biological-weapon.html 14

Alex Hern, “‘There are things worse than death’: can a cancer cure lead to brutal

bioweapons?”, The Guardian (31 July 2017). Available at:

7

additional skills, there is still a risk of hostile exploitation of the

technology by non-state actors or states in their bio defensive

programme.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative which is a non-profit,

non-partisan organization, at least sixteen countries in the world today

are suspected of having biological weapons programs. The list in 15

alphabetical order: Canada, China, Cuba, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq,

Japan, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, the United

Kingdom and the United States. All these countries are party to the 16

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of April 1972, which bans the

development and production of bioweapons, as well as outlaws offensive

biological research. Yet, the BTWC expressly permits biological defense

activities and biodefense program and thus, Dr. Piers Millett astutely

writes that “underneath the umbrella of a defensive program, you can do

a whole load of research and development to figure out what you would

want to weaponize if you were going to make a weapon”. Unfortunately 17

the BTWC has no verification provisions and it is therefore difficult to

solve compliance concerns. A state party is only allowed to issue a

complaint with the UN Security Council if it believes that another member

state is in breach of the convention; the UNSC may then initiate an

investigation but this power has never been invoked. In addition, 18

inspections can be vetoed by the permanent members of the Security

Council, in other words, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and

the United States. As a result, more than 40 years after it entered into

force, the BTWC remains without a proper verification protocol. Yet as 19

Zanders and Smithson note, “the verifiability of the BWC has become

such an article of faith that few critically question it any longer”. 20

Nonetheless, with the recent developments in science and technology,

this view needs to be reexamined.

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jul/31/bioweapons-cancer-moonshot-gene-

editing 15

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Biological Threat” (30 December 2015). Available at:

https://www.nti.org/learn/biological/ 16

Ibid. 17

Kirsten Gronlund, “Genome Editing and the Future of Biowarfare: A Conversation with

Dr. Piers Millett”, Future of Life Institute (12 October 2018). Available at:

https://futureoflife.org/2018/10/12/genome-editing-and-the-future-of-biowarfare-a-conv

ersation-with-dr-piers-millett/?cn-reloaded=1 18

Iris Hunger and Anna Zmorzynska, “Verifying and Demonstrating Compliance with the

BTWC”, EU Non-Proliferation Papers (December 2011), no. 5. 19

Ibid. 20

Ibid.

8

Lastly, the potential for bioterrorism is particularly concerning; indeed,

the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria or other germs can have

potentially devastating consequences on a global scale. The recent West

African Ebola virus epidemic has demonstrated how bio-agents can spread

quickly and easily between people. Terrorist organizations, lone 21

criminals, disgruntled scientists and rogue countries could pose a

substantial threat if they gain access to biological weapons. Since 22

bioterrorist attacks are perceived as ‘low risk’ but their potential is ‘high

impact’, effective global surveillance and preventive actions seems

necessary.

3D Printed Weapons 

3D printing technology is already changing the way we produce

objects from tools and toys to clothing and even body parts. 3D printing is

part of a process known as additive manufacturing where an object is

created by adding material layer by layer. Additive manufacturing allows

designers to create complex parts for machines, aeroplanes, cars, and

more at a fraction of the cost and time of standard methods like forging

and moulding. Now, smaller, consumer friendly 3D printers are bringing

additive manufacturing to homes and businesses.

In the spring of 2013, one more category was added to the list of

things that can be 3D printed. Weapons. On the 1st of May, Cody Wilson,

a founder of Distributed Defense, assembled and fired the first gun made

from 16 parts, 15 of them being 3D printed, and a single nail acquired

from a hardware store. This was just the beginning of the use of 3D 23

printers for weaponry. Ever since, academic institutions and corporations

alike have been experimenting with 3D printing of a wide range of

weaponry, from titanium knives to rockets . 24 25

21 NTI Building a Safer World, “The Biological Threat” (30 December 2015). Available at:

https://www.nti.org/learn/biological/ 22

Manfred S Green, James LeDuc, Daniel Cohen, David R Franz, “Confronting the threat

of bioterrorism: realities, challenges and defensive strategies”, Lancet Infect Dis (2019),

vol. 19. 23

Greenberg, 2013 24

Aldridge, Joseph. 2013. "3D Printer At Cutting Edge". NZ Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/bay-of-plenty-times/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503347&objectid=11107028. 25

"University Of Arizona Students Successfully Launch 3D Printed Rocket". 2014. 3Ders.Org. http://www.3ders.org/articles/20140706-university-of-arizona-students-successfully-launch-3d-printed-rocket.html.

9

The two main concerns when it comes to 3D printing weapons, are cost

and design files. As the technology advances, the cost of 3D printers and

their parts goes down, making it more accessible. Additionally, since

model parts are computer files, they can be shared almost instantly all

across the globe, even to outer space. Thus, anyone with an internet

connection and a few hundred pounds to spare can start printing

whatever they want, no expertise needed. This poses a risk, allowing

state and non-state actors, who previously had little to no access to new

weapon technologies to print them in a shed. This is especially alarming

when it comes to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Considering the

militarization of 3D printing and its advanced use in manufacturing jet

engines , the worry is that it will eventually be used to replace complex 26

manufacturing processes for previously well-regulated essential missile

parts, giving parties with malicious intentions access to WMDs that could

pose a security risk far greater than ever before.

As such, the concerns around 3D printing weapons are closely related to

bio-weapons when it comes to accessibility. It should be a priority to limit

and regulate who can access the pieces of tech that allow such atrocities

to be possible. From anticipating which shared files could be misused, to

monitoring the sale and resale of these devices, the international

community should work better together to preserve security. As such,

methods could be put in place to safeguard against both the use of 3D

printers for weapons and bioweapons.

26 Nardi, Tom. 2019. "3D Printing May Be The Key To Practical Scramjets". Hackaday.

https://hackaday.com/2019/09/03/3d-printing-may-be-the-key-to-practical-scramjets/.

10

Bloc Positions

Countries at the forefront of new technologies 

There are several countries that pursue biodefense programs or continue

to seek dual-use technologies that could be employed for bioweapons.

The United States published in 2018 its National Biodefense Strategy

which declares that continued research and development in bio science is

necessary to prepare for, detect, contain and respond to biothreats. It 27

also recognizes that in our interconnected world and with the globalization

of science, the United States cannot act alone to protect America’s health

and security. The facility known as the Centre for Disease Control in 28

Atlanta, U.S. is one of only two sites in the world holding samples of the

smallpox virus. The other is the Russian State Research Centre for

Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo, which also houses Ebola samples.

The WHO inspects both facilities every two years to ensure that they

function under the biosafety and biosecurity requirements. Yet in the 29

last 30 years, the scientific community has debated whether or not to

destroy the remaining live sample of smallpox. In 2011, Kathleen

Sebelius, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services laid out the rationale behind keeping the virus: “Destruction of

the last securely stored viruses is an irrevocable action that should occur

only when the global community has eliminated the threat of smallpox

once and for all. To do any less keeps future generations at risk from the

re-emergence of one of the deadliest diseases humanity has ever known.

Until this research is complete, we cannot afford to take that risk”. 30

However, some countries do not have biodefense programs yet still

engage in dual-use activities that could be applied to bioweapons. The

27 United States, National Biodefense Strategy (2018). Available at:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy

.pdf 28

Ibid. 29

Sarah Newey, ‘Russian lab blast: smallpox facility passed WHO biosecurity inspection

in January’, The Telegraph (19 September 2019). Available at:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/russian-lab-blast-smallpo

x-facility-passed-biosecurity-inspection/ 30

Kathleen Sebelius, “Why We Still need Smallpox”, The New York Times” (25 April

2011). Available at:

https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/opinion/26iht-edsebelius26.html?_r=0&mtrref=e

n.wikipedia.org&gwh=F343AE574FD1B174DDC58062A1E095DA&gwt=pay&assetType=R

EGIWALL

11

term ‘dual-use’ has been employed by governments to denote “peaceful

technologies that could be used to create various weapons -including

chemical, biological or nuclear weapons”. China for instance has set to 31

invest about $12 billion to advance biotechnology innovation from 2015 to

2020. Iran, Iraq and Japan, who recently managed to develop a bird flu 32

virus, are also countries that are involved with the issue of ‘dual-use’

research in biotech.

In European countries like France, Germany or the United Kingdom,

research and development programs were initiated either before or during

the Second World War; yet, several were put to an end before the BTWC

entered into force as biological weapons could not compete at the time

with nuclear weapons. Today, these countries are more concerned with 33

the recent development in 3D printing technology that have made it

feasible to create gun parts using a simple machine. The manufacturing of

weapons using 3D printers is banned by EU legislation. Nonetheless, very

recently on October 9, 2019, two people were killed in a German

synagogue by a man carrying a 3D printed gun. The concern of European

nations over the easy access to CAD files dates back to 2013 when a 25

year old student in Texas (U.S.) posted the designs for 3D printed

handguns online, as stated above, which he called ‘The Liberator’; these

were downloaded more than 1,000 times in just a few days before being

removed. Spain was ahead in the rankings, but closely followed by the 34

U.S., Brazil, Germany and Britain. For the United States, this case raised 35

some serious national debates and questions regarding First Amendment

protections for free speech and Second Amendment right to keep and

bear arms. The Russian Federation has gone even further by creating 3D

printed bullets to solve its production issue of ammunitions, thereby

demonstrating its active involvement in the 3D technologies

development. Delegates in this bloc will therefore be expected to not 36

31 Kirk C. Bansak, “Biodefense and Transparency”, The Nonproliferation Review (2011),

vol. 18, no. 2. 32

Hearing of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery,

Committee on Homeland Security, “Defending the Homeland from Bioterrorism: Are We

Prepared?”, U.S. House of Representatives (17 October 2019). 33

W. Seth Carus, “A Short History of Biological Warfare: from Pre-History to the 21st

Century”, Centre for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2017), Occasional paper

no. 12. 34

Georgi Kantchev, ‘Authorities Worry 3D Printers May Undermine Europe’s Gun Laws’,

The New York Times (17 October 2013). Available at:

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/business/international/european-authorities-wary

-of-3-d-guns-made-on-printers.html 35

Ibid. 36

Joseph Young, “Tested by Russian Researchers”, 3DPrint.Com (21 November 2016).

Available at: https://3dprint.com/156003/russia-3d-prints-bullets/

12

only study to what extent the country they represent is involved in

biodefense research and dual-use technologies but also to look at the

national laws in place and the progress made by their country in the 3D

printing of firearms. Even though the countries mentioned above may not

fall into the same bloc, they share the same position as technology

pioneers.

Developing countries  South Africa, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Indonesia, Syria, Austria, Saudi

Arabia, Lebanon, Switzerland

What connects these countries, though geographically spread out, is their

concern regarding the unbounded development of technology that can be

used to cause severe casualties in developing nations. Nations in this bloc

have not been developing the discussed technologies but are by their

uses. As such, they push for more regulation regarding the development

of such technologies, more specifically their use for malicious purposes.

The biggest concern for developing nations is the use of bioweapons, or

other defense systems that could become easier to access with the help of

3D printing, by local or regional terrorist groups. As such, they believe the

risk such technologies pose if not controlled is far greater than the

benefits they present.

13

Points a Resolution Must Address

● How can DISEC provide surveillance towards the seizure of

bioterrorism?

● Where would the line be drawn between the dual uses of both

technologies?

● What verification mechanism could be implemented to verify

compliance?

● Should the development of such technologies be halted or

controlled? If so, how?

● Can a framework be developed that would cover both technologies

along with other technologies that may emerge?

14

Further Reading

● Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessible at: https://www.nti.org/

○ Nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that gives an overview of

each country’s nuclear, chemical, biological and missile

program as well as in depth information regarding treaties

and conventions relating to nonproliferation

● Global Biodefense. Accessible at: https://globalbiodefense.com/

○ Webpage that publishes the latest news on health security

and includes articles on emerging infectious diseases,

bioterrorism agents, pathogens and preparedness, etc.

● Future of Life Institute. Accessible at:

https://futureoflife.org/2018/10/12/genome-editing-and-the-future-

of-biowarfare-a-conversation-with-dr-piers-millett/?cn-reloaded=1

○ Volunteer-run research and outreach organization which

works on existential risks facing humanity

15

References

Please use www.citethisforme.com Chicago style and include a list of full

references in the order they appear in the footnotes

1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1

UNTS XVI.

2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, 12 June 1968, INFCIRC/140. United Nations

Office for Disarmament Affairs, Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention, 10 April 1972. Organisation for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons

and on their Destruction, 3 September 1992. United Nations Office

for Disarmament Affairs, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 10 September 1996.

3. United Nations General Assembly First Committee, 2015,

https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/

4. R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal, “Legal Aspects of the Geneva

Protocol of 1925”, The American Journal of International Law

(1970), Vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 853-879.

5. Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts -a

collection of conventions, resolutions and other documents

(Dordrecht: Nijhoff: Lancaster: Kluwer Academicdistributor, 1988),

p. 13.

6. United Nations Office at Geneva, “The Biological Weapons

Convention”. Available at:

https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD63

15AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument

7. Benjamin King and Glenn McDonald, “Behind the Curve: New

Technologies, New Control Challenges”, Small Arms Survey (2015),

p. 59.

8. N Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the

Pacific, “The United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms

and Light Weapons”. Available at:

http://unrcpd.org/conventional-weapons/poa/

9. Brian Krassenstein, “United Nations’ Second Meeting of

Governmental Experts Discuss Dangers of 3D Printable Firearms”,

3DPrint.Com (22 July 2015). Available at:

https://3dprint.com/83422/united-nations-mge2/

10. J.K. Smart in Textbook of Military Medicine, Medical Aspects of

Chemical and Biological Warfare by F.R. Sidell, E.T. Takafuji and

D.R. Franz (Office of the Surgeon General, Washington D.C, 1997).

11. Judith Miller, “Biological Weapons, Literally Older Than

Methuselah”, The New York Times (19 September 1998). Accessible

at:

16

https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/19/arts/biological-weapons-liter

ally-older-than-methuselah.html

12. Friedrich Frischknecht, “The history of biological warfare”, EMBO

Reports (June 2003), Vol. 4.

13. James Revill, “Could CRISPR be used as a biological weapon?”,

Phys.org (31 August 2017). Available at:

https://phys.org/news/2017-08-crispr-biological-weapon.html

14. Alex Hern, “‘There are things worse than death’: can a cancer

cure lead to brutal bioweapons?”, The Guardian (31 July 2017).

Available at:

https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jul/31/bioweapons-can

cer-moonshot-gene-editing

15. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Biological Threat” (30 December

2015). Available at: https://www.nti.org/learn/biological/

16. Kirsten Gronlund, “Genome Editing and the Future of Biowarfare:

A Conversation with Dr. Piers Millett”, Future of Life Institute (12

October 2018). Available at:

https://futureoflife.org/2018/10/12/genome-editing-and-the-future-

of-biowarfare-a-conversation-with-dr-piers-millett/?cn-reloaded=1

17. Iris Hunger and Anna Zmorzynska, “Verifying and Demonstrating

Compliance with the BTWC”, EU Non-Proliferation Papers (December

2011), no. 5.

18.

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