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LONDON INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2017

Table of Content

United Nations Security Council London International Model United Nations 19th Session | 2018

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Table of Contents Letters from the directors ................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction to the UNSC ................................................................................................................. 4

Topic A: The Rohingya Crisis........................................................................................................... 5

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5

History of the problem ................................................................................................................. 6

Statement of the problem .......................................................................................................... 10

The current situation .................................................................................................................. 15

Bloc Positions ............................................................................................................................ 19

Questions a resolution should answer ....................................................................................... 20

Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 20

Topic B: Topic A: Defining a “Doctrine of Security” for the UNSC .......................................... 27

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 27

History of the problem ............................................................................................................... 28

Statement of the problem .......................................................................................................... 31

The current situation .................................................................................................................. 34

Bloc Positions ............................................................................................................................ 35

Questions a resolution should answer ....................................................................................... 36

Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 37

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Letters from the Directors

Dear Delegates,

I‘m Chris Whitehouse, and I‘m honoured to be your Chair for UNSC at

LIMUN 2018. As a Londoner and graduate of Imperial, I‘ve always considered

LIMUN to be my home conference, so I‘m thrilled to be back.

This year‘s two topics are very different, but whether you choose debate the

complexities of a grave humanitarian crisis or the very purpose of the Council

itself, all delegates will have to be at the top of their game. Don‘t let us down!

Hello, my name is David-Jan Bosschaert ("DJ" for short) and I'm delighted to

be co-chairing this year's Security Council at LIMUN, where I've now had the

privilege of chairing since 2014. The Security Council was my very first

committee back when I started MUNing and has a special place in my heart. I

together with Chris will help to make sure that our debates are balanced and

our work running smoothly. We look forward to welcoming you at LIMUN

2018.

Contact: [email protected]


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Introduction to the UNSC

Arising from the aftermath of the Second World War, the Security Council is

dominated by its Permanent Members, the major Allied powers of the war:

Russia, France, China, the UK and USA. The council primarily concerns itself

with matters of security. As the highest body of the UN, it is also the only body

that can pass resolutions which are legally binding. The UNSC will first try to

recommend parties come to an agreement. To support this, the UNSC can1 set

forth principles for such an agreement; undertake investigation and mediation;

dispatch a mission or appoint special envoys; or request the Secretary-General

to achieve a settlement of the dispute.

The UNSC can also attempt to deescalate conflicts by issuing ceasefire

directives, or dispatch military observers or peacekeepers. Failing that, the

UNSC can opt for harsher measures, including1:

economic sanctions, military embargoes, financial penalties and

restrictions, travel bans, blockade;

severance of diplomatic relations;

or even collective military action.

1UN, 2017. What is the Security Council? Accessed November 17, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/.

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Topic A: The Rohingya Crisis

Introduction

Burma (renamed Myanmar in 1989) is a country in Southeast Asia of

approximately 55 million people. By the 19th

century, various ethnic groups

and corresponding states existed within the borders of what is now Myanmar2.

The region was conquered by the British and incorporated into the British Raj

as a new province. Burma gained its independence in 1948.

The focus of today‘s topic is the plight of the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim

ethnic minority who mostly live in Myanmar‘s Rankine (formerly Arakan)

province, on the border with Bangladesh. There they account for nearly a third

of the local population. Their religion, ethnicity and language make them

distinct from the mainly Buddhist ethnicities of Myanmar3. The Rohingya

claim to be natives to Myanmar, but the Burmese state (and most Burmese

2 CIA. 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.

3 Albert, 2017. The Rohingya Crisis. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.

(Getty

Images, 2017)

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people generally) reject their claims and consider them ―Bengali‖

immigrants. They have suffered persecution for decades.

Violence and ethnic tension in the region are not new, but the situation

escalated after the 25th of August 2017, when Burmese security forces

launched a sweeping counter-insurgency operation in retaliation for ―Arakan

Rohingya Salvation Army‖ (ARSA) attacks on police stations in Rakhine4.

Hundreds of thousands have fled. It is up to the UNSC to decide the

international response to the crisis.

History of the Problem

A short history of Muslims in Burma

The territory of what is now Myanmar has historically been

mostly Buddhist. However, parts of the region had contact

with Muslim civilisations, and small numbers of Muslim

sailors, traders, mercenaries and former POWs settled in the

region. The influence of the Muslim Kingdom of Bengal in

the region grew after 1430, when the Bengali King

intervened to restore a deposed Arakanese prince to the

throne, and gained him as a vassal. Arakan‘s newfound

connection to the Muslim west led to greater Muslim

immigration and cultural influence, though Buddhism still

dominated5. It is from this mixing between Muslim,

Arakanese and Burmese civilisations that the Rohingya

claim their lineage.

In 1785, the Kingdom of Burma conquered the Arakanese kingdom. Burma

would expand further, conquering the Kingdoms of Manipur and Assam,

4 BBC. 2017. Myanmar: Who are the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army?

5 Yegar, Moshe. 1972. The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.

Figure 1: The British conquest

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thereby creating a border with British India. The resulting border

friction (and British concerns about the Burmese threat to India) led to the

three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–26, 1852, 1885), which would eventually see

Burma totally annexed by Britain and incorporated into the Raj as its newest

province6

Immigration in the colonial era

Despite being the largest single province in India, in 1909 Burma only had 9

million inhabitants, versus nearby Bengal, home to 75 million7. With the

border between India and Burma erased by the conquest, there was large scale

Indian immigration to Burma, particularly to commercial centres. The

immigrants were varied, drastically changing the socio-economic and religious

makeup of Burma8. The new Indian community‘s clout (by 1931 Indians

constituted 6.9% of Burma‘s total population and paid 55% of Rangoon‘s

municipal taxes) caused bitter resentment among Burmese: in 1930, anti-Indian

riots ravaged Rangoon9. This Burmese hostility to Indian (particularly Muslim)

immigrants bled into attitudes toward some Muslim Burmese groups. It is

during this colonial period of immigration that the Burmese state accuse the

―Bengali‖ Rohingya of settling in the country (a view widely backed by most

Burmese), as opposed to the Rohingya‘s pre-colonial claims.

The legacy of WW2

During the Second World War, the Japanese advanced into British Burma,

routing the British and causing hundreds of thousands of Indians to flee

towards India, and most would never return. The war was a catalyst, sparking

terrible violence in Arakan. Arakanese Buddhists in the South sacked Muslim

villages, driving Muslim refugees north sparking reprisals by Muslims in the

6 Encyclopedia Britannica. 2017. Anglo-Burmese Wars. https://www.britannica.com/event/Anglo-Burmese-Wars.

7 Imperial Gazetteer of India. 1909. ―Administrative Divisions.‖ Vol. 4. Oxford University Press. 46.

8 Egretau, Renaud. 2015. ―Indian and Chiniese communities in contemporary Burma: A comparative analysis of their

presence and influence. 9 Bhaumik, Subir. 2003. ―The Returnees and the Refugees: Migration from Burma.‖

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North, further dividing Arakan into a Muslim North and Buddhist

South10

. Further, both British and Japanese recruited and equipped auxiliaries.

Muslim Arakanese (including Rohingya) were the main recruits of the British

stay-behind ―V-force‖, while Japanese auxiliaries tended to be Buddhist. These

troops were accused of attacking ―rival‖ communities.

The Rohingya post-independence

In 1948, Burma gained its independence from Britain. The new country‘s

citizenship act included the Arakanese as a ―indigenous race of Burma‖, but

pointedly did not include the Rohingya11

. The law itself was partly a legacy of

colonial immigration: indigenous status for ethnic groups was defined in terms

of before and after 1823; i.e. the first Anglo-Burmese War. However, those

Rohingya with proof of family descent in the region (easier said than done)

could claim ID cards and certain rights.

In the chaos following the end of the war and independence, rebels sprung up

all over Burma, including Arakan. ―Mujahids‖: Muslim Arakanese who fought

for a separate state, or for the annexation of North Arakan to Pakistan. Though

these rebels did not have the total support of the Muslim population, they were

initially successful in securing North Arakan, helped by the government

offending many locals by replacing Muslim officials with outsiders. However,

the rebellion‘s cause was doomed when Pakistan refused to annex the region,

and this initial rebellion was crippled by government offensives in the mid-50s,

and finally totally crushed in 196110

.

10

Yegar, Moshe. 1972. The Muslims of Burma: A Study of a Minority Group. Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. 11

The Union of Burma, 1948. The Union Citizenship Act, 1948

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The military coup, and its aftermath

Instability, ethnic insurgency and weak government led

to a military caretaker government between 1958 and

1960. The 1960 general election winner promised to

grant statehood to Arakan. In response, Arakan Muslim

and Rohingya organisations made a concerted attempt to

negotiate a separate, Muslim North Arakan region; they

feared being at the mercy of a hostile, Buddhist

dominated Arakanese state government. The proposals

went nowhere, and were anyway rendered moot when

General Ne Win launched a coup during a period of renewed instability.

The new military junta‘s ideology was heavily influenced by

Burmese nationalism, and their experience of ethnic tension

and insurgency. The army considered federalism and autonomy for ethnic

groups a existential threat to the unity of the country. Coup leader Ne Win

stated: “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union”12

. This bode ill

for the Rohingya, who suffered further political repression as a result.

Their position was further damaged when the junta introduced a new

citizenship law in 1982. This went further than the 1948 law, further reducing

the Rohingya‘s previous rights and effectively rendering them stateless1314

.

(Calamur, 2017) (Union of Burma, 1982). This was the context of repeated

crackdowns and waves of repression, that saw hundreds of thousands of

Rohingya leave Burma/Myanmar since the late 1970s15

(Albert, 2017). As

before, the best the Rohingya could do was apply for limited identification

documents, ―white cards‖, registering as temporary residents.

12

Smith, M., 2002. Army Politics as a Historical Legacy: The Experience of Burma 13

Calamur, K., 2017. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis. 14

Union of Burma, 1982. Burma Citizenship Law. 15

Albert, E., 2017. The Rohingya Crisis.

Figure 2 General Ne Win, coup leader

(Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.)

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The situation since the democratic transition

Hopes were high as Myanmar opened up towards free elections, and the

international community repealed sanctions that had choked the country‘s

economy for decades. But Myanmar‘s ongoing transition to democracy did not

solve the Rohingya question. A UN-backed census which would have

recognised the Rohingya came under the pressure of Buddhist nationalists, and

the category was changed to ―Bengali‖. This was bitterly opposed by the

Rohingya16

. Further, the government rescinded the ―white cards‖ ID,

effectively disenfranchising the Rohingya just before the 2015 election that

saw Aung San Suu Kyi‘s party come to power.

The communal violence is not new, even recently. Similarly large clashes

flared in 201217

when a young Buddhist woman was raped (allegedly by

Muslim men), and in 2016, when ARSA struck Burmese security forces for the

first time. It was the 2016 violence that led to the establishment of an advisory

commission on ethnic strife led by Kofi Annan.

Statement of the Problem

Violence by government

forces, deliberate ethnic

cleansing?

The crisis is a direct result

of the counterinsurgency

―clearance‖ operations

undertaken by government

16

al-Jazeera, 2014. In Pictures: Myanmar's census bars Rohingya 17

BBC, 2014. Why is there communal violence in Myanmar?

Figure 3: Burmese soldiers in Rakhine

(AFP, 2017)

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security forces. These operations are meant to establish the location of

insurgents and drive them out. It should be noted that the military has barred

aid agencies and press access to most affected areas, citing security.

Following the 2016 operation, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR) released a flash report in February 2017, where they

interviewed 204 refugees, spread over 8 camps. Over half of those interviewed

reported witnessing beatings, killings and arson, while 43% reported seeing

rape. Detention and ―disappearing‖, particularly of men and boys, was also

reported. The authors considered the above numbers an underestimate of the

violence‘s scale18

. The testimony noted the indiscriminate nature of the

violence (the use of grenades, etc) and was consistent in noting the forces‘ use

of weapons and accelerants to start fires. The same report notes stories of

Buddhist Rakhine villagers, sometimes known to the refugees, joining the

security forces as auxiliaries in the violence.

During this year‘s clearance operation, NGO Amnesty International cited

refugee interviews and satellite imagery as evidence of an ―orchestrated

campaign‖ to burn Rohingya villages19

. Testimony described examples of the

army operations. In some cases they‘d surround a village; fire weapons in the

air or randomly at residents, then burned their homes as they fled. Other

testimony claimed that they were forewarned by officials that security forces

would be coming to burn their villages, and were urged to leave before their

arrival, suggesting premeditation. Further, Amnesty argues that the evidence

suggests that Muslim homes are being specifically targeted, while known

Buddhist homes were left alone. Amnesty has also received credible but

unverified reports of Buddhist Rakhine villages burned by Muslim militants.

18

OHCHR, 2017. Interviews with Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar. 19

Amnesty International, 2017. Scorched Earth Campaign fuels Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya from Rakhine State

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The government and Burmese have accused Rohingya militants of being

behind the arson, as scorched earth tactics to impede government progress.

However, this seems unlikely, and BBC reporter Jonathan Head was even able

to speak to Buddhist Rakhine villagers, who confessed to torching an

abandoned Muslim village with the tacit support of police20

.

The organised nature of the violence, seemingly designed to drive out and

prevent the return of refugees, have led to many concluding the operations are

a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The UNHCR Zei‘id Ra‘ad Al Hussein

described the operations as a ―textbook example of ethnic cleansing‖21

. In

September of this year, his Office (the OHCHR) launched a rapid response

mission to Cox‘s Bazar, Bangladesh, to interview some recent arrivals. The

mission corroborated other reports, including that previously authored by

OHCHR. It is worth quoting it at length22

:

―…credible information gathered indicates that the destruction of Rohingya

villages in Northern Rakhine… were executed in a…systematic manner. [They

were] committed against the Rohingya… by the Myanmar security forces often

in concert with armed Rakhine Buddhist individuals…

…the manner [of the destruction] points to it being coordinated, thus

challenging the assertion that it was merely collateral damage of the military

security operations…

…the Myanmar security forces purposely destroyed the property of the

Rohingya, scorched their dwellings and entire villages… not only to drive out

the population but to prevent the victims returning to their homes. The

20

BBC, 2017. Rohingya Crisis: Seeing through the official story in Myanmar 21

UN, 2017. UN human rights chief points to "textbook example of ethnic cleansing" in Myanmar. 22

OHCHR, 2017. Mission report of OHCHR rapid response mission to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh

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destruction by the Tatmadaw (army)… render the possibility of the

Rohingya returning to Northern Rakhine almost impossible…

[Reports] also indicate that the security forces targeted teachers, the cultural

and religious leadership, and other people of influence in the Rohingya

community… to diminish Rohingya history, culture and knowledge…‖

The report also argues that even prior to the incidents of 25 August, a strategy

was being pursued by the army to:

1) Arrest and detain Rohingya men of fighting age

2) Arrest and detain Rohingya community leaders

3) Deprive Rohingya villagers of access to food and livelihood

4) Commit repeated acts of violence and humiliation to drive out Rohingya

5) Instil deep and widespread fear and trauma through brutality

Further, the report argues that it was ―highly likely‖, based on injuries treated

by doctors, that the army had placed landmines along the border since the

operation‘s start to prevent returnees.

The hostility towards the Rohingya within Burmese society

Over the past few years, Myanmar

has democratised, with Aung San

Suu Kyi‘s party coming to power

in the 2015 elections. However,

this has not saved the Rohingya.

For one, the military still wield a

great deal of power within

Burmese society: it appoints one

Figure 4: Buddhist monk displays an anti-Muslim

message (AFP, 2017)

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quarter of parliamentary seats, and retains exclusive control of the

home, border affairs, and defence ministries23

. It is the military, not the civilian

government that exercises control over these operations. Some think that the

Commander in Chief of the Burmese Armed Forces, Min Aung Hlaing, ought

to feature more heavily in international discussion of the Rohingya crisis.

However, Suu Kyi‘s government has echoed the military‘s line, that the

violence is the work of ―extremist terrorists‖, and she herself has not used the

word ―Rohingya‖, referring only to ―Muslim Rakhines‖. Though Suu Kyi‘s

private thoughts can‘t be known, her public stance is as popular within

Myanmar as it is condemned outside it. Her followers have supported her

against foreign critics with political rallies, and such a small minority of

Burmese are sympathetic to the Rohingya that one activist remarked that

they‘d not dare launch a solidarity march24

(Guardian, 2017). This hostility is

grounded in the resentments dating back many decades, fanned over time by

military and Buddhist chauvinists (including extremist monks). Francis Wade,

a journalist focused on Myanmar, notes: ―There‘s been a longstanding fear of

Islamic cultures encroaching on Burma and weakening a national identity

centred on Buddhism…‖25

. A former American ambassador to Myanmar adds,

that many Burmese see calls for rights for the Rohingya as a separatist agenda

that infringes Burma‘s sovereignty and threatens the unity of the country,

harking back to the mujahid fighting after WW226

.

Uncertainty for Rohingya in Bangladeshi camps

Finally, on top of the hostility and the devastation of home, Rohingya‘s lack of

recognition by the government means the vast majority would not be able

return through proper means, even if they wanted to. Suu Kyi and the

23

Albert, E., 2017. How Myanmar's military wields power from the shadows. 24

Guardian, 2017. "A lot of fake news": Burmese back Aung San Suu Kyi on Rohingya Crisis. 25

Freeman, J., 2017. Can Anyone Stop Burma's Hardline Buddhist Monks 26

Calamur, K., 2017. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis

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government‘s assurances that they are ready to organise repatriations

have been dismissed by many as hollow promises: the process Suu Kyi

references covers only refugees registered by Bangladesh, and requires

documentation proving long-term residence in Myanmar27

. Furthermore,

Bangladesh feels the pressure of the sheer number of people, and doesn‘t want

to host them permanently28

. Many have been stuck in the limbo of the camps

for decades, and are now faced with the newest influx.

In summary, the Rohingya face the following pressing problems:

They‘re being pushed out of Rakhine by army ―clearance operations‖;

Those who escape to refugee camps face deprivation and uncertainty;

Even if the operations were to pause, deliberate destruction has made

returning to their villages impossible in many cases;

The government‘s position means that most have no way of proving

their right to return to Myanmar;

The underlying, deep-seated hostility of the Burmese government and

people means their position would be precarious if they returned.

Current Situation

The UN response thus far

After the outbreak of violence in

August 2016, Burmese leader

Aung San Suu Kyi invited Kofi

Annan to lead a commission on

the situation in Rakhine state.

The majority of the committee

27

Bennet, J., 2017. Rohingya refugees say Aung San Suu Kyi's promise to allow their return is hollow 28

Bennet, J., 2017. Rohingya asylum seekers fleeing Myanmar face limited welcome in Bangladesh.

Figure 5: Kofi Annan's Rakhine Commission takes questions (Voa News, 2017)

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was made of respected Burmese human rights activists and community

leaders, and the rest were UN grandees. The commission‘s mandate was to

provide recommendations to improve the communal situation in Rakhine in the

medium to long term29

. Its final report made many recommendations including

improved development, education, review of citizenship laws, resettling those

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within camps in Myanmar, softer security

enforcement, and better access to justice. It also called for unrestricted

humanitarian and press access to North Rakhine.

The commission was already something of a compromise. The report, at the

Burmese government‘s behest, never uses the word Rohingya, and the

commission did not have the mandate to investigate individual abuses. Suu

Kyi‘s office welcomed the commission‘s contributions, and has established an

implementation committee30

. However, the most recent crackdown came

almost immediately after the Final Report, throwing into question the

government and military‘s sincerity. A recent internal probe by the Burmese

military claimed that their forces hadn‘t committed arson, rape, beatings, or

used ―excessive force‖31

.

Though the Commission didn‘t investigate individual abuses and press/aid

agencies are barred from areas of active operations, other UN and other aid

agencies do have access to refugee camps in Bangladesh, and they‘re working

to provide aid and gather reports on the situation in North Rakhine.

The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, opened a Security Council

meeting on Myanmar with a Presidential Statement at the UNSC meeting on

the 28/09/17. He called for ―swift action—to protect people, alleviate

suffering, prevent further instability, address the root causes of the situation,

29

Rakhine Commission, 2017. Advisory Commision on Rakhine State. 30

Office of State Counseller, 2017. RAKHINE: MYANMAR OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE KOFI ANNAN REPORT 31

Reuters, 2017. Myanmar military denies atrocities against Rohingya, replaces general.

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and forge, at long last, a durable solution.‖32

Further, he called for: an

end to military operations; unrestricted access for humanitarian support; and

the assurance of ―safe, voluntary, dignified ad sustainable return of refugees to

their areas of origin‖. The statement was notable for its strong wording, but

unlike a Resolution, is not binding.

The UN in Myanmar: dysfunction?

While pondering what the UNSC‘s response, it is worth asking questions about

the UN‘s handling of the Rohingya question more generally. The persecution

of the Rohingya stretches back decades. The riots of 2012, 2013 and 2014

might‘ve indicated that the situation was getting worse, not better.

Some current and former aid and UN officials have strongly criticised the

UN‘s approach leading up to the beginning of the violence in August 2017. In

a BBC report on the issue, sources claimed that the United Nations Country

Team (UNCT) Renata Lok-Dessallien had33

:

Tried to stop human rights activists from travelling to North Rakhine,

Sidelined officials who wanted greater human rights priority,

Attempted to stifle public advocacy for the Rohingya,

Isolated staff who warned of ethnic cleansing.

The UN in Myanmar rejected these claims. The critics argue that these

problems were the result of an approach that sought to maintain government

goodwill and cooperation, to focus on a long-term strategy that prioritised

development. Further, Buddhist Rakhine resentment of aid to the Rohingya

(including blocking/looting aid convoys) complicated efforts, further

discouraging Rohingya advocacy. Leaked to the BBC, an internal UN report

32

UN, 2017. Secretary-General's remarks at open debate of the Security Council on Myanmar [as delivered] 33

Fisher, J., 2017. UN Failures on Rohingya revealed.

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from 2015, titled ―Slippery Slope: Helping Victims or Supporting

Systems of Abuse‖ was damning33

:

―The UNCT strategy with respect to

human rights focuses on heavily on

the over-simplified hope that

development investment itself will

reduce tensions…‖

Another, independent report was

commissioned by Dessallien in May 2017, entitled

―The Role of the UN in Rakine state‖, written by

analyst Richard Horsey. According to the Guardian, who obtained a copy, the

report predicted a ―serious deterioration‖ in the six months following its

submission, and warned that the army would be ―heavy handed and

indiscriminate‖34

. However, sources claimed that the report was ―spiked‖ by

the leadership. When Guterres became Secretary General in April, he

commissioned a short memo which assessed the UN in Myanmar to be

―glaringly dysfunctional‖33

.

Some, like former top UN Myanmar official Charles Petrie (who wrote a

critical report of the UN in Sri Lanka), argue that lack of coordination in

strategy was a problem33

: ―… the key lesson for Myanmar from Sri Lanka is

the lack of a focal point… a senior level addressing the situation in its totality,

the political, the human rights, the humanitarian and the development. It

remains diffuse, and means… there‘ve been almost competing agendas.‖

The perhaps distorting priority for development is likely because the UN

Development Program is empowered to appoint UN Resident Coordinators for

34

Stokes, E. & Holmes, O., 2017. Rohingya Crisis: UN "suppressed" report predicting its shortcomings in Myanmar.

Figure 6: Antonio Guterres, UN SG, addresses the UNSC on

the Rohingya question (AP, 2017)

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countries where the UN operates.35

. Guterres has been pushing for a

reform that would ―delink the functions of Resident Coordinators from UNDP

Resident Representatives…‖36

. It‘s clear that the UNSC‘s response to the crisis

will have to be stronger and more focused than the UN‘s interventions thus far.

Bloc positions

The “West”

The countries of the democratic West, like the UN, have been caught off guard

by the Rohingya crisis. With Myanmar‘s move to free elections, the west led

the international community in removing sanctions on the country. Further,

Western leaders had heavily invested in Aung San Suu Kyi politically, and

thus have been relatively muted in criticism of her. This is also due to a desire

to not push her closer to the Burmese generals.

However, in the wake of the most recent violence, their criticism has grown

stronger. Both the UK and US commented in November that the crisis looks

like ―ethnic cleansing‖3738

, and both countries have suspended all military aid

to Burma. US Ambassador Haley has called for prosecutions, and both the US

and EU are looking at possible targeted sanctions on the generals39

.

Russia and China

Russia and China have been less troubled by the recent violence. Both nations

are longstanding partners of Myanmar, cooperating on both economic and

military issues. However, as the greater economic power and a neighbour of

Myanmar, China wields more influence in the country.

35

Lynch, C., 2017. For Years UN was Warned of Threat to Rohingya in Myanmar. 36

UN, 2017. Secretar General's remarks to Economic and Social Council on Repositioning the UN Development

System to Deliver on the 2030 Agenda. 37

CNN, 2017. UK says Rohingya crisis "looks like ethnic cleansing". 38

Reuters, 2017. US Envoy to UN demands Myanmar Prosecutions. 39

Reuters, 2017. EU may shun Myanmar generals in new sanctions: draft

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In March 2017, the two nations vetoed a UNSC statement that expressed

concern for the Rohingya39

. Since the most recent violence, Myanmar has

openly said that it is negotiating with Russia and China to prevent the

Rohingya crisis becoming an issue at the Security Council40

.China has said that

it ―understands and supports‖41

Myanmar‘s efforts to protect national security,

condemns the ARSA attacks, but sympathises with refugees. It has also

suggested that the international community could foster ―peace talks‖, and

encourage cooperation on the crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Questions a Resolution Should Answer

What can the UNSC do to stop the violence?

What can the UNSC do for displaced Rohingya facing uncertainty in

refugee camps?

How can the UNSC ensure that recommendations made in the Kofi

Annan report are implemented on the ground?

Can and should the UNSC take steps to punish those responsible for the

violence? How should it go about doing so?

What can the UNSC do to improve the workings of the UN on the

ground?

What can the UNSC do about the Rohingya‘s long term prospects in

Myanmar?

Bibliography

AFP, 2017. Myanmar army kills 25 in Rohingya villages. [Online]

Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37970926

[Accessed 16 November 2017].

40

Business Insider, 2017. Myanmar working with Russia, China, to avoid UN rebuke over Rohingya 41

Reuters, 2017. China offers Myanmar support at UN amid Rohingya crisis.

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AFP, 2017. Why are Buddhist monks attacking Muslims?. [Online]

Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22356306


Albert, E., 2017. How Myanmar's military wields power from the shadows. [Online]

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ZZ

22


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Bennet, J., 2017. Rohingya refugees say Aung San Suu Kyi's promise to allow their return is hollow.

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Bhaumik, S., 2003. The Returnees and the Refugees: Migration from Burma. In: R. Samaddar, ed.

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rebuke-over-persecution-of-muslims-2017-9?r=US&IR=T


Calamur, K., 2017. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis. [Online]

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CNN, 2017. UK says Rohingya crisis "looks like ethnic cleansing". [Online]

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Egretau, R., 2015. Indian and Chiniese communities in contemporary Burma: A comparative

analysis of their presence and influence. In: C. K. Jayati Bhattacharya, ed. Indian and Chinese

Immigrant Communities: Comparative Perspectives. s.l.:Anthem Press.

ZZ

23


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Fisher, J., 2017. UN Failures on Rohingya revealed. [Online]



Freeman, J., 2017. Can Anyone Stop Burma's Hardline Buddhist Monks. [Online]

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hardline-buddhist-monks/538992/


Getty Images, 2017. s.l.:Getty Images.

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suu-kyi-myanmar-rohingya-crisis


Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909. Administrative Divisions. s.l.:Oxford University Press.

Lynch, C., 2017. For Years UN was Warned of Threat to Rohingya in Myanmar. [Online]

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Topic B: Defining a ―Doctrine of

Security‖ for the United Nations

Security Council

Introduction

The specific scope of intervention by the UN Security Council remains a hot

topic of debate. Often the scene of high politics and allegations of double

standards, the method by which a situation is deemed to be ―maintenance of

international peace and security‖42

is rather unclear. It is therefore of

paramount importance that the United Nations Security Council defines a more

workable definition of when any type of intervention is warranted, reckoning

with both international law as well as practical arguments.

At present any intervention (or decision, for that matter) from our body is

subject to a majority of 9 votes, including the absence of a veto by a Permanent

42

Art. 24.1 United Nations Charter


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Member. This in practice heavily relies on the political goodwill of

those 5 Permanent Members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the

United Kingdom and the United States). Several ways out of this possible

deadlock have been found in the past, but it still remains difficult to act in

specific circumstances when a Permanent Member wishes to use their veto:

even a mere announcement of a possible blockage (the so-called ‗pocket veto‘)

can already have a major chilling effect on many topics that are nevertheless of

importance for international peace and security.

The only way out of this is for the Security Council to clearly define its own

‗Doctrine of Security‘ on the conditions, methods and elements to be fulfilled

in a possible United Nations Security Council intervention. We will thereby

take an academic look at the requirements and constituent elements of such a

doctrine, if one exists at all.

However, is there a framework within which this use of force can be justified?

Are there any criteria (beyond ad hoc politics) under which an intervention can

be warranted? Let us try to define a more theoretical approach to this "Doctrine

of security" under this topic

History of the Problem

The right of the Security Council to intervene in a given situation of concern to

international peace and security has been clearly established by the United

Nations Charter.43

However, it has shown not to be absolute in all matters.

Defining the ―Doctrine of Security‖ for our council therefore requires a deeper

understanding of the blockages that arose at times in the past.

43

Art. 24.1 United Nations Charter

ZZ

29


A first major break in the absolute veto power of the Security Council

took place on 3 November 1950, when the Soviet Union repeatedly vetoed

interventions warranted by the United Nations in the Korean War. This process

frustrated the other member states of the United Nations at that time. They

came up with the so-called ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution 377 A of the

General Assembly.44

In this resolution a fallback option was formulated in case the Security Council

has failed to act as required to maintain international peace and security

because of a veto of a Permanent Member. The General Assembly may

thereupon immediately consider the matter. It shall do so ―with a view of

making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures,

including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of

armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and

security‖.45

This important precedent will be a major part of our possible ―Doctrine of

Security‖, since it stipulates both conditions and methods of intervention in

case a Permanent Member exercises his veto power. As a condition this veto

needs to have been exercised. As a method this resolution of the General

Assembly even authorises ―the use of armed force when necessary‖. It is

therefore an important precedent for document.

A second important step in the history of a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ was

made by another General assembly resolution. The so-called ―Responsibility to

Protect‖ incorporated in the 2005 World Summit outcome presented an outline

44

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V) 45

Art. 1, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V)

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/377(V

ZZ

30


of when the United Nations should intervene when preventing or

responding to the most serious violations of international human rights and

humanitarian law.

The General Assembly approved these findings in resolution A/RES/60/1 of 16

September 2005.46

This document outlined the fact that ―no State can best

protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and

efficient collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of

the Charter‖.47

This resolution also stressed the role of both the Security Council and the

General Assembly in maintaining international peace and security: ―We also

reaffirm that the Security Council has primary responsibility in the

maintenance of international peace and security. We also note the role of the

General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and

security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter‖.48

The so-called ―Responsibility to Protect‖ is therefore an element that

historically influenced a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ as we are trying to

formulate. It was featured in Security Council resolution 1674 of 28 April

2006,49

as well as in resolutions on Libya,50

Ivory Coast,51

Yemen52

and

Sudan53

in 2011.

46

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-dds-

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 47

Art. 72 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-

dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 48

Art. 80 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, https://documents-

dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 49

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1674, 28 April 2006,

https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1674-2006-on-protection-of-civilians-in-

armed-conflict 50

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1970, 26 February 2011,

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1970-%282011%29; United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973,

17 March 2011, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1973-%282011%29. 51

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1975, 30 March 2011,

https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1975-%282011%29.

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement






https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1674-2006-on-protection-of-civilians-in-armed-conflict


https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1970-%282011%29



ZZ

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On Syria the ―Responsibility to Protect‖ was equally invoked in 2012 in a draft

resolution which ended up being vetoed by the Russian Federation and

China.54

This confirms the pre-existing ―Uniting for Peace‖ doctrine that after

an initial veto by a Permanent Member, the United Nations General Assembly

can be called upon to take action instead.

From this brief historical overview we can therefore state that some initial

limitations have taken place of the Security Council‘s mandate according to the

United Nations Charter. The possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ should therefore

ideally incorporate these two existing limits on this council‘s powers whilst

also trying to look for new horizons in the process.

Statement of the Problem

Let us now take a closer look at the constituent parts of a possible ―Doctrine of

Security‖ of our council. Among other elements warranting the establishment

of for instance a peacekeeping operation we can clearly see some other criteria

emerging. The absence of a veto is a given, albeit a very politically charged

element. This first possible element can however be relatively easy

circumvented by working with the General Assembly after a veto in the

Security Council.

This document would ideally point out the conditions, the methods and the

elements of any possible Security Council intervention. Each of these

constituent parts deserves a closer look in their own right.

52

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2014, 21 October 2011,

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) 53

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1996, 8 July 2011,

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(2011) 54

Outreach programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, The Responsibility to Protect. Who is

responsible for protecting people from gross violations of human rights?,

http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/bgresponsibility.pdf, p.3.

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011


http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/bgresponsibility.pdf

ZZ

32


Conditions of intervention

Intervention is normally only allowed upon agreement of 9 out of 15 members

of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the Permanent

Members.55

However, if the General Assembly votes in favour of an

intervention after an initial Security Council veto this condition can also be

met. We can therefore conclude that there is a fair amount of flexibility when it

comes to the conditions of intervention.

A United Nations warranted intervention of any sorts would need the approval

of either of these two bodies in order to be considered legitimate. It can

however be further discussed if other preliminary conditions of interventions

should be added to our potential ―Doctrine of Security‖ in order to make sure

that international law is upheld through a targeted United Nations intervention

in a given situation.

Methods of intervention

A very clear outline of the way in which the Security Council can intervene

can be found in the United Nations Charter. It authorises this council to take

measures involving the use of armed force or not.56

However, in case the

Security Council should come to a gridlock through the veto of a Permanent

Member, it befalls upon the General Assembly to bypass this by using the

aforementioned ―Uniting for Peace‖ precedent of 1950. This even allows for

the ―use of armed force when necessary‖.57

55

Art. 27 United Nations Charter. 56

Chapter 6 and 7 United Nations Charter. 57

Art. 1, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A, 3 November 1950,


ZZ

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We can therefore state that at present both the military and non-military

method of intervention are allowed. Whereas originally the use of armed force

was restricted to the Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the United

Nations Charter, this method can now also be invoked by the General

Assembly acting under ―Uniting for Peace‖ or under the Responsibility to

Protect‖, as outlined before.

When an intervention is therefore authorised by either United Nations body,

there is a broad scope of possible methods of intervention. This ranges from

restrictive measures to use of armed force, and reflects the variety of options

found in the United Nations Charter. Additional specifications or limitations –

if needed in the opinion of the member states present at the Security Council

table – would have to be included in the possible ―Doctrine of Security‖

document that will be put forward.

Elements of intervention

Finally, we need to outline which elements of intervention would be required

as part of our possible ―Doctrine of Security‖. The methods of intervention

don‘t fully take into account the elements on the ground. Whether or not to

have a field mission, a peacekeeping mission or another element of

intervention on the ground is currently not codified: it depends on political

choices made in New York by those in the Security Council or in the General

Assembly.

This last of the three constituent parts is perhaps the least defined. It dwells

upon extra modalities not captured by either the conditions or the methods of

intervention. In a possible ―Doctrine of Security‖ the members of the Security

Council will therefore be free to add whatever extra elements they would deem

ZZ

34


necessary to curtail the intervention of the Security Council in the

future. This part of discussion will thereby arguably be the most controversial.

Current Situation

Up until now the decision to intervene or not was always made on a case by

case basis. We have however seen in the previous chapter that some dents were

made in this principle throughout the United Nations‘ history. Let us therefore

see what the current state of play is on formulating a possible ―Doctrine of

Security‖ for our council.

Any measures so far - whether under Chapter 6 or Chapter 8 of the UN Charter

- constituted an ad hoc response to a given situation. Distinguishing

characteristics for a United Nations intervention mandated by the Security

Council thereby led to a large 'grey zone': similar situations warranted different

responses, while mandates were copied from one situation to another, despite a

large set of different elements. Was there however an underlying doctrine

warranting more of our attention?

As mentioned before very clear indication of this possible "Doctrine of

security" was the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution adopted by the General

Assembly. This document clearly demonstrated a fallback option for the

General Assembly: in case a case would have been blocked by a Security

Council veto, the option exists to take it to the General Assembly. The latter

can then decide to take some actions in its own right which the Security

Council was unable to pass.

In case of a peacekeeping mission we can however clearly see how this UNGA

resolution has made a difference. Different operations were mandated which

failed to get approval in the Security Council. On the downside, a single

ZZ

35


fallback option like this one hardly amounts to a "Doctrine of security"

as promised by this topic's title.

It is therefore very much up to the United Nations member states currently

serving on the Security Council – including the powerful Permanent Members

– to state what they would like to see included in a possible ―Doctrine of

Security‖ valid for our council and the United Nations as a whole. Whilst such

a progression to a single document might look logic, its very existence might

already prove to be controversial for some members. Our council should

therefore carefully reflect on the necessity of having it in the first place,

followed by a discussion on its contents in terms of conditions, methods and

elements of intervention.

Bloc positions

A first block of countries would be formed by the Permanent Members of the

Security Council. Their interests are confined to maintaining the status quo in a

possible ―Doctrine of Security‖. Some might even believe there is no need for

such a document, undercutting the efforts of the other members of this council

significantly.

On the other side of the argument the non-permanent members would be

found: some of them see a need for a comprehensive ―Doctrine of Security‖ to

make sure the Security Council is kept in check and possibly bypassed if

certain conditions are met. This will increase the power of the General

ZZ

36


Assembly and consequentially their own power within that United

Nations body.

Some Permanent Members might however be emboldened by the 1950

precedent of ―Uniting for Peace‖, allowing a bypass of the Security Council in

exceptional circumstances (e.g. a veto by a Permanent Member). This will

make things potentially easier for those non-permanent members seeking to

formulate a more complete document on this topic.

Questions a Resolution Should Answer

Is there a need for a comprehensive ―Doctrine of Security‖ for the Security

Council or for the United Nations as a whole?

Can common criteria be formulated for such a doctrine?

What conditions should be met before the ―Doctrine of Security‖ kicks in?

Which methods of intervention shall be allowed?

Which other elements should be present in this document in order for it to

be operational, practical and realistically achievable?

ZZ

37


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