t8 b6 faa hq tony ferrante fdr- 4-19-04 mfr 849

8/14/2019 t8 b6 Faa Hq Tony Ferrante Fdr- 4-19-04 Mfr 849

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Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: Federal Aviation Adm inistration (FAA) HeadquartersType of event: Interview with Tony FerranteDate: April 19 , 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.Participants - Non-Comm ission: Brook Avery, Chief C onsul Office, FAAParticipants - Comm ission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNote: Please refer to the recorded interview fo r further details.Background:

Ferrante b egan his career with the FAA in 1982 after ten months as a militarycontroller. H e was a controller at Pittsburg Tower, in Miami, and in 1988 took a Staffposition. In 1989 was a Supervisor fo r Miami Tower, and in 1991 was an AssistantManager. In 1993 he becam e a Specialist in Civil O perations at FAA Headquarters. In1994 he was promoted to A ssistant Division Manager of C ivil Ops. In 1995 he becam eManager Terminal Flight Service O perations and Procedures (ATO -120). In 1997 hebecame Assistant Manager of A ir Traffic Investigations (AAT-201). In 1998 he becamethe Manager of Air Traffic Investigations (AAT-200). He has had various details since.In the fall of 2001 Ferrante reported to David Cannoles (AAT-20). AAT -20 isresponsible fo r Evaluations an d Investigations. Ferran te headed the Investigationsdivision. Cannoles reported to Jeff Griffith an d Bill Peacock.

September 11, 2001 (9/11):O n 9/11 Ferrante was in Chicago. W hen he returned to the FAA Headquartersbuilding on September 12, 2001, he imm ediately began to oversee w hat information hadbeen gathered. The forerunner of the DE N line had been established, and he checked thatline periodically. He met with the FBI and began turning over information and data

records. Cannoles an d Doug G ould were present as well. They reviewed air trafficcontroller (ATC) tapes, controller statements, facilities logs and Ferrante reviewedSATORI radar data. Ferrante believes the Dou g G ould reviewed the SA TO RI with theFBI.Traffic Situational Displays (TSDs) were located in the offices of Monte Belger,Mike Sorello (sixth floor), Jeff Griffith, the Air Crisis Center (ACC), an d "perhaps"BillPeacock's room. Ferrante believes snapshots of the air traffic system shut down from the



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TSD w ere provided to the FBI. Some TS D data was used in the FAA's Summary of AirHijacking Events.On Thursday 13 September 2001 Ferrante and his colleagues beganreconstructing events of the attacks for the aforemen tioned FAA book. T heAdm inistrator, Jane Garvey, wanted m ore informa tion and materials on what hade takenplace.Cannoles specified that he wanted the exact data that recorded the events. Theparameters were to start from the taxi instructions given to the aircraft, through the pointwhere the flights were received by air traffic control, an d then up to the point at which thehijack was c onfirm ed. Their primary resources were facility logs, personnel statements,radar data, and voice data. In the normal investigative progress, the record is five minutesbefore the initial contact with the air traffic system to five minutes after the last contactwith the air traffic system.Ferrante specifically noted that for every entry in their log book there is anunderlying document.Ferrante believes Col. Atkins, as the military liaison, may have been exposed toan y NEADS logs in possession of the FAA during their timeline efforts. Ferrante knowsof no classified documen ts that contributed to the FAA timetable. Ferrante had hisassistant gather the chronology inform ation and gave the reports from Dave Cannoles at

"somepoint" on the afternoon of September 16, 2001. During his normal course of work,if an investigation indicates that there were traffic violations, then the investigator willseek to review all the materials from all the facilities.Ferrante knows that John White was monitoring the FAA Tactical Net fromHerndon Com mand Center. He also understood that the Herndon Comm and Center mighthave been runn ing two or three separate lines at the time with the facilities.Ferrante stated that the Summary o f Air Hijacking Events was designedspecifically to explain how the air traffic system performed; not how FAA Headquartersoperated. The item was created specifically to forma lly brief the FAA senior executives.Ferrante further explained that Washington Operations Center (WOC) notification of anevent is not included in such an item. The item wo uld contain the technical issues that arepertinent to what w as done in the air traffic system to address an event.Ferrante understands that the military notification times on 9/11 becom e an issue,

bu t that notification to the WOC w as never addressed. Ferrantee explained that thetasking to uncover notification issues was focused on how the facilities comm unicatedregarding the aircraft. They also addressed wh en the air traffic system partook innotifying the military.Ferrante did not persona lly look at the comm unications that originated from FAAHeadquarters on 9/11, and is not aw are that this effort was made by any of his colleagues.



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Further, he commented that a field facility or Regional Operation Center (ROC) mayhave had different reporting responsibilities than Headquarters.Ferrante explained that in his career he never was exposed to a response to ahijacking that was not operated by FAA Security. He commented as well that it wasunusual for a Boston Center controller to notify Otis ANG B of the event. Theinvestigators recognized this example and looked to see if other facilities notified eitherthe ROC or the WO C.Ferrante commented that the notification to the military regarding U AL 93 wassolely the knowledge on the aircraft that was passed to Colonel Atkins in the CrisisCenter.Ferrante explained that pre-9/11 a Supervisor or Operations Man ger in Charge(OMIC) at a Center would call either the ROC or WOC. The WOC at Headquartersnotifies Civil Aviation Security (ACS), and then the crisis management guidance isinitiated for AC S to notify the National M ilitary Command Center (NMCC).The communications on the Tactical Net are not represented in the Summary ofAir Hijacking Events since Ferrante did not know there was a Tactical Net, or what therole of the AC S was on 9/11.Ferrante assumed that Darlene Freeman's group conducted the assessment ofwhat the ACS did on 9/11. He has no knowledge on this topic.Ferrante did ask the Regions to look for the notifications that were performed atthe different Centers. David Cannoles worked with Freeman's group on the effort.Ferrante commented that the notification of the threat to U AL 93 may n ot havebeen in the chronology because it occurred after their information indicated that the flighthad crashed. Ferrante commented that he would need to look at the log entries theyreceived to see if there was information that was in his possession when compiling theSummary of Air Hijacking Events to see if there is an entry for a 10:07 AM notification toNEADS. He believes that the only UAL 93 notification he was aware of involved C olAtkins. Ferrante took the position that incorrect inf ormation was not included in thereport. Ferrante believes that "somebody" at the FAA built a chronology based of f ofeither NEAD S materials or from a runnin g chronology that was developed in theCann oles conference call room. H e believes the built chronology was given to him byDavid Cann oles or Dan D iggins. Ferrante also worked with Doug Gould.Ferrante stated that he did not partake in discussions on the differences betweenthe FAA and the military chronologies. Ferrante believes it was clear to David Cann olesthat the Summary of Air Hijacking Events was not an assessment of the management flowof information. Ferrante w as not consulted on the chronology that was issued in August2002 by the FAA.


t8 b6 faa hq tony ferrante fdr- 4-19-04 mfr 849

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