t8 b2 faa ny center bob jones fdr- handwritten notes- jones mfr and alt mfr re boston visit

8/14/2019 T8 B2 FAA NY Center Bob Jones Fdr- Handwritten Notes- Jones MFR and Alt MFR Re Boston Visit

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event:Federal Av iation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field S ite Interview with

Robert Jones, Q uality AssuranceOfficer, ZB W.Type of event: Interview

Date: Monday, September22 , 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by:Geoffrey Brown

Team Number:8

Location:FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua,New Hampshire

Participants- Non-Commission:John R. Donnelly, FAA SeniorAttorney[(781) 238

7045]

Participants- Commission:John Azzarello,MilesKara, GeoffreyBrown

NOTE: Pleaserefer to the recorded interview for a complete account.

Jones has been with the FAA for the last14 years, 13 of which he has spent with ZBW .He is a full performance level controller, and aTM U supervisor. On9/11 Jones was a

QualityAssurance Specialist charged withprocessingth e accident informationfor flightUAL175.Jones identified the threatening communicationsfrom UAL175 on theflightrecording.

Jones explained to Com missionstaff the differencebetween an "accidentpackage"andan "accident file".The packageis developedand publishedby the FAA and has adefinedscope and purpose. Thefile is all the information collected regarding an accident, and inthis case containsa timeline createdby Jones and his colleague.The timeline, which willbe provided to the Com mission through a request to FAA headquarters, was piecedtogether throughth e call toll records.

Based off his notes, Jones stated that at 1224UTCArea C reported a possiblehijack.Jones w ent to 46R (Pete Zilowski). Jones then w ent to review the recording. He relayedthe recording information to the W atchdesk. He c onfirm ed that an"Arab" voice stated"we have someplanes". Jones relayed this to Biggio imme diately.

At 122456UTC Jones relayed another communication.At 1233359UTC Jones relayedth e final com mun ication. Jones estimatesal l three comm unications were toldto Biggioatsome point between 1233-1237 UTC. (CH ECK TIMES).

At 122750UTC thesupervisorat TMU Y called Herndonto relay informationon the

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l ikelyhi jacking .

At 1240UTC Dan Bueno requeststo be put on aconference call withHerndon,and re laysth e inform ation that AA1 1 had dropped speed, which he guessed m ight be a descent intoNY Tracon airspace.

At 130355UTCBoston CenterTM U tells intern al facilities to ground stop all ZBWtraffic.

At 1 3 1 1 02UTC an order was issued to increase cock pit security.

At 1 342 UTC all aircra ft were ordered to return to airports, and a nation al ground stopwas instituted.

Jones n oted that at the tim e of the9/1 1 attacks ZBW used reel to reel tapes for recordin g.

Now they have digital audio.He noticed that thereis a differencein terminology whenBoston ATCs tried to relay informationto MEADS.He thinks this lackof commonterminologyshould be dealt with .

Jones expla ined that he understands Gian t Killer as based out of Norfolk, V irgin ia and iscontrol of Navy train ing exercises, and all warningareas off the east coast.

Jones stated thatAAl 1 first became a primary targetat 122112UTC.He noted thatbecause they only h ad a primary C ollin Scoggins attempted to contactNEAPS tocoordinate with their heigh tf inding capa bili ty (checkon that) . | |

1 I

Jones also statedthe pre9/1 1 th e WO C's prime rolewas to notify th e other ATC centersof th e ongoing informat ionand operations.

Jones took Commissionstaff on a tour throughth e reel systemof ZBW, andCommissionstaff has requestedth e comple te acc identfile throughFAA headquarters .I t wasduringthis tour that Jones ex plain edto Comm ission s taffthat the communica t ionfrom AAl 1did notcome from theAmerican Airl inespilot k e y i n gthe microphone cover t lyto informauthori t iesof the h i j ack .After th e 9/1 1 attack s Jonesassisted an FBI audio analystincopyingthe recordings. The FBI ana lystinformed Jones that in ana lysis of the recordinghe could pickup spit in thespeech patternsof the hijackers being recorded smack ingth emicrophone . I t was the FBIanalyst 'sdefini t iveconclusionthat th e hijack ers wereinpositionof the cockpit ,an d speaking dire ctly intoth e microphone ,at the t ime of therecording.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Staff visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA

Type of Event: Briefing and Scheduled Interviews

Date: September 22-24, 2003

Special Access Issues: NATCA (National Air Traffic Control Association) representatives sat in onsome interviews. A FAA legal representative from the New England Region attended all staff contactswith FAA personnel

Prepared by: Miles Kara

Team Number: 8

Location: Nashua, NH (Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)

Participants - Non-Commission: See individual interview reports

Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown

Background Summary

Commission staff were able to efficiently an d effectively formally interview 18 people, tour facilities atboth the Boston Center and the New England Region, and accomplish discovery of four additionalrelevant document sources, thanks to a forthcoming, responsive reception by the Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio. Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to thepeople that would do Staff the most good in the time allotted. That required dropping some potentialinterviewees and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the FAA work force.

The work force accommodated those changes and the representatives of FAA Counsel appointed toattend Staffs presence pitched in and helped out. NATCA representatives, when requested byinterviewees to be present were also helpful in the overall process. The Staff left with the impressionthat Boston Center, Mr. Biggio in particular, wanted us to gain a complete and accurate view of theircollective work under near-unprecedented pressure on September 1 1 , 2001 . The Regional Administratortook a brief exit brief from the team at which time she was advised of the support provided by MrBiggio and staff and of the document discoveries made by the Commission staff.

Major Points

Discovery. Staff learned of additional responsive information that had not been provided through thedocument request process.

Accident File. Staff learned from Mr. Bob Jones, Quality Assurance Office, of theexistence of an accident file, different from th e "accident package" provided by FAA to both th eFBI and NTSB, and subsequently provided to the Commission in response to a document requestto DoT. Among other items in the package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephonecompany records. Mr Jones, locally considered a hero because of his quick work in replaying thetapes of cockpit conversations that day was insistently steered our way by Mr. Biggio.

After Action Review. Staff learned that the New England Region convened a round table twowepk


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of any formalproduct tha t ensured,but asked that associatedfiles an d records of that eventbem ade available to the Com m ission. A m em ber of the Region's 24-hour operations center, duringinterview, produced a region log, a document previously not providedstaff, but one that staff wascertain m ust exist since a similar docum ent was produced by the Eastern Region in New Y ork.Staff has a copy of that log.

Additional Transcripts. During one interviewStaff became aware of a radar controller positionthat controlled the scrambled Otis fighters. Staff asked for informationfrom that position. It isStaffs under standing that the only inform ation that went into the "accident package" was datapertainingto FAA's actually contact withor handlingof the four hijacked aircraft, possiblybecause thatwas theFBI/NTSBfocus. That excludedan y accident file information that pertainedstrictly to theOtis fighters themselves.The FAA legal representative saidhe would make surewe got the informationwe needed. Separately,an d previously,Staff had brought to HeadquartersFAA attentionthe lack of transcripts pertainingto the Otis fighters, aircraft that we know fromother sources had been controlled by F AA , at least in part. FAA provided the tapes of BostonCenter radar control positions 17R and 18R to Staff on September 25, 2003.

Personal Notes. Two persons interviewed brought with thempersonal notes at least one set ofwhich had been constructeda few days after 9/11. Staff askedfor and voluntarilygot both setsofnotes. Those notes are im portant because both individuals worked in theTraffic Management

Unit that day, the focal pointfo r decisions made by and information flowingto the OM IC, Mr.Biggio.

Boston Center Performance.To a person, Boston Centeris proud of its performance thatda yan d the Cen ter has internalized that it did all that it could do, given the events of the day. The SeniorTraffic ManagementController, M r. Bueno, carefullyan d repetitively described to Staff "the box,"hisdescriptionof how the Center perceived that hijackings would proceed. No one seriously considered anyoutcomeother than an airplane proceeding to an airport somewhere and landing, perhaps Cuba. Theview prevailed evenafter the content of the cockpit communications was learned. Therefore, BostonCenter controllers proceeded to do what the y were trained to do; they notifie d supervisors as eventsproceeded , and then continued to try and ensure safety in the sky by keeping planes separated,from eachother andfrom AA11, an d notifyingadjoining sectors withinthe Center an d other Centers,as necessary.

Determining a hijack. No one factor or combinationof factors that day,other than the cockpitcommunications,definitely led Center personnel to a hijac king awareness. T here are three such factors.

Loss of Radio C ontact .This phenomenon w as com m on, to the point of being notorious.Pilots an d crews were simplylax in m aintaining contact.One interviewee m ade sureweunderstood the commonlymisunderstoodacronym "NORDO." That means"n o radio" in theliteralsense thatthe aircraft's radio(s)are notworking.It is in that sense that controller 38Riscapturedon tape early in the AA 11 story designating AA11"nordo," im plying that the pilot is incontroland unable to communicate. Thatis differentfrom an aircraft witha working radio,butdeliberatelynot com m unicating. The term for that, Staff was told, is"NORAK," (ph)

Loss of Transponder. This phenomenon is m uch rarer, but notin-and-of-itself,alarming.

Controllersroutinely ask theaffected plane to"recycleyour transponder." [That is the protocolused withUA175by NewYork Center controllers.]Controllers generally agreed thattransponder loss wouldbe reported to the supervisor.The combinationof "nordo" andtransponder loss is highly unusual and m any controllers had never experienced that combination.According to Mr.Biggio that com binationis a sign of major equipm ent m alfunctionand atthatpoint in theflight of AA11 wouldnot have triggeredany notion of a hijack.

Course Deviation.On e contro ller, a supervisor on duty that day as a radar associate tocompletem onthly qualification requirem ents, citied m inor coursedeviationAA11failure toclimb to 35000feetas an additional warning sign. There was no consensus on that point, but all

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1ORANDUM FOR THERECORD Page3 of 5

controllersagreed that the com bination of"nordo," transponder loss, and significantcourse deviation the AA11 turn to the south was serious. How ever, M r. Biggio on that pointsaid that given amajor equipmentmalfunctionwhat might be happening was a pilot turning toland at a "heavy" capab le airport.One controller suppo rted that thesis, describinga "heavy" pilotas one who w ould try to land at Kennedy, vice elsewhere. A"heavy" aircraft is a term used byFAA controllers to describe a largeaircraft such as a747/757/767'.Center personnel w hoobserved the turn south also observed a unusually rapid rate ofprogress,indicatively of a pilotwho wanted to get somewhere in a hurry.

The Intervening V ariable, Unu sual Cockpit Com munications.After AA 11 lost itstransponder and jus tbefore it made a significant course deviation to the south, unusual communicationsof unknow n source were hea rd on the AA 11 assigned freque ncy of controller 46R . It was quite clear tothe controller that he had a problem and he imm ediately and loudly made thatfact know n. In a rapidsequence of events a quality assurancestaff member, BobJones,personally went to the basement andreran the tapes an d made the call that the voice said "we have som eplanes." M r. Jones' accident filetimeline will providethe exact timehe comm unicated that factto the watch deskand to Mr.Biggio.TheOMIC log shows that Biggio declared a hijack, based on cockpit comm unications at 0825 EDT . Thattime appears tostaff to be the time of the original communication itself and not the time that Biggio wasnotified by Jones.The accident file logwill be determining factor.

First Aircraft Impact into WTC and AA11. The Boston Center learned of developingproblemsin New York one of twoways. First,a CNN feed is maintainedin a office contiguousto thewatch desk in the center proper. Se cond, con trollers on break typically went to the cafeteria w here aCNN feed was also available. Intuitivelyand instinctively, Center personnelw ho were awareof andfollowedAA11 on its flight south knew thatit was AA 11 that impactedth e north tower, irrespectivelyof differing informa tion availablefrom CNN. At least at the supervisory level,if not at theindividualcontrollerlevel, Boston C enter personnel also u nderstoodAA11 to be slowing and descending.Stafftentativelyconcludes that Boston Center itself was not the initial source of confusion about AA11afterthe impact of the first plane into the W TC . Nev ertheless, Cen ter personnel aware o f the altitude searchfor AA11, southbound, were also aw areof two other factors. Firstth e last know accurate altitudefo rAA11 was29,000 feet. Second,UA175,under direct queryby a Boston Center controller sited AA11atabout 0837 EDT and established its altitude to be 27-29,000feet.

The Altitude Problem. FAA controllers cannot determine altitude on anon-transponding,primary-only,aircraft. Center personnel confirmed that toStaff several times over. On the other hand,air defense scope operators at the Northeast Air D efense Sector (NEA DS) can determine altitude in thatcircumstance.Acc ording to the Dep uty Comm ander at the 84 Radar EvaluationSquadron.,FAA didno t purchase that altitude-determining capability and,further, was consideringthe eliminationof allprimary radar returnsfrom its en-route radar system. Most Centerpersonnelwere not aware that theSector Area O perations C enter (SAOC)at NEADS could read altitudeand that might have beena reasonto contact NE AD S. One key person did, Colin Scoggins, a member of the TMU and the person m ostoften in contact with NEAD S.H e arrived at the Sector about 0825EDT andimmediately became awareof a deve loping situation. His initial instinct was to stay out o f theroadtoomany onlookers impededthe task at hand. As hebecame awareof a primary-only po ssible hijackedaircraft his immediateresponsewas that NEADS neededto be notifiedso they couldget altitudeon the airplane.He headed fo r

the TMU andby the time he arrived Joe Cooper was in contact with NEADS. Mr. Scoggins spend themajority of his time thereafterin intermittent direct phone contact w ith NEAD S, primarilyMajorDeskins,trying to assist NE AD S in gaining scope contact with AA 11. His calls, how ever, were not on ataped line. He believes those calls were taped at NE AD S. Thedifficulty was that NEADS wanted"latsand longs" and he was trying to give them positionfrom a known VO R, e. g."x" miles south of Albany.He recalled that he passed two distinct sets of lat-long coordinates to NEADS.

Military Notification.No person Staff interviewed seriously considered contacting NEADSthroughthe process onpaperFAA-NMCC-NORAD,if they were even aware of it. Dan Bueno getshigh marksfrom Center personnelfo r instinctivelycalling FAA traffic approachpersonnel at thelocationwhere he knew the fighters to beOtisAFB. Bueno called Otis becausehe knew "fromthe

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eighties"that is where military assistance camefrom. He also considered BurlingtonVT andAtlantic CityNJ for thesame reason. EvenMr. Scoggins,who knew thatthe call had to go to NEA DS ,did not fault Bueno for trying to call theAF W ing directly through other FAA personnel. T he responseto Bueno's callwas that Otis needed NEADS authorization. Accordingto available transcriptstheCooper call directlyto NEADS and the Otis tower callto NEADS basedon Bueno's call reachedNEA DS at nearly the same time, approxim ately 0838 EDT.

The Scramble. Staff learned from the controller who was onposition 18R that he vectored thefighters to a holding po sitionin area Whiskey 105,a military controlled area southof Long Island. Fromhis perspective thatwas the result of several factors. Therewas nodefined mission. Therewasuncertainty aboutthe continuingthreatthe first impactwas an event of the past. There were alsomultiple controllers involved. An entity known as Giant K iller at Oceana,VA controls militarytraffic inthe training areas,but they only controlto a certain altitude. High altitudeis controlledby H untressNEADS.The Center controller's situational awarenesswas that the military wantedto be positionedtovector in any directionas requiredand that overheadNew York Citydid notprovide that.He also ruledou t supersonicflight because it, in-and-of-itself,introducedcomplicating air traffic control factors.Moreover, withouta defined mission the usefulness of such flight was problematic.The controllerhadexperience wo rking Concordeflights and was used to the complicating natureof such flight.

Military/FAA Relationships. There is a natural tension betweenthe two entities because both

desire the use of thesame airspacefor different reasons. When both entities wantthe same space at thesame time coordination issues needto be worked ou t and, as in theparagraph above, multiple controllersge t in the act. Staff observes, basedon this single visit, that those relationships co uld have beensmootheron 9/11, especially in the realm of information sharing.One person interviewedput itsuccinctly. Paraphrased, he said the role of the FA A is to keep plane s separated in the air, the role of themilitary is to bring planes together. Those are mutually exclusive goals. Mr. Scogginsefforts in trying totranslatesufficient information to allow NE AD S to acquire AA 11 are indicative of the need for betterinformationsharing. As a resultof the inherent tensionan d differing protocols an d languages, m ilitarycells have been established in FAA to work day-day air space m anagem ent issues. The New EnglandRegionhas one such cell, acell that also provides support to the Eastern Region in New Yo rk.Staff helda short discussion with the senior Navyofficer in the cell. The cell has 2-3 person contingentsfrom eachof the three servicesan d each reports separatelyto a differentboss. The Army an d Navy representativesreport to their GeneralStaffs at Headquarters US Army and US Navy , respectively. T he Air Force Cellreports to the Air Force LiaisonOfficer at FAA Headquarters. All of the assigned military personnel areeither flight or controller-trained and each cell exits to handle administrative matters only. There is noreason that they could have or should have been contacted or interjected themselves in the process on9/11. The senior Navyofficer put in succinctlyfrom a military perspective. Thereare defined lines ofcommunication andproceduresto handle eventslike that and if he or hisother service counterpartshadgotten involvedthey would have justconfoundedthe situation.

Additional Items of Interest

Effect of Events of 9/11.Staff experiencedthe breakdownof two controllersas they struggledtotell their storyof the events of 9/11. Both composed themselvesan d completedthe interview. One wason e of the individualswho brought personal notesto the interview.All Staff members as well as the

FAA legal representative encouragedhim to allow the Commissionto have a copy of valuablecontemporaneous records.He had incorporated personal thoughtsan d notes and Staff encouragedhim toprovidejust the factual content. He said he would consult with hisfamily and consider our request overnight. He returnedthe next day andhanded staff a CD containing whatever portionof his notes hejudged of value to the C om mission. The second individual was the one who experienced discovery ofthe hijackingnordo,no transponder, cockpit comm unications,an d turn to the south. He was alsointerviewed by TomBrokaw.He is upset that what is in the public domain is distorted and not whatfactuallyhappened that day.Staff told him that was the reason we had come to interview him.Hisprimary concernsare three-fold:

He isupset aboutthe AA11 pilot gettinga hero's creditfo r "keying the mike."He knows from

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first hand listening thatth e hijacker was speaking directly intoth e microphone. Thatunderstandingis supportedby Bob Jones who listened to the tapes an d then re-listenedto themagain in the presence of an FBI agent. Accordingto Jones, th e Agent describeda man talking,even spitting, directly into the microp hone.Staff will ask for the 302 report concerning that eventan d has, but has not listened to the tape.

He is also up set withhis co-workerswho did notshare his sense of urgency that day, especiallyafter the plane's transponder shut and when thefirst cockpit communication occurred. He knew atthat mom ent there was big tro uble and he literally screamed for assistance. H e perceived hissupervisor'sresponseas slow and his request for a "D side," a radar associateto assist,as notresponsiveto his needs.

He is also not happy with Brokaw's portrayalof what the controllerwas hearing and feeling thatda y

The Region's Role. The New England Region's role appears to be primarily administrative.However, Staff reserves judgm enton this point untilthe Region's after action review is analyzed. Theso-called"ROC," Regional Operations Center,functionsessentially as a switchboardto facilitate tele-conferences,various ROC line-of-business (i. e. security) requirements to be on orenter HeadquartersFAA tele-netsand to essentially act as a clearing house for Regional managem ent. Fortu itously,

according to Region personnel,an RMT (Regional Management Team) meetingwas in session th atmorning and all Region entities werenotified simultaneo usly of the developing situation.

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t8 b2 faa ny center bob jones fdr- handwritten notes- jones mfr and alt mfr re boston visit

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