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Novem ber 22, 2003Work Paper: Intercept of UA Flight 93Purpose: to provide me mb ers of Team 8 information on what it would take to analyzepossible intercept scenarios for UA Flight 93 and how that might be accomplished.W ho m ight do it: There are three options1) NT SB, 2) DoD,and 3) Comm ission Staff.The best option is 2, the least preferred option is 1, and the likely option is 3.Option 1: Based on conversations with Lanny Cleland, 84 th RADES we know that thedivision of labor on accidents/incidents is that the 84 th supports either F AA or NTSB oncivilian occurrences and, for military air incidents, the Services, in this case the AirForce, accom plishes the task on behalf of DoD. NTSB does no t have the expertise toassess performance factors (weight, fuel, armament, and so forth) necessary toaccom plish what-if analysis of military aircraft. Nor will the military allow anotheragency to do that without either input from or final approval by DoD. Therefore, NTSB ,if approached w ill likely respond in one of two w ays. It will either refer us to the AirForce directly or take the request and then refer it to the Air Force to respond.Option 2: For the Langley scram ble the entity best able to accomplish the analysis is Det1, 119 th FWThor and Captain Bergstrom. The second best entity is NEADSDeltaFlight and Major Fox in particular. Major Anderson demonstrated for us how NEADScan quick ly establish a vector and distance between any two given points. They do thiskind of geometry continuously in order to execute scramb le m issions. How ever, if DoDis tasked they w ill delegate the request to the Air Force and the Air Force m ay decide thatits staffer the Air Com bat Comm and should do the analysis. Based on my work on theBrothers to the Rescue (BTT R) investigation the probab le response from DoD is that theywill not do what-if, speculative analysis for a fact driven investigation.At this point a bit of history is necessary. For the BTTR investigation, and because the"families," in this case the surviving pilot, made an assessment based on open sourceinformation, we felt obligated at the analyst level to determine if and under whatconditions Cuban MiGs could have shadowed Jose Basulto to within three miles of theUS coast. The analytical problem then is equivalent to the UA 93 issue. W e had todetermine if an armed fighter could have intercepted a civilian aircraft at some point. W edetermined that und er certain conditions of fighter configuration and speed the MiGscould have done as the "families" suggested. W e were precluded from including thatanalysis in the repo rt because the analysis was "what-if and speculative. The DoD IG atthe tim e was Eleanor Hill. Because of litigation issues responsive docu ments had beencentrally gathered and controlled by the DoD G eneral Counsel. The General CounselPO C was Stu Aly. Stu Aly will not allow the DoD to assist us in "what-if analysis.Option 3: That leaves me, with the experience and background to accomplish thatanalysis. That is, in fact, one of the primary reasons I was hired onto this Staffwork onthe BTTR investigation. /H ow the Analysis Might Be Accom plishedIrrespective of which option we successfully pursue, we need to establish a reasonablescenario to address three "what-if questions concerning UA 93 and one "what-ifquestion concerning AA7 7:

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W hat if UA 93 had continued and not crashed, could it have been interceptedW hat if UA93 had taken off on time, could it have been interceptedWhat if Langley fighters had been efficiently scrambled, could they have beenthe cause of the crash of UA93did they shoot it down.Wh at if Langley fighters had been efficiently scrambled, could they haveintercepted AA77

A reasonable scenario can be built based on the facts of the day.- UA 93 took off 41 minu tes late. AC AR S data establishes a "push-back" time of0801 EDT and a nose wheel strut extension time of 0842 EDT- None of the other three hijacked aircraft took o ff on time dictating that a "what-if' take off time for UA 93 should include the average delay of the other threeaircraft- Un ited Airlin es never lost continuity on its plane, FA A lost continuity onlybriefly, according to NTSB- The Langley fighters were put on battle stations at 0909 EDT- Witnesses have established a 12-15 minute time to get airborne as normal- Det 1, 119th FW demonstrated conclusively that the fighters will take off to theEast- Lan gley AFB has only one runway and departures are either at 080 degrees tothe ENE or 260 degrees to the WSW- An easterly departure is more efficient an d effective in getting fighters into theair and to altitude. It has the further advantage of placing the fighters closer toDC immediately after takeoff.- Scramble agreements in existence on 9-11 provided that active air defensescrambled fighters would proceed on runway heading to 4000 feet altitude- The scramble order that day specified at heading of 010 (magnetic) at FL290- The 84 th RADES radar files establish within 12 seconds the geograph ic point atwhich the Langley fighters reached 4000 feet- The Com mander, Det 1, 119th FW established the default en route speed to be"military standard" .9S-.99 Mach- The Senior Director, NE AD S, based on broad experience and knowledg e of thefighter configuration on 9-11 assessed that the maximum speed would not exceed1.2 Mach.- Because of the ongoing Russian exercise on 9-11 the Lang ley fighters wereflying "dirty." ["Dirty" me ans that there was additional resistance b ecause ofadded fuel tanks an d armam ent. Ultim ately, intercepting fighters may have to fly"dirty" in order to match speed with a slower mo ving target. That may includeflap extension, air brake deployment, landing gear down, nose up attack angle.]

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- Specifications for the Langley fighters list a maximum speed of 1.5 Mach(check this), a figure used in several web-based analyses- W e can establish through time-distance ana lysis the speed the Langley fightersflew once they were vectored toward BW I and use that speed

Therefore "what-if' intercept analysis should be based on the following parameters:- Fighter Lift off at 0921, an d alternatively at actual lift off at 0930- A fighter turn to 010 at 4000 feet altitude until "vectored" specifically toeither AA77 or UA93 [Note: this is the softest part of the "what-if analysis]

A vectored intercept at a time to be based in som e logical way onFAA/Com pany notification to NEAD S- A fighter en route speed of either "military standard" or that actually reachedon the BW I leg of the actual scramble.- An assumption that the path UA93 flew after hijack approximates the path itwould have flow n had it taken off on time or within a few m inutes thereafter,

or to put it another w ay, that the hijack would have occurred at about the samerelative time , regardless of takeoff timeAn assumption that the fighters were cleared to proceed directly as necessary

End Result- An intercept time for UA 93 had it proceeded on course and time e stablishedon 9-11, based on fighter take off times of 0921 an d 0930

An intercept time fo r UA93 based on an on-time take off and a take off thatapproxima tes the average delay in take off of the other three hijacked aircraftan d based on fighter take off times of 0921 and 0930- An assessment of the likelihood that the fighters would have been near UA93at the moment of impact

The Bottom LineAs Major Nasypany and others speculated on the NEADS tapes, has anyonethought about what we are going to do when we get there?

- The NEADS floor had no awareness of any shootdow n authority prior to 1030EDT . An authenticated order to the fighters wou ld have com e from theNEADS floor WD controlling the scramble.