t1a b40 material faxed to snell fdr- entire contents- court doc re muhammad al-qudhaieen and...

8/14/2019 T1A B40 Material Faxed to Snell Fdr- Entire Contents- Court Doc Re Muhammad Al-Qudhaieen and Withdrawal Not

1/6

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00014 Folder: 0040 Document: 1Series: Team 1A FilesCopies: 1 Pages: 266

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Material Faxed to Saudi Arabia/BayoumiDocument Date:Document Type: MiscellaneousSpecial Media:From:To:

Subject: notes, handwritten notes, FB I 302s, an d other records faxed to Saudi Arabia for Team 1A trip and materials for Bayoumi interview

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefor examination.

NND: 341Withdrawn: 07-14-2008 b;RETRIEVAL #: 341 00014 0040 1System DocID: 3593


2/6

OCT.25.2003 12:43PM NO.802 P. 2/6

1 of 1 DOCUMENTMuhammad Al-Qudhai'een, et al., Plaintiffs, -v- America West Airlines, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.Case No. C-2-00-1380

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OFOHIO, EASTERN DIVISION267 F. Supp. 2d 841; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9964

April 30,2003, Filed

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Corrected July 9,2003.DISPOSITION: Defendant's motion for summaryjudgment granted.LexisNexis


3/6

25.2003 12:44PM NO.8 0 2 P.3/6

267 F. Supp. 2d 841, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9964, ** Page 2

make reservations for the flight until after 9:00 p.m. onNovember 18, 1999. On November 19, 1999, plaintiffswere issued boarding passes and boarded America WestFlight 90 from Phoenix, Arizona to Washington, D.C.with a layover in Columbus, Ohio. n2 Prior to departure,plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een asked flight attendant DeCampoif he could get nkjnjdff Al-Shalawi to sit in the emptyieat next to hirnTPIaintiff was instructed thgt-he wouldive to wait until the plane was airborne!] IgnoringDeCampo's instruction, Al-Qudhai'een decided to get upfrom his seat and tell Al-Shalawi to come ait next tohim. Plaintiff Al-Shalawi then remained in his seat forthe duration of the flight and did not do anything thatdefendants considered suspicious.

n2 Plaintiffs claim that die America Westreservation agent told Mr. Al-Qudhai'een whenhe made the reservation that Flight 90 wasnonstop. Mr. Al-Qudhai'een was first told that theflight was stopping in Columbus, Ohio by Mr.Al-Shalawi. Mr. Al-Quadhai'eea apparentlyneeded further confirmation of the flight itineraryand asked flight attendant Asada if there wouldbe a stop. When she responded yes, plaintiffbecame irritated and tense, claiming he was nottold that there would be a stop.

[**4]The only other time plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een got upduring the flight was to use the bathroom. Plaintiff

decided to go to the first class bathroom because peoplewere waiting to use the bathroom at the rear of theairplane. Flight attendant Asada observed Al-Quadhai'een walk straight to the cockpit door and pull onthe handle. Plaintiff now denies that he ever touched thecockpit door. Plaintiff claims that before he even reachedthe first class bathroom, he was told by flight attendantAsada that the first class lavatory was reserved for firstclass passengers only and he would have 10 use thebathroom at the rear of the plane. Plaintiff used thebathroom at the rear of the airplane and then returned tohis seat and remained there for the remainder of theflight.

Although plaintiff now denies that he touched thecockpit door or even got close to the first class bathroom,plaintiff did state 10 the FBI later that day that he mayhave inadvertently touched the door [*844] to the flightdeck due to its close proximity to the handle of theforward lavatory. Additionally, a first class passenger.Renatn Fernantte^ observed Al-Qudhai'een walk directly'jothe cockpit and try to^get into the [**5] cockpit.

After plaintiff used the bathroom at the rear of theplane, flight attendant De Campo searched the bathroom.

He also searched under the seat originally assigned toMr. Al-Shalawi, but did not find anything. Plaintiffs alsonote that no other passengers on Flight 90 had their seatssearched, nor were the bathrooms searched after otherpassengers used them.

Although plaintiff claims to have returned to his seatafter using the bathroom, flight attendant De Campostates that Al-Qudhai'een approached him after returningfrom the bathroom and asked a series of questions relatedto the flight. De Campo recalls that plaintiff asked, howlong would the plane be on the ground in Columbus andwhether they would be on the same plane going toWashington, D.C. After some discussion between the*flight attendants regarding plaintiffs' behavior, theydecided to inform Captain Patterson that plaintiff hadasked similar questions about the flight to two differentflight attendants, plaintiff disobeyed the flight attendant'sorder to remain in his seat, and plaintiff attempted to getinto the cockpit. Flight attendant De Campo alsomentioned to Captain Patterson that plaintiffs were Araband [**6] plaintiffs believe that defendants relied on thisinformation to justify the allegation that plaintiffs werehijackers.

Captain Patterson was concerned with th e report bythe flight attendants y^ believed diat the circumstancesposed a security threat to the flight. Therefore, henotified America West's Dispatch and relayed hisconcerns. Captain Patterson provided plaintiffs' namesand seating information and suggested that when theyarrived they should, be met by security to determine theirintent and examine their luggage. When the plane arrivedin Columbus, Captain Patterson was instructed by airportsecurity to taxi at a remote parking area away from theterminal. When the plane stopped, airport securityboarded the plane, handcuffed plaintiffs and escorted,them off the plane and then interrogated them for four/hours, while the rest of the passengers were abte^tocontinue on to their destinations. After being questionedby the FBI, plaintiffs were advised that they were notunder arrest and were free to leave. America Westapologized to plaintiffs and upgraded them to first classfor their flight to Washington, D.C.

Plaintiffs assert that defendants allegedly relayedfalse information ["""7] based on racial stereotypes andthis led to the unlawful harassment and detention of theplaintiffs. Based on these actions, plaintiffs filed theircomplaint alleging defendants violated their civil rights.Defendants believe they are entitled to summaryjudgment on all of plaintiffs' claims because they havebroad discretionary authority under the Federal AviationAct ("FAA ") to request investigatory assistance from lawenforcement authorities and/or remove any passenger thepilot determines may be inimical 10 safety.


4/6

.25.2003 1 2=4 5PM NO.802 P.4/6

267 F. Supp. 2d 841, *; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9964, ** Page 3

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENTThe standard governing summary judgment is setforth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), which provides:

The judgment sought shall be renderedforthwith if the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admissionson file, together with the affidavits, if any,show that there is no genuine issue as toany material fact and that the [*S45]moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law.

Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about amaterial fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is suchthat a reasonable jury could return a verdict for thenonmoving parry." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477U,S. 242,248,91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct 2505 (1986).[**8] Summary judgment is appropriate, however, if theopposing party fails to make a showing sufficient toestablish the existence of an element essential to thatparty's case and on which that party will bear the burdenof proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct 2548 (1986); see alsoMatsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith RadioCorp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct1348(1986).

When reviewing a summary judgment motion, theCourt must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of thenonmoving party, and must refrain from makingcredibility determinations or weighing the evidence.Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.133, 150-51, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).n3 The Court disregards all evidence favorable to themoving party that the jury would not be not required tobelieve. Id. Stated otherwise, the Court must creditevidence favoring the nonmoving party as well asevidence favorable to the moving party that isuncontroverted or unimpeached, if it comes' fromdisinterested witnesses. Id,

n3Reeves involved a motion for judgment asa matter of law made during the course of a trialunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 rather than a pretrialsummaiy judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,Nonetheless, standards applied to both kinds ofmotions are substantially the same. One notabledifference, however, is that in ruling on a motionfor judgment as a matter of law, the Court, havingalready heard the evidence admitted in die trial,views the entire record, Reeves, 530 U,S. at 150.In contrast, in ruling on a summary judgmentmotion, the Court will not have heard all of the

evidence, and accordingly the non-moving partyhas the duty to point out those portions of thepaper record upon which it relies in asserting agenuine issue of material fact, and the court neednot comb the paper record for the benefit of thenonmoving party. In re Morris, 260F.3d 654, 665(6th Cir. 2001). As such, Reeves did notannounce a new standard of review for summaryjudgment motions,

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognizedthat Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and Matsushita haveeffected "a decided change in summary judgmentpractice," ushering in a "new era" in summaryjudgments. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472,1476 (6th Cir. 1989). The court in Street identified anumber of important principles applicable in new erasummary judgment practice. For example, complex casesand cases involving state of mind issues are notnecessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. at1479.

Additionally, in responding to a summary judgmentmotion, the nonmoving party "cannot rely on the hopethat the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial ofa disputed fact, but must 'present affirmative evidence inorder to defeat a properly supported motion for summaryjudgment."1 Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257).The nonmoving party must adduce more than a scintillaof evidence to overcome the summary judgment motion.Id. It is not sufficient for the nonmoving party to merely'"show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to thematerial facts."1 Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at586). [**10]

Moreover, "the trial court no longer has a duty tosearch the entire record to establish that it is bereft of agenuine issue of material fact." Id. at 1479-80, That is,the nonmoving party has an affirmative [*846] duty todirect the court's attention to those specific portions ofthe record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuineissue of material fact. In re Morris, 260 F,3d 654, 665(6th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSIONPlaintiffs assert that defendants, America WestAirlines, Inc., and America West employees CaptainRobert Patterson, First Officer Ron Moore, Robert De

Campo, Carol Asada, and Leslie Franklin, violated theircivil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), and 49 U.S.C.A. 40127. Plaintiffs also assertstate law claims of false arrest/imprisonment, defamationand privacy invasion (portrayal in false light), intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach ofcontract and trespass to chattels. Defendants argue that


5/6

.25.2003 12:45PM" ' - N O .802 P.5/6

267 F. Supp. 2d 841, *; 200 3 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9964, ** Page 4

the FA A gives pilots broad discretionary authority torequest investigatory assistance from law enforcementauthorities [**11] and/or remove an y passenger die pilotdecides is or may be inimical to safety. In the alternative,defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriatebecause each of plaintiffs' claims fails to state a cause ofaction and/or flails because plaintiffs have insufficientevidence to substantiate those claims.A. Immunity under 49U.S.C. 44902(b)

Defendants contend that Captain Patterson hadauthority to refuse transportation to plaintiff and also theauthority to remove or have law enforcement removeplaintiffs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44902(b) and they aretherefore immune from all of plaintiffs claims againstthem. Th e Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 44902(b),states that an air carrier "may refuse to transport apassenger or property the carrier decides is or might beinimical to safety." "Such a refusal cannot give rise to aclaim for damages under either federal or [state] lawunless the carrier's decision was arbitrary andcapricious." Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F,2d942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975); Schaeffer v. Cavallero, 54 F.Supp. 2d 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). [**12]Plaintiffs correctly assert that airline personnel aregiven broad, but not absolute, discretion to removepassengers for safety reasons. Williams 509 F.2d at 948,sets forth the following test to analyze whether anairline's action of removing passengers was proper:

The test of whether or not the airlineproperly exercised its power under [ .44902] to refuse passage to an applicantor ticket-holder rests upon the facts andcircumstances of the case as known to theairline at the time it formed its opinionand made its decision and whether or notth e opinion and decision were rational andreasonable and not capricious andarbitrary in the light of those facts an dcircumstances.

Williams, and other cases app lying 4490 2, confirmthai the statute protects any decision that is not arbitraryand capricious. See e.g., Schae ffer, 54 F. Supp.2d at 351(Refusal to transport cannot give rise to liability unlessarbitrary and capricious.); Norman v. TWA, 2000 U.S.DisL LEXIS 14618, 2000 WL 1480367, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.Oct. 6,2000)(same).Plaintiffs argue that defendants should not beentitled to immunity because their actions were arbitraryand [**13] capricious. Plaintiffs, in comparing theirbehavior to cases in which imm unity under 44902 wasfound, assert that they did not assault or threaten to

assault a passenger or crew member; they were nothostile or disruptive but were in fact described as being'calm1 when arrested; p laintiffs did not m ake any remarksthat could be interpreted as threatening a hijacking ormaking a [*847] bomb-threat; nor did p laintiffs possessweapons. Plaintiffs believe that the on ly allegation of anyattempted breach of security is defendant Asada's claimthat plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een touched the cockpit door,which he contests.

Defendants, however, dispute plaintiffs' argumentthat they did, nothing unusual or out of the ordinary onFlight 90 , Defendants assert that plaintiffs' ow ntestimony and undisputed evidence demonstrates that: I ) /plaintiffs disobeyed defendant DeCampo's instructionsand changed seats without permission; 2) plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een entered the first class area and proceeded towalk toward the cockpit without obtaining permission; 3)plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een appeared to be 'anxious1 when heasked defendant Asada questions regarding the flight andbecame 'irritated' and "uneasy" when [**14] informedmat ii would be stopping in Columbus, Ohio; and 4)defendant DeCampo considered plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een'squestions about whether, the plane they were currentlyon would also be the one that would travel on toWashington, D.C. to be uncommon for a passenger. Inaddition, while plaintiff Al-Qudhai'een appears to deny itnow, he did admit to the FBI that he "might haveinadvertently touched the door to the flight deck." n4Plaintiffs behavior was reported to Captain Patterson,who made the decision to notify AmericaWest and haveplaintiffs' bags subjected to a canine sniff search basedon the facts known to him at that time.

n4 The factual conflict between the partiesregarding whether plaintiff Al-Qudhai'eentouched the door to the cockpit is not materialand the Court does not rely on this dispute inreaching its conclusion. The Court is onlyrequired to assess what was known to CaptainPatterson at the time he made the decision to callAmerica West officials, not to look beyond theflight attendants representations. See Christel v.AM R Corp., 222 F. Supp.2d 335, 340 (E.D.N.Y.2002)["15]

The Court must make an "objective assessment" ofthe carrier's decision, which involved "taking intoaccount all the circumstances surrounding the decision,including the (perhaps limited) facts know n at the time;the time constraints under which the decision is made;and, not least, the general security climate in which theevents unfold." Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 22 8


6/6

.25.2003 NO.802 P.6/6

267 F. Supp.2d 841, *; 2003 U.S.Dist LEXIS 9964, **PageS

F. Supp.2d 531, 539 (D.N.J. 2002). Additionally, theCourt in Williams noted that one of the factorscontributing to the decision not to transport plaintiff was"the danger of hijacking in light of those recentlyexperienced [in 1969] by TWA and other airlines." 509F.2d at 945. In this cage, plaintiffs even acknowledgethat this incident took place "within weeks of the EgyptAir crash,"

Plaintiffs additionally appear to argue thai CaptainPatterson should have conducted some investigationprior to radioing for assistance when they state "Withoutattempting, to verify Mr. De Campo's allegations byspeaking with plaintiffs or other passengers, CaptainPatterson radioed America West and said he needed tohave plaintiffs' bags "sniffed" for explosives uponarriving in [**16] Columbus." Pis' Mem, Opp'a Defs'Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. A captain of an airplane,however, is "entitled without further inquiry to rely upona flight attendant's representations that a conflict with apassenger might distract the flight attendant fromperforming his or her safety-related duties," Christel v.AM R Corp,, 222 F. Supp.2d 335, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).In Christel, as the plane approached the runway fortakeoff, the flight attendant called the cockpit and toldthe captain there was a disruptive passenger whointerfered with her duties and refused to comply with herinstructions. Upon receiving [*848] this information,the Captain acted within his discretion and decided toremove Christel from the plane. The Court concludedthat "even if the battle of the egos escalated between[flight attendant] making exaggerated or even falserepresentations to the Captain, the Captain did not havean obligation to leave the cockpit and investigate thetruthfulness of [flight attendant's] statements." Id. at 340.

Taking into account all the circumstances known toCaptain Patterson at the time he made the decision toradio America West for assistance and [**17] the factthat he is entitled to rely on the information provided tohim by his crew despite arty exaggerations or falserepresentations, the Court finds as a matter of law thatCaptain Patterson's decision to remove plaintiffs from theairplane and to request a search of their baggage was notarbitrary or capricious. Defendants are therefore entitledto immunity under 49 U.S.C. 44902(b), and areentitled to summary udgment on all of plaintiffs' federalclaims against them.B. State law claims

The Court has granted defendants' motion forsummary judgment on plaintiffs' federal claims. TheCourt therefore declines to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. It is well

settled that a District Court may decline to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claims once ithas dismissed all claims over which it possessed originaljurisdiction. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112F.3d 226,233 (6th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit hasrecognized that if all federal claims are dismissed beforetrial, remaining state claims generally should bedismissed. Id.; Taylor v. First of Am, Bank-Wayne, 973F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992). [**18] Therefore,pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) and (d), the Courtwill dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims againstdefendants without prejudice.

IV. DISPOSITIONBased on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS

defendants' summary judgment motion, The Clerk shallenter final judgment in favor of defendants, and againstplaintiffs, dismissing all plaintiffs' federal claims withprejudice and dismissing plaintiffs' state claims withoutprejudice.

The Clerk shall remove this case from the Court'spending cases and motions lists.

The Clerk shall remove Doc. 95 from the Court'spending motions list.IT IS SO ORDERED.GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGEUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTJUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

[] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for atrial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury hasrendered its verdict.[] Decision by Court This action came to trial orhearing before the Court. The issues have been tried orheardwA a decision hasbeen rendered.[X] Decision by Court. This action was decided by theCourt without a trial or hearing.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGEDthat [**19] pursuant to Order dated April30, 2003 Court grants defendants'summary judgment motion. Judgment fordefendants'. Dismissing all plaintiffs'federal claims with prejudice anddismissing plaintiffs' state claims withoutprejudice.

Date: April 30,2003

t1a b40 material faxed to snell fdr- entire contents- court doc re muhammad al-qudhaieen and...

Documents