EN BANC G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,petitioners,vs.HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and MIGUELA TAN SUAT,respondents.G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,petitioners,vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and CHAN PO LAN,respondents.MAKALINTAL,J.: These are actually two (2) separate petitions forcertiorariand prohibition with preliminary injunction but are decided jointly because the issues presented proceed from the same factual background. The pertinent facts are not disputed. On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No. 4012, which is hereunder quoted in its entirety: This is a petition to have the petitioner Miguela Tan Suat, a Chinese National, to be declared a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1937 petitioner was legally married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino citizen; and that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the petition of Miguela Tan Suat to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his opposition. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, petitioner Miguela Tan Suat is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card.lwphi1.et On the same day the same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No. 4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. This second decision reads: This is a petition to have the petitioner Chan Po Lan, a Chinese National, to be declared a Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1961, petitioner was legally married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino citizen; and the petitioner has all the qualifications and more of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant any opposition. The Court had it announced to the public if there is any opposition to the petition of Chan Po Lan to be declared a Filipino citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his position. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Chan Po Lan is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by marriage and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card. On July 1, 1963 the Solicitor General1filed separate notices of appeal from said decisions, at the same time requesting an extension of ten (10) days within which to file the corresponding records on appeal. However, because of the unexplained failure of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon to forward the records immediately despite repeated requests therefor by the Solicitor General, the latter, unable to prepare the records on appeal, filed the instant petitions instead, including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for compliance. On August 10, 1963 we issued in each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution and enforcement of the judgment. Thereafter these two cases were submitted for decision without any answer from the respondents. Private respondents' identical prayer in the lower court was for a declaration of their Filipino citizenship and for an order to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel their respective alien certificates of registration on the ground that they had married Filipino husbands. In granting the said prayer the lower court was clearly in error. At that time jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of citizenship. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).2 Before these cases were submitted for decision, the Solicitor General filed a motion, dated February 14, 1964, to cite the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon for contempt by reason of his failure to forward the records of these cases to this Court despite our resolution to that effect. It appears, however, that after the said resolution was issued the Clerk did send those records and the same were received here on January 24, 1964. The question of contempt has therefore become moot. WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby granted; the questioned decisions are set aside and the writs of preliminary injunction previously issued are made permanent. Costs against private respondents.ZITA NGO BURCA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-24252 (January 30, 1967)This decision, although concerning the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino, is ironically reflective of the difficulty Filipino women faced under the 1935 Constitution when they automatically lost Philippine citizenship by marrying an alien.Facts: Zita Ngo was married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen and a resident of Ormoc City. Prior to her marriage, Zita was a Chinese citizen. The record showed, however, that she was born in Gigaquit, Surigao, and was a holder of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. She filed a petition declaring herself as possessing all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, and sought the cancellation of her alien certification of registration with the Bureau of Immigration. The Solicitor General opposed such petition and moved that the petition be dismissed because: (1) there was no procedure under the law that can judicially declare citizenship to a particular person; and (2) fatal defects in the petition. After trial, Zita was declared a Filipino citizen, primarily because she was married to a Filipino citizen.Held: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that Zita was not a citizen of the Philippines. It had the same ratiocination as those of its previous rulings, i.e. that the Philippine citizenship of the husband does not ipso facto grant Philippine citizenship to the alien wife. Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not be handed out blindly to any alien woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipinoirrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions. [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, if an alien wife of a Filipino wishes to acquire Philippine citizenship, the Supreme Court held that she herself must file a petition for citizenship or naturalization.1 Citizenship derived from that of another, as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization.2 If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for being an undocumented alien.EN BANC [G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,Respondent-Appellee.

SYLLABUS1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRATION ACT; SECTION 9 (G) THEREOF, NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN WHO LEGITIMATELY BECOMES FILIPINO. Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.

2. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; EFFECTS. The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LANGUAGE OF STATUTE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS, THAT WHICH CARRIES OUT OBJECT PREVAILS. A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. A construction will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction will not result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences.

4. ID.; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDED IF INCONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE INTENT. So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the legislature an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right.

5. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION, EXPLAINED. The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the Philippines.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING FILIPINO IPSO FACTO BECOME CITIZEN PROVIDED NOT DISQUALIFIED BY LAW. We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING, NOT REQUIRED. Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES OF. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 15 OF REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW; PURPOSE. The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIEN WIFE DEEMED A CITIZEN IF SHE MIGHT HERSELF BE NATURALIZED. The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.

11. ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA NOT APPLICABLE TO RULINGS THEREON. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

12. ID.; ID.; NATURALIZATION; PROCEDURES FOR ALIEN WIFE TO ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husbands citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited Section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

REYES, J.B.L.,J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO FILIPINO MUST PROVE QUALIFICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3. Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the positive qualifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under Section 4. And it has been shown in our decision in the second Ly Giok Ha case (Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, L-21332 March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 416) that those not disqualified under Section 4 would not necessarily qualify under Section 3, even if the residence qualification were disregarded. In other words, by giving to Section 15 of our Naturalization Law the effect of excluding only those women suffering from disqualification under Section 3 could result in admitting to citizenship woman that Section 2 intends to exclude. In these circumstances, I do not see why American interpretation of the words who might herself be lawfully naturalized should be considered hinding in this jurisdiction.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-27429. August 27, 1969.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, OH HEK HOW,Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor-Appellant.

1. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION; OATH OF ALLEGIANCE; NULL AND VOID WHEN TAKEN AFTER APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENTS TIMELY APPEAL. It is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November 28, 1966, and the certificate of naturalization issued to petitioner in pursuance thereof, as well as the authority given therefor by the lower court, are null and void. Indeed, the order of February 9, had not and up to the present has not become final and executory, in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. What is more, petitioners second oath was taken, not only after the filing of the notice of appeal and the submission of the record on appeal, but, also, after the approval thereof. In other words, the lower court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case.

2. ID.; ID.: REQUIREMENTS; LUCRATIVE INCOME; P540 A MONTH, NOT LUCRATIVE. Where petitioners net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79, respectively, or from about P330 to P425 a month and his income tax return for 1962 filed subsequently to the institution of this case, showed a net income of P6,485.50 for that year, or about P540 a month, and considering that petitioner has a wife and 3 children, one of them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for naturalization, his aforementioned income is not a lucrative one.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF ALLEGIANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRY, PURPOSE. Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT REGARDING CHINESE NATIONAL. A Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality. The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of the Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Where it is conceded that petitioner has not secured from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China the permission required by the laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his Chinese citizenship, petitioners application for citizenship should be denied.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 30241. December 29, 1928.]

GREGORIO NUVAL,Petitioner-Appellant, v. NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL.,Respondents. NORBERTO GURAY,Appellee.

SYLLABUS1. ELECTIONS; ELECTION LISTS, PETITION TO EXCLUDE, VOTER FROM; SUMMARY CHARACTER OF PROCEDURE. The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance.

2. ID.; ID.; "QUO WARRANTO." The judgment rendered in the case on the petition to cancel the respondent-appellees name in the election list is not conclusive and does not constitute res judicata in the present quo warranto proceeding, as in the two cases, there is no identity either of parties, or of the matter litigated, or of issues or causes of action.

3. ID.; RESIDENCE OF VOTER. It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term residence as so used, is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." (People v. Bender, 141 N. Y. S., 45.)

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]

A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody,Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER. To effect the abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that M ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. As Ms legal domicile at the time of his death was the Philippine Islands and his estate had its situs here, the inheritance and income taxes here involved were lawfully collected.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in an action to recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018,39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.

The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.

"II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of America.

"III. That on February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated as case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.

"V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit FF is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.

"VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit II is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.

"IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.

"XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers the assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.

"XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.

"XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present case.

"Manila, August 15, 1933."cralaw virtua1aw library

In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and Testament . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The substance of the plaintiffs cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or industry established in the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:"xxx

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-resident of the Philippine Islands." The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense that "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence that Moodys domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W. C. Tucker v. A. C. Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [2], 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U. S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayers protest is included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.

We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands. He lived in the Elks Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly Ill never return there to live or enter business again." In this same letter he says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I wish to know as soon as possible now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies . . . before I go to the necessary investments in placing any side lines. I concluded to get your definite reply to this . . . I have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and this will give you plenty of time . . . anything that kills a business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid." He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moodys continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence." The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

The contention under the appellants third assignment of error that the defendant collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of P259,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant contends that this assessment involves triple taxation: First, because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the collectors assessment, Exhibit II, that the collector allowed the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by the appellants argument that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U. S. v. Phellis, 257 U. S., 171, and Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be included as income subject to tax.

Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against theAppellant.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-22041. May 19, 1966.]

MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO,Petitioner-Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor-Appellee.

SYLLABUS1. NATURALIZATION; REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP; RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT. One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63].

2. ID.; ID.; ID; TERM "RESIDENCE" CONSTRUED. The term "residence" has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil., 890; 50 Off. Gaz., 4781). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who hae been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 88831. November 8, 1990.]

MATEO CAASI,Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL,Respondents.

[G.R. No. 84508. November 8, 1990.] ANECITO CASCANTE,Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL,Respondents.

SYLLABUS1. POLITICAL LAW; SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS; ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES; IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTED AN ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES. In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguels answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguels answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrants (not a visitors or tourists) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "IMMIGRATION" AND "IMMIGRANT", DEFINED. "Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating, the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. "An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (B.P. BLG. 881), APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR, NOT SECTION 18, ARTICLE IX OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides: "Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED PRIOR WAIVER OF GREEN CARD, CONSTRUED. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT; REASON THEREFOR. The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF IMMIGRANT STATUS, SHOULD BE AS INDUBITABLE AS THE APPLICATION FOR IT. Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS,Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,Respondents.

SYLLABUS1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; CONSTRUED. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that" [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

2. ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE, CONSTRUED. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.

3. ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED FROM RESIDENCE. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM PERMANENT RESIDENCE WITHOUT INTENTION TO ABANDON IT DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT OF RESIDENCE, NOT STATEMENT IN CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELECs Second Divisions questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM LEGAL RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE OF A TEMPORARY OR SEMI-PERMANENT NATURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LOSS OF RESIDENCE. We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

9. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; A MINOR FOLLOWS THE DOMICILE OF HIS PARENTS; CASE AT BENCH. A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondents averments.

10. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO EFFECT CHANGE OF DOMICILE. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE, NOT A CAUSE FOR LOSS OF DOMICILE. In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the, late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o a pais extranjero. Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence. Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together. The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.

13. ID.; ID.; TERM RESIDENCE REFERS TO "ACTUAL RESIDENCE." The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessatium.

14. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTE REQUIRING RENDITION OF JUDGMENT WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME, MERELY DIRECTORY. It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.

15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PENDING DISQUALIFICATION CASE NOT LOST BY HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

16. ID.; LEGISLATURE; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET); SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN PROCLAIMED. As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

PUNO,J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AND DOMICILE OF CHOICE; ESTABLISHED BY CANDIDATES CONTINUED STAY IN HER PARENTS RESIDENCE. There is no question that petitioners original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school, and thereafter worked there. Justice Puno considers Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

2. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE AND DELIBERATE CHOICE OF A DIFFERENT DOMICILE BY THE HUSBAND. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioners marriage to former President Marcos ipso facts resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. Justice Puno respectfully submits that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wifes domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wifes prior domicile even if it is different. It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioners Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT AFTER THE HUSBANDS DEATH, WIFE RETAINS LAST DOMICILE OF HER HUSBAND, SHOULD NOW BE ABANDONED. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioners Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. He echoes the theory that after the husbands death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husbands domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. The rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS and AM JUR 2d are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 and 1938, or before the time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the womens liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law. In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone." . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister." In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFE REACQUIRED DOMICILE OF ORIGIN UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND. Prescinding from these premises, Justice Puno respectfully submits that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioners Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husbands death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, Justice Puno cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husbands domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATE CHOICE BY WIFE MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred among others that: "I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there." It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence." . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

7. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; AMENDMENT TO CORRECT A BONA FIDE MISTAKE, ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. (Alialy v. COMELEC, 2 SCRA 957, 960 [1961]; Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 [1960]; Gabaldon v. COMELEC , 99 Phil. 898 [1956])

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM FROM HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION OF BONA FIDE CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; RIGHT VIOLATED BY LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL OBSTACLES AGAINST CANDIDATE TO PREVENT HER FROM RUNNING. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the peoples representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioners Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred that when respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioners (Montejos) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; RATIONALE; CANDIDATES LIFE TIME CONTACTS WITH FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE SATISFIES INTENT. In Gallego v. Vera, we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . .." Petitioners lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

10. ID.; ID.; ELECTION CASES; DOMINANT CONSIDERATION IN RESOLUTION THEREOF IS THE NEED TO EFFECTUATE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the peoples political judgment.

FRANCISCO,J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DEFINED. Domicile has been defined as that place in which a persons habitation is fixed, without any present intention, of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

2. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).

3. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF DOMICILE; REQUISITES. In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415).

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE. In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ABANDONED OR LOST BY REGISTRATION OF VOTER IN A PLACE OTHER THAN HIS PLACE OF ORIGIN. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioners intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL DOMICILE; LOST UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND; WIFE REVERTED TO HER ORIGINAL DOMICILE; CASE AT BAR. Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioners domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latters termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise,Petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husbands death without even signifying her intention to that effect.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY CLAIMING THAT A PERSON HAS ABANDONED OR LOST HIS RESIDENCE OF ORIGIN MUST SHOW AND PROVE SUCH LOSS OR ABANDONMENT. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT; REQUIREMENT MET IN CASE AT BENCH. The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila. In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.

PADILLA,J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING CANDIDATE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION. The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidates intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. Petitioners certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES CAN NOT BE DECLARED WINNER OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE FOR OFFICE. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (Labo v. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1)

3. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 (AN ACT INTRODUCING REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES); VOTES CAST FOR A CANDIDATE DECLARED DISQUALIFIED BY FINAL JUDGMENT SHALL NOT BE COUNTED; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WHERE THE WINNING CANDIDATE IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED DEEMED THE WINNER. Under Sec. 6 of RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that: . . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes. It stands to reason that Section 6 f RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

REGALADO,J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN; CONSTRUED. The domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, o