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On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. andappointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. On

December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio thememorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the

partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were opposed bySpecial Administrator Jose Ortaez.

On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio thedeeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special AdministratorJose Ortaez. On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of thedeeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes asspecial administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any

shares of stock for her to administer. On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motionof Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the approval of the deeds of sale.

ISSUE:

Whether the memorandum of agreement, extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate of the

deceased, is valid.

RULING:

Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidlyentered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among

themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before finalsettlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana

Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof byJuliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.

An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of

the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heirwithout interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienatesuch portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate orintestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or

legatees shall have been given their shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undividedshare in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaezsold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitionerFLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court

because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the

present case.

Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-

settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate.

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G.R. No. L-2277 December 29, 1950MONICO CONCEPCION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PACIENCIA STA. ANA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

An action was instituted by Monico Concepcion vs. Paciencia Sta. Ana to annul the sale made bythe late Perpetua Concepcion, sister of the plaintiff, of three parcels of land with the improvementsthereon to the defendant. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is the only survivinglegitimate brother of Perpetua Concepcion, who died on or about January 28, 1948, without issue and

without leaving any will; that in her life time or on about June 29, 1945, said Perpetua Concepcion, inconnivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, sold and conveyed three parcels ofland for a false and fictitious consideration to the defendant, who secured transfer certificates of title ofsaid lands issued under her name; and that the defendant has been in possession of the properties soldsince the death of Perpetua Concepcion, thereby causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of not less

than two hundred (P200) pesos.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of

action, because the deceased being the owner of the properties sold had the right to enjoy and dispose ofthem without further limitation than those established by law. The Court of First Instance of Manila

granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint on the ground that "the plaintiff is not a partyto the deed of sale executed by Perpetua Concepcion in favor of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff has any right ro bring an action to annul the sale.

RULING:

The late Perpetua Concepcion has not transmitted to the plaintiff any right arising from thecontract of conveyance or sale of her lands to the defendant, and therefore the plaintiff cannot file anaction to annul such contract as representative of the deceased. According to the complaint, the deceased,in connivance with the defendant and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, (that is, in order not to leave the

properties above mentioned upon her death to the plaintiff) sold and conveyed them to the latter, for afalse and fictitious consideration. It is, therefore obvious, that the conveyance or sale of said properties tothe defendant was voluntarily made by the deceased to said defendant. As the deceased had no forced

heir, she was free to dispose of all her properties as absolute owner thereof, without further limitation thanthose established by law, and the right to dispose of a thing involves the right to give or to convey it toanother without any consideration. The only limitation established by law on her right to convey said

properties to the defendant without any consideration is, that she could not dispose of or transfer herproperty to another in fraud of her creditors.

A voluntary conveyance, without any consideration whatever, is prima facie good as between the

parties, and such an instrument can not be declared fraudulent as against creditors in the absence of proof,that there was at the time of the execution of the conveyance a creditor who could be defrauded by theconveyance. Even a forced heir of the deceased Perpetua Concepcion would have no right to institute as

representative of the decedent, an action of nullity of a contract made by the decedent to defraud hiscreditors, because such a contract being considered illicit under article 1306 of the Civil Code, Perpetua

Concepcion herself had no right of action to annul it and recover the properties she had conveyed to thedefendant. But the forced heir could in such case bring an action to rescind the contract under article 1291

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(3) of the Civil Code. The reason why a forced heir has the right to institute an action of rescission is thatthe right to the legitime is similar to a credit of a creditor. Therefore, as the plaintiff in the present case,

not being a forced heir of the late Perpetua Concepcion, can not institute an action to annul under article1300 or to rescind under article 1291 (3) of the Civil Code the contract under consideration entered into

by the deceased with the defendant.

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G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992MAURICIO SAYSON vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios

and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who hadmarried Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their

properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim tobe their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoroand Isabel Sayson.The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged

successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for theaccounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four

surviving children. The complainants asserted that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children andDoribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit

Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether plaintiffs have a right to inherit from Teodoro; and2. Whether respondents can represent Eleno for the inheritance from their grandparents.

RULING:

1. NO. When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before theissuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of

DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the

revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by lawfor the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption ofthe plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, thesame not having been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judgecannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parentswere not disqualified. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to thevalidity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct

proceeding frontally addressing the issue. Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and IsabelSayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of

the deceased couple.

2. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter ofEleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestateestate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly

inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. But adifferent conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents weretotal strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have thesame right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by

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the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the bloodrelatives of either party.

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G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL

SIKAT, Petitioners,vs.EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSECRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim that theyare the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On theother hand, private respondents are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his secondmarriage to Donata Enriquez.

On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square

meters. Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later,petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property

and transferred its title to their names.Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle thecase between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for

Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents torecover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property.

To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates ofElisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,

Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners sufficiently proved their filiation with the deceased.

RULING:

YES. Article 172 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the childsbaptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been entered,common reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, andother kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

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In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro werepresented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in

accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31January 1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.

Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed thatcommon reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobalwith his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous

possession of the status as a legitimate child. In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondentswere unable to present any proof to refute the petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to

Buenaventura Cristobal. The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince the Court that petitioners are,indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.

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G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V)

FACTS:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by hiswidow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa andFilomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose. On July 12, 1939, the real properties left byBenito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita,and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiresswas her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit

adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter.As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena

Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein shedisposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons,Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). During the period from July, 1958 to February,

1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-thirdshare in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of theirfather, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to

probate as a holographic will.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion toexclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceaseddaughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited

by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and

Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

ISSUE:

Whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or mortiscausa to the reservees within the third degree

RULING:

NO. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren thereservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable

properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the

reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. As repeatedly held in the Cano andPadura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from thereservor.Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearestrelatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda.

She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the otherreservees of their share therein.To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of thereservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore thereservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary dispositioncannot be allowed.

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G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao,Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thruthis judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarizedagreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial, over the then present and existing properties of thespouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory. On January 5, 1955, DonJesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separately executed their respective holographic

wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition ofNovember 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or

her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned toconstitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wills

also declared that in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereofwould belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally among the four children.

On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocalcodicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly

acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal,had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura deParticion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves the other half or those not

disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually andreciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might

be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse,whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the fourchildren. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving

spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties

reserved for themselves.

Upon the death of Doa Tinay, Don Jesus was named executor. Thereafter in the early part ofNovember, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and

secretary,whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with their correspondingdescriptions. His lawyer was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus andhis attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at his home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will andtestament had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisionsof Don Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided for

the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the "Escritura deParticion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his

estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific

properties, and as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future,before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to serve withouta bond.

ISSUE:

Whether the questioned will and testament of November 14, 1959, was executed in accordancewith Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code.

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RULING:

YES.About 2 weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new will,thereby revoking and cancelling his previous holographic will and also its codicil. In the presence of his

bookkeeper and secretary, he crossed out in ink each and every page of said page he wrote on each pagethe word "cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon. He then instructed him to make a list of all s

properties with their corresponding descriptions. Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer. DonJesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly gave more detailedinstructions as to how he wanted to divide his properties among his four children. He handed to them alist and on the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed properties shall pertain. To DonJesus, Spanish is his major language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are always inSpanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft

of the will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and after making a few minorcorrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge

Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14,1959, and that the witnesses should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose

Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus.

Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, the witnesses arrived at the residence of Don Jesus atLigao; Albay, and they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated atthe usual receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their arrival to Don Jesus who was on

the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to be signed placed inside acartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them inconversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across the road from the

house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signingthe will that morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had already arrived,

Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus, without much delay. With the coming of Madarietaand the coming back of Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don JesusAlsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr.

Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and

lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about time to do what they were there for, and this wasfollowed by a more or less statement from Jesus, who said yes.

On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on another part of the samesala for convenience in signing because there were chairs all around this table. The will which consistedof nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round table and the signing began, withAtty. assisting each person signing by indicating the proper place where the signature shall be written.Don Jesus, as testator, signed first. After signing the original and the two other sets, the three sets were

then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarietasigned next as another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the three sets, the

same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third attesting witness. On each of the three

sets, Don Jesus signed ten times. Each of the three attesting witnesses signed eleven times on each set.The original will, the duplicate, and the triplicate were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty.(now Judge) imperial. It was also clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr.Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed said signing, and that when each of these three

witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two other attesting witnesses were present and Witnessing saidSigning. The signing by the testator and the attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S.Imperial as Notary Public with commission for the entire province of Albay, notarized the will and sealedit with his notarial seal which he brought along that morning. After all the three sets were notarized, theywere all given back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same folder.

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G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special

administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,vs.MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.

FACTS:

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clauseof which he declared:

I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez andhis daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially

declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F.Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made,

Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At thetime the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such

accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearestrelative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to

probate by judicial determination.

ISSUE:

Whether the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of theindividuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez

is entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.

RULING:

As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two,dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, definingthe particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions ofthe former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the

provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression"and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found insubsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation abovereferred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation suppliesthe only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil

Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur whenaccretion is impossible.

Under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted isdisqualified to succeed, while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurswhen one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance. Adistinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the

disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are ofthe opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of theCode, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability tosucceed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case foraccretion rather than for intestate succession.

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G.R. No. 2586 January 19, 1906

TOMAS GUISON,Petitioner-Appellant, vs. MARIA CONCEPCION,Respondent-Appellee.

FACTS:

Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. The last part of the willis as follows:

Asi lo otorgo ante los testigos Seores Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y FelixPolintan, de Manila, Islas Filipinas, y por no yo poder firmar, firma a mi ruego el mismoFeliciano Maglaqui, en mi presencia y de los mencionados testigos, quienes tambien suscriben,

cada uno de ellos en presencia de los otros y la mia.

(Firmado) FELICIANO MAGLAQUI.(Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES.

(Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON.(Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN.

Nosotros Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, atestiguamos queFeliciano Maglaqui, a ruego de la Sra. Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo y en presencia de la misma y

la nuestra, firmo el testamento que antecede; y que cada uno de nosotros lo firmo en presencia delos otros y de dicha testadora.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Manila, tres de Enero de mil novecientos cuatro.

(Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES.(Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON.(Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN.

It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix onthe will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on the ground that the name ofthe testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signing made by Maglaqui was valid.

RULING:

Section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, which prescribes the form of the

execution of wills, provides in part as follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any

estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signedby the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and

by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses

in the presence of the testator and of each other.

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As will be seen, the law does not prescribe the specific form in which the name of the

testator should be affixed at the foot of the will when written at his request by another person.

The only thing required by law is that the will shall be bear the name of the testator. Inconstruing this legal provision this court has held and established in case No. 1708,Ex partePedro Arcenas et al. (4 Phil. Rep., 700), that "where a testator does not know how, or is unable

for any reason, to sign the will himself, it shall be signed in the following manner: 'John Doe, bythe testator, Richard Roe;'or in this form: 'By the testator, John Doe, Richard Roe.'"chanroblesvirtuallaw library

The question presented has been decided adversely to the appellant in the followingcases:Ex parte Pedro Arcenas et al.,No. 1708, August 24, 1905 ;Ex parte Nemesio DelfinSantiago,No. 2002, August 18, 1905. chanroblesvirtuallaw library

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the

appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance

herewith and the case remanded to the court below for execution.

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G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,vs.NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with thefiling of the petition consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does notcontain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof;

but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix andher three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will

and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by thetestatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence

and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on pagethree (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the

attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by theaforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrixthat the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was

executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copieswere duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that hemay have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was

signed in his presence. Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that thesignatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the sameoccasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were

executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into

adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisionsof the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will andthe provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held

by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-

appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose theprobate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUE:

Whether the will is valid.

RULING:

YES. The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, dueto the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of

probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two

other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of thenotary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law shouldnot be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of asingle witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee theidentity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate

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deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.Otherwise, witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight isshown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set ofsignatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary

Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

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G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS vs.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for

the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and codicil dated April 18, 1963 of thelate Eugenia Danila who died on May 21, 1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and properhearing, the alleged will and codicil be probates and allowed and that she or any other person beappointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto beinterposed and the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be summarily settled inaccordance with the Rules.

Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on and an

amended opposition, to the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son anddaughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the purported will and codicil

subject of the petition were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required bylaw for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly

attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported testatrix; that the lateEugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which was duly

probated and not revoked or annulled during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not

competent and qualified to act as administration of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was valid.

RULING:

YES.

There is no showing that the lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently,respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioneddocuments. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of

anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to provetheir occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authenticsignatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from

being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnessestook turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments

were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause which,

significantly, is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution.Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had

been observed. The attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which lateron may be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to

the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signature following thatof the testatrix show that they have in fact at not only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature butalso to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attention clause. By signing the wilt the witnessesimpliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, thecapacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like.

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G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR.

SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICALABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants,vs.COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died, leaving behind a parcel of land and the followingheirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, allsurnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased butsubstituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the

probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his

heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has beenextinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before

Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deedof Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio the lot.

Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand(P5,000) Pesos. Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio andJesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado

allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic willexecuted on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment, being premised on the fact that the aforesaidDeed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

ISSUE:

Whether the holographic will was invalid as it was not dated.

RULING:

NO.

The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.

It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigningthe respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, inthe year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the

one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only

requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. Theserequirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of theexecution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by

petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that

what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as thetestator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the natureof the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to controlthe disposition of his estate.

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G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant, vs.CORNELIO

MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC,opponents-appellees.

FACTS:

On or about the 27th day of July, 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament. Inthe month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance ofthe Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed byCornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. After hearing all of the

parties the petition for the probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2nd

day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919, executed anew will and testament.

On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to secure

the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919. To said petition Cornelio Mamuyac,Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their oppositions, alleging (a) that

the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that thesame had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said willwas not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will presented for probate was revoked.

RULING:

YES. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator,

when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was

cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready accessto the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed

by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption ofcancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the

circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by thetestator with intent to revoke it.

In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testatorMiguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the

conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In aproceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its

execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant

to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for thepurpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence ofits cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with greatcaution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each

copy was executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may beadmitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled ordestroyed by the testator.

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G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA

deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,vs.AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

FACTS:

On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of RicardoB. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by the appelleesAmparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on thefollowing grounds: (1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to

produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the

Rules of Court;(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition ofproperty after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will; (3) The

alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it wouldproduce no effect; and (4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and

attested as required by law.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case. Their motionwas granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977. On November 13, 1978, following theconsolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will.

They argued that: (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to themanagement and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

ISSUE:

Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of aphotostatic copy.

RULING:

YES. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance ofthe will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If

uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may beresorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic willhas been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the bestand only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison

between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or

xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standardwritings of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contentsof a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who haveseen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. Thelaw regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it

says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed orcarbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of thedeceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copyof the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwritingof the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

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G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,vs.RITA R.

MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

FACTS:

The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923,composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesseson the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnessesafter the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed byRita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives.The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifyingin this case, declared that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed

their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.

The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but as theright side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many years

thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that FlorenciaMateo did not sign this will.There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the opponents in

support of their opposition.The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did. Thesignatures of the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are between the signatures of thetwo witnesses Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel, and below her surname is the signature of the other witness

Felicisimo Gabriel. The signatures of Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel are on a level with each other, whilethat of Felicisimo Gabriel is found a little lower down. The testatrix's signatures start on the line withFelicisimo Gabriel's signature, but tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's

signature.

It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact that when it was writtenFelicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there, and so she had to write her surname upwards in order toavoid interfering with that Felicisimo Gabriel, which would have been the case had she continued on the

horizontal line on which she had written her first name. From this detail it is pretended to draw the

inference that the attesting witnesses signed before testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she singedbefore they did. Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in hersignature and by the attesting witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether the will was valid.

RULING:

YES. At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting

witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink,

these are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the dateon which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this reasonalone. The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial of this case, showedthemselves to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is

no reason to reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying, and that theyfalsified the will in question.

Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving anything to theprincipal opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so

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affectionate during life. But as to the affectionate relations between the deceased and the opponents, onlythe opponent Rita Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on good terms with her sister during

the latter's lifetime; that the said sister used to give her a sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a littlemoney; that she held all her nephews and nieces in equal regard. But even supposing that this were so,there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her having left all of herestate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it

not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the testatrix when the former wasbut 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death had never been separated from her.

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G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN,

Petitioners,1vs.TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ,Respondent.

FACTS:

On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last willand testament. On September 23, 1960, the will was admitted to probate. On August 27, 1962, the CFIManila approved the project of partition presented by the executor of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will.At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, wascompletely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of

Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage theincome from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.

The last will and testament of the decedent is the creation of a perpetual trust for the

administration of her properties and the income accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. Thedecedent, in Clause 10 of her will, listed a number of properties to be placed under perpetual

administration of the trust. The decedent unequivocally forbade the alienation or mortgage of theseproperties. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the disposition of these properties, but only sought tobequeath the income derived therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.

Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of HilarionOrendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the

decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation ofArticles 8678 and 870 of the Civil Codes.

ISSUE:

Whether the trusteeship should be dissolved.

RULING:

YES.

Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set ofproperties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedentintended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Thedecedents will did notinstitute any heir thereto. The testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties

which were definitely more than the two (2) properties in the aforecited case. The herein testatrixs largelandholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then

effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.

The trust on the testatrixs properties must be dissolved and the case was remanded to the lowercourt to determine the following: 1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the

perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and 2. The intestate

heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

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G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO

and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,vs.FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.

FACTS:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate, leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P.Arellano who is represented by her daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, andrespondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of IntestateEstate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,", respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land(the donated property), which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the

validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" ofpetitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate .

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner, which respondents assailed butwhich they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial

court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE:

Whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation.

RULING:

NO.

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the

addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it

is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during hislifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is

possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may bereduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine

the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsoryheirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitledto any legitimethat part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has

reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at

liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit.His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated

property is not subject to collation.

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G.R. No. L-10111 August 31, 1960Trusteeship of the Estate of BENIGNO DIAZ Y HEREDIA, deceased.BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, trustee.SOLEDAD ROBLES, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,vs.ISABELMANAHAN DE SANTIAGO and NESTOR M. SANTIAGO, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

In the will of Benigno Diaz y Heredia, in his will dated July 5, 1944, , a trust estate was createdout of the properties not otherwise disposed of, which the Bank of the Philippine Islands was designatedas Trustee. After the death of his wife, Da. Rafaela Mercado y Beleti on August 8, 1944, Diaz, then stillliving, caused the preparation of a codicil (to his will), dated September 29, 1944. The testator died on

November 7, 1944, and his will and the codicil were accordingly probated. On November 1, 1949, the

Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed Trustee of the trust created by the testator in his will andcodicil, for the purpose of paying the monthly and yearly legacies of the legatees named therein, to which

office it duly qualified.

Pursuant to the terms of the codicil, and 10 years having already elapsed from the testator's deathon November 7, 1944, the Trustee, on January 13, 1955, petitioned the court, with the consent of all the

legatees, for authority to sell all the properties and liquidate the estate. This petition was granted.Accordingly, the property located at Rosario, Binondo, Manila, was sold to legatee Isabel Manahan deSantiago on March 18, 1955. Immediately thereafter, or on March 21 of the same year, legatees Soledad

Robles and her children Pilar, Jose, Vicente and Angeles, all surnamed Legarda (her husband Domingoand daughter Paz died in 1945) filed a motion praying that the trustee be ordered to deliver to them, inaccordance with the provisions of the will, 90 per cent of the rentals collected from the property in

Rosario during the period of liquidation of the estate, that is, from January 13 to March 18, 1955, whichthe Trustee refused to deliver, the latter contending that upon the authorization of the court on January 19,

1955, of the sale of the properties, the trusteeship ceased already and the rentals collected thereafter notonly from the Rosario property but also from all the other properties of the estate, constitute the mass ofthe residuary estate to be distributed among the legatees in accordance with the terms of the codicil, i.e.,

only 30 per cent and not 90 per cent to the heirs of Domingo Legarda.

ISSUE:

Whether the legatees may be subject to the payment only of real estate tax, necessary expenses

for conservation of the property, and for estate and inheritance taxes.

RULING:

The will, it must be remembered, imposed on the legatees merely the payment of the real estate

tax and expenses for the preservation of the Rosario property, and no other. It is evident therefrom that thetestator intended the expenses incidental to the execution of his will to be defrayed and deductible from

the residuary estate, excluding the rents from the Rosario property. On this point, the Rules of Court

provide:

SEC. 2.Part of estate from which debts paid where provision made by will.If thetestator makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of

his debts, the expenses of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according tothe provisions of the will; but if the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated, is notsufficient for that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real or personal, as is notdisposed of by the will, if any, shall be appropriated for that purpose. (Rule 89.)

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There is nothing on record to show that the provisions made by the testator in the will areinadequate to cover the expenses of administration. On the contrary, it appears that as of the date of the

filing of the appellees' demand, there were still properties of the estate yet unsold. In the absence of validand cogent reasons, the provision of the will as to how the expenses would be satisfied must be respected.

In the belief that the court's order of January 19, 1955, allowing the sale of the properties of the

estate, had the effect of terminating the trust and putting an end to the legatees' right to the fruits of theRosario property, appellants contend that appellees' claim over rentals terminated on said date, hence,appellees are not entitled to the rentals from January 20 to March 18, 1955, date when the Rosario

property was actually sold. This is equally without merit. The trust has been created to carry out thedispositions made in the will, principally the payment of the legacies. The codicil provides that after thelapse of ten or fifteen years from the date of the testator's death (November 7, 1944), the properties may

be sold upon agreement of all the legatees and the proceeds of the sale, after deducting certain amounts,are to be distributed in the manner indicated therein. The approval of the petition to sell did not

automatically terminate the trusteeship, nor did it constitute full accomplishment of the trust. It was onlyafter the actual sale of the properties on March 18, 1955, and the distribution of the proceeds directed by

the testator that the trust could be considered as accomplished and terminated. Consequently, theappellees are entitled to their share of the rentals during the liquidation of the trusteeship from January 20

to March 18, 1955.

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G.R. No. L-30455 September 30, 1982MARIA LANDAYAN, et al., petitioners,vs.HON. ANGEL BACANI, et al., respondents.

FACTS:

In his lifetime, Teodoro Abenojar owned several parcels of land located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,

and a house and lot in Manila. The said properties were all covered by Torrens Titles in his name. He diedintestate in Urdaneta, on March 20, 1948. On February 3, 1949, private respondents Maxima Andrada, thesurviving spouse of Teodoro Abenojar, and Severino Abenojar, executed a public document, entitled"Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition" whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left

by Teodoro Abenojar. Severino Abenojar represented himself in said document as "the only forced heirand descendant" of the late Teodoro Abenojar.

On March 6, 1968, petitioners herein filed a complaint seeking a judicial declaration that they are

legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar, and that private respondents be ordered to surrender theownership and possession of some of the properties that they acquired under the deed of extra-judicial

settlement corresponding to the shares of the petitioners and that the said deed of extra- judicial settlementand the subsequent deed of donation executed in favor of private respondents, spouses Liberata Abenojar

and Jose Serrano, in consequence thereof be declared nun and void. In their complaint, petitioners allegedthat they are the legitimate children of Guillerma Abenojar, then already deceased, who was the onlychild of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia Bautista; and that while Teodoro Abenojar

contracted a second marriage with Antera Mandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada,he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages. They aver that privaterespondent Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar. They accordingly pray that

they be declared as among the legal heirs of the deceased Teodoro Abenojar entitled to share in his estate.

Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their pleadings that Teodoro Abenojarmarried only once, and that was with private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that privaterespondent Severino Abenojar is an acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar with Florencia

Bautista. They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners that their mother Guillerma Abenojar was a

legitimate daughter of Teodoro Abenojar and Florencia Bautista, the truth being allegedly that GuillermaAbenojar, the mother of the Landayans, was Teodoro Abenojar's spurious child with Antera Mandap whowas then married to another man.

ISSUE:

Whether Severino Abenojar may be considered as a "legal heir" of Teodoro Abenojar and as suchentitled to participate in an extra-judicial partition of the estate of said deceased.

RULING:

The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar depends on the

truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma Abenojar, but an acknowledgednatural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right to inherit from Teodoro Abenojar isrecognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code). He even claims that he is the sole legal heir of TeodoroAbenojar inasmuch as the petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased

Guillerma Abenojar, have no legal successional rights from Teodoro Abenojar, their mother being aspurious child of Teodoro Abenojar.

Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino Abenojar is anillegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of

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representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit ab intestato from thelegitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil Code). On this supposition, the subject

deed of extra- judicial partition is one that included a person who is not an heir of the descendant whoseestate is being partitioned. Such a deed is governed by Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:

Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,

shall be void only with respect to such person.

It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not seek thenullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the same deprived them oftheir shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar; Should it be proved, therefore, thatSeverino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-

judicial partition adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be deemedinexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles 1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil

Code. By the express provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of thenullity of the same does not prescribe.

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A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO,

FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C.BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.

FACTS:

At the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, withmore than 38 years of service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative ornot case against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary hereceived was P18,700.00 per annum. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only sonMario it appears that there are other illegitimate children of the deceased with one Angelina R Crespo,

and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants areof legal age. According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits;

(2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.

It appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rentto the claimants. The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed

his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, shouldhe die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributedamong his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate succession.

ISSUE:

Who are entitled to the intestate estate?

RULING:

There may be instances, like the instant case, where in legal succession the estate is distributed

according to the rules on legitime without applying the rules on intestate ion. The reason is that

sometimes the estate is not even sufficient to satisfy the legitimes. The legitimes of the primarycompulsory heirs, like a child or descendant, should first be atisfied. In this case the decedent's legal heirsare his legitimate child, his widow and two intimate children. His estate is partitioned among those heirs

by giving them their respective time. The legitimate child gets one-half of the estate as his legitime which

is regarded as his share as a legal heir Art 888, Civil Code).

The widow's legitime is one-fourth of the estate. That represents also her share as a legal heir(Art. 892, 1st sentence, Civil Code). The remaining one-fourth of the estate, which is the free portion,goes to the illegitimate children in equal shares, as their legitime, Pursuant to the provision that 'the

legitimate of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the free disposal ofthe testator, provoked that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that free

portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied par., art. 895, Civil

Code). The rule in Santillon vs. Miranda, L-19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 563, that when the survivingspouse concurs with only one legitimate child, the spouse is entitled to one-half of the estate and the getsthe other half, t to article 996 of the Civil Code, does not apply to the case because here intimate childrenconcur with the surviving spouse and the intimate child.

In this case, to divide the estate between the surviving spouse and the ligitemate child that deprivethe illegitimate children of their legitime. So, the decendent's estate is distributed in the proportion of 1/2for the legitimate child, 1/4 for the widow and 1/8 each for the two illegitimate children. Also not of

possible application to this case is the rule that the legal of an acknowledge natural child is 1/2 of the

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legitime of the legitimate child of that the of the spurious child is 2/5 of that of the of the intimate child or4/5 of that of that of the acknowledged natural child. The rule cannot be applied because the estate is not

sufficient to cover legitimes of all compulsory heirs. That is one of the flaws of the law of succession. Asituation as in the instant case may arise where the illegitimate children get less than their legitime. Withrespect to the decendant's unpaid salary and the money value of his leave, the same are conjugal

properties because of the rule that property "obtained by the or work, or as salary of the spouses, or either

of them", is conjugal in character (Art. 153[2], Civil Code).

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G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,

Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI andKAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration.Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, whodied intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consistingof real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy,

Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointmentof a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in

the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator ofthe estate.In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that

his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters ofadministration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private

respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Weipursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished

by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the

financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children dischargethe estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their

successional rights.

RULING:

NO. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms whichleave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Awaiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent toabandon a right.

In this case,the Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of itsexecution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor

daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature

and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did notspecifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot beconstrued as a waiver of successional rights.Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived thehereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the

Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiatean inheritance.

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Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parentsor guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by

judicial authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designatedby the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to

those mentioned in Article 1030.

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicialapproval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court'sscrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release andWaiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights

as heirs of the deceased. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishmentof a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can

rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent givenunder a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights

because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitionerhimself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent torule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.

Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

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G.R. No. 126996 February 15, 2000HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA VELASQUEZ, SOFIA

VELASQUEZ, ELISEO VELASQUEZ, JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ,LEONORA VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES VELASQUEZ, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OFAPPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES,

ANDRES MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947,respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman(mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the

existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties. Sometime in 1989, theheirs of Anatalia de Guzman filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of

Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters' refusal to partition the conjugalproperties of the Spouses Aquino.

The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs'

mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his sonCesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina deGuzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband

earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties toCesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support;Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to

give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to 1/2 of each of all the properties inquestion being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs

further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties anddespite plaintiffs' repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of anydocuments covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino

spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to

order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the timedefendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.

Defendants alleged that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman,

they had already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, CesarioVelasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez. Defendants denied thata conference took place, nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or toexecute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their

possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all

others.

ISSUE:

Whether or not partition is the proper action in this case.

RULING:

NO. In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property unlessit first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issueof ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lieif the claimant has no righ