swyngedouw_2005_governance innovation and citizen

Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The JanusFace of Governance-beyond-the-State

Erik Swyngedouw

[Paper first received, June 2004; in final form, June 2005]

Summary. This paper focuses on the fifth dimension of social innovationi.e. politicalgovernance. Although largely neglected in the mainstream innovation literature, innovativegovernance arrangements are increasingly recognised as potentially significant terrains forfostering inclusive development processes. International organisations like the EU and the WorldBank, as well as leading grass-roots movements, have pioneered new and more participatorygovernance arrangements as a pathway towards greater inclusiveness. Indeed, over the past twodecades or so, a range of new and often innovative institutional arrangements has emerged, at avariety of geographical scales. These new institutional fixes have begun to challenge traditionalstate-centred forms of policy-making and have generated new forms of governance-beyond-the-state. Drawing on Foucaults notion of governmentality, the paper argues that the emerginginnovative horizontal and networked arrangements of governance-beyond-the-state aredecidedly Janus-faced. While enabling new forms of participation and articulating the statecivil society relationships in potentially democratising ways, there is also a flip side to theprocess. To the extent that new governance arrangements rearticulate the state-civil societyrelationship, they also redefine and reposition the meaning of (political) citizenship and,consequently, the nature of democracy itself. The first part of the paper outlines the contours ofgovernance-beyond-the-state. The second part addresses the thorny issues of the statecivilsociety relationship in the context of the emergence of the new governmentality associated withgovernance-beyond-the-state. The third part teases out the contradictory way in which newarrangements of governance have created new institutions and empowered new actors, whiledisempowering others. It is argued that this shift from government to governance isassociated with the consolidation of new technologies of government, on the one hand, and withprofound restructuring of the parameters of political democracy on the other, leading to asubstantial democratic deficit. The paper concludes by suggesting that socially innovativearrangements of governance-beyond-the-state are fundamentally Janus-faced, particularly underconditions in which the democratic character of the political sphere is increasingly eroded by theencroaching imposition of market forces that set the rules of the game.

1. Introduction: Towards Governance-beyond-the-State

In recent years, a proliferating body ofscholarship has attempted to theorise andsubstantiate empirically the emergence of

new formal or informal institutional arrange-

ments that engage in the act of govern-

ing outside and beyond-the-state (Rose and

Miller, 1992; Mitchell, 2002; Jessop, 1998;

Pagden, 1998; Hajer, 2003a; UNESCAP,

Urban Studies, Vol. 42, No. 11, 19912006, October 2005

Erik Swyngedouw is in the School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Mansfield Road, Oxford, OX1 3TB, UK.Fax: 44 (0)1865 271929. E-mail: [email protected]. The author would like to thank Pasquale de Muro, JuliaGerometta, Sara Gonzalez, Patsy Healey, Maria Kaika, Flavia Martinelli, Frank Moulaert, Johan Moyersoen and Morag Torrancefor their assistance, helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, only the author is responsible for the content. The author alsowishes to to thank the EUs Framework V programme for providing the funding to make the research possible.

0042-0980 Print=1360-063X Online=05=11199116# 2005 The Editors of Urban StudiesDOI: 10.1080=00420980500279869

2004;Whitehead, 2003; Gonzalez and Healey,this issue; SINGOCOM, 2005; Moulaert et al.,this issue). Governance-beyond-the-staterefers in this context to the emergence,proliferation and active encouragement (bythe state and international bodies like theEuropean Union or the World Bank) of insti-tutional arrangements of governing whichgive a much greater role in policy-making,administration and implementation to privateeconomic actors on the one hand and to partsof civil society on the other in self-managingwhat until recently was provided or organisedby the national or local state. In addition, asargued in other papers in this issue, sociallyinnovative practices in urban governance andterritorial development are also invariablyassociated with the emergence of new insti-tutional forms that draw heavily on a greaterinvolvement of individuals or actors fromboth the economy and civil society (Moulaertet al., 2005). In a context of perceived or realstate failure on the one hand and attemptsto produce systems of good governance onthe other, institutional ensembles of govern-ance based on such horizontally networkedtripartite composition are viewed as empower-ing, democracy enhancing and more effectiveforms of governing compared with the sclero-tic, hierarchical and bureaucratic state formsthat conducted the art of governing duringmuch of the 20th century. While these innova-tive figures of governance often offer thepromise of greater democracy and grassrootsempowerment, they also exhibit a series ofcontradictory tendencies. It is exactly thesetensions and contradictions that this paperwill focus on.While much of the analysis of a changing, if

not new, governmentality (or governmentalrationality; see Gordon, 1991) starts from thevantage-point of how the state is reorganisedand mobilises a new set of technologies ofgoverning to respond to changing socioeco-nomic and cultural conditions, this paperseeks to assess the consolidation of newforms of governance capacity and the associ-ated changes in governmentality (Foucault,1979) in the context of the rekindling of thegovernancecivil society articulation that is

associatedwith the rise of a neo-liberal govern-mental rationality and the transformation ofthe technologies of government.Governance as an arrangement of governing-

beyond-the-state (but often with the explicitinclusion of parts of the state apparatus) isdefined in the context of this paper asthe socially innovative institutional or quasi-institutional arrangements of governance thatare organised as horizontal associationalnetworks of private (market), civil society(usually NGO) and state actors (Dingwerth,2004). These forms of apparently horizontallyorganised and polycentric ensembles inwhich power is dispersed are increasinglyprevalent in rule-making, rule-setting andrule implementation at a variety of geographi-cal scales (Hajer, 2003b, p. 175). They arefound from the local/urban level (such asdevelopment corporations, ad hoc committees,stakeholder-based formal or informal associ-ations dealing with social, economic, infra-structural, environmental or other matters) tothe transnational scale (such as the EuropeanUnion, the WTO, the IMF or the Kyoto proto-col negotiations) (Swyngedouw, 1997). Theyexhibit an institutional configuration basedon the inclusion of private market actors,civil society groups and parts of the tra-ditional state apparatus. These modes ofgovernance have been depicted as a newform of governmentality, that is the conductof conduct (Foucault, 1982; Lemke, 2002),in which a particular rationality of governing iscombined with new technologies, instrumentsand tactics of conducting the process ofcollective rule-setting, implementation andoften including policing as well. However,as Maarten Hajer argues, these arrangementstake place within an institutional void

There are no clear rules and norms accord-ing to which politics is to be conductedand policy measures are to be agreed upon.Tobeprecise, there are nogenerally acceptedrules and norms according to which policy-making and politics is to be conducted(Hajer, 2003b, p. 175; original emphasis).

The urban scale has been a pivotal terrainwhere these new arrangements of governance

1992 ERIK SWYNGEDOUW

have materialised in the context of the emer-gence of innovative social movements on theone hand and transformations in the arrange-ments of conducting governance on the other(Le Gale`s, 1995; Brenner and Theodore,2002; Jessop 2002a). Much of the empiricaland case study research on which this paperdraws was undertaken in the context oftwo major European-Union-funded researchprojects on urban development and urbangovernance (see Moualert et al., 2001, 2002,2006; SINGOCOM, 2005; see also otherpapers in this issue). The main objective ofthis paper is to address and problematisethese emerging new regimes of (urban)governance with a particular emphasis onchanging political citizenship rights andentitlements on the one hand, and theirdemocratic credentials on the other. Ourfocus will be on the contradictory nature ofgovernance-beyond-the-state and, in particu-lar, on the tension between the stated objec-tive of increasing democracy and citizensempowerment on the one hand and theiroften undemocratic and authoritarian charac-ter on the other. This analysis is particularlypertinent as the inclusion of civil societyorganisations (like NGOs) in systems of(urban) governance, combined with a greaterpolitical and economic role of local politicaland economic arrangements, is customarilyseen as potentially empowering and democra-tising (Le Gale`s, 2002; Hajer, 2003a; Novyand Leubolt, this issue). These forms ofgovernance are innovative and often promis-ing in terms of delivering improved collectiveservices and they may indeed contain germsof ideas that may permit greater open-ness, inclusion and empowerment of hithertoexcluded or marginalised social groups.However, there are equally strong processesat work pointing in the direction of a greaterautocratic governmentality (Swyngedouw,1996, 2000; Harvey, 2005) and an impover-ished practice of political citizenship. Thesesocially innovative forms of governance areboth actively encouraged and supported byagencies pursuing a neo-liberal agenda (likethe IMF or the World Bank) and designatethe chosen terrain of operations for NGOs,

social movements, and insurgent planners(see Sandercock, 1998) (Goonewardena andRankin, 2004, p. 118; see also Novi andLeubolt, this issue). It is exactly this interplaybetween the empowering gestalt of such newgovernance arrangements on the one handand their position within a broadly neo-liberal political-economic order on the otherthat this paper seeks to tease out.In the first part of the paper, we outline the

contours of governance-beyond-the-state. Inthe subsequent part, we address the thornyissues of the statecivil society relationshipin the context of the emergence of the newgovernmentality associated with governance-beyond-the-state. In the third part, we teaseout the contradictory way in which newarrangements of governance have creatednew institutions and empowered new actors,while disempowering others. We argue thatthis shift from government to governanceis associated with the consolidation of newtechnologies of government (Dean, 1999), onthe one hand, and with profound restructuringof the parameters of political democracy onthe other, leading to a substantial democraticdeficit. Hence, this mode of governanceentails a transformation of both the institutionsand the mechanisms of participation, nego-tiation and conflict intermediation (Coaffeeand Healey, 2003). Participation, then, is oneof the key terrains on which battles over theform of governance and the character ofregulation are currently being fought out(Docherty et al., 2001; Raco, 2000). We shallconclude by suggesting that socially innova-tive arrangements of governance-beyond-the-state are fundamentally Janus-faced,particularly under conditions in which thedemocratic character of the political sphereis increasingly eroded by the encroachingimposition of market forces that set therules of the game.

2. Governance-beyond-the-State:Networked Associations

It is now widely accepted that the system ofgoverning within the EU and its constituentparts is undergoing rapid change (European

GOVERNANCE INNOVATION 1993

Commission, 2001; Cars et al., 2002; LeGale`s, 2002). Although the degree of changeand the depth of its impact are still contested,it is beyond doubt that the 19th and 20thcentury political formations of articulatingthe statecivil society relationship throughdifferent forms of representative demo-cracy, which vested power in hierarchicallystructured transcendental state-forms, iscomplemented by a proliferating number ofnew institutional forms of governing thatexhibit rather different characteristics(Jessop, 1995, 2002b; Kooiman, 1995, 2003;Grote and Gbikpi, 2002). In other words, theWestphalian state order that matured inthe 20th century in the form of the liberal-democratic state, organised at local, oftenalso at regional, and national scales, hasbegun to change in important ways, resultingin new forms of governmentality, character-ised by a new articulation between state-likeforms (such asfor example, the EU, urbandevelopment corporations and the like), civilsociety organisations and private marketactors (Brenner et al., 2003). While thetraditional state form in liberal democraciesis theoretically and practically articulatedthrough forms of political citizenship whichlegitimise state power by means of it beingvested within the political voice of the citi-zenry, the new forms of governance exhibita rather fundamentally different articulationbetween power and citizenship and constitute,according to Lemke (2001, 2002), a new formof governmentality. As Schmitter defines it

Governance is a method/mechanism fordealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arriveat mutually satisfactory and binding deci-sions by negotiating with each other andco-operating in the implementation ofthese decisions (Schmitter, 2002, p. 52)

Paquet defines governance as

The newly emerging models of actionresult from the concerted combination ofsocial actors coming form diverse milieus(private, public, civic) with the objectiveto influence systems of action in the

direction of their interests (Paquet, 2001,quoted in Hamel, 2003, p. 378; authorstranslation)

From this perspective, it is not surprising tofind that such modes of governance-beyond-the-state are resolutely put forward as pre-senting an idealised normative model (seeLe Gale`s, 1995; Schmitter, 2000, 2002) thatpromises to fulfil the conditions of goodgovernment (European Commission, 2001)in which the boundary between organisationsand public and private sectors has becomepermeable (Stoker, 1998, p. 38). It impliesa common purpose, joint action, a frameworkof shared values, continuous interaction andthe wish to achieve collective benefits thatcannot be gained by acting independently(Stoker, 1998; Rakodi, 2003). This modelis related to a view of governmentality thatconsiders the mobilisation of resources (ideo-logical, economic, cultural) from actorsoperating outside the state system as a vitalpart of democratic, efficient and effectivegovernment (Pierre, 2000a, 2000b). Schmittercontinues to argue that, in a normative-idealised manner,

Governance arrangements are based on acommon and distinctive set of features:

Horizontal interaction among presump-tive equal participants without distinc-tion between their public or privatestatus.

Regular, iterative exchanges among afixed set of independent but interdepen-dent actors.

Guaranteed (but possibly selective)access, preferably as early as possiblein the decision-making cycle.

Organized participants that representcategories of actors, not individuals(Schmitter, 2000, p. 4).

State-based arrangements are hierarchical andtopdown (command-and-control) forms ofsetting rules and exercising power (butrecognised as legitimate via socially agreedconventions of representation, delegation,accountability and control) and mobilisingtechnologies of government involving


policing, bio-political knowledge and bureau-cratic rule. Governance-beyond-the-statesystems, in contrast, are presumably horizon-tal, networked and based on interactiverelations between independent and interdepen-dent actors who share a high degree of trust,despite internal conflict and oppositionalagendas, within inclusive participatoryinstitutional or organisational associations.The mobilised technologies of governancerevolve around reflexive risk-calculation (self-assessment), accountancy rules and accoun-tancy-based disciplining, quantification andbenchmarking of performance (Dean, 1999).The participants in such forms of govern-

ance partake (or are allowed to partake) inthese relational networked forms of decision-making on the basis of the stakes they holdwith respect to the issues these forms ofgovernance attempt to address. The relevantterm stakeholder has gained currency inrecent years and propelled its associated poli-tics of stakeholder governance to the fore-front of the political platform (Newman,2001). According to Schmitter (2000), theshift from political citizenship articulatedthrough statist forms of governing to a stake-holder-based polity does not go far enough.He proposes, therefore, an enlarged approachby introducing the notion of holder, whichshould constitute the foundation for establish-ing rights or entitlements to participate.Table 1 summarises Schmitters extendedformulation.Of course, such an idealised-normative

model of horizontal, non-exclusive and par-ticipatory (stake)holder-based governance is

symptomatically oblivious to the contradictorytensions in which these forms of governanceare embedded. These new practices are riddledwith all manner of problems, particularlywith respect to their democratic content. Assuch arrangements are often imposed (fromabove), there is widespread distrust, particu-larly as rules and norms are not agreed, butdecided under non-codified and often informalad hoc principles (Hirst, 1995; Dryzek, 2000;Akkerman et al., 2004). Before we embarkon considering the democratic credentials ofsuch institutional ensembles, we need to turnour attention, first, to how these innovationsin the arrangements of the conduct of conductarticulate with changing choreographies ofcivil societystate interaction and, secondly,to the emergence of these new forms of govern-ance in the context of broader processes ofpolitical-economic regime changes.

3. Articulating State, Market and CivilSociety

Bob Jessop (2002b) argues that the state iscapitalisms necessary other. For him, thesocial relations that produce and sustain capi-talist economic forms require extra-economicrules and institutions to function. These insti-tutions can take a variety of forms, thenational liberal democratic state form thatdominated the West from the late 19thcentury onwards being just one of them. So,while state and market can be separated con-ceptually, they are functionally and strategi-cally intimately interconnected. In additionto state and market, there is also the sum

Table 1. Schmitters matrix of definitions of holders

Right-holders participate because they are members of a national political communitySpace-holders participate because they live somewhere affected by the policyKnowledge-holders participate because they have particular knowledge about the matter concernedShare-holders participate because they own part of the assets that are going to be affectedStake-holders participate because, regardless of their location or nationality, they might be affected bychange

Interest-holders participate on behalf of other people because they understand the issuesStatus-holders participate on behalf of other people because they are given a specific representative roleby the authorities

Source: Schmitter (2000).


total of social forms and relations that areneither state nor market. These are usuallycaptured under the notion of civil society.There is considerable confusion about thestatus, content and position of civil society,both analytically and empirically. This con-fusion arises partly from the meanderinghistory of the concept, partly from the chan-ging position of civil society within politicalsociety (see Novy and Leubolt, this issue).While the early Enlightenment view of civilsociety posited civil society versusnatural society, Hegel and Marx consideredcivil society as a set of economic/materialrelations versus the state. Of course, thischange in perspective was in itself related tothe changing nature of the state (from asovereign to a bio-political statei.e. froma (feudal) state focused on the integrity of itsterritorial control to one operating allegedlyin the interest of all for the benefit of all).Liberal thinkers, like Alexis de Tocqueville,in turn, associated civil society with volun-tary organisations and associations. In con-trast, with Antonio Gramsci, writing at thetime of the embryonic formation of theliberal-democratic Keynesian-welfarist state,civil society became viewed as one of thethree components (the others being the stateand the market) that define the content andstructure of society (Gramsci, 1971). Forhim, civil society is the sum total of privateactors (outside state and market) and constitu-tes the terrain of social struggle for hegemony(Showstack Sassoon, 1987; Simon, 1991;MacLeod, 1999). Moreover, both civilsociety and its meaning are also closelyrelated to the Foucaultian notion of govern-mentality. Indeed, with the rise of theliberal state in the 18th century, civil societybecame increasingly associated with theobject of state-governing as well as being per-ceived as the foundation from which thestates legitimacy was claimed. In addition,as the state turned increasingly into a bio-political democratic state, concerned withand intervening in the life qualities of itscitizens (health, education, disciplining,socioeconomic well-being, among others)from whom the state draws its legitimacy

through a system of pluralist democraticcontrols, civil society emerged as both anarena for state intervention and a collectionof actors engaging with and relating to thestate (Lemke, 2001). At the same time, theliberal state maintained the economicsphere as a fundamentally private one, opera-ting outside the collective sphere of the statebut shaping the material conditions of civillife in a decisive manner. The social order,consequently, became increasingly seen andconstructed as the articulation between state,civil society and market. While for Hegeland Marx, albeit in very different ways, theideal of society resided in transcending theseparation between the political state andcivil society, the operation of the economy,under the hidden hand of the market inliberal-capitalist societies, rendered this desi-red unity of state and civil society impossible.In fact, a fuzzy terrain was produced, some-where in-between, but articulating with, stateand market, but irreducible to either; aterrain that was neither state nor private, yetexpressing a diverse set of social activitiesand infused with all manner of social powerrelations, tensions, conflict and socialstruggles. Civil society is, in other words,the pivotal terrain from which social transfor-mative and innovative action emerges andwhere social power relations are contestedand struggled over. The relative boundariesbetween these three instances (i.e. state, civilsociety and market) vary significantly fromtime to time and from place to place. Thenotion of civil society, therefore, also cannotbe understood independently of the relationsbetween political and economic power, thefirst articulated in terms of access to orcontrol over the state apparatus, the latter interms of access to or control over resourcesfor accumulation (whether in the form ofmonetary, physical, cultural or social capital).In sum, the position and role of civil society

are closely related to the dynamics ofother moments of societyi.e. state andeconomy. At moments of increasing socio-economic tension and restructuring (such asduring the 1920s/1930s or 1980s/1990s), theconduct of conduct changes in such a way


that continued sustained accumulation can bemaintained or improved, but without under-mining the relative coherence or stability ofthe social order. Successful restructuring ofcapitalism demands, therefore, strong gov-ernance in order to produce stronger econ-omic dynamics (understood in marketeconomy terms) while maintaining cohesionin civil society. Such restructuring of govern-ance often takes place at exactly the time thatcivil society goes through painful shocksassociated with that restructuring; shocksthat further undermine the legitimacy of thestate and reinforce calls for alternativemodels of governance. In other words, gov-erning becomes more problematic and theterrains of governance begin to shift (see Pou-lantzas, 1980). The state can become moreauthoritarian (as happens with fascism) ormore autocratic, while delegating power andincluding new strata of civil society in theforms of governance (as is happening atpresent) (Harvey, 2005).Foucaults notion of governmentality may

help to chart recent changes in the statecivilsociety relationship and the emergence ofarrangements of governance-beyond-the-state(Donzelot, 1991; Pagden, 1998). For Foucault,governmentality refers to the rationalities andtactics of governing and how they becomeexpressed in particular technologies ofgoverning, such asfor example, the state(Foucault, 1984). The state, therefore, appearsin Foucaults analysis as a tactics of govern-ment, as a dynamic form and historical stabilis-ation of societal power relations (Lemke,2002, p. 60). Governmentality, therefore, is

at once internal and external to the state,since it is the tactics of government whichmake possible the continual definition andredefinitionofwhat iswithin the competenceof the state and what is not, the public versusthe private, and so on; thus the state can onlybe understood in its survival and its limits onthe basis of the general tactics of govern-mentality (Foucault, 1991, p. 103).

Foucaults analysis of neo-liberal reason andneo-liberal governmentality exactly excavatesthe changing role of the state in, and the

reshaping of governing under, neo-liberalism.Lemke summarises the emerging new articula-tion between state and civil society under aneo-liberal governmentality as follows

By means of the notion of governmentality,the neo-liberal agenda for the withdrawalof the state can be deciphered as atechnique for government. The crisis ofKeynesianism and the reduction in formsof welfare-state intervention therefore leadless to the state losing powers of regulationand control (in the sense of a zero-sumgame) and can instead be construed as are-organisation or restructuring of govern-ment techniques, shifting the regulatorycompetence of the state onto responsibleand rational individuals. Neoliberalismencourages individuals to give their livesa specific entrepreneurial form. It respondsto stronger demand for individual scopefor determination and desired autonomyby supplying individuals and collectiveswith the possibility of actively participatingin the solution of specific matters and pro-blems which had hitherto been the domainof specialized state agencies specificallyempowered to undertake such tasks. Thisparticipation has a pricetag: the individ-uals themselves have to assume responsibil-ity for these activities and the possiblefailure thereof (Lemke, 2001, p. 202; seealso Donzelot, 1984, pp. 157177 and1996; Burchell, 1993, pp. 275276).

Elsewhere, Lemke argues how a Foucaultianperspective permits a view of neo-liberalismnot as

the end but a transformation of politics thatrestructures the power relations in society.What we observe today is not a diminish-ment or reduction of state sovereignty andplanning capacities, but a displacementfrom formal to informal techniques ofgovernment and the appearance of newactors on the scene of government (e.g.NGOs), that indicate fundamental trans-formations in statehood and a renewedrelation between state and civil societyactors (Lemke, 2002, p. 50).


This destatisation (Jessop, 2002b) of a seriesof former state domains and their transferto civil society organisations redefines thestatecivil society relationship through theformation of new forms of governance-beyond-the-state. This encompasses a three-fold reorganisation (Swyngedouw, 1997,2004; see also Lemke, 2002). First is theexternalisation of state functions throughprivatisation and deregulation (and decentrali-sation). Both mechanisms inevitably implythat non-state, civil society or market-basedconfigurations become increasingly involvedin regulating, governing and organising aseries of social, economic and cultural activi-ties. Second is the up-scaling of governancewhereby the national state increasinglydelegates regulatory and other tasks to otherand higher scales or levels of governance(such as the EU, IMF, WTO and the like)and, third, is the down-scaling of governanceto local practices and arrangements thatcreate greater local differentiation combinedwith a desire to incorporate new socialactors in the arena of governing. This includesprocesses of vertical decentralisation towardssub-national forms of governance (seeMoulaert et al., 2002; or SINGOCOM, 2005,for a range of case studies).These three processes of rearrangement of

the relationship between state, civil societyand market, simultaneously reorganise thearrangements of governance as new institu-tional forms of governance-beyond-the-stateare set up and become part of the system ofgoverning, of organising the conduct ofconduct. This restructuring is embedded ina consolidating neo-liberal ideologicalpolity. The latter combines a desire to con-struct politically the market as the preferredsocial institution of resource mobilisationand allocation, a critique of the excess ofstate associated with Keynesian welfarism,and a bio-political engineering of the socialin the direction of greater individualisedresponsibility (Harvey, 2005). Of course thisscalar reorganisation of the state and theassociated emergence of a neo-liberal govern-ance-beyond-the-state redefine in fundamentalways the statecivil society relationship. The

new articulations between state, market andcivil society generate new forms of gover-nance that combine the three moments ofsociety in new and often innovative ways(Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004).Of course, the new modalities of govern-

ance also involve the mobilisation, by thestate, of a new set of technologies of power,which Mitchell Dean (1999) identifies astechnologies of agency and technologies ofperformance. While the former refers to strat-egies of rendering the individual actor respon-sible for his or her own actions, the latterrefers to the mobilisation of benchmarkingrules that are set as state-imposed parametersagainst which (self-)assessment can takeplace and which require the conduct of aparticular set of performances. These technol-ogies of performance produce calculatingindividuals within calculable spaces andincorporated within calculative regimes(Miller, 1992). Barbara Cruikshank (1993,1994) refers in this context to the mobilisationof technologies of citizenship, which aredefined as

the multiple techniques of self-esteem, ofempowerment and of consultation andnegotiation that are used in activities asdiverse as community development, socialand environmental impact assessment,health promotion campaigns, teaching atall levels, community policing, the combat-ing of various kinds of dependency and soon (Dean, 1999, p. 168).

Ironically, while these technologies are oftenadvocated and mobilised by NGOs and othercivil organisations speaking for the disempow-ered or socially excluded (Carothers et al.,2000), these actors often fail to see how theseinstruments are an integral part of the con-solidation of an imposed and authoritarianneo-liberalism, celebrating the virtues of self-managed risk, prudence, and self-responsibility(Castel, 1991; OMalley, 1992; Burchell, 1996;Dean, 1995, 1999).To the extent that participation is

invariably mediated by power (whether poli-tical, economic, gender or cultural) amongparticipating holders, between levels of


governance/government and between govern-ing institutions, civil society and encroachingmarket power, the analysis and understandingof shifting relations of power are a centralconcern, particularly in light of the linkbetween participation, social innovation anddevelopment (see Getimis and Kafkalas,2002). Since it is impossible within the remitof this paper to exhaust the possible theoris-ations and perspectives on social and politicalpower, we focus on the principles that funda-mentally shape individuals or social groupsposition within the polity and that articulatetheir respective (but interrelated) powerpositions vis-a`-vis governing institutions, onthe one hand, and within civil society, onthe other. In particular, in what follows, wetake the theoretical and practical yardsticksof what constitute democratic governmenttogether with the practices associated witharrangements of governance-beyond-the-state.

4. The Democratic Deficit of Governance-beyond-the-State

Whilst in pluralist democracy, the politicalentitlement of the citizen is articulated viathe twin condition of national citizenship,on the one hand, and the entitlement to politi-cal participation in a variety of ways (butprimarily via a form of (constitutionally orotherwise) codified representational democ-racy) on the other, network-based forms ofgovernance do not (yet) have codified rulesand regulations that shape or define partici-pation and identify the exact domains orarenas of power (Hajer, 2003a). As Beck(1999, p. 41) argues, these practices arefull of unauthorized actors. While suchabsence of codification potentially permitsand elicits socially innovative forms oforganisation and of governing, it also opensup a vast terrain of contestation and potentialconflict that revolves around the exercise of(or the capacity to exercise) entitlements andinstitutional power. The status, inclusion orexclusion, legitimacy, system of represen-tation, scale of operation and internal orexternal accountability of such groups or indi-viduals often take place in non-transparent,

ad hoc and context-dependent ways anddiffer greatly from those associated withpluralist democratic rules and codes. Whilethe democratic lacunae of pluralist liberaldemocracy are well known, the proceduresof democratic governing are formally codi-fied, transparent and easily legible. Themodus operandi of networked associations ismuch less clear. Moreover, the internalpower choreography of systems of govern-ance-beyond-the-state is customarily led bycoalitions of economic, socio-cultural or poli-tical elites (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). There-fore, the rescaling of policy transformsexisting power geometries, resulting in anew constellation of governance articulatedvia a proliferating maze of opaque networks,fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill-definedresponsibilities and ambiguous political objec-tives and priorities. In fact, it is the state thatplays a pivotal and often autocratic role intransferring competencies (and consequentlyin instantiating the resulting changing powergeometries) and in arranging these new net-worked forms of governance. The democraticfallacies of the pluralist democratic stateare compounded by the expansion of therealm of governing through the proliferationof such asymmetric governance-beyond-the-state arrangements. In fact, when assessingthe formal requirements of pluralist demo-cracy against the modes of arrangements ofgovernance-beyond-the-state, the contradic-tory configurations of these networked associ-ations come to the fore and show the possibleperverse effects or, at least, the contradictorycharacter of many of these shifts. That iswhat we turn to next.

4.1 Entitlement and Status

The first question revolves around entitle-ment and status. While the concept of(stake)holder is inclusive and presumablyexhaustive, the actual concrete forms ofgovernance are necessarily constrained andlimited in terms of who can, is, or will beallowed to participate. Hence, status andassigning or appropriating entitlement to parti-cipate, are of prime importance. In particular,


assigning holder status to an individual orsocial group is not neutral in terms of exercis-ing power. In most cases, entitlements are con-ferred upon participants by those who alreadyhold a certain power or status. Of course, thedegree to which mobilisations of this kind aresuccessful depends, inter alia, on the degreeof force and/or power such groups or indivi-duals can garner and on the willingness of theexisting participants to agree to include them.In addition, the terms of participation mayvary significantly from mere consultation tothe right to vote. Needless to say, statuswithin the participatory rituals co-determineseffective power positionality. More fundamen-tally, while political citizenship-based entitle-ments are (formally) inclusive (at least at anational level) and are based on a one personone vote rule, holder entitlements are invari-ably predicated upon willingness to acceptgroups as participants, on the one hand, butalso on willingness-to-participate on theother. The latter of course depends cruciallyon the perceived or real position of powerthat will be accorded to incumbent participants.This is a context in which, partly through theerosion of political power (compared withother forms of power) and partly throughan emerging more problematic relationshipbetween state and civil society, many indivi-duals and social groups have fully or partiallyopted-out of political participation and havechosen either other forms of political actionor plain rejection. Deep ecologists, part of thealternative globalisation and anti-capitalistmovements and even segments of the socialeconomy sectors, have gone in this direction(Hertz, 2002).

4.2 The Structure of Representation

Secondly, in addition to decisions overentitlement to participate, the structure ofrepresentation is of crucial importance. Whilepluralist democratic systems exhibit clearand mutually agreed forms of representation,holder participation suffers from an ill-defined and diffuse notion of an actualsystem of representation (Edwards, 2002).Various groups and individuals participating

in networks of governance have widelydiverging mechanisms of deciding on repre-sentation and organising feedback to theirconstituencies. To the extent that it is pri-marily civil society organisations that partici-pate in governance, their alleged insertioninto grassroots civil society power, is muchmore tenuous than is generally assumed. Infact, it proves to be extremely difficult todisentangle the lines of representation (andmechanisms of consultation and accounta-bility that are directly related to the form ofrepresentation) through which groups (or indi-viduals) claim entitlement to holder status(and, hence, to participation) or are assignedholder status. This, of course, opens up aspace of power for the effective participantswithin the organisation that is not at all, oronly obliquely, checked by clear lineages ofrepresentation.

4.3 Accountability

Thirdly and directly related to the above, themechanisms and lineages of accountabilityare radically redrawn in arrangements ofgovernance-beyond-the-state (Rhodes, 1999;Rakodi, 2003). Again, while a democraticpolity has more or less clear mechanisms forestablishing accountability, holder repre-sentation fundamentally lacks explicit linesof accountability. In fact, accountability isassumed to be internalised within the parti-cipating groups through their insertion into(particular segments) of civil society (throughwhich their holder status is defined andlegitimised). However, given the diffuse andopaque systems of representation, account-ability is generally very poorly, if at all, deve-loped. In other words, effective representationhas to be assumed, is difficult to verify andpractically impossible to challenge. Thecombined outcome of this leads to oftenmore autocratic, non-transparent systemsof governance thatas institutionswieldconsiderable power and, thus, assign consider-able, albeit internally uneven power, to thosewho are entitled (through a selective randomprocess of invitation) to participate.


4.4 Legitimacy

This brings the argument directly to thecentrality of legitimation. The mechanismsof legitimation of policies and/or regulatoryinterventions become very different fromthose of representational pluralist democracy.To the extent that legitimation does not resultfrom the organisation of entitlement, repre-sentation and accountability, these newforms of governance face considerableinternal and external problems with respectto establishing legitimacy. In fact, this hasbeen a long-running problem for many ofthe new forms of governance, particularly ascoercion and the legitimate use of coercivetechnologies remain largely, although by nomeans exclusively, with the state. Legitimacydepends, therefore, more crucially on the lin-guistic coding of the problems and of strat-egies of action. This is particularly pertinentin a policy environment that, at the best oftimes, only reflects a partial representationof civil society. As Kooiman notes, govern-ance implies a linguistic coding of problemdefinitions and patterns of action (quoted inGrote and Gbikpi, 2002, p. 13). This view par-allels recent post-modern theories of politicalconsensus formation (see Hajer, 2003a),which implies a reliance on the formation ofdiscursive constructions (through the mobilis-ation of discourse alliances) that produces animage, if not an ideology, a representation ofa desirable good, while, at the same time,ignoring or silencing alternatives. Thesediscursive or representational strategies havebecome powerful mechanisms for producinghegemony and, with it, legitimacy. The latter,of course, remains extremely fragile as it canbe continuously undermined by means ofcounter-hegemonic discourses and the mobilis-ation of a deconstructionist apparatus for deci-phering the codings of power that areimbedded in legitimising discourses.

4.5 Scales of Governance

Fifthly, the geographical scale or level atwhich forms of governance-beyond-the-stateare constituted and their internal and external

relational choreographies of participation/exclusion are clearly significant. Whengovernance-beyond-the-state involves pro-cesses of jumping scales (Smith, 1984)that means the transfer of policy domains tosub-national or transnational forms of govern-ancethe choreography of actors changesas well. As Hajer (2003a, p. 179) contends,scale jumping is a vital strategy to gainpower or influence in a multiscalar relationalorganisation of networks of governance. Forexample, where national urban policy increas-ingly replaced local publicprivate partner-ships, the types of social actor and theirpositions within the geometries of powerchanged as well. In other words, up-scalingor down-scaling is not socially neutral asnew actors emerge and consolidate their posi-tion in the process, while others are excludedor become more marginal (Swyngedouw,1996; Swyngedouw et al, 2002). In sum,with changing scalar configurations, newgroups of participants enter the frame ofgovernance or reinforce their power position,while others become or remain excluded.

4.6 Orders of Governance

Finally, as both Kooiman (2000) and Jessop(2002b, 2002c) attest, a clear distinction, atleast theoretically, has to be made betweenmeta-, first-, and second-order governance.Meta-governance refers to the institutionsor arrangements of governance where thegrand principles of governmentality aredefined (Whitehead, 2003). For example, theEuropean Union, the World Trade Organi-sation or the G-8 meetings are textbookexamples of vehicles of meta-governance.First-order governance is associated withcodifying and formalising these principles,while second-order governance refers to thesphere of actual implementation. In terms ofpolitical and social framing of policies, thereis a clear hierarchy between these ordersof governance, which can and do operate atall spatial levels. However, the choreographyof participation, including entitlement, statusand accountability, varies significantly depend-ing on the order of the governing network.


5. The Janus Face of Governance-beyond-the-State: The Contradictions of SocialInnovation in Governance

Of course, the political and institutionalarmature does not operate independently ofthe social and economic sphere. In fact, anyoperation of the political sphere is, de facto,a political-economic intervention as govern-ance inevitably impinges on decisions overeconomic processes and modes of environ-mental use and transformation. This is parti-cularly true in a market economy, in whichkey decisions over resource allocation, useand transformation, are taken by privateactors who operate within the constrainingor enabling regulatory framework of systemsof government. To the extent that over thepast few decades there has been a tendencytowards deregulation and reregulation andtowards the externalisation of state functions,the new forms of governance were eitherinstrumental in shaping this transformationor else they became established as the regu-latory framework for managing a beyond-the-state polity. In this sense, the powergeometries within and between networks ofgovernance as well as, most importantly, thetheatre for their operation and focus of theirintervention, are shaped by these widerpolitical-economic transformations.It would of course be premature to

announce the death of the state in the wakeof the emergence of these new forms ofgovernance. In fact, many of these networkedorganisations are both set up by, and directlyor indirectly controlled by, the state and,regardless of their origins, necessarilyarticulate with the state. Hence, the poli-tical power choreography in this hybridgovernment/governance configuration ismultilayered, diffuse, decentred and, ulti-mately, not very transparent. Yet, whetherwe are considering EU levels of governance,or the emergence of sub-national levels ofgovernance (social economy initiatives,development corporations, local social move-ments), these cannot operate outside, or inde-pendently of, the state. However, theirinstitutional operation beyond-the-state

permits, in fact, a form of governmentalitythat is only apparently outside the state andto which the state must necessarily respond.This ambiguity becomes one of the meansthe state mobilises to deal with its own imma-nent legitimation crisis. For example, the newforms of governance (at the EU or otherlevels) are invoked by the state to legitimiseand push through forms of intervention thatmight otherwise meet with considerableresistance from (significant parts of) civilsociety. The imposition of the budget normon national governments by the Maastrichttreaty in the run-up to European monetaryintegration was a classic example of thispractice. In the absence of clear channels ofrepresentation and accountability, civilsociety individuals and groups find it moredifficult to engage in public debate and tocontest or change courses of action decidedbeyond-the-state.Therefore, the thesis of the transition

in socioeconomic regulation from statistcommand-and-control systems to horizontalnetworked forms of participatory governancehas to be qualified in a number of ways.First of all, the national or local state andits forms of political/institutional organisa-tion and articulation with society remainimportant. In fact, the state takes centrestage in the formation of the new institutionaland regulatory configurations associated withgovernance (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Thisconfiguration is directly related to theconditions and requirements of neo-liberalgovernmentality in the context of a greaterrole of both private economic agents aswell as more vocal civil-society-basedgroups. The result is a complex hybrid formof government/governance (Bellamy andWarleigh, 2001).Secondly, the non-normative and socially

innovative models of governance as non-hierarchical, networked and (selectively)inclusive forms of governmentality, cannotbe sustained uncritically. While governancepromises and, on occasion, delivers a newrelationship between the act of governingand society and thus rearticulates and reorga-nises the traditional tension between the


realisation of the Rousseauian ideal inimmanent forms of governing on the onehand, and the imposition of a transcendentalHobbesian leviathan on the other, there arealso significant counter-tendencies. In parti-cular, as discussed above, tensions arisebetween

(1) The possibilities and promises of enhan-ced democratisation through participatorygovernance versus the actualities of non-representational forms of autocratic elitetechnocracy.

(2) The extension of holder participation aspartially realised in some new forms ofgovernance versus the consolidation ofbeyond-the-state arenas of power-basedinterest intermediation.

(3) The improved transparency associatedwith horizontal networked interdependen-cies versus the grey accountability of hier-archically articulated and non-formalisedand procedurally legitimised, associationsof governance.

These tensions arise in a particularly prevalentand acute way in the context of the processesof rescaling of levels of governance. The up-scaling, down-scaling and externalisation offunctions traditionally associated with thescale of the national state have resulted inthe formation of institutions and practices ofgovernance that all express the above con-tradictions. This is clearly evident in thecontext of the formation (and probablyimplementation) of a wide array of sociallyinnovative urban and local developmentinitiatives and experiments, on the one hand,and in the construction of the necessaryinstitutional and regulatory infrastructurethat accompanies such processes on theother. Needless to say, this ambiguous shiftfrom government to a hybrid form ofgovernment/governance, combined with theemergence of a new hierarchically nestedand relationally articulated gestalt of scale,constitutes an important and far-reachingsocio-political innovation.Thirdly, the processes of constructing

these new choreographies of governance areassociated with the rise to prominence of

new social actors, the consolidation of thepresence of others, the exclusion or diminishedpower position of groups that were present inearlier forms of government and the continuingexclusion of other social actors who have neverbeen included. The new gestalt of scale ofgovernance has undoubtedly given a greatervoice and power to some organisations (of aparticular kindi.e. those who accept playingaccording to the rules set from within theleading elite networks). However, it has alsoconsolidated and enhanced the power ofgroups associated with the drive towardsmarketisation and has diminished the partici-patory status of groups associated with social-democratic or anti-privatisation strategies.Finally, and perhaps most importantly,

governance-beyond-the-state is embeddedwithin autocratic modes of governing thatmobilise technologies of performance and ofagency as a means of disciplining formsof operation within an overall programme ofresponsibilisation, individuation, calculationand pluralist fragmentation. The sociallyinnovative figures of horizontally organisedstakeholder arrangements of governance thatappear to empower civil society in the faceof an apparently overcrowded and excessivestate, may, in the end, prove to be theTrojan Horse that diffuses and consolidatesthe market as the principal institutionalform.

Note

1. Les nouveaux mode`les daction en emer-gence resultant de la combinaison plus oumoins concertee dacteurs sociaux provenantde divers milieux (prive, public, civique)dans le but dinfluencer les systemesdaction dans de sens de leur interets(Paquet, 2001).

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